A DIMMING LIGHT

Diversity of School/Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia

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Hamid Nasuhi and Abdallah

PPIM
UIN JAKARTA

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AUTHORS AND RESEARCHERS:
Yunita Faela Nisa (*Coordinator of authors and researchers*)
Hamid Nasuhi (*Author and editor)*
Abdallah (*Author and editor)*
Tati Rohayati (*Author*)
Faiqoh (*Author*)
M. Zaki Mubarak (*Author and researcher*)
Erita Narhetali (*Researcher*)
Laifa Annisa Hendarmin (*Researcher*)
Agung Priyo Utomo (*Researcher*)
Bambang Ruswandi (*Researcher*)
Ahmad Alfajri (*Author and researcher*)
Rangga Eka Saputra (*Author and researcher*)

LAYOUTER:
Ahmad Jajuli

Foreword

The phenomena of intolerance, radicalism, and terrorism have entered a new chapter in the discourse on Indonesian Islam in the last two decades. This is marked by the discourse on exclusivism and religious literalism, Islam vis a vis Pancasila, strengthening support for the concept of *khilafah*, rejection of diversity, as weakening social cohesion. In a broader spectrum, this indicates a stronger symptom of Islamism. At the same time, the phenomenon of the 411-212 Movement, which occurred recently, has also marked the emergence of a symptom of Islamic populism in Indonesia.

The religious phenomenon above has entered into the joints of community life in various domains and is targeting the younger generation through education. A number of studies confirm that religious conservatism and radical movements are increasing in the world of education (Bryner, 2013; Makruf, 2014; Tan, 2014). In this context, not only has Islamic education such as pesantren (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005) become a nursery for intolerance, but schools that have relatively less understanding of religion compared to pesantren have also followed suit the (Afrianty, 2012). At this juncture, schools are suspected to be a venue for the development of an ideology that Woodward calls "neo-Wahhabism." Furthermore, other studies have increasingly confirmed that intolerance and exclusivism in schools enters through various gaps. At least, this sentiment enters schools through extracurricular activities (Maarif Institute, 2011) and textbooks on PAI or Islamic Education (PPIM, 2016). In addition, external factors, such as the influence of radicalism in cyberspace, especially the internet and social media, also affect the formation of students' understanding (PSBPS, 2018).

This book is the result of a national survey conducted in 2018 by

the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. The survey focuses on a portrait of intolerance among Muslim teachers from kindergarten (TK)/RA to SMA/MA, both under the Ministry of Education and Culture (*Kemendikbud*, or MOEC) and under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Kemenag*, or MORA) of the Republic of Indonesia. The survey is very broad in scope--targeting a population of 2,237 Muslim teachers in 34 provinces, who teach all subjects in schools/madrasas. Why was this survey necessary among teachers? To answer this ontological question, there is at least some evidence that the factor contributing to the high level of intolerance among students and students is the teacher. Namely, there are 34% of teachers who teach religion in schools who have intolerant opinions towards minority groups in Islam, and as many as 29% of teachers have an intellectual opinion towards adherents of other religions (PPIM, 2017). To some extent, this teacher survey (2018) is a continuation of the 2017 PPIM survey, but on a broader scale.

The second evidence refers to the results of the PPIM study (2016) which focuses on the issue of intolerance in education. The results of this research illustrate that teachers play an important role in coloring students' religious understanding. An important finding that needs to be noted is that many PAI (Islamic Education) teachers at the primary and secondary education levels tend to have an exclusive view and are intolerant of groups that have different understandings from them, both Islamic and non-Islamic. Most PAI teachers reject non-Muslims from becoming public leaders.

The last evidence is the research findings by Maarif Institute (2017) which explores OSIS policies in six cities: Padang City, Cirebon Regency, Sukabumi Regency, Surakarta City, Denpasar City, and Tomohon City. This study examines various weaknesses faced by schools, including radical extra-organizational infiltration, the role of teachers in the teaching and learning process, as well as school policies and roles (both school principals, teachers, student council administrators, and school committees) who are weak in warding off the entry of religious radicalism. Therefore, a study that specifically examines the diversity of Muslim teachers is urgently needed to fill in the gaps, both in terms of knowledge and policy recommendations to relevant stakeholders — in this case the Indonesian MORA and MOEC.

In brief, the findings of this survey indicate that the intolerant opinions of teachers towards adherents of different religions and beliefs

are as follows: If you look at the teacher tolerance opinion scores from both the implicit assessment tool (IAT) and the explicit measuring instrument (questionnaire), the results show that that by using the IAT, 63.07% of teachers have intolerant opinions towards adherents of other religions. By way of questionnaire, 56.90% of teachers have intolerant opinions towards adherents of other religions. If we look at the scores of teachers' radical opinions, both from the IAT and the questionnaire, the results show that by using the IAT, 14.28% of teachers have very radical and radical opinions. Meanwhile, by using the questionnaire, the teacher has a very radical and radical opinion of 46.09%. There are three factors that can be attributed to teacher intolerance and radicalism. First, is the Islamist view. Second, the demographic aspect of the teachers. Third, is a source of Islamic knowledge and affiliation to mass organizations.

Happy reading!

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Introduction

In the last two decades, the infiltration of intolerance, radicalism and terrorism in various domains has become an increasing trend in Indonesia's religious landscape. A number of socio-religious events that lead to violence give a gloomy image for the religious message, which is supposed to lead to *rahmatan li al-ʾala- min* - a blessing for the universe. This tendency is even more concerning if viewed from the perspective of nationhood, which is--by its very nature--plural, both in terms of ethnicity, race, language, culture, and religion.

Since the 9/11 attacks that devastated the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York, United States, there have been bitter tragedies in Indonesia on a somewhat similar scale: Bali Bomb I (2002) and Bali Bomb II (2005). This series of events marked a new chapter for the religious landscape on the global stage, including in Indonesia. This phenomenon is an early marker of the portrait of extremism that is attached — both directly and indirectly — to the religious realm. The violent tragedy created tension for all parties, and in turn eroded social cohesion in a multicultural society.

In the Indonesian context, the portrait of extremism has become increasingly prevalent in the last decade: attacks on the Ahmadiyah community in Cikeusik, Banten (2011), the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang, Madura (2013), the burning of churches in Singkil, Aceh, and of mosques in Tolikara. Papua (2015), the bombing on Jalan M. H. Thamrin, Jakarta (2016), the attack on the Ahmadiyah congregation in East Lombok, NTB (2018), the terrorist convict attack on the police at the Mobile Brigade Detention Center, Depok (2018), and the suicide bombing at three churches in Surabaya (2018). The latter case was a terrorist attack claimed by the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)

group, which is the ISIS branch in Southeast Asia. This incident killed at least 28 people and injured 57. What was also surprising was the parade of kindergarten (TK) students wearing black clothes and veils in Probolinggo. Not only that, these pupils also joined in the march while weighing replica firearms. Ironically, these parades were held to celebrate the Independence Day of the Republic of Indonesia.

Besides the phenomenon of violent extremism, expressions of religious conservatism have also emerged in the form of intolerance. The rejection of the former governor of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, on the basis of religion and ethnicity, followed by a large demonstration "Action to Defend Islam 411 and 212" adds to the long list of cases of intolerance in Indonesia. This is not a singular event. Based on data from the Setara Institute (2018), between 2007 and 2017 there were a total of 5,215 cases of violations of freedom of religion and belief in all regions in Indonesia. This means that there is an average of 472 cases annually. At the same time, symptoms of conservatism have grown in religious institutions (Bruinessen, 2014).

It can be concluded from the series of socio-religious events that radicalism, intolerance, and violence based on extremism are real problems facing the Indonesian nation today. This re-raises the question of the extent of the commitment of Muslims to the existence of the Indonesian nation-state and the democratic system it adheres to, as well as what the true form of Muslim political culture in Indonesia is. These questions are not entirely new, but with the emergence of the events above, they become relevant again. This is so because, basically, in the concept of a modern nation-state and a democratic system, all citizens have the same rights in public affairs, and tolerance is an important and inseparable aspect. With Indonesia being the country with the world's largest Muslim majority population where religion is inherent in its education system, examining Islamic education in the context of radicalism and intolerance becomes actual.

Education in the Shadow of Radicalism

In the context of Indonesia, which is naturally complex, exclusivism and religious extremism in the realm of education is a threat to social cohesion because it directly targets the young people. Research that has been done shows that the infiltration of intolerance is not only in Islamic education such as pesantren (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005); it also flourishes in public schools under the umbrella of the state. A thesis confirms that

religious discourse in public schools has a weaker tendency compared to that in religious schools such as madrasa. Thus, this results in students not getting a comprehensive understanding of Islamic teachings in public schools. Students who graduate from madrasa have a better understanding of Islamic material than students from public schools (Afrianty, 2012). To a certain extent, this has led to an infiltration of intolerant and radical students to grow in public schools--as well as campuses, which are suspected to be a vehicle for systematic and massive seeding of the "Neo-Wahhabism" ideology (Woodward, 2010).

The nursery of exclusivism and religious extremism in schools is very effective through the teaching process by a teacher to students (Farha, 2008). This certainly becomes worrying when viewed in the framework of democracy and citizenship because exclusive and intolerant values based on narrow and dogmatic religious understanding have high destructive power to diversity of identities. This way of thinking leads students to a closed attitude and often views others as a threat, and in turn they are turned away from human values that promote openness and compassion. Recognition of the others is an important pillar for democratic values based on an egalitarian spirit. At this level, religious education must be based on a national curriculum that emphasizes an inclusive spirit and a dialogical spirit formulated by listening to the voices of all groups (Gutman, 1987).

Therefore, religious education needs to be revisited by holistically examining all the instruments contained in it: curricula, textbooks, and teachers. Religious education needs a new policy direction in accordance with the education *khittah*, namely the National Education System Law (Sisdiknas) No. 20 of 2003, which has the aim of not only creating devout individual students but also creating good citizens who have awareness and tolerant attitudes towards differences and have empathy with one another. This last thing is still homework for all parties. The afore-mentioned facts show that religious education is an arena of struggle for exclusive values that encourage students to be deprived of inclusive values.

The focus of this study is to investigate and understand teachers' views on issues related to Islam, nationhood, and democracy. From this we can understand the commitment of teachers and their acceptance of the concept of the nation-state and democracy, as well as what the Muslim teacher's political culture is really like. This study also contextualizes the teacher's views with the socio-religious problems that are happening in

today's Indonesia.

Teachers are one of the vital instruments in educational institutions. In the Indonesian context, teachers are not only funnels for channeling knowledge but are also considered to be a standard of behavioral values. For example, a student will be assessed whether he or she behaves in a commendable or despicable manner by observing his or her obedience to the teacher. Likewise, for teachers, they are required to behave in accordance with the standard values that exist in society. From this point of view, teachers are not only professionals as teaching staff; they also have traditional authority that exerts influence in Indonesian society.

Knowledge in an instantaneous and sophisticated world can easily be sought and obtained. The internet has a large share in filling the knowledge of students and teachers in schools. By all means, the information they get can be either negative information or positive knowledge. With the loss of territorial boundaries in cyberspace, it is highly possible for them to reap dangerous information from groups whose ideologies are contrary to human values, examples of which include narratives that advocate and justify the use of violence in religion.

Religion is a domain where information is easily available in the digital world. It should be admitted that the internet also has a positive side, considering that information and knowledge can be obtained easily and massively. On the other hand, the internet has also become a tool for particular groups to propagate exclusive, radical and intolerant ideas about religion. For example, several online sites present narratives to replace the fundamentals of the Indonesian state (NKRI, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution) and the democratic system with the caliphate system. Furthermore, the internet is also used by terrorist groups to spread their ideology and recruit members.

What happens in the virtual arena is not really that different from what happens in the real world. Movements demanding the replacement of the Indonesian state system into a *khilafah* (an Islamic government system) have only strengthened after the Reformation. They try to justify their ideology in the midst of the country's unstable economy. They build the opinion that non-Muslims benefit the most from the current process of economic development. This is an effort to frame Muslims into feeling that they are treated unfairly and are always disadvantaged by state policies. Such narratives are what ultimately become a framing justification for changing the nation-state system and democracy. The *khilafah* is offered by these movements as the only alternative solution

to the conditions of injustice and economic backwardness of Muslims.

Such understanding will eventually produce attitudes and intolerance towards non-Muslims because they are considered a threat and cause of problems for Muslims. At the very least, it will lead to attitudes and demands for Muslims as the majority to be treated more specially by the state than that to members of other religions. One of the real expressions of such a religious attitude is the recent proliferation of movements demanding the application of Islamic law. We can see how the development of regulations with religious nuances was born in this democratic era. These movements also often use violence in spreading their ideas. Discrimination cases against minorities are evidence of anomalies of Indonesia's current democracy.

Democracy is supposed to allow and give the opportunity to every citizen to convey their ideas freely. In fact, it also provides an opportunity for citizens to reject democracy itself albeit in peaceful ways. However, if the ideas expressed are accompanied by violence, both verbal and non-verbal, this is where the law applies to prohibit the perpetrators. Thus, it is the duty of those who are aware of the nature of democracy to counter the ideas of radical circles who want to replace the concept of the Indonesian nation-state and the democratic system.

This is where the role of teachers is needed to ward off ideas that want to replace the state system and justify violence by radical and extremist groups. Teachers who have moderate, tolerant religious views and have strong national and democratic insights are required to counter intolerant and radical ideas, especially towards the younger generation. This is considering that currently intolerant and radical movements and ideas have entered educational institutions in Indonesia.

Recent studies on the strengthening of exclusivism and intolerance in schools do confirm the importance of this research. Exclusivism and intolerance at school enter through various gaps. At the very least, this persuasion has entered schools through extracurricular activities, PAI (Islamic Education) textbooks, and religion teachers. However, external factors such as student involvement in radical movements outside of school and the influence of radicalism in cyberspace--particularly the internet and social media--also influence the formation of such religious understanding.

The infiltration of radicalism in schools enters through extracurricular activities of Rohani Islam (Rohis) (Ciciek, 2008; Salim HS, Kailani, & Azekiyah, 2011). Reinforcing these findings, Masooda Bano, Didin

Syafruddin, and friends (2016) stated that radicalism also enters schools through *ustadz* or alumni affiliated with certain radical movements. It should be noted, however, that although radicalism in schools is introduced through Rohis activities, not all Rohis organizations promote radical religious views. Some Rohis activists have moderate religious views.

Exclusivism and intolerance ideas also enter through the PAI textbooks produced by the MOEC (Nasuhi, Makruf, Umam, & Darmadi (ed.), 2018). Such ideas can be found in textbooks used in elementary school level up to high school level. For example, there are materials teaching the pupils that it is permissible to kill both infidels and polytheists; some materials also mislead on some devotional practices such as pilgrimage and *tahlil*. In fact, books for use by kindergarten students are also subject to violent contents, containing such words as: *bomb, kill other religious teachers,* et cetera.

Apart from school textbooks, PAI textbooks in higher education (PPIM, 2018) and religious reading books circulating around campus environment are also dominated by Islamist-style books (Puspidep, 2017). At this point, higher-education textbooks become an arena for the struggle for influence by various groups. All these groups compete for influence and try to influence educational orientation with their respective ideologies (Apple, 2000). In addition, other findings also emphasize that religious teachers tend to be increasingly intolerant (PPIM, 2016).

We can conclude from the studies described above that radicalism is a threat to the world of education in Indonesia. Radicalism and intolerance have penetrated various gaps in the education system, ranging from: PAI textbooks, Islamic religious teachers, teachers of other subjects, and extracurricular activities. Several studies also show how general subject teachers also contribute to shaping students' religious views (Saputra, 2018). Teachers are by no means the only parties in the school who play a role in countering or sowing radicalism and intellectualism in schools. For this purpose, it is crucial to undertake a comprehensive study that maps the religious views of teachers; let alone in the midst of increasing religious conservatism and radical movements in the world of education in Indonesia (Afrianty, 2012; Bryner, 2013; Makruf, 2014; Tan, 2014).

In addition, the PPIM national survey findings show that SMA/SMAK/MA students show high intolerance and radical opinions. Moreover, teachers have a significant role in influencing their students'

levels of intolerance. Besides discussing with religion teachers, students also discuss religious issues with teachers of other subjects (PPIM, 2017). Research conducted by the Maarif Institute (2017) confirms the same thing, in which teachers and school principals are important actors in the context of nursery of intolerance in schools. This study by Maarif takes an in-depth look at the OSIS policies in six cities: Kota Padang, Kab. Cirebon, Kab. Like-earth, Surakarta City, Denpasar City, and Tomohon City. In addition, the phenomenon of rampant intolerance and religious radicalism does not only occur in middle school students but also at the earliest levels of education (cf. *Miris Tepuk Anak Saleh*, 2018; Dita Siska, 2017; *I want ISIS all over the World*, 2018). Such tendency for such religious expressions has been observable since early education levels such as kindergarten (TK)/Raudhatul Athfal (RA).

As such, the 2018 PPIM survey focused on teachers from various levels of education, namely from TK/RA, SD/MI, SMP/ MTs, and SMA/ SMAK/MA, as well as those who teach in all subjects. The phenomenon of religious expressions in society and the results of the 2017 PPIM survey lead to quite a surprising and at the same time alarming point to all of us: that teachers are an important factor to observe because they have such an important role for students' understanding and perspectives.

Problem Statement

The studies conducted by PPIM UIN Jakarta that focus on the issue of intolerance in education confirm to us an idea that teachers play an important role in coloring students' understanding of religion. An important finding that should be noted is that many PAI teachers at the primary and secondary education levels tend to have an exclusive view and are intolerant of groups with different beliefs, both Islamic and non-Islamic. Most PAI teachers reject non-Muslim leadership and the percentage of their rejection of non-Muslims from holding public offices is quite high. For example, at the level of regional heads it is 89%, of school heads 87%, and of heads of offices 80%. In addition, most of the teachers (81%) are unwilling to give permits for the establishment of houses of worship of other religions in their vicinity. Regarding acceptance of different groups, it shows that 80% of them are not willing to be asked to accommodate Shia and Ahmadiyah groups (PPIM, 2016).

Meanwhile, the PPIM 2017 survey findings further reinforce that the factor contributing to the high level of student/university-student

intolerance is the teacher. Thirty-four per cent (34%) of teachers who teach religion in schools have intolerant opinions towards minority groups in Islam and as many as 29% of teachers have intolerant opinions towards followers of other religions. Although in this survey the number of teachers and lecturers' responses was not big enough (264 PAI teachers and 58 PAI lecturers), the results are quite significant.

Based on these findings, it is important to view teachers--deeply and on a national scale--as a key factor in an educational institution. The 2018 PPIM survey focuses on several important questions that need to be explored in depth: How big is the intolerance of school/madrasa teachers in Indonesia? How much radicalism (e.g. support for Islamic State) do these school/madrasa teachers in Indonesia have? And, what factors contribute to their intolerance and radicalism?

This 2018 survey specifically captures intolerance among Moslem teachers from kindergarten (TK)/RA to SMA/MA both under the Indonesian MORA and the MOEC. This survey has a much broader scope, targeting respondents from among 2300 teachers in 34 provinces. While the 2017 survey only involves teachers teaching religious subjects, the 2018 survey scrutinizes at a broader scale with a focus on teachers teaching in all subjects.

Research Methods

This survey aims to obtain an overview of the population based on information from a sample selected from members of that population. The research was conducted nationally in 34 provinces and data were collected in each province by taking a number of samples from districts/cities. The number of sampled districts/cities is proportional to the number of teachers in each district/city within each province. Data collection was carried out on 6 August - 6 September 2018 simultaneously in all surveyed areas.

The target population in this study were all active Muslim principals and teachers with a minimum working period of one (1) year at the following school levels: Kindergarten (TK)/Raudhatul Athfal (RA); Elementary School (SD)/Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MA); Junior High School (SMP)/Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs); Senior High/Vocational School (SMA/SMAK)/Madrasa Aliyah (MA).

Based on the official MOEC and MORA websites accessed on 3-17 July 2018, there are 3,056,648 schools and 776,903 madrasas, respectively, so that in total there are 3,833,551 schools/madrasas. The

following table presents the number of teachers who are the target population according to school levels and supervisory agencies.

Table 1
Number of Teachers by Education Levels and
Development Agencies in 2018

No	Educational Level	Number
A. MOEC		
1	Kindergarten	329.102
2	Elementary School	1.480.453
3	Junior High School	635.972
4	Senior High School	611.121
	Sub Total A	3.056.648
B. MORA		
1	Raudhatul Athfal (RA)	118.196
2	Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI)	269.460
3	Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs)	265.784
4	Madrasah Aliyah (MA)	123.463
	Sub Total B	776.903
	Total A+B	3.833.551

Source: http://referensi.kemdikbud.go.id/ (viewed on 17 June 2018); www.emispendis.Kemenag.go.id (viewed on 12 June 2018)

Sample and Margin of Error

The research sample is taken from 34 provinces in Indonesia, whereby in each province a district/city was selected randomly based on the proportional to size (PPS) probability technique on the number of teachers in each province in Indonesia, both below the MOEC and MORA. From the district/city selection process, 767 districts/cities are obtained. The largest number of districts/cities selected to be the sample are provinces with the highest number of teachers, namely East Java, West Java, Central Java, North Sumatra, and South Sulawesi.

Meanwhile, the lowest number of teachers is found in North Kalimantan province. From the number of selected districts/cities, schools/madrasas are determined randomly, also using the PPS technique. After they are determined at random, the survey officers obtain a sample of Muslim teachers in the selected schools. To determine a sample of teachers in selected schools/madrasas, a circular systematic random sampling technique is used based on gender. This is so that the

proportion of the total sample of male teachers will be the same as the number of male teachers in the school. The same procedure is applied to female teachers. In total, the number of teacher samples in this survey is 2,237 people as represented in the following table:

Table 2
Teacher Demographic Profile

Description	N	%
Gender		
Female	1335	59,79
Male	898	40,21
Profession		
Teacher	1638	73,35
Principal	595	26,65
School/Madrasa Category		
Public	1172	52,39
Private	1065	47,61
Domicile		
Village	1335	59,73
City	900	40,27
Economic Status		
≤1.000.000	603	26,97
1.000.000-2.500.000	565	25,27
2.500.000-5.000.000	740	33,09
5.000-000-7.500.000	231	10,33
≥7.500.000	97	4,34
Employment Status		
PNS (Civil Servant)	925	41,37
Full Time non-PNS	270	12,08
Full Time Foundation	562	25,13
Part Time/Honorary	479	21,42

This study uses two measuring instruments to measure the level of intolerance and radicalism. Firstly, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) measurement tool is used to implicitly see the potential for intolerance and radicalism. This implicit measuring instrument is used considering that the topic of this research is relatively sensitive so that it can be used as a medium for checking the accuracy of measurement results using a

scale and questionnaire. Secondly, a self-report questionnaire is used to assess intolerance and radicalism as well as the factors that influence intolerance and radicalism. This survey emphasizes issues on religious tolerance in Indonesia, such as their views on religious freedom, relations between different religious groups, and others.

Meanwhile, the sample allocation at each level of school/madrasa (along with the Margin of Error (MoE) calculating at 95% confidence level and assuming the proportion of tolerant/intolerant teachers of 0.5) is 2.07%. The sampling method is Multistage Sampling (Three Stage Stratified Sampling) with district and city strata. To ensure data quality, this study carries out a spot check mechanism of 5% of the sample. The technical mechanism is such that if the sample in a district/city is 1-4 schools, then a spot check is carried out by checking the implementation of the survey in one school affected by the sample. If the sample is 5-10 schools, then 2 schools are sampled. Finally, if the sample is in one district/more than 10 cities, then the spot check is carried out in 3 sample schools.

Two variables used to measure the level of diversity are intolerance and radicalism that are limited to: support for the Islamic State. The two variables are measured both at the opinion level and the action-intention level. Thus, what is measured is the opinion of intolerance, the intention of intolerant action, the opinion on support for the Islamic state, and the intention of action in support of the Islamic state. The intolerance scores are classified according to these categories: *very intolerant, intolerant, tolerant,* and *very tolerant*. Meanwhile, the score of radicalism in support of an Islamic state is classified and categorized into: *very radical, radical, moderate,* and *very moderate*.

Definitions and Concepts

Conceptually, to measure intolerance this 2018 survey uses Sullivan's (1982) framework with a focus on the *least like group* model. Moreover, to measure the level of intolerance of opinion, this survey raises questions about whether respondents agree or disagree with the possibility of restrictive policies towards people of different religions or groups they do not like. Another dimension to be seen is socio-political. At this level, the 2018 survey specifically emphasizes tolerant opinions and actions against followers of different religions from school and madrasa teachers. Thus, conceptually, the 2018 survey is different from the previous survey.

In the 2018 survey, three basic concepts make the focus of the study, namely: religious intolerance, radicalism and Islamist views. Religious intolerance is defined as an unwillingness to invite followers of other religions to express different ideas or interests (Sullivan et al. 1982). Meanwhile, the concept of radicalization in this survey refers to the adoption of views of extremist groups to influence social or political change (Mohammed Hafez, 2015); and the use of methods that reject democratic principles to achieve political goals (O'Ashour, 2009).

Furthermore, this survey uses the concept of *Two-Pyramid Model Theory* (Mc Cauley & Moskalenko, 2017), which confirms that radicalization can be in two stages: opinion and action--with acknowledgment that not all radical opinions will result in radical actions. Meanwhile, the Islamist concept refers to an absolute Islamic view that tends to be closed, inward looking, and exclusive in responding to developments in science, especially those identified as "not having an Islamic nature or origin" (Harris, 2008 and Ruthven 2004).

Literature Study

Studies related to tolerance that correlate — either directly or indirectly — with religion have been carried out by many scholars. This section will look at tolerance from various sides: historical, conceptual, and theoretical. In addition, we will look further at the results of studies from various research institutions relating to tolerance in the social, political and religious contexts in Indonesia.

Historically, although the word tolerance appeared in many studies and writings post 1950s, it has been used since the sixteenth century. In fact, according to some literature, the word tolerance has been used since the second century (Van Doorn, 2001). In the 16th and 17th centuries AD, tolerance was used as a legal concept (act) in European countries which forced government officials and the general public to be tolerant of followers of minority religions (Habermas, 2003). This law forces people, especially in Germany, to be tolerant towards religions and minority groups that have been discriminated against. In the context of British history, the word "tolerant" has a different meaning from "toleration." Tolerant refers to the expected behavior, while toleration is a term that shows the rules that overshadow the obligation to behave in that way. In other European countries, there is no distinction between the terms tolerant and toleration.

The initial idea of the need for tolerance in religion can be

traced from the works of European philosophers such as John Lock, Montesquie, Piere Baile and Spinoza. Initially, narratives to persuade people to behave tolerantly towards religious minorities were based solely on material interests (trade). Later on, however, the philosophical bases were given by the philosophers above. Spinoza defends religious tolerance on the basis of *freedom of consciences* and *on MORAl ground*. Meanwhile, Lock uses the *human right* argument to justify an attitude of religious tolerance. Apart from these two figures, Piere Baile uses *"universal reasoning."* As quoted by Habermas, Baile said "[…] *if it should thus suddenly cross the mufti' mind to send some missionaries to the Christians as like the Pope sent such to India, and someone were to surprise the Turks in the process of forcing their way into our houses to fill their duty to converting us, I do believe we do not have authority to punish them*" (Habermas, 2003).

Tolerance is not a term owned exclusively by a particular discipline. It is a word that applies across disciplines. Therefore, various figures define tolerance from various perspectives. Many definitions of tolerance have emerged, such as: (1) "[…] *the willingness to neutralize the practical impact of a cognitive dissonance that nevertheless in its own domain demands that we resolve it* (Habermas, 2003); (2) "[...] *tolerance is the capacity to tolerate something in which the verb 'to tolerate' means to allow the existence or occurrence of something without authoritative interference* (Fadzil, 2011); (3) Little, as quoted by Tobing (2013), defines tolerance as *"[…] a response to a set of beliefs that are originally thought to be objective, with disapproval but without using force or coercion [to change them]*; (4) Cuffaro defines tolerance as *"[…] the act of enduring or putting up with something you disapproved of."* Another definition often used as a reference in post-1982 research on tolerance is one formulated by Sullivan (1982), which calls tolerance as "[...] *a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes."*

In addition to different definitions, the conferring of meaning of tolerance gets more complicated when the word is added with other properties. Potgieter and Van Der Walt suggest that as far as their search of the literature on tolerance goes, the word has been given confusing meanings (cf. Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006; D'Souza, 2007; Garrison, 2007; Harris, 2004; Haught, 2008; Hitchens, 2007; Leiter, 2012; Mendus, 2008; Powell, 2013). The complexity of the meaning of tolerance becomes more pronounced when the word is added with the word "religion" (Rangus, 2001; Tobing, 2013). The dynamics above make the meaning

of the word tolerance very plural.

However, despite the widely varied definitions and meanings of the word tolerance, several points can be considered as the meeting points for the plurality of definitions. First, tolerance presupposes a fundamental difference that cannot be reconciled. Differences in the context of tolerance can take the form of differences in religion, ethnicity, skin color, gender, and so on. Second, these differences must be responded to in a way of respect and respect, not by rejection and discrimination. Respect and appreciation can be in the form of passive (accepting differences but not actively integrating differences) or active (not only accepting differences but also willing to interact with them).

Previous studies on tolerance included three dimensions: *political, MORAl* and *social*. In the political field, tolerance is related to public spaces such as giving opinions, demonstrations, organizational meetings, and so on (Vogt, 1997). This tolerance is closely related to the basic rights possessed by each individual. The second dimension-- the dimension of MORAl or MORAl tolerance--is closely related to issues such as homosexuality, abortion, and so on. The third dimension is the social dimension or social tolerance, which is tolerance for social issues such as language, skin color, and so on. Among these three dimensions, research with a political or public dimension is more dominant as tolerance in the public sphere is the basis of tolerance for the other dimensions. This is why tolerance research in the public dimension has been the main research since the 1950s.

Studies on tolerance so far, according to Gibson (2013), use one of the following three models. The first is the *Fixed Group* approach model that is often used by the General Social Survey. The second is the *least like group* approach used and popularized by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus since 1982. The third approach does not focus on groups but, rather, on support for restrictive policies. This model developed by Sullivan received a lot of attention. In it, to measure how tolerant American society is, they try to see how willing or unwilling (objection) the general public is if a social group they don't like *(the least like group)* occupy certain public offices or do certain things that are part of their public rights *(civil liberties)*. The more they object, the more they have intolerant views, and vice versa.

In Indonesia, quite a lot of studies on tolerance have been conducted. A plural country with a very high level of diversity, Indonesia has acknowledged the existence of six official religions and belief schools.

It also has social and religious groups that are often under the spotlight - sometimes being discriminated against - in society, such as the Shia, Ahmadiyya, Gafatar, Islamic Defenders Front, Liberal Islam Network, Tablighi Jamaat, and so on. Referring to the classification of research dimensions in the previous explanation, studies on tolerance in Indonesia focus heavily on the social and political—or public--dimensions by combining the two or three models above. Researchers generally ask questions about groups they do not like as well as ask questions about support or disapproval of restrictive policies towards the social groups in the spotlight.

Among the institutions that frequently conduct research on tolerance are the Setara Institute, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), The Wahid Institute, the Research and Development Agency (Balitbang) of MORA, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM). These institutions usually conduct national-level research. Apart from their studies, studies at the local level are carried out by higher education academics. Major research findings by the above institutions will be summarized below.

In 2008, the Setara Institute conducted research on public intolerance and state restrictions on freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia. From this research, it was found that there were 367 violations of freedom of religion/belief in 265 incidents. Most of the events occurred in June (with 103 events). June was the month when the pressure and persecution of the Ahmadiyah had experienced quite high expansion, both as pressure on the government to issue a Presidential Decree on the Dismissal of the Ahmadiyah and as a serious impact from the existence of the Decree on the Restriction on the Ahmadiyah.

From the areas where violations occurred, three provinces show a very high number of violations when compared to other provinces: West Java (73 events), West Sumatra (56 events), and Jakarta (45 events). These three provinces had a low level of tolerance as well as a high potential for religious conflict. Still in the 2008 Setara Institute research report, it was found that violations of freedom of religion/belief in 2008 mostly befell the Ahmadiyya Congregation (238 violations), ranging from victims of intolerance, state repression, neglect of the state, to criminal acts of citizens. country/community group. Furthermore, individuals (48 actions), other religions/beliefs (15), and Christians (15).

In 2015, the Setara Institute conducted another research on tolerance

by creating a kind of Tolerant City Index (IKT) in Indonesia. The dimension studied is the political/public dimension. The Setara Institute conducted a study, collected data, and ranked 94 cities in Indonesia in terms of promoting and practicing tolerance. The measurement uses the negative rights paradigm, in accordance with the character of freedom of religion/belief which is the family of political civil liberties, which is measured negatively. The research found that there are 10 most tolerant cities in Indonesia, namely: Pematangsiantar, Silatatiga, Singkawang, Manado, Tual, Sibolga, Ambon, Sorong, Pontianak, and Palangkaraya. Another research with this model was repeated in 2017, confirming that the cities of Manado, Persaksiantar, Singkawang, Salatiga, and Tual remain in the top 10 most tolerant cities in Indonesia. The five cities not yet in the 2015 list of 10 most tolerant cities are: Kotamobagu, Binjai, Palu, Surakarta, and Tebing Tinggi.

Research by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) also explores a lot about the tolerance of Indonesian society. LSI focuses on social and political dimensions and tends to use the model developed by Sullivan. In a 2006 survey on the social tolerance of Indonesian society, it was found that although in general Indonesian society is quite tolerant, tolerance for people of different religions is lower. A total of 36.7% of respondents said they objected if followers of other religions held religious events/services where they lived. As many as 42.3% objected if followers of other religions establish a place of worship in their neighborhood. Even 64% disagreed on whether a group they didn't like should be allowed to stage a demonstration to voice their aspirations. Indonesian people also have a negative view of the West. Six out of 10 Muslims consider Western culture to bring more harm to Indonesia. The intolerance rate is higher when associated with groups that are considered to have different sexual orientation and behavior, such as homosexuals and transgender people.

Another study in 2018 by LSI confirmed the same findings. There are 38% of Muslims who object if followers of other religions hold religious activities in their neighborhood. This number is not much different from the figures for 2017 (36%), 2016 (40%), and 2006 (38%). In this 2018 survey, 52% of Indonesian Muslims objected to non-Muslims building houses of worship in their neighborhood. This figure is higher than the 2017 data (48%) and the same as the figure in 2016. Some 59% of Muslims object to non-Muslims becoming president. This figure is higher than 2017 (53%) and 2016 (48%). In general, LSI found that intolerance of Muslim groups towards non-Muslims tended to be high,

especially in terms of politics/public. Even intolerance in politics has increased in the last three years (2016-2018).

The Wahid Institute also conducts research on religious tolerance. In 2014 the Institute conducted research on the theme of freedom of religion/belief and tolerance. The research covers 18 monitoring areas consisting of West Java, DKI Jakarta, Ban- ten, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, North Maluku, Bali, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, NTB. NTT, Riau Islands and Papua. The result stated that the violation of freedom of religion/belief throughout 2014 totaled 158 incidents with 187 actions. Of these, 80 incidents involved 98 state actors while 78 incidents involved 89 non-state actors. Compared to 2013, the incidence of violations in 2014 decreased by 42%. In 2013, the number of violations was 245 incidents. This number is also down 12% compared to 2012.

In 2016, The Wahid Institute conducted joint research with LSI to measure the level of intolerance and radicalism in the Indonesian Muslim community. The study involved 1520 Muslim respondents in 34 provinces, using the *least like group* research model as developed by Sullivan. According to the finding, 92% of the Muslim community does not agree if anyone from the group that they don't like becomes a state apparatus. In fact, 82% said they did not want to live next door to a group they did not like. Regarding the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, the survey generally concluded that 38% of the Indonesian Muslim community is intolerant of non-Muslims. With regard to certain questions, the scores are higher. When asked whether they agreed if a non-Muslim became president, 48% disagreed. When asked whether non-Muslims should be allowed to build a place of worship near where they lived, 52% answered that they did not agree.

The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in 2018 also conducted research on intolerance and radicalism in Indonesia, involving 1800 respondents in nine provinces in Indonesia. The results are not much different from similar surveys since 2016, namely that: 56% of Indonesians say they will only accept leaders of the same religion. This figure is not much different from the results of the 2018 LSI study, which amounted to 52%. In addition, 30% of Indonesians consider their religion to be the truest and that followers of other religions are lost. Different result is found regarding the question of whether or not the Muslim community object to non-Muslim community building a house of worship in the area where they live. In the LIPI study, it was

found that about 40% objected and rejected the establishment of places of worship for other religions around them, while in the LSI study in the same year it was 52%.

The Research and Development Agency (Balitbang) of the MORA of the Republic of Indonesia also conducted research in 2012 and 2013 on national religious harmony involving researchers from LIPI. It followed up province-based local research conducted several years earlier, namely in West Java (2009), Lampung (2011), and East Java (2010). The results show that the level of religious tolerance in Indonesia is still good. At the level of perception, the average tolerance level of Indonesian society is at the level of 75%; at the level of attitude and interaction at the level of 72%. Research conducted by the MORA shows more positive results compared to the studies previously described. The level of intolerance is slightly below the general data produced by other research institutions. However, this MORA research raises more tolerant findings and figures so as to be more positive as compared to other studies that choose the perspective or intolerance rate.

Apart from quantitative research using survey methods, qualitative studies were conducted by Balitbang. In 2016 the agency published research results on religious tolerance in conflict-prone areas. The cases of social conflicts with religious nuances occurred in various regions, such as in Tasikmalaya (1996), Ketapang (1999), Poso (1999), Sambas (1999), Temanggung (2010) and Ambon (2011). They were the basis why research in these conflict-prone areas needed to be done. The aim was to show that tolerance between religious believers could be built and implemented, even in conflict-prone areas.

The research locations included Padang, Bekasi, East Jakarta, Bogor, Temanggung, Poso, Mataram and Kupang. It found the factors that led to the development of religious tolerance among the religious communities, including: historical capital of a culture of mutual respect and appreciation; remnants of local wisdom that are still being brought to life; government efforts and community initiations in strengthening ties between citizens, both quotidian and associational; and existence of latent teachings in each religion to respect adherents of other religions.

Other research on smaller scales were also carried out by several university-affiliated researchers. Rina Hermawati, Caroline Paskarina, and Nunung Runiawati from Padjadjaran University, for example, researched the level of tolerance among religious believers in 2016 by focusing on research in the city of Bandung. This research is published

in the journal Umbara; Indonesia Journal of Anthropology Volume 1 Number 2 December 2016. In this study, they wanted to see the level of tolerance of urban communities that have various social characteristics when compared to rural communities. It basically wanted to continue the national research that was conducted by CSIS in 2012 with 2,213 respondents in 23 provinces regarding Indonesian religious tolerance. The CSIS research concluded that religious tolerance in Indonesia was still quite low. As many as 68% said that it was better to not build houses of worship for followers of other religions in their neighborhood. This intolerant tendency existed at all levels of education. This means that there is no positive correlation between the level of education and the level of tolerance.

From the research conducted by the three researchers, it was found that the majority of respondents had a positive perception of the statements made about religious tolerance. Sixty-four percent of respondents allowed other religious activities in their vicinity, even 49% stated that they were ready to help build places of worship for other religions. This result is in line with the attitudes of the respondents who indicated openness to interact with people of different beliefs. This study uses a pattern used by the MORA, namely by generating positive data (tolerance). If the opposite data were presented (intolerance), the results would not have been much different from those of other studies.

Achmad Muchaddam Fahham, a researcher at the DPR RI's Board of Experts has also conducted research to determine the level of religious tolerance in multi-religious communities by making Kupang City, NTT Province and Denpasar City, Bali Province as his research locations. This research was a qualitative research with the same point of view as the research conducted by the MORA. The research shows that religious tolerance in the two regions is still quite strong because there are factors that are able to maintain tolerance. It is found in Kupang that there are many peaceful memories in the relationship between religion and ethics; there is strong enthusiasm for not repeating the bitter experience of the 1998 tragedy; there are practices of inter-religion marriages or inter–ethnicity kinship that diluted religious differences; there are institutionalized cultures or values of peace throughout major public activities such as through Easter celebrations and MTQ activities; there are strong connections among religious and cultural elites, who play a critical mass of peace-enhancing leadership. Meanwhile in Bali, efforts to maintain religious harmony in their respective regions generally do

not experience significant obstacles. The awareness that is created among religious groups is felt to contribute to the maintenance of harmony and harmonization of relations between religious believers.

Referring to the definitions, models, and dimensions of research that have been described in the previous part of this paper, previous studies generally use relatively the same frame of mind and dimensions. They use the concept of tolerance that implies acceptance of differences and does not make differences as a basis for discriminating against the public rights of other groups. The dimensions measured are almost the same, namely the social and public dimensions. As a result, in general, previous studies show that the level of intolerance of the Indonesian people is still quite high, especially if it is related to aspects of public rights. Although the majority of Indonesians do not mind being neighbors with non-Muslims, they do not want followers of other religions or other groups who are not comfortable with holding public positions.

Another thing quite similar to previous studies is the respondent character. Although the number of respondents for each study was different, the samples selected were Muslims and the general public--not a society of a certain character, job, or position. In the LSI survey specific questions were given to Muslim respondents as well as questions that were specifically given to non-Muslim respondents without choosing the educational background and occupation of the respondents. Research specifically on student/university student/teacher respondents were not available in previous studies.

The 2018 PPIM study, "A Dimming Light," has several differences compared to previous studies. The 2018 PPIM research was born as a follow-up to the 2017 PPIM study with the theme "A Fire in the Husk: Religiosity of Gen-Z Muslims." In the 2017 study, through collecting data from 1800 student/university-student respondents in 34 provinces, it was found that the level of tolerance and radicalism of Muslim students and students was quite high. As many as 34% of students and university students had intolerant opinions towards followers of other religions. The level of intolerance towards minority groups in Islam, such as Ahmadiyah, Shia, and others, was much higher, reaching 51%. Through this research, it was found that among the factors that contributed to the high level of intolerance of students were teachers. As many as 34% of teachers who taught religion in schools had intolerant opinions towards minority groups in Islam, and 29% had intolerant opinions towards followers of other religions. Thus, the teacher can become a "fire" that

maintains and spreads intolerant ideas.

This 2018 study uses the definition framework used by Sullivan, using the least like group model. This model is almost similar to the model used by LSI in some of its surveys. In addition to this model, to measure the level of opinion intolerance, this study also raises questions to see whether respondents agree or disagree with the possibility of restrictive policies towards adherents of different religions or groups they do not like. Meanwhile, the dimension to be seen is the socio-political (public) dimension. This study wants to see the extent to which school and madrasa teachers have tolerant opinions and actions towards followers of different religions. Obviously, the PPIM 2018 research subject is quite distinct from those of previous studies.

Systematics

This book is the result of a methodological field survey described in the previous section. The survey data are collected by each of the main researchers for analysis so that they become easy to read and understand. Systematically, this book consists of several chapters that present the survey results in a comprehensive manner. In the first chapter, this book attempts to describe the context in which this survey was conducted by looking at the facts of the religious phenomenon that has occurred in Indonesia in the last two decades. The portrait of diversity in Indonesia leads to exclusivity in the perspective of religion, which leads to the strengthening of the symptoms of Islamism and even Islamic populism that occurred recently. This section also discusses a number of studies which find that the symptoms of exclusivity are triggered by a narrow religious understanding which, in turn, leads to intolerance and even, in an extreme way, leads to radical attitudes and terror. The infiltration of international and radical attitudes has penetrated various domains and specifically targets educational institutions, both schools and madrasas. From the studies that have been conducted, the infiltration of intolerance in the world of education occurs through various channels, such as students, PAI textbooks in schools, student councils, and teachers. This last point is the main object in this survey, specifically outlining the reasons why a survey of teachers in schools is necessary. In addition, this section presents the survey scope related to conceptual aspects and definitions of the theoretical framework as parameters in this survey; aspects of the problem formulation that revolve around the focus of the questions in the survey; methodological aspects with

respect to sample and margin of error; and aspects of literature review which include descriptions of religious relations and tolerance from various studies that have been carried out and put the relevance of this survey on teachers in the broader research landscape.

The second chapter explains the survey findings on teacher tolerance in schools in a comprehensive manner, both in terms of opinion and action. In addition, the next description is related to radicalism among teachers, both in opinion and in action. This section also explains the teacher's views on the values of nationality and democracy and views related to Islamism. The view of Islamism, in the findings of this survey, is one of the factors why teachers have an intolerant attitude.

The third chapter, continuing the previous chapter, deals with factors of intolerance among teachers. It analyzes the demographic factors that have contributed to teacher intolerance and radicalism. The demographic aspect tries to break down the survey results in terms of gender, such as the level of intolerance and radicalism among male teachers and female teachers. On the other side, it looks at the comparison of schools and madrasas, for example, where intolerance reigns higher than the two, and more specifically from the point of view of school status, namely public and private. Apart from that, the other aspect that needs to be considered is the taught subjects--that is, what subjects are taught by more intolerant or more radical teachers. Another demographic dimension used is teacher income. Teacher income corelates with intolerance; moreover, education level also has an influence on the intolerance and radicalism of a teacher. It should be noted that the level of education here refers to the level of education that a teacher teaches, namely from TK/RA to SMA/MA. The last demographic that affects teacher tolerance and radicalism is age. Age level is also important to scrutinize—as confirmed by the survey results.

The fourth chapter is still part of the previous part on the factors that make teachers intolerant and radical. Apart from the views of Islamism and demographics, other aspects such as mass organizations and Islamic knowledge are important in encouraging teacher radicalism. In this section is described the closeness of teachers to Islamic organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Wathan, the Al-Qur'an Tafsir Council and the Islamic Defenders Front. It also describes the extent to which a number of teachers have close relationship with Islamic mass organizations and how it may correlate with intolerance and radical attitudes, both in terms of opinion and action. Besides the Islamic

organizations mentioned above, student organizations also have close ties with teachers, such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI), the Islamic and Indonesian Student Movement (PMII), GMNI, LDK and others. Chapter four also describes ustadz who are used as role models by teachers, such as Ustadz Abdul Somad, Mamah Dede, Prof. Quraish Shihab, Ustadz Adi Hidayat, Ustadz Maulana, and Kiai Mustofa Bisri. Lectures by religious role models do influence the tolerance level of their adherents towards other religions.

The fifth chapter, the last part of this book, covers conclusions and summarizes essences of the survey findings. It concludes with a number of recommendations for relevant stakeholders, particularly the MORA and MOEC. It is hoped that the results of this survey can be used as references for evidence-based policy formulation in the education sector.

Chapter 2

Islamism and Some Issues on Nationhood

This study confirms that there are strengthening intolerant and radical opinions among Muslim teachers, both in general public schools and in madrasas, in support of the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The survey results show that most of them have opinions that fall into the intolerant/very intolerant and radical/very radical categories. When seen from the viewpoint of action/action intentions, however, most of the teachers show a tolerant and moderate tendency. Even though their intentions are moderate and tolerant, the tendency of their opinion, which is mostly towards intolerance and radicalism, is quite worrying since it has the potential to transform into radical action.

Teacher intolerance. The following graph visualizes teachers' intolerance:

Table 3

Percentages of Teachers' Tolerant/Intolerant Opinions

The results of this intolerance opinion toward followers of other religions are measured using six statements with tested construct-validity. Two examples of the six statements are: "Non-Muslims may establish houses of worship in the neighborhood where you live" and "Neighbors of different religions can hold religious events (for example: Christian services, or Mesodan for Hindus) in their residence. "Both examples of these statements have a high factor content in measuring intolerant opinions on adherents of other religions. The following is the percentage of "disagree" answers in the example of an intolerant-opinion statement:

- 56% of teachers disagreed that non-Muslims should be allowed to establish a religion-based school in their neighborhood.
- 21% of teachers disagreed that neighbors of different religions were allowed to hold religious events (e.g. Christian services, or Mesodan for Hindus) in their own homes.

Apart from intolerant opinion, this survey also looks at intolerant actions of teachers. The results can be seen in the following graph:

Table 4
Percentage of Opinion vs Teachers' Intention
for Intolerant Actions

Intolerant action-intentions towards adherents of other religions are measured using five pre-tested statements in terms of their construct validity. The if-would instructions given are: If the opportunity arouse as contained in this statement, would you do it? Two examples of those statements are: "Signing the petition rejecting the head of a different religious education office" and "Signing the petition rejecting the establishment of non-Islamic religious-based schools in the vicinity of our residence." Both statements contain strong factors for measuring intolerance-action intentions toward adherents of other religions. On intolerant action-intentions, the findings of this survey indicate that *if*

those statements were asked:

- 29% of teachers would sign the petition rejecting heads of education offices of different religions.
- 34% of teachers would sign the petition rejecting the establishment of non-Islamic faith-based schools in their neighborhood.

Teacher radicalism. If we look at the scores of teachers' radical opinions, both from the implicit measuring tool (IAT) and the explicit measuring tool (questionnaire), the results show that by using the implicit measuring instrument (IAT), 14.28% of teachers have *very radical* and *radical* opinions in favoring an Islamic State. Meanwhile, by using an explicit questionnaire measuring tool, 46.09% teachers have *very radical* and *radical* opinions. A visualization in a tabular-form of the results above is as follows:

Table 5
Percentages of Radical Opinions (i.e. Support for Islamic state) of Teachers in Indonesia


The results of teachers' radical opinion in the context of supporting the Islamic State are measured using six statements with pre-tested construct validity. Two examples of such statements are "Encouraging others to join the fight to create an Islamic state" and "Joining the jihad in the Southern Philippines, Syria, or Iraq in fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state." Both statements contain strong factors for measuring teachers' radical opinions.

In terms of radical opinion and radical action-intentions, the results of this survey show that:

- 33% of teachers would agree to encourage others to fight for an Islamic state.
- 29% of teachers would agree to join the jihad in the Southern Philippines, Syria or Iraq in fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state.

Apart from radical opinion, this survey also looks at radical actions of teachers. The results can be seen in the following graph:

Table 6

Percentages of Teachers' Radical Actions: Opinions vs Intentions

As was the case with the other measurements, the teachers' radical action intentions are also measured using six statements with pre-tested construct validity, the questions being: If the opportunity arouse as contained in this statement, would you do it? Two examples of such statements are: "Encouraging others to fight in creating an Islamic state" and "Attacking the police who arrest people who are struggling to establish an Islamic state." Each statement contains a high factor for measuring radical action-intentions. The following are the percentages of teachers' responses to the statements. When the statements were asked, the results were:

- 27.59% of teachers would encourage others to fight in realizing the Islamic state.
- 13.30% of teachers would attack the police who arrest people who were fighting for an Islamic state.

This survey finds that three important factors are at play that drive the level of intolerance and radicalism of teachers in Indonesia, namely: 1] an exclusive view of Islam (Islamism); 2] demographic factors, and 3] sources of religious knowledge and religious mass organizations. The following chapters explains these three factors in detail.

Increasing Islamism in Teachers

In some parts of the Islamic world including Indonesia, this strengthening of Islamic religiosity and political identity generally goes hand in hand with the growing tendency towards conservatism. A number of parties consider that it is important to observe what they describe as the rising tide of conservative Islamism--and some of them even tend to be puritanical. In the current political sphere in Indonesia, the strengthening of Islamism is marked among others by the growth of Islamic political parties and the continuous efforts to formalize Islamic teachings in state life, both at the national and local levels. For a number of parties, the ongoing Islamization process is considered a quite worrying development. This is because, at the same time, the tendency towards intolerance, radicalism and violence is also increasing. Many data show that attacks and violence are still happening, affecting the majority from year to year. Not to mention that there have been enough acts of terror involving a number of militant Islamic groups throughout the post-Reformation period.

Based on such reasons, some argue that the so-called phenomenon of the rise of Islam and Islamism is more or less the twin sister of extremism and radicalism. The difference is only visible on the side of the shell or the outer appearance. That being so, several other experts see positive aspects, especially with regard to the involvement of a number of Islamist groups in the democratic process.

Bassam Tibi (2012) considers that the re-emergence of Islamist groups in recent times that carry conservative ideas and "Islamic supremacy" needs to be seen as more of a dangerous--rather than hopeful--trend. Tibi firmly doubts the commitment of Islamists to democracy and political aims when engaging in the democratic process. He also states that even if they show changes in the ways to gain power, it does not mean that their goals and values will also change. Islamism is still an ideology or belief that requires the realization of power based on Islam in the form of a caliphate *(khilafah)* and the like, with Islamic Sharia being the reference in all aspects of life, including in the state.

For most Islamists there is only one legitimate type of power on earth, namely a state based on Islam. They demand that Islamic law be enforced in state life. Most Islamists see the formation of an Islamic government as imperative because it is this institution that can guarantee the implementation of Islam as a whole. Thus, the enforcement of sharia

alone, or Islam that is merely complementary, is not sufficient in their view.

Source of Knowledge and Truth Claim

Religious fundamentalism is characterized by an absolutist view of religious doctrine (Harris, 2008; Ruthven, 2004). Scriptures are often understood not only as the guidance in religious rituals and religious social relations, but also as the source of truth in all matters, including in science. Because of this viewpoint, adherents tend to be closed, inward looking, and exclusive in responding to developments in science, especially those identified as "not having an Islamic origin."

Table 7
"All knowledge is already in the Quran so that Muslims do not need to learn science from the West."


The national data above show that respondents who agree that Muslims no longer need to study sources of knowledge from the West because they are sufficient with the knowledge contained in the Koran reach 40.36%. Kindergarten/RA teacher respondents mostly embrace this belief (51.41%), followed by SD/MI teachers 41.71%. Meanwhile, the numbers of SMP/MTS and SMA/MA teacher respondents are almost the same, namely 35.54% and 36.66%. In general, these percentages are quite large. The respondents' views can be interpreted as their belief in absolute Islam. This is because Islam is understood as "the most perfect and all-encompassing" so that it must be the only source of reference in understanding various aspects of life, including the field of science. As a consequence, Muslims, owing to their having a perfect holy book, no longer need any other references, including various innovations, which they consider as not coming from Islamic teachings.

This absolutist religious-thought that self-claims the most correct

has resulted in low acceptance of other different opinions, both against outsiders (externally) and fellow Muslims themselves. Respondents' opinions regarding differences in opinions in understanding religious issues can be seen in the table below:

Table 8
"Differences of interpretation in Islam are bad."

As many as 28.70% of respondents strongly agree and agree that differences of opinion in interpreting Islam are bad things, and therefore should be avoided. Indeed, most of them disagree (71.30%), but the number who agree--which accounts for more than a quarter of respondents, shows a significant number that needs to be watched out. Rejecting differences of opinion is generally based on one-sided truth claims. In fact, in reality, there are various religious ideologies and understandings within the Muslim community. However, intolerance and persecution often stem from unilateral truth claims that lead to accusations that those with different religious understanding are wrong or even heretical. The persecution experienced by, among others, Muslim minorities such as the Shia, Ahmadiyah, and others, are principally based on the "truest" belief and the "most Islamic" feeling shared by a number of perpetrators.

The issue becomes even more crucial when this absolutist understanding of diversity is brought into the realm of social and social life. What emerges then is the extreme view that only religion (in this case Islam) can be a solution or an answer to human problems. As many as 82.77% of the national data of teachers agree that Islam is the only solution to overcome social problems. This view can be interpreted as negating the existence of other sources and approaches (e.g. general science, technology, social and cultural systems, etc.) that can contribute to problem solving. As a result, all the root problems will be resolved only through the window of religion. The jargon of "Islam or sharia is

the solution" often promoted by the Islamist group Hizbut-Tahrir seems to reflect this point of view.

Islamism, Sharia Supremacy, and Democracy

Other aspects of Islamism can be seen from the perspective of how they place the position of sharia in the life of the nation and society, as well as their views on ideology and the nation's constitution, which originate from mutual agreement. For Islamists, with a number of variations between them, Islamic values must become the main pillars in political and state affairs. Radical Islamists see that only a religion-based state is legal and must be obeyed. Therefore, fighting for a religious state is an obligation. For them, in a very popular language, Islam is *al-din wa al-daulah* (the religion and the state). Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Maududi have a huge influence on the development of contemporary Islamist thoughts. In the concept of *al-hakimiyyah* or God's power, the law and constitution must be based on Islamic law. The table below shows how teachers view sharia and the state:

Table 9
"Only a government system based on Islamic law is
the best for this country."

The majority of respondents (62.22%) agree that a government system based on Islamic law is the best. It is clear that the majority of respondents want *syariat* (Islamic law) to be given more positions. The state is required to be more accommodating to religion so that *syariat* gives a stronger color. Does this mean they want an Islamic state? Does this also mean that the current state of the Republic of Indonesia is inconsistent with or even contrary to Islamic law? The answer, as it turns out, is not simple.

Table 10
"The government must enforce Islamic law for its adherents."

Apart from idealizing a government based on Islamic law, the majority of respondents (75.98%) also agree for the government to impose Islamic law on Muslims. The issue of the application of Islamic law reemerged at the beginning of the democratic reforms in 1998-1999. Several Islamic parties demanded the enactment of one of the articles in the Jakarta Charter, which stipulates the application of Islamic law. The aspirations of these parties then failed because they did not get enough support from other political parties. Nonetheless, the desire for Islamic law to have a more special position in government regulation continues. The vigor of regional regulations or *perda* on "Islamic sharia" that emerged in a number of regions from the reform period to 2006/2007 shows that a number of Islamic groups continued to strive to accommodate Islamic teachings in formal government regulations. Some parties view this development as a signal of strengthening Islamism in post-Reformation Indonesia; yet, not a few also see it as a pragmatic political movement for electoral interests, especially regarding the contestation of regional head elections (Buehler, 2016; Mubarak and Saʾdiyah, 2018).

The strong tendency to apply and formalize Islamic sharia appears to run linearly with the view that the government official elites who are to be elected must have the commitment to implementing Islamic law when they are in power. When asked whether they agree or not that it is obligatory to only elect heads of state and regional heads who are committed to implementing Islamic law, 80. 27% of respondents express their agreement. Only 19.73% do not agree with the obligation to have a president and regional heads who are pro-implementation of Islamic law. From some of the data findings above, it can be interpreted that the hope that Islamic law is given a wider and decisive space in the life of the nation and state is very strong among Indonesian teachers.

However, it would be wrong to conclude that the findings of these data, which show the strong aspirations of teachers for the application of Islamic law, also automatically reject the constitution and the state ideology, as well as anti-democracy. This is so because, as seen in the table below, it turns out that the majority of them give a positive picture of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila, as well as support for the democratic system. However, the number of respondents with a negative assessment is also significant.

Table 11
"The Indonesian government, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, is a *thagut* because it has taken God's right as a law maker."


The table above shows that the majority of respondents disagree that the government of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is categorized as *taghut*. There are 76.85% of respondents who stated that the government is not *taghut*. This means that in principle governance does not contradict or violate Islamic law. Those who think that the current government is *taghut* amount to 23.15%. In terms of number, it is a minority, but it is significant enough to be categorized as being very extreme. As a term itself, *taghut* is very popular among Islamist-jihadists who reject the government and the system it implements as it is considered contrary to Islamic teachings. The *taghut* verdict against the government has a number of dangerous implications, because the predication is often a justification for them to commit acts of violence against the government and its apparatus. Terrorist attacks against state officials, especially the police, which have been increasingly intense since 2012/2013 until now, for one thing, are because of the perception of the state apparatus as the main *taghut* supporters against jihadists. Therefore, the findings should not make the government and policy makers complacent as it must be taken

into account seriously so that that minor-yet-significant view does not develop and have stronger influence.

One of the more optimistic findings is the respondents' positive assessment of democracy. Support for democracy is still very strong as can be seen in the following table:

Table 12
"Democracy is against Islamic teachings."

The data above illustrate the existence of a solid relationship between democracy and Islam in the assessment of the majority of respondents. Democracy does not have serious problems from an Islamic point of view. The number of respondents amounts to 88.53% who disagree with statements opposing Islam and democracy. In other words, they see democracy and Islam as one way; the two are not contradictory. Only 11.46% of respondents disagree with the suitability of Islam and democracy. At this point democracy should already be in a safe position.

The support of Indonesian Muslims for democracy has been confirmed in political reality. Indonesia has successfully entered the phase of a consolidated democracy and successfully held four general elections (election). Most of the Islamist groups also prefer the democratic path in fighting for their ideals. This can be seen from the participation of Islamic parties from election to election. Several Islamic political parties have played a significant political role in politics in Indonesia after the reformation. They include the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the United Development Party. (PPP). In short, in the political struggle, Islamist groups are compromising with the democratic system. However, a small proportion of radical Islamist groups refused to be involved in the democratic system, and chose unconstitutional methods. In fact, it is true that within Islamist groups there are many different schools of thought, including in assessing democracy (Platzdasch, 2009; Hilmy, 2010).

At first blush, this "sharia" support for democracy may appear as an anomaly. This is so because, as seen in the tables of the previous data findings, the aspirations of formalistic Islamism are very strong among the respondents, especially when questions are related to the issue of sharia. One of the possible interpretations is that the respondent's understanding of sharia is still not very clear. It could also be because the respondents' understanding of what is meant by sharia, its scope and function, is still very limited and has multiple interpretations. Thus, the answers of respondents to a number of questions related to sharia are often inconsistent.

Islamism and Acts of Violence

According to the findings of PPIM 2018 research, approval of acts of violence and armed jihad by radical groups amount to relatively small figures. For example, in relation to the meaning of jihad as war *(qital)* aimed at non-Muslims, only 18.50% of respondents agree and 82.50% disagree (cf. the table below).

Table 13
"The real jihad is fighting against non-Muslims."

In a number of jihadist doctrines, the meaning of jihad as *qital* plays a very important role in providing legitimacy for acts of violence, including their intended targets. This religious justification, which often refers selectively to *"sword verses",* gives the perpetrator the conviction that his actions are religiously justified and that their demise will be considered martyrdom leading to rewards and guarantees of heaven. In fact, the use of verses for these acts of violence often ignore the context in which the verses originated (Kimball, 2002). As shown in the following table, a smaller percentage is obtained when the respondents are asked whether they consider the suicide bombing in Surabaya a justifiable application of the concept of jihad:

Table 14
"Jihad with suicide bombing
(as what happened in Surabaya some time ago)
is justified in Islam."

Only 3.23% agree that this is an act of jihad; 96.67% refuse to state that the actions by several people who are strongly suspected of being affiliated with the radical jihadist group Jemaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) are justified acts of jihad. The respondents' approval rate of support for the Islamic State jihadist group in Iraq and Syria/Syria (ISIS), or also known as Daesh, is also quite low. As is well known, ISIS, in addition to al-Qaeda, is currently a very influential global jihadist organization. As of May 2018, more than 1,100 Indonesian citizens left for Syria to join them. About 500 of them have been deported, and 103 are recorded as having died in Syria (www.kompas.com, 14 May 2018).

Table 15
"Supporting the ISIS armed struggles in Syria and Iraq
to uphold the Islamic state/caliphate is a noble act."

Respondents' support for the ISIS movement is quite low, totaling only 6.40%. The rest (93.60%) stated that they do not agree to provide support to ISIS. Up to this point, the findings of these data are quite encouraging because they underline that the majority of Indonesian Muslims can be considered moderate Muslims, and they consider those

who go to Syria to join ISIS as wrong. What becomes a problem is when the name of the ISIS organization is omitted in the question and replaced by general calls for jihad in conflict areas such as Syria, Iraq and the Philippines for the purpose of establishing an Islamic state. It turns out that the number of respondents that state that the action is a form of religious obedience is large enough, reaching 29.33%; those who do not see it as a form of religious obedience amount to 70.67%.

Table 16
Agree to join jihad in Southern Philippines, Syria or Iraq
to fight for the establishment of an Islamic State.

When compared with the 6.40% teachers who consider being with ISIS to be noble, those who agree that jihad in establishing an Islamic State in the Philippines, Syria and Iraq are quite high-- 29.33%. Quite possibly, the stigma on ISIS as a radical, brutal and vicious movement is one of the factors that influence the respondents' view that their struggle is very un-Islamic or even contrary to Islam. However, with regard to jihad for the formation of an Islamic State carried out by other groups, whose bad stigma is not as strong as ISIS, a number of respondents give good views and are willing to join them. From the data found, a number of respondents in a smaller but significant percentage still see the ideas and efforts to fight for an Islamic State as good things and need to be supported. If there is an opportunity, more than 30% of respondents agree to encourage others to fight for the Islamic State, as can be seen in the following findings:

Table 17
Agree to encourage others to fight for an Islamic state.

The table above shows that those teachers who, if the opportunity were available, would agree to recommend fighting, recorded as much as 32.87%. This figure is classified as very high for a measure of recommendations for radical actions. The rest, 67.13%, state that they would not agree to recommend so even though there was an opportunity. The findings of the subsequent data show a quite worrying situation related to their existence in contributing to jihad activities for establishing an Islamic State.

Table 18
Agree to donate money or goods for the struggle to establish an Islamic state.

As shown in Table 18 above, 56.87% of those who were willing to donate money and goods for the purposes of jihad or struggle to establish an Islamic State were more than half of the total respondents. The number is of course very high and alarming. Those who disagreed amounted to 43.12%. Among jihadists, especially those who provided support to ISIS, there was widespread doctrine that the law to join the Islamic State is obligatory for all Muslims. If they are unable to do so, it is obligatory to fight for jihad in their respective countries. However,

if there is a certain age or obstacle to jihad, then they are still bound by the obligation, namely to provide assistance, both material and non-material, to people who are jihad to fight for the Islamic State or Islamic caliphate.

Almost the same percentage, even higher, is found in the willingness of respondents if they had the opportunity to pray for people who died because of jihad activities to establish an Islamic State. Those who agree to pray are 65.47%, and those who do not amount to 34.53%. The willingness to pray can be interpreted in various ways. It could be because of sympathy because of the similarity of ideology and ideals, but maybe it is not ideological, but only social in nature. For a willingness to take more extreme measures, such as attacking police officers who are considered to be obstacles to the struggle for jihad, the following data are obtained:

Table 19
Willingness to attack the police who arrest people who are struggling to establish an Islamic State

Exactly 13.30% of respondents are willing to attack the police if there is an opportunity. Meanwhile, 86.70% said they are not willing. In a number of statements by the Islamist group, the police are the targets of terror because they are seen as part of the *taghut* that thwarted a number of jihad efforts. In the last five years, there have been many acts of terror that have deliberately targeted the police, both on duty cops and police station buildings. In May 2017, it was stated that 120 police officers were victims of acts of terrorism and 40 of them were killed (www.liputan6. com, 27 May 2017). This number continued to increase, because in 2018 there were also acts of terror that killed the police, including the terror action at the Mobile Brigade Command Headquarters in May 2018, which left 5 police officers dead.

From 2016 to 2018 acts of terror continued, including suicide bombings that targeted various public facilities as well as symbols of the West and churches. What received widespread attention included the terror action on Jalan Thamrin Jakarta in January 2016, the suicide bombing in Kampung Melayu in May 2017, and the suicide bombing involving two families in Surabaya that targeted the police station and the church in May 2018.

In this study, 30.27% of respondents also find that they agree that fighting state policy that prohibited the establishment of an Islamic State is a form of obedience to religious teachings. While the rest, 69.72%, disagree. Based on the data on the consent to acts of violence and the willingness to do it if there is an opportunity as described above, it can be concluded that there is a potential for violence that is motivated by religious beliefs among teachers. Even though the number is smaller, teachers seem vulnerable to invitations and persuasion to justify acts of violence, especially if they are packaged with religious arguments.

It is important to note that kindergarten/RA teachers make the highest contribution to many aspects of Islamism, especially in terms of willingness to act justification and to commit violence if they have such opportunities. For example, their willingness to donate money for Islamic State jihad reached 61.04% compared to the average data of all national teachers, which was 58.67%; suggesting others to fight for the establishment of an Islamic State reached 38.56% compared to 32.87%; also the willingness to join the jihad wars in the Southern Philippines, Syria and Iraq at 33.73% versus 29.30%. Based on these data, teachers at the kindergarten/RA level who have a higher level of Islamism need to be prioritized in programs of strengthening religious and national insight.

A number of findings on the diversity of these teachers are quite alarming and need the attention of the government, without neglecting the many positive aspects that exist. Especially for the MOEC, in order to better activate teacher literacy on religious issues that are prone to abuse. Strengthening religious literacy needs to emphasize a number of religious concepts that have been widely misunderstood, for example, regarding jihad, sharia, caliphate, and the relationship between Islam and the state. This process, of course, cannot be short-lived, because of the large number of teachers who are recommended. However, in this way the teachers' religious insight will become more open and moderate.

Standing on Majority's Supremacy

As a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, and whose religious education has been embedded in the national education system, the study of Islamic education in the context of increasing radicalism and intolerance in Indonesia is highly relevant. Understanding how teachers view issues related to Islam, nationality and democracy are the focus of this section. From here we can get an explanation of how committed teachers are to the issue of the Indonesian nation-state and democracy, the extent of their acceptance, and how the political culture model of these Muslim teachers actually is. This study also explores the relationship between the teacher's views and the socio-religious problems that have occurred recently in Indonesia.

When Radicalism Enters the "Teacher's Room"

The teacher is one of the vital instruments in education. In Indonesia, teachers are not only funnels for channeling knowledge but are also determinants of behavior standards. For example, whether or not a student will be labeled as having a commendable or despicable behavior is based on his or her obedience to the teacher. Conversely, teachers are also required to behave in accordance with the standard values that exist in society. From this point of view, teachers are not only professionals but also traditional authorities who are influential in Indonesian society.

In an instant and sophisticated world, knowledge can be obtained easily. The internet has a relatively large portion in filling the knowledge of students and teachers in schools today. Of course, their information can prove to be negative information, but it can also be positive. Coupled with the loss of territorial boundaries in cyberspace, they may receive dangerous information and narratives from groups with ideologies that conflict with human values--for example, narratives that advocate and justify the use of violence to achieve goals.

One of the easily available information in the digital world concerns religious issues. Unfortunately, the virtual world is also used as a tool by certain circles to propagate their exclusive, radical, and intolerant ideas. For example, several online sites provide narratives to replace the basis of the Indonesian state (NKRI, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution) and the democratic system with a caliphate system, a theocratic system—i.e. sovereignty in the hands of God, not in the hands of the people--who apply Islamic law as a whole. Moreover, the internet is also used by

terrorists to recruit members and spread their ideology.

What happens in the virtual arena is not really that different from what happens in the real world. Movements calling for the replacement of the Indonesian state system into a caliphate have strengthened after the Reformation. They are trying to justify their ideology in the midst of the country's unstable economy. They develop an opinion that non-Muslim groups are the groups that benefit from the process of economic development. The development of such opinion aims to frame the feelings of Muslims that they have been treated unfairly and are always disadvantaged by state policies. This kind of narrative eventually becomes a framing and is used as a justification for replacing the nation-state system and democracy. The Islamic government system *(khilafah)* was offered by these movements as an alternative solution to the conditions of injustice and economic backwardness of Muslims.

Such an understanding will eventually produce an intolerant attitude towards non-Muslims, because they are considered a threat and cause of problems in Muslims. This condition also creates attitudes in--and demands for--Muslims as the majority to be treated specially by the state than members of other religions. One of the real expressions of this attitude is the recent proliferation of movements calling for the application of Islamic law. We can see how the development of regulations with religious nuances was born in this democratic era. These movements often use violence in spreading their ideas. Discrimination cases against minorities are precisely the anomaly of Indonesia's current democracy.

True democracy allows every citizen to convey their ideas freely. Democracy even provides an opportunity for citizens to reject democracy itself albeit in peaceful ways. However, if the ideas expressed are accompanied by violence, both verbally and non-verbally, this is where the law should work against the perpetrators. Thus, the task of those who are aware of the nature of democracy is to counter the ideas of radical groups who want to replace the Indonesian nation-state system and democracy.

This is where the role of teachers, as an educated group of people, is needed to fight ideas that want to replace the state system by justifying violence. Teachers who have moderate, tolerant, nationalistic and strong democratic views can fight these intolerant and radical ideas in the younger generation. This is rather pressing because intolerant and radical movements and ideas have entered educational institutions in this country.

Intolerant and radical attitudes and understandings enter schools through various gaps. Internally, it can be done through extracurricular activities, PAI (Islamic Education) textbooks, and religious teachers. However, external factors, such as student involvement in radical movements outside of school and in the virtual world, especially on the internet and social media, also have an influence on the formation of such religious understanding.

One of the doors for radicalism infiltration in schools is through extracurricular activities of Rohani Islam (Rohis) (Ciciek, 2008; Salim HS, et al., 2011). Strengthening these findings, Masooda Bano et all (2016) state that radicalism also entered schools through ustadz or alumni who were affiliated with certain radical movements. However, it should be noted that although radicalism in schools can enter through Rohis activities, not all Rohis organizations promote radical religious views. Some Rohis activists hold moderate religious views.

Exclusive and intolerant understanding also enters through PAI textbooks, one of which is produced by the MOEC (Nasuhi, et al. Ed., 2018). These ideas can be found in textbooks starting from the elementary school level to the high school level. For example, there is material that teaches that it is permissible to kill both infidels and polytheists; and labeling some religious practices commonly practiced by Muslim communities in Indonesia, such as the pilgrimage to the grave and *tahlil*. In fact, books for kindergarten level students also contain violent contents involving use of such words as bomb, jihad, and *kafir*.

Religious teachers who play have an important role in forming moderate and tolerant religious views of their students, in fact, tend to have an exclusive and intolerant religious viewpoint (Syafruddin, et al. Ed., 2018). Although they admit that the internal differences in Muslims (*khilafiyah*)--for example the matter of *qunut*, grave pilgrimage, and *tahlil*--are things that do not need to be questioned, they still reject the existence of minorities such as the Ahmadiyah and Shia as part of the Muslim community. Meanwhile, with regard to inter-religious tolerance, their form of tolerance tends to be superficial as there is a tendency for them to somehow lack trust in members of other religions.

Nonetheless, the PAI curriculum has in general provided moderate contents, such as those on values and culture of peace, multiculturalism, and human rights. Such examples are the materials on: *al-taʾaruf* (synergy), *al-shura* (demonstration), *al-taʾawun* (working together), *al-mashlahah* (common good), *-ʾadl* (fair), *al-ukhuwwah* (brotherhood),

al-ta-kaful (mutual burden), and *al-tasamuh* (tolerance) (Masooda et al., 2016). Still, it seems that these materials are rarely discussed in depth if at all in class learning activities. The lack of proficiency of PAI teachers in applying attractive learning methods causes this subject matter to become boring for students.

From the studies described above, it can be concluded that intolerance and radicalism are threats to the world of education in Indonesia. Therefore, in the midst of increasing religious conservatism and radical movements in the country, comprehensive studies that map the religious views of teachers become crucial (Afrianty, 2012; Bryner, 2013; Makruf, 2014; Tan, 2014).

Operationalization of Concepts

In Muslim-majority countries, Islamic education has indeed become one that is considered to have colored the nation-state building process, and generally have created a dilemma for the state as to where to place Islamic education within the education system (Thobani, 2007). What is happening in Indonesia reflects the above reality. Indonesia has two ministries that regulate education. This condition can be regarded as a policy resulting from a dilemma within the nation-state development in which Islam, one of which is through Islamic education, is part of the process (Ropi, 2017).

This condition can be viewed positively because Islamic education in its curriculum must recognize and strengthen the existence of the Indonesian nation-state. However, at the same time, it also forms a political culture of citizens that does not separate religious and state affairs. Jeremy Menchik (2016) calls the Indonesian nationalism model *"godly nationalism"* or divine nationalism in which, in the historical process, national consensus has made religion an important element in the nation and state of Indonesia. This national consensus, although recognizing the diversity of religions, is limited to only recognized certain religions, namely Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. As a result, the potential for intolerance towards religious groups that are not included in the consensus becomes latent. Cases of intolerance towards the Ahmadiyah, Shia, and several other minority faith groups can arise as a result of such a nationalism model.

In Indonesia, religious education is a compulsory subject for all students. The learning model only teaches students to embrace religion. Students are not given material about other religions that differ from their beliefs,

especially in public schools. In fact, PAI materials tend to accommodate Islamic teachings from one of the schools only, especially the Sunni-Shafi school, which makes the majority. PAI does not provide space for the introduction of the teachings of other sects or streams in Islam that also live in Indonesia, such as the Shia, Ahmadiyah and Sufis or tarekat.

Such a model of religious education can eventually strengthen exclusive religious attitudes and behaviors to students. The experience of interreligious conflicts that occurred after the New Order in several regions of Indonesia shows that religious communities in Indonesia tend to be vulnerable to conflicts between religious believers. Learning models that are inclusive, objective, and introduce other religions are important to shape the religious attitudes and behaviors of students who are more moderate and pluralist.

It should be noted, however, that attempts to bring religious education as an instrument to form a moderate Muslim society have actually been made. Al Makin (2018) notes that figures such as Mukti Ali, Munawir Sjadzali, and Driyarkara are fighting for an inclusive religious education model in order to support national development. Religious education is important in the process of strengthening the legitimacy of the Indonesian nation-state which is fundamentally secular. However, although their efforts are quite effective, in the current Indonesian context they tend to be viewed as elitist. Their idealism does not seem quite visible in the current curriculum and textbooks of PAI.

This study looks at the political culture of Muslim teachers in terms of their attitudes on issues related to Islam, nationality and democracy. Political culture is a psychological orientation towards social objects, or attitudes towards the political system and towards oneself as a political actor (Almond and Verba, 1972). The orientation consists of three main aspects: namely knowledge or belief; feelings or affections; and evaluation or assessment of citizens of the political system in general, political inputs and outputs, and their role in the country's political system (Mujani, 2007).

Furthermore, Almond and Verba (1972) divide political culture into three typologies. First, parochial political culture. In this typology, there are no structural differences, such as what is religious and what is political. In such a political culture system, a citizen cannot orient himself in a differentiated political system. Those who fall into this category are those who are apathetic and alienated from the political system.

Second, the political culture of the subject. In this political culture, citizens are positioned as people who are active in a differentiated political system, but only in terms of the output of the political system. They are passive in the input of a political process. Third, the political culture of the participants. In this political culture, citizens play a role as active participants in a differentiated political system, also in terms of output and the political system. However, it needs to be underlined that the political culture of the participants is a complementary culture of the other two political cultures. A person who is categorized as having a participant political culture does not necessarily leave the parochial and subject political culture (Mujani, 2007).

In fact, Mujani (2007) states that the combination of the three political cultures has a positive influence on democratic stability. According to him, political culture is not just the culture of the participants, but a culture of combination between activism and pacifism from the three cultures. This combination is what creates moderate and non-radical political behavior. The resulting political orientation is to create gradual change, not revolutionary.

Furthermore, democracy is related to the existence of nations. It requires the existence of rational law enforcement and, in modern concepts, the nation-state is the only institution that has the authority to enforce the law. One of the modern nation-states is based on the principle of guaranteeing human rights. Consequently, the state must guarantee the equal rights of all citizens and it must also run on these principles, both in legal instruments and state administering institutions. Meanwhile, Islam as a religion basically has a set of laws (sharia) that are binding its adherents. The teacher's view regarding the relationship between Islam and the Indonesian nation-state is needed to see what the political culture of Muslim teachers is. Furthermore, this study looks at teachers' attitudes towards acceptance and views on the harmony between the state constitution, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution, and Islamic teachings or sharia.

The democracy referred to in this study is substantial democracy. In contrast to the concept of procedural democracy--which assumes that a political process is said to be democratic when it has implemented democratic procedures (such as holding peaceful elections and strict separation of power in political institutions), substantial democracy emphasizes on guaranteeing the values of equality, tolerance, freedom, welfare, and law enforcement by the state (Tilly, 2007).

It must be admitted that, although procedurally the democratic institutions in Indonesia are quite well established, substantially Indonesian democracy still faces several obstacles. This needs to be underscored when attempting to address the social and religious problems that have occurred recently. Discrimination cases against religious minorities and state policies that favor one religious group are proof that, substantially, Indonesian democracy has not been achieved. To that end, Indonesia must raise the democratic standards from being merely procedural to becoming more substantive.

Islam and Nation-State

In the matter of the relationship between Islam and nationality, it can be said that the commitment of Muslim teachers to the Indonesian nation-state based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is still high. Such support is confirmed by their view of the harmony between the concept of the Indonesian nation and the principles of Islamic teachings. The survey data show that 87% of teachers agreed that NKRI is in accordance with the principles of governance in Islam (see Table 20). This acceptance actually has positive consequences on the one hand and negative consequences on the other. The positive aspect of accepting the compatibility between Islam and the concept of the Indonesian nation-state is that Muslims, being the majority, are willing to be part of the Indonesian nation. This support guarantees the existence and stability of the Indonesian state from the threat of separatism or sectarianism as is common in Muslim-majority countries, especially in the Middle East.

Table 20
"NKRI is a government in accordance with
the principles of governance in Islam."

Indonesia has had the experience of separatist conflict and sectarianism. In the period 1950-1060s there was a separatism movement based on religion or intersecting with religion, which is commonly called Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) and the Indonesian Revolutionary Government and the Universal Struggle Charter (PRRI/Permesta). During the democratic transition period, conflicts between religious believers also occurred in Maluku. However, these conflict cases, when compared to what happened in other Muslim majority countries, are relatively smaller in scale, and did not cause conflict or prolonged civil war. The majority of Muslims, represented by their figures, even become important actors in conflict resolution.

Furthermore, the attitude of Muslim teachers who agree with the statement that Islamic principles or values are compatible with the Republic of Indonesia, in a more abstract level, makes it difficult for us to separate their views on the relationship between religion and state. This means that automatically, the concept of secularism, which separates religion and state, is impossible in Indonesia. Religion is considered by Muslims to be an inseparable part of the state. As a result, the state is required to regulate a lot of the religious affairs of its citizens. Furthermore, Muslims as the majority are considered to have higher supremacy than other religious communities in public affairs.

Post-World War II newly independent Muslim countries faced a dilemma in which religious education should be placed in the national education system of their country. Traditional religious education institutions--such as pesantren or surau in the Indonesian experience - are accommodated in the national education system. Many Muslim countries include religious education, particularly Islamic education, in their official state curricula. This means that religious education is inherent in the state education system.

In Indonesia, the implementation of education is under the auspices of two ministries, namely the MOEC and the Ministry of Trade. The MOEC regulates general education starting from Kindergarten (TK) to SMA/SMK levels. Religious education is also taught in schools under the MOEC. Meanwhile, religious education under the MORA, such as in Raudhatul Atfal (RA), madrasas and pesantrens, received a larger portion. By looking at the existence of two ministries that manage religious education in Indonesia, it is important to see how the views of the teachers under the two ministries are related to issues of nationality and democracy.

Data at the national level show that Muslim teachers' support for the Republic of Indonesia is still very high. Eighty-five percent (85%) of teachers of each category above agreed that NKRI is a form of government in accordance with the principles of government in Islam. The difference between the two ministries is not more than 1%; 87.03% of MORA teachers and 86.96% of MOEC teachers agree with this statement. It can be said that although there were more teachers under the MORA than those under the MOEC who agreed with the harmony between the Republic of Indonesia and Islam, the difference is still small. Thus it can be concluded that the support of teachers in both ministries for the Republic of Indonesia was equally high.

In a more practical statement, namely regarding the conformity between Islamic law and Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the support of Muslim teachers tends to be higher than the previous statement. Ninety percent of Muslim teachers agree with the statement that practicing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is essentially the practice of Islamic teachings. When viewed from the level of education in which the teachers teach from kindergarten to senior high school, on average 90% of teachers agreed with this statement (see Table 21). It can be generalized that this figure shows that the Indonesian constitution is considered to be in accordance with Islamic law.

Table 21
"Practicing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is essentially practicing Islamic law."

The data also show that the long debate to change the Indonesian constitution is no longer relevant. The debate to return to Piagam Jakarta, which was incessant in the Constituent Assembly in the 1950s and at the beginning of the Reformation, has lost its relevance at this time. The data also show that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are considered to have accommodated and represented the substances contained in Islamic law.

It is a big asset that the existence of the Indonesian nation-state in the eyes of Muslims is still an inseparable part of their religious life.

However, it can also be interpreted that the religious life of Indonesian citizens must be regulated by the state, because Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the state constitution are not separate from Islamic teachings. As a consequence, the derivative products of regulations and laws are considered to be in line with Islamic values and sharia. For example, the interpretation of the first principle, God Almighty, can be interpreted as saying that the state is considered to have to apply Islamic law in the life of the state. One of the aspirations for the implementation of sharia in the form of sharia regulations is based on an understanding of this kind of constitution.

Furthermore, support for the Indonesian nation-state is tested in questions related to daily practices, for example, the extent to which teachers support respect for the Red and White flag as a symbol of the state. This question is important because currently there is a phenomenon of Islamic groups or movements that do not allow their congregation to respect the Red and White flag. Their reason is that respect for the flag is a *bid'ah* and, more than that, the flag of the country is a symbol of *taghut*. This phenomenon can be found in the institutions of the Salafi movement groups (Wahid, 2014).

Interestingly, the survey data show that teachers under both ministries agreed to salute the Red and White flag. Their support can be said to be very high, almost absolute. 96.68% of teachers under MOEC and 96.70% of teachers under MORA agreed with this action (see Table 22). These data also says that nationally, the acceptance of Muslim teachers towards state symbols is also very high. This figure shows that Muslim teachers who support the Indonesian nation-state are still a mainstream group. This high support can be a capital to take a step towards making the understanding of the nationality of Muslim teachers more substantive. The modern nation-state concept that emphasizes the equality of all citizens of the country must be strengthened in the understanding of Muslim teachers as the basis of their civic culture.

Table 22

On saluting the Red and White flag during the ceremony

It should be noted that, although those who do not agree to pay homage to the Red and White flag tend to be very small, this figure is important for further review. Teacher acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state should be intact, including the symbols of the state. It is also important to trace who and how the religious attitude of teachers who refuse to respect the state flag. There are still around 3% of teachers under the two ministries who refuse to respect the Indonesian flag. It is safe to suspect that those who refuse are affiliated with groups or movements that reject the concept of the Indonesian nation-state and promote the idea of a caliphate.

When viewed from the real number of teachers who disagree with the national flag, the teachers under the MOEC (3.32% or 59 people) are far more than teachers under the MORA (3.30% or 15 people). It is important to further investigate why MOEC teachers tend to refuse to respect the national flag. Several hypotheses were put forward for a more qualitative follow-up study that the deeper the religious understanding of teachers, the stronger their acceptance of the nation-state would be. On the other hand, the less religious understanding, teachers will be more vulnerable to being exposed to radical ideologies that reject the Indonesian nation-state. In line with the findings above, teachers also have a strong tendency to disagree when it is stated that the Indonesian government is *taghut* and *kafir*. As many as 91% of teachers disagreed with this statement (see Table 23). Once again, these data confirm that teachers who support the Indonesian nation-state are still mainstream in Indonesian society. These Muslim teachers could potentially be used to counter the radical ideology that wanted to change the Indonesian nation-state into a state based on one particular religion. The huge support from Muslim teachers for the Indonesian nation-state has become a very expensive asset in maintaining the existence of the

Indonesian nation-states based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; which is sociologically plural as well.

Table 23
"The Indonesian government, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, is *thagut* and *kafir*."

Agree
9.00%

Teachers

Disagree
91.00%

Islam and Democracy

The discussion regarding the appropriateness of Islam and democracy is an interesting and always current theme in Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world. The acceptance of Muslims towards a democratic system is considered to be a determinant of democratic stability in Indonesia. Not without reason, in the midst of many Muslim-majority countries, especially in the Middle East, failing to make a democratic transition, Indonesia in approximately six years, 1998-2004, has succeeded in carrying out a democratic transition (Liddle and Mujani, 2013).

Studies of Islam and democracy have also colored the stretching of academic discourse to date. In the case of Indonesia, many studies have stated that the commitment of Muslims to democracy is one of the factors that determines the suitability of Islam and democracy in this country. Several arguments state that this acceptance cannot be separated from that of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and other mainstream Islamic organizations (Mujani, 2007). In addition, the tolerant political culture of Indonesian Muslims has also become fertile ground for democracy (Azra, 2016; Hefner, 2011; Schneier, 2016).

All studies on the relationship between Islam and democracy to date tend to state that the commitment of Muslims to democracy is still quite high. This can be seen from several surveys from the 2000s to the

present which found the high commitment of Muslims to democracy. However, there are still few who look beyond the model and to what extent Muslim acceptance of democracy. This survey contributes to the context of this academic debate.

This survey also found that Muslim commitment to democracy is still quite high. This can be seen from the majority of Muslim teachers, 67.31%, disagree with the statement that democracy is not in line with Islamic teachings (see Table 24). Likewise, if it is sorted from the answers of teachers under two different ministries. There is no significant difference regarding this. A total of 67.62% of teachers under the MORA and 67.23% of teachers under the MOEC stated that democracy is compatible with Islam. Thus, the difference is around 0.39% where the MORA teachers are more than the MOEC teachers.

Table 24
"Democracy, with the principle that supreme sovereignty in the hands of the people is not in the hands of God, is not compatible with Islamic teachings."


The same trend can be seen at all levels of education. An average of over 65% of teachers at all levels of education agree that democracy is compatible with Islamic teachings. The highest acceptance of conformity

between democracy and Islamic teachings is high school level teachers (67.73%), then elementary school level teachers (67.72%), followed by kindergarten level teachers (69.48%), and finally junior high school teachers. (65.16%). Although junior high school teachers support less than Muslim teachers who teach at other levels of education, the figures are tolerable as a similar trend where their support for democracy is still quite high.

The support of Muslim teachers for democracy can also be seen from their support for the participation of Muslims in democratic processes, especially democratic elections. As many as 89.66% of teachers, at the national level data level, do not agree with the statement that Muslims do not need to participate in the democratic process (elections and others) (see Table 25). If interpreted with reverse logic, then this percentage represents the support of Muslim teachers that Muslims need to participate in the democratic process. Once again, this proves that the commitment of Muslims to democracy is quite high.

Table 25
Muslims do not need to participate in the democratic process
(elections, etc.)

Agree **10.34%**

Teachers

Disagree **89.66%**

The data above can also be interpreted that Muslim teachers still believe that democratic processes are a good way to run the country. Regardless of whether their aspirations are ideological, namely the accommodation of Islamic teachings by the state in legislative work, or rational reasons for the broader public interest, the fact is that these goals are believed to have to go through a democratic process. This view is important to avoid violent means for ideological purposes that are

practiced by movements acting in the name of Islam. This attitude is important to maintain as a moderating capital for Indonesian Muslims.

The data also show that the value of democracy with the principle that supreme power is not in the hands of God is still considered in line with Islamic teachings. However, it is necessary to investigate further whether their acceptance of democracy is based on these principles. In the context of voter behavior, not the elite, they may not understand more deeply the difference in the principle of sovereignty between democracy and Islam. For example, they might understand that the compatibility between Islam and democracy is limited to a matter of deliberation *(shura)*. This means that Muslim teachers' knowledge of democracy is still superficial, or is still limited to procedural democracy, not democracy that is substantial in nature. This may still be a big challenge for the consolidation of Indonesian democracy. Cases of intolerance are not impossible due to a superior understanding of Indonesian Muslims towards democracy.

Civil Islam? Support for Majority's Supremacy

The survey findings in the previous section have confirmed that the support of Muslim teachers for Indonesia and democracy is still high. However, this study looks further at how the model is and the extent of the acceptance. Knowing these two things is important to see how the political culture of Muslim teachers in Indonesia actually is. The findings of this study indicate that teacher acceptance of the nation-state and democracy is still in the form of abstract concepts. Even Muslim teachers' understanding of democracy is still superficial. A more substantial democracy, in which the equal rights of all citizens is recognized and upheld, is less part of the attitude of teachers.

The aforementioned conditions have led Indonesian Muslims to a political culture of "majoritarianism." The survey data show that although teachers' support for the Indonesian nation-state and democracy is very high, this support stands on the principle of their supremacy as the majority. This means that the nation-state and democracy that is run must provide great privileges and benefits to Muslims as the majority. The political culture of "majoritarianism" is fundamentally incompatible with the concept of a modern nation-state and substantial democracy which emphasizes equal rights for all citizens, regardless of religion and belief. The strong aspiration for the application of Islamic law and support for state policy to prioritize Muslims is evidence of this political culture.

First, regarding the relationship between Islam and nations, the data show that 75% of teachers agree with the statement that governance based on Islamic law, and under religious leaders, is the best for this nation. When viewed from the distribution of teachers in both ministries, the data also show the same trend. An average of 75% of Muslim teachers in both ministries agree with this statement. Uniquely, teachers in the MOEC have a slightly higher level of support (75.21%) compared to teachers in the MORA (74.16%), a difference of around 1.05% (see Table 26). These ministry-level data go in line with findings on teacher support for democracy. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake further research on why teachers in public schools have stronger aspirations for leadership based on Islamic law.

Table 26
"A government based on Islamic law and under the leadership of religious experts is best for the country."

One important finding from this survey concerns teacher support for the application of Islamic law and religious leadership for the state, namely teachers at the kindergarten level provide the highest contribution of support. Kindergarten level teachers who support this statement amount to 87.15%. This figure is far above the support of teachers at other levels. After kindergarten teachers, the second biggest support comes from elementary level teachers (75.10%), then high school (73.68%), and finally junior high school teachers (71.05%).

Kindergarten teachers' support--which tends to be greater than teachers at other levels of education--can be explained for two reasons. First, teachers at the kindergarten level tend to have fewer educational qualifications than teachers teaching at the higher level. This condition causes teachers at this level to have less critical power towards the developing Islamic discourse whereas their religious understanding

tends to be literal (Nasuhi, Makruf, Umam, & Darmadi, 2018). Second, teachers at the kindergarten level tend to receive less attention from the state than teachers at the education level above. Kindergarten teachers tend to lack the provision of training to improve their professionalism. In addition, their income from being kindergarten teachers also tends to be very low. In this context, the state's attention to kindergarten teachers determines the extent of their affection or feelings for the state.

As found in the theme of Islam and nationhood, although their acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state can be said to be final, it is based on their supremacy as the majority religion--likewise in the relationship between Islam and democracy. Previously, in this section we have seen that their support for democracy is still high, but it is also still based on the basis or to the extent that democracy provides greater supremacy to Muslims, especially in public affairs.

Table 27 shows that Muslim teachers want the representatives of the people who are elected in the democratic process to fight for Islamic law. The data at the national level show that 51.79% agree with the statement that the general election should only be to elect representatives of the people who understand and fight for the upholding of Islamic teachings in Indonesia. This shows that the democracy process is considered to have contributed to the application of Islamic teachings in Indonesia. Favoritism towards one religion in democracy is not justified in a modern democratic and nation-state system; all citizens must be treated equally regardless of their religious background, race, ethnicity, and even sexual orientation.

Table 27
"General elections should only be to elect representatives
of the people who understand and fight for the upholding of Islamic
teachings in Indonesia."

The data are also consistent at the teacher level in the two main ministries. On average, over 51% of Muslim teachers agree that the representatives they elect must be those who understand and fight for Islamic teachings. Although the difference can be considered minute (0.18%), teachers under the MOEC (51.83%) agree with this statement more than teachers under the MORA (51.65%). Interesting data can also be seen from the level of education. The survey results show that teachers at the TK/RA level are the ones who agree with this statement the most (56.63%), then high school level teachers (at 53.55%), followed by teachers at the SD level (51.57%). Teachers at the junior secondary level show relatively less support than other level teachers, namely (48.50%).

When seen from their views on matters relating to public policy, the results are similar. The attitude that Muslims should receive special treatment is evident in the results of this survey. Although the value is below 50%, their support for the statement that Muslims should have the main rights in public affairs can be said to be quite large. As many as 44.65% of Muslim teachers agree that in public services Muslims

should be prioritized (see Table 28). Once again, this attitude actually contradicts democratic values, which require equal rights for all citizens in public affairs. Such an attitude can be called the potential for radicalism because of the limits of tolerance in democracy, namely when it comes to public affairs.

Table 28
"In public services, Muslims should be prioritized."

Agree
9.00%

Disagree
55.35%

The findings of this study provide both a challenge and a critique of the concept of citizenship in the Indonesian Muslim community as referred to by Hefner (2011) as "Civil Islam." The political culture of Indonesian Muslims which he calls is different from the pattern of Muslim diversity in other areas, namely tolerance, diversity, and a high culture of participation, to a certain degree less contextual when seen from the facts of the political culture of "majoritarianism" of Indonesian Muslims. Such a political culture has the potential to be very vulnerable to acts of intolerance. The findings of this research have confirmed their view that the nation-state and democracy must be run to provide greater supremacy to Muslims, including in state public affairs and policies.

Towards a Citizenship Culture

The views of Muslim teachers on the relationship between Islam, nationality, and democracy form a consistent pattern of attitudes, namely in the form of a political culture of majoritarianism. Their strong acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state and democracy is considered to be in line with the position of Islam as the majority religion in Indonesia. This can be seen from the results of this study. In a more abstract concept, Muslim teachers assert harmony between Islamic values, the concept of the Indonesian nation-state, and the democratic

system. On the other hand, the data also show Muslim teachers feel that Muslims should get priority in public affairs compared to members of other religions. It is also considered that a democratic system must produce leaders who can apply Islamic law.

It can be presumed that this political culture of majoritarianism arose from the splitting of Muslim identity between parts of the nation-state and the *"ummah."* Basically, it is necessary to re-examine how their knowledge of the concepts of the nation-state and democracy. The author suspects that the attitude of majoritarianism is the result of their lack of understanding of the concept of the nation-state and democracy. So, both are viewed abstractly in harmony with Islam. However, if it is collided with more practical issues, especially those dealing with public affairs, this support is inconsistent with the concept of a modern nation-state and democracy that stands on the basis of equality. This culture of majoritarianism is actually a result that cannot be separated from the nation-state building process in which Islam occupies a special position in the Indonesian nation-state. They think that Islam cannot come from the state and nation, and must get supremacy higher than other religions.

The culture of majoritarianism has consequences for the implementation of the Indonesian nation-state and democracy. The Indonesian nation-state which should prioritize the equality of all citizens seems to be continuing to give a special position to Muslims. We are witnessing that the government is currently providing special scholarships for *santri* through the LPDP scholarship assistance scheme. Furthermore, the DPR is also discussing a bill on pesantren, the consequence of which is that the state must contribute to finance the operations of pesantren in Indonesia. Favoritism towards one religion apart from contradicting the principles of democracy and the modern nation-state, it is also not good for religious harmony. There is a potential for people of other faiths to feel discriminated against in state policies because they do not provide equal rights and opportunities to all citizens regardless of their identity.

Based on the explanation in this study, the state must carry out policy interventions by strengthening teachers' insights regarding the more substantive concepts of nationality and democracy. This can be done through strengthening in the curriculum, textbooks, and training. This step is in order to ensure that teachers have the knowledge that all citizens have equal rights and opportunities in the state. This is also an attempt

to strengthen a tolerant attitude towards adherents of other religions or beliefs, which is one of the requirements of a modern nation-state. Thus, it is hoped that Muslim teachers can become state instruments to on the one hand strengthen students' understanding of the Indonesian nations, on the other hand, they will also become agents that nurture tolerance and maintain diversity in the young generation. This step is important to take to change the form of the major political culture of the Indonesian Muslim community into a culture of citizenship in line with the modern state concept of substantive democratic values.

Teacher Demographics and Potentials of Radicalism

The demographics of school/madrasa teachers are one of the driving factors that need to be seen in detecting potential radicalism. Certainly, the hope is that by looking at these driving factors the right response in overcoming the potential of radicalism among school/madrasa teachers can be done. This paper describes demographic factors as one of the factors that are considered in looking at the mapping of intolerance and radicalism among teachers. The factors include gender, level of education, teacher profiles, teacher employment status, teacher certification, and teacher income. Two other factors that encourage intolerance and radicalism are Islamic views as well as sources of knowledge and Islamic mass organizations will be discussed in another chapter.

The findings of these demographic factors are based on a survey conducted by PPIM in 2018 by looking at the portrait of the understanding and attitude of diversity of teachers and measuring the level of their radicalism. The survey looked at teachers affiliated under the auspices of the MOEC and MORA. This survey covers teachers at the TK/RA, SD/MI, SMP/MTs, and SMA/SMK/MA levels. This survey was conducted on 2,237 teachers with a composition of 1,335 women (59.79%) and 898 men (40.21%).

Gender

Data regarding gender segregation are separated to see radical opinion and the intention of radical action that occurs between women and men. These data are also disaggregated on the basis of where these teachers teach either in schools under the MOEC or and madrasas under the MORA.

The survey results show that national female teachers have more

radical views/opinions, namely 54.1% compared to male teachers, namely 34.0%. These data can be seen in Table 29.

Table 29
Radical Views/Opinions of School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia by gender

■ Females ■ Males

	Females	Males
Very Moderate	4.4%	8.7%
Moderate	41.4%	57.2%
Radical	46.5%	30.7%
Very Radical	7.6%	3.3%

Not only radical perspective/opinion, the percentage of female teachers nationally with the intention or desire to take radical action is 48.8%. This percentage is more than that of male teachers, which amounts to 30.0%, as can be seen in Table 30.

Table 30
The Intention of radical actions of school/Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia by gender

■ Females ■ Males

	Females	Males
Very Moderate	4.0%	10.4%
Moderate	47.2%	59.7%
Radical	42.4%	26.5%
Very Radical	6.4%	3.5%

When school teachers are separated from madrasa teachers, a similar pattern is found: more female madrasa teachers, as illustrated in Table 31, have radical perspectives (55.6%) and even 8.8% are considered very radical. This is a significant number compared to male madrasa teachers, 33.6% of whom having radical views.

The intention of the action in carrying out a radical action, as in Table 32, is in line with the opinion but with a slightly lower percentage. Female madrasa teachers have more intentions of radical action (52.8%) than male madrasa teachers (28.4%).

Table 31
Radical Perspectives/Opinions of Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia by gender

■ Females   ■ Males

	Females	Males
Very Moderate	4.6%	8.2%
Moderate	39.8%	58.2%
Radical	46.8%	29.8%
Very Radical	8.8%	3.8%

Table 32
The Intention of radical actions of Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia by gender

■ Females   ■ Males

	Females	Males
Very Moderate	5.1%	9.1%
Moderate	42.1%	62.5%
Radical	43.5%	23.1%
Very Radical	9.3%	5.3%

Table 33 and Table 34 show the same pattern seen again when looking at the population of school teachers who are under the MOEC. Significantly more female school teachers have a radical viewpoint (53.9%) when compared to male teachers (34.2%). In line with the opinion, the number of female school teachers who have the intention of radical action is also greater (48.1%) than male teachers (30.4%).

Table 33
Radical Perspectives/Opinions of School Teachers in
Indonesia by gender

■Females ■Males

	Females	Males
Very Moderate	4.4%	8.8%
Moderate	41.7%	57.0%
Radical	46.5%	31.0%
Very Radical	7.4%	3.2%

Table 34
Intentions of Actions of School Teachers in Indonesia by Gender

■Females ■Males

	Females	Males
Very Moderate	3.8%	10.7%
Moderate	48.2%	58.8%
Radical	42.2%	27.5%
Very Radical	5.9%	2.9%

Broadly speaking, there is a significant relationship between gender and radical thought patterns and intentions of action. There are more female teachers who teach in general schools under the MOEC and madrasa under the MORA, who have a radical mindset and action intention when compared to male teachers. This of course needs special attention given that nationally the number of female teachers is more than male teachers. In addition, the role of women as mothers in the domestic sphere, which places them as child caregivers, is of course very crucial. This high radical mindset and action intention enables female teachers to convey their ideas not only to students at school, but also to the children at home.

The special attention that needs to be given to this women's group shows that the approach to changing the perspective and intention of radical action does not only need to respond to women as a group that has high support for radicalism. So far, there is an assumption that women as actors

who can promote peace because of their nurturing nature and men tend to be seen as closer to radical actions as a manifestation of masculinity. Thus, the approach to changing the perspective and intention of radical action by teachers can not only target one particular gender, but both genders: women and men. One approach that can be used is a gender transformative approach that challenges gender norms, promotes social and political positions that influence women in society by understanding the inequalities of power that exist between genders. This approach makes it possible to also reveal why women are more likely to have more radical perspectives and intentions of action than men.

Teacher and Education Unit Level

Data on levels of education units are seen on the basis of the level of educational institutions in which teachers teach, namely TK/RA, SD/MI, SMP/MTs, and SMA/SMK/MA. The description of the survey data can be seen in Table 35, which shows nationally that teachers in Indonesia at the TK/RA level (61.8%) do have radical perspectives, followed by teachers at SD/MI level (58.0%), SMP/MTs (41.2%), and SMA/SMK/MA (38.8%).

Table 35
Radical Perspectives/Opinions of School and Madrasa Teachers in
Indonesia by Education Unit

The teacher population is grouped based on the ministry that supervises it, it is found as shown in Table 36 that teachers under the MOEC have the same pattern as the national data. Teachers teaching at the early education level under the MOEC have a significantly more radical outlook. The lower the level of education the more radical the way

the teacher views it. The data show that 61.8% of kindergarten teachers have a radical viewpoint, followed by elementary school teachers (48%); SMP (41.2%); and the lowest was for high school teachers at 38.8%.

Meanwhile, for madrasa teachers under the guidance of the MORA, it is found that most of the madrasa teachers at the Raudhatul Athfal (RA) level have radical perspectives, namely 62.1%. Meanwhile, for the level of Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), and Madrasa Aliyah (MA), each has 40.4%; 43.5%, and 41.0% teachers who have radical perspectives/viewpoints. The magnitude is approximately the same at these three levels of education. Although, the data on MORA teachers are not statistically significant (p> 0.05), in general it can be seen that more than half of the population of teachers in early education such as TK and RA have radical perspectives. As for other levels of education, although teachers with moderate thinking are found in a greater number, the percentage of teachers with radical thinking is still high, more than a third of the population.

Table 36
Radical Perspectives/Opinions of School Teachers (MOEC)
by Education Unit

In general, the perspective is followed by the desire to take a certain action. This survey also measured the desire or intention of the teachers to take radical actions. It is found that the procured national data are in line with the data concerning the patterns of opinions or perspectives. Table 37 illustrates that teachers at the early education level (TK/RA and SD/MI in Indonesia, nationally) make the most teachers with the intention or desire to take radical actions--respectively 55% and 42.6%,

compared to teachers at higher education levels, SMP/MTs. (34.3%) and SMA/MA (38.7%).

Table 37
The Intention of Radical Action of School/Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia by Education Unit

The same pattern is found when the population of teachers is segregated based on the auspices of the respective ministry, namely the MOEC and the MORA. Table 38 illustrates that almost more than half of teachers at the kindergarten education level have the desire to take radical actions, namely 54.7%. Significant numbers of teachers are also found at the SD level (42.8%) and SMA (41.4%). Meanwhile, for SMP only 33.8% of teachers have the intention to take radical actions. This number is still quite large.

Meanwhile, as regards madrasa teachers, it is found that teachers under the MORA also have the intention or desire to take radical actions, especially for early education madrasa teachers, namely RA and MI. RA seems to have detected the most radical opinions. Similarly, with regard to the intention of action, 56% of RA madrasa teachers have radical action intention. Meanwhile, for the percentage for MI is 41%. Madrasa teachers with more moderate action intentions are found in MTs and MA. It is found that 35.7% of MTs teachers and 38.8% of MA teachers have the desire to take radical action. However, these data on the teacher population under MORA are not statistically significant.

Table 38
The Intention of Radical Action for School Teachers (MOEC)
by Education Unit

■ Kindergarten ■ Elementary School ■ Junior High School ■ Senior High School

	Very Radical	Radical	Moderate	Very Moderate
Senior High School	3.8%	35.0%	53.1%	8.1%
Junior High School	3.5%	30.3%	57.7%	8.5%
Elementary School	4.9%	37.9%	51.7%	5.5%
Kindergarten	8.9%	45.8%	42.1%	3.2%

The survey finds that the higher the level of education is, the more moderate the teachers are who teach it. Thus, special attention needs to be given to teachers at the early education unit level, namely kindergarten and elementary school.

Teacher Profiles

Other demographic data seen are teacher profiles based on the subjects being taught. These teachers teach a wide variety of subjects. In these data, they are grouped into subject teachers: languages; mathematics and natural sciences (MIPA); social studies (IPS) and history; PAI (Islamic Education and manners; arts and crafts; guidance and counseling; classroom teachers; principals (who do not teach classes); and other subjects. The largest number of respondents who are filtered in this survey are class teachers, at 28.2%. These class teachers generally teach at the SD/MI grade 1, 2, and 3, they teach almost all lessons to students. The second largest proportion is Islamic Education and Character teachers as much as 19.6%, followed by language subject teachers (14.1%) and Mathematics and Natural Sciences (13.4%). The sample population below 10% are school principals (9.2%); arts and skills teachers (6.9%); social studies and history teachers (6.5%); and BK teachers (guidance and counseling) as much as 1.7%. Only 0.4% of the population is grouped in other subjects excluding those listed above.

Based on the opinion of these teachers who come from different backgrounds, 46% of teachers who teach both schools and madrasas (nationally) have radical perspectives. This forty-six percent is quite big, almost half of the sample population. Of that percentage, 5.9% are in

the very radical category. Percentages within clusters are also as high. More than half of art teachers (51.3%), language teachers (50.6%), and classroom teachers (50.4%) have radical perspectives. Similarly, teachers of other subjects also score high: PAI and character building (46.8%); and natural sciences (MIPA) (41.8%); meanwhile, school principals (41.5%) also indicate a fairly high percentage of almost half of the population. On the other hand, social studies and history teachers as well as guidance and counseling teachers, according to the survey results, have more moderate views. Only a third (29.4%) of the social studies and history teachers of the population have radical views; 28.2% of the population of BK teachers have radical views. These national data prove to be statistically significant, as can be seen as graphs in Table 39.

Table 39
Radical Perspectives/Opinions of School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia based on Teacher Profiles

When the teacher population is grouped according to the parent ministry that houses the teachers, a more or less the same pattern is obtained. Of the madrasa teachers under MORA, more than half of the population is arts and skills teachers (52.1%); MIPA (51.1%); classroom teachers (50.9%); even 66.6% of the guidance and counseling teachers still have radical views. Meanwhile, teachers of other subjects are more likely to have moderate views but still high who have radical views, namely, 47.2% language teachers and 40.6% Islamic Education teachers. In madrasa principals, it is found that most of them have moderate views, more than one third of the population with radical views (37.5%). The same thing happens to social studies and history teachers, 30% of whom have a radical view. Although the data on madrasa teachers under MORA are not statistically significant, they picture a situation that must be considered.

Meanwhile, for school teachers under the auspices of the MOEC, again arts and skills teachers and classroom teachers are detected--amounting more than half of the population (51.1% and 50.3%)–as having radical perspectives. Such highly radical perspectives are also detected in language teachers (51.3%); PAI teachers (48.6%); principals (42.4%); and MIPA (40.2%). The same is true for madrasa teachers: their social studies and history teachers are the most moderate, which makes one-third of the population of teachers with radical views, namely 29.3%. Of the whole school teachers, BK teachers have the least radical perspectives (25%). These data on school teachers from the MOEC are statistically significant.

Now that the perspectives or opinions of school and madrasa teachers have been discussed based on their profiles, how about their intention in manifesting their perspectives? It turns out that the teachers' desire or intention of action to realize their perspectives is in line with their opinion. Teachers with radical perspectives--art and skills teacher (59.7%); language teachers (44.3%); class teachers (43.9%); PAI and character-building teachers (41.9%) --also do have high intentions for radical actions. The rest of the teachers have moderate action intentions. This is reflected in the respective percentage of those with radical action-intentions, namely: 38.1% of Mathematics and Natural Sciences teachers; 36.6% of school principals; 29.5% social studies and history teachers; and 28.2% BK teachers. These national school/madrasa teacher data are presented in Table 40.

The same pattern is found by looking at the data on school teachers who only serve under the MOEC and not elsewhere. The profiles of teachers with the most radical action intentions significantly reflect the national picture, namely: arts and skills teachers (46.5%); language (45.3%); PAI and manners (34.3%); classroom teachers (43.4%); MIPA (37%); principals (35.2%); social studies and history (27.6%); and counseling teachers (25%).

Table 40

Intention of Action of School/Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia based on Teacher Profiles

Overall, the data on the perspective based on the subjects taught show that almost half of the sample population (46%) have radical opinions. Moreover, more than half (50.4%) of the population of class teachers authorized to teach a whole class at the MI/SD grade 1, 2 and 3 have perspectives. Obviously, these findings need to be taken seriously considering that classroom teachers are dominant figures who always appear in front of students during the first 3 years of student education. This makes it possible for class teachers to have a greater influence on their students. This finding also shows that there is a correlation between the level of early education units (in this context, elementary school teachers) who tend to have radical perspectives and intentions of action, to be more specific, namely teachers in grades 1, 2, and 3. Thus, we also cannot close our eyes that nearly half of the sample population based on the subjects taught have radical perspectives. Apart from these class teachers, the second layer of teachers with radical perspectives that need to be changed are teachers of other subjects.

Teacher Employment Status

School or madrasa teachers in Indonesia can have either one of 4 types of employment statuses: civil servants (PNS), full-time non-PNS teachers, full-time foundation teachers, and temporary or honorary teachers. PNS teachers, as state officials, naturally have a clearer hierarchical status and are more established than other teachers. PNS teachers in Indonesia can be under the auspices of the MOEC if they are teachers at public school level from the Early Childhood Education (PAUD), Kindergarten, Junior High and High School levels. Teachers

can also be under the auspices of the MORA if they are madrasa teachers from RA level to Madrasah Aliyah (MA) level.

The survey data based on those teacher statuses show that the perspectives and action intentions of most civil servant teachers under the MORA and MOEC are the most moderate. Meanwhile, teachers with non-civil servant status, full-time foundation teachers, and honorary teachers need to be watched out for because most of them have radical perspectives.

It can be seen in Table 41 that, nationally, teachers with civil servant status are more moderate in perspective (39% radical) compared to teachers with non-PNS permanent employment status (57.8% radical); remain foundations (52.6% radical); and temporary teachers (51.1% radial).

The same pattern is found when only analyzing teachers who work solely under the auspices of the MORA. Civil servant teachers have the most moderate point of view, 34.3% of them have radical views. Meanwhile, for other statuses, the most radical are part-time/honorary teachers (61.5%); full time teachers of foundations (43.8%); and non-PNS teachers (39.4%).

However, the pattern is different once we look at the teachers under the auspices of the MOEC, in fact many teachers with civil servant status have radical views/views (54.7%) compared to teachers with other employment statuses; 42.8% of non-PNS teachers with radical opinions; followed by part-time/honorary teachers at 38.8%; and full-time foundation teachers, being the lowest at 33.8%. These perspectives need to be investigated further to see the causes and to be confirmed by looking at the action-intentions of the teachers. Is their perspective followed by a desire to do something radical?

Table 41
Opinions of School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia based on Teacher Employment Status

As far as the desire or intention to take radical action or action is concerned, the national data confirm the opinion data above. Teachers with civil servant status are mostly moderate in their intentions of action, 33.7% of them have radical intentions. Compared to teachers with other status, Civil Servant (PNS) teachers are the most moderate. Part-time teachers who have radical action intentions amount to 49.9%; followed by full-time foundation teachers at 44.5% and non-PNS teachers at 45.2%.

The same picture is also seen for teachers under the MORA. In line with his opinion description, MORA teachers with civil servant status are the most moderate compared to others, 29.9% who have the intention of radical action. Meanwhile, teachers with non-permanent or non-permanent status are the ones with the most radical action intentions, namely 60.3%, followed by full-time foundation teachers (39.5%) and non-PNS teachers (33.8%), who have the desire to take radical actions.

An interesting thing is shown in the results of the data analysis regarding the action intentions of teachers under the MOEC (Table 42). Although in terms of opinion or the point of view of teachers with civil servant status, they are more radical, but the intention of action is that the PNS teachers are the most moderate. How opinion thoughts are only at the level of opinion, different from the desire when you want to take an action. Meanwhile, data on other aspects have actually increased: at opinion level they are not too radical but at intention of action level, they become more radical. The increased percentages in the level of action intention compared to their opinion occur in non-PNS teachers (49.2% radical); full-time foundation teachers (47.5% radical); and temporary teachers (47.8% radical).

Table 42
The Intention of Action of School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia
Based on Teacher Employment Status

Overall, the data show that teachers with full time employment status are non-PNS, remain foundations, and honorary have a radical viewpoint than those with PNS status. This is in line with the intention of radical action, where the teachers with civil servant status are more moderate (only 33.7% of teachers have radical intent). Teachers under the auspices of the MORA, civil servant teachers 34.3% have radical views and teachers with other status are more radical than them, namely temporary/honorary teachers (61.5%); full time teachers from foundations (43.8%); and non-PNS teachers (39.4%). In line with his opinion portrait, teachers with PNS status are more moderate than teachers with other statuses. Teachers under the auspices of the MOEC, PNS teachers have a radical viewpoint (54.7%) compared to other employment statuses. However, for teachers under the auspices of the MOEC, opinion and the intention of radical action are not in line. In the intent of the action, the MOEC's civil servant teachers are the most moderate. This shows that radical opinion does not necessarily indicate that someone will intend to take radical action.

Teacher Certification

Not all teachers are certified. Apart from being competency-oriented, certification is a measure of teacher reliability because being certified means that there is an additional allowance from the government.

The survey results show that, nationally, uncertified teachers have a radical perspective and desire to act, compared to those who are not yet certified. As can be seen in Tables 43 and 44, 53.3% of teachers who are not certified have a radical viewpoint and 48.7% of them have the desire or intention to take radical action.

Table 43
Opinions of School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia Based on Teacher Certification Status

■ Certified ■ Uncertified

	Certified	Uncertified
Very Moderate	6.9%	5.4%
Moderate	53.3%	41.3%
Radical	34.8%	46.3%
Very Radical	5.0%	7.0%

Analyzed on the bases of their ministry affiliation, uncertified teachers under both the MORA and MOEC are more radical in both their opinion and intention than those certified. Nearly half them (49.5%) under the auspices of the MORA have radical opinions and 46.1% of them intend to take radical actions as well. As for teachers under the MOEC, 54.2% have radical perspectives and 49.4% are prone to taking radical actions.

Table 44
Intention of Action for School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia
Based on Teacher Certification Status

Certified ▪ Uncertified

	Certified	Uncertified
Very Moderate	7.4%	5.7%
Moderate	57.8%	45.6%
Radical	30.1%	42.7%
Very Radical	4.7%	6.0%

This is in line with the finding that the economic level of teachers or teachers' income affects their opinion and intention of radical action.

Teacher income

The survey results show that the greater the teacher's income, the more moderate the teacher. Teachers who earn less than one million rupiah per month have the highest point of view and intention of radical action. This phenomenon is found in national data, as well as at the MORA and MOEC level teachers. Social economic factors clearly influence the perspective and action intention of teachers in Indonesia.

Table 45

Opinions of School/Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia based on Teacher's Economic Status

Table 46

Intention of Action of School and Madrasa Teachers in Indonesia based on Teacher's Economic Status

In conclusion, the importance of the role of teachers in shaping the perspective and character of the students they teach needs special attention by policy makers and non-governmental organizations who work to prevent radical perspectives and action intentions. Research conducted by PPIM shows that based on gender demographic characteristics, female teachers tend to have radical perspectives and action intentions compared to male teachers. Although the causes cannot be explored in this study, a gender transformative approach in responding to these findings makes it possible to reveal the causes. Based on the level of educational units, the lower the level of educational units (kindergarten and elementary school), the more they tend to have a radical perspective and action intention. Based on the subjects taught, half of the sample population supports radical perspectives and

intentions of action. Half of the class teachers have a radical perspective and intention of action. This correlates with previous findings that the level of education units is low (in this case MI/SD), has a radical perspective and intention of action. Specifically, this relates to classroom teachers teaching grades 1, 2, and 3.

Based on the employment status, full time non-PNS teachers, full-time foundation teachers, and honorary teachers do have a radical viewpoint, unlike their counterparts with PNS status. This is in line with their intention on radical action: PNS teachers are more moderate (only 33.7% of them have radical intention). This research also found that income levels and ownership of certification do influence their radical opinion and action intentions. This latter finding also allows for a correlation between PNS statuses and income levels. PNS teachers have a more stable income than their non-PNS counterparts. This being said, it should be noted that non-PNS teachers can get additional income through possession of teacher certifications. These findings show that one's economic level does affect one's view and intention with regard to radical actions.

Chapter 4

Social Media and Affiliations with Islamic Organizations

According to Jewkes (2011) in "Media and Crime", half of the members of radical organizations in Saudi Arabia are recruited through the internet network. The internet is known as an effective propaganda tool due partly to the ease in getting information. Also, the internet has no rules in its use. Readers can read anything on the internet, including reading about religions that have no clear basis. Readers who have limited knowledge of religion do not rule out the possibility of absorbing information without being able to filter it first. This, in turn, may contribute to acts of intolerance and radicalism.

Nowadays, the internet serves as one of the most extensive media that present news about intolerance and terrorism. According to Dolnik (2007), broadcasting terrorist acts that are not accompanied by comprehensive information has created more terrorist followers. The organization that carried out the action earned the nickname resolute actor and received sympathy from the international community which did not want to understand the reasons behind its action.

In Indonesia, almost all internet users--from young to old, from entrepreneurial workers, teachers, students, employees, consultant services, factory workers, to housewives--can access the internet freely (APJII, 2018), all information wide open. They are free to find and share the information they get. In fact, not a few teachers in schools in Indonesia access information on social media to increase their knowledge.

The 2018 Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII) survey shows that internet users in Indonesia continue to increase every year. In 2018 there were around 171.17 million internet users. In summary, around 54.8% of the total population of 264.16 million

Indonesians are internet users. Judging by the percentage of internet users per island, Java is in the first position with the amount of 55.7%; then Sumatra as much as 21.6%; followed by Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua, namely 10.9%; Kalimantan (6.6%); Bali and Nusa Tenggara (5.2%). Then the three things most frequently accessed by internet users in Indonesia are communication via messages (24.7%); social media (18.9%), and seeking work-related information (11.5%).

Internet users can also easily access via cell phones (handphone) because it is more mobile and dynamic. This sophistication can satisfy their thirst for a variety of information, including religious information, that they need. For example, they sent each other hadiths as well as religious advice, religious symbols, shared friendly videos of *ustadz* and other facilities that had never been obtained before. This phenomenon illustrates that the existence of social media cannot be denied, and that people find their trust in it. The internet is a boundless space that makes it easy for people to connect and interact with one another, carefree and are very egalitarian. Mark C. Taylor argues that the internet is a complex maze like the shadow of God (Taylor, 2001).

In the book Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet, editors Lorne Dawson and Douglas Cowan explain the difference between "religion online" and "online religion." Online religion is defined as information related to religion on the internet, while online religion is religious experience and religious practice on the internet (Dawson & Cowan, 2004). The book also elaborates on religious relationships online and offline, and the impact of religion on the internet as a new space for religious practice and expression.

In Indonesia, the increasing number of internet users has made it easier for them to learn about religious issues. Even many *ustadz* in the village or in messages have lost their relevance to "google cleric or google *kiai*", they only type in the keywords they are looking for and then "click" then hundreds or even millions of words appear related to religious issues, without having to wait long and without fear. The flexibility that this technological sophistication has helps individuals and communities facilitate forms of meditation in influencing religious practice.

Therefore, the spread of sacred religious ideas on the internet easily affects their religious perceptions and religious behavior. It is undeniable that people who are interested in waging jihad in Syria and joining ISIS are because they access the internet by reading blogs related

to jihadi, watching videos of warfare, where the video also describes the intimidation that the West has perpetrated against the people. Islam, and they also watched tutorials on making bombs and assembling firearms. From these incidents, they moved them to carry out acts of terror by means of suicide bombings (brides). Some of them went to Syria for jihad. Why did this happen? because one of the strengths of social media is that it is able to sublimate one's awareness.

Social Media as Teachers' Source of Knowledge

Social media as a source of religious knowledge can be further explored from the data from the 2018 national survey "Diminishing Lights: The Religious Portrait of Indonesian Teachers", which involved 2,237 Muslim teachers from TK/RA, SD/MI levels, SMP/MTS, and SMA/MA. Based on the survey data we find that social media are the most favored by teachers for finding sources of religious knowledge. This can be seen as an era in which humans have relied on the sophistication of communication technology in disseminating messages; this is the basis for computer-mediated communication (CMC) in the dissemination of religious messages.

This survey posits several questions that are submitted to Muslim teachers in Indonesia regarding the use of social media as a source of knowledge to obtain religious information. The questions include the availability of internet access, internet access on mobile phones, frequency of internet use, use of social media applications, sites that are frequently visited, who are role models, how often they follow the fatwas of a figure, and what are the activities of Muslim teachers on the social media.

Social Media Studies

Several studies try to explore the relationship between social media and religion. Religion is believed to be a profane holy entity, which is always intriguing to see because religion can exist in the world not because of religion but because religious people make religion the attention of intellectuals.

First, a study from Nava Nuraniyah related to "online extremism: the advent of encrypted private chat groups" explains that extremist groups are like political activists who use the internet to disseminate propaganda messages aimed at getting them to agree to and carry out jihad. by the ISIS terrorist group. This extremist group has conversation

groups on certain social media such as WhatsApp groups and Telegram which are more personal (Nuraniyah, 2017).

Second, Stephen D. O'Leary wrote a journal at the American Academy of Religion with the title "Cyberspace as Sac- red Space: Communicating Religion on Computer Networks." O'Leary saw religious communication that developed from time to time. Starting from the culture of lecturing (orality), writing, printing, electronic media and new media. He also emphasized that the virtual arena is a holy space where communication occurs between religions. Social interaction in the virtual arena occurs in two directions in the dissemination of religious messages (O'Leary, 1996).

Third, Rosalind IJ Hackett's writing on "Religion and the Internet" wants to see this new media used by individuals and religious organizations which then have an impact on conflicts between religions and peace-building in global community networks (Hackett, 2006).

Fourth, Elena Larsen writes "Cyberfaith: How Americans Pursue Religion Online," Larsen points out that approximately 28 million Americans use the internet to obtain religious and spiritual information, even in connection with the search for religion, Larsen calls them "Religion Surfers" (Larsen, 2004).

Fifth, Mia Lovheim's writings related to "Young People, Religious Identity, and the Internet," underlined her findings on the young people in Sweden who use the internet as their interaction space to form their religious identity. She saw how the internet serves as an arena for identity formation (Lovheim, 2004).

### Social Media Survey Findings

The UIN Jakarta Islamic and Community Studies Center (PPIM) survey of Muslim teachers in Indonesia from TK/RA, SD/MI, SMP/MTS, to SMA/MA levels, finds that 82.03% of teachers access the internet, while those who do not access the internet the amount is only 17.97%. This means that Muslim teachers in Indonesia cannot be separated from the internet in their daily lives.

Table 47
Internet Access for Teachers in Indonesia
Do you have access to the internet?

No
17.97%

Yes
82.03%

Many teachers access the internet using various gadgets, although they find it much easier to access the internet on their cellphones. Teachers also cannot stay away from their phones as they often need them to check personal messages on WhatsApp, read news or information via cellphones, and other activities on social media. This survey finds that 98.47% of teachers have internet access on cellphones, and only 1.53% of teachers do not have internet access on cellphones. Thus in sum, most teachers in Indonesia can access the internet easily through their cellphones.

Table 48
Internet access on mobile
Do you have internet access on your handphone?

Yes 98.47%

No 1.53%

As regards the frequency of internet use by teachers in Indonesia, 77.06% of teachers say that they use it "every day." Some teachers respond "not all the time" (22.61%) and the rest say that they "never use the internet at all" (0.33%). This means that social media, especially the internet, is a source for finding information. In addition, teachers are also actively using social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Line, Telegram, Instagram and other social media (97.72%), only 2.28% of teachers do not use social media. Below is its graphical summary:

Table 49
Internet Use by Teachers
How often do you use the internet?

Table 50
Use of Social Media Applications
Are you currently using social media, such as Facebook,
Twitter, WhatsApp, Line, or Instagram?

2,28%

97,72%

● Yes ● No

This social media arena has opened opportunities for teachers to access all the information they want to get, including the opportunity for them to learn about religions through social media. Moreover, social media has presented interesting and varied information with a good appearance. So, finding sources of information related to religious issues is no longer difficult, all problems and solutions have been offered on social media.

In addition, Muslim teachers in Indonesia use the internet to access information about religion at any time (31.22%); 2-3 times a week (30.11%); at least once a month (9.17%); almost never (6.50%); and never (5,56%). This means that religious material taught by the teacher to students may be referred from websites or social media accessed by the teacher. The danger, if the sites accessed by teachers are radical sites, which contain intolerant and radical content. It is even more dangerous if the teacher does not try to filter the information they get, so that what is given by the teacher is accepted by the students.

Table 51
Frequency of Internet Use
How often do you use the internet (include social media)
to access information about Religion?

Although the government, in this case the Ministry of Communication and Information (Kominfo), has blocked sites that are considered radical, many teachers in Indonesia still access these radical websites as their sources of knowledge.[1] The survey results below show that, between radical and non-radical sites, teachers access more radical sites, namely 58.86%. These radical sites include: Voa-Islam.com, Salafy.or.id, Panjimas.com, Nahimunkar. com, Hidayatullah.com, EraMuslim.com, Arrahmah.com. Meanwhile, only 41.14% of teachers access non-radical sites, such as the NU Online site and Suaramuhammadiyah.id.

The case of blocking several sites by Kominfo actually has reaped some pros and cons in the community. The pro opinion states that these sites have spread negative messages in the online media that have led to calls for acts of terror and radicalism. Meanwhile, the contra opinion argues that it is based on freedom of opinion that is protected by the constitution. The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) has asked the Ministry of Information to block sites that are categorized as radical that invite religious and pro-ISIS propaganda.

Based on the survey we find that EraMuslim.com ranks third after NU Online and Suaramuhammadiyah.id as referenced sources of religious knowledge among teachers. In fact, some sites are included in the category of radical sites by BNPT and have been blocked by Kominfo.

Meanwhile, the Hidayatullah.com site ranks fourth after EraMuslim. com. Assuming the teachers read both sites, then their percentage amounts

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1   "Kominfo Sudah Blokir 814.594 Situs Radikal", https://komin- fo.go.id, 6 Agustus 2015

to 12.62%, beating the rate of Suaramuhammadiyah.id popularity (the official website of the Islamic organization Muhammadiyah), which is only accessed by 10.73%.

Table 52
Most Frequented Websites
What website do you frequently access as a referenced source of religious knowledge? choose one of them!

Islamic website frequently accessed by teachers

Religious leaders who become role models for teachers

Apart from looking at the activities and frequency of teachers using the internet, this survey also looked at the tendency of teachers to frequently access the internet to view religious preachers. From the survey results, there are seven religious preachers who are often seen on the internet/social media by Muslim teachers in Indonesia. Among them, in the first place, Muslim teachers in Indonesia chose Ust. Abdul Somad (29.31%) as a figure or ustadz; K.H. Abdullah Gymnastiar (11.63%); Mamah Dedeh (9.66%); then Prof. Dr. Quraish Shihab (5.41%); Ust. Adi Hidayat (3.58%); Ust. Maulana (3.45%), and; KH. Mustofa Bisri (2.9%).

In general, many Muslim teachers in Indonesia view popular lecturers on social media as quite moderate. The survey results show that there is an influence of religious role models on teacher intolerance. Where the greatest average tolerance score is the teacher who makes Prof. Quraish Shihab as a role model for religion. This survey shows that there is an effect of religious role models on tolerance of followers of other religions (F = 3,572, p = 0.000; F = 2.451, p = 0.000), radicalism (F = 5,210, p = 0.000; F = 5,149, p = 0.000) both at the opinion level and the action intention.

Table 53
Ustadz/ustadzah who become role models for
teachers in religious learning

When teachers view and watch religious lecturers on social media, which then become a source of reference in teaching, the teacher also often follows the character's recommendations or fatwas. Teachers who *often* follow fatwas are 56.42%; *very often* 4.17%; while teachers who *rarely* follow the lecturer fatwa amount to 34.91%, and those who *never* do so amount to 4.50%. This means that many teachers in Indonesia take fatwas or recommendations from social-media preachers. It may be that every religious content and fatwa by these preachers are followed by the teachers. The danger lurks from contents that may contain *sara*, despicable, and violent materials. The following is the frequency at which teachers follow the preachers' fatwas.

Table 54
Frequency of following role-model religious figures

One question asked to teachers is: what do you do after receiving information related to religious issues or about Islam? It is found that 44.10% of teachers say they try to "check the truth and share it if necessary;" around 33.48% say they read only modestly without sharing it; 17.80% teachers say they do "share" information related to religion, and 4.62% simply say they ignore it.

Table 55
What teachers do after getting certain information from social media

- ● Share the information
- ● Read only modestly without sharing it.
- ● Check the truth and share it if necessary.
- ● Ignore it.

Effects of Teacher's Proximity to Islamic Organizations

Islamic organizations began to grow in line with the collapse of the New Order in 1998. The end of the New Order was an important momentum for the awakening of Islam in Indonesia, becoming the beginning for the emergence of various groups of new Islamic movements, including radical Islamic movements outside the framework of mainstream Indonesian Islam, such as Nahdlatul Ulama. (NU) and Muhammadiyah.

NU and Muhammadiyah are the two largest Islamic organizations embraced by the people in Indonesia; they are often considered the mainstream of Indonesian Islam. Since the fall of the New Order, these two organizations have struggled to realize moderate Islam in Indonesia, one of which is through education. However, in the midst of religious moderation efforts, the phenomenon of radicalism is actually growing in the world of education. Not only NU and Muhammadiyah, other moderate Islamic organizations in various regions in Indonesia such as Nahdlatul Wathan also took part in fighting for moderate Islam.

As of May 2018, the number of Islamic mass organizations in

Indonesia based on data from the Ministry of Home Affairs was 380,166 organizations.[2] This number is certainly not small, but not all Islamic mass organizations established in Indonesia are in line with the ideals of the Indonesian nation. Many of these organizations wanted to change the form of government (republic) into a caliphate. There are also not a few mass organizations that want to replace all applicable regulations in Indonesia with Islamic law.

According to R. William Liddle, the revival of the Islamic movement in Indonesia referred to as scripturalist Islam is something he has even predicted in the article "Da'wah Media Scripturalism: A Form of Thinking and Political Action of Islam in Indonesia during the New Order Period." According to him, the current political climate has changed after the New Order which was marked by openness and freedom. Scriptural Islam will find a metamorphosis of his resurrection. The three factors that caused the rise of scriptural Islam were that: 1) it is easier for the teachings of the scripturalists to be accepted by most Muslims in Indonesia; 2) Possible political alliances between scripturalists and other social groups are growing; and 3). The passion of ambitious politicians is to build a mass base.

Following are some of the findings released by research institutions in Indonesia related to Islamic mass organizations, the results released show that Islamic organizations have been exposed to radicalism.

First, the Wahid Foundation in its 2014 report entitled "Revisiting the problems of Religious Intolerance, Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesia: a Snapshot", found that out of 230 organizations that had been established since the Old Order era, 147 were identified as Intolerant organizations. , 49 organizations had a tendency towards radicalism, and 34 organizations indicated as terror groups. This network of radical groups has a fairly strong support base in Indonesia and at least three of the 49 radical groups are openly seeking international funding. However, most of these radical organizations have little support in the region and 63% of them only exist at the local level in certain provinces.

Second, the Alvara Research Center with a research entitled "The Portrait of Indonesian Muslim Religion in Jakarta", the findings are that the 3 closest community organizations are NU, Muhammadiyah and FPI. NU has a good image by the Indonesian people because it respects local culture, traditionalists and its teachings are compatible with Indonesia and protects minority groups; while Muhammadiyah

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2   "Mendagri Beberkan Informasi Terbaru Jumlah Ormas di Indonesia," https://www. kemendagri.go.id, Saturday, 12 May 2018.

was imaged as a modern and moderate mass organization; it is different from FPI, which is portrayed as an organization that carries Islamic law and its teachings are rigid and rigid.

Third, Infied conducted a study on tolerance and radicalism in four regions in Indonesia, namely, Tasikmalaya, Jogjakarta, Bojonegoro and Kupang. The finding is that the struggle for influence between Islamic organizations has played a role in producing conservative tendencies and a symptom of intolerance and even radicalism.

Fourth, Wahid Foundation conducted a National Survey of Social-Religious Tolerance Trends among Indonesian Muslim Women. The finding is that 51.7% are anti-radical mass organizations, 39.2 are not in a position and, 9% are pro-radical mass organizations. In addition, women support the right to freedom of religion or belief more than men, and women are less willing to be radicalized.

Fifth, Jamhari in his book "The Image of Women in Islam: The View of Religious Organizations" states that women are an important group in building tolerance and peace. Women were involved in conflict reconciliation efforts in the early days of the republic. Even women from religious mass organizations were actively involved with men in the independence of the Republic of Indonesia.

From the above studies, it can be concluded that Islamic mass organizations have an important role in society, especially in preventing the development of radicalism, extremism and intolerance. Thus, Islamic organizations must strive to spread Islamic teachings that are more moderate, friendly and peaceful.

Findings from Survey on Islamic Organization Affiliations

General findings at the teacher level, there are five organizations that are considered close to teachers in Indonesia, namely NU (45.62%); None (21.07%); Muhammadiyah (18.45%); Nahdlatul Wathan (2.92%); FPI (2.50%); and MTA (1.40%).

Table 56

Table 56

Teachers' proximity to Islamic mass organizations

Teachers feels closest to the following four Islamic Mass Organizations:

NU
$\overline{x}=48,33$

Muhammadiyah
$\overline{x}=46,46$

NW
$\overline{x}=44,03$

FPI
$\overline{x}=39,04$

65,35%
**Teachers are not active in Islamic Mass Organizations**

There is an effect of the closeness of Teachers with Islamic Mass Organizations to intolerant opinions and intolerant actions-intentions.

Table 57

Teachers' proximity to Islamic mass organizations

Organization	Percentage
No Affiliations	19.51%
Others	1.39%
Al-Washliyah	1.39%
Wahdah Islamiyah	0.22%
Persatuan Umat Islam (PUI)	0.18%
Persatuan Islam (Persis)	1.07%
Nahdlatul Wathan (NW)	3.00%
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	46.22%
Muhammadiyah	19.19%
Mathla'ul Anwar	0.04%
Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an (MTA)	1.21%
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)	0.31%
Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII)	1.21%
Jamaah Tabligh	1.48%
Al-Khairat	0.45%
Al-Irsyad	0.31%
Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI)	0.00%
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)	0.13%
Front Pembela Islam (FPI)	2.28%
Darul Dakwah wal Irsyad (DDI)	0.40%

In general, many teachers choose to be inactive/very inactive in Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, compared to teachers who choose to be very active/active. The results of the survey show that the high average score of tolerance is that teachers are close to NU and Muhammadiyah. Meanwhile, those who felt close to Nahdlatul Wathan and FPI had a lower average tolerance score. The survey findings also showed that there was an effect of closeness to Islamic CSOs on external tolerance (($F = 2.001$, $p = 0.007$; $F = 2.240$, $p = 0.002$) both their opinion and action intention. In addition to external tolerance, this survey shows

that their experiences are active. in student organizations it also affects the radical opinion and intentions of teachers (F = 2.385, p = 0.015; F = 3.012, p = 0.002).

Table 58
Teachers' activities in Islamic organizations in Indonesia

Islamic Organizations on Campuses

In general, 62.28% of the teachers said that they were never affiliated with any extra and intra-campus organizations. The rest said that they were affiliated with the Islamic Student Association (HMI) (12.18%); with Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII) (6.64%); Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) (5.05%); Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) 4.20%; or with others (5.18%). The survey results show that the order of teacher tolerance scores--from high to low--are teachers who were active in the GMNI, PMII, HMI, LDK, and KAMMI organizations. In addition, this survey also shows that active experience in student organizations also influenced teachers' radical opinions and intentions (F=4.458, p=0.000; F=4.778, p=0.000).

Table 59
Experience of Teacher Organizations on Campuses

62,28% teachers were never affiliated with any extra and intra-campus organizations.

0,9%; $\bar{x}=50,92$

12,30%; $\bar{x}=45,6$

7,20% $\bar{x}=47,1$

1,4% $\bar{x}=39,63$

3,98% $\bar{x}=45,3$

Experience of Teacher Organizations

PMII

KAMMI

LDK

Active experience in student organizations also influenced teachers' radical opinions and intentions.

In sum, most of the teachers in Indonesia have internet access. This is a dominant technology as their sources of religious knowledge because most of their time is spent on teaching. Unfortunately, many websites managed by radicals are popular with them. Some popular *ustadz* whom they see on the internet or social media may include those considered as figures who often spread hate speech and radical ideology.

Therefore, all parties (both the state, mainstream Islamic organizations, research institutes, and NGOs) must tackle this problem in all seriousness. Mainstream Islamic organizations can be more active in spreading messages of tolerance and peace through media that are acceptable to teachers. This is so because in reality the digital space is in some ways controlled by radicals. In addition, the state, in this case the MORA and MOEC, is expected to make reforms to finance PAI learning, starting from teacher recruitment, increasing the portion of tolerance in the material and learning, and penetrating in supervising religious extracurricular activities and organizations that are considered to be the entry points for radicalism in schools.

Chapter 5
Closing

Conclusions

The results of this survey show that radicalism associated with support for the idea of an Islamic State and intolerance is threatening Muslim teachers in Indonesia, starting from the kindergarten/RA, SD/MI, SMP/MTS, to SMA/SMK/MA levels. Although in terms of behavior they tend to be moderate, in terms of the opinion the percentage of intolerant people is greater than those who are tolerant. This condition is quite dangerous because such a radical and intolerant attitude can become a bridge for the birth of radical and intolerant behavior.

Several important variables have been examined to have an influence on the radicalism and intolerance of Muslim teachers in schools/madrasas in Indonesia. For one thing, a teacher's exclusive and inward-looking Islamic viewpoint might make him or her less open to other Islamic views and other groups. Most of our teachers have internet access, and this technology is dominant in being used instantaneously to find sources of religious knowledge as most of their time is spent on teaching. Unfortunately, websites run by groups categorized as radical are quite popular with teachers. Some of the *ustadz* figures whom they frequent in the cyberspace (internet) or on social media are also religious teachers who are considered to be fond of spreading hate speech and radical understanding. These figures tend to be popular in the eyes of the teachers.

All parties - the state, mainstream Islamic organizations, research institutions, and NGOs – simply cannot take this issue lightly. Mainstream Islamic organizations can be more active in spreading messages of tolerance and peace through media that can be accepted by Muslim

teachers in schools/madrasas. This is because, in reality and in many ways, the digital space is controlled by radical groups. The state, in this case the MORA and the MOEC, ought to be compelled to reform PAI. This could start from PAI teacher recruitment, increasing the portion of tolerance material in PAI learning, and penetrating in conducting supervision of religious extracurricular activities and organizations that are considered to be the entry points for radicalism in schools.

Recommendations

The survey results show that teacher income correlates with their tendencies of intolerance and radicalism. Therefore, attention to teachers' welfare must be a priority for the government in its policy making. One way to improve their welfare is by setting better minimum payment standards for teachers regardless of the status of schools, both public and private.

Education in TK/RA is important in cultivating students' basic values because kindergarten students are at an important phase in cultivating values for their future. The results of this survey indicate that TK/RA teachers have more intolerant and radical opinions than teachers at other educational levels. Therefore, it is important that the experience of kindergarten teachers in situations of diversity be enriched.

This research also shows that female teachers are more intolerant than male teachers. This is somewhat related to the trend of women's *taklim* (assemblies), which tend to increase and are often the "targets" of preaching by intolerant/exclusive groups. For this reason, attention to female teachers in relation to the spread of Islamism must be regarded as a serious concern.

Madrasa teachers tend to have more intolerant opinions of followers of other religions than school teachers. However, this can be understood because of the homogeneous nature of madrasa education, but various understandings that provide opportunities for them to increase the plurality experience need to be done. For this reason, it is necessary to initiate various programs that give madrasa teachers the opportunity to gain experience in a pluralistic and diverse environment, increase their religious literacy so that they are more familiar with different religions and groups.

One effective way to strengthen the nationalism and plurality of teachers in both public and private schools/madrasas is by empowering teacher-producing institutions, such as the LPTK (Educational

Personnel Education Institute). LPTK empowerment must be made a top priority as part of the efforts to prevent the spread of intolerance and exclusion. The same thing must also be done with the Teacher Professional Education (PPG) and the Sustainable Professional Development Program (PPKB), which are at the forefront in creating "lights" that are able to illuminate the path of students in filling the lives of the nation and state in the future.

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About the Authors and Researchers

Yunita Faela Nisa joined PPIM UIN Jakarta in the study of "Religious Attitudes towards PAI (Islamic Education) Teachers" (2016). In 2017, she was trusted to be coordinator of PPIM National Survey on the "Religious Attitudes of Highschool and University Students and Teachers/Lecturers in Indonesia." In 2018 she was appointed as coordinator of another survey by PPIM, namely on "The Diversity of School/Madrasah Teachers in Indonesia," the report of which was compiled in this very book. Her experience in the summer courses on Advanced Statistics and Research Methodology at Guelph University, Ontario, Canada and at Massey University, New Zealand, supported much of her research activities. Yunita now lectures at the Faculty of Psychology of UIN Jakarta.

Hamid Nasuhi has been a PPIM researcher at UIN Jakarta since 2015. In addition, from 1988 until now, he has served as a lecturer at the Religion-Religion Study Study Program, Ushuluddin Faculty, UIN Jakarta. Hamid is involved in several studies related to Islamic education in Indonesia, including "Dissemination of Exclusive Understanding in Islamic Education: Policy and Political Analysis of Production of PAI Teaching Materials" (2016) and "Obstacles to Research in Higher Education in Indonesia: The case of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta" (2015).

Abdallah joined PPIM UIN Jakarta in 2015 as a young researcher focusing on the socio-religious issues. He completed his education at the Arabic Language and Literature Study Program, Faculty of Adab and Humanities at UIN Jakarta. Since 2017 Abdallah has been involved

in a number of research projects on religious education and religious life under the CONVEY Indonesia program carried out by PPIM UIN Jakarta in collaboration with UNDP Indonesia. He frequently writes in journals (such as Studia Islamika) books--both as author and editor--and columns in printed and online media, such as Tempo, Media Indonesia, Warta Kota, Radar Banten, Geotimes, and Beritagar.id.

Tati Rohayati has been a young researcher at PPIM UIN Jakarta since 2015. The focus of her study is on social history and Dutch colonial archival studies. Tati completed her higher education at the Islamic History and Culture Study Program, Faculty of Adab and Humanities, UIN Jakarta. She was involved in the PPIM national survey on "The Religious Attitudes of Students/University Students and Teachers/Lecturers in Indonesia" (2017) and the PPIM national survey on "The Religious Teachers' Religion in Indonesia" (2018). Now, Tati is pursuing a master program at the Islamic History and Culture Study Program, UIN Jakarta.

Faiqoh is a master's graduate from The International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam in The Hague, The Netherlands. She has work experience in issues of youth participation, child protection, peace building, gender mainstreaming, and prevention of intolerance and violent extremism. Currently she is working at PPIM UIN Jakarta as a gender specialist. Her interest in gender issues began in 2012 by participating in various trainings, as well as being a facilitator on issues of gender equality and justice, particularly on anti-sexual violence and prevention of early marriage.

M. Zaki Mubarak is a lecturer at the Political Science Study Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UIN Jakarta. Zaki completed his S1 at FISIP Airlangga University Surabaya and his S2 in Political Science at the University of Indonesia (UI). Currently he is completing a doctoral program at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM). Zaki is the author of Genealogy of Radical Islam in Indonesia: Movements, Thoughts, and Prospects for Democracy (2008), author and editor of Politics of Islamic Sharia: Ideology and Pragmatism (2018). He is actively involved in a number of research activities on the Islamic movement, democratization, and radicalism.

Erita Narhetali is a lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology, University of

Indonesia. She completed her undergraduate education in psychology at the University of Indonesia, and master's degree at a university in Poland. Currently Erita is completing her doctoral degree, also in Poland. She has started to be involved in research at PPIM since the 2017 national survey on "The Religious Attitudes of Students/University Students and Teachers/ Lecturers in Indonesia" to the national survey on "The diversity of school/madrasah teachers in Indonesia" (2018).

Laifa Annisa Hendarmin has been a dentist and full-time lecturer at the Faculty of Medicine at UIN Jakarta since 2008. Starting in 2015 she joined PPIM UIN Jakarta which encouraged her to further explore social sciences. At PPIM he was involved as a researcher in the national survey on "The diversity of school / madrasah teachers in Indonesia" (2018) and the national survey on "the religious attitudes of students/ college students and teachers/lecturers in Indonesia" (2017).

Agung Priyo Utomo is a lecturer at the College of Statistics (STIS) in Jakarta and at the Psychology Faculty of UIN Jakarta. As a statistician, Agung is involved in two national surveys conducted by PPIM UIN Jakarta. First, a national survey on "Student / Student and Teacher / Lecturer Religious Attitudes in Indonesia" (2017). Second, the national survey on "The diversity of school/madrasah teachers in Indonesia" (2018).

Bambang Ruswandi is a statistics lecturer at the Sociology Study Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UIN Jakarta. He completed his Masters in Statistics at Padjadjaran University, Bandung. Bambang, as a statistician, has been involved in the national survey conducted by PPIM UIN Jakarta two years in a row. Namely, a national survey on "Religious Attitudes of Students/Students and Teachers/ Lecturers in Indonesia "(2017) and a national survey on" The diversity of school/madrasah teachers in Indonesia "(2018).

Ahmad Alfajri is a lecturer at the International Relations Study Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UIN Jakarta. He completed his Masters program at the Australian National University, Canberra. Fajri was involved in several studies at PPIM, including on the Salafi movement in Indonesia (2017) and a national survey on "The diversity of school / madrasah teachers in Indonesia" (2018).

Rangga Eka Saputra is a researcher at PPIM UIN Jakarta. He completed his undergraduate political science education at the Faculty of Social

and Political Sciences, UIN Jakarta. Currently, Rangga is studying his master's degree at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He has been involved in several studies, including "Dissemination of Exclusive Understanding in Islamic Education: Policy Analysis and the Politics of the Production of PAI Teaching Materials" (2016); "Teachers of Religion, Tolerance, and Issues of Contemporary Religious Life in Indonesia" (2016); a national survey on "Student / Student and Teacher / Lecturer Religious Attitudes in Indonesia" (2017); and a national survey on "The Diversity of School / Madrasah Teachers in Indonesia" (2018).

This book is the result of a national survey by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of UIN Jakarta through the Countering Violence Extremism for Youth (CONVEY) program on the diversity of school/madrasa teachers in Indonesia. This survey finds that radicalism in support of the idea of an Islamic State and intolerance is penetrating Muslim teachers in Indonesia, starting from the kindergarten TK/RA level, up to SD/MI, SMP/MTS, and SMA/SMK/MA levels. Although in terms of behavior they still tend to be moderate, in terms of opinion, the percentage of intolerant teachers is greater than that of those who are tolerant. This is deeply concerning because the radical and intolerant attitude can become a bridge for the birth of intolerant and radical behavior.

A number of important variables have been tested which influence the radicalism and intolerance of our Muslim teachers in schools/madrasas in Indonesia. A teacher's exclusive and inward-looking view of Islam, for instance, does make him or her less open to other Islamic views or to views shared by other groups. Most of our teachers have access to the internet. This technology is used dominantly and instantaneously to find sources of religious knowledge since more of their time is used for teaching. Unfortunately, many websites run by radical groups are quite popular with our teachers. Some ustadzs that the teachers access on the cyberspace or social media are religious figures suspected of frequently spreading hate speech and radical views. They tend to be popular in the eyes of our teachers.