

COMPILATION OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

**English
Edition**

- DIVERSITY TRENDS OF CONTEMPORARY HIJRAH MOVEMENT
- PORTRAITS OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION IN MUSLIM COLLEGE STUDENTS
- EVALUATION AND STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF PROGRAM "PESANTREN LEADERS VISIT TO JAPAN"
- RELIGION-BASED EXTREMIST'S NARRATIVE: EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELIGIOUS ASPIRATION
- PRELIMINARY STUDY OF RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY OF ISLAMIC EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN RESPONDING TO THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF COHESION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC CRISIS: STUDY AT THREE STATE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITIES (JAKARTA, BANDUNG, YOGYAKARTA)
- SEEDING HOPE, HARVESTING FAITH: MAINSTREAMING MODERATE RELIGIOSITY AMONG FEMALE TEACHERS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION
- DIVERSITY IN THE IVORY TOWER: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AT UNIVERSITIES

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Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta

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FOREWORD

The book you are reading is a compilation of the Executive Summary of CONVEY 2020-2021 activities. What is CONVEY? CONVEY stands for Countering Violent Extremism for Youth. CONVEY is a collaborative program between the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Indonesia to build young people's resilience to violent extremism or to strengthen religious moderation through religious education. The collaboration between PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP Indonesia has been going on since 2017 and has now entered its 4th year.

CONVEY consists of 3 main activities.

1. Surveys/researches and policy advocacy. Survey and research activities are aimed at deepening and sharpening existing knowledge and reviewing relevant government policies. The goal is to provide inputs to the government so that it can develop evidence-based policies and programs.
2. Capacity building. Capacity building is aimed at allowing institutions that have the potential to build resilience of young people from violent extremism to have sufficient capacity in playing its effective roles.
3. Public campaign. Public campaign is required to allow the public to aware of the dangers of intolerance and extremism potentials. This campaign is launched through a variety of media, including webinars, *twitter*, *IG*, and *youtube*.

What has CONVEY produced so far?

CONVEY has produced a number of books, short version of the research reports (*CONVEY Report*), *policy briefs*, training modules, and SOPs, all of which contain a variety of issues and discussions on education in general and religious education, in particular, in relation

to intolerance and extremism and any effort to strengthen young people's resilience to intolerance or extremism or education.

Researches conducted by CONVEY have found that the majority of Indonesians have tolerant views and attitudes. They recognize the rights of minorities, including the right of different religious adherents to worship according to their beliefs. However, they have also found a significantly increasing number of intolerances (more than 30%) as found in recent cases, including rejection of intolerants to the establishment of houses of worship in their immediate environments, their rejection to socialize with those having different beliefs and their rejection to equal political rights for those having different beliefs to be public leaders such as principals of public schools, heads of regional education offices, or even president. The researches also found that teachers, lecturers, and students of religious education institutions such as madrasas and Islamic religious colleges are more intolerant than those who work or study in public schools and universities.

Women are more intolerant than men are. The CONVEY 2020-2021 survey and research confirms these findings.

Actually, based on statistical analyses, such exclusive attitudes have, in particular, relationship with economic threats, social interactions, and religious exposures through social media. They feel that Moslems have long been living in economic hardship, and consider that the situation will get even harder in the future. They then see Islam as the solution to these difficulties. In fact, Islamic views and invitations to Islam as an alternative have been recently spreading on social media. Such exclusive and intolerant tendencies have especially occurred to those who have homogeneous associations, hanging out only with their own groups. On the contrary, those who have multiple social relationships tend to be more tolerant and inclusive or tend to be more open-minded about the civil and political rights of other citizens.

What should the readers know about what we have produced this year?

Based on the data above, it is obvious that national development must result in prosperity and justice for all people, especially disadvantaged groups of people. The government and civil society must actively "flood" social media with tolerant views and invitations

to respect diversity and brotherhood of nationality and humanity. The government's educational and social policies should compel different groups of people in terms of religions, cultures, and ideologies to interact in public spaces as much as possible. Since its establishment in 2017, CONVEY has found that encounters, friendships, interactions, and dialogues between different group of people of different backgrounds are very effective in eliminating negative prejudices and fostering mutual understanding, cooperation and solidarity. CONVEY 4 has also corroborated such conclusion through Peace Generation (Peace Gen). Peace Gen is a non-profit organization dedicating itself to campaigning living in harmony and peace in diversity. Peace Gen is a very important partner of PPIM and CONVEY. This year Peace Gen carries out activities that bring together young Muslims who have rarely met and socialized due to different understandings of Islam: HTI, Salafi, Persis, Muhammadiyah, and NU. It turned out that the strategy taking them together to discuss common problems like water problems has allowed them to know each other, to recognize their differences and, subsequently, to build friendship. In the end of the two-month activity, they could even compose, sing, and publish the song entitled "We Are Still Here" through the social media. You can imagine what will happen if schools, *madrasah*, and religious colleges played a full role in building friendship and brotherhood in diversity. It will surely result in positive impacts for all.

This Compilation of Executive Summaries contain research findings and activities of CONVEY as described above. Happy reading!

Didin Syafruddin, Ph.D.
(Project Manager CONVEY)

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DIVERSITY TRENDS OF CONTEMPORARY HIJRAH MOVEMENT

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Azhar Muhammad Akbar, Febiyana.

MAIN FINDINGS

This research finds that the development of contemporary hijrah in Indonesia is in conjunction with the increasing of Islamic conservatism in the country, including in the cyberspace. In general, the hijrah communities studied have various levels of religious understanding. They tend to be conservative, and only one of them shows supports for Islamism. The diversity of levels of conservatism can be seen from their attitude in responding to certain issues. Conservatism, in this case, leads to Salafi and non-Salafi. This typology of ideology and religious understanding can be seen from their interpretation of hijrah and responses to various issues such as nationality, relations with non-Muslims, and gender. Even though the hijrah communities diverse in religious understandings, they are fused in the ties of Muslim United as a manifestation of *ukhuwah Islamiyah* and *one ummah*. In addition, hijrah is a part of religious conversion, which is the intensification of beliefs. This shifts from individual experiences to communal movements and develops among the urban middle class, especially young millennials. With the target of millennial age group, the hijrah communities optimize the use of social media. They present messages in ways and contents that suit the tastes of young people, such as the use of pop cultures.

PRELIMINARY

Hijrah is a religious phenomenon that has recently become popular in Indonesia. This phenomenon is increasingly popular among the urban middle class with the emergence of public figures who have undergone hijrah. In this context, hijrah is defined as

spiritual hijrah, where a person becomes better in terms of religion. This hijrah phenomenon has developed along with the increasing of religious conservatism in Indonesia, including in the cyberspace (PPIM, 2020). Referring to this background, this research examines the contemporary hijrah movement in Indonesia to find out the typology of the movement, the views of the hijrah communities on strategic contemporary issues, and their strategies in spreading their ideas.

In the modern context, this is not the first time the term of hijrah has been used. Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda have also used hijrah with new meanings (Schulze & Liow, 2019; Uberman & Shay, 2016). ISIS has used hijrah as a propaganda tool to attract more followers from various countries and turn them into combatants in ISIS territory. From this, it can be seen that the ISIS interpret hijrah as a physical movement from an area called *dar al harb* to *dar al Islam*; or *dar al Islam* to *Islamic State* for those who come from Muslim countries (Schulze & Liow, 2019). The meaning of hijrah by this extremist group is clearly different from the new phenomenon of hijrah in Indonesia, which views hijrah as a spiritual and non-physical movement.

In Indonesia, the group that can be considered as the precursor to the hijrah movement is the Darul Arqam movement in the 1990s. This movement adopted the Arab way of life in the 17th century and embodied the Muslim “*back to nature*” movement. Apart from Darul Arqam, there are other groups that can be associated with the hijrah movement, namely Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the tarbiyah movement, the salafism movement, which use methods and strategies attractive to young people (Puspasari, 2018; *The Changing Face of Indonesian Islam - The Diplomat*, 2019).

IDN Research Institute’s survey reveals that 72.8% of individuals who underwent hijrah were from the youth group or often referred to as millennial (Noormega, 2019). The hijrah movement offers a way to remain committed to religion, but still be able to enjoy modern cultures. This is what makes the hijrah movement attractive to millennial groups. However, it is also what two of Indonesia’s leading Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah have missed. In the context of this research, an initial assessment was carried out through a Focus Group Discussion with a hijrah community

in Bandung, SHIFT or Pemuda Hijrah in Bandung on March 13-14, 2020. It is known that Bandung is one of the centers for the development of hijrah movement in Indonesia. From the FGD, it was found that SHIFT used a market analysis strategy that categorized their targets. SHIFT classifies the targets into four categories, namely: those who are still apathetic to those who are still fanatical about religion. From these characteristics, SHIFT finally develops two figures: a virtual figure and a friendly figure to young people. That way, they become appealing to the millennial group. The market analysis developed by this group is interesting to reveal the strategies in spreading the idea of hijrah.

In general, the hijrah movement offers positive things to achieve a better life based on Islamic principles. However, this movement is seen as having a vulnerability to exclusivism (*The Changing Face of Indonesian Islam - The Diplomat*, 2019). This symptom can be seen from the contents of the 'da'wah (proselytization), which tend to promote a more conservative interpretation of Islamic teachings, such as supports for the formal implementation of Islamic law, the development of very exclusive Islamic housing, the strict use of Islamic banks and others.

For this reason, it is crucial to understand this hijrah movement, including the aspects of the values and norms being taught; teaching dissemination strategies and also the diversity of the hijrah movement spectrum. In addition, there have been no studies examining hijrah movement in detail and its typology. Knowledge of these matters will enable policy makers or religious moderation actors determine attitudes and take strategic steps in responding to the movement. This research can also explain the backwardness of the Indonesian Muslim mainstream organizations in responding to the needs of young people to more attractive methods in learning Islam.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the typology and spectrum of the hijrah movement in Indonesia? Do different hijrah groups also have differences in agendas, taught norms and values, religious affiliation, religious references and practices?

2. How do hijrah groups understand and respond to contemporary issues such as democracy, statehood, pluralism, and efforts to fight religious extremism?
3. How do the hijrah groups view the role of women and issues related to women?
4. What strategies are used by hijrah groups to attract followers from millennial circles?

RESEARCH METHODS

This is qualitative research that relies on text and visual analysis of videos and images on Youtube and Instagram and in-depth interviews. The research was conducted on five hijrah communities, selected from 50 hijrah communities on the internet. The five communities are Terang Jakarta, Kajian Musawarah, the Strangers Al Ghuroba, Yuk Ngaji, and Pemuda Hijrah. These five communities are based in Jakarta and Bandung. These two locations were chosen because they are strategic locations for the emergence of religious communities that color the religiosity in Indonesia. Content analysis was carried out on Instagram and Youtube contents, consisting of 1237 Instagram contents and 180 YouTube videos. Meanwhile, in-depth interviews were conducted with 24 community figures and followers, consisting of 16 men and 8 women (table 1 & graph 1). The female figures who acted as ustadzah / tutors were not successfully interviewed in this study because the unwillingness of the figures contacted. Informants were selected using *snowballing* techniques. The limited number of informants was due to the COVID-19 pandemic situation and the closure of several communities in responding to interview requests. Data were collected for two months, from September to October 2020. The following is the distribution of the followers of the five hijrah communities:

Figure 1. Information on Social Media Followers of the Hijrah Community as of November 2020




Table 1. Research Subject

Hijrah Community	Informant	Information
Yuk Ngaji	7	4 female followers; 2 male followers; 1 ustad from outside the community. Total: 3 men, 4 women
Kajian Musyawarah	5	1 management; 1 follower of Syariah Friend dan Taubaters; 1 study participant from hijrah artists; 1 President of Bintaro Mosque Youth (Remisya); and 1 team of EO Hijrah fest Total: 4 men, 1 woman
Terang Jakarta	7	2 male followers; 2 female followers; 1 ustad/speaker; 1 speaker of Terang Taaruf program; and 1 leader of the community initiator. Total: 5 men, 2 women
SHIFT Pemuda Hijrah	3	1 ustad; 1 male follower; and 1 community mobilizer Total: 3 men

Hijrah Community	Informant	Information
The Strangers Al Ghuroba	2	1 man from Komuji management Bandung; and 1 woman of Komuji management Jakarta Total: 1 man, 1 woman
Total	24	

Graph 1. Comparison of the Number of Male and Female Informants from the Hijrah Community



DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

To explain the typology of hijrah movement, at least three concepts emerge in this study: conservatism, Salafism, and Islamism.

Conservatism, in this study, refers to Martin van Bruinessen (2013) and Sebastian et al., (2020). Bruinessen defines a conservative religious attitude as: *“The various currents that reject modernist, liberal or progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines and social order. Conservatives notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges to established authority and modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture. There are conservatives among traditionalists as well as reformist Muslims (i.e., in Nahdlatul Ulama as well as Muhammadiyah), just as there are liberals and progressives in both camps”*. This definition implies that conservative tendencies can be seen in the forms of rejection of the modernist,

liberal and progressive interpretation of Islamic teachings; gender equality ideas, the modern hermeneutic approach to sacred religious texts; and the obedience to established doctrines and social orders;. This conservative attitude can take up space in both traditional and reformist Muslim communities, as liberal and progressive attitudes.

Meanwhile, Sebastian et al., (2020) highlight conservatism in Islam in Indonesia as: *“A combination of normative and practical issues derived from Islamic texts that promote literal and exclusive compliance towards 'Shari'a (Islamic moral ethics, and the adaptation of a more literal understanding of Islam within 'Indonesia's political and legal structure). The opposite concept of Islamic conservatism is Islamic modernism or liberalism, which promotes a contextual and inclusive interpretation of Islam.”* From this point of view, conservatism in Islam is understood as a practical and normative combination that derives from Islamic texts and promotes literal and exclusive obedience to shari'a, as opposed to the contextual and inclusive interpretation of Islamic teachings.

The terminology of Salafism refers to a religious understanding that emphasizes on three main elements These include, the textual interpretation of the 'Qur'an and Hadith; the ideal of living like in the time of the Prophet; and the use of Salafus Salihin, or the three early generations of Islam, as the basis of religious understanding. Some claim that Salafism is a religious belief close to Wahabi ideology, but others claim that it is more about purifying Islam. The Salafi categorization in this study refers to Wiktorowicz (2006), which classifies Salafis into three categories: Quietist Salafi, political Salafi, and jihadi Salafi; and Wahid (2014), which divides Salafi into three variants, namely purist Salafi, haraki Salafi, and jihadi Salafi .

Meanwhile, Islamism is a political Islam movement, which is termed by Tibi (2012) as *“religionized politics”*. Islamism itself is defined as a movement that is considered a failure, as Roy (1996) calls it *the failure of political Islam*. Even so, 'Roy's thesis received criticism, among others, from Bassam Tibi, who argues that what is considered a failure of Islamism did not necessarily end. Islamism takes a different form. Bassam Tibi then divides Islamists into two forms: institutional Islamists and jihadi Islamists. The difference between the two is only

in the method used to achieve its goals: nonviolence and violence. In addition, institutional Islamists operate in the context of the state or carry out Islamization from within the state. According to Tibi (2012), one example that fits the characteristics of institutional Islamists is the AKP in Turkey. Furthermore, another form of Islamism moves outside the state, taking a violent or non-violent approach. The latter is said to have “*quities*” approaches and characteristics (Mozaffari, 2007). One thing that all Islamist groups share is the belief that “Islam is a solution” (al-Islam huwa al-hal) (Muhtadi, 2009).

According to Tibi, equating Islamism with revivalism is not appropriate because Islamism is not something new (Tibi, 2012). Islamism invites the glorious history of Islam by realizing political Islamization that involves the “*imagined umma*” or what Anderson calls the “*imagined community*” (Anderson, 2006; Tibi, 2012) by carrying out political Islam as the goal.

LITERATURE REVIEW

REINTERPRETATION OF HIJRAH

By looking at the characteristics of the hijrah trend in Indonesia, the hijrah movement is not entirely new. This movement is an extension of Islamic revivalism, which began to surface in the Reform (*Reformasi*) era after the fall of the New Order in 1998. However, in those early days, the hijrah terminology was unpopular and was not used to describe the movement that has developed today. Several groups promoting a similar discourse include *Darul Arqam*, *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, the Tarbiyah movement, *Jama’ah Tabligh* and Salafism. What makes the current movement different from previous movements is the new approach used, which is more attractive to young people, or more popularly known as millennial groups, such as the use of social media with a more modern look and caption.

It is rather challenging to determine when the term hijrah began to be used to describe the return of an individual to a more devout Muslim. Tracing previous studies on trends in the contemporary hijrah movement shows that the interests in studying this issue began in 2017 (Prasanti & Indriani, 2017; Saefullah, 2017; Setiawan, 2017).

Meanwhile, these studies also show that hijrah groups began to emerge in at least 2014 (Saefullah, 2017). Studies conducted prior to that year did not mention the term hijrah at all, although they examined the groups currently referred to as hijrah groups (Beta, 2014; Nisa, 2013).

At the same time, the terminology of hijrah has also been adopted by extremist groups such as ISIS, which associate the term with the jihad movement (Schulze & Liow, 2019; Uberman & Shay, 2016). ISIS uses the term hijrah to attract followers from various countries to fight in Syria. Hijrah propaganda is disseminated through social media and newsletters (*Dabiq*), which are also published online (Schulze & Liow, 2019). That way, ISIS can easily influence millennial groups who are fond of using online digital media.

In the Indonesian context, historically, the hijrah terminology was popularized by Darul Islam together with Kartosuwiryo. Kartosuwiryo proposed the hijrah policy in facing the Dutch colonialism. However, this proposal was rejected with the consequences of limiting the Islamic Syarikat Party movement, which was considered less moderate (Bruinessen, 2013; Formichi, 2010). In the 1980s, the word hijrah was again used by followers of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). The teachings about hijrah are well recorded in a book written by Abdul Qadir Baraja entitled “*Jihad and Hijrah*”. In this case, hijrah is interpreted as an effort to escape from the enemy of Islam, as happened during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. In practice, followers of NII exiled themselves to Malaysia (Van Bruinessen, 2002).

The use of the term hijrah for self-exile is also used by Free Aceh Movement (*GAM/Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*) followers. Hijrah is done to avoid persecution due to conflict. However, this hijrah is only temporary for them, so they will return when things are considered safe (Missbach, 2017). This is the form of hijrah carried out by the Prophet Muhammad SAW, who at one time, he and his followers returned to conquer Mecca. The exact definition is used by followers of the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) in the Philippines. The conflict between the MNLF and the government made MNLF followers exile themselves abroad. The journey undertaken is not the final destination because returning to their country is part of the hijrah cycle (Abubakar, 1999).

From this explanation, it can be seen that the hijrah has been reinterpreted by different groups with various meanings. There are at least two ways of interpreting hijrah, namely political meaning for group interests and spiritual meaning. The spiritual meaning is used by the new hijrah movement, which is a personal thing. However, this individual matter later becomes a collective movement whose influence becomes significant in the society. In addition, it appears that hijrah is interpreted according to the interests of the group. This can be a concern when the hijrah is interpreted to justify intolerance or violence in the name of religion. From that, the understanding of the meaning of hijrah by groups that call themselves the hijrah movement is crucial.

HIJRAH AND RELIGIOUS CONVERSION

Although the mention of the hijrah movement tends to be exclusively found in Indonesia, the phenomenon of a Muslim's transformation into a more religious figure is not something exclusive. This is a global phenomenon called with various terminologies. For example, Roy (2004), who studies a similar phenomenon in the UK, calls it *"born-again"* by borrowing the term *"born-again Christian"*. Roy explained that *"born again"* refers to *"someone who suddenly makes his belief the core principle of his whole life"* (Roy, 2004). A similar term is also used by Amelia Blom in her study in Pakistan, and Marloes Janson in the Gambia (Blom, 2017; Janson, 2014). Ali Kose, who in his study in the UK, calls this phenomenon an *intra-faith conversion*. Its means *"the process whereby an individual makes a dramatically renewed commitment to their existing faith tradition, and their religious identity and conviction become altered, changed, stimulated, strengthened, energized, revived, and invigorated"* (Kose, 2012). Furthermore, Sophie Gilliat Ray uses the term *"rediscovering Islam"* or *reinventing Islam* (Gilliat-Ray, 2010).

Those terms then converge to a more general term in religious studies, namely *conversion*. 'Rambo's conversion is divided into inter-religious conversion and conversion within one religious tradition (Rambo, 1999). The latter represents the meaning of hijrah. Paloutzian et al. then called it *intensification*, which means a form of conversion

where a person or group of people does not move from one faith community to another but becomes more obedient, passionate and committed to the beliefs they already adhere to (Paloutzian et al., 1999). In addition, Ulman added that a person who goes through conversion experiences self-transformation and becomes a new individual (*becoming new*) (Paloutzian et al., 1999).

The next question is, what drives a person to convert. Some of the studies mentioned above reveal that several things motivate a person to convert, first, due to dissatisfaction with previous religious practices, which are generally taught in families (Blom, 2017; Janson, 2014; Kose, 2012; Roy, 2004). For example, young people in Pakistan feel that the path of tasawuf chosen by their parents is not a representation of the authentic Islam (Blom, 2017). Then, young people who are the third generation of Muslim immigrants in Britain feel that their 'parents' practice of Islam is far from authentic (Roy, 2004). This anxiety makes them easy to accept teachings that claim to return to the original teachings of Islam. The second is the 'individual's traumatic experience. This can be psychological difficulties and bad experiences that make individuals look for alternative solutions and inner peace. Reconversion and strengthening of a religious commitment then become an option. The third is criticism or resistance to hegemony and modern cultures, which is considered to carry hedonism. This is what Hikmawan Saefullah found among the hijrah punk group in Bandung (Saefullah, 2017).

ISLAM IN THE CYBER SPACE

Another essential framework in studying the contemporary hijrah movement is the Islamization of cyberspace, considering that this movement is widely active and popular in the cyberspace. Islamization on social media is seen as a bottom up Islamization effort.. This means that the process of Islamization has moved from being legalistic towards social and cultural Islamization (Abdullah & Osman, 2018; Fealy, 2005). The shift in promoting piety in the public sphere from the real world to the virtual world requires a ,broader reach and transcends traditional boundaries, including conventional religious authorities (Alfitri, 2015; Bunt, 2018; Campbell, 2007;

Turner, 2007). This also makes conservatism easier to spread via the internet (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003).

A previous study by Abdullah & Osman (2018) reveals the trend of conservatism in the cyberspace in Indonesia, showing that after the fall of the New Order, the Islamization of Indonesia through the media has taken various forms. The offer of conservative teaching is one of them. This means that all kinds of religious expressions become fluid, and nothing is dominant. However, PPIM's research findings say another. The Islamic narrative that dominates cyberspace in Indonesia today is conservative (PPIM, 2020).

As explained above, the dominance of conservative narratives may be due to the fragmentation of religious authority in these new media (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003). The figure offering religious messages is no longer considered significant by the recipient of the message. In the NU and Muhammadiyah traditions, figures who have religious authority are those who have qualified Islamic knowledge obtained through deep Islamic education. On social media, this is no longer important. Cyber explorers feel sufficient with the information obtained regardless of who the messenger is.

In addition, social media has created new public spaces where religious norms and values can develop. Dayana Lengauer said that public space in social media further strengthens the social ties of the Muslim community (Lengauer, 2018). Lengauer explains that the concept of "*imagined 'community'*" proposed by Anderson (2006) becomes more real with more intimate interactions through social media. It is also possible to form a close community that transcends boundaries of distance and space.

CONSERVATISM AND GENDER ISSUES

In this research, gender issues are seen in relation to religious conservatism. Initially, conservatism on gender issues was only related to politics, namely the involvement of women in general elections. However, in its development, conservative attitudes toward gender issues have also emerged among religious conservatives. Conservatives tend to be resistant to gender issues. Therefore, they

are often labelled as anti-gender. This anti-gender attitude is evident in the efforts of the religious conservative movement to oppose the decisions of the World Conference on Women in Cairo (1994) and Beijing (1995) (see Kourou, 2020).


According to Rosie Campbell and Silvia Erzeel (Celis & Childs, 2012), the anti-gender attitude is embraced by various right-wing, populist, and traditionalist political and religious actors. The conservatives tend to place women in domestic areas and limit 'women's access to public spaces because motherhood is the central ideology instilled in its followers. Similarly, Ahmad and Sen (2018), in their research, found that women living in conservative Muslim families in Bangladesh tend not to have formal jobs that can increase economic welfare due to the low motivation and opportunities for women to work in public spaces.

Conservatives emphasize the differences between men and women to complement each other, rather than fight for the issue of equality (Campbell and Erzeel in Celis & Childs, 2012). The similarity of viewpoints by conservative religious groups is the reproduction of thought due to social habitus and practices of religious leaders, adopted by referring to the life of the Salafus Sholeh. Both of which are concepts proposed by Bourdieu (1977).

FINDINGS

Findings I. This research finds two typologies of the hijrah movement in Indonesia: conservative and Islamist. The conservative category is then divided into two: Salafi and non-Salafi. All communities, except the Strangers Al Ghuroba, then coalesce to form Muslim United and *Barisan Bangun Negeri*. The typology and spectrum of the hijrah community are explored through responses and views on nationality, tolerance and gender.

Figure 2. Finding I: Typology and Spectrum of Movement



To facilitate the reading of the typology, this part presents the findings per community and not thematically. This is to show the differences and uniqueness of each community.

1. The Strangers Al Ghuroba


The Strangers Al Ghuroba can be categorized as pure Salafist or quietist Salafist, referring to the Salafi categorization by Din Wahid (2012) and Quintan Wiktorowitz (2006). This also means that the community is apolitical. Hijrah, according to The Stangers Al Ghuroba, means that someone becoming a new individual by leaving his/her past lives. One of the notable message spread through the community’s social media is the prohibition of music. As a consequence, a musician must leave his/her profession because music is considered something close to immorality. In addition, for this community, a change in appearance is very important. Although one of the figures said no, it can be seen in this community’s social media posts that they invite men to cut their pants to leave *isbal* and women to change their scarf to a bigger one and wear a *niqab*.

Figure 3. Instagram of The Strangers Al Ghuroba Promotion of Free Pants Sewing Service Activities



The tendency of 'Salafi's conservatism also arisein the community's views on 'women's issues, such as the support for polygamy, restrictions on 'women's mobility in public spaces, and the obligation to wear *niqab*. To this community, men are the only breadwinners in the household. Working women are seen as violators of 'women's rights in the household.

Figure 4. YouTube SafdahTV, Ustad Abdullah At-Taslim with his three wives



A husband is the only leader in the household, and a wife is obliged to obey all the orders from the husband as long as they do not violate the principles of Islamic teachings. In terms of 'women's leadership, The Stranger Al Ghuroba gave an example of how Khadijah RA, as a businesswoman, returned to her obligation to serve the Prophet as the leader in the household.

The tendency for strict interpretation is also seen in the discussion of Islamic economics. Among the issues discussed

were the rejection of Fatwa No. 57 DSN MUI 5/2007 regarding the Letter of Credit (LC) through the *kafala* contract, which was deemed incompatible with Islamic law; the prohibition of the sale of cigarettes which are considered haram; the prohibition of the sale of clothing that does not cover 'one's *awrah* (body parts that should not be revealed except in front of particular individuals, such as spouses); and the prohibition of all professions containing *riba* (usury), such as tax collectors.

With regards to the issues of nationalism and opposition to violence and terrorism, the community figures have a very open attitude. Regarding Pancasila, for example, Ustad Subhan Bawazier emphasizes love for the country and supports for Pancasila. The community leaders also reject violence, including the acts of terrorism. *"A terrorist is someone who disturbs security who messes up amid safe people. Islam is very safe"*. (Ruzika Tv, "Terrorists Are"-Ustad Ahmad Zainuddin, 4 March 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?V=N49RcYN8qx8&t=341s>).

2. Terang Jakarta

Compared to the Strangers al Ghuroba, Terang Jakarta is quite unique. On one side, this community can be categorized as a Salafi community, using references produced by Salafi ulama and maintaining a very literal use of Islamic sources. Ustaz and Ustazah of this community tend to emphasize textual arguments without basing their views on certain mufassir. Among references by scholars who are close to Salafi/Wahabi used are Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (Kitab al-Tauhid) and Shaykh Muhammad bin Shalih al-'Utsaimin (al-Qaul al-Mufid 'al Kitab al-Tauhid). Other references used include those written by other scholars such as Tafsir Ibn Katsir, Tafsir Ath-Tabari/Tafsir Jami'ul Bayan fit Tafsiril Qur'an by Ibn Jarir Ath-Tabari (Tafsir bilMa'tsur), Hadith al-Arba'in An-Nabawiyah Imam Nawawi and others.

"We take a light book. Tafseer of Ibn Kathir, Ath-Thobari. Fiqh of the Four Schools. His hadith is also light, Arbainnabawi. His tauhid, the book of Shaykh Muhammad Abdul Wahhab (Shaykh Muhammad

bin Abdul Wahhab, pen.). There is also Shaykh Uthaimin (pen.). “ (UstadTaufiq al-Miftah, 27 October 2020)

Despite the closeness to Salafi traditions, the Terang Jakarta community is very open and accommodative to contemporary issues. The Characteristics of Terang Jakarta are not accommodated by the categorization proposed by Wictorowitz (2006) and Wahid (2012). For this reason, this research calls Terang Jakarta an accommodative Salafist, referring to a community that adheres Salafism but is very open to modern values. Terang Jakarta Community shows accommodating attitudes toward someone’s hijrah journey. Becoming religious for this community does not mean giving up anything else that is worldly. The figures in the Terang Jakarta community have maintained trendy look images for themselves.

Figure 5. Ustad Abu Fida in Terang Jakarta Community Activities themed *“How to Deal with All the Injustice and Inequality of the World as A Muslim”*



Regarding women issues, the Terang Jakarta community shows openness on one side but is closed in several ways. The openness is seen in the involvement of women in the community activities. Female figures or ustadzah are allowed to become speakers for both women and men.

Figure 6. Abi and Ummi Makki in Terang Jakarta Community Great Study Activities with the Themed “After Hijrah, What Next?”



However, apart from that, the Quranic verse saying “*ar-rijāluqawwāmuna ‘alan-nisā’i*” (Surah Annisa: 34) is interpreted that men are the protectors and guardians of women. The word “*ar-rijal*” is still interpreted as men in the sexual sense. This places women in a stereotype as a weak sex who need protections and guardians. Women have spaces to do their activities and work outside the home, even if they do not meet the needs of the family. Furthermore, polygamy is seen as part of Islamic teaching and may be carried out under strict conditions. From this, it can be seen that Terang Jakarta community is out of the bias tendency that generally occurs among conservatives with regard to women issues. Although this community is included in the Salafi category, accommodative behavior is also seen in acceptance of music, which is also seen as a means of preaching. The community even uses characters and titles of popular movies as part of da’wah tools. This can be seen from the narrative of Kang Shani (Budhi Priyadarshani):

“For example, about music. I still like to listen to it and use it as da’wah material on social media or material in classes. I made LOVEANGERS inspired by the Avengers movie. In da’wah, we are not alone; so, we copy superheroes who work together.” (Kang Shani/Budhi Priyadarshani Interview, 22 October 2020)

The openness is also seen in the viewpoints on tolerance and interactions with people who are different in terms of religion, nationality, and assertive rejection to violence and terrorism. Ustad Abu Fida conveyed this in one of the following statements:

“We must not harm ourselves. Moreover, suicide bombing (or) suicide is not allowed. When we have a suicide boomer, it is not Islam because Islam does not teach that. Because there is this hadith [Laa Dhororu wa la dhiroor] which becomes a strong foundation that we should not harm ourselves. Should not! If, for example, [we commit] the suicide bombing, it was clear that we already knew that we were going to die. This is self-harming, and this is against the teachings of Islam (Terang Jakarta, “How to Deal with All The Injustice and Inequality of The World as A Muslim”-Ustad Abu Fida, 19 June 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8sxxg2yJeF4&t=4656s>)

3. SHIFT or Pemuda Hijrah

From the discussion of various religious issues, the SHIFT community or Pemuda Hijrah can be categorized as conservative. Islamic sources such as the Al-Quran and Hadith are understood textually without interpretations or references from previous scholars. As in determining the prohibition of dating, Ustad Hanan Attaki did not quote any interpretation or opinion of previous scholars. In his lecture, he said, *“That’s why I often ask, which one is better? close to the same person, or closer to the Owner of the heart. If you are close to the Owner of the heart, it means that sometimes you have to stay away from the girl first. How to get away? Break up!”*. Another example is Q.S Al-Ahzab verse 59, as the basis for the obligation to veil for women, is understood literally without quoting the opinion of previous scholars. However, the community tends to avoid *furu’iyyah* (debatable) issues. In addition, this hijrah movement also supports young age marriage, matchmaking, and encourages women to propose the smallest possible dowry to their potential spouses. Besides, this community teaches the ethics of walking for women behind men and suppress the ideal woman as written in the hadiths. The conservatism attitude can be also seen in women’s involvement in the community. Although women have opportunities to become speakers in community activities, their involvement is limited to female *audiences* and issues related to women.

Figure 7. Poster of SHIFT Pemuda Hijrah Community Activities Involving the Role of Women and Youth Issues



Apart from this, the SHIFT community shows open attitudes. For example, the community does not require its followers to transform themselves entirely and leave their past lives, including their hobbies. The SHIFT community makes various hobbies a means to attract followers. Skateboarding, parkour, and others are events that are often held and integrated with da'wah activities.

The openness can also be seen in the views related to nationalism, relations with other groups including non-Muslims, and an anti-violence attitude. Even so, non-Muslim leadership cannot be accepted because it is contrary to the believed teachings. Although the interview results show the belief that Khilafah is a part of the shari'a, this belief is only a discourse without any desire to realize it. None of the community social media content talks about this.

4. Kajian Musawarah


Kajian Musawarah invites its followers to become more religious. However, this community, does not require them to leave what have been done in the past. For example, the followers of the Kajian Musawarah, whom most of them are artists, are still working in the entertainment world such as hosting shows, playing soap operas with mahram opponents (husband/wife) performing for commercials, and becoming *brand ambassadors* for halal products. Even though they are permissive in some activities, they are encouraged to leave jobs that are deemed violating Islamic teachings, such as *hosting gossips/infotainment* or playing films

and soap operas that lead to *ikhtilat* (intermingling between men and women who are not mahram).

The conservative understanding can also be seen in their understanding of gender issues, especially regarding women's role in public spaces. There is a belief that women are better to be at home. In the economic field, this community believes that trading as an economic activity must comply with the Shari'a and avoid all forms of usury.

The openness can be seen very clearly on the issue of nationalism. This community shows religious-nationalist branding with the post showing the characters saluting the flag by wearing a robe as a symbol of religiosity. The community also insists on the need to respect differences, including in political choices.

Figure 8. Musawarah Community Leaders In Commemoration of Indonesia's 74th Independence Day



This community makes Ustad Adi Hidayat and Ustad Abdul Somad as the main figures to learn Islam. On the issue of political Islam or *Khilafah*, Ustad Adi Hidayat indicated that the *Khilafah* is not needed because the goodness of Islamic values can be applied in the existing system. This shows that Ustad Adi Hidayat agrees that the Indonesian democratic system, with the Pancasila ideology, is in line with Islam. In addition, Ustad Adi Hidayat also makes a clear and firm statement rejecting extremism and violence. For example, he said that the suicide bombing on Jalan Thamrin, which was claimed as jihad, does not come from Islamic teaching, but a misleading teaching.

Figure 9. Ustad Adi Hidayat in the Kajian Musawarah Activity



In terms of relations with non-Muslims and muamalah, Ustad Adi Hidayat and Ustad Abdul Somad agree that a Muslim must continue to do good to non-Muslims. A Muslim must show the virtue of *akhlak*, as exemplified by the Prophet. However, resistance occurs when it comes to choosing leaders from among non-Muslims. This is based on their understanding that the Quran indicates the prohibition of choosing leaders from non-Muslims.

With such understandings, this group can be categorized as a conservative non-Salafi typology. The group is considered conservative because the figures do not accept contextual and modernist interpretations. Then, this community is called non-Salafi because they do not identify themselves as a Salafi group, and there is no compatibility between Salafi characteristics and this community.

5. Yuk Ngaji

Yuk Ngaji community can be categorized as an Islamist community. The tendency towards Islamism can be seen from the view of this community towards the *khilafah* as the only political system that is in accordance with Islamic teachings. The issue of the *khilafah* is discussed in several Youtube videos, including when the figures discuss the issue of hijrah. Felix Siau explained that three matters can support *istiqomah* (steadfastness) in hijrah, namely faith, ukhuwah (brotherhood), and shari'a. Faith becomes the reason and basis for someone when deciding to undergo hijrah. In other words, faith is the answer to the question "why

hijrah?” The next is ukhuwah. Ukhuwah is also interpreted as a supportive environment. With ukhuwah, hijrah is done together (in congregation). Thus, each individual feels that someone is accompanying his/ her hijrah journey. The third is shari’a. Shari’a is interpreted as a system or state that creates a supportive environment for hijrah. The state has the power to prohibit and eliminate bad deeds. With the existence of the Shari’a, there will be a prohibition against immoral acts. Furthermore, according to Felix, these rules also encourage individuals to undergo hijrah.

Described by Felix Siau: *“A trustworthy leadership system is a Khilafah. When we accuse that Islam does not have a distinctive leadership system, that the Prophet did not bring down a distinctive leadership system, this is similar to accusing that Allah has not sent down a perfect Islam.”* Paying attention to several video uploads, it can be seen that Islamic sources are interpreted very literally without interpretation, except in some cases, such as music. Besides, several references used referring to the works of HTI figures, such as the work of Hafidz Abdurrahman entitled “Islam, Politics, and Spirituality” which has been later summarized into the book “Islam Rahmatan lil Alamin” written by Felix Siau. This book is a study material for some of Yuk Ngaji Youtube contents.

Regarding women’s issues, this community opens opportunities for women to be involved in community activities. However, there is a tendency that women’s involvement in public activities is only for female *audiences* and discusses “women’s issues”. In relation to marital relationship, it is explained in one of the Youtube videos that a wife is a friend to her husband. Even so, men are still the leaders of the family. In addition, there is also a discussion explaining that women need to be protected because they become targets for enemies of Islam who destroy Islam through cultures and others. The following is an excerpt from Felix Siau’s explanation in a Youtube video: *“The world changes and is dominated by women. The nature of women dominates the world. Logical man, emotional woman. Now we see the world getting emotional. People promoted features in the past. Now people promote the experience. Men can create emotional status, which was not possible by men of old. That’s why women are important. Those who do not like Islam take*

advantage of this by controlling women. They spoil women with food, fun, and fashion. When the woman is damaged, the children are damaged, then the husband is damaged."

Figure 10. The Involvement of Women in Several Posters of the Yuk Ngaji Community Activities



The Yuk Ngaji community shows openness in responding to religious diversity, between different religions and within one religion, and the use of modern elements in their religiosity. This community firmly rejects violence in the name of religion. However, the figures do not tolerate matters related to fundamental beliefs, such as selecting non-Muslim leaders and congratulating Christians for Christmas celebrations.

FINDING 2: IDEA SPREAD STRATEGIES

Next, by explaining the strategy of spreading the idea of the hijrah community, this study also answers the question of how conservative narratives can develop and dominate the cyberspace. It can be said that the hijrah communities is eminent n utilizing social media to attract followers from young people. The use of social media is further supported by several strategies. The followings are some of the strategies extracted from the five hijrah communities. Not all of these strategies are implemented by every community, but they make hijrah popular and in demand.

- 1. The appearance of the figures and religious teachers tends to be trendy, casual, and unconventional when conveying religious messages. For example, *hoodies*, flannel shirts, skullcaps, t-shirts are more preferable than koko (a shirt worn by Muslim men

usually in religious occasions), robes, or caps. This strategy has been chosen, among others, to eliminate the social gaps between the ustad and congregation; and also makes them closer to the congregations, who are generally young millennials.

2. Some communities choose unusual meeting places for learning Islam, such as hotel ballrooms, futsal courts, skateboard arenas, *cafes*, etc.
3. Methods resembling motivational training are chosen in learning Islam. This involves an interactive way, using digital technology and *ice-breaking* activities that attract participants.
4. English is often used in the social media postings or activity tag lines to be more youth friendly.
5. Yuk Ngaji encourages its offline activity participants to form a small *halaqah* group to make the community solid in maintaining the resilience of the hijrah.
6. Popular celebrations popular among young people, such as Valentine's Day, are used to have more religious discussions.
7. Yuk Ngaji often uses third party figures in its Instagram contents. The characters used are those that are popular among young people, such as K-Pop idols and *anime*.
8. Some communities use online groups such as Whatsapp and Telegram to deliver materials and promote their activities.
9. Non-religious social activities are used to convey religious messages, such as sports (futsal, skateboarding and cycling), motorbike convoys, and *hanging out*.
10. Yuk Ngaji has developed mobile based-applications, such as Fast Habit and SKY.
11. Most of the communities use of *public figures* or celebrities in the promotion of community activities.
12. Kajian Musawarah maintains the endorsement of Islamic nuanced products using their members, who are celebrities.
13. All hijrah communities in this research, except The Strangers Al Ghuroba exchange their figures and religious teachers and

strengthen the movement through the establishment of the Muslim United and Barisan Bangun Negeri organizations.

14. Hijrah communities tend to avoid the discussion of *furu'iyah* topics or the topics that lead to debates.
15. Apart from online activities, the hijrah communities maintain *offline* activities.
16. They also use the elements of *pop culture* to attract young people.

DISCUSSION

With the fragmentation of religious authority in cyberspace, as explained by previous studies (Alfitri, 2015; Bunt, 2018; Campbell, 2007; Turner, 2007), the aforementioned strategies have made the hijrah community more popular than the *mainstream* Muslim communities, which tend to maintain the established religious authorities. The unconventional ways of preaching and the appearance of the characters have made what is conveyed more easily accepted by the followers of hijrah communities. They have contributed in providing an “environment” to strengthen one’s commitment his/her religion, which in this case is Islam, especially for youth groups.

Related to the conservatism tendency of the hijrah communities, the conservative understandings touch more on women’s issues than other issues such as politics, nationality, or social relations with non-Muslims. This tendency is commonly found in the phenomenon of conservatism elsewhere (Kouru, 2020; Karen & Childs, 2004), including in Indonesia (Beta, 2019). With this, it seems that hijrah communities in Indonesia show the conservative tendency and they reproduce conservative perspectives on gender. Such reproduction occurs because of the existence of “*habitus*”, affecting the perspective of religious figures. This perspective, then, is carried out in ‘social practices’ (religious), referring to the Salafus Sholeh era (Bourdieu, 1977).

The conservatism that leads to Islamism is seen in only one community. For other communities, even though they believe the khilafah as part of Islamic teachings, the idea is still within the

discourse. With the fluidity of one community with others, it is not impossible for an exchange of ideas to occur. This, in turn, may lead to the unification of ideas related to the embodiment of Islamic politics based on *Khilafah* or Islamic exclusivity. This research strengthens Bourdieu's (1977) habitus theory in terms of reproducing accommodative religious understanding in various issues, including the issue of nationality and women. Also, this study is also in line with PPIM's (2020) findings regarding the dominance of conservatism in cyberspace.

CONCLUSION

1. There are two typologies of contemporary hijrah communities in Indonesia, namely conservative and Islamist. The conservative group consists of Salafi and Non-Salafi. Furthermore, the Salafi community shows the characteristics of pure Salafi and accommodative Salafi. The term accommodative Salafi is used in this study to refer to the Salafi community that shows accommodative attitudes towards modern values. Meanwhile, previous studies on Salafism have not accommodated this characteristic.
2. The typologies are made based on an in-depth study of community responses to issues such as nationality, tolerance and gender. The conservatism shown by the five hijrah communities is very diverse. Thus, they are not homogenous.
3. The hijrah communities are successful in attracting followers from young millennials from various social classes. This is due to the ability of the community to use non-conventional methods of da'wah by optimizing the use of social media, youth-style communication, and the ability to follow and respond to emerging trends (lifestyles and issues).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Starting from these findings, several recommendations put forward by this study are:

1. Encourage the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia to maximize the potential of the local religious figures network and do by providing guidance to reach and target younger generations in promoting religious moderation values. This is likely to succeed by expanding the local religious figures' functions to foster not only offline communities but also online communities.
2. Increase the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in facilitating meeting spaces between the Ministry, **the hijrah community**, MUI, mainstream Islamic organizations (such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama), and intra-religious groups, to build an understanding to create a harmonious life amid heterogeneity of religious understanding.
3. Encourage the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, in this case, Bimas Islam, to prepare a module or general guide for young preachers who speak out about Islam and Indonesian based on moderate values with participatory methods and responsive to the development of the digital world.
4. Encourage the role of civil society fronted by social organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, al-Washliyah, Mathla'ul Anwar, Nahdlatul Wathan and others, it is necessary to balance moderate religious narratives in the public sphere by considering the spirit of young people.
5. Reactivating the gender *focal point* at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in mentoring and evaluating activities, so that gender issues become a concern in various programs.
6. Increase the synergy between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Women and Children Empowerment in strengthening gender sensitivity for policymakers and implementers.

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PORTRAITS OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION IN MUSLIM COLLEGE STUDENTS

The Case of Three Islamic Universities (Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta)

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Muhammad Akhyar, Iif Fikriyati Ihsani

MAIN FINDINGS

This study used a mix method approach with samples from three target campuses Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta), Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University Bandung (UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung), and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta (UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta). A quantitative study is conducted in the form of a survey that looks at indicators of religious moderation-national commitment, tolerance and non-violent attitudes as factors of resilience to pro-violent extremism opinions. The qualitative study was conducted with a focus group discussion related to the meaning of religious moderation in the programs, strategies and regulations of the three target campuses. From the regression analysis, it is found that many factors of religious moderation are related to pro-violent-extremism opinion, which in other words means that these factors are factors of resilience to pro-violent-extremism ideology. However, there are several factors that are relatively vulnerable and can be strengthened, namely the factor of empathy towards adherents of other religions (external empathy), in the form of a relatively low perspective-taking ability score, and empathy for other sects of Islam (internal empathy), with a score of rejection of adherence to other sects in Islam is still relatively high. These two factors are operationalizations of tolerance. Although from a policy perspective it is relatively new, there have been efforts from these three State Islamic Universities (PTKINs) in promoting religious moderation in terms of education/teaching, research and community service, organizational culture

and student activities. However, a guideline/guideline module is still needed in ensuring the sustainability and adequacy of the promotion of religious moderation accompanied by structured monitoring and evaluation activities in mainstreaming religious moderation in PTKIN. In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the institutional structure of the Religious Moderation Houses/Institutions so that they are more flexible in managing activities and budgets to ensure that the promotion of religious moderation in PTKI runs.

PRELIMINARY

Religious moderation is a concept initiated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs as an effort to answer the challenges of the Nation State which in recent decades has been faced with movements of religious extremism. Conceptually, religious moderation is a balanced (moderate) religious attitude between one's own (exclusive) religious experience and respect for the religious practices of other people with different beliefs (inclusive). Balance in religious practice means being confident in the essence of religious teachings that it embraces, which teaches fair and balanced principles, but sharing the truth as far as religious interpretation is concerned (Religious Moderation, Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2019).

The Islamic Religious College (PTKI) is an important element in developing and mainstreaming the concept of religious moderation. At least for two reasons, *first*, Islamic religious colleges are under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs which is the initiator of the concept, and *second*, Islamic religious colleges are centers of Islamic studies, as the religion followed by the majority of religious communities in Indonesia. With this in mind, the Directorate of Islamic Education of the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a Circular Letter Number B-3663.1/Dj.I/BA.02/10/2019 dated October 29, 2019 concerning the Circular of Religious Moderation Houses.

The House of Religious Moderation (RMB) is the implementing agency for strengthening religious moderation in the PTKI environment. Adhering to its position within the PTKI encourages RMB to be actively involved in the role and function of the tridharma

of colleges. RMB is assigned to be the center for education, assistance, complaints and strengthening of discourse on religious moderation within PTKIN.

The Islamic Religious College has been known as one of the pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia. IAIN alumni are absorbed in a moderate frame of mind in the ideology of development and modernization which in the 1980s was the dominant ideology (Jabali and Jamhari, 2002). In recent years, however, the thesa appears to have been disproved by the findings of several studies on violent extremism in colleges that also occurred in Islamic Religious Colleges.

The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), and research institutions such as the Setara Institute, CSRC, Research and Development Ministry of Religious Affairs reported symptoms of an increase in violent extremism on college campuses. In this fact, relying on the discourse of religious moderation on PTKI needs to be further elaborated and examined. The parameters of violent extremism include (1) the existence of transnational ideologies and ideologies that aim to build an Islamic state (*dawlah Islamiyah*) or the caliphate (*khalifah*), (2) the existence of takfiri attitude, disbelieve those who are of the same religion, but have different religious understandings and praxis and (3)) the prohibition of tolerant attitudes and having a good faith (*mujamalah*) with adherents of other religions (Schmid, 2015), needs to be confirmed with the concept of religious moderation as a discourse of resilience.

This research on the Portrait of Religious Moderation among Muslim Students tries to unravel the institutional capacity of Islamic Religious Colleges as agents of religious moderation, both in terms of resources, organization and regulation. College is one of the most important institutions in building public virtue in preparing the nation's young generation who have a strong national insight. For this reason, elaborative studies in tertiary institutions are absolutely necessary to provide institutional capacity that is not only capable of becoming centers of virtue but also of mainstreaming virtue, especially in religious moderation.

DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has determined four indicators of religious moderation, namely: 1) national commitment, 2) tolerance, 3) anti-violence and 4) accommodative to local culture (Book of Religious Moderation, 2019). The four indicators are determined by the Ministry of Religious Affairs as a measuring tool to assess the level of religious moderation that is practiced by a person and how vulnerable they are. By measuring these indicators, the administrators of religious moderation can identify and take appropriate steps in strengthening religious moderation.

Conceptually, the four indicators have a fairly strong theoretical basis. In the commitment of nationality, the foundation of nationalism and Pancasila is used as a way to see the extent to which one's views, attitudes and religious practices have an impact on loyalty to the basic consensus of nationality, especially related to the acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology, his attitude towards ideological challenges that are contrary to Pancasila (Ubaedillah, 2014)

Tolerance indicators refer to attitudes in dealing with differences, which in the context of interfaith relations are described through attitudes towards adherents of other religions, willingness to dialogue, work together, establish places of worship and experience interacting with adherents of other religions. Meanwhile, intra-religious relations are illustrated by the ability to respond to minority sects which are considered to deviate from the mainstream of religion (Halili, 2018).

The measurement of the variable of anti-violence does not start with an attitude of resistance, but starts with an ideology or an understanding that wants to make changes to the social and political system by using violent / extreme methods in the name of religion, both verbal, physical and mental violence. This violent ideology and understanding can only find the roots of its growth if it is accompanied by perceptions of injustice and threat which, if managed ideologically, can encourage someone to hate and fight with violence and terror (Mirra, 2019).

The accommodative attitude of local culture is an item to see the extent to which religious adherents accommodate local culture and

traditions in their religious behavior. This item is based on the untested assumption that a moderate religious person tends to be friendlier in accepting local traditions and culture. However, Azyumardi Azra’s notes regarding *Wasathiyah Islam* can be used as a theoretical basis, that the actualization of religious moderation is seen in Indonesian Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, NU, al-Washliyah, Persis and so on, which have developed accommodatively with local culture since the mid-century 13 in Indonesia (Azra, 2020).

Table 1. Variable Concept of Religious Moderation

Indicator of religious moderation (Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2019)

Dimension	Explanation & Explanation Sentences	Derivative Behavior
National Commitment	“... to what extent a person’s religious views, attitudes and practices have an impact on loyalty to the basic consensus of nationality, especially in relation to the acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology, his attitude towards ideological challenges as opposed to Pancasila, and nationalism.”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approval of the Principle of Nation in the 1945 Constitution ▪ Conduct activism and participation as a good citizen ▪ A sense of trust in the country
Tolerance (Extra-Intra and Practices that accommodate local culture)	<p>“... attitude to make room and do not interfere with the rights of other people to believe, express their beliefs, and express opinions, even if it is different from what we believe. “</p> <p>“...the willingness to accept religious practices that accommodate local culture and traditions.”</p> <p>(These two indicators are combined because they have similar behavior)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tolerance: enter level 4 Intercultural Stage Ben-net à just ‘accept’. ▪ This research takes level 5, namely understanding each other and being able to see from the other person’s point of view (empathy). ▪ Boer & Muynck (2015) à tolerance requires awareness that each individual has human rights and empathy. ▪ Empathy is translated into empathy between religious communities or religious schools.

Dimension	Explanation & Explanation Sentences	Derivative Behavior
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Treating others according to human rights (equality) is measured by social dominance orientation
Anti violence	<p>“... radicalism, or violence, in the context of religious moderation is understood as an ideology (idea or concept) and a notion that wants to make changes to the social and political system by using violent / extreme methods in the name of religion, whether verbal or physical violence. and thoughts. “</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Have anti-violence belief

Because the 4 (four) indicators are still theoretical-conceptual, for measurement purposes, this study uses a measuring tool that in concept and theory has a close definition and purpose with religious moderation. In the indicator variable of national commitment, using the keyword “loyalty to the consensus of the basis of nationality”, a measurement framework of “Civic Attitudes” is used whose variable item derivatives consist of (1) Support for democratic principles and practices (attitudes), (2) Support for democratic principles and practices (behavioral intentions), (3) Openness for diversity, and (4) Nationalism (Blasko, Costa and Vera-Toscano, 2018).

The variable item indicators of tolerance in religious moderation indicate respect, accepting differences both socially and politically. Tolerance requires an attitude of giving space, being willing to dialogue and being able to respond to the presence of minority sects. To be able to elaborate on this indicator, this study uses the variable item “Intra and Interreligion Empathy” which was adapted from “Ethnocultural Empathy” (Wang et al., 2003).

The tolerance indicator variables include (1) Empathy (Affective and Cognitive) (2) Social Dominance Orientation. Adaptability to local culture is internalized into indicators of tolerance because its

substance is essentially rooted in a willingness to accept differences, in this case local traditions, by adapting and accommodating. Meanwhile, the non-violent aspect is measured by adapting items from the BRAVE (Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism) measurement tool (Grossman, et al, 2020).

As for the pro-violent extremism with the parameter of the extent to which the participants agree on the use of violence in upholding sharia and changing the state ideology to an Islamic state, explored through the variable item “Fire Research in Husk” (Halili, 2018). The items in “Fire in the Chaff Research” have been used by many studies to measure a person’s level of violent extremism. In this study, pro-violent extremism items serve as a criterion with the moderating variable of religion as a predictor.

As an institutional study, the study of measuring religious moderation which is quantified based on 4 (four) indicators is confirmed in the quality of higher education institutions regulatively, structure and administratively. Assessment of institutional qualifications uses the concept of “UNDP Measuring Capacities” which elaborates on three components; (1) Performance, (2) Adaptability, and (2) Stability.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the research background and theoretical foundation above, the questions raised in this study are:

1. What is the description of “Religious Moderation” in the surrounding PTKIN environment
 - a) Attitudes and behavior moderation of the PTKIN academic community
 - b) Implementation of Religious Moderation in Program Policy at PTKIN
2. What *capacity building* is needed by PTKIN to increase religious moderation?
3. To what extent has the *capacity building* been carried out effectively in increasing religious moderation in PTKIN?

The program offered is *Research and Capacity Building* on the Institutional Capacity of PTKIN, which focuses on religious moderation. The research itself is aimed at checking the initial conditions of PTKIN related to religious moderation and assessing what *capacity building* needs can be done in increasing religious moderation. In addition, research is also used in testing the effectiveness of the *capacity building* that is being carried out.

METHODOLOGY




This research was conducted within the scope of PTKIN. The PTKIN chosen is the PTKIN which is considered capable of being a role model for other PTKINs so that if *capacity building* is carried out and its effectiveness is tested, it can become a best practice for other PTKINs. The PTKIN referred to is (1) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta; (2) UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung (3) UIN Sunan Kalijaga, DI Yogyakarta

This study uses a mix of methods; quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative studies are carried out by surveying the student and non-student population which includes lecturers, education staff and officials. The two population categories were taken randomly (*stratified random sampling*) from each faculty and semester level subgroups (year 1 to year 3). To estimate the number of samples needed, the researcher made calculations using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Based on the *power* calculation for *linear multiple regression* analysis with 4 predictors, following the number of religious moderation components, and the prediction of a small *effect size* ($f^2 = .02$), and *power* = .95, a total sample of 934 people is needed to detect an effect.

Based on this calculation, the required data are 1080 students and 180 non-students. The number of student samples was increased to anticipate a smaller actual *effect size*, while the sample size of the non-student population was determined by considering the number of non-students who actually might not be large. This amount is evenly divided into the three target PTKIN. Can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Illustration of Sampling Survey

Population Type	Sub-Population	Population description	Quota N per faculty family	Quota N per PTKIN	Quota N total
Students (Quota N = 1080)	General student	Students from 1st to 3rd year include general students	106	318	954
	Key Actor Student	Are Active students who are referred by general student participants	14	42	126
Non-students (Quota N = 1080)	Key Actor Lecturer	is the name of an active student referred to by general student participants	10	30	60
	Lecturer of PKN and Islamic Studies	Lecturer who teaches PKN and Islamic Studies courses	4	12	36
	Officials for Academic and Student Affairs	Faculty officials who are authorized to issue strategic policies related to Academic and Student Affairs	6	18	54

-  Proportionate quota random sampling
-  Random quota sampling
-  Snowball sampling

*A balanced quota will be made for the gender of women and men

Referral students are students who are considered influencing political and religious views by *randomly* recruited students. Lecturers and faculty officers comprise several sub-populations; randomly recruited PKN and Islamic studies lecturers, lecturers referred to by general student participants, and faculty officials. In recruiting participants, we strive to ensure that the sample is gender balanced. Most of the filling out of the survey was done online using the Zoom


and Limesurvey applications, unless there were special requests from lecturer and faculty participants to fill in by meeting in person.

The predictor variables measured in quantitative studies are empathy, *social dominance orientation*, anti-violence, as well as citizenship behavior and attitudes. These variables are the operationalization of religious moderation. The measurement of the empathy variable was carried out using a measuring tool for adaptation of *ethnocultural empathy* (Wang, et al. 2003), which is divided into empathy for followers of other religions, which in this study we use Christianity as a reference (external empathy) and adherents of other sects who are considered perverted (internal empathy). The flow used to measure internal empathy is based on the participant's choice of which sect he considers the most unified or different from the Islam he practices (eg Ahmadiyah, Shia).

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is the tendency of individuals to agree on hierarchy and inequality in society, measured by SDO7 adaptation (Ho, et al. 2015). To measure nonviolence, we use an adaptation of a portion of the BRAVE scale (Grossman, et al. 2020). These predictor variables were tested whether they could predict the criterion variable, namely agreement with opinions that justify acts of violence in the name of Islam or the Islamic state, which was measured using the revised Pro Violent Extremism Opinion scale / OpVERad, made by PPIM.

All scales used are 1-6 Likert scale (eg Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree). The analysis to be carried out is to test whether the moderating variables of religion really predict the OpVERad variable (Figure 1). To do this, we used multilevel regression with the general student population as the sample analysis.

Figure 1. The model tested in the regression analysis



The quantitative method is used in this study as a “baseline”, which aims to get an initial picture of the sample, as well as the variables that are the target of the intervention. The procedure for filling out the survey is carried out online using the Limesurvey platform which is taken directly by inviting participants to a zoom meeting. Every single survey session is followed by one type of population. In one data collection session, participants will be guided by two co-researchers. This is done to obtain valid survey data. The role of the co-researcher is to assist the process so that participants can have the opportunity to ask questions, confirm question items and even if they want to resign as participants, they can directly convey them to the co-investigator. Upon completion, participants will notify the co-researcher, and one of the co-researchers will check the participants’ answers in the Limesurvey, to ensure that no answers have been missed by mistake.

The findings resulting from the quantitative survey were confirmed in a qualitative study carried out through *focus group discussions* with four types of participants, namely level 2 students, students of *key actors* (who are heads of student organizations or

whose names appear as references), lecturers (who teach subjects PPKN and Introduction to Islamic Studies, as well as lecturers whose names appear in quantitative surveys as reference lecturers) and PTKIN officials (Deputy Chancellor, Deputy Dean and Chair of Study Centers / Institutions).

The *sample* selection was done by *purposive sampling*. The FGD is conducted *online* via the *zoom* meeting platform. This qualitative focuses on exploring the exploration of understanding religious moderation in students, acceptance of definitions and indicators of religious moderation in lecturers and officials and the practice of PTKIN in increasing religious moderation. Qualitative data analysis was carried out by selecting several themes (a collection of *codes* from statements in verbatim transcripts) that were most frequently mentioned from a total of 12 FGDs conducted.

SURVEY RESULTS

After reducing the sample that did not pass the *attention check* item using the attention check item and reducing the number of statistical outliers, the total sample we used in the analysis was 846 students, the mean age was 20.45 years. As many as 48% of the participants were male.

Multilevel regression analysis shows that almost all factors of the moderating variables of religion predict OpVERad, although the direction of the prediction does not always match the initial estimate:

1. External empathy: the higher a person's tendency to empathize with other religious communities, in this case specifically Christians, the lower the likelihood he will justify extreme actions to defend Islam or establish an Islamic state.
2. Internal Rejection: The higher a person's tendency to be apathetic or feel anxious about the existence of followers of other sects in Islam who are considered heretical, the more he will agree with OpVERad.
3. SDO: The higher a person's tendency to like hierarchy and inequality, the more he agrees with OpVERad.

4. Nonviolence: The more nonviolent a person is, the less agreeable to OpVERad
5. Practical politics and activism: The more a person shows an intention to engage in practical politics and activism, the greater will be his approval of OpVERad
6. Trust in government systems: The more trust a person has in the government system (eg central, regional, law enforcement systems), the lower his / her approval of OpVERad.


A summary of these results can be seen in Figure 2.

Apart from the results of the regression analysis, we also carried out a descriptive analysis to see which variables were indicated as vulnerable. We find that empathy, both external and internal, is a vulnerable variable.

The score for the perspective taking factor (a person's tendency to find out more and try to put oneself in another person's shoes) for external empathy is still low ($M = 3.14$, $SD = .86$), from the maximum score (6). General empathy for internals is also low ($M = 2.92$, $SD = .89$), and rejection high ($M = 3.67$, $SD = .97$). This shows that both external and internal empathy can be targeted for intervention in the three PTKINs.

From these findings we draw several conclusions. First, almost all religious moderation variables significantly predict OpVERad. This supports the notion that religious moderation, at least in its operationalization as a social skill, predicts extreme views in fighting for religion. Second, for the sake of intervention, we found that empathy is perhaps the most important aspect of religious moderation to be targeted.

Figure 2. Model analysis results. Figures show non-standardized regression coefficients (greater is the greater the power of the variable in predicting OpVERad), and stars (*) indicate a statistically significant relationship.



QUALITATIVE RESULTS

TERMINOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION

Of the 4 (four) indicators of religious moderation, tolerance is the *term* most discussed by students participating in the FGD. Discussions about tolerance take place both externally (among religious followers) and internally (between sects within one religion).

The second *term* that becomes the locus of study is a national commitment embodied through the approval of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which are believed to be in accordance with Islamic teachings / values and fulfill elements of nationalism / love for the country. Nonviolence is a *term* that has not been discussed much in the discussion, however, similar terms appear as not extreme.

The non-extreme that is meant here is related to not being in an extreme right / left position, not being excessive in worshiping, or not overly imposing certain religious teachings.

The indicators and definitions used in this study are also accepted by the majority of lecturers and officials, but lecturers and campus officials in 3 (three) tertiary institutions still view that the concept of religious moderation does not yet have operationalization of religious moderation behavior with a obvious *clear cut*.

Some respondents gave revised input related to religious moderation indicators where the intended revision was by combining existing indicators with 12 religious moderation values (*Tawasuth, I'tidal, Tawazun*, and so on) or adding religious commitment, namely carrying out religious teachings correctly.

IMPLEMENTATION OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION

In general, the FGD Participants believed that there were factors that could influence a person's religious moderation fluctuations, including: religious insight, scientific background and individual experience in interacting with people of different beliefs, exposure from the media related to violent extremism and participation and / or individual relations in student organizations.

Lecturers and Officials clearly stated that religious moderation has become the agenda and even the spirit for PTKIN. UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta refers to the material "Islam in terms of its various aspects", written by Prof. Dr. Harun Nasution. UIN Sunan Kalijaga refers to Prof. Dr. Abdul Mukti Ali who initiated the Inter-Religious Dialogue and revitalized the Inter-Religious Conference forum.

As a terminology, religious moderation has become the theme of the programs and activities of the three tertiary institutions. Seminars, student activities, introduction to campus and various webinars use the core theme of religious moderation. However, as a work concept that is translated into an institutional system, the three universities agree that they do not yet have a clear operational concept.

Whereas there are still elements of religious moderation in education and teaching activities with an andragogical approach, their characteristics are based on what FGD respondents said individually. In the three tertiary institutions, data and procedures as well as an integrated mechanism have not been found. This means that the religious moderation movement is still individual-personal, not yet an institutional movement.

The three tertiary institutions also admit that there are lecturers who are not *inherent* in religious moderation, even do not have a spirit of moderation as has the identity of UIN that has existed since the IAIN era. Some lecturers consider the change from IAIN to UIN which opens opportunities for lecturers from outside UIN who are not in the same identity as the trigger for this. Therefore, in the majority, both lecturers, students and education staff feel it is important for the Religious Moderation House to attend.

EMPATHY: A VULNERABLE VARIABLE TO INTOLERANCE

The findings of the survey results which indicate the unstable value of empathy in almost all circles, both in students, lecturers and education personnel at the three research target State Universities indicate vulnerability to the Tolerance Indicator.

This is not good news for PTKIN, which has claimed to be part of its religious moderation program. Religious extremism can arise from the perception of injustice and threat experienced by a person or group of people.

With a high level of vulnerability, empathy can turn into antipathy, encouraging feelings of threat, which if managed ideologically by generating hatred against groups that are considered to be injustice makers and those who threaten their identity.

Some suggestions that emerged from FGD participants to operationalize religious moderation in the curriculum system, for example by integrating it into a MKDU learning process using certain learning methodologies that encourage openness and are able to increase empathy, can be considered in dealing with this vulnerability.

In addition, PTKIN is also expected to increase its activities that involve interaction with people from different backgrounds. From an organizational perspective, it is hoped that the operationalization of an integrated vision and mission related to religious moderation is escorted by monitoring and evaluating the *mainstreaming* activities undertaken. The need for regulation of religious moderation houses to become orthakers was also raised in the FGD. In addition, PTKIN must also be involved in the socialization of religious moderation in society.

Three tertiary institutions in their capacity have sufficient human resources to be able to translate the values of religious moderation into one integrated curriculum concept.

RELIGIOUS MODERATION HOUSE (RMB)

The three research target public universities agree and fully support the Circular of the Directorate General of Islamic Education No B-3663.1/Dj.I/BA.02/10/2019 concerning the Establishment of Religious Moderation Houses. However, how to carry out their roles, duties and functions, the three state universities still do not have a clear concept and direction.

The formation of RMB in both UIN Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta is non-structural in nature, so that the authority and scope of its movement is limited internally and externally. As a non-structured institution, the Religious Moderation House does not have the rights to budget, planning, performance indicators and financing. As a result, supervision and measurement of the sustainability of roles, duties and functions is *optional*.

With this position, the growth and development of the Religious Moderation House really depends on the policies and strategic directions of the Parent Institution, Tertiary Institutions and its ranks. Without a strong will from the existing organizations in the structure, non-structural institutions such as RMB in the end are just names.

The RMB in the three tertiary institutions was simultaneously legalized and formed after the circulation was published. The RMB at UIN Jakarta is the Center for Religious Moderation Studies which was legalized in November 2020. The RMB at UIN Bandung is called the

Religious Moderation House which was legalized in early 2020 and the RMB at UIN Yogyakarta is the Center for Moderation of Religion and Diversity which was also established in November 2020.

The age of the formation of the RMB is still young, the institutional foundation is not clear and the spirit of *wasathiyah* has been eliminated along with the expansion of UIN enthusiasts who are not connected to the Islamic *wasathiyah* mass organization, which are a challenge for the Religious Moderation House. If it is not anticipated and managed quickly and systematically, the restlessness that Azyumardi Azra calls the “Ideological Battle” may lose its knot of moderation.

In addition, even though PTKIN’s vision and mission values have been perceived as containing Religious moderation value, it is still necessary to have clarity on the operationalization of PTKIN’s vision and mission. The absence of a monitoring and evaluation system also hinders the implementation process of incorporating religious moderation values in PTKIN itself.

CONCLUSION

Religious moderation as a concept seems to have been thoroughly accepted, recognized and felt by its needs by the three universities (UIN Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta). However, operationally and practically, it is still far from being burned.

The level of vulnerability to the element of empathy which fluctuates in the values of tolerance and intolerance in a thin line shows that in terms of resources, State Religious Universities are still not ideal to be declared agents of religious moderation. This means that with the current condition of empathy, there is a potential for symptoms of violent extremism to still grow and develop, thus requiring a structured and sustainable operationalization strategy of religious moderation.

The results of previous research which mentioned about the symptoms of violent extremism in Islamic religious colleges were confirmed positively again through this research, so it is necessary to intervene in higher education institutions, one of which is by optimizing the role of the Religious Moderation House.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations to the Government, in this case the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as part of the education policy authority, are as follows:

1. Regulation of the Institutional Structure of Religious Moderation Houses which if possible become an integrated part of the Organization and Work Procedure (Ortaker) of Higher Education, if this is not possible given the agenda of simplifying the bureaucracy, perhaps a special structure advocacy regulation can be made where programs and activities of derivative religious moderation are institutionalized into one particular subject and / or certified training activities as competency requirements in the SKPI;
2. Integrated measurement index as an evaluation tool for religious moderation in PTKIN, this can be an early detection tool for the vulnerability and resistance of religious moderation in each university, so that PTKIN as a knot of Islam *wasathiyah* can maintain its existence;
3. The basic modules for each Religious Moderation House in developing their coverage areas consist of the Education and Training Module, Study and Research Model as well as advocacy and community assistance;

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EVALUATION AND STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF PROGRAM “PESANTREN LEADERS VISIT TO JAPAN”

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Since a long time ago, Indonesia and Japan have established diplomatic relations in various areas through cultural exchange. Each year the Japanese government gives opportunity to Indonesian Muslims to visit Sakura Country. Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) becomes one of the primary groups to promote a better understanding between the Indonesian Muslims and Japanese Muslims.

The Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of the State Islamic University Jakarta, in cooperation with the Japanese government, has initiated the Program of “Pesantren Leaders Visit to Japan.” The Program has been implemented from 2004 to 2019 involving around 160 Muslim clerics (*kyai*), wife of kyai (*nyai*), *ustaz*, and *ustazah* from a number of Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia. 70% of the program participants are males, and 30% are females.

During the program’s implementation, the leaders of the Islamic boarding schools visited a number of religious, cultural, historical sites, educational institutions, companies, and government buildings in several parts of Japan. They experienced the life of the Japanese community. They stayed in a non-Muslim community when they had an opportunity for a *homestay* program in the house of a community member. The presentation on Islam in Indonesia and explication of their understanding of the Japanese community also constitute the part of the series of the program.

It is in this context that MAARIF Institute is involved in conducting the evaluation and study of the impact on such program in relation to a lesson learning for the development of the program in the future.

The evaluation and study of this impact is fully conducted by MAARIF Institute team; therefore, it has an adequate independency level.

The aim of the program that has been implemented for 16 years is to introduce the culture of Japanese community such as discipline, honesty, and work ethic. It is expected that such cultures may be put into effect in the Islamic boarding school where the alumni have served, so this program is specifically intended to give inspiration to the Islamic boarding school leaders to manage education, in particular as the main focus of their daily activities.

This assessment is intended for all alumni of the program. However, during the assessment, there were only 87 alumni that could be contacted; 59 alumni filled out the questionnaire online. Out of 59 alumni, 34 alumni were interviewed via a telephone connection. The questionnaires were filled out online from 21 November to 27 December 2020. The interview was carried out from 17 – 31 December 2020.

For points to be answered in this assessment shall be to identify the alumni activities, find out any effect in the Islamic boarding school, analyze the extent of the benefit of follow-up by the alumni, and identify any challenges they encountered as well as any solutions taken in responding to such challenge in implementing the lesson learning obtained in Japan.

In conducting the evaluation and study of this impact, MAARIF Institute gathered information in various manners such as online discussion, online workshop, assessment through an online questionnaire, interviews via telephone connection, and deriving information via social media.


The assessment was carried out through several phases in the form of the planning, implementation, support and analysis as well as writing the assessment results. There were two main hindrances in carrying out the assessment that include the delayed respond from some of the program alumni, the difference of time and the duration of departure of one alumnus and the other alumni. Therefore, MAARIF Institute has made some notes and individual adjustments.

PROFILE OF ALUMNI

Alumni comprises 23 (37,29%) females and 36 males (62,71%). They are in West Indonesia (79,66%), Central Indonesia (18,64%), and East Indonesia (1,69%). 50,85% of the alumni live in rural areas and 49,25% live in urban areas.

Most of the alumni are those carrying out activities in the Islamic boarding school: Salafiyah, Khalafiyah, and Combination (88,14%) and the rest of them are from non-islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) engaged in the area of Islamic-based religious education (11,86%) as is evident in figure 1.

Figure 1. Type of pesantren/institution supporting the alumni.



Based on the type of pesantren, there is a difference of percentage between the time of visit and the present condition as seen in table 1.

Table 1. Comparison of the Type of Islamic Boarding School at the time of Rihlah and the present Place of Activity

Type of Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren)	Time of visit	Present
Salafiyah	8,47%	10,17%
Khalafiyah	44,07%	42,37%
Combination	35,59%	37,29%

The alumni serving themselves in the Islamic boarding school hold different positions. The comparison of the time of departure and the present condition indicates some changes as seen in table 2.

Table 2. Comparison of the type of Islamic Boarding school at the time of Visit and the Present Place of Activity

Comparison of Departure and Present Condition based on Position						
	At the time of Visit		Total	Present		Total
	Male	Female		Male	Female	
Kyai/Nyai	20,34%	6,78%	27,12%	22,03%	10,17%	32,2%
Ustaz/Ustazah	16,95%	13,56%	30,51%	16,95%	15,25%	32,2%
Mudir/Vice Mudir	13,56%	5,08%	18,64%	10,17%	5,08%	15,25%
Coordinator/Head /Vice Head of Ma- drasah (Muslim reli- gious school)	1,69%	11,86%	13,56%	1,69%	5,08%	6,78%
Supervisor	1,69%	0%	1,69%	6,78%	0%	6,78%
Director of HRD / Education	3,39%	1,69%	5,08%	1,69%	1,69%	3,39%
Secretary	0%	0%	0%	0%	1,69%	1,69%
Trainer	3,39%	0%	3,39%	1,69%	0%	1,69%
Total	61,02%	38,98%	100%	61,02%	38,98%	100%

GENERAL FINDINGS

The Program of “Pesantren Leaders Visit to Japan” has given inspiration in translating the conceptual Islamic values to practical form by appropriate implementations in the field.

PRIMARY FINDINGS

CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE LEADERS OF ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL

The alumni give score of 4,6 of maximum 5 related to any values that may be adopted, currently applied in the Islamic boarding school. The answers of the alumni vary as is apparent from the value of deviation standard seen in table 3.

Table 3. The average and Deviation Standard of Adoption of Japanese Cultural Values

Value of Japanese Culture	Average	Deviation Standard
Discipline	4,85	0,61
Loyalty	4,58	0,81
Honesty	4,85	0,52
Responsibility	4,86	0,51
Totality	4,66	0,73
Developing good relationship	4,71	0,53
Motivation	4,73	0,67
Economy	4,54	0,86
Obedience in performing religious obligations	3,63	1,17

From table 3 it is apparent that responsibility, as interpreted by the alumni as a part of integrity has the highest score. Other cultures that have possible high scores to be adopted are discipline and honesty. Out of such 3 cultures, discipline is mostly adopted.

The majority of the alumni responded that the visit to Japan has given effect on the change of their behavior in daily life. That has impacted on the management of Islamic boarding school at present. However, in the assessment of the effect on the change in the individual there is a pattern which answers vary greatly in this respect manners to the colleagues as indicated by the deviation standard value of 0,77 and the average of 4,59. As a whole, the effect may be seen in table 4.

Table 4. Criteria of the Value of Effect of Visit to Individual Behavior

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Manners to colleague	4.5932	0.76831
Showing Respect to colleague	4.6949	0.67605
Openness in accepting any opinion	4.6271	0.69228
Independence in work	4.7458	0.63227
Showing attention to the condition of others	4.6610	0.73368
Honesty in resolving any problems	4.6780	0.68079
Time discipline	4.7627	0.65229
Discipline in behavior	4.7458	0.63227
Willingness to share knowledge	4.7627	0.53624

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Willingness to share experience	4.7288	0.61112
Willingness to share skill	4.7119	0.64463
Perseverance in resolving any work problems	4.7119	0.67084
Valid N (listwise)		

From table 4 it may be seen that time discipline affects the program alumni the most. Whereas manners and colleague have the least effect. Independence in working also has the least effect.

If any individual aspect is further observed, it is likely that Japanese culture adopted into the life of Islamic boarding school will have a positive relation to the effect of the visit program (the coefficient of correlation is around 0,81). It means, the higher the perception of the alumni, the higher their assessment will be of the effect of the visit program that was carried out. This is in line with the assessment through the interview we conducted, where to this extent discipline is the most possible thing to be implemented within the any Islamic boarding school that may be applied in the event of maintaining cleanliness and commitment in order to appreciate time.


INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The score of the change in institutional change shall have a maximum score of 7 and minimum score of 0. The average score of change of each alumnus in this institution is 6,03. It means that the score of change in this aspect is good, as it gets close to the maximum score.

All alumni filling out the questionnaire (100%) declared that they acquired inspiration in learning method and curriculum preparation. 38,98% position themselves as facilitators in the class, and consequently the students are required to study more actively and independently. The other type of change is the combination of lecture (75%) and discussion (25%). In a more specific answer, some of the alumni make use of the surroundings such as rivers, rice field, plantation and give emphasis to the mitigation of disaster in a teaching

process. The following is the learning method referred to as seen in figure 2.

Figure 2. Change in Teaching Method for Alumni.



The other changes inspired by the visit shall be the effect on the material and/or curriculum totaling 84,75% with various types of change, and the remaining 15,25% is not affected by the visit. The change in this curriculum is more to the expected output value. Some types of the change give more emphasis to aspect of character and behavior of the students, and also the model and/or the contents of curriculum.

In the aspect of character and behavior, the curriculum includes the values of discipline, cleanliness, independence, manners and other positive values that may be adopted by the participants as has been explicated in the part of effect on the change of the personality of the participants. While in the aspect of model and/or the contents of curriculum, the preparation of *lesson learn* is made simpler, that includes Japanese as one of the teaching materials taught in the Islamic boarding school, cleanliness is one of the lessons framed in religious terms. There is an Islamic boarding school that has just included general knowledge materials in its Islamic boarding school following the visit, need analysis based- curriculum and *student center*, has started to provide IT-based training and learning, included

project learning, included SDG’s issues, and it gives more emphasis to any tolerance between religious people.

The change of other institutions is in the event of the work system/ performance as seen in table 5.

Table 5. Percentage of the Type of Change of Performance in the Islamic Boarding School After the Visit (Rihlah).

Category	Change After the Visit	
	Yes	No
Ability to prepare Performance Achievement Indicator	71,19	28,81
To prepare Strategy Plan and Work Program	77,97	22,03
Ability to respond any New Development swiftly	89,83	10,17
To carry out regular Performance Evaluation	91,53	8,47
To give Reward and Punishment for the Students and Employees	88,14	11,86

The criteria for performance achievement used by the alumni, in general may be concluded into several factors by referring to values such as discipline, integrity, loyalty, totality, capacity, work quality, and independence. In addition some people evaluate based on the outputs of the values of characters implemented by the students and employees in daily life, and some people evaluate the performance of the schools that have applied project based curriculum from the quality of the project established by the students. The strategies in implementing evaluation of this performance, shall be among other things:

1. To convene meetings for regular/periodic evaluation;
2. The management motivates the employees to complete the duties promptly;
3. To apply the organization strategies such as *planning, organizing, action, and evaluation*.

42 out of 59 alumni (around 71%) declared that they were able to make measured performance indicator following the visit to Japan. From various indicators put forwarded, discipline, punctuality and cleanliness are mostly used.


The change in the work system following the visit evidently indicates that most of the alumni have accustomed themselves to prepare any strategy plan and work program in carrying out their activities. Several examples of change following the visit are to prepare any work plan with a clear output achievement indicator and based on the results of SWOT analysis study of the needs in the Islamic boarding school; complete and improve the statute, or taker, strategy plan, SOP applicable in the Islamic boarding school; prepare total quality control with registered and standardized *quality control* and *quality insurance* system. 46 alumni (around 78%) are of the opinion that following the visit to Japan they have been able to prepare any work planning provided with the description of the strategy and work program as required.

The other change experienced by the alumni is the ability for adoption and innovation, in particular in IT based learning and give good and swift respond in case of any changes in science. 53 alumni (around 90%) also declared that they are able to respond swiftly to any change in line with the current development.

54 alumni (around 92%) declared that they always evaluated their performance. This is followed by *reward and punishment* system. 52 alumni (around 88%) declared that they had applied such system.

The scores of change in the institutional aspect are maximum score of 7 and minimum score of 0. As regards the score of change in this institutional aspect, each alumnus has a score of 6,03. It means that the score of change in this aspect is relatively good as it gets close to the maximum score. Based on the responds from the alumni, each indicator of change has various scores of change as seen in figure 3.

Figure 3. . Variation of Score of Change



BENEFIT VISIT (*RIHLAH*) TO THE INSTITUTION

The primary benefit of the visit for the institution where the alumni have served is a new awareness particularly any inspiration in translating values of Islamic doctrines in the form of a concept thus far to a form of practice with measured implementation in the field.

In addition, more than a half of the alumni (33 alumni or 56%) always give information on their visit to Japan up to present. 18 alumni (30,5%) give information to all students in the Islamic boarding school at the year of departures. 8 alumni (13,6%) share information to the students in the class taught at the year of departure. The estimated total students receiving information may be seen in table 6.

Table 6. Estimated total students Receiving Information

Estimated Total Students Receiving Information	Percentage
< 100	1,69%
101 – 500	49,15%
501 – 1000	16,95%
1001 – 3000	22,03%
3001 – 5000	5,08%
5001 – 1000	5,08%

Several of the students continue their education overseas. Japan whose population is mostly Muslims is the first country where the students continue their education overseas. On the whole, Japan is in 4th place out of 7 countries where continue their education overseas. The seventh countries are Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Australia, Yaman, and Germany.

CHALLENGES IN APPLYING LESSON LEARNING

The main challenge encountered by the alumni following the visit is: 1) on their first arrival, they felt that they walked alone as most of them are sole representatives of the Islamic boarding school and the other asatidz “not yet enlightened”; 2) the difference of culture implemented in the Islamic boarding school and homes (specifically), and Islamic boarding school and the community (in general).

CONCLUSIONS

It can be concluded that the program “Pesantren Leader Visit to Japan” is a success and it deserves appreciation from various parties.

RECOMMENDATION

1. To anticipate any loss of communication with the alumni, give motivation so that the alumni do not feel that they are alone, and involve more female students.
2. To urge the alumni to campaign for lesson learning in any social media.
3. To fully support the program implementation.
4. To review the program proclaimed and implemented pertinent to the empowerment of any Islamic boarding school.

RELIGION-BASED EXTREMIST'S NARRATIVE: EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELIGIOUS ASPIRATION

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BACKGROUND

Indonesia's post-1998 democratization has opened a door for religion-based radicalism and extremism in public spaces. In addition to ideological factors, existing studies associate these radicalism and extremism with structural factors: dissatisfaction with the state's policies and access to social justice. Furthermore, identity and social or friendship network factors also have some contribution to encourage an individual to be attracted to radicalism and involved in acts of terrorism. The fact that radicalism and terrorism are frequently associated with figures with certain educational background has encouraged a number of researchers to investigate to what extent religious educational background contribute to the occurrence of radicalism and extremism in Indonesia.

Reports from some survey institutes show that Indonesia is still a fertile land for the production and reproduction of extremism ideology by radical movement activities. The community's support to intolerance and violence is also fairly high. They survey conducted by Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah in 2011 finds that 60.4 percent of respondents support intolerance and violence. Intolerance and violence are also internalized in some educational institutions. PPIM's survey in 2017 shows that 58.50% students holds a religious view that tends to be radical. Moreover, PPIM's survey in the following year correlates these students' radical

view with teachers' religious view. The survey shows that 56.90% of teachers hold intolerant opinion, and 46.09 % have radical opinion.

The numbers above reveal the high acceptance of intolerance among students. This fact indicates that radicalism have infiltrated education and targeted youth. On the other hand, the correlation between religion education in Indonesia and the occurrence of radicalism and extremism is rejected by the fact which shows how one educational institution gives birth to figures of strikingly contrast religious views, such as Pondok Modern Gontor that graduates the liberal Muslim scholar Nurcholis Madjid, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who is known as the leader of jihadist Muslim. This case leaves a question on the extent of religious educational background's contribution to the internalization of radical and extremist views, and the factors contributing to it.

OBJECTIVE, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

This research aims at investigating the educational background of those involved in acts of violence radicalism and extremism and interested in religion-based violence ideas by exploring the narrative of their lives. Three criteria are sought to be the informant of this study, namely former inmates for terrorism case, returnees or those travelling back to Indonesia after joining NIIS, and deportants or those arrested and deported to Indonesia before joining NIIS.

This research focuses on three provinces in Indonesia, i.e. West, East, and Central Java. West Java is selected since it is deemed as the basis of DI/TI movement. Central Java, particularly Solo, in academic studies has been associated with radical and extremist Islamic movement such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Pesantren Ngruki network and so forth. Finally, for East Java, despite generally known as the pocket of NU, the church bombings in 2018 and some terrorist cells from East Java such as Amrozi and friends show the importance of East Java as the basis of terrorism network.

Previous studies on the individuals involved in the acts of radicalism and extremism associate them with various arguments such as the problem of finding identity, indoctrinated with religious ideology,

experiencing structural marginalization and socialization through friendship and *pengajian* (religious informal study). Meanwhile, the studies focusing on educational background generally highlight the separation of exact and social sciences. These studies show that most perpetrators of acts of radicalism and extremism have exact science background and argue that the black-white, simple and clear worldview plays an important role in facilitating an individual to be a radical and extremist.

Nevertheless, exploration of religious educational background and investigation into whether or not an individual's religious educational background takes some part in making them radical and extremist tend to be ignored in the previous studies. Based on the field findings, this research propose a theoretical argument that religious educational background and knowledge make an individual exposed to radical and extremist ideology and encourage them to be involved in religion-based terror activities when being mediated by structural factors, identity, ideology and socialization or social network. In other words, these four factors shape, and direct certain religious comprehension towards radical religious view and religion-based terrorism practice.



First of all, data are collected using desk study by exploring the information available in media, relevant previous studies, and result of Police Investigation Report or *Berita Acara Pemeriksaan* (BAP). To deepen the information, this research involve 20 informants using in-depth interview with 13 (thirteen) former inmates for terrorism cases, 6(six) returnees, and 1 (one) deportant from the three provinces.

This research uses ‘*life narrative*’ approach which inspect the life history of these former terrorism inmates, returnees and deportant by exploring their educational background, life aspiration, and world views.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

This research has some findings. **First**, the religious educational background of these former terrorism inmates, returnees and deportant of NIIS will only be significant in making them exposed to radical and extremist ideology if it is mediated by structural factors, identity, social network, and ideology. The structural factors, both the individual micro and social macro ones, meet each other and encourage an individual to join radical groups. In addition, youth life process in finding their identity also help shape the radical and extreme view among them, not to mention if it is strengthened by social network which internalize the radical doctrine and ideology through informal education in the form of *halaqah* and *pengajian*. This informal religious education has a significant contribution in shaping an individual to be radical and extreme because of the failure of formal religious education in understanding student’s agency: inspecting their narrative and religious aspiration.

Second, this research finds two categories of radicalist and terrorist generations when viewed from their world view. The first—older—generation is dominated by former terrorism inmates, who generally come from middle-lower families, and are exposed to social network. Meanwhile, the second generation is dominated by returnees and deportant of NIIS, who generally come from wealthy family and urban culture, and are exposed to family and internet network. Those who have been exposed experience a turning point when they find access to upward-mobility or new spiritual authority.

Third, women seem to play less significant role in the old generation. Conversely, in the new generation, women seem more predominant in disseminating radicalism and extremism ideas. The context of masculinity seem more dominant in the old generation of radicalism. In the old generation, women’s involvement in acts

of extremism and violence seems more passive and only serving as a liaison and as the party who covers the acts of extremism of the perpetrators. In the new generation, however, a shift has taken place in terms of women's involvement and role, from previously being passive to being active perpetrators.

Fourth, informal religious education has significant contribution in shaping individuals into radical and extremist ones due to the failure of formal religious education in understanding the student's agency: exploring their narrative and religious aspiration. Judging from the construction of religion education curriculum in general, formal religious educational background actually does not directly encourage an individual to be exposed to radicalism and extremism. However, informal religious learning channels in certain schools, universities, or Islamic boarding schools also introduce students to radical Islamic movement through some teachers or lecturers, student's Islamic forum or Rohis (*Kerohaniah Islam*), or students' religious propagation community.

Fifth, religious references or literature plays a significant role in shaping an individual's religious comprehension. An individual exposed to radical views has a minimum or no access to literature other than those containing radicalism and extremism, leading them to shape an exclusive comprehension of Islam. The old generation go through radical literature to reference figures and close themselves from other sources of knowledge. The new generation, on the other hand, accesses information of radical views through digital books, video and radical content in the internet.

Sixth, individuals who have been exposed to radicalism and extremism experience a turning point when they find access to upward-mobility or new spiritual authority. Of course, structural factors are not the only motive of this turning point. Some of them find a turning point when they find a "new teacher" who are capable of exploring their religious aspiration upon reflecting on their previous experiences.

Seventh, the failure of formal education in understanding students' religious aspiration necessitates an engaging education—or an education which pays attention to each student's uniqueness,

background, problems and connect the religious concept to social-religious reality in the society—is the weak point of formal religious educational schools, Islamic boarding schools, and universities.

As a recommendation, moderate religious actors and ideas in informal religious education environments need to be encouraged to fulfill the spaces of *pengajian* and *halaqah* to make it harder for hard-line religious actors and ideas to move. Also, the idea of contextual Islam need to be encouraged further through publications, social media contents, and community to give it a new space for actualization which brings greater good for the humanity.

PRELIMINARY STUDY OF RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY OF ISLAMIC EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN RESPONDING TO THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF COHESION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC CRISIS: STUDY AT THREE STATE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITIES (JAKARTA, BANDUNG, YOGYAKARTA)

Authors and Researchers::

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BACKGROUND

After a year of being declared a pandemic, the number of COVID-19 cases continued to increase which reached more than a hundred million people being infected and two million people lost their lives globally. The Indonesian government has made various efforts to reduce the COVID-19 cases. These efforts include campaigning and enforcing the implementation of 5M health protocol (wearing masks, washing hands with running water, applying physical distance, avoiding crowds, and restricting mobility), applying 3T strategies (*COVID-19 testing*, *contact tracing*, and treatment for those who *test positive*), implementing Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) policy and Public Activity Restriction policy (PPKM) and COVID-19 vaccination program. To avoid crowds, the government also issued policies regarding School from Home or Distance Learning (PJJ) for students, and Work from Home (WFH) for workers.

Although various efforts have been made, a survey conducted by the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency (BPS) conducted from 7 to 14 September 2020 stated that there were still around 8% of respondents who rarely and very rarely use masks and more than 20% who rarely

and very rarely use hand sanitizers, washing hands with soap for at least 20 seconds and maintaining a minimum distance of 1 meter from each other (BPS COVID-19 Statistical Task Force Team, 2020). In another study that was specifically conducted on more than 6,000 respondents at more than 10 universities in Indonesia, the results showed that knowledge related to the transmission and prevention of COVID-19 was still low (Saefi et al., 2020). A study related to knowledge, attitudes, and experiences related to worship during the pandemic conducted on more than 18 thousand respondents in 34 provinces in Indonesia showed that there were 20.89% of respondents always worshiped in public worship places during the pandemic, and 12% of respondents very frequently did that activity. Even though, 48.86% of respondents on that study were in the COVID-19 red zone (Ruhana & Burhani, 2020).

A social phenomenon that shows a correlation between religious beliefs and attitudes related to the pandemic was shown through a case that occurred in Gowa, South Sulawesi. The Indonesian Jamaat Tabligh wanted to continue holding the Jamaat Tabligh Conference which was scheduled to be attended by around 25,000 people. Although in the end it was successfully disbanded, 8,695 participants had arrived and some participants were positively infected with COVID-19 (Wirawan, 2020). In addition, based on information from the General Chairperson of the Central Board of Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyah Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Abdul Ghaffar Rozin, as many as 333 Kyai and Ulama from NU died due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to him, the deaths of NU Kyai and Ulama increased after Eid al - Fitr 2020. The number continued to increase after Eid al-Adha (<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/>). That condition might be happened due to the lack of application of health protocols during religious rituals such as kissing Kyai's hand and gathering at the Kyai's house during the Eid celebration. Those rituals were still carried out considering a strong culture to honor the Kyai even though the rituals might have a high risk of transmitting COVID-19.

Previous studies have discussed the relationship between knowledge, attitude, perception, and practice/behavior, also between religiosity and behavior. The relationship between knowledge and behavior is found in the Behavior Change Theory from Davis which

stated that sufficient knowledge and good attitudes can produce good behavior (Davis, et al., 2015). Another theory namely the Health Belief Model (HBM) which was developed by Rosenstock in 1974 showed that perception was a determinant of behavior. This model comes from the hypothesis about a person's disease preventive behavior based on their beliefs about risk (perceived susceptibility), the seriousness of the risk (perceived severity), ways to reduce the incidence or severity of illness (perceived benefits), and costs versus benefits of action (perceived barriers). As for looking at the relationship between religiosity and behavior, the theoretical model of causal pathways is used to see the impact of religion and spirituality on physical health. Koenig states that stress and negative emotions increase susceptibility to disease and have the side effect of slowing healing. In this case, religiosity helps a person in overcoming the illness he is feeling. This research shows that more religious people, more easily adapt to the health problems they suffer. The majority of studies show that the higher the level of religiosity, the better the health condition.

The pandemic certainly has a direct impact on society. The COVID-19 pandemic not only has an impact on the health aspect but also has an impact on the economic and social problems of the community. Several studies conducted since the beginning of the pandemic have shown a tendency to decrease economic growth and increase unemployment and poverty rates (Delloite, 2020; Samudra & Setyonaluri, 2020; Suryahadi, et al., 2020; Susilawati et al., 2020; UNICEF, 2020). On the social aspect, the pandemic is believed to have an impact on social cohesion. According to Stanley, social cohesion is "the desire of community members to cooperate to survive and prosper" (Stanley, 2003). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung divides the dimensions of social cohesion into three things; connectedness, social relations, and focus on the common good (Stiftung, 2018).

Based on Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's research on social cohesion between 2009 to 2015 in Indonesia, it was found that focus on the common good aspect has the highest score (0.43) which includes high solidarity, mutual help, respect for social rules, and participation of civilians. While the lowest score is connectedness (-0.68) which includes low trust in the government and low perception of justice.

However, social cohesion during the pandemic among Indonesian remains understudied.

Therefore, the study needs to be performed to analyze the resilience and vulnerability of an educational institution, particularly higher education in responding to the impact of social cohesion during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis that occurred in the community within it. Higher education institutions are considered the party most exposed to various information about COVID-19 through various sources of information, as well as their ability to make policies at the institutional level that affect the academic community within them. Therefore, the level of knowledge, attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors related to the prevention of COVID-19 and the social cohesion experienced by the academic community, as well as the response of educational institutions to the pandemic conditions were explored in this study.

RESEARCH METHOD

QUANTITATIVE

In collecting quantitative data, the number of samples was calculated based on the hypothesis test for two population proportions formula using the sample size calculator software released by the World Health Organization. With α : 5% and β :80% (power) and proportion values of 1 and 2 based on research performed by the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency on COVID-19 *“Preventive Behavior during a Pandemic”* (Tim BPS Covid-19 Statistical Task Force, 2020), the value obtained is the minimum sample for each institution is 312 respondents. In this study, the number of samples for each institution was 330 respondents in UIN Jakarta, 316 respondents in UIN Bandung, and 334 respondents in UIN Yogyakarta. The sample selection technique for this research is non-probability sampling using a proportional quota sampling technique where the quota in this study is determined based on the proportion of the number of students, non-academic staff, and teaching staff (lecturers) in each campus. The quantitative data collection uses a self-administered questionnaire which is made online through the Google Form application.

Quantitative data collection instruments were obtained through adoption from previous related researches and standardized instruments. After the researchers conducted a literature study related to the research objectives and made instruments, the research team then conducted consultations with experts to minimize the level of weaknesses and errors of the instruments that had been made by the researchers. Researchers conducted expert consultations with Prof. Yayi Suryo Prabandari, Ph.D. (Health Behavior Scientist, Gadjah Mada University) and Hendro Prasetyo, Ph.D. (Sociologist, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta). Furthermore, the researcher also conducted a survey questions testing to the students of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta regarding the respondents' understanding of the instrument that had been made. The test was carried out for one day on February 20, 2021. From the trials carried out, various suggestions had been accommodated and the researchers had improved the instrument according to the suggestion given by the respondents. After that, the validity and reliability tests were carried out on the questionnaire. The results of the reliability of the questionnaire made are 0.756, 0.729, 0.742, 0.616, and 0.609 for respondents' attitudes, perceptions, religious understanding, religious attitudes, and religious perceptions, respectively. This shows that the instrument reliability is at a strong level.

The instrument consists of 15 parts: 1) Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents, 2) Health and Religious Knowledge Sources, 3) Knowledge related to COVID-19 and its prevention, 4) Perceptions related to COVID-19 and its prevention, 5) Attitudes related to COVID-19, 6) COVID-19 Prevention Behavior, 7) Religious understanding related to the pandemic, 8) Religious perception related to the pandemic, 9) Religious attitudes related to the pandemic, 10) Worship during the pandemic, 11) Vulnerability conditions related to the pandemic, 12) Resilience during the pandemic, 13) Trust in the academic community in responding to the pandemic, 14) Relationships between the academic community and 15) Social Cohesion.

Univariate and bivariate analyses were performed for quantitative data. Univariate analysis was conducted to determine the number and percentage of the 15 variables measured. Bivariate analysis was carried out to be able to compare the proportion of Knowledge related

to COVID-19 and its prevention, Perceptions related to COVID-19 and its prevention, Attitudes related to COVID-19, COVID-19 Prevention Behavior, Religious understanding related to the pandemic, Religious perceptions related to the pandemic, Religious attitudes related to the pandemic, Worship during the pandemic, Vulnerability conditions related to the pandemic, Resilience during the pandemic, Trust in the academic community in responding to the pandemic, Relationship between the academic community and Social Cohesion based on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The bivariate test was carried out by conducting the Mann-Whitney test for socio-demographic characteristics with two groups and the Kruskal-Wallis test for socio-demographic characteristics with three or more groups. While the correlation analysis was carried out with the Spearman test to analyze the relationship between the variables of knowledge, attitudes, and health, and religious behavior. The analysis was carried out using the SPSS statistical application version 24.0.

QUALITATIVE

Research informants were selected using the purposive sampling method where they were considered relevant and can be able to answer research questions. Informants consisted of three groups namely students, lecturers, university managements, and staff (non-academic). Students and lecturers were separated from three science fields i.e. social, science and technology, and religious study. University leaders that were selected in this study consisted of Rector, Vice-Rector, Head of Bureau, and Head of COVID-19 Taskforce in each University.

This study involved 29 informants from Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University Bandung (UIN Bandung), Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta (UIN Jakarta) and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta (UIN Yogyakarta). The informants consisted of 19 men and 10 women. From UIN Bandung, 11 informants were consisting of 3 leaders, 3 lecturers, 3 administration staff, and 2 students. From UIN Jakarta, 12 informants were consisting of 3 leaders, 3 lecturers, 3 administration staff, and 3 students. From UIN Yogyakarta, 5 informants were consisting of 1 leader, 2 lecturers and 3 students. In the qualitative method, data collection is collected through

in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). FGDs were conducted for approximately two hours while in-depth interviews were conducted for approximately one hour and a half. Data collection has been performed via teleconference using the Zoom application.

The instrument for collecting qualitative data consisted of 12 semi-structured open-ended questions that explore issues related to the research objectives. The research instrument is also adjusted to the target of the research informants. The research questions are divided into several parts; 1) knowledge and behavior of preventing COVID-19, 2) religious attitude and behavior related to the COVID-19 pandemic, 3) social cohesion during the pandemic and 4) institutional response related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In qualitative research, interview recordings and FGDs were then transcribed by the transcriber. Furthermore, the researchers conducted a content analysis to explore the contents of the interviews according to the research objectives. Qualitative method data analysis was carried out manually (not using an application or software).

RESULTS

KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDE, PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIORS RELATED TO THE COVID-19 PREVENTION

In general, respondents' knowledge related to the COVID-19 and its prevention is quite good, especially about the spread of the COVID-19 virus through droplets (90.1%), although knowledge about close contact is still a lot of doubts (40.8%). Qualitatively, the knowledge of the informants is good, and if they have been exposed to COVID-19, their knowledge is more detailed, for example, related to symptoms, transmission and close contact. Regarding attitudes, quantitatively there are a small number of respondents who do not agree to be vaccinated (20.5%). However, far more respondents agree (79.5%). Qualitative data also shows that almost all informants have a positive attitude towards vaccines and realize that it is an effort to prevent transmission accompanied by implementing health protocols. The percentage of respondents who perceived that COVID-19 is a conspiracy reached 28%. Based on an interview with informants,

they said that some people still believe that COVID-19 is a conspiracy. Related to the COVID-19 prevention behavior, most of the respondents have implemented COVID-19 prevention behavior, although the number who always wear a mask when outside the house were still 56.6%. The better the knowledge, attitudes, perceptions related to the COVID-19, the better the health behavior.

Various efforts are still needed to increase the knowledge of the academic community related to the transmission and prevention of COVID-19 considering that there are still respondents who still have misunderstandings and are hesitant about various knowledge regarding how COVID-19 is transmitted and to prevent it. This study shows that there are still around 20% of respondents who say they are not willing to be COVID-19 vaccinated. In addition, this study also found that around 28% of respondents perceived that COVID-19 was a conspiracy and 19.8% of respondents did not consider COVID-19 to be something dangerous. Efforts to increase understanding to be able to improve good attitudes and perceptions related to the prevention of COVID-19 are especially needed for the male group and respondents from the student group and university staff considering that both groups have low levels of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes compared to the group. lecturers/teaching staff. In terms of behavior, there is a significant difference between respondents from rural and urban areas where respondents who live in urban areas have better COVID-19 prevention behavior than respondents who live in rural areas. Efforts to improve good knowledge, attitudes and perceptions related to COVID-19 need to be done to be able to improve COVID-19 prevention behavior among the academic community considering that these three factors have a positive and significant impact on COVID-19 prevention behavior.

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDE, PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR RELATED TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Regarding the understanding of religious issues related to the pandemic, there were still respondents who feel they did not understand these various contexts, such as whether a Muslims should prefer to prevent harm over attracting benefit', Muslims are required

to conform with the '*ulil al-amr*' (authorities), Muslims can use *rukhsah* (leniency for Muslim). Regarding religious attitudes, there were still respondents who stated that they did not agree if they had to follow the fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council related to the prevention and control of COVID-19 and there were also attitudes to make physical contact as part of religious rituals during the pandemic. In addition, there are still academics who think that COVID-19 is God's army sent to attack Muslims. In terms of worship during the pandemic, there were still respondents who carry out religious rituals without paying attention to the COVID-19 prevention protocol, such as not wearing a mask when worshiping, not wearing personal worship equipment and maintaining a distance between the prayer lines when worshiping in Mosque.

SOCIAL COHESION OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, LECTURERS AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF DURING A PANDEMIC

The level of social cohesion of the academic community tends to be high, for example, the majority of respondents stated that the existence of ethnic and cultural diversity is very good for the campus, has a responsibility to help the academic community and respects campus rules and policies. However, there are still aspects that need to be improved considering that there were still more than 20% of respondents stated that the institution system is corrupt, not treated fairly as a campus citizen, do not trust the campus system to do what is right and not put university first before anything else.

INSTITUTION RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY IN RESPONDING TO THE PANDEMIC

Institutional resilience and vulnerability can be viewed from several aspects such as 1) Institutional human resources which include the leadership of the university and the formation of a COVID-19 task force, 2) Financial assistance for those who impacted by the pandemic, 3) Database and Tracing related to COVID-19 case, 4) Infrastructure/facilities particularly for learning activities. In the human resource aspect, the three institutions have sufficient resilience because the

knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of respondents and informants were considered good in responding to the pandemic. In addition, it was also mentioned that the three institutions (UIN Yogyakarta, UIN Bandung, and UIN Jakarta) created a task force and various pandemic response programs instructed by the chancellor. The campuses also reallocated budgets and raised funds to help students and staff who were economically impacted or infected by COVID-19 and even helped the community around the campus.

However, the vulnerability is shown in the context of slow decision-making related to the prevention of COVID-19 for example in deciding on the implementation of online learning. In addition, the task forces from the three institutions acknowledged that the task force's main tasks and functions were unclear, there was no specific direction from the Ministry of Religion, and there was no special budget to run the task force programs. Lastly, the task force took the initiative to make its program.

In terms of the learning process during the pandemic, institutional resilience can be seen from the ability of students to adapt to the use of technology. In addition, the campus also took the initiative to reduce tuition fees, even at UIN Bandung there was a policy to waive tuition fees for students whose family members died due to COVID-19. UIN Bandung and UIN Yogyakarta also provide mobile phone internet package assistance for students to support learning. Particularly in UIN Bandung, the campus even made its learning platform that is more internet-efficient called the Learning Management System (LMS).

Institutional vulnerabilities in the term of the learning process were caused by an inadequate supporting facility such as an internet network. In addition, in the three campuses, it is found that senior lecturers have difficulty in using technology which has an impact on the implementation of online learning. Moreover, an informant from UIN Yogyakarta stated there was no online learning standard so that there was a lecturer that only gave assignments via the Whatsapp platform during an online learning session.

In the term of database and tracing related to COVID-19, there was a weakness when COVID-19 taskforce in each campus did not have COVID-19 database for recording COVID-19 infection among

university staff and student. COVID-19 database is an important issue because the existence of the data can be used in the decision making process of university leader and also trace the spread of the disease so that can prevent further infection. The head of the task force for each campus admits that they know the number of positive cases, but there were still unreported cases. Even an informant from UIN Jakarta said that as long as she was confirmed for COVID-19, there was no attention from the campus for her.

In the aspect of institutional infrastructure/facilities, the three institutions have health facilities. UIN Yogyakarta and UIN Bandung have primary healthcare services, and UIN Jakarta has a COVID-19 Hospital and Lab. These health facilities are the basic capital in supporting COVID-19 response programs, for example in terms of providing referrals for COVID-19 testing. In addition, health facilities at the campus level also collaborate with the City Health Office and Government Primary Health Care to carry out the vaccination for the university staff. However, the vulnerability of institutions in the aspect of infrastructure/facilities can be seen from the assumptions conveyed by UIN Jakarta informants regarding the basic functions of the Faculty of Medicine, UIN Jakarta and UIN Jakarta Hospital. According to him, the basic function of Faculty of Medicine of UIN Jakarta is to provide education services. Likewise, UIN Jakarta Hospital whose basic function is to provide healthcare for the non-COVID-19 patient. Thus, if there is university staff or student has COVID-19, it will not automatically become a campus matter.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study concluded that knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of preventing COVID-19 among university staff and students were quite good, but still, need to improve on more specific information related to COVID-19 and the implementation of health protocols. In terms of religious knowledge, attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors related to the pandemic, the majority of respondents used their religion to increase COVID-19 resilience during the pandemic. However, several things need to be improved, such as worship with implementing health protocols, avoiding crowding religious activities

and implementing physical distancing with religious leaders, improving respondent's religious belief related to COVID-19 origin and prevention.

The level of social cohesion of the university student and staff tended to be high but there were still more than 20% of respondents stated that the institution system is corrupt, not treated fairly as a campus citizen, do not trust the campus system to do what is right and not put university first before anything else. Furthermore, we found that women have better social cohesion than men, lecturers have better social cohesion than students and administration staff, and UIN Bandung has higher social cohesion than UIN Jakarta and UIN Yogyakarta.

In terms of institutional resilience and vulnerability, the three institutions demonstrated their resilience in the human resource aspect because each institution has a COVID-19 task force, a pandemic response program initiated by the chancellor, and budget reallocation for the pandemic. In the learning process, the institution provides a mobile phone internet package, and tuition is waived. In the aspect of COVID-19 data and tracing, the institution cooperates with relevant agencies to conduct COVID-19 testing for university members. In terms of infrastructure, institutions have their health facilities. The institutional vulnerabilities in the human resource aspect are the delayed pandemic responses and the absence of clear tasks for the COVID-19 task force. In the teaching-learning process, there were often network disturbances, difficulties for senior lecturers to use technology in the context of online learning, and the absence of standardization of online learning. In terms of COVID-19 data and tracing, the institution does not have a complete COVID-19 database. In the infrastructure aspect, even the campuses have healthcare facility and health/medical faculties but its functions was for providing educational services and non-COVID-19 care so that its function might not be fully utilized as an instrument for increasing institutional resilience in responding COVID-19.

Based on the results, several recommendations can be applied by university leader to improving the COVID-19 responses:

1. In addition to the formation of the COVID-19 Task Force in University, University leaders also need to create other instruments to support the prevention and control of COVID-19 in universities such as guidelines/standard operational procedures for the prevention and control of COVID-19 at the university level, considering that the University not only act as educational institutions but also as workplace institutions. Therefore, the university is expected to not only have a good instrument for the learning-education process during the pandemic but also a better instrument for COVID-19 control and prevention, particularly for their staff and student.
2. Efforts are needed to increase the knowledge of the university student and staff related to the transmission and prevention of COVID-19 that can be done by the University COVID-19 Task Force considering that there were still respondents who still had misunderstandings and are hesitant about various knowledge regarding how to prevent and transmit COVID-19.
3. Efforts are needed to improve religious understanding, perception and attitudes because these three variables have a positive and significant effect on COVID-19 prevention behavior during worship. The improvement efforts were mainly aimed at groups of students and administration staff considering that both groups had lower levels of the variables compared to lecturers.
4. Universities should maximize the various potentials possessed by universities, both the potential of human resources and the facilities they have to be able to carry out various efforts to prevent and fight COVID-19. University leaders are expected to develop instruments and policies related to fundraising aimed at increasing financial resilience for parties affected by the economy from COVID-19.
5. One of the impacts of the pandemic is the emergence of economic vulnerabilities that are especially felt in the informal worker group. In this case, the families of students who come from these groups also have economic vulnerabilities that can affect the ability of students to participate in learning activities. Therefore, the institutions need to expand various assistance such as mobile

phone internet package and tuition fee waivers aimed to increase economic resilience.

6. The pandemic also affects the teaching and learning process that occurs in universities. There needs to be an emphasis especially on students in the learning process from home to keep paying attention to learning objectives which are not only in cognitive aspects but also affective and psychomotor. In addition, lecturers also create creative learning designs and strategies so that students are interesting in participating in online learning and reached learning objectives.

Some recommendations for the Ministry of Religion of Indonesia that oversee State Islamic Religious Universities:

1. Clarify the main tasks and functions of the COVID-19 Task Force at the university level, so that there are clear guidelines in the preparation of COVID-19 response programs and budgeting.
2. Creating an integrated system that requires every institution to have a database related to positive cases of COVID-19 in the context of strategic policymaking at the university level under the Ministry of Religion.
3. Conducting structured monitoring and evaluation related to the State Islamic University (PTKIN) COVID-19 responses and supporting PTKIN's efforts as a workplace and educational institution in preventing COVID-19.
4. Support PTKIN's efforts to increase economic resilience, especially for students affected by the pandemic by providing various financial assistance.
5. Performing various efforts to improve health and religious understanding related to the pandemic to increase the religious understanding of the university staff and students which empirically can have a positive and significant impact on increasing COVID-19 prevention behavior.

SEEDING HOPE, HARVESTING FAITH: MAINSTREAMING MODERATE RELIGIOSITY AMONG FEMALE TEACHERS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

Authors and Researchers::

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BACKGROUND

Numerous studies and publications have highlighted that school-age children and youth are among the most vulnerable target groups for extremism and intolerant beliefs. Research conducted by PPIM, for example, underlines that Islamic schools are proven to be among the potential institutions targeted as breeding grounds for religious extremism or radicalism (PPIM 2018, PPIM 2019). It is alarming, moreover, as the discourse of radicalism in Islamic schools involves teachers as the main actors, their role significant in transmitting the spread of exclusivism, radicalism and violent-extremism among children in Islamic schools. Furthermore, the survey conducted by PPIM (2018) “Faded Light: A Portrait of Religious Teacher in Indonesia” shows a high level of intolerant and radical views among teachers in Indonesian, from kindergarten to high school level. The data shows that 56% of teachers disagree that non-Muslims should be allowed to establish a faith-based school in their neighborhood, while 21% of teachers believe that their neighbors of different religions should not be given permission to hold religious services in their homes. This study also shows an alarming phenomenon where teachers at the lower level of education, elementary and pre- school level, are proven to be less tolerant than those in the higher level of education, junior and senior high schools. This survey has put female teachers in the spotlight as in some variables they appear to be more intolerant than their male counterparts. Female teachers, for example, shows higher levels of intolerance against followers of other religions compared to

male teachers. The survey shows that female teachers have higher levels in regards to radical views and intended radical actions.

It is unfortunate, however, that studies and projects on the issue of schools and radicalism tend to focus more on issues occurring at the high school and college level, based on the large number of youths involved in cases of violence radicalism. Little attention is given to the discourse of radicalism and violent-extremism at the elementary and pre-school level. Yet studies which have been undertaken strongly demonstrate that elementary schools and even pre-school institutions are no less vulnerable to be targeted as platforms for the development of intolerant and radical beliefs among children in the society.

The Center for the Study of Islam and Social Transformation (CISForm), based at the State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, is one among the prominent CSOs who has been working in the area of de-radicalization, employing alternative approaches, including soft-measures, focused on alleged radical institutions and other vulnerable groups. Alongside the government efforts to counter radicalism through hard-measures, it is essential for NGOs and other elements of society to be involved in such de-radicalization actions through soft-measures. In the last ten years, CISForm has been initiating various long-term projects, such as “Mainstreaming Moderate Islam among the Youth through Animated Movies” (2017) and “Enlightening Comics” (2016), as well as series of workshops involving conservative Islamic schools. In regards to the workshops with schools, CISForm focuses the projects on various issues/angles, i.e., social advocacy workshop (2014), leadership workshops (2012), active learning workshops (2011), and library improvement (2010). CISForm also continues its commitment to mainstreaming moderate Islam in all levels of education, including early childhood education (PAUD). In this regards CISForm employs various cultural approaches, as it is believed that such approaches are proven to be successful in supporting the project of countering radicalism initiated by the government and other related NGOs.

Through this project, CISForm targets female PAUD teachers. It is expected that strengthening their capacity is not only vital to transforming these teachers into active agents to promote the discourse

of tolerance and peace at the school level, but also within society in general. This project also aims to strengthen the capacity of female PAUD teachers to counter the spread of conservatism, exclusivism, intolerance, and extremism among children at the pre-school level. In addition to the lack of training and capacity building for PAUD teachers, it is the goal of this project to contribute to the production of teachers who are able to promote messages of tolerance and peace in the school environment.

TARGET AND AIMS OF THE PROJECT

For the reasons noted above, it is intended that this project targets mainly female teachers at the level of early childhood education (Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini/ PAUD), especially Kindergarten (Taman Kanak-kanak/TK and Raudhatul Athfal/RA) in 3 (three) cities; Yogyakarta, Solo Raya, and Salatiga. Among the criteria in which these three cities have been selected for this project, are the proximity of these cities to various religious movements in Indonesia, and also the fact that these cities – especially Solo Raya – are noted in the data of BNPT (National Counter-terrorism Agency) as among the country's red zone areas. Yogyakarta, for example, despite its various attributes of multiculturalism, is ranked in the top 10 cities with the lowest tolerance level (Setara, 2018). Solo Raya has long been in the spotlight due to various cases of terrorism. This city is one of the red zone areas, not only in Central Java but also in Indonesia in general, for spreading radicalism and terrorism. A number of perpetrators of radical acts and terrorism are linked to Solo Raya, such as Slamet Pilih, Nuim Baasyir, Ibrahim, and David (2013), Abdul Rochim, and Sugeng Riyadi (2019). These figures are linked to Islamic organizations which lean toward radicalism, such as the Jamaah Ansharud-Daulah (JAD) and Islamic State of Iraq and Suriah (ISIS). In comparison, Salatiga is selected as it is a city included in the top 10 cities in Indonesia with the highest level of tolerant. It is expected that the diverse backgrounds of these three cities will provide a comprehensive picture of the circumstances of pre-school institutions in Indonesia, especially as they relate to the capacity of their teachers.

The project focuses on examining the resilience of female PAUD teachers towards radicalism and intolerant beliefs at the early childhood education. It is the aim of the project to strengthen the capacity of female PAUD teachers to counter the spread of conservatism, exclusivism, intolerance, and extremism among children at the pre-school level. As a long-term goal, it is expected that this project will contribute to the government's agenda to transform the significant role of female PAUD teachers to be active agents in promoting the discourse of tolerance, inclusive Islam, and peace in the society.

ASSESSMENT

An intensive assessment was conducted as one of the most important activities of the project, aimed to explore the views of female PAUD teachers and to examine further their resilience towards issues of exclusivism, intolerance, radicalism and violent-extremism at the early childhood education in Indonesia. The data for the assessment was collected by employing mixed-methods; online survey, interview/ focused group discussion (FGD), and participatory observation.

ONLINE SURVEY

The online survey was conducted between 15 to 31 December 2020, involving 631 female teachers, who were recruited from more than 3,000 randomly contacted teachers from the three cities; 218 participants from Yogyakarta (Kotamadya Yogyakarta, Sleman and Bantul), 262 participants from the greater Solo areas or Solo Raya (Kotamadya, Surakarta, Sukoharjo, Boyolali, and Karanganyar), and 151 participants from Salatiga (all sub districts in Salatiga city and some other districts of Semarang). The respondents include those who are from Kindergarten/ Taman Kanak-kanak (401), Raudlatul Athfal (223), and Bustanul Athfal (2). These early childhood education institutions are mainly (615) private, with very few (16) of them being public. The private institutions are affiliated with various Islamic organizations including Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah/'Aisyiyah, Al-Irsyad, Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an, as well as Tarbawi and Salafy.

The teachers’ views and attitudes towards the issues were examined based on Bassam Tibi’s (2012) theory of Islamism, which outlined six criteria, namely: 1) Islamic purification, 2) formalization of Islamic Shari’a, 3) anti-democracy, 4) anti-other religion, 5) anti-Western and 6) application of violence. Variables related to gender sensitivity were also included as a cross-cutting theme.

Referring to the the above-mentioned Bassam Tibi’s six variables of Islamism, the online survey found that in general the vast majority of teachers are in the medium level in regards to their score of Islamism (74.2%), 12.4% of the respondents in the low level, and those who are identified to have high level of Islamism 13.5%. Such trend in the level of Islamism among teachers appears to be similar across all three cities; Yogyakarta, Solo and Salatiga, in which the vast majority of teachers in these three cities are in the medium level in regards to their score of Islamism.

Table 1. Respondents’ Islamism score distribution

	Freaquency	Percentage
Low	78	12.4
Medium	468	74.2
High	85	13.5
Total	631	100.0


In more detail, the survey highlights the response of female teachers relating to some items from the six variables of Islamism. For example, even though these female teachers are noted to be moderate in their response to the variables of Islamic purification and formalization of Shari’a, the data shows different findings in other aspects, where the mean score is relatively high. Regardless of the fact that they appear to be moderate, for example, 25,99% of them have reservations to opening a conventional bank account due to the halal issue of interest (riba’). This could be attributed to the anti-riba’ and ex-bank movements that have been popular in recent years in Indonesia. In addition, 58,16% of these teachers endorse a long style head covering for children. Furthermore, on the topic of anti-democracy, the survey reveals that their level of anti-nationalism is quite high as shown by the following responses: (1) Pancasila is not compatible with

Islam (6,66%), (2) the government is thoghut and therefore not to be obeyed (5,55%), (3) flag-raising ceremonies could damage our faith (5,07%), and (4) every Muslim is responsible to ensure that the khilafah system is adopted because others are perceived as kafir (un-Islamic) (19,33%).

In terms of their relationships with the religious other, the following survey data shows their level of Islamism: even though the percentage of the teachers who teach students to not interact with non-Muslims is relatively small (7,61%), there are 56,1% who adhere to the view that conveying greetings to non-Muslims on their holy days means affirming their belief. In addition, there are 62,7% who forbid their students to convey holy days greetings to non-Muslims. The teacher's perceptions on the West/foreign display a significant level of Islamism. There are 36,13% who believe that all Western countries are against Islam. In addition, 32,33% suggest boycotting Western products, and 49,76% argue that Chinese immigrants to Indonesia might incite the revival of communism and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Our survey also affirms a high level of perception on the use of violence. 77,34% state that they support Islamic mass organizations to raid against places deemed as immoral, and 11,41% agree that equipping children with guns during the PAUD parade could enhance their enthusiasm for jihad. In line with other findings, our survey reveals that on the one hand the teachers are highly gender sensitive because 91,6% of them state that women should have the same opportunity as that of men to become leaders. However, on the other hand, 33,12% argue that when they have male and female students in a class, the leader should be a male student. This is an important finding because where gender equity and gender justice is not present, the values of tolerance do not develop.

Figure 1. The Islamism Score of PAUD Teachers



In regards to the curriculum, the majority (99,21%) of PAUD teachers have learned and claimed to understand the government curriculum. However, 7,77% believe that the teaching and learning process at TK/RA should not follow the government curriculum. In addition, 11,25% of them argue that the government curriculum is insufficient to be implemented as guidance for religious education at TK/RA, and 14,42% state that the reference to tolerance in the curriculum is not in line with Islamic belief.

FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATION

To maintain the validity and reliability of the data findings from the online survey, the project employed focused group discussion, interviews and observation. In general, the qualitative data from FGD and observation emphasizes the findings from online survey, while some provide further exploration and clarification to some issues highlighted in the survey. For example, as noted above, some schools segregate female and male students, which might be identified as an issue related to gender bias. However, some teachers clarify that the gender segregation does not necessarily means gender bias as in some cases it is merely based on pragmatic issues as to minimize bullying against female students. The survey also did not capture any indication that female teachers condone violence in their learning process, yet the fact that some schools include sirah nabawiyah, stories

from the life of the Prophet, in their curriculum with high emphasis on stories of violence and war. Such findings provide alternative insight in the ways the project analyzes the numeric data from the survey.

The differences in curriculum between general PAUD under the Ministry of Education and Culture (Kemendikbud) and Islamic-based PAUD under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag) is another factor identified from FGD to have an impact on teachers' approaches in their learning process. In the general Kindergarten, Islamic education is placed under the subject of Islamic Education (Pendidikan Agama Islam/PAI). Whereas Islamic-based Kindergarten offers more subjects related to Islam and therefore its curriculum is more similar to RA, with an emphasis on the integration of science and religion. These differences are reflected in the religious milieu of the schools. In the general Kindergarten, religious subjects are delivered within the frame of nationalism, especially when there are non-Muslim students in the class. It is for this reason that religious tolerance within such school develops quite well. The celebration of religious holy days, for example, becomes the medium to introduce different religions. However, there is an increasing emphasis on religious teaching (PAI) at the general Kindergarten based on demands from the parents. There is an increasing trend for parents to send their children to Islamic-based Kindergarten due to the belief that the children will have better knowledge and practices of Islamic teachings, in addition to being smart. For this reason, in some general Kindergarten PAI is given a greater portion in addition to the wearing of Muslim dress and memorizing Qur'anic verses at school. This has led to the demand of PAI teachers with related backgrounds. In reality however, some non-specialist PAI teachers are forced to teach the subject due to the lack of such teachers at the schools.

In Raudhatul Athfal, Islamic subjects are central, whereas in Islamic-based Kindergarten, especially TK Islam Terpadu (Islamic Integrated Kindergarten), the curriculum integrates science and Islamic teachings, even though Islamic teaching materials and approaches are also inserted within secular subjects. The teaching on nationalism at Islamic-based Kindergarten and RA is conducted through various means, including: (1) Introducing Pancasila and memorizing it as well as conducting the flag-raising ceremony; (2) Introducing Pancasila, but not memorizing

it, and conducting the flag-raising ceremony, with or without honoring the flag; (3) Does not introduce Pancasila but Islamic values instead, arguing that Islamic values are in line with Pancasila. Quite often they do not conduct the flag-raising ceremony.

TEACHERS’ LEVEL OF ISLAMISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LEARNING PROCESS

Table 2. The Influence of Teachers’ Level of Islamism on Teaching-Learning Process

	B	Std. Error	t	P-Value
Constant	13,096	1,236	10,593	0,000*
Pandangan Islamisme Guru	0,624	0,025	25,316	0,000*
Model Regresi	Pembelajaran = 13,096 + (0,624* Pandangan Islamisme Guru) + Error			
Uji F	F = 640,886		P-value=0,000*	
Adjusted R Square	Adj R2 = 0,504			
Korelasi	R = 0,710			

*Signifikan pada $\alpha=0,05$

It is the aim of the assessment, as noted above, to explore religious views and attitudes of female PAUD teachers towards issues of exclusivism, intolerance, radicalism and violent-extremism. Furthermore, the assessment aims to examine the extent to which their personal views and attitudes of these teachers impact the learning process in PAUD.

The data from the survey shows that the teachers’ religious views and attitudes significantly influence their teaching method and the content of teaching ($F=640,886$; $p<0,05$). This means that students’ religious understanding is greatly influenced by their teachers (50,5%). This is supported by the number of teachers who shared their stories during FGD and interviews on how students reminded their parents at home on the obligation to wear Muslim dress as prescribed by their school teachers. This point emphasises to us the importance of providing a progressive understanding of Islam to the teachers, especially in relation to moderate religiosity and religious tolerance.

In regards to the six variables of Islamism, 1) Islamic purification, 2) formalization of Islamic Shari'a, 3) anti-democracy, 4) anti-other religion, 5) anti-Western and 6) application of violence, the analysis notes that teachers' level of Islamism as it relates to the fourth variable (anti-other religion) appears to have the highest influence (33.7%) to the way they deliver learning activities at school. The influence of the variable of anti- democracy noted to be in the level of 6.7%, variable of Islamic purification (2.2%), variables of anti-Western (0.8%), variable of formalization of Sharia (0.3%), while variable of condoning violence appears to have no impact the teachers' learning process. It is important to note that variables related to gender sensitivity, which is a cross-cutting theme, appear to have influence (12.6%) in the learning activities performed by female PAUD teachers.

DEVELOPMENT OF MODULE, TRAINING AND EVALUATION

Based on the survey findings and FGD for the teachers, CISForm has developed a training module which has received feedback from various stakeholders, including: Sub Directorate of PAUD, Directorate of PAI MORA, Directorate of GTK PAUD MONE, local education authorities (Dinas Pendidikan Kabupaten/Kota), provincial and district offices of MORA (within which our research is conducted), associations of TK and RA teachers (IGABA, IGRA, IGTKI), Communication Forum of PAI teachers at TK (national, province, and districts levels), as well as academics (Study programs of PIAUD at IAIN/UIN).

The module consists of seven important themes, namely: (1) Returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah; (2) Creating a religious atmosphere at school; (3) Seeding the kernel of Indonesian nation; (4) Islam as the religion of mercy; (5) Embracing the other; (6) Reviving religious values at early childhood education. CISForm have also conducted a series of try- out programs before finally applying the module as intensive training for female teachers of TK/RA. The training was organized in the three target cities, Yogyakarta, Solo, and Salatiga on the 12 and 13 February 2021. The training involved 100 female teachers who have previously participated in our survey and FGD. The training, which applied andragogical method, was enthusiastically welcome by the participants.

A pre-test and a post-test was conducted as part of the evaluation process for the training. Both tests affirmed that the training was significantly effective in enriching the perspective of the participants toward a more inclusive and moderate understanding of Islam. A significant positive change was witnessed in the views of the female teachers on religion and nationalism.

Table 3. Pre-Test and Post-Test Islamism Scores

Aspect of Islamism	Average Score		Decreasing Value (%)
	Pre-Test	Post-Test	
Purification of Islam	7.644	7.34	3.966
Formalisation of Shari’a	7.574	7.085	6.458
Anti-Democracy	5.554	5.117	7.875
Anti-Other Religions	6.634	6.149	7.307
Anti-Western	5.149	4.713	8.464
Violence Tendency	6.644	6.128	7.765
Gender Insensitivity	6.931	5.926	14.503
Total/Average	46.129	42.457	7.959

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The data from the survey shows that teachers’ religious views and attitudes significantly influence the method and the content of their teaching ($F=640,886$; $p<0,05$), which means that students’ religious understanding is greatly influenced by their teachers (50,5%). This fact urges the government and all related stakeholders to provide training aimed at broadening their religious perspective and nationalism. Such training could be most beneficial if compulsory for all PAUD teachers, not only those who teach religious subject but also others who teach general subjects, because at Islamic-based Kindergarten, general subjects are also integrated with Islamic teachings.
2. Trainings on moderate religiosity for TK/RA teachers using andragogical method, which at the same time strengthens wasathiyah Islam and nationalism stated in point 1 above could be conducted by involving moderate Islamic mass organizations and Islamic higher educational institutions (STAIN, IAIN, UIN).

While acknowledging that training is not the sole means to enhancing moderate religiosity, we argue that with the right training materials these methods have been proven to be effective

3. The findings that 7,77% PAUD teachers believe that the teaching and learning process at TK/RA should not follow the government curriculum and that the government curriculum is insufficient to be implemented as guidance for religious education at TK/RA (11,25%), and that the reference on tolerance in the curriculum is not in line with Islamic belief (14,42%), underlines further the need of intensive dissemination of the national curriculum. There needs to be an official procedure and mechanism to monitor the implementation of the curriculum that could be monitored, which could also be connected to school accreditation system as well as teacher's certification process.
4. This calls for a specific regulation issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture, which underlines the embedding of nationalist values at PAUD. This could at least be done through revising the existing Regulation of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic Indonesia, Number 146/2014 about "Curriculum 2013 for Early Childhood Education/PAUD," article 5, verse 1 by inserting "nationalist values" within the PAUD curriculum. Alternatively, this could also be conducted through the revision of the existing Regulation of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic Indonesia, Number 18/2018 on "Provision of services for PAUD," article 11 by inserting control over curriculum on nationalism as part of the national and local government responsibilities.
5. In regard to the issues of nationalism and Pancasila, the government needs to be more explicit in enforcing PAUD students to receive an introduction to Pancasila, memorizing its principles, values, and conducting flag-raising ceremonies once a week minimum, in addition to memorizing songs that could enhance nationalism.
6. The inclusion of Sirah Nabawiyah (The history of the Prophet) in the curriculum in order to learn from the prophet's good deeds as well as the history of Islam in Indonesia. This should underline the narratives which reflect social ethics, humanity, harmony, cooperation, tolerance, and not on the narration of wars.

7. The data related to teachers' gender sensitivity urges the need of building strong perspective on gender equity and justice among female teachers, which will strongly influence their concept of tolerance. There needs to be comprehensive trainings on gender equity and justice that are based on Islamic foundation texts, the Qur'an and Sunnah. This could be conducted in collaborations with various Centers for Gender Mainstreaming and Children Rights at Islamic higher education institutions.
8. Our research also finds that teachers often do not have sufficient teaching materials on inclusive interpretations of religion and materials on nationalism that are attractive for PAUD students. Because of this, teaching materials, including videos, and methods of teachings must be developed which could be easily disseminated through social media.
9. Some local education authorities (Dinas Pendidikan) could require PAUD teachers and students, including Islamic-based Kindergarten to wear traditional dresses on certain days in the week. This could be duplicated in RA under Kemenag and be implemented nationally. Schools could be provided space to accommodate this request by, for example, combining the traditional dress with head covers to comply with the school's uniform.

DIVERSITY IN THE IVORY TOWER: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AT UNIVERSITIES

Authors and Researchers::

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MAIN FINDINGS

In general, Indonesian university students have fairly high religious tolerance. However, this survey found that one of three students has relatively low or very low religious tolerance. In term of the type of educational institutions, students from religion-based universities have the lowest tolerance, followed by private, public, and government-affiliated universities.

In terms of their cross-group social interaction, the average social interaction of Muslim students is lower than students of other religion. Students from religion-based and government-affiliated universities have higher religious ritual intensity than those from public and private universities. In connection with economic aspect, the average income of parents of Muslim students is lower than parents of students of other religions. Moreover, the perception of being threatened among Muslim students is on average higher than those among students of other religions.

From these findings, we can then ask what actually make students in Indonesia have higher or lower religious tolerance? Firstly, students having experience of social interaction with different groups show high religious tolerance. Also, the higher number of certain religious activities conducted by students, such as campus religious teaching propagation organizations, the lower students' religious tolerance.

Secondly, the campus social environment also influences students' religious tolerance. Campus policy to accept and respect minority groups also has an effect on religious tolerance in students of other religions than Islam and lecturers' religious tolerance influences the

religious tolerance in Muslim students, particularly in religion-based and private universities. Although it is only found in public university students, it is worth mentioning that student parent's economic condition also influence their religious tolerance

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research findings, we propose some recommendations. They are: 1) to promote the richness of social experiences and social interactions across religious groups, 2) to improve campus social environment by improving the culture of religious tolerance among the academic community and respect to diversity and minority groups, and adopting programs or policies aiming at improving students' religious tolerance by taking the university social context and students' socio-demographic conditions into consideration.

INTRODUCTION

This national survey is part of PPIM's attempts to prioritize evidence-based policy in education. Complementing some previously conducted surveys (PPIM, 2018, 2020), which were limited to Muslims, the current survey covers other religions.

Indonesia still has a challenge in responding to diversity. Social conflicts and even violence stemming from diversity is still frequently reported (Kumparan, 2020; Tirta, 2018, Riyadi & Hendris, 2016). Several surveys show that intolerance is relatively high in the society (PPIM, 2017, 2018; Wahid Foundation, 2019). Religious differences in particular continue to be the frequent source of social conflicts. The educational environment that should be a place to sow the seeds of an attitude of openness cannot even be separated from narrow and closed views in addressing religious differences. Ironically, policy makers do not seem brave enough to make policies to review our education, particularly in relation to religious issues.

In education realm, being the victim of social and religious intolerances will have negative effect on academic achievement since students think they are insecure and cannot focus on the academic and learning process at campus (Tholkhah, 2002, VanTongeren,et. al., 2016). The case of a student who during her study in one private university wears the attribute of a certain religion she does not follow serves as an example of what happens in Indonesia (CeritaAyu, 2020). Not to mention the currently viral case of a non-Muslim student who is required to wear *hijab* (a head covering worn in public by some Muslim women) in a public school in West Sumatra (AlasanSiswiNon-Muslim, 2021) is an evidence that intolerance issue in our education does exist.

Universities play an important role to take a stand towards diversity. Unfortunately, they cannot be separated from seeds of intolerance either. Some activities with intolerance tendency occur in universities. It is unfortunate considering that education is expected to generate candidates of leaders with openness and appreciation to diversity. This is just as set forth in Law Number 20 Year 2003 concerning National Education System. Under this law, education must be administered in a democratic, fair, and non-discriminatory way by upholding the human rights, religious values, cultural values, and plurality.

To date ,most studies on tolerance focus at individual level (Batool & Akram, 2019; vanTongeren et.al, 2016; Clobert,et.al., 2014).The existing studies on university students' tolerance mostly focus on public universities (Students Kampus Keagamaan, 2019; Ketidakmauan Kampus Menolak, 2019), not to mention the purposive sampling method they use, leading to public or major university bias. No research has been conducted on tolerance using national data and portraying the types of universities existing in Indonesia. For this reason, this research will pay greater attention to campus environment and students' activities.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Some questions we would like to see to get a grasp of intolerance issues are formulated in the following research questions:

1. How is the picture of Indonesian university students' tolerance?
2. Does the democratic practices in that campus influence students' tolerance attitude?
3. Does the environment (including lecturers' tolerance level) and religious activities in the campus influence students' religious tolerance?
4. Does students' activities influence their tolerance level?
5. What can be done to improve tolerance in universities?

DEFINITION AND CONCEPT

In this research, religious tolerance is defined as “a person's willingness to accept the civil rights of individuals or groups from other religions they dislike or disagree with”. Three important components form this definition. Firstly, tolerance requires the willingness to respect the statements or behavior of those they dislike or disagree with. One of the definitions of tolerance most frequently quoted suggests that tolerance is ‘the willingness to accept something refused or rejected’ (Sullivan, Pierson dan Marcus 1982: 2). This dislike or disagreement towards other parties' opinions and behavior does not necessarily allow an individual to prevent the parties they dislike or disagree with from stating their opinion or to behave in a certain way.

Secondly, our definition emphasizes the relationship with other parties from different religions as the subject of tolerance attitude or behavior. While the religious belief can be one of the causes for religious intolerance, it is not the only source of problems.

Thirdly, in defining religious tolerance, this research does not only see the religious views or behavior from the disliked or disagreed parties as the object of religious tolerance attitude or behavior. Rather, this research defines the object of religious tolerance in a wider sense by seeing the civil rights of other religions in the context of life as a nation. As suggested by Avery et al. (1993), tolerance means ‘the willingness to admit the civil freedom of those they disagree with’.

In line with the above view, researchers have showed that tolerance is varied and depends on the context. Tolerance cannot be completely associated with one cause, such as personal one, since tolerance stems from a wider social and political process (Gibson and Gouws 2003: 94). According to Menchik and Pepinsky (2018), “tolerance can only be understood in a situational term”. To what extent a person is likely or unlikely to tolerate individuals from other religion groups will be varied, depending on the context of problem. For example, a person can tolerate a group of other religion followers to live in the same neighborhood, yet they do not allow these group to build a place of worship or to assume a public office. Therefore, as what we will discuss further in the research method, we will use a number of questions on various forms of tolerance attitude or behavior among different religious groups to allow us to explain the religious tolerance phenomena.

RESEARCH METHOD

This survey was conducted at national level in 34 provinces. To obtain the best possible picture of religious tolerance in universities, this study covered 92 universities from the planned 100 universities, spread throughout the country, as its sample using stratified random sampling. The number of universities taken as its sample in each province was determined proportionally against the number of students in that province. The data was collected from 1 November to 27 December 2020 simultaneously in all of the study areas. The data was collected from 2866 students (in 92 universities), 673 lecturers (in 87 universities), and 79 universities.

RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The instrument was developed from the existing one and some items were developed to complement it according to the research objective. To ensure the quality of the obtained data, two questions were added to be attentional checker. The data used in the analysis is the one which passed the attentional checker. Try out was conducted

to ensure the face validity and readability and relevance of the question items made.

Religious tolerance is situational in nature. To what extent an individual tolerate a statement or other parties they dislike depends on the issue and its context. Thus, to capture the religious tolerance phenomena well, this research ask a number of questions to the respondents on their attitude and behavior to the parties they dislike or disagree with. In regard to attitude, this research measured religious tolerance using eight questions below:

1. Place of worship (*of the religion I dislike the most*) can be built in my neighborhood.
2. Adherents (*of the religion I dislike the most*) can live in my current neighborhood.
3. Neighbors following (*the religion I dislike the most*) can organize religious event in the public space in my neighborhood.
4. Adherents (*of the religion I dislike the most*) can lead campus religious organization.
5. If an adherent (*of the religion I dislike the most*) passes away, the corpse can be buried in the public graveyard in my current neighborhood.
6. Adherents of (*the religion I dislike the most*) can be a head of district.
7. Adherentss of (*the religion I dislike the most*) can be a president.
8. Adherents of (*the religion I dislike the most*) can comment on my religion in front of the public.

Additionally, we also ask a set of questions to capture the religious tolerance behavior as follows:

1. To sign an online petition or campaign in media to prevent political participation of someone from a group of (*the religion I dislike the most*).
2. To sign an online petition/campaign in media to ban symbols of (*the religion I dislike the most*).


- 3. To participate in demonstration against a group of (*the religion I dislike the most*).
- 4. To congratulate feast to adherents of (*the religion I dislike the most*).
- 5. Attend a religious ceremony of (*the religion I dislike the most*).
- 6. Receive assistance from a person or organization from (*the religion I dislike the most*).

SURVEY RESULTS

PORTRAIT OF STUDENTS’ TOLERANCE IN INDONESIA

In general, this survey shows that the majority of students have relatively high and very high religious tolerance attitudes. However, the proportion of students whose religious tolerance attitude is relatively low and very low is high. 30.16% of students, or on average one in three students has relatively low or very low religious tolerance attitude. This surely needs a serious attention from policy makers and other relevant parties.


Figure 1. Religious Tolerance Attitude among Students



Based on figure 1, 24.89% of students have low religious tolerance attitude, and the other 5.27% has relatively very low religious tolerance attitude. Combined, 30.16% of Indonesian students has low or very low religious tolerance attitude. Meanwhile, out of 69.83% of students with relatively high religious tolerance attitude, 20% of them have relatively very high tolerance to adherents of other religions.

In terms of religious tolerance behavior, figure 2 shows that only about 11.22% of Indonesian students show low (10.08%) or very low (1.14%) tolerance behavior. The rest, around 88.78% of Indonesian students, show high or very high tolerance behavior to adherents of other religions.

Figure 2. Religious Tolerance Behavior among Students



PORTRAIT OF STUDENTS’ TOLERANCE BY TYPE OF UNIVERSITIES

The next finding is that students from government-affiliated universities have higher tolerance, followed by public universities, private universities, and religion-based universities. Similar finding is also obtained for level of perception of being threatened, where students from religion-based universities have the highest perception of being threatened, followed by private, public, and government-affiliated universities.

Figure 3. Thermometer towards Adherents of Other Religions by Universities





Figure 3 shows that student respondents from religion-based universities have the lowest average thermometer (perceived like/dislike) to other religions than respondents from other universities.

Meanwhile, by the type of universities, as in figure 4, respondent students from religion-based universities generally have higher perception of being threatened than students from other types of universities. Considering the data on trust mean and intercept, it can be concluded that perception of being threatened is varied between religion groups and types of universities.

Figure 4. Students' Perception of Being Threatened and Types of Universities



FACTORS INFLUENCING STUDENTS' RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE LEVEL

We performed a multilevel analysis to see the factors at both individual student and university environment levels which influence students' religious tolerance. Below is the result of our analysis:

Table 1. Result of Regression Analysis of Students' Religious Tolerance

	Model 1 (Multilevel)	Model 2 (Multilevel)	Model 3 (Multilevel)
Fixed Effects			
Cross-Group Discussion	0.139***	0.098***	0.095***
Cross-Group Relationship	0.309***	0.215***	0.213***
Non-Religious Organization	0.016	-0.007	-0.008
Religious Organization	-0.039*	-0.024	-0.024
Spiritual Activities	-0.075	-0.107*	-0.105*
University's Attitude to Minority	0.181**	0.118*	0.064
Lecturers' Tolerance	0.212**	0.109#	0.152*
Muslim		-0.375***	-0.373***
Religious Rituals		-0.012	-0.012
Religious Literature		-0.064#	-0.064#
Javanese		0.117**	0.128**
Male		0.077*	0.078*
Perception of Threat		-0.267***	-0.268***

	Model 1 (Multilevel)	Model 2 (Multilevel)	Model 3 (Multilevel)
Parent's Income >Rp15million		0.259*	0.245*
Poverty of Place of Origin		-0.075#	-0.073
Religion-Based Universities		-0.214#	
Government-Affiliated Universities		0.011	
Public Universities		0.046	
Intercept	0.009	0.601**	0.595**
Random effects			
Intercept	0.078	0.044	0.039
Residual	0.611	0.524	0.525
No. of observations	1923	1884	1884
No. of groups	71	71	71
R2m	0.276	0.405	0.416
R2c	0.358	0.452	0.457
AIC	4636	4274	4274
BIC	4691	4440	4457

Significance codes: ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 #p<.1

Models 2 and 3 control the influence of: age, commitment to democracy, openness (Actively Open-minded Thinking/AOT), authoritarianism, social identity, parent's income, religious diversity of region of origin.

Table 2. Result of Regression Analysis of Students' Religious Tolerance by Religion

	Model 4 (Muslim)	Model 5 (Pemeluk Agama Lain)
Fixed Effects		
Cross-Group Discussion	0.086***	0.153**
Cross-Group Relationship	0.231***	0.144**
Non-Religious Organization	-0.013	0.043
Religious Organization	-0.012	-0.056
Spiritual Activities	-0.139*	-0.002
University's Attitude to Minority	0.075	0.130#
Lecturers' Tolerance	0.187*	0.008
Religious Rituals	-0.065***	0.003

	Model 4 (Muslim)	Model 5 (Pemeluk Agama Lain)
Religious Literature	-0.080*	0.029
Javanese	0.162***	-0.130
Male	0.058	0.116
Perception of Threat	-0.258***	-0.277***
Parent's Income >Rp15million	0.222	0.438*
Poverty of Place of Origin	-0.046	-0.246**
Intercept	0.277	0.369
Random effects		
Intercept	0.047	0.001
Residual	0.507	0.537
No. of observations	1548	336
No. of groups	69	49
R2m	0.353	0.363
R2c	0.408	0.364
AIC	3476	803
BIC	3631	914

Significance codes: ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 #p<.1

Regarding the campus environment, Model 4 shows that lecturers' religious tolerance level is positively correlated with Muslim students' religious tolerance level. However, this is not found in students of other religions. Nevertheless, Model 5 indicates that level of acceptance of minority group has a positive influence on the religious tolerance of students of other religions. On the contrary, this is not found in Muslim student group. This discrepancy shows that lecturers' tolerance has significant influence in Muslim students and acceptance to minority has significant influence in students of other religions.

Among adherents of other religions, the socio-demographic condition of their region of origin has fairly significant influence. Models 4 and 5 show that the poverty level of region of origin has negative influence on the religious tolerance of students of other religions, yet it is not the case in Muslim students. Likewise, there is a positive association between parent's income, particularly those earning Rp15 million or more, with religious tolerance level. The

positive correlation between them is found in students from other religions, yet not in Muslim students.

FACTORS INFLUENCING STUDENTS’ RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE BY TYPES OF UNIVERSITIES

This section sees to what extent personal, campus, and socio-demographic factors in region of origin are associated with the religious tolerance between universities. For this purpose, we re-analyze Model 2 by separating students by their campus. Nonetheless, since the number of observations in government-affiliated universities is limited, this section only analyzes three different types of universities, namely public universities, private, and religion-based universities.

Table 3. Table 3. Result of Regression Analysis of Students’ Religious Tolerance by Religion

	Model 6 (Public)	Model 7 (Private)	Model 8 (Religion- Based)
Fixed Effects			
Cross-Group Discussion	0.078*	0.118***	0.141*
Cross-Group Relationship	0.213***	0.212***	0.217***
Non-Religious Organization	0.009	-0.015	0.028
Religious Organization	-0.050	-0.029	0.046
Spiritual Activities	-0.151#	-0.061	-0.029
University’s Attitude to Minority	0.042	0.096	-
Lecturers’ Tolerance	0.042	0.228*	0.780*
Muslim	-0.451***	-0.177#	0.266
Religious Rituals	0.029#	-0.023*	-0.030
Religious Literature	-0.110#	-0.059	0.064
Javanese	0.166*	0.089	0.202#
Male	0.030	0.143**	0.092
Perception of Threat	-0.300***	-0.269***	-0.188***
Parent’s Income >Rp15million	0.346*	-0.019	-
Poverty of Place of Origin	-0.164	-0.021	-0.149
Intercept	0.480	0.200	-0.518
Random effects			

	Model 6 (Public)	Model 7 (Private)	Model 8 (Religion- Based)
Intercept	0.015	0.039	0.005
Residual	0.476	0.550	0.403
No. of observations	621	976	204
No. of groups	22	38	8
R2m	1376	2285	448
R2c	1508	2432	534
AIC	0.419	0.438	0.446
BIC	0.437	0.475	0.453

Significance codes: ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 #p<.1.

Table 3 shows that in general positive correlation between social interaction with other groups and religious tolerance is found in students in all types of universities. Yet, Table 3 also indicates some important discrepancy in the tendency of religious tolerance attitude in the different types of universities. The regression analysis result shows that the correlation between religious activities such as activeness in campus spiritual activities and habit of reading online religious articles and religious tolerance is not similar between student groups. Both tend to be negatively correlated with religious tolerance in students from public universities, yet it is not the case with students from religion-based and private universities.

The correlation between lecturers' religious tolerance attitude and students' religious tolerance also shows different tendencies between universities. Table 3 suggests that Lecturers' religious tolerance has positive correlation with students' religious tolerance in religion-based and private universities. However, similar correlation is not found in public universities. The discrepancy between universities is also seen in the correlation between parent's income and students' religious tolerance attitude. The correlation of this variable and students' religious tolerance is found to be significant only in students from public universities, but not in those from private universities.

Discrepancy between types of universities is also seen in the correlation between perception of threat and religious tolerance.

Although the direction of the correlation between these two variables seems to be negative in all groups of university types, the coefficient level differs from one type of university to another. Negative correlation between perception of threat and religious tolerance is found highest in public universities and lowest in religion-based universities.

CONCLUSION

In general, Indonesian students' religious tolerance is fairly high. Yet, one out of three students has relatively low or very low religious tolerance attitude. From the type of universities, students from religion-based universities have the lowest religious tolerance, followed by those from private, public, and government-affiliated universities.

The research result indicates that two important variables have strong correlation with students' religious tolerance. First, social interaction with different groups has strong positive correlation with religious tolerance. The interaction between groups can take place in the social interaction, cooperation, and discussion or exchange ideas with fellow students. At the same time, this study shows that certain religious activities, such as campus religious propagation organizations, have negative correlation with religious tolerance.

Second, this research also indicates that campus social environment also has a correlation with students' religious tolerance. We find that campus' policy towards students' religious minority group and lecturers' religious tolerance attitude have positive correlation with students' religious tolerance. The higher the lecturers' religious tolerance and the campus' acceptance or respect to minority group, the higher the students' religious tolerance would be. The latter is mainly correlated with the religious tolerance of students from other religions, who at national level are classified as minority, while lecturers' religious tolerance attitude has positive correlation with Muslim student's religious tolerance attitude.

In addition, we also find that there are some discrepancies exist between groups of students or types of universities which need to be seriously considered. The positive correlation between lecturers' religious tolerance and students' religious tolerance is mostly found

in private and religion-based universities. Meanwhile, the positive correlation between parent's economy and students' religious tolerance is mostly concentrated in public universities. These discrepancies, in some cases, show significance differences between students in various types of universities. For example, regarding parent's economic background, this survey result shows that parent's average income of students from religion-based universities is lower than that of students from other types of universities. In terms of religious ritual intensity, this study also finds that on average the intensity of religious ritual of students from religion-based and government-affiliated universities is generally higher than that of students from public and private universities. Cross-group relationship is also different between these groups of students. The average cross-group relationship of students from religion-based universities is lower than that of students from other types of universities.

Apart from between types of universities, some important discrepancies are also found between groups of religion. In the case of cross-group social interaction, this research finds that the average cross-group social interaction of Muslim students is lower than that of students from other religions. In terms of economic background, this survey also finds that parent's average income of Muslim students is lower than that of students from other religions. Moreover, we also find that Muslim students' perception of being threatened is on average higher than that of students from other religions.

These findings have a number of important implications for universities or relevant policy makers in formulating the appropriate policies or campus environment to nurture religious tolerance among students. The heterogeneity of universities and student indicates the need for policies that are sensitive and responsive towards the existing socio-demographic conditions. A single policy might not be able to work effectively to nurture religious tolerance attitude amidst the varied conditions of students and universities.

One of the challenges in the data collection process is the unavailability of data on proportion of students' religious affiliation in every university. The data might be possessed by the universities yet it cannot be accessed by the public. This of course makes the data

collection harder since students' religious affiliation is the basis for sampling stratification. Nevertheless, the absence of this data does not significantly influence the results of this study, considering that the random sampling process done in this survey has represented the proportion of students' religious affiliation at national level.

The results of this study indicate that religion is something that is proven to be related to students' religious tolerance. This means that the attempts to nurture religious tolerance among students require strategic and comprehensive approach, which involve or covers various actors. Not only students, these attempts also need to involve lecturers and campus in general.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research results, some recommendations we can propose are:

1. To promote cross-religious group social experience and interaction among students.
2. To improve campus social environment by improving the religious tolerance culture among the campus's community of academics and respect to diversity and minority groups.
3. To strengthen programs or policies to improve student's religious tolerance by considering the specific social contexts of the universities and students' socio-demographic conditions.
4. To Enrich religious moderation program in religion-based universities by increasing the cross-religion social interaction; and
5. The policy of improving students' religious tolerance also needs to be used as output and outcome measurement at the universities.
6. Data sorted by socio-religious groups needs to be made available for public to improve awareness and respect to social diversity in every policy making in universities.



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