


# ULAMA AND THE NATION-STATE

Comprehending the Future of Political Islam in Indonesia

Edited by: Noorhaidi Hasan



Noorhaidi Hasan | Suhadi | Miftahun Ni'mah Suseno  
Moch Nur Ichwan | Nina Mariani Noor  
Euis Nurlaelawati | Muhrisun | Munirul Ikhwan Mo-  
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## Transliteration

### Consonant

ء	'	ز	z	ك	k
ا	a	س	s	ل	l
ب	b	ش	sy	م	m
ت	t	ص	sh	ن	n
ث	ts	ض	dh	و	w
ج	j	ط	th	ه	h
ح	ḥ	ظ	zh	ي	y
خ	kh	ع	'	ال	al and 'l
د	d	غ	gh	ة	ah
ذ	dz	ف	f		
ر	r	ق	q		

### Vocal

Long	آ	ā	Short	ا	a
	إي	ī		ي	i
	أو	ū		و	u
Double	أي	iyy (ending ī)	Diftong	أَي	ai
	أُو	uww (ending ū)		أُو	au



## **FOREWORD**

The fall of the New Order's authoritarian government in May 1998 has opened the door to freedom and political participation and social transformation that may not have been predicted before. Democratization which is the main demand of the reform movement has opened up public spheres and provided an open stage for political, social and religious figures to help discuss the formulation of the benefit of the nation which is facing a great economic and political crisis in its history. The most important figures in this contestation are the ulama and the religious leaders. They have actively participated in conceptualizing the benefit of the Indonesian people in the framework of religious thinking in a diverse spectrum. Islamic and ulama discourse that once covered peripheral areas in the national and state issues have begun to move into the center stage and have become an important idiom in socio-political debates, especially when identity politics began to cover many contestations and struggles for political and religious authority, both at the national and regional levels.

This book reviews the central issues related to the perceptions of Indonesian ulama to the idea of nation-states and their derivative concepts. The strengthening of the role and discourse of ulama in political debates has encouraged our researchers to carry out serious studies to analyze the future of the nation and the politics of Islam in Indonesia. The survey of the ulama's perceptions of the nation-state is the first step to see the level of acceptance of ulama towards the concept and its dimensions and character. Indeed, some ulama reject the idea of a nation-state, but this refusal needs to be analyzed carefully. Not all of these rejections are based on the idea of rejecting the nation-state. In the survey, the researcher found that "reservation" of ulama against the nation-state is based not only on ideological aspects but also on the strict understanding of tradition and dimensions of locality wrapped in ethnicity.

The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) became an important entry in analyzing the shift in the orientation of ulama affiliated with the state from having the paradigm mind-set of “government servants” to “servants of the people”. Outside the MUI, democratization provides an open stage for ulama from various educational backgrounds and socio-political affiliations to expand their influence by carrying out orthodoxy politics. Democratization and the communication media revolution have recently necessitated fragmentation of political and religious authority. One consequence is that a new authority arises in the logic of populism and capitalism which is much loved by the urban middle-class Muslim community. These figures introduce Islamic discourse that is populist in style and not hierarchical, but their content is rigid and dogmatic. Moderate-conservative Islamic discourse which is quite dominant in the public sphere is interesting to be studied thoroughly. Ulama are no longer only involved in the production of discourse but also their encouraging actions that affirm the ‘orthodoxy’ in the public sphere. This phenomenon has an unpleasant effect on social and religious minority groups and women emancipation groups. This is not only felt in contestation in the socio-political region but also the jurisdiction, especially when Sharia law becomes part of political negotiations at the national and local levels.

This book is the second book that is processed and developed from surveys and research on the perception of ulama about the nation-state conducted by researchers from the Center for the Study of Islamic Democracy and Peace (PusPIDeP) and Postgraduate UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. This research is part of the Indonesian CONVEY Program in 2018 which was initiated by the Center for Islamic and Community Studies (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Indonesia. This book was originally planned to be published in conjunction with the first book of Ulama, Politics, and National Narrative which highlighted the dynamics and perceptions of ulama towards the nation-state in fifteen cities: Banda Aceh, Medan, Padang, Jakarta, Bandung, Surakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Pontianak, Palangka Raya, Banjarmasin, Kupang, Makassar, Manado, and Ambon. However, because of several technical obstacles and campus assignments outside of the research, the publication of this book can only be realized at this time.

This research can not be separated from the contribution, hard work, and dedication of the fifteen researchers, namely Noorhaidi Hasan, Suhadi, Najib Kailani, Munirul Ikhwan, Moch Nur Ichwan, Muhammad Yunus, Euis Nurlaelawati, Roma Ulinnuha, Ibnu Burdah, Sunarwoto, Ahmad Rafiq, Rofah Muzakir, Nina Mariani Noor, Eva Latipah, and Muhrisun Afandi. The success of the research that this

book was able to be produced is also inseparable from the role of research assistants who have worked hard to help researchers in the field. Hard work and dedication were also shown by the management of the PusPIDEP-Postgraduate of Sunan Kalijaga UIN: Noorhaidi Hasan, Suhadi, Najib Kailani, Munirul Ikhwan, Erie Susanty, Siti Khodijah Nurul Aula and Nisa Friskana Yundi who oversaw the research project from the beginning to the end.

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Yogyakarta, May 14 2019  
Puspidep Team



# 1

## INTRODUCTION

*Noorhaidi Hasan*

This book derives from research conducted in fifteen Indonesian cities and aims to provide an overview of the perceptions and views of contemporary Indonesian ulama on the nation-state format and system. The significance of this research is not only to understand the position of contemporary Indonesian ulama dealing with nation-state but also to analyze the direction and challenges facing Indonesia in the context of the strengthening influence of political Islam in this predominantly Muslim country. It should be noted that ulama are important figures who characterize the religious, social, political and national dynamics of Indonesia from time to time. Since colonial times, they have played an active role in introducing religious discourse, modernity and national ideas (Azra 2004; Laffan 2004). Before the Indonesian independence, they even appeared as the pillars of teachers and layers of the foundation of Indonesia's national ideology. Important figures like K.H. Wahid Hasyim (NU), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah) and Kasman Singodimejo (Masyumi), to name a few, were involved in the sessions of the Preparatory Investigation Board for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) which encouraged negotiations which eventually led to Pancasila being confirmed as Indonesia's national principle.

Ulama also has an important influence on the development of education in Indonesia. They established thousands of traditional Islamic boarding schools with its curriculum, religious traditions, and a unique teacher and student relations since the 17th century (Dhofier 1999). Modernist ulama have provided an important role since the end of the 19th century. They became central figures in the management of modern patterned Islamic educational institutions which were also widespread in various cities in Indonesia. Especially since the 1980s, Salafi ulama who popularized the scripturalist approach to Islamic

religious texts also began to actively build educational networks. They set up Salafi pesantren that seeks to revive the tradition of teaching Wahabi-style Islam (Hasan 2010, 2018; Wahid 2014). In the Reformation era, Tarbawi ulama emerged and offered Integrated Islamic Education (IT) which was very popular among the urban middle-class Muslims who were eager to express religious identity while showing their status, class, and social tastes as pious, modern and globalized Muslims. Inspired by the ideology of *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (the Muslim Brotherhood), they established integrated Islamic schools from kindergarten to high school level which are also widespread throughout Indonesia (Hasan 2012).

Indeed, not all ulama are directly involved in the administration of education. Among them, some instill thought and influence into educational institutions through various media, especially the writing and publishing of Islamic religious literature that is widely consumed by teachers, lecturers, school students, university students and the wider community (Hasan 2018, Ikhwan 2018). Other ulama have popularized their ideas and thoughts with more trendy and popular packaging, through TV media, the internet, smartphones and various types of social media. Formed by ideas and thoughts of the ulama who are pervasive, the style of thought, ideas and aspirations of today's young generation, which is often referred to as the millennial generation, come from the perceptions and views of ulama in understanding various issues, including issues surrounding the nation-state.

On a broader scale, this research aims to identify the direction and future of the nation-state of Indonesia. As mentioned above, ulama have long proved themselves to be important figures who influence politically, sociologically and culturally towards the historical dynamics of Indonesian society. They pioneered the struggle to establish a nation-state and guard its existence to this day. But they guard it from the ulama themselves, too, because there are ulama who differed in their perceptions, views, and understanding of the nation-state, and threats from them often blocked the journey of the Indonesian people who are committed to carrying out the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. They became pioneers of Islamist movements that sowed ideas about religious integration and power (*din wa daulah*), *hākimiyyah*, and even revitalization of the caliphate. Some of them appeared as ideologues of the Islamist movement which gave a prominent highlight in the dynamics of Indonesian politics, whose influence seemed to strengthen after the fall of the New Order regime. They actively held demonstrations demanding the adoption of Sharia, carried out raids on cafes and discos which were considered as nests of immorality, and also held jihadi demonstrations in various conflict zones in Indonesia.

## ISLAMIC POLITICAL TRAJECTORIES

As a recurrent phenomenon that presents a challenge for the nation-state, political Islam needs to be first understood in terms of trajectories and broader development contexts. Political Islam, or Islamism, is not a movement from traditions that were developed in the past, especially related to the relationship between Islam and politics formulated by classical Islamic jurists. Political Islam is a new idea that changes the formalistic and symbolic relations between Islam and politics to become inseparable and real. By reversing the characteristics of traditional relations between religion and politics, Islamists seek to make politics subservient to religion, not the opposite, as it has happened in history. Then how is the relationship between religion and politics actually in the Islamic tradition?

The general impression that developed in Western academic circles considered Islam to be indeed a religion of politics, based on the understanding that Islam established its existence through military conquest. However, this assumption does not have a strong foundation. As mentioned above, the doctrinal sources of Islam only mentioned a few about political issues, concerning how to form a state, run a government or regulate an organization. If the rulers of the historical Islamic state are also the spiritual leaders of their communities, this is not because Islam requires religious leaders (*imām*) to be political rulers. On the contrary, Islam is spread in regions whose production modes tend to be based on strict controls from countries in which the state always plays an important role in the economic and social activities of the community. Control of religion has always been an instrument of the state to establish its ideological hegemony. Historical Islamic countries inherited this tradition.

It is understandable if resistance to power always begins with efforts to seize complete control of religion. Although built on the argument of diversity, the ideology of the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) as the pioneer of the political Islam movement, for example, is clearly laden with political premises. In the context of facing the power of Western imperialism, the Muslim Brotherhood rolled the idea of rebuilding the Islamic Caliphate. However, monotheism is placed as a basic fact and the main component of the Islamic creed. Total surrender to God is emphasized as the true meaning of one's commitment to worship. Sayyid Qutb, one of the main ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, continues this principle by developing the *imiākimiyyah* as a key doctrine that teaches about God's absolute sovereignty. For him, the only rulers, legislators, and regulators of life who are entitled to be obeyed and worshiped is only Allah (Haddad 1983). Because of the dominance of the secular

system that is not sourced from God, he rhetorically asserts that the world today is a world that is attached to the culture of *jabiliyyah*. Muslim commitment is considered absolute to free the world from the '*jabiliyahism*' market. His way of thinking is black and white. He considers those who disagreed with the way of thinking that he developed are infidels (Moussalli 1993).

Three decades later, Abdullah Azzam succeeded in contextualizing the idea of Qutb's radicalism - that is to undermine the 'infidel' regime in power in their respective countries (near enemy) - in their efforts to encourage offensive jihad throughout the world. This is believed to be an integral part of jihad against ignorance as an inherent obligation for every Muslim (*fardhu in ain*) to strengthen the integrity of the Islamic region. Based on Azzam's ideas, Ayman al-Zawahiri developed an alternative vision of the jihadist movement: the war against jahiliyyahism must go directly to the source, namely the 'Salabis' which is identical with the United States and its Western allies and Zionist Israel. Al-Zawahiri's idea that clearly shifted the focus of the jihad movement with the main goal of 'far enemy' was adopted by Al-Qaeda which was formed by Osama Bin Laden who founded the Islamic World Front Jihad in 1998 (Mandaville 2007).

Many observers and analysts fail to see well the complexity of political Islam that has developed as a result of the complicated link between religion, politics, and economics. Some people see religion - or rather religious texts - as the most important factor, if not the only one, behind this phenomenon. The circle of violence that occurs is believed to come from the radical minds of those who understand religious texts in black and white only and with a rigid mindset. In other words, religious texts are emphasized as the most decisive Doxa behind acts of violence. Agreeing with intellectual circles and mass media in the West, they view Islam as the root cause in the Muslim world. According to them, Islam is a religion that does not have the concept of citizenship and civil liberties. This happens because of the belief in God's sovereignty which removes the people's power. Essentially believed to be a political religion, Islam emerged as a worldview in which human life does not have the same values as in the West; while freedom, democracy, openness, and creativity become foreign. Such a view is strengthened by the increasing number of Islamist groups that have emerged, in the name of religion. They suspect democracy as a "foreign construction" and eliminate the people's will to follow God's sovereignty.

This view has long been disputed by those who defend the thesis on "the compatibility between Islam and democracy," by presenting a spirit of Islam that is inherently democratic and claims to be a tolerant, pluralist, just and in line with Human Rights. John Esposito

and James Piscatori (1991) showed the fact that in the Qur'an there is the concept of *syūrā* (deliberation) which is the basis for Muslims to build their democratic practices in politics. Inherent in the concept of *syūrā* is the need for the authorities to deliberate and seek a public opinion as a basis for building consensus and decision-making. According to Filaly-Ansary (1999), even though it cannot be denied that the majority of Muslims accept God's will as the most important thing and God's law as something that cannot be changed and deflected by human will and interests, public interest (*maslahah mursalah*) requires the participation of the community in making consensus and decisions is a basic principle in the political practice of Muslims.

So does this mean that Islam is in line with democracy when democracy is assumed to be free from ambiguity? Obviously, nothing is intrinsic in Islam - or any other religion - which makes it inherently in harmony or not with democracy. Social agents determine the truth of an inclusive or authoritarian religion because religion is nothing, instead, it is our understanding of what we do and what we comprehend that shapes religion. Religion is a matter of interpretation. The anthropological explanation of the relationship between the authority of the text and power relations in a complex literary process that forms discursive formation explains the significance of the criticism of several ulama towards the tendency of reason to confront Islam and democracy (Messick 1993).

Understanding the above problems, according to Asef Bayat (2007), it is wrong to confront Islam and democracy. He said that it is more appropriate to answer the following question: What conditions can Muslims adapt to the main principles inherent in democracy: power-sharing, participation in decision-making, egalitarianism, and liberation? Fifty years ago, social scientists believed that Christianity and democracy were incompatible. But today, democracy blooms in Christian areas, even in areas where fascism arises and is related to the church. Indeed, previous authoritarian and exclusive ideologies were always juxtaposed with Christianity. The early Christian sects promoted loyalty to authoritarian rulers, provided they were not atheists and did not endanger their adherents. Compliance is the subject of Christian political thought based on the belief that higher power is given by God.

Bayat further suggested that we better test conditions that allow social forces to convert scriptural texts into hegemonic powers. This is closely related to the group's capacity to mobilize consensus around the "truth" they have built. Because it refers solely to the scriptures, it may not act as an effective analytical tool, but must be directed at the core of political struggle in building hegemonic discourse. The

statement that “Islamic government has a democratic character” may be considered as an immature analysis, but this is an expression of the struggle to create a democratic Islamic government.

It is undeniable, there are still many structural problems that hinder the development of the Islamic world. These problems range from issues of poverty, illiteracy, unequal education, and health access, wide social and economic disparities, corruption, nepotism, authoritarianism, radicalism, and terrorism, all of which contribute to the low HDI (Human Development Index) of Muslim society. In this context, political Islam came to offer alternatives. With the core support of a poor middle class, political Islam has been successful for three decades in moving a large number of disappointed people through ‘cheap Islamization’: with language slogans of moral purity and culture, demanding identity politics, and carrying out productive charitable work. However, towards the mid-1990s political Islam could not move far when it arrived at a more challenging Islamization: establishing an Islamic government. As a result, the power of political Islam faces a major crisis wherever it is practiced (such as in Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan, for example). At the same time, the strategies of armed violence and struggle adopted by political Islamists who took radical lines (in Egypt and Algeria, for example) failed to achieve their targets. Faced with the authoritarian regime of many figures who were forced to abandon destructive discourses or methods of violence. They began to build a more democratic vision for more compromising political Islam projects.

For Bayat, political Islam often appears as a self-affirmation language to mobilize people (mostly middle class) who feel marginalized by dominant economic, political or cultural processes in their society; people who feel the failure of capitalistic and utopian-socialist modernity which then makes the language of morality through religion while wanting a change in the political system. In fact, according to him, political Islam can sometimes be read as a way for the newly growing Muslim middle class to say no to what they consider to be foreign influences - national elites, secular governments, and Western allies of the government. They balked at the “domination of Western culture”, political rationality, moral sensibility, and normative symbols, even though they use many foreign items such as ties, food, education, and technology.

It is noteworthy, the momentum of the development of political Islam took place following the defeat of the Arab world from Israel in the 1967 War. The defeat in this war made many aware of the fragility of the ruling regimes in their countries. Since then, the slogan “Islam is the solution” began to resonate loudly in various parts of the Islamic world (Ajami 1992; Esposito 1992). The choice

of the use of violence that attaches to Islamic radicalism is related to political opportunity and mobilizing structures. Closely related to the efforts of marginalized individuals to vent disappointment caused by social, economic and political factors that occur at the macro level as well as frustration triggered by individual micro experiences, the format of the action that accompanies the wave of Islamic radicalism usually develops as well as in response given by the state to the problems they are hearing about. If the response is inadequate and the country responds to challenges with repressive actions - as an effort to cover up its failure to carry out political, legal and economic reforms, for example - the political Islam movement is usually driven by a strategy of violence and terror. The potential for such threats will be even more serious when the government and security forces apply indiscriminate repression tactics which will only add to the anti-system framework developed by radical groups (Hafez 2004).

### **ABOUT THE BOOK**

This book consists of ten chapters. After the first chapter of the introduction written by Noorhaidi Hasan, the second chapter, which was written by Suhadi and Miftahun Ni'mah Suseno, presented the results of the survey that underlies the entire contents of this book. After describing the methods and approaches used in the survey, this chapter shows a map of the outlooks of ulama towards the nation-state according to the categories developed to avoid partial thinking such as describing what percent of ulama agree with the enforcement of Islamic law, agreeing with the use of violence in *jihād fi sabīlillāh*, rejecting the house of worship of another religion, and so on. Moreover, this chapter seeks to explain the pattern of acceptance and rejection of ulama towards the nation-state drawn from their answers to the items asked in the questionnaires, as well as dimensions that are thought to contribute to shaping their outlooks.

The third chapter, written by Noorhaidi Hasan, seeks to understand the results of the survey in the context of strengthening the challenges of political Islam in Indonesia. This chapter also seeks to analyze the direction of Islamic and political relations; the extent to which political Islam can expand its influence and present a real challenge to the survival of the Indonesian nation-state. This effort is based on the theoretical belief that there is a significant relationship between the perceptions and attitudes of ulama regarding the nation-state and the future of political Islam. Recognizing the complex situation faced by ulama as religious authorities, caught in the middle between state institutions that continually undermine their legitimacy and Islamist ideologues that are never tired of offering very populist political Islamic discourse, this chapter emphasizes on their outlooks towards

the nation-state as an effort to negotiate with the situation, and thus, maintain their relevance in public and community life.

The fourth chapter, written by Moch Nur Ichwan and Nina Mariani Noor, seeks to explore the direction of developments that occur within the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) - as a semi-government institution that accommodates various Islamic religious groups in Indonesia - in responding to current developments related to dynamics relations between religion and state, which marked the strengthening of the influence of political Islam. This chapter shows the new direction of the MUI as seen in the accommodation of groups that are theologically puritanical, and politically “semi-rejectionist”, which then raises a new wing of the MUI. This “semi-rejectionist” wing does not reject Pancasila, the state constitution (the 1945 Constitution), Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), but rejects the official interpretation of the state by developing Islamist interpretations of the Pancasila and the three pillars of the nation by supporting the idea of “Indonesia or NKRI Sharia”.

The fifth chapter, written by Euis Nurlaelawati and Muhrisun, discusses the relationship between the outlooks of ulama about the nation-state with the discourse and practice of Islamic law in Indonesia. This chapter attempts to show a significant correlation between the views and acceptance of ulama about the format of a nation-state with their perceptions of the position of Islamic law in the system of legislation in Indonesia. The group of ulama who tend to reject the nation-state has a view of Islamic law which tends to be formalistic, if not scripturalist, while the ulama group that accepts the nation-state tends to be more open, if not progressive. As for the second group, the application of Islamic law - in the sense that it is limited to accommodating Islamic family law in the national legal system as currently understood - is inadequate. This must be translated as the first step towards implementing Islamic law comprehensively, including in the fields of civilization and law.

The sixth chapter, written by Munirul Ikhwan and Mohammad Yunus, discusses the discourse of *amar makruf nabi mungkar* which is prominent in the context of the ulama orthodoxy. This chapter attempts to analyze the reasoning of Indonesian ulama in responding to the social and political dynamics after the fall of the New Order government while analyzing responses, arguments and their position in dealing with the nation-state to reveal what principles underlie ulama in accepting or rejecting these ideas, and encouraging them to take action related to religious politics. By examining the logic of thinking and the actions of the ulama from the fundamental religious dictum, *al-amr bi 'l-ma'rūf wa' l-nahi 'an al-munkar*, this chapter

seeks to show how the dictum becomes the basic principle of ulama in the politics of orthodoxy in the context of democratization of religious authority Islam.

The seventh chapter, written by Najib Kailani and Sunarwoto, seeks to read and reflect theoretically the research data “Perception of Ulama on the Nation-State” in the context of the emergence of “new ulama” in the landscape of religious authorities in Indonesia. This chapter shows that intellectual Islamic discussions such as religious and state relations appear to be absent from the religious discourse promoted by new religious authorities. Instead of linking Islamic discourse with the problems of diversity of Indonesian society, both inter-intra-religious, the new religious authorities echoed the practice of conservative personal piety in line with the market, such as wearing hijab designed by Muslim designers, settling in Islamic housing, refusing to shake hands with non-mahram and the suggestion to get married early. By elaborating on the discussion of religious authorities and new media in contemporary Indonesia, this chapter also highlights the encounter of religious authorities and new media which facilitates the emergence of the phenomenon of Islamic televangelism in Indonesia.

The eighth chapter written by Ro’fah and Eva Latipah discusses the outlooks of ulama towards the nation-state in the context of Muslims as a minority. This chapter explains that in the relations of Muslim-non-Muslims through the frame of the majority-minority, ulama and religious leaders play a central role. As a representation of Muslims, ulama are the spearhead of Muslim relations with the majority group. They play a role in voicing aspirations and ensuring Muslim interests are accommodated. Internally, for Muslims themselves, ulama play the role of educators who shape understanding, thought patterns and expressions of Muslim religious identity. More importantly, this chapter shows how the acceptance of sufficiently strong ulama against the nation-state in minority regions should be seen as their survival strategy to ensure existence as a minority. In this effort, ulama and Muslims in minority regions carried out various negotiation steps, including developing accommodative Islamic education activities, to balance the need to express their Muslim identity on the one hand, and desire to remain a good citizen, on the other.

The ninth chapter, written by Ahmad Rafiq and Roma Ulinnuha, discusses the dimensions of locality in the outlooks of ulama regarding the nation-state. Taking narratives that developed in cities far from the center of power, this chapter shows that the views of the ulama on the nation-state are often also determined by their geographical and political position in dealing with the power system. Peripheral areas that have been far from the center of power often feel neglected

in the context of power and development relations. This feeling is intertwined with the ethnicity sentiment that has developed in these regions. The critical view of the ulama in the periphery towards the nation-state, therefore, is often their response to the relations involving ethnic sentiments which are considered to be inequitable. By exposing these views they tried to negotiate the interests of the 'periphery' face to face with the 'central government' which always wanted to appear dominant.

The book ends with an epilogue written by Ibn Burdah that seeks to conclude the whole discussion presented in the chapters of this book. The Epilogue also seeks to underline not only the strong anchor of the nation-state system in Indonesia but also the challenges that Indonesia will likely face in the future, especially in the context of very dynamic national life.

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# **THE SURVEY OF ULAMA AND THE NATION-STATE**

*Suhadi & Miftahun Ni'mah Suseno*

Polemics about the relationship between religion and state are recurrent and usually strengthen when there are necessary changes in the political landscape. In this context, it is important to re-examine the extent to which the pros and cons of the ulama are still ongoing related to the basis and format of the nation-state, by exploring their outlooks about the nation-state, not only with the system and format but also with basic principles which support it, including citizenship, tolerance, democracy, human rights, gender equality, etc. This effort was carried out first through a survey in fifteen Indonesian cities, which aimed to map the outlooks of the ulama from various backgrounds of social, political, and religious affiliations about the format of the nation-state, along with the basic concepts that supported it.

Previous research on ulama almost all emphasized a qualitative approach that is divided into four parts. First, a research on the MUI, both its fatwas such as Mudzhar (1990, 2001), Hosen (2003, 2004), Adams (2012), Sholeh (2016), Sirry (2013), and political behavior, such as Ichwan (2005, 2012, 2013, 2016), Menchik (2007), Hasyim (2014, 2015), and Current (2016). Second, the research of ulama in cultural contexts, such as Hirokoshi (1987), Dhofier (1999), Mansurnoor (1990), Personal (2013), Hoesterey (2015). Third, research on ulama in historical contexts, such as Azra (2004) and Hisham (2001). Fourth, research on ulama in general political contexts, such as Van Dijk (1996), Bruinessen (1990), Berhend (2003) and Kersten (2015). Apart from the study of the post-New Order MUI, which touched on their political views and behavior, there were still not many who specifically looked at the perceptions and views of Indonesian ulama regarding the nation-state, especially quantitative studies. This paper seeks to fill the gap.

The research that used this survey method was carried out in cities selected based on three categories: metropolitan city categories in

which urban Muslim culture is very strong (Jakarta, Medan, Bandung, Makassar and Surakarta); Cities with a high number of population (and Islamic tradition) (NU and Muhammadiyah), namely Banda Aceh, Padang, Palangka Raya, Surabaya and Banjarmasin); Finally, cities with typical minority issues (Pontianak, Denpasar, Manado, Kupang and Ambon). With the diversity of locations chosen, the survey is expected to provide an overview of the map of the ulama's outlooks on the nation-state on a national scale, as well as local dynamics and nuances.

In this research, the definition of ulama refers to religious scholar and religious entrepreneurs. Religious scholar is a person who has a formal religious education background in the sense of studying and exploring Islamic texts specifically, either through educational institutions such as Islamic boarding schools, world-leading Islamic universities, such as Al-Azhar, Ibnu Saud, Tarim Hadramaut and UIN / IAIN as well as those who study specifically through a strict Taklim assembly tradition. They have deep knowledge in the fields of fiqh, tawhid, Sufism or Islamic education and other Islamic fields. With this educational and knowledge background, they gained authority in conveying religious messages and are recognized by their worshipers. Often religious scholar is also a religious leader who is active in running religious organizations and has a religious vision, including teachers in religious schools. In scholarship studies, religious scholars are generally associated with traditional religious authority.

The rapid development of educational institutions and the birth of new media in Muslim countries, in turn, contributed to the emergence of new religious authorities. Unlike traditional religious authorities, new religious authorities generally do not have a strict religious education background. They obtain religious knowledge through available and easily accessible sources such as reading translated books, joining Qur'an recitation forum, and listening and watching Qur'an recitation talk shows in the media such as television and the internet. In academic studies, this new religious authority is also referred to as a religious entrepreneur because of their ability to package religious messages through various mediums such as writing, training, and short videos and delivered through new media to reach a wider audience. Ulama who were respondents to this survey are also ulama from the two definitions above.

## **METHOD**

The survey was a group-based survey with respondents from ulama groups or Muslim religious leaders. This survey involved 450 respondents spread across fifteen cities (each city 30 respondents). Because there is no data on the population of Indonesian ulama

- both by state and private institutions - the data collection on the population of ulama in each city is the first step taken. This research used the proportionate stratified random sampling technique by considering the distribution of respondents' sampling adequately from each group of ulama and the character of the city.

The grouping of strata is based on the background of the religious organization / movement in which the distribution and variation of respondents in each city is determined by looking at the following four categories: First, mainstream ulama who are closely associated with MUI, NU / Muhammadiyah / Persis (adapting to the local context), with the priority of ulama who have a boarding school base and / or become leaders / thinkers from the campus environment. Second, ulama from the "new" Islamic movement (salafi, tarbawi, or tahriri, etc.) who have the potential to make the nation-state still a polemic in their discourse and movement. Third, ulama/figures from minority groups in Islam, such as Shia, Ahmadiyya, etc. Fourth, new ulama who tend to be religious entrepreneurs, are usually ulama who are relatively young (less than 40 years old) and most of their audience are millennials.

In addition, the selection is also based on factors of age, gender, and level of education. The proportion used is 50 percent of the ulama population data in each region obtained from the initial mapping conducted by researchers with research assistants in each region, and then carried out a random process by considering the representation in each of the strata, so that the number of samples obtained as many as 30 ulama in each city/research location. This survey used a 95 percent confidence level, and it is known that the standard deviation is 33.69, the standard error is 1.59 with a margin of error of 3.11. The measurement of the characteristics of ulama used an attitude scale consisting of 70 items (statements) with a Cronbach alpha reliability level of 0.98.

As a result, survey respondents consisted of 76.22 percent of men and 23.78 percent of women. Total respondents who claimed to be affiliated to NU (including Fatayat, Muslimat, Ansor, etc.) amount to 22.22 percent, Muhammadiyah (accounting for Aisyiah, Nasyiatal Aisyiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, etc.) of 15.78 percent, Ahmadiyya and Shia were 5, 33 percent and the remaining 35.56 percent came from various ulama affiliated with various organizations or movements both at national and local levels which numbered no fewer than 60 organizations or groups. As a consequence of the research location in urban (city) areas, the educational background of ulama who were respondents to this study was highly educated. The largest percentage of respondents in this research are doctorate graduates (31.31 percent), then a little smaller followed by those who are

post-graduates (30.63 percent) and undergraduates (29.28 percent). Meanwhile, those who are high school graduates only amounted to 6.08 percent.

## DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT

In this survey, measurement is a quantification process of an attribute which aims to obtain a quantitative description in the form of scores obtained by using a measuring instrument that has a measurement objective characteristic. The development of measuring instruments refers to the recommendations of the Joint Committee namely the American Educational Research Association (AERA), the American Psychological Association (APA) & the National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME) (1999), Marnat (2003), Kline (2005), Urbina (2004), Azwar (2012) and Netemeyer, et.al. (2003), namely:

### *a. Determination of Measurements and Measurement Limits*

In this research, the researcher used an attitude scale developed from a four-dimensional concept compiled by the research team namely pro-system, non-violence, tolerance, and pro-citizenship which refers to experts in this field. *First*, the pro-system dimension is defined as an attitude and understanding that respects and accepts the nation-state system, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, NKRI, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. In this dimension, there are also pro-government aspects which are attitudes and understandings that respect and accept the format of government, the legitimacy of governments in power, namely governments elected through electoral democracy and open to aspects of community participation from diverse political and social backgrounds. Furthermore, the pro-system also means the attitude of accepting legal products produced by referring to the state constitution by involving the government and parliament and placing the Constitutional Court as the highest institution in deciding review on inconsistencies in the law with the constitution.

*Second*, the dimension of nonviolence is defined as an attitude that pays attention to the promotion of life and the right to live (Anand 2016) and explores anti-violence attitudes at the personal level both real and latent (Galtung 1996). While the dimension of tolerance is limited in the context of religious tolerance, which is defined as the attitude of a person in accepting differences in religion and belief in the context of social life. Tolerance is more emphasized in the form of acceptance of other religious beliefs (external tolerance) and differences in understanding in a religious family (internal tolerance; Woolf & Hulsizer 2003).

*Third*, the pro-citizenship dimension is the attitude of acceptance of the principle of citizenship which includes several basic principles such as the principle of justice which refers to forms of justice and equality for all citizens before the law, recognition principles that refer to state recognition of individual diversity and the principle of self-determination which emphasizes the right of individuals to make decisions on their own behalf as citizens without any intervention and control from other parties, including the state. In addition, there is also the principle of solidarity which refers to the capacity of individuals to unite with others in an effort to fight for what is their

Characteristics	Sub Characteristics	Progressive Levels	Sub Characteristics	DIMENSIONS			
				Anti-Violence	Pro-system	Tolerance	Pro-citizenship
Acceptance	Progressive	High Progressive	Progressive	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Medium Progressive	Inclusive	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Low Progressive	Moderate	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Moderate		Conservative	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rejection	Conservative		Exclusive	✓	✓	-	-
	Radical		Radical	✓	-	-	-
	Extreme		Extreme	-	-	-	-
Unidentified	Unidentified		Unidentified				

In the pro-citizenship dimension there are two important elements: (a) *pro-democracy* which is an attitude or view that respects and actively encourages democracy to operate as a system of government in which political sovereignty is controlled by the people and directly controlled by the people (Campbell 2008). And (b), *pro-human rights*, namely attitudes and views that recognize human rights that refer to human rights as stated in the Indonesian Constitution (amended 1945 Constitution). More specifically, the human rights included here are reserved following the context of research on ulama, namely the level of acceptance of the basic concepts of human rights, religious rights, religious rights, and non-discriminatory treatment. More explicitly the measurement limits used in this survey are illustrated in the matrix below.

*b. Compilation of Blueprint Measurement, Item Writing, and Content Validity*

The measurement of the characteristics of ulama is developed by compiling behavioral indicators based on the 4 dimensions of the nation-state so that the blueprint of the scale of ulama characteristics is produced as a reference in the preparation of items whose details can be attached in Appendix 1 of this chapter. After the items on the

scale of the attitude characteristic of the ulama have been arranged, the review process is carried out by the author of the item itself, namely by double-checking every item that has just been written whether it is in accordance with the behavioral indicators to be revealed and also reviewing the item grammar. The review process is carried out by a professional judgment from both the linguist and the person who understands the construction of measuring instruments for the characteristics of the ulama whose results of the review were delivered in several research design workshops. The review process is a step to test content validity which shows the extent to which the items in the measuring instrument of the ulama's characteristics include the content to be measured and not out of the limitation of the measurement objectives.

Tests for content validity statistically are carried out using a formula proposed by Aiken (1985) to calculate the content validity coefficient based on the results of the expert panel's assessment of an item in terms of the extent to which the item represents the measured construct. V score has the possibility of a value of 0 to 1 indicating the degree of item validity. An item is considered valid when it has a V of 0.5 or more. The results of testing content validity involving 20 experts in the field of ulama studies and the results of the analysis showed a range of V values of 0.61 to 0.92 so that it can be concluded that 80 items found on the scale of attitudes characteristic of ulama included are valid.

### *c. Item Selection and Scale Test Data Collection*

The collection of items from the scale of the ulama characteristic attitude that has gone through the process of analyzing content validity was then reviewed by experts through focus group discussions with cognitive debriefing techniques which aimed to determine whether the sentence in the item was easily understood in terms of grammar by the respondents as desired by the author. Cognitive debriefing is basically a method developed for linguistic validation for measuring instruments used on an international scale. The main purpose of cognitive debriefing is to ascertain whether the questions or items on the attitude scale can be understood as intended by the compiler of the tool or the question itself (Hoben et al. 2014).

The next step is to take a try out data for scaling purposes and evaluate the quality of the items in the scale of the ulama's characteristic bacterial attitude scale by involving 30 respondents according to predetermined criteria and representation of the population, namely religious leaders living in the Yogyakarta area.

*d. Data Analysis and Preparation of the Final Format of the Measuring Instrument*

Data that has been collected from 30 respondents are used for the analysis of testing parameters to find out whether items meet psychometric requirements to be included as part of the scale. The first parameter is discrimination items by calculating the correlation coefficient between items with a total scale score (rix) as an indicator of alignment or consistency between item functions with the overall scale function, which is called total item consistency (Azwar, 2012). A satisfying item is one that has a total item correlation coefficient (rix) equal to or more than 0.30 (Azwar 2012). The results of this item analysis form the basis of item selection. Items that do not meet psychometric requirements will be discarded or revised before they can become part of the scale.

Based on the results of the discrimination item analysis it is known that there are 10 items declared not to pass the selection, so that the ulama's characteristic bacterial attitude scale consists of 70 items that pass selection with the total item-correlation coefficient (rix) moving between 0.301-0.903. It can be concluded that in terms of the power quality of discrimination items in the scale of the characteristic of the ulama meet different power index quality standards.

The second parameter is the estimation of the reliability of the measuring instrument. Reliability in this study was carried out by internal consistency methods, one of which was the Alpha coefficient formula. The scale of the ulama attitude is known to have a reliability value of 0.98 and this indicates a good or excellent level of reliability as a measuring instrument. This is in accordance with the opinion of Azwar (2012) which states that the scale that has good reliability is said to have a reliability coefficient above 0.9. Likewise according to Kline (2005) classifying the limits of the excellent reliability coefficient with a score of around 0.90. While Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham (2006) states that for research with an exploration approach with a reliability coefficient of 0.70 it is considered feasible or fulfilling.

Tests of item discrimination and reliability estimation were carried out using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software for Windows version 20 according to the analysis steps in the instructions in the book manual written by Landau & Everitt (2004). Based on the results of data analysis that has been carried out, the next step is to compile the final format of the scale of the character of the ulama's character which is one of the products developed from this research. The blueprint of the final format of the ulama scale of character can be read in appendix 2 of this chapter.

### SURVEY RESULTS

After the concepts and research methods are explained at length above, below are the results of the survey. As in general quantitative research, we minimize the interpretation of the survey results. Narratives of survey findings are presented descriptively. A lengthy explanation of the dynamics of ulama attitudes towards the nation-state in the field will be discussed in other chapters in this book. In the end, we wrote conclusions and brief discussions.

#### *a. Acceptance and Rejection*

The general description of this study shows that the percentage of students who accept the concept of the nation-state is high, namely 71.56 percent. Meanwhile, those who refused amounted to 16.44 percent. The rest is not identified.




Figure 1: Acceptance and Rejection of Ulama on the concept of the nation-state

The survey also found differences in the level of rejection and acceptance seen from the clustering aspect of the city previously described, namely the metropolitan city, the main city of Islam, and the city with the Muslim minority. Although the difference in percentage rates is not too large, the level of acceptance of the concept of the nation-state and their derivatives in cities with minority Muslims tends to be higher (26.44 percent) compared to metropolitan cities (22.89 percent) and mainstream Muslim cities (22, 22 percent). From the characteristic aspect, it also shows a similar pattern. Up to this point, we can draw an overview that ulama in more populated cities are increasingly plural, so they increasingly have higher acceptance of the nation-state.




Figure 3: Acceptance and rejection of the nation-state based on city clusters

If we look at city comparisons, there are also differences in numbers of rejection and acceptance of the concept of the nation-state. From the survey results, it appears that ulama in Pontianak (86.70 percent) and Manado (86.70 percent) are cities with ulama who show the most attitudes towards accepting the concept of the nation-state, followed by ulama in Surabaya as much as 80.60 percent and ulama in Ambon as much as 80 percent. Whereas the ulama who have the highest tendency to reject the concept of the nation-state are ulama in Surakarta (30 percent) and Banjarmasin (30 percent), followed by Padang (26.70 percent) and finally Aceh (23.30 percent) and Bandung (23, 30 percent).




Figure 4: The highest acceptance and rejection based on the city

The findings of acceptance and rejection based on the city explain the different dynamics of attitudes towards the concept of the nation-state in various research locations. Many factors cause differences in attitudes, both in terms of the personal attitude of the ulama in a

subjective manner as well as historical and cultural factors in each city which cannot be explained by this quantitative research.

The survey also found interesting facts about the attitude of ulama based on the affiliation of religious organizations. The acceptance of NU ulama towards the concept of nation-state was 83 percent, which was higher than the Muhammadiyah ulama in which those who accepted the concept of nation-state amounted to 63.4 percent. This was also confirmed in terms of rejection, it was noted Muhammadiyah ulama who rejected the concept of the nation-state as many as 21.1 percents and NU ulama only 5 percent. This is an interesting finding, even though due to the limitations of this survey it was not possible for the researchers to give an in-depth description.




Figure 6: Acceptance and rejection based on religious organizations

*b. Dimension of Attitude*

The tendency of acceptance and rejection is interesting when taken from the four-dimensional aspects used in this research. Sequentially the reception from the highest to the lowest is anti-violence, pro-system, tolerance, and then pro-citizenship. Very high acceptance was in the dimension of nonviolence (acceptance of 92.89 percent; rejection of 7.11 percent) and pro-system (acceptance of 90.22 percent; rejection of 9.78 percent). Whereas the acceptance in the other two dimensions is somewhat lower, namely the dimension of tolerance (acceptance of 76.44 percent; rejection of 23.56 percent) and the pro-citizenship dimension (acceptance of 69.11 percent; rejection of 30.89 percent).




Figure 7: Dimensions of acceptance and rejection

Interdepartmental analysis of aspects of this dimension shows that ulama in the city of Manado belong to the highest anti-violence attitudes, namely as much as 100 percent, whereas ulama in Denpasar show the lowest anti-violence support of 16.70 percent. Ulama in Jakarta are 100 percent supporting pro-system, while the lowest is in Surakarta, which is 9.78 percent. While the dimension of tolerance, the highest is in the cities of Pontianak and Manado, which together amount to 90 percent, while those that occupy the lowest position are in Banjarmasin, which is 43.30 percent. The last is the pro-citizenship dimension in which the highest is found in Manado and Ambon with each percentage 83.30 percent. Whereas ulama who do not support the principle of the biggest citizenship is found in Aceh with 53.32 percent. Below is a graph of the highest and lowest percentages for each dimension based on the city.




Figure 8: Dimensions of ulama characteristics between regions

The inferential statistical test results found several interesting things, among others, based on the results of the analysis of the independent sample test, it was found that there was no difference in the acceptance and rejection of the concept of nation-state both for male and female ulama. In terms of the dimensions of the nation-state concept, there is also no difference in assessment between male and female ulama in assessing the concept of dimensions of non-violence, pro-system, tolerance, and pro-citizenship. This shows that the factor of gender differences on the ulama does not become a cause of differences in the ulama's assessment of the concept of the nation-state.

Whereas in terms of age, in this case, age is divided into two groups, those above 45 years old and under 45 years old. Based on the analysis of an independent sample, it was found that there were differences in the attitudes of ulama in each dimension of the nation-state concept, the results of which showed that the tendency of ulama under the age of 45 had higher values in each dimension of the characteristics of ulama. The evaluation of the dimensions of nonviolence showed a value of  $t = 3.080$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) with an average value of ulama less than 45 years old at 34.36 while the ulama aged over 45 years had an average of 33.17. The assessment of the pro-system dimension shows the value  $t = 2.711$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) with the average value of ulama less than 45 years old at 68.02 while the ulama aged over 45 years have an average of 65.59. Assessment of the dimension of tolerance shows a value of  $t = 2.887$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) with an average value of ulama less than 45 years old at 38.89 while the ulama aged over 45 years have an average of 37.22. The assessment of the pro-citizenship dimension shows the value of  $t = 2.301$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) with the average value of ulama less than 45 years old at 106.66 while the ulama aged over 45 years have an average of 102.94. This shows that ulama with an age of less than 45 years old showed a higher attitude towards the acceptance in all dimensions of the concept of nation-state compared to ulama with age above 45 years.

The assessment of the nation-state concept on scholars also found differences in the level of education. In this research, education was distinguished from the last education of elementary / MI, junior high / MTs, high school / MA, bachelor, post-graduate, and doctorate graduates. Based on the one-way ANOVA analysis, it was found that the assessment of the dimensions of nonviolence showed a value of  $F = 2.470$  ( $p < 0.05$ ), meaning that there were differences in the assessment of anti-violence dimensions based on education level, and the differences appeared in bachelor and post-graduate education levels. Post-graduates have a higher anti-violence dimension than bachelor graduates, while there is no difference for other levels

of education. The assessment of the pro-system dimension shows the value of  $F = 3.665$  ( $p < 0.05$ ), meaning that there are differences in the assessment of the pro-system dimension based on the level of education, and that difference arises only at the bachelor, post-graduate, and doctorate levels. Doctorate graduates have the highest pro-system dimension assessment compared to bachelor and post-graduates, and the post-graduate education level is higher than bachelor graduates, while there is no difference in other levels of education.

Assessment of the dimensions of tolerance, it is known that the value of  $F = 3.067$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) shows there are differences in the assessment of the dimensions of tolerance only at the level of education of bachelor, post-graduate, and doctorate. Final education at the post-graduate level has a higher rating on the dimension of tolerance compared to ulama with a bachelor's final education, and ulama with doctorate education levels also have a higher assessment of the dimension of tolerance compared to ulama with a bachelor degree as their final education. Likewise, on the pro-citizenship dimension, it was found that  $F = 3.326$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) appeared with differences in the assessment of the pro-citizenship dimension on ulama with bachelor, post-graduate, and doctorate as their final education. Ulama with a final education at the post-graduate level have a higher rating compared to ulama with a bachelor degree, and ulama with doctorate education levels have a higher assessment of the pro-citizenship dimension compared to scholars with a bachelor degree. This shows that the high level of ulama education influences their perspective in assessing the concept of the nation-state more openly.

### *c. Character*

From its characteristic aspect, the results of this survey show the largest ulama or Muslim leaders in Indonesia with moderate character (34 percent) and inclusive (23.33 percent). While those with conservative character are 9.33 percent and 9.79 percent exclusive. The rest, groups of ulama who have progressive characteristics amount to 4.89 percent; those who are radical are 4 percent, and the extreme is only 2.67 percent.




Figure 9: Characteristics of ulama

What do the character numbers mean? The character figures explain the ulama that is in the middle (large-moderate-conservative-exclusive) position in a large number and which is in a progressive and radical-extreme position both in small numbers. It seems that this explains that most ulama are positive about the concept of the nation-state and their derivatives.

If we look at the urban cluster aspect, the data shows that ulama in regions or cities with a minority of Muslims have a progressive, inclusive and moderate character that is higher (sequentially: 2.22 percent, 8.67 percent, and 12.44 percent) compared ulama in metropolitan cities (2 percent, 7.33 percent, and 11.11 percent) and mainstream Muslim cities (0.67 percent, inclusive of 7.33 percent, moderate 10.44 percent). In the direction of the opposite (exclusive, radical and extreme) character of ulama in cities with Muslim minorities recorded lower (sequentially: 2.22 percent, 0.44 percent and 0.67 percent) than ulama in Islamic metropolitan cities (3.56 percent, 2 percent and 1.11 percent) and mainstream Muslim cities (4 percent, 1.56 percent and 0.89 percent). This trend also confirms findings of the acceptance of the concept of a nation-state in which ulama who are in a city with a minority of Muslims have higher acceptance as illustrated in Figure 3 in the previous sub-chapter above.




Figure 10: Dimensions of ulama based characteristics city cluster

Quantitative analysis shows the interesting findings of the characters of ulama between cities. The most progressive clerics are found in the cities of Jakarta (13.80 percent), Manado (13.80 percent), and Ambon (13.80 percent). Then followed by the city of Surabaya as much as 9.70 percent and subsequently scholars in the cities of Medan (6.70 percent) and Makassar (6.70 percent). The most inclusive ulama are also found in Jakarta (41.40 percent), then in Pontianak (36.70 percent), Surabaya (35.50 percent), and in Makassar (33.30 percent). Ulama which are categorized as moderate in succession from the highest are found in ulama in Kupang (53.30 percent), then in Surakarta (50 percent), and Palangka Raya (46.70 percent). Many conservative ulama are found in Aceh at 23.30 percent, in Pontianak at 16.70 percent and in Banjarmasin at 13.30 percent.

While the ulama included in the exclusive category are found mostly in Padang (20 percent), followed by Bandung (16.70 percent), Jakarta (13.80 percent), Aceh (13.30 percent), and Banjarmasin (13.30 percent). There is 13.30 percent of ulama in Surakarta included in the radical category, then there are 10 percent of ulama in Aceh and 10 percent of ulama in Banjarmasin who are also included in the category of radical ulama. Ulama which are included in the extreme category, the highest are found in Surakarta as much as 13.30 percent and in Banjarmasin as much as 6.70 percent.

## CONCLUSION

The position of ulama, both in social and political life is increasingly being felt. On the other hand, politically the discourse of religious relations and the state always finds its recurrent point in the Muslim

world, not least in the political context in Indonesia. Research and studies of ulama in relation to the nation-state have been carried out, but it is still very rare to take a comprehensive picture with a quantitative approach through surveys. The research outlined in this article fills that gap. As a result, some affirmed and ensured other research findings such as the mainstream of moderation among the majority of ulama, but others presented very dynamic new insights.

The method and method of presenting this survey seek to avoid on how to think partially, such as describing what percentage of ulama agree with the enforcement of Islamic law, agreeing to the use of violence in the framework of *jib d f sab lill b*, refusing houses of worship of other religions, etc. Although the items in the questionnaire have many statements about it. What the results of this survey want to convey is more about patterns of acceptance and rejection, concept-based dimensions and character of ulama based on the arguments explained in advance.

Many things have been presented in detail above, this part of the conclusion and discussion only picks up a little from it, including those that have not been explicitly presented. First, although the role of major religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah is very significant in Indonesia, out of 450 ulama surveyed there were 41.09 percent who stated that they were outside the two large organizations and the two minorities within Islam (Shia and Ahmadiyya). Many of them also do not have the closeness to formal or conventional religious institutions or have a very conducive relationship pattern with religious organizations. Up to this point, if the moderation transformation of Islam is needed, it should not only target ulama who represent religious organizations.

*Second*, if the transformation through the religious organization of the ulama is carried out, especially in the NU and Muhammadiyah circles, it seems that Muhammadiyah needs to get more attention. As the findings of this survey, the acceptance of NU ulama towards the concept of nation-state amounted to 83 percent (there were only 5 percent rejections) higher than those of Muhammadiyah ulama who amounted to 63.4 percent (the rejection was still large, 21.1 percent).

*Third*, survey findings based on regions or cities are very dynamic. To comprehend it in-depth, of course, we cannot rely on the results of the survey or the writing in this chapter alone. It is not surprising to read the findings of this survey that the ulama in Surakarta were the highest (30 percent; together with Banjarmasin) in showing their resistance towards the nation-state. However, if the results of this survey are read carefully, at the same time we get 50 percent of the ulama who were respondents to this survey in Surakarta which are of moderate character (in this survey it is the top third category

after being progressive and inclusive). Up to this point, for some cases and findings, just reading between sections of the survey in this chapter will provide interesting knowledge and lessons. Although to understand the reason Banjarmasin ulama are classified as the highest in rejecting the nation-state is not easy. One of the answers maybe is because of the locality elements that make them feel far away and are neglected by the central government. The same is true in Denpasar, in which the ulama showed support for the lowest anti-violence attitudes (16.70 percent); things that cannot be separated from political contestation at the local level, which is triggered by the politics of Ajeg Bali which is developed by the dominant group.

*Fourth*, the last but not least important finding that might make us quite optimistic is that ulama with inclusive and moderate character (if combined) accounted for a total of 57.33 percent who constituted the majority of Indonesian ulama surveyed. Of course, it is difficult to expect the figure of the ulama to have a very progressive character so that their number of 4.89 percent is a fairly good development. Attempting to transform 19.12 percent of ulama with conservative-exclusive characteristics to moderate-inclusive ulama is an important agenda. Moreover, transforming and involving 4 percent of the radical and 2.67 percent of the extreme ulama is a heavy task among internal ulama and those who have an interest in this matter.

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Appendix 1:

The scale of ulama characteristics blueprint as a reference for the organization of items

No	Dimension	Behaviour Indicator	Total of Item		Amount Weight per Dimension
			F	UF	
1.	Anti-Violence	Reject all forms of violence, including the reasons for jihad and <i>amar ma'ruf nahi munkar</i> .	2	2	12  (15%)
		Condemning the use of hate speech against religious minorities and other beliefs.	2	2	
		Refuse and disapprove of the act of persecution attacks on non-Muslim groups and minorities in Islam	2	2	
2.	Pro-system	Receive Pancasila as philosophical foundation and ideology of the state.	2	2	20  (25%)
		Receive NKRI as a form country.	2	2	
		Receive the 1945 Constitution as state constitution	2	2	
		Receive validity elected government.	2	2	
		Receive regulations drafted by the elected government.	2	2	
3.	Tolerance	Receive existence other individuals/groups that are have religious differences and creed (non-Muslim)	2	2	12  (15%)
		Receive existence minority groups within Islam.	2	2	
		Encourage involvement religious individuals / groups and different beliefs in	2	2	

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4.	Pro-citizenship	Accept the basic principles of equal rights and obligations in politics.	2	2	(45%)
		Accept the principle of equality in accessing the state budget	2	2	
		Accept harmony of democratic concepts and Islamic values.	2	2	
		Receive freedom of association and opinion.	2	2	
		Accept substantive democracy (equality between classes, between religions, gender, etc.)	2	2	
		Accept the basic concepts of human rights	2	2	
		Receive religious rights	2	2	
		Receive civil rights	2	2	
		Receive non-discrimination treatment.	2	2	
		<b>Total of Item</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>80</b>

*Appendix 2:*

Compilation of the final format of the measuring instrument

No	Dimension	Behavior Indicator	Total of Item		Amount & Weight per Dimension
			F	UF	
1.	Anti-Violence	Reject all forms violence, including by reason of jihad and amar ma'ruf nahi munkar.	1	1	9 (13%)
		Denounced use utterance of hatred towards religious minority and other beliefs.	2	2	
		Reject and not approve of the action persecution and assault towards non groups Muslims and minorities	1	2	
2.	Pro-sistem	in Islam Receive Pancasila as philosophical foundation and ideology of the state.	2	2	18 (25%)
		Receive NKRI as form of state.	1	1	
		Received the 1945 Constitution as the country's constitution	2	2	
		Receive validity elected government.	2	2	
		Receive regulations	2	2	
3.	Tolerance	drafted by the elected government.	2	2	11 (16%)
		Receive existence other individuals / groups who have differences religion and beliefs (non Muslim)	1	2	
		Receive existence minority groups within Islam. Encourage involvement religious individuals / groups and beliefs that are	2	2	

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4.	Pro-citizenship	Accept the basic principles equal rights and obligations in politics.	1	2	32 (46%)
		Accept the principle equality in access state budget	2	2	
		Receive alignment the concept of democracy and Islamic values.	1	2	
		Receive freedom get together / associate and argued.	2	2	
		Accept democracy substantive (inter equation class, interfaith, gender, etc.)	2	2	
		Receive basic concepts Human Rights	2	2	
		Receive religious rights.	1	2	
		Receive civil rights.	2	2	
		Receive non-treatment discrimination.	1	2	
		<b>Total of Item</b>	32	38	70

## **ISLAMIC CHALLENGES OF POLITICS AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY OF ULAMA**

*Noorhaidi Hasan*

As explained in the previous chapter, 71.56 percent of today's Indonesian ulama accept the nation-state with levels of acceptance varying from conservative, moderate, inclusive to progressive ulama. 16.44 percent reject the nation-state with a degree of rejection that also varies, from exclusive, radical to extreme ulama. The rest cannot be identified because of the lack of response to their questions. The majority of ulama fall into the moderate and inclusive category, 34 percent and 23.33 percent respectively. Only a few are classified as progressive, which is 4.89 percent. Those who are progressive are generally ulama from minority groups such as Shia and Ahmadiyya who see the nation-state as their only hope to depend on their fate in the midst of a stream of intolerance and the threat of persecution from the majority group. The ulama with radical and extreme characteristics occupy the two lowest levels, 4 percent, and 2.67 percent respectively. If radical ulama reject fundamentally and fundamentally all the nation-state conceptual buildings, along with the basic principles that support them, extreme ulama move further because they justify the use of violence to realize their vision of rejecting the nation-state system.

The number of 16.44 percent of scholars who reject nation-states is not a small percentage. This sends a signal about the existence of fundamental problems related to nation-states in the perceptions and views of scholars. But this kind of symptom seems not typical of Indonesia. European countries, the United States and many other countries in the world are also beginning to face a crisis of trust in the nation-state, as evidenced by the increasing popularity of extreme right-wing political groups and a wave of populism. Many people began to question the ability of the nation-state to solve common problems as a result of depletion of natural resources, widening socio-economic disparities, globalization, environmental crises,

natural and humanitarian disasters, and various other problems. The problem is getting worse when it happens in Muslim countries that are still struggling with basic structural issues and endless clans, tribes, political forces and religious affiliations.

Therefore, I dare to say that the figure of 71.44 percent shows not only the acceptance of the majority of scholars towards the nation-state but also the position of the nation-state which is quite strong in the view of the ulama. Accompanied by the refusal of almost all ulama to violence, the figure of 71.44 percent can be understood as an indication to the failure of Islamists in competing to seize the public sphere in Indonesia, by peddling *Khilafah* ideology and violent extremism. Factors contributing to this failure include the success of the government and the power of civil society to wage a war against radicalism and terrorism as well as the dynamics of global politics related to ISIS's actions and the various impacts they have caused.

The main role of civil society organizations, pioneered by NU and Muhammadiyah, lies in their efforts to strengthen awareness and resistance of grassroots communities to the threat of radicalism and terrorism. Their efforts focus on how to deal with what they define as internal and external issues related to the threat of radicalism and terrorism (Hasan 2017). At the internal level, civil society organizations pay attention to the task of inculcating *wasatiyyah* Islam, a more tolerant, moderate and inclusive religious understanding, which is wrapped in the spirit of nationalism among Indonesian Muslims. At the external level, their attention is directed at seeding the image of Islam as the *rahmatan li 'l-ālamīn* and part of solving major problems that occur both at the local, domestic and international levels.

Although the acceptance figure of 71.44 percent sent a positive signal about the future of Indonesia, it does not mean that I have considered all the problems have been dealt with. There are several reasons, namely (1) There is still 16.44 percent of ulama who reject the nation-state, as explained above; and (2) The high level of reservation of ulama, especially towards tolerance and citizenship. Ulama who firmly reject the nation-state emphasize their belief in the doctrine of inseparability between *din wa daulah*. Tawhid for them means that Allah is the Creator who must be worshiped and glorified. This view demands the regulation of life in the world with laws that have been revealed by Allah, and reject all ideologies of human creation, be they Pancasila, capitalism, communism, socialism, and others, all of which are considered as pagan systems. They also actively voiced the importance of the struggle to save the people from oppression and mischief in the framework of what they called *amar makruf nahi munkar*. In contrast to those who reject it, ulama who accept the nation-state with some reservations appear to have finished with the

format of the nation-state through their reinterpretation of religious doctrines. But they still often express grievances and disappointments when assessing certain social, economic and political situations. Some complained about a 'dysfunctional state', in conspirative nuances of narration.

This fact is more or less correlated with the results of the research I conducted — assisted by dozens of other researchers — regarding the narrative of Islamism and identity politics in twenty Indonesian provinces in 2013 which showed that the majority of Indonesian people, including ulama, community leaders, students, and students, are quite aware of the existence of radical groups that they consider to have tarnished Islam through the misuse of jihad symbols. They believe the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila are non-negotiable. Maintaining the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila are seen as meaningful in maintaining the existence of Islam in Indonesia (Hasan et al. 2013). Some circles do question democracy and compare it with Islamic sharia. But democracy is questioned not about its substance, but rather about anomalies and irregularities that still often occur in the exercise of power based on the democratic system. Therefore, the wishes of some people applying the Shari'a can be read in protest at these anomalies and irregularities. This research ironically also shows that despite accepting the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila and considered to be something that is non-negotiable, the majority of Indonesians have intolerant outlooks towards followers of other religions. The intolerant attitude that afflicts Indonesian society seems to be closely related to a siege mentality and overtrust in conspiracy theories. They believe that Indonesia is always under siege by global conspiracy forces.

### **ISLAMIC POLITICAL COMPLEXITY**

The situation facing Indonesia today, as reflected in the perceptions and views of ulama regarding the nation-state, not only shows that there are still a number of claims and inconveniences towards the nation-state but also reflects the complexity of Islamic politics that develops amid the swift flow of social change and the wave of globalization. In the Indonesian context, the transition to democracy in the Reformation era encouraged the presence of Islamic symbols more prominently in the political arena, accompanying the development of identity politics. Its presence is increasingly prominent as the institutionalization of democracy and electoral politics allows these symbols to be appropriated in political contestations that demand direct public support. The symbols of Islam are not only transformed into important variables in the daily lives of the people of big cities who are increasingly eager to consume these symbols

through their participation in recitations, grand *tablighs*, and various other religious events, but also develop as major political attributes in electoral contestation.

It is difficult to avoid the paradoxical impression that plagues various aspects of the life of today's Indonesian society. On the one hand, democracy is growing as marked by press freedom, freedom of expression and expressing opinions and holding relatively free elections. But on the other hand, more and more Indonesian people are trying to openly express their religious identity, making a difference, and opening new public spheres that are in line with the demands of religious and Islamic lifestyles by consuming Islamic symbols, which simultaneously increases intolerance. In addition, the political sphere developed more openly allowing oligarchic political elites to play all kinds of moves to gain constituent support and dominate the grip of political power. They not only actively roll out political discourses that are conspiratorial but they also do not hesitate to play around with religious symbols and money politics.

Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori (1996) have long demonstrated the complexity of Islamic politics. They define it as politics that is characterized by competition and bargaining through interpretation and meaning of religious doctrines and symbols in order to support their respective political claims. The contestation involved a variety of figures, from school students in France who came to school wearing headscarves, Islamic and activist intellectuals and activists with traditional and Western education, mostly people involved in da'wah activities and Islamic philanthropic services, to government officials who played various religious stance in carrying out their political, bureaucratic and administrative duties. State and non-state figures and among figures in each of these categories are in the core vortex of competition in the political arena that Eickelman and Piscatori describe as marketplaces. In this context mass education and the advancement of science and technology, especially information technology, play an important role in the dissemination and fragmentation of religious authorities.

The ulama's outlook of the present nation-state, as described above, is clearly inseparable from the political dynamics of Islam. Their choice to support or reject, support with some reservations, and reject with varying degrees of rejection of the nation-state reflects their involvement in the competition to provide meaning and interpretation of religious doctrines and symbols in the context of competing for their respective political claims. The competition is very intensive as seen from the increasingly complex diversity of the composition of religious public spaces, which in this study is shown by the broad spectrum of ulama' views. Differences in choice in the spectrum reflect their efforts to negotiate their respective positions

dealing with the state, on the one hand, and with other ulama who differ in their views and interests.

The fact that there are not many ulama who progressively accept the nation-state, in terms of recognizing the totality of the nation-state system and all its derivative principles, shows a challenge for ulama to not only maintain their relevance in the context of the nation-state, but also understand and actualize the position they are in the present life. Likewise, the fact that only a few ulama really reject the nation-state shows the desire of their majority to remain within the framework of the nation-state, although many are increasingly doubtful about their relevance in the dynamics of rapidly changing the nation-state. They express their doubts with reservations that vary in degree, depending on each experience and the dynamics that occur in local, national and international contexts.

With different nuances, this contestation can be felt in the discursive dynamics of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) which has a fluctuative relationship with the state (Mudzhar 2000; Ichwan 2005). Their efforts to contextualize themselves facing the state are evident in *Ijtima' Ulama* (Ulama Meeting) on May 8-10 2018 in Banjarbaru, South Kalimantan. The *Ijtima'* was attended by representatives of the Indonesian Fatwa Commission and representatives of the fatwa institutions of Islamic organizations, and several Islamic tertiary institutions. One of the interesting commissions was the *masā'il asāsiyyah wathbaniyyah* commission (national issue) because it worked on recommendations or decisions related to national problems. For this purpose, the committee has prepared a draft decision, which was then discussed by the commission. This initial draft reflected the MUI's perspective on political and national issues in the context of the Islamic *wasathiyah* (moderateism), in line with the understanding of NU and Muhammadiyah.

However, when the important points of this draft were read one by one, different views emerged from the participants. Some of them suspected that there was a power interest in the MUI draft. The discussion at the forum reflected efforts to strengthen identity politics, majority domination in the name of democracy, legitimacy on the inseparability of Islam from politics, validation of the use of mosques and religious symbols for political purposes. There was no attempt to change the basis of the state, but to encourage the Jakarta Charter to be the soul of the 1945 Constitution, the state based on Belief in the One and Only God (in religious terms), Islamization of the Pancasila interpretation, and the Islamic NKRI, which is one of the 212 movement slogans. Interestingly, the final result of the commission's decision, which was formulated by a small team drawn from several participants, appeared to be a synthesis between the

initial draft and the results of the deliberations. Although in general it is moderate, it does not reject the nation-state, but the decisions of *Ijtima' MUI Ulama* reflect the strengthening of the reservation against it, which accompanies the development of identity politics.

Undoubtedly, the expansion of the nation-state system has shifted the privilege of ulama who closely cooperated with patrimonial rulers. They must be willing to leave the position as *ablu 'l- $\square$ all wa' l- $\square$ aqd* in the system of the Caliphate, for example, which is very important and decisive for the course of government. They are no longer the main source of knowledge and legitimacy. Nation-states develop as secularization develops in the context of changes in social organizations, from communal-based societies to systems-based societies. Bryan Wilson (1982) calls this phenomenon "societalization". According to him, the pre-modern period was determined by a communal system of social organizations, whose characteristics were limited to the local scope and were done face-to-face. Society is bound by trust in the supernatural. In this context the role of religion and religious authority is still very significant. Religion is the ideology of society, with which they manage power, maintain status, and validate the privileges of life.

The nation-state brings the destruction of the communal system and replaces it with a societal system. This new system is a very broad impersonal association and extensive network that changes the local life order. Community collectivity and individuals are depicted in complex interdependent relationships in their roles and involvement which are rationally articulated. The legal system and the rational set of rules determine the economic system, cultural space, and political organization of society. Relationships in society are taken over by human dependence on technical equipment and the order of rational action. Likewise the authority system, is now built rationally. Communities remind themselves of the nation-state through social contracts. Tied to the principle of citizenship, they are domiciled as citizens of the nation-state that have the same rights and obligations before the state. There is no difference. The government appointed to oversee the social contract is chosen rationally, through elections involving all citizens. In exercising its power the government is responsible for citizens. Their power is limited both in the context of time and type.

In his seminal work on ulama, Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2002) complained about the slowness of ulama in response to the major changes that occurred in the 21st century, especially related to changes in the criteria of power in the modern world as measured by mastery of science and technology, not merely politics. Ulama generally remain locked in the classical political worldview. As a result, they only see the problem of "injustice, conspiracy and suffering," rather than

new opportunities and opportunities presented by modernization and globalization. They are in limbo between legitimizing the status quo and seeking alternatives to their actualization and relevance in shared life (Van Bruinessen 1990). Along with the desire to maintain traditional identity and privileges, the suspicions of some ulama towards the nation-state were finally inevitable (Tayob 2015). The nation-state that was present accompanied modernization and globalization developed the concept of citizenship, as mentioned above. But this concept is still very foreign in the political worldview of the ulama. Citizens require acceptance of the principle of equality and human rights (Kymlicka 1996), which contributes to undermining the authority and traditional privileges of the ulama.

### **CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL ISLAM**

This situation allows political Islam to develop. As thoughts, discourses, actions and movements that see Islam as not only a religion but also a political ideology and totality of the system of life, political Islam constantly tries to remind of the superiority of “Islamic textual sources and transcendental ideas” dealing with “ideology and human made institutions“. While Islamic ideologues offer “new understanding on Islam,” which are contextualized with the latest world developments, ulama still have to endure as guardians of religious traditions. The power of the ulama to defend the credentials as orthodoxy guards was constantly challenged and tested by the persistence of Islamists to push the concept of Islamic totality and Islamic supremacy, while singing the romanticism of the Caliphate’s glory.

Political Islam developed since the nation-state was accepted as a new format of political management among Muslim communities. The momentum is marked by the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jama’at-i Islami in Indo-Pakistan in the first half of the 20th century. Founded consecutively by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Abul A’la Maududi (1903-1978), the two movements actively introduced thinking that sought to define Islam as a political ideology, facing the big political ideologies other 20th century (Mitchell 1969; Nasr 2004; Ahmad 2009; Kennedy 2017). These two prominent ideologues legitimized their new vision by referring to the call for purification (Salafism) which had been previously introduced by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) - which was later better known as Wahhabism - and Islamic modernism initiated by Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1898), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935). If the first focuses on the theme of returning to the texts of the Qur’an and hadith and the inspiration of the early generation of Muslims and the purification of Islam from shirk, heresy, and other traditional religious expressions,

the latter tries to encourage the acceptance of rationality and the advancement of science modern West which is claimed to be an inherent part of pure Islam (Hourani 1983; Voll 1994). The ideas of the great reformers blew amid the strong pressure of the wave of colonization, which gave birth to anti-Western (domination) sentiments and at the same time an obsession with the revival of Muslims and the system of the Caliphate (pan-Islamism) that had flourished for centuries.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jama'at-i lament the decline and backwardness of the Islamic world while working hard to call for the revitalization and solidarity of the people. Both emphasized that the decline of Muslims was due to the lack of a sense of solidarity and brotherhood between them and the fading of awareness of moral and religious values. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama'at-i Islami experienced ups and downs, rowing between the flows of repression and accommodation by the authorities, and the leaders involved in the spread of revolutionary ideas, which they borrowed from militant Marxists (Roy 1996). For them, taking control of the state will provide a way for the spread of Islam in a society that has been tarnished by Western values.

Undoubtedly, both of them have considerable influence in various parts of the Islamic world and spread severe threats to the ruling elites and the nation-state system.

The development of the Islamic world in the past century shows clearly how the political arena has grown into a field of contestation between various agents who share a strategic position and access to resources and capital. Contestation that occurs both at discursive and praxis levels involves competition for ideology and value in an open field of discourse. The results of the contestation determine the configuration of power with all aspects that surround it. In the contestation, the agents are equipped with a series of continuously internalized patterns that are useful for them to feel, understand, and assess the social world. It is what Bourdieu (1977; 1992) calls *habitus*. *Habitus*, in this context, develops as an internal subjective structure obtained by agents through their experience of internalizing the objective structure of the social world and playing a role in shaping social practices.

The failure of Islamists in taking political control and changing the format of the nation-state, according to Oliver Roy (1996; 2002), did not reduce the dynamics of the contestation. Instead, they reorient the movement to grassroots activism in the Muslim world. Active Islamists hold recitations, seek to dominate community mosques, offer religious services, sermons, philanthropy, etc. while continuing to voice *gazwu 'l-fikr*, fearful and conspirative narratives regarding the position of Islam in local, national and international constellations.

Their real actions at some level can win the hearts of the community and then move towards political tendencies and activism, especially when trigger events — both on a local, national, and international scale — can be capitalized by the elite- conflicting political elite. This kind of actions resonates through the walls of educational institutions, influencing the perspectives and perspectives of students, students, teachers, and lecturers, mainly when society is divided in political polarization.

### *New Media and Ulama*

Globalization has made the situation more complicated, mainly because of the expansion of the latest communication media technology is taking place massively into the daily lives of Muslims. Blending in the contemporary life experience of the community, the media shape the life and identity of each Muslim in the face of social change and significant transformation in the era of globalization. Media culture creates new connections, new imaginations, and new desires that make it difficult for Muslims to separate their contemporary experience and identity from the development of global dynamics. Undeniably, the advancement of information and communication technology has significantly affected the daily lives of Muslims in almost all parts of the world, with some significant impacts. Because globalization has changed the way people relate to space, many people are deprived of the root of the locality as a structure of emotional feelings, the property of social life, and community ideology (Appadurai 1995). They experience an identity crisis (Castells, 2000).

The contemporary experience of Muslims dealing with the expansion of the latest communication media is one of the most critical factors in influencing the latest dynamics and manifestations of Islamic politics throughout the world. Contestation of symbols and interpretations of religion and the institutions that control them, which are the main features of Islamic politics, often occur through the media and are indeed closely related to the way information, ideas and discourses are shared, communicated and produced. The growth of new modes of interactive communication, such as the internet, satellite television, cellular phones, and smartphones, has increased their capacity to understand the world, on the one hand, while at the same time eroding their grip on the locality that is very meaningful in managing daily life.

Although it does not automatically encourage the birth of public spaces that allow people from diverse backgrounds to engage in discussing common issues, new media contribute significantly to the formation of public structures. Public Islamic embryos are born in

this context and provide room for broad community participation in interpreting the relevance of Islamic symbols with the increasingly complex dynamics of everyday life (Salvatore and Eickelman 2004). The transparency generated by new media increases the scope, intensity, and form of community involvement in religious discourse. New religious figures have emerged and do not have religious authority in the traditional sense. Although they are not as fluent as traditional ulama in delivering religious texts, they can package religious symbols and contextualize them with the present life of society. Using new interactive media, these “new religious ulama” package Islamic symbols and offer them for mass consumption. The commodification of religion flooded these media.

The centrality of the media lies in its ability to build bridges between local and global ones. Through the mediation process, people form and rearrange their experiences and distinctiveness in a shared social space. Media plays an important role not only in giving shape to the social and cultural environment of everyday life but also in providing a framework for understanding the world. At the political heart of everyday life, media can form the basis of dramatic social and cultural changes in the short term and a more extensive process of social transformation in the long run (Eickelman and Anderson 1999). By proposing the centrality of the media to the contemporary experience of Muslims in the face of significant transformations, the researcher would like to underline that the media contribute to the birth of new ulama. Unlike traditional ulama, that have classical knowledge about Islam, new ulama try to present Islam in ready-to-use standards that directly correlate with the interests and lifestyles of the general public who need practical references on how to understand and apply religious messages.

As in other Muslim countries, what is called ‘religious public spheres’ has flourished in Indonesia. The public religious spheres have more character as a space for participation and at the same time a variety of competing elements of society in interpreting and articulating religious symbols and discourses, plus their relevance to contemporary life, for a central position in the field of discourse. The democratic climate contributes significantly to facilitating new figures from various educational backgrounds and professions to share and define Islam and its relationship with the state and society. The emergence of new figures offering new discourses and habitus has implications for the destabilization of conventional religious authorities.

The nuance of contestation over the central position in the field of discourse was felt when the political configuration underwent a change that triggered competition between constellations. The trigger

is none other than the electoral competition, which sometimes forces ulama to be divided into polarizing interests. Religious public spheres are transformed into an arena where ulama not only compete with each other to give meaning to religious symbols and texts and their relevance to contemporary life but also negotiate their respective political interests. In this context, sectarian politics targeting minority groups such as the Ahmadiyya and Shia thrives.

## CONCLUSION

In the dynamics of competition and complex competition as described above, ulama are caught in the middle. Complexity occurs not only because of the many figures who seek to negotiate a place in the changing political arena but also because the ulama position exists between state forces and Islamists. While the former actively encouraged people to accept the fact that power is no longer conducted above the legitimacy of religion, but the principles of citizenship and science and technology, Islamists stood challenging by offering the centrality of Islam as a perfect system (*kāffāh*) which governs all aspects of life at once build a base in the grassroots. Between legitimizing the status quo and looking for alternatives to maintain the relevance and self-actualization of public life, ulama are involved in the competition and also interact with one another.

In the process of competition and interaction, the problem is always how much the country can accommodate the interests of ulama who are very diverse. The level of state accommodation capabilities of the ulama gave birth to the establishment of ulama and oppositional ulama - borrowing the term Muhammad Qasim Zaman. It is important to note that the boundary between establishment and oppositional positions is fragile because ulama share a vision of the central position of Islam in society and their role in this regard. A person can move quickly from the establishment position to oppositional or vice versa, or stand between the two. The movement is determined by our success in improving the quality of democracy while continuing to encourage economic growth and accountability of state institutions.

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## 4

# THE NEW DIRECTION OF THE INDONESIAN ULAMA COUNCIL (MUI)

*Moch Nur Ichwan & Nina Mariani Noor*

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) has always been associated with the Suharto government since its birth in 1975 during the Th New Order. It makes sense since Suharto engineered the establishment through the Ministry of Religion. In a Muslim-majority country like Indonesia, the thing that the government is confident to do is mobilizing Muslims to support development programs, and minimizing them from practical political activities, especially those that oppose it. Thus, Suharto used a top-down approach, with the mobilization of the religious elite through institutions representing the five established religions, including the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) for Islam. By subduing the ulama under his influence, it was expected that the people below them also, in the assumption of this approach, would be easily mobilized.

One of the roles of the MUI during the New Order was the translator of government development programs to the community in the language of religion. Therefore, naturally, most of the MUI fatwas do not conflict with and even support state programs, such as in the case of Family Planning (KB), transmigration, and even the acceptance of Pancasila. Of course, not all of them support the government, as shown in the Mudzhar (1992) research of celebrating Christmas together. However, the MUI's silence on several essential cases showed the powerlessness of the MUI at that time against the Suharto regime (Ichwan 2005), such as the MUI's silence towards the Tanjung Priok and Porkas cases (a sport lottery in the late 1980s managed by the government), even though in the 1990s -an MUI twice issued Tausiyah which refused SDSB (a Prize Social Donations), a replacement from Porkas. It was a normal situation because the 1990s was a period in which the New Order was leaning towards Islamic politics.

The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 gave birth to a drastic change in Indonesia's political map. This transition from the

authoritarian regime gave birth to a wave of democratization that allowed the birth of various political and social movements with various ideologies, especially after the abolition of the single principle of Pancasila. New political parties and the metamorphosis of several old parties emerged, even though they were naturally selected with the existence of threshold provisions. Movements that were previously underground, religious movements, became prominent, both old and new. Local and transnational religious movements were also increasingly making use of this changing political structure. The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) then reformed, namely by repositioning itself vis-a-vis the country. The choices made were transformed from serving the country to serving Muslims.

This chapter discusses the development of MUI, both nationally and locally in the past decade. It argues about the significant shift in the MUI both theologically and politically, seen from the perception of MUI and MUI ulama about the nation-state with all their derivatives, such as state ideology, the system of government, citizenship, tolerance, and the use of violence. Theologically, the MUI developed a moderate religious understanding of puritans, and politically voiced the aspirations of Muslims and developed religious activism. This article will specifically look at the new direction of the MUI, the emergence of new wings within the MUI, internal contestation, and the influence of this new wing on the discourse and political attitudes of the MUI.

### **NEW DIRECTION: THE STRUGGLE TO BECOME THE UMMAH REPRESENTATION**

As soon as the New Order regime collapsed, the MUI began to maintain a distance from the country. However, the MUI's process of keeping a distance from the state was not easy; after all this time being a subordinate to the New Order. It must be acknowledged that at that time, the regime and the state had almost no difference, because the former dominated so much in almost all aspects of people's lives, including religion (Porter 2002). Therefore it was only natural that when the New Order collapsed in 1998, the MUI did not immediately moved away from the state. With the rise of Habibie, who was previously chairman of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), the MUI sought to draw closer to power. During Habibie's confirmation as president, there were parties who questioned because it happened through Suharto's appointment and was carried out in the palace, not in front of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). MUI then issued "Amanah to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Prof. Dr. Ing. B.J. Habibie" (Mimbar Ulama, no. 238 / xx, June 1998: 29-31) which besides being advice to Habibie as president is also the legitimacy of an ulama institution for Habibie (Ichwan 2005). During the General Election, MUI initially tried

to be in the middle. However, when the election was approaching, MUI seemed to be on the side of Habibie. MUI issued three Tausiyah. The first two Tausiyah were general, urging Muslims to choose a party that was believed to be able to bring a better life for the nation and state. The third Tausiyah encourages Muslims to choose political parties that were believed to be able to “fight for the aspirations and interests of Muslims.” When PDIP won the 1999 election, the electoral system was not direct. Presidential elections remain with the MPR. Five days before the presidential election at the MPR Session, the MUI issued a Tadzkirah (warning), which supported Habibie from his attackers who linked him to the crisis in Ambon, the East Timor Referendum and the Bank Bali scandal (pulpit Ulama, no. 253, xxi, September 1999: 26 -7).

The MUI can maintain distance precisely during the presidency of KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (October 20, 1999, July 23, 2001). The reason is that before becoming president, Abdurrahman Wahid was known as an ardent critic of the MUI. He often went against the MUI. At the beginning of his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid had at least four controversial issues which made MUI upset. First, the idea that MUI should be financially independent of the Ministry of Religion, and should be located outside the Istiqlal Mosque, which is a state-funded mosque. Second, a statement about the plan to open official trade relations with Israel. Third, the proposal to remove MPR TAP No. 15 of 1966 concerning communism. If the first issue is more threatening to the existence of the MUI, the second and third issues are considered to be at odds with the aspirations of Muslims. MUI issued “the attitude of MUI” and “Tausiyah” about the illegitimacy of communism (Mimbar Ulama, no. 260, xxii, April 2000: 28-9; Mimbar Ulama, no. 265, xxii, September 2000: 32). Fourth, the opposition of Abdurrahman Wahid to the MUI fatwa on the illegitimacy of Ajinomoto (Mimbar Ulama, no. 269, xxiii, January 2001: 18-20). According to Gus Dur, Ajinomoto is not forbidden because traces of pig elements no longer exist in Ajinomoto’s final products. In addition, Abdurrahman also used the *usul al-fiqh* argument about preventing a greater danger, namely the dismissal of Ajinomoto workers, if the company went bankrupt.

It is a kind of a blessing in disguise for the MUI. Gusdur’s approach was like weaning. He made himself “hostile,” so as if it was a one-sided relationship and there was no choice for the MUI but to keep a distance. Gus Dur’s efforts to make the MUI independent was real, including allocating land for the MUI building and preparing funds for its construction. However, during the next period of government, the funds were transferred to other things. The land that was allocated by Gus Dur was different from the land that is currently being occupied by MUI (Ichwan 2013). Abdurrahman Wahid’s attitudes could help MUI to maintain distance from the state.

In the 6th MUI National Conference in 2000, MUI officially revised its statutes and bylaws and included Islam as the “principle” of the organization. This condition did not occur during the New Order, and MUI declared itself as *khādim al-ummah* (servant of the people; MUI 2000, 13; Ichwan 2005). Through this change, MUI portrays itself as a representation of “Muslims.” MUI functions as a big tent for Indonesian Muslims, who are following the criteria of the MUI. Thus, Islamic organizations that can join the MUI are in line with their direction and understanding. According to Syafiq Hasyim (2015a, 247), the concept of this large tent has two meanings; open (inclusive) and at the same time closed (exclusive). The expression of this “big tent” is more pragmatic than it is because not all Muslims are welcome. Primordial preconditions and groupings to enter into this large tent still exist.

It is an essential step towards a “new direction” because this is also a declaration to keep a distance from the country. However, does that make MUI maintain full distance from the state? The reality is not, because the MUI still depends on government assistance when it comes to funding. Even the building occupied by the MUI is currently the building belonging to the Ministry of Religion. In his remarks at the inauguration of the MUI building on July 24, 2008, Minister of Religion Maftuh Basyuni said that the building was “loaned by the government to an undetermined extent.”<sup>1</sup> The consequence of its existence as a government building, the maintenance costs are covered by the government. This building is more beautiful and luxurious compared to the first MUI office at the Istiqlal Mosque ground. It also seems to be a binder so that the MUI can refrain from making decisions or fatwas that can make it have to leave the state-owned building. However, this is a crucial first step in breaking through the new direction of the MUI.

Nonetheless, to assume the MUI has lost its independence from the state due to its dependence on the funds is not entirely true. We can see it from their attitude of how the organization, the fatwa, and Tausiyah, which it produces, are getting closer to the “aspirations of the people.” It is done to fulfill the attitude outlined in its constitution, namely to become *khādim al-ummah*. However, the question is which ummah was represented by the MUI? When observing the post-New Order developments, with the appearance of fatwa on terrorism (2004) and the fatwa forbidden of liberalism, secularism and religious pluralism (2005), *Ijtima' Ulama's* decision about *Masā'il Asāsiyyah Wathbaniyyah* which asserted that the NKRI was the final form of struggle and those who opposed it was *bughatt* (2006), and a fatwa on 10 criteria for cults (2007), the Muslims there are moderate mainstream people, who are not liberal, secular, pluralist, “misguided”, and also do not share rejectionism (reject the Pancasila and nation-state) and

1 The author (Moch Nur Ichwan) attended the event.

terrorists. Therefore there is exclusion or negation of Muslims who are considered to be secular, liberal, pluralist, and also which are considered as “heretical” schools and are rejectionist and terrorist.

Below we will see that the semi-rejectionist wing has entered the MUI. From the beginning, MUI was born as a conservative ulama organization. Therefore, conservatism in the MUI environment is not new. The decisive new direction occurred when the MUI issued a fatwa regarding the prohibition of pluralism, liberalism, and religious secularism (2005). It has not only made MUI more conservative but also more puritanical (Ichwan 2013). This conservative and puritan tendency not only occurs in the central MUI in Jakarta but also in the MUI in the regions. According to Gillespie (2007), the fatwa of the MUI regarding the illegitimacy of pluralism, liberalism and religious secularism arose because of three interrelated factors, namely (1) the MUI’s efforts to redefine its role in a rapidly changing environment; (2) efforts to respond to the rapid changes experienced by the MUI relevantly, and (3) as a fatwa born of frustration over the dominance of neo-modernist Islamic thought in more than a quarter of a century in Indonesia.

In his article, which was the result of a study between 2008 and 2012, Ichwan (2013) called this new direction an understanding of puritanical moderate Islam. What he means by puritanical moderate Islam is Islamic thought and practice which is basically moderate which is characterized by a number of aspects of puritan teaching that emphasize the purification of the creed of shirk and beliefs that tarnish religion, heterodox, heresy, and lead to apostasy, as well as liberalism, secularism, pluralism (especially in the sense of religious relativism); adopting a more strict legal orientation in worship; more sensitive to issues of morality, such as pornography, porno-action and gambling, which are defined as *munkarāt*; more aware of the political interests of Muslims; and supports the development of sharia-based economies and halal markets, but at the same time acknowledges and even supports the Indonesian nation-state that ideologically do not adopt Islamic countries.<sup>2</sup> This term shows the existence of a theological, legal, and moral puritanization process, but in the context of Islamic moderation.

Is the contemporary condition after Ichwan’s (2013) study above changing the direction of the MUI even further? Below we will see that basically, the MUI is still developing a puritan moderate Islamic

2 the researcher assumes that moderate ideology is not singular. Moderation is a broad scope. If there is an ideological classification of right, left and center wing, then those in the center is close to the left-wing, and some are close to the right-wing, and there are also those in between. It could also be, between the two, there are other moderate positions. NU and Muhammadiyah are both referred to as moderate Islamic organizations, but their character is different, the first being a traditionalist moderate and the second being a puritan moderate. The moderation of the MUI is closer to the moderation of Muhammadiyah and the more puritanical modernist groups than NU which is more accommodating to tradition, although the representation of NU in the MUI is quite large and occupies essential positions.

discourse, but with the inclusion of a number of semi-rejectionist figures and the emergence of the 212 movement, there is a dynamic internal MUI contestation between the accepting wing of the NKRI, including the Pancasila ideology, and the semi-rejectionist group, which basically rejects the interpretation of the dominant NKRI and Pancasila nation-states, and develops the interpretation of the NKRI and the emphasis on the first precepts (Belief in only One God) over the other precepts of Pancasila. It is what distinguishes this semi-rejectionist group from the rejectionist group. Compared to the mainstream wing of the MUI, the semi-rejectionist wing is stronger in terms of its Islamic activism.

### **NEW WING: SEMI-REJECTIONISTS**

The new direction of the MUI is apparent in the inclusion of theologically puritan, and politically “semi-rejectionist” groups of people, which then gave rise to the new wing of the MUI. The “semi-rejectionist” wing does not reject Pancasila, the state constitution (UUD 1945), NKRI and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, but rejects the official interpretation of the state by developing an Islamist interpretation of Pancasila and the three pillars of the nation by supporting the idea of “Indonesia or NKRI sharia.” Pancasila is emphasized in its first principle, which are understood as *tauhid*, not *shirk*. It is not only an interpretation but also an imagined goal and programs leading to *sharia* Indonesia. It is an imagined state which can only be realized with Islamic leadership in politics, economics, social, and culture.

We can see this in the management of the central and regional MUI. Since 2000, and more intensively since 2005, there have been efforts to purge the MUI from administrators who are considered to have liberal, secular, and pluralist thoughts. On the contrary, there was inclusivity among several semi-rejectionist figures, and it has created new wings, for example, KH Cholil Ridwan, Zaitun Rasmin and Bahtiar Nasir, who currently holds an essential position in MUI in the management position of 2015-2020. Each figure held positions as one of the Members of the Advisory Council, Deputy Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary of the Central MUI Advisory Board. KH Cholil Ridwan, for example, refused to respect the red and white flag, but then said Pancasila and Islam do not need to be confronted because the establishment of the Pancasila is in line with the principle of Islam. He considers that Pancasila is a local Islamic product in Indonesia.

“Pancasila is a local Islamic [product] in Indonesia, so it is regrettable if anyone believes that Pancasila violates Islam. It’s as if there is an ideological war.” (*Santri News*, June 1 2016).

But on another occasion, he also said that Pancasila (and

democracy) is like a boat, if it has reached the desired island, namely the Unitary Republic of Indonesia which applies sharia, then the boat is no longer needed (VOA Islam, 6 June 2011). It is also the argument used by Zaitun Rasmin and Bahtiar Nasir.

There had also been a “rejectionist” wing which refused the ideology of the state, the system of government and the NKRI nation-state, namely Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Once there was a member of HTI in the management of the central MUI, Muhammad al-Khatath. He was expelled from both the MUI and HTI. In several regional MUI, there are also HTI members, such as MUI Banten and Yogyakarta. Partial rejectionism usually occurs either rejecting Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution, and even both but does not reject the nation-state (NKRI) and Unity in Diversity. These rejectionist have not been able to influence the MUI’s religious discourse in general, although they are quite active in disseminating the idea of Khilafah in MUI forums. After the ban on HTI by the government, this wing was lost, at least in the central MUI.<sup>3</sup>

It is true that in the management of 2015-2020 period, there is also the inclusion of several figures who are considered “liberals”, namely Prof. Nazaruddin Syamsuddin and Prof. Azyumardi Azra, both are deputy chairmen of the Advisory Council, Dr. Abdul Moqsih Ghazali, who is once the coordinator of the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL), and as the deputy chairman of the Interfaith Relations Commission, Dr. Syafiq Hasyim, who was the executive director of the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), and the deputy chairman of the Commission on Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Dr. Zastrow al-Ngatawi, who was an NU cultural figure, was the secretary of the Islamic Culture and Arts Development Commission. Among them are included in the book *50 Tokoh Liberal Indonesia (50 Indonesian Liberal Figures)*. But unlike the semi-rejectionist figures above, the liberal figures do not dominate the MUI decisions, Tausiyah, and Fatwa, except in certain cases Nazaruddin Syamsuddin post *Aksi Bela Islam* in 2016. Their recruitment seems only to be a kind of camouflage so that the MUI not criticized turned radical.

In relation to the state, it appears that the MUI is trying to create a wider negotiating space within the state, especially after the emergence of the new wing above. If it is related to HAMKA’s “Bika cake theory,” the first MUI chairman, that the MUI is like a cake, if the heat is too hot on the top it will burn the top, and if it is too hot below it will burn underneath, then it appears that Bika cake has been it has been burned underneath, because it tends to be downward. In another sense, after a long time being *kbādim al-hukūmah* (servant

3 We received information that HTI members in the regional MUI were deactivated. But we have not been able to confirm.

of the government) - if this is always denied, now the MUI becomes *kbādim al-ummah*, a representation, and connective of the people (Ichwan 2005).

The recruitment of the new wing and the return of the liberal wing seems to be motivated by the adage of K.H. Ma'ruf Amin, "Soften those that are too hard and harden those that are too soft" in relation to Islamic organizations or movements. MUI, on the one hand, tried to soften hard-line or radical Islamic groups, and on the other hand, tried to harden Islamic groups that were considered too soft.

Is MUI's character as an organization that develops a puritan moderate Islamic understanding and practice still relevant after the *Aksi Bela Islam* and then the 212 Movement? It requires more in-depth research. However, so far, and until the time of writing this research (2019), this character is still valid; namely, the MUI has developed a puritanical Islamic understanding but have a tendency of activism. It is because of two factors. First, internally, the new semi-rejectionist and rejectionist wing are sufficient, and in some cases very active in responding to issues concerning the interests of Muslims. Secondly, there was once a Regional Head Election that involved Muslim and non-Muslim candidate, and there were statements that are considered tarnishing the Qur'an and insulting the ulama by a non-Muslim governor candidate, Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok).

The involvement of MUI was seen mainly in issuing "Religious Opinions and Attitudes" towards the statement of Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok), the Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time, on the Thousand Islands on September 27, 2016, "Deceived by using Surah Al-Maidah verse 51". MUI stated that his statement was a defamation of the Qur'an and an insult to the ulama and Muslims. "Stating that the content of *surah* Al-Maidah verse 51, which contains a prohibition on making Jews and Christians as leaders is a lie, the law is haraam and includes the desecration of the Qur'an. Stating a lie against the ulama who conveyed the argument of surah Al-Maidah verse 51 about the prohibition of making non-Muslims as leaders is an insult to the ulama and the Muslim community".<sup>4</sup> The MUI was involved in giving the legitimacy of the *Aksi Bela Islam* movement and then the initial 212 Movement, but not in its subsequent movements. There are several members or leaders involved, though it was not institutionally. Furthermore, there was a conflict of interest. Although they did not act on behalf of the MUI, they were still seen by the public as a representation of the MUI as well.

4 <http://mui.or.id/index.php/2016/11/13/pendapat-dan-sikap-keagamaan-mui-terkait-pernyataan-basuki-tjahaja-purnama/>; accessed 30 January 2019.

*MUI, Pancasila, and the Nation-State*

Did the emergence of this new semi-rejectionist wing change the direction of the MUI to develop a semi-rejectionist discourse too? The MUI's attitude towards Pancasila and the nation-state, for example, was mentioned in the 2003 *Ulama Ijtima* Decree. In one statement of the considerations of the Decree:

“The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia which was proclaimed on August 17, 1945 which has the philosophy of the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the state's objectives as stated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is a Grace of Allah SWT and the result of the struggle of the entire Indonesian nation.”

The decree states that the Unitary Republic of Indonesia is an agreement of the Indonesian people as an effort to maintain the nobility of religions, regulate the welfare of the people and is binding on all elements of the nation, including Muslims. Besides, it was mentioned that “The establishment of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia is the final effort of the Indonesian people to establish a state in this territory.”

In addition, it is also evident in the statement of the Secretary-General of the Indonesian Ulema Council, Anwar Abbas, regarding HTI who wanted to replace the government system with the Khilafah. He said:

“If it is like that [replacing the government system with the caliphate], we object. Because the issue of NKRI is final for the MUI, the problem of the Pancasila national philosophy is final. So, if there are parties who want to change the NKRI we don't agree.” (Solo Pos, July 20, 2017).

The MUI's official discourse and attitude towards the nation-state issue are reflected in its decisions and fatwas. What Anwar Abbas said is in line with MUI decisions. Among the decisions and fatwas were born in *Ijtima' Ulama* of the MUI Fatwa Commission, which is held every three years, and also in the National Conference (Munas) held every five years. In the *Ijtima' Ulama* and Munas there are *Masā' il Asāsiyyah Waṭaniyyah* commissions (fundamental issues of statehood) that discuss state issues. During this moment, the MUI decisions and fatwas on the national political issue emerged.

To see the latest MUI trends regarding the nation-state, this article will limit itself to the fatwa of the *Masā' il Asāsiyyah Waṭaniyyah Ijtima'*

*Ulama* 2018 in Banjarbaru, in which one of the writers (Ichwan) was an observer and also present at this commission. There were three discussions on national issues, in addition to one issue of community economic empowerment, namely: (1) Maintaining the Existence of the State and the Defense Obligations of the State; (2) Principles of Unity as Pillars of Strengthening the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia; (3) Relation of Religion and Politics in National and State Life (MUI 2018).

What is interesting is that, despite the existence of a semi-rejectionist element in the MUI, the decision of Ijtima' Ulama 2018 produced by the *Masā'il Asāsiyyah Waṭaniyyah* commission was very far from the rejectionist image. It can be seen in the points of the decision related to the theme "Maintaining the State's Existence and the Defending Obligations of the State." There are at least three points out of the six essential points mentioned here, namely points 1, 2, and 4. In point 1 it says that "The existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), as stated in the Preamble and the Body of the Constitution of the Republic of the Republic of Indonesia Indonesia 1945, in essence is a form of national agreement (*al-mītsāq al-watthanī*) which contains a joint agreement (*al-mu'ābadah al-jamā'iyyah*) of the Indonesian people."

MUI gave a theological justification that NKRI is a national treaty (*al-mītsāq al-watthanī*) in which there is a mutual agreement (*al-mu'ābadah al-jamā'iyyah*). In the initial draft proposed by the Indonesian Ulama Council, the original formula was *mittsāqan ghalīdhan* (noble covenant), but some ulama were criticized if the context was inappropriate, because the term relates to marital relations. It seems that the MUI uses the term *mittsāqan ghalīdhan* only in the linguistic meaning, that the Unitary Republic of Indonesia is a noble agreement of the Indonesian people. The use of the term *al-mu'ābadah al-jamā'iyyah* refers to verses about the obligation to obey the collective agreement (Surah Al-Isra' (17): 34; Al-Nahl (16): 91). It also emphasized that the struggle for independence through a series of long struggles carried out by the fighters, "especially the ulama and Muslims from generation to generation in order to endorse the realization of rules that guarantee the preservation of religious dignity and welfare for the inhabitants of this nation-state."

The nationality agreement above is reaffirmed in point 2, that the nationality agreement is a form of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia based on the Pancasila, in which the first principle inspires the other four principles. It is said as emphasizing, "religiosity and monotheism." With such logic, the agreement "sharply binds all elements of the nation that must be maintained and protected" from all efforts to change it. As the previous statement points, it still refers

to the obligation to obey the collective agreement, in addition to being considered as a manifestation of love for the state and nation (*ḥubb al-waṭan*) which is part of the faith. In this section, he also maintains “defending the country to maintain the existence of the Republic of Indonesia by strengthening the character of the nation and the pillars of nationhood” for the realization of excellent social life, nationality and statehood, in order to obtain the pleasure of Allah SWT and the realization of a quality society (*kbairu ummah*). It indeed refers to the verse about *baldatun thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr* (Surah Saba [34]: 15) and *kbairu ummah* (Surah Ali’ Imran [3]: 110).

The theme “The Principles of *Ukhuwah* as a Pillar of Strengthening the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia” is also very far from the rejectionist impression. The theme emphasizes *ukhuwwah Islāmiyyah* (brotherhood that is harmonious among fellow Muslims), *ukhuwwah waṭṭhaniyyah* (among fellow children of the nation), and *ukhuwwah insāniyyah* (among fellow humans). Among the three, what is relevant alluded to here is *ukhuwwah waṭṭhaniyyah*. Of the four main things *ukhuwwah waṭṭhaniyyah* can be summarized into two, namely the ideology of the state and citizenship. Regarding state ideology, it is said that Pancasila as the basis, philosophy, and ideology of the nation and state.

Pancasila as the basis, philosophy and ideology of the nation and state is the binding rope of all citizens of the nation in establishing relations between fellow citizens of the nation. Pancasila is not a religion, it cannot replace religion and cannot be used to replace the position of religion. People who uphold the values of Pancasila should be a person who has a high commitment to upholding religious values (MUI 2018, 15).

What is interesting is the explanation that Pancasila “is not a religion, cannot replace religion and cannot be used to replace the position of religion.” It was emphasized because of the concern of some Muslim groups that Pancasila would be considered a religion and replace religion. It was intended to convince Muslims to accept Pancasila with all their heart.

Regarding citizenship, there are three points (1) national commitment that requires peaceful and harmonious coexistence as fellow children of the nation; (2) equality between citizens before the law; (3) religious plurality. The first two points support citizenship, while the third point, “religious plurality,” which is understood as “acknowledging the existence” of other religions “without acknowledging the truth” of the religious teachings, lack - if not - support citizenship. It is different

from the view of pluralism, which recognizes the existence and truth of religion according to their respective adherents. This view has a practical effect on patterns of interfaith relations. MUI is known for its fatwa that it is haram to participate in Christmas rituals and other religious rituals, and wear non-Muslim clothing even though it is not related to rituals, like Santa Claus clothing. Even the MUI fatwa states that it is haram wish someone Merry Christmas or wish other religion.

The third theme, “The Relationship of Religion and Politics in National and State Life,” is the most essential part, because it reflects MUI’s political theology. Of the eight points, two relevant things are mentioned here. First, Islam is *kāffah*, but does not necessitate the unification of religion and state (*din wa daulah*) in the form of an “Islamic state,” but the union between religion and politics (*din wasiyāsab*). Islam that originates from revelation is comprehensive teaching (*kāffab*), has a universal benevolence (*syumūliyyah*) and covers all aspects of life (*muttakamil*), but stops at the statement “Islam rejects views and efforts that separate religion and politics,” not “religion and country.” Secondly, the statement that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) was formed with an agreement to place the principle “Belief in the one and only God” as the first principle in the basis of statehood. It is intended that “all state political activities must be designed and in line with religious norms.”

If we look at the development of MUI discourse, the period from 2000 to 2015 is the period of puritanization of the MUI, which is marked by the emergence of fatwas, decisions, and *tausiyah* about heretical sects, haram liberalism, secularism and religious pluralism, “halalization” of food, medicine and other products, the “sharization” of the economy, business and public space. Besides continuing its previous tendencies, it appears that the MUI since 2015 has begun to be oriented towards “political religiousization”, in the sense of the unification of *dīn wa siyāsab*. It began with the effect of electoral politics in 2014, in which many important MUI management supported the losing presidential candidate, and continued with the Jakarta’s electoral politics which was dominated with religious-political nuances. Then, it continued with the emergence of the 212 movements that united not only Islamist movements with its various variants (Salafi, Tahrir, Tarbawi / Ikhwanī, “*nabi-munkarī*” / FPI) but also non-affiliated and affiliated Muslim masses. Not to mention, it focused on the Ahok case, following the organization or other movements (GNPF; Ichwan 2016). It is evident in the 2018 Ulama Ijtima ‘Ulama in Banjarbaru, which later gave birth to several *Masā’ il Asāsiyyah Wathbaniyyah* decisions as above.

## CENTRAL AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS: MUI AND “MUI ULAMA”

Are developments that occur at the Central MUI also reflected in the regional MUI? MUI other than at the national level (in Jakarta) also exists at the provincial and district/city levels. In certain regions, MUI also exists at the sub-district level. As in the case of the 212 Movement, it is necessary to sort between MUI and “MUI ulama,” who assume that the two are separate entities, but cannot be separated. The purpose of sorting for analysis is essential so that the similarities or differences in attitudes of the two are apparent. MUI ulama do not always act following MUI policy lines. From the total number of respondents in this study that is 450 people with the details of 30 ulama in each city, the number of ulama who are members of the MUI is 84 people or 18.67 percent. We will discuss the characteristics of regional MUI ulama based on quantitative and qualitative data taken in September-November 2018 in 15 cities in Indonesia.


The following explanation will be divided into four sections based on the dimensions used in this study, namely the pro-system, anti-violence, tolerance, and pro-citizenship dimensions, but before that it will be elaborated on the MUI and the composition of MUI members nationally and their criteria based on the dimensions measured by looking at the level of acceptance of ulama from the MUI of the concept of the nation-state based on the results of quantitative research that is strengthened by the results of qualitative research.

Like the central MUI, regional MUI scholars are ulama from mainstream religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, DDII and local mainstream religious organizations in each city. For example, some of the elite of the Padang MUI organization affiliated with PERTI, a mainstream religious organization that has a strong influence on public issues related to Islam, social and local politics (Ulinuha 2019). Somewhat different from other regions in Indonesia, in Aceh the MUI has an MUI, but the MPU (Ulama Consultative Council), which is a transformation of the MUI since 2001, but its function and role is not much different from the MUI. The difference is that MUI is a community organization, while MPU is part of a government institution (Ichwan 2019). In all the areas studied, there were no ulama from the minority groups of Ahmadiyah and Shia who were members of the MUI because Ahmadiyah and Shia are considered heretical by the MUI. However, several regions accommodate in their stewardship of representations of LDII, which in the New Order era were considered heretical, and were then declared they were back on the right path (*rujūi ilā al-ḥaq*). Besides, there is HTI, a transnational organization that aspires to establish a global *Khilafah*.<sup>5</sup>

5 In the management of the central MUI, there is an LDII figure, Hasyim Nasution. LDII and HTI ulama are also in the management of Banten and Yogyakarta MUI. The au-

The new direction of the MUI which has changed after the New Order period and is reflected in our research results, precisely “The level of acceptance of MUI ulama towards the nation-state in 15 cities”. Of the 84 members of the MUI, there were 57 scholars (67.86 percent) who accepted the concept of the nation-state (receptionist), 16 scholars (19.05 percent) refused (rejectionist), and 11 scholars (13.01 percent) were not identified. The percentage of rejectionist ulama affiliated with the MUI was higher compared to the ones who do not join MUI. At the national level, there was 16.44 percent of rejectionist ulama, and the unidentified percentage is 11.78 percent. The data shows that the percentage of MUI ulama who reject the nation-state (rejectionist) is higher than rejectionist ulama at the national level. These new wing ulama are inside both the Central and Regional MUI.

More specifically, in general, the majority of MUI ulama are in the moderate category, i.e., 32 people, 17 people are inclusive, 1 person is progressive, 14 people are exclusive, 7 people are conservative, 1 person is radical, 1 person is extreme, and while the remaining 11 are not identified (from 84 MUI ulama surveyed). The choice to be moderate is more or less influenced by the age of MUI members who are on average above 50 years old, and this is in line with national quantitative results which show that ulama over 50 years old tend to be more acceptive and moderate, not inclusive or progressive. It can be seen in the following bar chart:



The attitude of MUI members, when divided in more detail based on four dimensions, it was found that they were generally pro-system, supporting NKRI with Pancasila as the basis. Of the 84 MUI members in this study, 79 people (94.05 per cent) were pro-system, the remaining five people (5.95 per cent) were not pro-system. The

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thor identifies their whereabouts, especially when following MUI meetings attended by regional representatives. However, the existence of HTI ulama in the MUI body was considered in the “grey area” after the government banned in 2017.

idea of NKRI and Pancasila is almost unshakable in the MUI. The Chairman of the NTT MUI, Abdul Kadir Makarim, for example, said:

“Pancasila is not against Islam. We waste too much time debating Pancasila as the nation’s ideology. What will happen if other ideologies enter? We should focus on talking about poverty, unemployment, and the problems that surround NTT” (Victory News, 5 June 2017).

The pro-system attitude of the MUI ulama is not surprising, because most of the mainstream Muslim groups do have a track record of supporting a legitimate government system. The attitude is reflected in MUI when the government issued policies relating to the survival of Muslim communities, such as the Rubella vaccination case in 2018. There were pros and cons regarding the prohibition of vaccination due to the ingredients that contained pig elements. When finally the central MUI issued a fatwa allowing the vaccination to be based on emergencies, MUIs in the regions also issued similar attitudes. The MUI attitude has been criticized by other ulama who are not affiliated with the MUI. For example, an ulama in Ambon who stated that the MUI was an extension of power because the ulama saw that the reason for the emergency was the reason for the vaccination itself to happen (Noor 2019). According to him, this was far-fetched because he thinks there is no emergency at all at this time.<sup>6</sup>

Speaking about the attitude of regional MUI ulama in general, they are anti-violence. Out of 84 MUI ulama, 81 (96.43 per cent) refused to use violence, and only 3 (3.57 per cent) were non-violent. In practice, MUI is heavily involved in efforts to prevent violence and terrorism. For example, in the case of Solo, the MUI together with NU and Muhammadiyah participated actively in the government’s program to counter radicalism in the community, religious organizations and religious assemblies. Their involvement has proven to be effective in reaching the lowest levels of society (Hasan & Ajudin 2019). Although the MUI is generally anti-violence, several MUI fatwas serve as justifications for a group of Muslims to commit acts of violence. For example, the MUI fatwa on Ahmadiyah (2005) serves as a justification for certain groups to carry out persecution or violence against them. For the Ahmadiyya group, the MUI fatwa triggered a lot of violence they experienced after the New Order (Noor 2018).

During President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) leadership, MUI seemed to get the chance to become more conservative. SBY explicitly

6 It was a misconception about the concept of emergency. The local MUI ulama understood that it was an emergency in the community, while what is meant by emergency in the central MUI fatwa is that an alternative vaccine has not been found that does not contain pork. The condition of the absence of halal vaccine alternatives is what is called an emergency.

expressed his support that in the case of heresy, the government was behind the MUI. The ruling regime used MUI as a support of their Islamic political interests. There is a symbiotic mutualism between the MUI and the authorities. On the one hand, the authorities have a stable government, and on the one hand, the MUI can fight for their agendas against the Islamic minority groups they are labelling as heretics, and the Islamization of Indonesia in general (Hasyim 2015a, 251).

The MUI's intolerant attitude towards sects or minority groups of Islam that is different from the understanding of Sunni Islam is confirmed in the results of our national survey. Of the 84 MUI ulama, there are 22 (26.19 per cent) MUI members who are intolerant, although the majority of them, i.e. 62 people (73.81 per cent) are tolerant. More specifically, the intolerant attitude towards fellow Muslims who are considered heretical by the MUI fatwa is higher when compared to tolerance towards non-Muslims.

The problematic situation to strengthen Islamic pluralism in Indonesia is caused by the monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and the making of fatwas by one group. In the Indonesian context, it is Sunni who monopolizes the interpretations of Islam. Assuming the overall role of representatives of Muslim organizations, the MUI acts as a mainstream Islamic referee in Indonesia and marginalizes Muslim minority movements on the margins (Hasyim 2015b, 493).

Related to the pro-citizenship dimension, out of 84 MUI ulama, there were 57 people (67.86 per cent) who were pro-citizenship, while the rest (27 people or 32.14 per cent) were not pro-citizenship. Along with the views of other ulama nationally, the number of MUI ulama who are not pro-citizenship is also quite high, which is more than 32 per cent. This attitude, according to our analysis, is also influenced by the attitude taken by the central MUI. It shows that MUIs in the regions are more an extension of fatwas, attitudes and views of the central MUI. Although sometimes in specific issues, MUIs in the regions take the initiative to take action according to their local context without waiting for central MUI recommendations or even to make their fatwas that contradict the fatwas of Central MUI, such as a fatwa on Shia in East Java.

The Ahok case also reflects the lack of MUI citizenship. The central MUI stated that Ahok did indeed denounce religion, and this became a driving force for MUI in the regions and also Muslims in Indonesia to carry out religious defence actions starting from the 411 Movement to the 212 Movement in late 2016 and the years after. Ahok, who has a non-Muslim identity and of Chinese descent, is deemed not entitled to become a governor in Jakarta because Jakarta's majority population is Muslim. Jakarta's leaders, according to them, must be Muslim too. It turned out that the Ahok incident was very memorable

in the minds of the Ulama and Muslims in Indonesia. Even further, the MUI fatwa stating that Ahok's statement denounced the Qur'an and insulted the Ulama had a consecutive impact. The fatwa gave birth to the National Movement for Defending Fatwa (GNPF) which then mobilized the Islamic Defending Action movement. It has made Muslims seem to be divided into two large groups, defenders of Islam and defenders of *Penista Islam* (Nurlaelawati 2019).

The attitude of the central MUI and Jakarta MUI was reportedly heard in other regions. For example, there were still members of the regional MUI, stating that the leader must be Muslim because the majority of Indonesian citizens are Muslims. Still, in line with the attitude of the MUI in pro-citizenship, the concept of Islam Nusantara, which is widely echoed by Nahdhatul Ulama faced intense challenges from MUI members in several regions. The West Sumatra MUI strongly opposed Nusantara Islam. The MUI in Padang, in particular, affirmed its attitude by conveying the statement that Nusantara Islam gave rise to unnecessary debate and interpretation among Muslims (Ulinnuha 2019).

While the response was given by the MUI concerning their attitude towards the issue of citizenship in Muslim minority areas varies. In East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), in which the majority of the population is Christian, both Protestant and Catholic, MUI develops a discourse that is tolerant of citizenship. The Chairman of the NTT MUI, Abdul Kadir Makarim, said in the Four Pillars Socialization forum at the NTD DPD RI Building on June 5, 2017:

“Never trust anyone who carries religious jargon for any purpose. Religion does not teach us to clash with others. We are thankful for our independence by living in peace with our brothers and sisters and brothers of other religions” (Victory News, 5 June 2017).

In Denpasar, where the majority of the population is Hindu, MUI Denpasar also behaves similarly, living peacefully between religions side by side. Chairman of the Bali Province MUI, H.M. Taufik Asadi said that the MUI's main program is to build morals that are rooted in religious values, maintain relationships with both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, maintain and build togetherness. The Balinese community for him is a family consisting of various tribes and religions (Bali Ministry of Religion, January 1, 2014). The groundbreaking of the Bali MUI building on January 26, 2019, was also carried out by Governor Dr I Wayan Koster who is Hindu. MUI said that the building was not only for the benefit of Muslims. Non-Muslims can also use it (Bali Ekbis, May 5 2019).

However, related to citizenship, which really depends on the issue. The issue that is almost, if not entirely, both central and regional MUI equally rejects is the LGBT issue, even though MUI is in

a Muslim minority area. In Denpasar, MUI expressed its disapproval of the implementation of the Grand Final of the Mister and Miss Gaya Dewata event, which was led by the Gaya Dewata Foundation, an LGBT foundation in Bali, on October 10, 2018. According to them, the event went too far. The MUI urged the police to cancel or dismiss the activity. In this case, Muslims do not want to deal directly with the organizers of the Grand Final Mister and Miss Gaya Dewata activities, which if possible carried out in direct protest could invite severe tension. MUI uses procedural methods by insisting on the police. What is interesting is that the police finally complied with MUI's demands by cancelling the event (Suhadi 2019, 367). It means that, although MUI represents minorities in Denpasar and Bali in general, they have significant pressure. It is inseparable from the fact that, although Muslims are a minority in Bali, they are the majority in Indonesia so that the problems that exist in Bali are also a concern for the majority of Muslims in Indonesia.

## CONCLUSION

During the Post-New Order, MUI developed a significant new direction, from becoming a government spokesperson to a spokesperson for Muslims - from *khadim al-ūukūmah* to *khadim al-ummah*. The effort is not all at once but requires quite a long time and in line with the political process taking place in Indonesia. The post-New Order MUI developed a moderate puritanical Islam, which was generally included in the conservative category, and politically developed its activists in responding to issues considered crucial to Muslims. In line with this new direction, a new wing in the MUI also emerged, namely the semi-rejectionist wing which encouraged the MUI to fight for the Islamic KNRI. The rejectionist wing which rejected the nation-state and encouraged the MUI to fight for the *Khilafah* had entered but then weakened after HTI was dissolved by the government.

Most ulama accept the official MUI discourse, such as decisions and fatwas, like accepting the ideology of the state and nation-state, even considering the Pancasila and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia as the final form of the struggle of Muslims in Indonesia. However, it should be underlined that official discourse is one thing, and non-official and daily discourse is another. Semi-rejectionist discourse also began to spread through figures and their networks within the MUI. It is evident in the discussion in the *Mas'alah Asāsiyyah Watthaniyyah* commission at *Ijtima' Ulama* 2018 in Banjarbaru. Although they have not been able to shift the established receptionist discourse within the MUI, as seen in the decisions of the *Ijtima' Ulama*, future developments and political processes may turn the MUI acceptionist discourse into a semi-rejectionist discourse, or even rejectionist. *Wallāhu a'alam*.

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## **ULAMA, THE STATE, AND THE FACE OF ISLAMIC LAW**

*Euis Nurlaelawati & Muhrisun*

Although discourse about the nation-state and its relation to the practice of Islamic law is not precisely the focus of this study, several important issues arise regarding the perceptions and views of Islamic scholars regarding the position of Islamic law in the context of state life in Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The data shows a significant correlation between the views and acceptance of ulama regarding the format of the nation-state and the position of Islamic law in the legal system in Indonesia. As explained earlier, seven characteristics are used in this study to explain the views of ulama regarding the nation-state, including progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical and extreme. These seven characteristics also represent the outlooks of ulama regarding Islamic law with state practices in Indonesia.

The data shows that ulama groups who are considered attached to extremism and radicals have views on Islamic law that tend to be formalistic, while groups of ulama who are in the inclusive and progressive spectrum tend to view Islam law more openly. Some ulama from radical groups view the application of Islamic law should not stop at the discourse of applying Islamic family law as understood today. The discourse of the application of Islamic family law, according to them, should be interpreted as a first step towards the implementation of Islamic law in a comprehensive manner, including in the area of civil and criminal justice.

It is interesting to note that the influence of the transnational Islamic movement which views Islam as not only a religion but also a political ideology and a plenary system that regulates all aspects of life is dominant among the ulama. It affects the views and discourses of people related to Islamic law. Sharia formalization discourse that strengthened in almost all regions in Indonesia correlates with the spread of the influence of transnational Islamic thought and movements

in Indonesia. Related to the views of the ulama on Islamic legal issues based on the data, it is worth mentioning that the categorization of ulama based on their background and social, political, and religious affiliations as carried out by most previous studies, seems to no longer be used as a benchmark to understand the pattern of their thinking about Islamic law. The influence of transnational thinking is seen in all groups of scholars from diverse backgrounds so that the boundaries of Islamic legal views of the ulama based on their organizational backgrounds are sometimes no longer clear. In reality, the ulama's view of Islamic law tends to be fluid, in which the ulama in one category in certain cases can have views that are contrary to the views of other ulama in the same category. Ulama affiliated with NU or Muhammadiyah mass organizations, for example, do not necessarily have a view of the Islamic law that is congruent with the views of their organizations.

This chapter aims to map the outlooks of ulama from various backgrounds and different social, political, and religious affiliations about the format of the nation-state, particularly concerning issues of Islamic law. Their views are impressive to study to provide an understanding of Islamic legal discourse and features socialized by the ulama in their religious activities and preaching. It provides an overview of relevance perceptions of the ulama regarding the concept of the nation-state and issues of Islamic law, which often presents challenges for the nation-state. In this chapter, the outlooks of the ulama, in general, are related to the constitution, in which Islamic law is not explicitly used as a source of an application of the law in Indonesia. The description continued to discuss the views of the ulama regarding legal issues that were most heavily applied by the Muslim community, i.e. family law followed by economic and criminal law issues. It was supplemented with exposure to legal issues in other fields, i.e. the issue of leadership and the use of the hijab or headgear. The discussion continued with a presentation related to the style and face of the Islamic law that was understood by the community where the new media had replaced the authority of fiqh books and primary reference books in the study of Islamic law.

### **ULAMA, SHARIA, AND CONSTITUTION**

It is no exaggeration to say that among the Muslim countries in the world, Indonesia is currently a Muslim country with the most potent democratic system (Mujiburrahman 2013). The democratic system in Indonesia developed mainly after the Reformation era, which was marked by the fall of the Suharto regime. However, it does not mean that there are no significant challenges for the development of a democratic system in Indonesia because until now, the emergence of anti-democratic

organizations and groups has been growing successively. The debate among Muslims regarding the position of Islam as the majority religion in the unitary state system in Indonesia had taken place long before Indonesia's independence. Furthermore, the discourse of the application of Islamic law in the Indonesian legal system has become a discourse discussed by some of the figures involved in discussions based on the state at the beginning of independence.

In President Sukarno's speech that was read in the session of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Agency for Investigation (BPUPKI) on June 1, 1945, for example, the formulation of the principle of "Belief in the one and only God," which at that time was the fifth principle, had already sparked heated debate. The final formulation of the first principle of the Pancasila, "Belief in the one and only God", is known as a form of compromise between Islamic ideology and the national ideology agreed upon by the nation's founders at that time represented by a team of 9 (nine) formed by BPUPKI.

In this case, there are 7 (seven) words omitted from the initial formulation of the Pancasila by the BPUPKI Team contained in the Jakarta Charter. The initial formulation of the first precepts reads "Belief in the one and only God with the Obligation to Observe Islamic Sharia for its Adherents." The existence of these seven words triggered protests mainly from Christian nationalist groups (Taher 1996, 6-12) because they were considered to place Islam as *primus inter pares* and put down Islamic law as a law that must be applied by Muslims constitutionally (Bolland 2014, 27). Finally, the seven words were agreed to be deleted.

The objection to the elimination of the seven words continued, especially among Islamists. The objection was seen to strengthen again after the fall of the Old Order considering the efforts to marginalize Islam and political parties affiliated with Islam were powerful at the end of the Old Order. Because of their considerable contribution to the fall of the Old Order and the founding of the New Order, Islamic groups have high hopes of being able to rise and establish Islamic political parties. One of the major parties hoping to revive is the Masyumi (Indonesian Muslim Shura Council) which was founded in 1942 with the support of the Government of the Japanese occupation as a replacement for the Indonesian A'la Islamic Council (MIAI). Sukarno banned this party in 1960. Several Islamic forces took to the streets to bring into reality the hopes of the revival of Masyumi. For them, Masyumi rehabilitation was a historical necessity that had to be approved by the New Order. In addition to demanding Masyumi rehabilitation, Muslims also demand the return of the application of the Jakarta Charter or more precisely the legislation and constitutionalization of the application of Islamic law. However, instead of meeting the demands of Muslims, the New Order emphasized

the need to depoliticize religious expressions. In this case, the New Order implemented a policy of party unification by reducing the number of political parties. With the exception of Golkar as a Government party, in 1973 the New Order forced 9 (nine) political parties to participate in the 1971 Election, namely Parmusi, PSSI, Perti, NU, PNI, Roman Catholic parties, IPKI, Parkindo, and Murba (Mahfud 2018, Mahfud 2018, 264) to merge into no more than two different groups.

The Reformation Era began by the fall of the New Order regime. It became a new momentum for Islamist groups to voice the demand for the return of seven words from the Jakarta Charter. It is an indication that the discourse on the formalization of Islamic law in Indonesia has strengthened (Ichwan 2003, 23-24). At the 2002 MPR session, for example, public figures from Islamic parties again voiced the issue of the application of Islamic Sharia in the country's base by urging the reintroduction of seven words from the Jakarta Charter, although it did not get adequate support. As illustrated by Mujiburrahman (2013, 146) the agreement of the founding fathers of this nation to create Pancasila the foundation of the country by removing the seven words of the Jakarta Charter cannot be interpreted as a form of secular group victory over the Islamists. Why? Because Indonesia neither is a secular country nor an Islamic state. However, the Islamists' disappointment at the agreement never stopped. Therefore they continue to strive for the return of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter.

The results of this research emphasize that although most ulama in Indonesia accept the democratic nation-state system, discourse against the nation-state system and democracy continues to resonate in various forms. Among the Muslim community itself, there is no agreement regarding the form and limitations of the application of Islamic law. A.M. Fatwa (2000), for example, states that there are at least 3 (three) forms of understanding among Muslims regarding the application of Islamic law. First, the application of Islamic Sharia is interpreted as an effort to create a new constitution that leads to the formation of an Islamic state. Second, the application of Islamic Sharia is interpreted by some Muslims as limited to efforts to make Islamic law as a supporter of the existing laws and regulations in Indonesia. Third, the application of Islamic law is interpreted by some Muslims as an effort to make Islamic law an integral part of the legal system in Indonesia. In this case, they think that Islamic law should be the main inspiration in the formation of the legal system in Indonesia, while other sources such as customary law or Western law are limited to supporting elements in the Indonesian legal system.

The failure of the discourse of the application of Islamic law at the national level did not dampen the spirit of the Islamist group to carry this discourse at the regional level. The granting of special

autonomy to the Aceh province by the application of Islamic law made the discourse of the Sharia Law more strongly echoed in several Indonesia. As noted by Bush (2008) in 2008 there were at least 52 regions that had implemented Sharia regulations. The data continues to increase, in which until 2017 there are at least 443 Sharia Regulations that are applied throughout Indonesia (Buehler 2017).

The research in Aceh showed the majority of ulama in Aceh agreed with the statement on the survey regarding the return of the Seven Words in the Jakarta Charter. When given the statement “Return 7 (seven) words in the first principle of Pancasila, “Belief in the one and only God, with the obligation to observe Islamic sharia for its adherents”, it is essential to better accommodate the rights of the majority,” 69.9 percent ulama accepted the statement with the details 36.6 percent who agreed and 33, 3 percent who strongly agreed. Meanwhile, only 6.6 percent of scholars disagreed with this statement, and none of them strongly disagreed (Ichwan 2019). However, the results also show another phenomenon, in which there is a paradoxical indication related to the acceptance of the ulama towards Pancasila, especially the principle of “Belief in the one and only God.” Most ulama believe that the first principle does not obscure Islamic faith. In general, they also hold that Pancasila does not conflict with Islam. However, on the other hand, they agreed to an alternative ideology that was considered better, which led to the replacement of the state ideology with an Islamic ideology. It can be seen from the response of the ulama to one of the statements in the survey, namely “There is no harm in Muslim leaders trying to find an alternative state ideology that is better than Pancasila.” Data shows that 50 percent of ulama in Aceh accept this statement, with the details of 40 percent who agree, and 10 percent who strongly agree (Ichwan 2019).

Besides Aceh, South Sulawesi is one of the regions in Indonesia with the most potent Islamism movement. The survey results show that the discourse of the application of Islamic Sharia in this region is among the most structured when compared to other regions in Indonesia, which is marked by the establishment of the Committee for the Preparation of Islamic Sharia Enforcement (KPPSI). The Committee successfully used structural channels to encourage the application of Islamic law in South Sulawesi (Ali 2011). The research shows that Makassar ulama who support KPPSI refuse to be associated with the Darul Islam movement, which openly seeks to uphold Islamic law through separation from the state by establishing an Islamic State. However, the existence of KPPSI led by the son of the DI-TII figure Kahar Muzakkar further raised growing concerns that the prospects for the emergence of the Islamism movement in South Sulawesi need to be supervised (Mujiburrahman 2013).

The success of KPPSI in promoting Islamism in South Sulawesi itself can be seen from the success of the formation of several Sharia Regulations that confirm that the strengthening of the Islamism movement in Makassar is real. The success of KPPSI in embracing almost all Islamic organizations and elements of society is proof that the narrative of Islamism in this region is quite strong. Several Makassar ulama who were involved in this study saw the re-entry of seven words from the Jakarta Charter in the first principle of Pancasila to be the key to the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia. Ulama B (male), for example, argues that the first principle with the addition of seven words can be an entry point for the implementation of Islamic law comprehensively, including the application of Islamic *Jinayat* laws as a substitute for the existing criminal law. For him, in the concept of a state, the highest and most important rule is God's law. In this case, he does not differentiate which areas of law must be prioritized for application, civil, or criminal law. Therefore in the context of the application of the law for theft, for example, according to ulama B, the law of cutting off hands must be applied as it should without being interpreted again. He believes the application of the law of cutting off the hand will provide an apparent high deterrent effect.

The discourse of returning the seven words of the Jakarta Charter itself according to most ulama who approve it should not be interpreted as a form of reduction of the principle of plurality in the Pancasila state. One ulama in Medan, NRA (woman), argued that the return of the seven words was only related to the Muslim community and had no impact on the non-Muslim community, so it should not be debated.

The same tendency arises in other regions, including in regions that do not formally apply the Sharia Law. The results of research in the city of Pontianak, for example, show that the desire of the ulama in the region to implement Islamic law is quite large. The presence of Islamic symbols in a stronger public space is one indication of this strong desire. Of the 30 (thirty) ulama in Pontianak who filled out the research questionnaire, there were 12 (twelve) ulama who agreed or strongly agreed with returning the seven words of the Jakarta Charter to the first principle of the Pancasila. However, some ulama did not openly show a consistent attitude regarding the enforcement of Islamic law in interviews. One of the ulama from the West Kalimantan MUI, for example, despite agreeing to return the seven words of the Jakarta Charter to the first principle of the Pancasila, he rejected the formalization of Islamic law in the constitution. For him, there is no need to formalize the application of Sharia, because Sharia can be applied without formalization by the State.

In A.M.'s perspective Fatwa (2000), as mentioned above, the views of these ulama reflect more perspectives that try to see the application of Islamic law interpreted as limited to efforts to make Islamic law as a supporter of existing laws and regulations in Indonesia, not as an effort to create a new constitution that leads to the formation of an Islamic state (Mujiburrahman 2013). They understand that formally returning the seven words to Pancasila is very difficult, in which they see that a more realistic effort is to encourage the state to approve the application of certain aspects of Islamic sharia in real life in society.

In the context of South Sulawesi, for example, this fact was realized by KPPSI leaders. They need strong political support at both the local and national levels in the context of implementing their political agenda. Therefore, pragmatic steps were seen taken by KPPSI leaders to get this support. Aziz Kahar, for example, felt the need to emphasize that KPPSI took a different path from his father, Kahar Muzakkar, in which he would not take the path of military force to implement Islamic Sharia in South Sulawesi (Mujiburrahman 2008). Islamist groups have also seen these pragmatic steps in almost all regions in Indonesia. As explained by Bush (2008) that discourse on the application of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia itself is not always identical with Islamic parties or Islamist groups. Many politicians from the secular party carry the platform of implementing Islamic law for a variety of reasons. Some of them see the discourse of implementing Islamic law as strategic enough to attract public sympathy (Bush 2008, 187; Mujiburrahman 2013, 166).

The same tendency, i.e., the return of seven words from the Jakarta Charter substantially in the form of the implementation of Sharia is fully visible in several other regions, such as in Bandung, Solo, Padang, Bogor, and Aceh. In some other regions, such as Jakarta, Bali, Kupang, Menado, and Surabaya, the trends are slightly different. Although some ulama emphasize the application of Sharia, they consider that Sharia has been implemented substantially in Indonesia. In Surabaya, for example, acceptance of a basic nation-state system or building can be said to be "almost" complete. Of all the ulama in Surabaya involved in the research, only one who mentioned the return of seven words in the first principle of Pancasila. In Jakarta, the discourse of returning the seven words in the first principle of Pancasila was mentioned by two ulama, in which they stated that the application of Sharia must be formalized and accommodated in legislation and recognized by the constitution. Other ulama want formal application in all areas of Islamic law without requiring the return of seven words in the first principle of the Pancasila (Nurlaelawati 2019; Muhrisun 2018).

### INSTITUTION OF SHARIA IN THE NATIONAL LAW SYSTEM

Due to the complicated history of the formulation of religious and state relations, Indonesia has accommodated several aspects of Islamic law. Islamic family law, for example, has long been adopted by the state with some adjustments and integration of state customs and interests. The enactment of Islamic economic law later followed the enactment of family law. In certain areas, such as Aceh, Sharia criminal law has even been adopted through the implementation of 3 (three) Criminal Qanuns, i.e., theft, alcohol, and seclusion; worship; setting morality, and others.

The formal and substantial application of Islamic law or Islamic law is a lengthy process pursued by Muslim intellectuals who disagree with the idea of establishing an Islamic state and the full implementation of Islamic law in the Suharto era. They consider that the realization of a just and prosperous state is prioritized in the enforcement of Sharia. They understand that Islam provides a set of ethical values to build political principles, such as justice (‘adl), deliberation (syūrā), and equality (musāwāh). They assume that the ideological foundation has reflected the substance of Islamic teachings (Bakri 1983). Even for them, Pancasila can be compared to the Medina Treaty, where both substantially recognize the relationship of religious values and state problems (Syadzali 1990).

With such a view, political reconciliation between the state and Islam took place,<sup>7</sup> which was indicated by a state agreement issuing several policies that emphasized Islamic interests.<sup>8</sup> The establishment of the ICMI (Association of Muslim Intellectuals in Indonesia) in 1990 under the leadership of B.J. Habibie, a new regulation on school curricula that recognizes the role of religious education at all levels of education, enacts the Religious Court Law No. 1 Year 1989 regarding legal procedures that must be applied in religious courts, and the enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Law through Presidential Decree No. 1/1991 concerning the Compilation of Islamic Law (the family field) is part of the results of the reconciliation.

Regarding family law, which was the earliest adopted law, the state realizes that Islamic family law is seen as a Muslim religious identity that must contain certainty. The lack of certainty of family law is believed to have an impact on the instability in the lives of Muslims, which in turn can damage national political stability. For this reason, the state considers that the demands of Muslims concerning

7 On the discussion of the council on the relationship between Islam and the State marked by tension and changing relations towards accommodation and harmony, see Dody Truna (1992).

8 Bachtiar Effendi groups the growth of State accommodation towards Islam into four types: (1) structural; (2) legislative; (3) infra-structural; and (4) cultural. See Effendi (2003, 303).

legislation relating to the legal status of Islamic families are essential to be accommodated. The step is not seen as an Islamization policy, but rather is a form of negotiation carried out by the state to be able to accommodate the vigorous demands of legal certainty on essential issues that develop in society. It is worth mentioning that some Muslim countries have codified Islamic law so that legal actions related to family matters can be considered legal if carried out following state regulations. For example, with the provisions of the country, a child born in a legal marriage can obtain legal status and can establish the civil rights of the child with his father, which includes various matters such as guardianship, inheritance, and provision of income.

The state policy as stated above confirms what Ziba Mir Hosseini, as quoted by Nurlaelawati (2010), stresses related to the reasons for the survival of Islamic family law during conditions in which laws in Muslim countries are originating from the West slowly replace post-colonization sharia. Ziba Mir-Hosseini's reasons are; First, Islamic family law is the most developed field of law compared to other fields of Islamic law; Second, in the modernization scheme, the colonial government well managed and arranged the differences between public and private areas, in which family law was left to the ulama because it was considered private and politically less important; Third, the government that is conducting modernization avoids confrontations with the ulama in relation to the application of Islamic family law (Nurlaelawati 2010). In Nurlaelawati's note (2010), Hosseini's view is in line with Muhammad Abduh's opinion regarding sharia justice. As quoted by Asad, Abduh views that the Sharia judges see very private issues and solve them carefully personal problems that cannot be heard widely and openly. For Abduh, continued Asad, Sharia courts must be independent of state control, but he also views that the court system is an integral part of the state and that the Sharia court - which is essentially a "family court" - is essential, because without it the community would be threatened by moral collapse (Asad 2001).

In addition to these legal policies, in 1991, the government also arranged school uniforms, which revised the hijab policy, and decided to allow Muslim girls to wear long skirts and headscarves for public schools, instead of short skirts and headcovers. , as stated in Decree (SK) No. 100 / C / Kep / D / 1991. Besides, the Minister of Religion and the Minister of the Interior also issued a joint decision regarding the Guidelines for Amil Zakat, Infaq, and Sadaqah (BAZIS) No. 29 and 47/1991. Despite these new decisions, the state does nothing more than supervising and guide the implementation of zakat. In this case, the new decisions do not deal with "zakat payments," which are the obligations of zakat payers (*muzakki*) but with "zakat arrangements." In subsequent developments, the government passed the Sharia

Banking Act in 1999, which led to the expansion of the authority of the Religious Courts in 2006 over cases of economic dispute carried out and promised under Islamic economic law.

Legal policies based on this Shari'a are issued and apply nationally. At the local level, several legal policies in sharia-based regional regulations are also issued based on the reasons for the welfare of the community in various fields as mandated in the provisions of regional autonomy. Aceh is a region that has specificities related to this. As mentioned above, there are three *Qanun* and many Sharia Regulations issued in Aceh. Related to *Qanun*, Aceh regulates that the consumption of alcohol, theft, and *khalwatare* criminal offenses, the sanction of which is criminal sanctions based on Islamic *jinayah* law.

Considering that the research emphasizes the concept of the nation-state and the perceptions of the ulama, some of the issues examined and highlighted are issues related to the concept of the nation-state. Several other issues were presented to see the relevance of the ulama's legal views regarding Islamic legal issues that intersect with the concept of the nation-state and Islamic legal issues in general. Three issues will be examined in this context, i.e., the issue of leadership, family issues (underage marriages and interfaith marriages), and morality primarily related to head-covering.

## NON-MUSLIM LEADERSHIP AND WOMEN

Pros and cons related to non-Muslim leadership in Indonesia is not a new discourse. Differences of opinion among ulama regarding the interpretation of QS. Al-Maidah (5): 51 is also a classic issue that has long been discussed. However, discussions related to the issue of non-Muslim leadership in Indonesia such as finding momentum in recent years, i.e., since 2016 along with the rise of cases of 'blasphemy' that hit the Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok. Although the fatwa issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) specifically related to the blasphemy case against Ahok for his remarks about QS. Al-Maidah (5): 51, but the fatwa is more often understood as a new reference about the unlawful leadership of non-Muslims in Indonesia. The attitude of rejection of non-Muslim leaders is becoming more open and stronger, not only among ordinary Muslims but also among ulama.

Therefore it is no exaggeration to say that the MUI fatwa related to Ahok has become one of the crucial factors that have encouraged the growth and strengthening of Islamism in Indonesia in recent years. As emphasized by Hosen (2017), the majority of ulama, both classical and modern, are of the view that there is no firm and strong argument regarding the ability of Muslims to choose non-Muslim leaders in Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah is one of the ulama who have a different view

from most ulama on this issue. Although he does not explicitly allow non-Muslim leaders, Ibn Taymiyyah did not make religion the most important condition and consideration in the selection of leaders but instead emphasized the conditions of justice. However, this view of Ibn Taimiyah was not made a significant reference among the majority of scholars in Indonesia (Hosen 2017).

The results of the research also underline the view of the majority of Indonesian ulama that religion is the main requirement and consideration in choosing a leader. Therefore, it is difficult to make the ulama's view of non-Muslim leadership an indicator of their style of Islamic law, because the perspective of religion as the primary condition of a leader is a general view of ulama in Indonesia, regardless of social, political background and affiliation their religion. However, the research shows that there are differences among the ulama in relation to their articulation of outlooks towards non-Muslim leadership. Ulama from regional areas in which Muslims constitutes the majority appear to be more articulate and open in expressing their rejection of non-Muslim leadership. Furthermore, the rejection of non-Muslim leaders is also interpreted as a prohibition for Muslims to obey a legitimate government if led by non-Muslims.

Some ulama in Solo who belong to radical groups, for example, emphasize that a government led by non-Muslim or who implement a un-Islamic system is not included in *Ulil Amri's* category, so it is not obligatory to be obeyed (Hasan 2019). The same thing was expressed by several ulama from Jakarta, such as AR (male) who clearly explained that the terms of religion (Islam) were the main conditions of a leader in Indonesia whose population was predominantly Muslim, including in regions of Indonesia with a majority non-population Muslim. For him, non-Muslim leadership must not occur in Indonesia from the lowest level to the highest level. Ahok's leadership, for example, was not, in his view, a leadership system that was under Islamic law. He bases his views on the word *aulyā'*, which is interpreted by the leader and asserts that a Muslim must take the leader who is Muslim with other conditions that must be considered (Nurlaelawati 2019).

Different outlooks are shown by ulama from majority non-Muslim regions, such as Bali, Kupang, Ambon, and Manado, in which they appear to be more accommodating towards non-Muslim leaders. Nevertheless, in principle, the accommodative attitude of the ulama cannot be interpreted as a form of acceptance. One ulama from the Islamic party in Kupang, for example, thinks Muslim leaders are essential in Indonesia in which the majority of the population is Muslim. However, the condition of Muslims as a minority in Kupang encouraged him to be realistic by expressing his opinion about leadership that might be against the platform of his political party. In

one statement, the ulama emphasized that the views of the majority of Indonesian Muslims would not be much different from those of non-Muslims in Rome. He saw that the people of Rome would not be willing either if the leader were a Muslim. That, according to him, because in Islam the leader does not only carry out the leadership of one cabinet or one country but also has other diverse functions, such as the state function, security, and protection function, including protection of Aqidah. Thus, according to him, it is no surprise if Indonesia wants a Muslim leader. As it is also not surprising that Italians understand the figure of a leader they need is a figure of the same faith (Ro'fah 2019).

Concerns about discrimination and the marginalization of the interests of Muslims are the concern of most ulama in addressing non-Muslim leaders. The ulama in Palangkaraya, for example, accepted non-Muslim leaders, but their acceptance did not dispel anxiety and suspicion that non-Muslim leaders had the potential to prioritize the interests of their religious groups over those of the Muslim community (Kailani 2019). This suspicion is stronger among ulama from non-Muslim majority areas, as seen from the opinion of one of the ulama in Manado, AR (male), in which he mentioned that the concern of Indonesian Muslims arises because in history there has never been a country in which a minority leads the majority. According to him, in theory, this might be possible, but in practice, it would be challenging to expect minority leaders to be able to do justice to the majority community (Kailani 2019).

Regarding women's leadership discourse, there are no new issues that have not been discussed before. In general, this research clearly shows that the views of ulama on the position of Islamic law in the Indonesian legal system have a significant correlation with their views on women's leadership. In this case, ulama who accept the constitutional system tend to have a progressive look of women's leadership. Ulama who support the formalization of Islamic law, on the other hand, tend to reject the concept of female leadership. For example, an ulama in Pontianak said that leaders must be male-only applies to the political system of the *Khilāfab* or *Imāmab*. Therefore, it is not relevant to the Indonesian context because this country does not adhere to the *Khilāfab* or *Imāmab* system (Sunarwoto 2019).

The results of this study indicate that in general, ulama in Indonesia accept the concept of female leadership. However, the attitude of rejection of female leaders continues to emerge for a variety of reasons, especially regarding the breadth of scope of leadership allowed for women. Some ulama accept the concept of female leadership in certain aspects and domains, but they reject female leaders in other domains. Some others accept the concept of women's leadership by

presenting certain conditions (conditional acceptance). The reasons for rejecting women leaders are generally the same, i.e., referring to the Qur'anic verse about the provision that men are *qawwāmun* ('*alā' n-nisā'*). Although most ulama interpret that the concept of men as *qawwāmun* is in the context of religious and household leadership, not in an institutional or government setting, so it should not be applied to obstruct the role of women as leaders.

In the Aceh context, for example, the results of the research show that data is quite reliable in which the majority of ulama (80 percent) view that democratically elected women leaders must be obeyed. The percentage is seen as quite convincing in the Aceh context, but as stated by Ichwan (2019) it can also be interpreted as a shift towards a deterioration concerning the historical reality that Aceh was once led by 4 (four) Sultanahs (Ichwan 2019; Khan 2017). Even some of the most influential ulama in Aceh openly forbade female leaders. The same phenomenon is seen in the data in almost all cities, which are the focus of the research.

It is undeniable that there are still ulama who forbid female leadership in all contexts and domains. For example, an ulama in Jakarta made an analogy that the provision of men as *qawwāmun* ('*alā' n-nisā'*) shows that 'if you have a small family, women cannot be the imam/leader, let alone become a leader for the the country' (Nurlaelawati 2019). Conditional acceptance is seen as the most dominant among ulama related to the concept of women's leadership, in which women, in general, are allowed to be leaders, but at the same time, the ulama set certain restrictions and conditions are. Some ulama accept women as leaders, but with the condition that they do not occupy the country's leadership position. Meanwhile, others limit women's leadership to administrative positions in a country, but not in the context of religious authority, such as being *qādhī* (Sunarwoto 2019).

Among ulama who accept the concept of female leadership, the terms and conditions given are more on the aspects of skills and competencies. The agreed concept of women leaders, in this case, is not solely related to the issue of gender equality. However, it is because the concept of equality is considered already settled, men and women have the same position and rights, both of which must demonstrate their skills and competencies if they are to become leaders. The views of one female ulama in Padang (Ulinuha 2019), for example, clearly confirm this. She views that women can become leaders if they meet the criteria. For her that in a democratic country, not an Islamic state, all citizens have the same rights regardless of gender differences. She gave an example of Sri Mulyani's leadership in the financial sector. In her statement, she was a leader because she had competence in managing

and solving financial problems. In this case, she further views that Sri Mulyani could become a leader at a higher level, like the position of a president, solely because of her competence.

In Makassar, the results of the research are in contrast compared to other cities. The issue of women's leadership does not appear as a significant issue to be discussed. Survey and interview data do not indicate discriminatory attitudes among ulama towards the role of women in the social and political spheres. However, discriminatory indications among ulama towards the role of women appear in the context of women's participation in religious life in society, more specifically their role as leaders in religious activities. Data from the interviews illustrate the emergence of new, more rigid restrictions on women's access and role as ulama or religious leaders in Makassar society. Three informants in this research looked at the issue of limiting access and the role of female ulama to be taken seriously. An ulama named Z (woman), for example, firmly stated that in her place of residence, there was a significant shift in the position of women as religious leaders. She found that it was increasingly difficult for women to carry out activities such as lecturing at mosques and attending public Quran recitations.

Furthermore, she had long been registered as a regular lecturer in several mosques in her area. Her role and involvement as a preacher for male worshippers also have never been an issue in question. However, in recent years, there have been attempts to limit her role as a preacher. For example, she was not allowed to use a loudspeaker, and had to speak behind a curtain when speaking in front of male worshippers. Furthermore, the emergence of women's role constraints is allegedly related to the shift in the management structure in several mosques in Makassar, where they were affiliated with certain Islamic organizations that apply more rigid restrictions regarding the role of women in the public sphere. So far, based on the data, there has not yet been a form of a strict ban on women in Makassar, but indications in that direction are very likely to occur in the future (Muhrisun 2019).

So far there is not enough data to explain the factors that cause women's roles as religious leaders in Makassar to be more questioned than their roles in other fields, including their role in the political sphere. However, this condition implies that religious authority among the people of Makassar is paramount. In this case, being a figure who has authority and theological legitimacy can be more important for the people of Makassar than a position as a leader who merely has political and territorial authority. In reality, the term *Gurutta* itself is not commonly given to female ulemas in South Sulawesi, regardless of the capacity and competence of the female ulama. As far as searching for researchers, there is only one female figure who is called *Gurutta*,

namely Siti Aminah Adnan from As'adiyah Islamic Boarding School. However, the Gurutta call to Siti Aminah Adnan itself, as explained by Halim (2015, 235), was only limited among her students not by the wider community (Muhrisun 2019).

### CHILD MARRIAGE AND INTERFAITH MARRIAGE

The ulama's conservative attitude on some of the issues above is parallel with their attitude related to other sharia issues in general, such as in family law issues. In Jakarta, for example, the case of underage marriage of a teenager named Alvin, the son of a famous preacher, Arifin Ilham, was supported by ulama. It shows their tendency not to accept modernity and changes in the interpretation of Islamic family law. For some ulama, further Alvin is seen as a role model that must be followed in order to avoid immorality and the application of sharia. They consider what Alvin did was far more beneficial than what other young men who put off marriage in immorality. Ustazah Oki Setiana Dewi, for example, gave Alvin appreciation and considered Alvin's marriage as an excellent example in the current era. Ustaz Arifin Ilham, Alvin's father, even assessed Alvin's marriage as a breakthrough in the era of adultery and was expected to be followed by other young men to avoid adultery. The same appreciation was given by Ustadh Yusuf Mansur, who considered Alvin's marriage was under Islamic law (Nurlaelawati 2019).

Interestingly, this view seems to be supported by justice enforcers. Judges tend to grant adolescent marriage dispensation requests like Alvin as a common reason for the application of marriage dispensation to be granted the conviction of the judges, who emphasize the avoidance of adultery by adolescents such as Alvin without considering the age of their maturity. In Alvin's case, the judges who examined the petition case believed that Alvin would not fall into immorality, but they are worried that it would tarnish his father's ulama status. Another reason in Alvin's case is that Alvin's future wife is a *mu'allaf* and there might be a possibility she would return to her original religion if her marriage to Alvin is not immediately held (Nurlaelawati 2019; Angga 2018).

The reason for the attempt to avoid adultery in granting a marriage license is indeed the reason most frequently cited by the judges. In many studies, dispensation applicants mostly present this reason. Another reason found in many requests for marriage dispensation is the reason for pregnancy as a result of adultery. In this case, the judges emphasized the importance of religious protection. Aspects that must be protected in the determination of sharia (*maqāshid al-syarīah*) should include other aspects of protection besides the protection against religion, such as life protection, in which such protection can be best achieved if underage marriage is not carried out since it has health risks.

The tendency of understanding and practice is realized by activists of children's rights and modern-thinking ulama and put their minds about the benefits in the long term, including women ulama who are embodied in the Indonesian Women's Ulema Congress (KUPI). Through the first international conference, KUPI examined the issue of underage marriage and put forward progressive views and recommendations for overcoming it. Nyai Badriyah Fayumi said that without abandoning the basis of Islamic law, she hoped that KUPI would be able to convince the government to make changes to the minimum age requirement for marriage, which despite the submission of requests for amendment through judicial review had not shown results.<sup>9</sup>

Related to the issue of interfaith marriages, the marriage law in Indonesia does not open a gap for the practice of interfaith marriages. The prohibition of interfaith marriages is further emphasized in Inpres No. 1/1991 on the Compilation of Islamic Law (KHI), which emphasized that it is unlawful for Muslims, both men, and women, to marry non-Muslims (Nurlaelawati 2010). Provisions for the prohibition of interfaith marriages were even reiterated by the fatwa of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued in 2005. The basis on which to base the prohibition of marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims includes the theorem of the Surah Al-Baqarah (2): 221, Al-Mumtahanah (60): 10, and Al-Maidah (5): 5. The history that Umar bin Khattab decided to divorce his two wives because they were non-Muslims was seen as a firm basis for prohibiting interfaith marriages for Muslims (Ghazali 2012).

Regarding the prohibition of Muslims marrying non-Muslims themselves there are differences of opinion among fiqh ulama (Eid 2005, 46-7). Regarding QS. Al-Maidah (5): 5-6, some ulama argue that the prohibition of Muslims to marry non-Muslims applies only to women, but not to men. Men are allowed to marry non-Muslim women (Eid, 2005: 46). The fact that QS. Al-Maidah (5): 5-6 came down later after Surah Al-Baqarah (2): 221 and Al-Mumtahanah (60): 10 were used as reasons by some ulama that the ban was no longer valid (Ghazali 2012).

In the Indonesian context, the absence of loopholes in the law in Indonesia for interfaith marriages has forced some interfaith couples to take several alternative paths. The usual step is the process of converting by one partner to legalize their marriage. Another step that is also often done is to get married in another country that accommodates interfaith marriages; then the couple records their marriages in Indonesia. Therefore there are strong indications that even though interfaith marriages are not formally permitted, they are still carried out by various alternative methods. Because in reality many couples convert to legalize their marriages administratively, but

9 Interview with Nyai Badriyah Fayumi, Pondok Gede, October 2019.

they do not convert because the conversion process is taken solely as an alternative strategy to avoid administrative obstacles to their marriage (Afandi 2015).

This research does not specifically highlight interfaith marriages in Indonesia. However, the issue of the practice of interfaith marriages was mentioned during the interview with ulama in various regions. In general, ulama involved in this research forbid interfaith marriages. However, there are some differences in their perceptions about the practice of interfaith marriages. One of the ulama in Makassar, SA (male), saw the practice of interfaith marriages as part of a conspiracy theory of apostasy among Muslims. He understands that the practice is part of the preaching of non-Muslims, in addition to other ways that are commonly found, such as giving donations, health assistance (Muhrisun 2019). He further revealed that interfaith marriages are rife in the current era and occur not only among artists as exposed in the media. According to him, interfaith marriages among artists can be easily identified because they are reported in the media. In reality, as is believed by SA ulama, the practice of interfaith marriages is also prevalent among the general public.

The results show that in some areas in which Muslims are a minority population, such as in Kupang, the practice of interfaith marriages is actually common and widely practiced, especially in some districts which are seen as pockets of the Muslim population in East Nusa Tenggara, namely Flores, Alor and Ende (Hutagalung 2016). The scholars in Kupang themselves are of the same view as most scholars in Indonesia who view interfaith marriages for Muslims as haram. Furthermore, some scholars even view Muslims who marry non-Muslims as practicing adultery because their marriage is illegitimate (Hutagalung 2016, 64; Ro'fah 2019).

It is undeniable that many issues and problems are recorded among married couples of different religions in Kupang, one of which is triggered by the couple's disagreement regarding the religion of their children. However, one of the fascinating things related to the practice of interfaith marriages among Muslims in Kupang that may not be found in other regions is the fact that tolerance and influential kinship factors are essential pillars for the resilience of married couples of different religions. In Ro'fah's research (2019), the practice of conversion has always existed in the practice of interfaith marriages in Kupang, because of administrative demands as explained above. However, the data shows that the conversion carried out by different religious couples in Kupang, both Muslim and Christian, does not seem to damage the kinship and kinship relations on both sides. Furthermore, this can be understood as a form of tolerance that is built not because of faith or ideology but the element of kinship (Ro'fah 2019).

### MORALITY, CULTURE, AND WOMEN'S PRIVATE PARTS

The way of some ulama's views on the status of women is influenced by bias view that the position of women must be below men, and women are the source of the nation's destruction. Some ulama think that women with their private parts are a source of disobedience, and therefore they must cover their bodies properly. The use of the veil, or even the hijab, is a way for women to try to resist disobedience. This situation is the reason the ulama group strongly opposes the actions and policies to ban the use of the hijab in several educational institutions as is the polemic occurred over the policy of prohibiting the use of hijab that was once issued by the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.

A guest speaker, for example, said that the act of prohibiting the hijab at UIN Sunan Kalijaga should be brought into the realm of law because, for him, it had deviated from the Islamic Sharia and restricted Muslim freedom to practice its teachings and beliefs. In his view, this action was an odd and difficult one to accept. He questioned the attitude of university leaders who questioned the use of the hijab by female students, while they let other female students wear minimal clothing. For him, this indicates the impartiality of educational institutions and the government over the practice of sharia (Nurlaelawati 2019). However, the results of this research indicate that the majority of ulama have a reasonably moderate view regarding the issue of head covering. Although they consider that hair is considered as aurat (private parts) and must be covered, these ulama consider that wearing a hijab in accordance with fashion and condition is considered relevant. For them, the use of the veil is an excessive attitude in understanding the provisions of genital closure.

The use of hijab is also an interesting issue in Bali. However, if in other areas, such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta, the issue that is being debated is the use of hijab that extends to face covering, in Bali the issue is more related to the culture of using traditional Balinese clothing. According to Suhadi (2019), the strengthening of the Balinese Ajeg movement which had entered into the political sphere and became a local cultural policy, in turn, demanded Muslims in Bali to negotiate with the situation. An example of a cultural policy that is clearly seen in Bali is the issuance of Governor Regulation No. 79 of 2018 concerning "Day of Use of Balinese Traditional Clothing." The Governor Regulation stipulates that on Thursday and certain days (full moon, *tilem*, and the anniversary of Bali province) all employees in government institutions, teachers, education personnel and students are required to use traditional Balinese attire. Suhadi revealed (2019), the purpose of the Balinese traditional dress policy was to "recognize

the aesthetic, ethical, moral, and spiritual values embodied in Balinese culture” (Article 3c). Quoted Suhadi, the Pergub also regulates in detail the provisions on the use of traditional Balinese clothing for both men and women, in which men wear headgear “*destar(udeng)*” and women are allowed to leave their hair open with “a neat hairdo” (Article 4).

Some ulama in Bali has a moderate view related to the provisions of traditional clothing set out in the Governor’s Regulation. They understand that the policy was made to maintain the Balinese religion, culture, and language amid the onslaught of globalization through tourist flows and at the same time also become a bastion against the flow of Muslim immigrants that are increasingly striking in Bali (Suhadi 2019). However, the regulation text related to traditional Balinese attire opens a space for respect for the non-Hindu Balinese minority, although it is less explicit. In Suhadi’s notes, article 8 of the Governor’s Regulation contains rules on exceptions intended for workers who are freed from the obligations of traditional Balinese clothing for “religious reasons.”

Several informants of this research are aware of the existence of the Regulation of the Governor of Balinese and Muslims know that the regulation is part of cultural politics that favor the dominant culture of Hinduism; they accept it but continue their negotiation efforts. It should be noted that at the time of this research, the Governor’s Regulation had just been issued by the government and was a subject of discussion among education practitioners in Islamic educational institutions. Based on their presentation, male students followed the provisions of the Governor’s Regulation, while female students used the kebaya (top) and kamen (bottom), while still wearing the hijab (headgear). Responding to things like this, an informant explained about what he considered to be a principle in Islam that “clothing is not an act of worship,” and there are no provisions regarding its form in detail. For him and other ulama, women must cover their nakedness or wear headscarves, and of course by following government policy. The conclusion is that for them, the tolerance of Muslims to use Balinese (Hindu) traditional clothing is part of their survival strategy amid the dominant culture and the resurgence of Bali’s steady identity politics.

## ISLAMIC LAW DISCOURSE IN NEW MEDIA

The role of the media becomes a matter of concern regarding the strengthening of conservatism and radicalism in Indonesia. Indonesia and the rest of the world, in general, use media in most aspects of life, including in the discourse of religious life. The insistence of Islamism that is carried out by conservatives and radicals, for example, is often triggered by the rampant and rapid information related to morality and the nation’s problems. When compared with cases in other cities,

the active role of the media is changing the patterns, and religious views, and it is mostly seen in Jakarta. The results of interviews with three ulama informants in Jakarta, for example, are clearly illustrated that the media influenced their perspectives regarding nationality. They, for example, say that information about terror events through the media in several countries and places that corner Islam makes it necessary for them to clarify that terrorism is not Islamic teaching and it is impossible for Muslims to do that. For that, they then agreed on conspiracy theories developed to defend Islam. Television, internet, and other media are essential for da'wah and understanding that Islam is being cornered. It prompted the ulama to offer radical-sounding views regarding Muslim relations with non-Muslims often. Thus, some studies reveal that the media plays a useful role in transforming Muslims into radicals and in the transfer of ideas of religious radicalism. Winarni, for example, mentions that:

Basically, Indonesia is a moderate Islamic country and it is difficult for radicalism to develop in this country. But that does not mean Indonesia is not spared as a target for them, especially the younger generation. Whatever it is, the mass media has moral and social responsibility towards the public, although on the other hand the news does benefit these movements as a form of free propaganda (Winarni 2014).

The following note is similar to what was expressed by Fealy:

The importance of the internet as a tool for the transmission and dissemination of ideas is especially strong among Indonesian Salafi groups. Apart from their typical social conservatism, Salafi groups use the internet because the media offers the opportunity to create a generic (deculturated) Islamic identity by giving birth to the sites of [www.salafi.net](http://www.salafi.net) (Fealy 2008).

Regarding this matter, it is no exaggeration to conclude that the face of Islamic law in the present and the future will also be determined by the dynamics and development of the media, especially to how the ulama have responded and used it. Thus, our previous research about the observation of Islamic law and the role of the ulama have emphasized this. Observing the contents of religious lectures that often touch the issue of Islamic law, our research on Islamic family law and its socialization through the media by lecturers revealed that lecturers tend to refer to conservative *fiqh* views. They also do not refer to Islamic family law provided and initiated by the state, although in some cases their views are in line with the provisions made by the state. Mamah Dede, a famous female preacher who often appears on television screens, for example, often only mentions that specific issues are regulated without any explanation of the term Islamic law used i.e., which Islamic law is being referred to.

Interestingly, religious views that are often not in line with state regulations can also be seen and observed in television programs,

such as drama, film, and others. The film titled *'Talak Tiga,'* (Triple Divorce) for example, in one of its scenes, displays *Talak* (the demand of divorce) that a husband dropped on his wife who demanded it three times at once and was then authorized by the judge by tapping his hammer at the trial of the Religious Court. This scene and dialogue are not in line with the state-style divorce law, which does not recognize divorce as well as the three times-demand for divorce.

## CONCLUSION

From the discussion above, several things need to be underlined. First, there is a strong tendency among ulama to formalize Sharia in almost all regions in Indonesia. This tendency is strongly influenced by transnational thought and movement and not by the dynamics of thought in the local context. The style of Islamic law whose formalization is supported by the state is Islamic law which tends to be conservative, strongly emphasizing the interests of religious protection. The debate related to changes in some provisions of Islamic law on family law and criminal law issues reinforces this matter. Islamic law accommodated by the state strictly regulates the practice of underage marriages, but in reality, the ulama can stick to their beliefs that are different from state provisions. They understand that underage marriages can and should even be permitted in order to protect couples from acts that violate religious morality.

*Secondly*, the patterns and forms of thinking of the ulama regarding Islamic legal issues are not as relevant to the categorization of the ulama based on the background of social, political, and religious affiliation as was done by most previous studies — the influence of transnational thinking more influences the patterns that emerge. Thus, the barriers and features of Islamic law in all groups of ulama from various backgrounds related to Islamic law are no longer visible. The influence of this national thinking synergizes with the political element, which then gives a powerful influence in the debate on Islamic law in Indonesia today.

*Third*, the influence of transnational and political thought on Islamic law in some regions such as Jakarta. They are supported by the media and also used by the ulama to socialize their understanding and views. The ulama, considered as religious experts in all fields, often conveys their legal views which are often not based on a comprehensive understanding of the provisions of state law or their understanding of the diversity of views of the ulama in *fiqh*. With the trend of increasingly widespread use of media among ulama (while their understanding of Islamic law tends to be conservative), the face of Islamic law in Indonesia in the future is predicted to be more dominated by conservative Islamic legal design. Thus, media enthusiasts absorbed the content without going through critical discussion and in-depth study.

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## **AMAR MA'RUF NAHI MUNKAR AND THE POLITICS OF ORTHODOXY OF ULAMA**

*Munirul Ikhwan & Mohammad Yunus*

The democratization that developed in the Reformation era, as Masdar Hilmy (2010) observed, participated in facilitating the development of Islamism in Indonesia. Islamist groups took the opportunity of freedom provided by democracy to organize and consolidate their power to reach the public stage, play the drama of Islamic heroism (Hasan 2008) and maneuver for Islamist goals which are often counterproductive to democratic principles. The “Islamic solution to all things” jargon places Islam at the center of religious-political discourse and seeks to associate secular systems and other ‘non-Islamic’ systems that are hegemonic in the Islamic world as *jabiliyyah* systems. By Islamists, the secular system hegemony in the Muslim world is considered as a *gbazwu’ l-fikr* (war of thought) strategy waged by Islamic ‘enemies’ to subdue Muslim power (Muhtadi 2008, 159-60).

Although Islamist groups are relatively smaller than the mainstream Indonesian Islamic groups, the Islamic discourse they offer can be an essential part of public religious discourse, especially in urban Muslim societies. Discourses such as Islam *kafah* (totality), *hijrah* (moving),<sup>10</sup> *gbazwu’ l-fikr* (war of thought) and Shari’ahition have inspired some Muslim societies not only in their daily religious practices but also in channeling their political aspirations. These discourses need to be understood not only as an Islamist strategy to affirm Islamist identity that has been marginalized in political structures and national narratives but also as an attempt to set new standards and definitions of what systems the state must adopt and what defines as a good citizen.

10 10 The discourse of Hijrah is one of the most popular discourses among urban Muslims, especially the younger generation of Muslims who feel frustrated with materialist and liberal lifestyles. The doctrine of Hijrah invites and leads them to follow a lifestyle that is ‘more meaningful,’ rewarding, and showing the way of salvation (heaven). The presence of Islamist literature further facilitates the spread of Hijrah discourse and other jargon of Islamism among Muslim societies which generally have a higher reading tradition but with a relatively minimal background of religious traditions. See Ikhwan (2018).

This chapter tries to identify the reasoning of Indonesian ulama in responding to the social and political dynamics after the fall of the New Order government. To that end, this paper analyzes the responses, arguments, and positions of the ulama towards the nation-state to uncover the principles that underlie the ulama in accepting or rejecting the idea and encourage them to carry out religious, political action. While some Islamic ulama often associate the ulama's reasoning with the realization of the *maslahab dictum* (Zaman 2004), this paper looks at the logic of the ulama's thinking and action from a more basic dictum, i.e., *al-amr bi 'l-ma'rūf wa' l-nahi 'an al-munkar* (to order benevolence and forbid *munkar*; then it was revised to "*amar makruf nahi munkar*"). Although ulama agree that this dictum is rooted in the Qur'an (Qur'an 3: 104, 110), but they cannot be interpreted one word at a time, what is "*makruf*" and what is "*munkar*", who has the right to perform that function, and how to do it (Bayat 2013, 4–5).

This chapter begins with the formulation of *amar makruf nahi munkar* in the classical Islamic discourse before entering into the discussion of how this dictum is used by ulama to justify their responses and actions in the context of the nation-state in Indonesia to enrich discussion and mapping. This paper emphasizes that *amar makruf nahi munkar* became the basic principle of ulama in conducting orthodoxy politics in the context of the democratization of Islamic religious authority. Furthermore, the political direction of orthodoxy is not only shaped by the conceptualization of the ulama about the *amar makruf nahi munkar* itself, but also the position of the ulama towards the existing power system.

### THE POSITION OF AMAR MAKRUf NAHI MUNKAR IN RELIGION

Pre-Islamic Arab societies were familiar with the concepts of *al-ma'rūf* (known) and *al-munkar* (rejected) before Islam adopted the two concepts and harmonized them with Islamic values. In the context of Arab society, *makruf* is "something already known." The understanding can be traced from its etymological meaning. Toshihiko Izutsu (2002, 213) explains that the word *al-ma'rūf* in this context is something that is known as something worthy of its existence and therefore is considered as something good. Thus, something *ma'rūf* is something that is considered as not threatening to the Arab community.

Conversely, as the literal meaning, *al-munkar* is something that is undesirable because it is considered as a strange thing. The strange feeling towards something, in turn, becomes the reason why it is considered as something inappropriate and rejected. These two meanings are meanings absorbed by Islam when used in the context of *amar makruf and nahi munkar*. The process of appropriation is

based on the provisions contained in sharia. What is permitted by sharia is *makruf*, while what is *forbidden* is *munkar*.

To understand the position of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* in Islam, an examination of Islamic canonical sources becomes a necessity. QS. Ali Imran (3): 104 says, “*Let there be among you a group of people who call for virtue, command the good and prevent the evil, they are the lucky ones.*”

Michael Cook (2004, 15) considers that there are three characters in the Qur’an when talking about *amar ma’ruf nabi munkar*. *First*, the word *al-ma’rūf* is mentioned several times in the Qur’an, but does not necessarily contain formal legal meaning, sometimes even having the equivalent meaning with the word *ihsān*, which means virtuous. *Second*, inviting and banning in this context is always associated with standard ethical terms. *Third*, the word to invite to do good deeds always deals with topics such as conducting prayers, paying zakat, trusting in God, obeying God and His messengers. In other languages, the third point confirms that inviting to do good deeds is only associated with some instances. Cook’s analysis above shows one interesting point that the Qur’an does not speak in detail about the concept of *amar makruf nabi munkar*.

In the prophetic tradition, the most detailed hadith of the Prophet SAW addresses the problem of *amar makruf nabi munkar* is the hadith narrated by Abu Sa’id al-Khudhri (m. 74/693) as follows:

“I have heard Rasulullah SAW said,” Whoever among you sees iniquity, let him change it with his hands; if he is unable, then with his tongue; and if he is incapable, then with his heart, and that is the weak of faith”(al-Nawawi 2007, 25).

The above hadith is used to legitimize *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* as obligations that cannot be abandoned. Furthermore, based on this tradition, *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* are often understood as half of Islam. Najm al-Din al-Thufi (m. 716 H / 1318 AD), an *ushul* expert in *fiqh* from the Hanbali school of thought (*madzhab*), tries to construct an argument about the position of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* as follows:

“This hadith should be half of the Islamic sharia because sharia is sometimes a virtue (read: *makruf*) that is ordered to be done, and there are times when *munkar* must be shunned. The hadith becomes sharia in this sense” (al-Thufi 1998, 292).

Al-Thufi’s explanation above actually does not only talk about the position of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* which occupy half the religion. On the contrary, the explanation illustrates that the obligation (read: *amar makruf nabi munkar*) based on the above

hadith occupies the entirety of Islamic sharia. Al-Thufi even added another narration that the Prophet said after the above hadith, “after that there is no grain of faith at all” (al-Thufi 1998, 291). It shows that *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* are “the whole of Islam” —both as a creed and as sharia.

Taqi al-Din ibn Taimiyah (m. 728/1328) argues differently that *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* constitute one third of religion. For him, the Qur’an contains three things: monotheism, commands (read: *amar makruf*, including *nabi munkar* in them), and stories (read: about previous people; Ibn Taymiyah 1976, 9). If monotheism is a third of the Qur’an, then *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* are another third.

Meanwhile, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (m. 505/1111) views that *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* are obligations based on the Qur’an, hadith, logic, and the agreement of the ulama since the time of the companions. In fact, for this figure dubbed the *hujat al-Islām* (Islamic argument), *amar makruf nabi munkar* is the subject of the great teachings of Islam, the main task carried by the prophets. If this obligation is not carried out by the prophets, then prophecy loses its importance so that it is no longer needed (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 302-03).

Several views and explanations of the above ulama indicate the critical position of *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* in Islam. This dictum is present not only as a result of *ijtihad* by its ulama; it is part of the prophetic revelation and experience.

## AMAR MAKRUF NAHI MUNKAR AS A POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE OF ULAMA

The ulama’s conceptualization of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* have made the dictum an arena of knowledge political contestation among the ulama. The politics of knowledge referred to here is the ulama’s strategy to conceptualize religious knowledge, which is used to prove its authority (Safi 2006). As a politics of knowledge, *amar makruf* is a key concept that has been debated by the ulama to claim the legitimacy of the ulama’s authority. On the other hand, the politics of knowledge is also a strategy to assert an orthodoxy of knowledge. Through this kind mechanism, the contestation of the conceptualization of *amar makruf nabi munkar* in classical Islam is an essential factor for the possible orthodoxy of specific knowledge.

*Amar makruf nabi munkar* as a politics of knowledge can be seen, for example, from al-Ghazali’s conceptualization. In the Sunni Islamic discourse, al-Ghazali’s position is quite central. As a leading ulama during the heyday of the Seljuq Dynasty, al-Ghazali was trusted by the Prime Minister Nizham al-Mulk (m. 1092 M) to explain religious teachings in depth. The Nizham al-Mulk period is considered a period of maturity of Islamic sciences, which is still felt today. Currently,

Sunni Islam is the official teaching of Islam by the state. In this context, al-Ghazali has an essential role in the crystallization process of Sunni Islamic orthodoxy through the conception of religious knowledge. In this case, the concept of *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* is a strategic concept to strengthen Sunni orthodoxy (Safi 2006).

*Amar makruf nahi munkar* becomes an essential concept in the politics of knowledge and Islamic orthodoxy because this obligation involves not only practical problems in the public sphere but also theological issues. Through this obligation, all theological concepts that are different from Sunni Islam are considered as false theology. Al-Ghazali is among those who are committed to these goals. His book entitled *Fadhb al-Bathiniyyah* (Heresy of the Bathiniyah Group) is an attempt to heterodox the Shi'ah understanding because it is considered incompatible with the Sunni Islamic paradigm. He wrote a book about his views regarding the heresy of theological sects (read: including philosophy) in addition to Sunnis in his autobiography titled *Al-Munqidz min al-Dhalal*. The books can be read in accordance to *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* because it is done in order to give an idea of how true and how wrong Islam is.

The book *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* is an attempt by al-Ghazali to conceptualize *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* systematically. In this book, al-Ghazali does not use the terms *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar*, but rather a sermon that can be interpreted merely as "censorship." With this term, Al-Ghazali seeks to summarize all the scope of concepts and practices of *amar makruf nahi munkar* that exist in Islam as a form of formal normalization of the *ḥisbab*. This effort eventually involved the authorities to realize it. Patronation between ulama and ruler appears in *amar makruf nahi munkar* as a politics of knowledge.

On the other hand, as a politics of knowledge, *amar makruf* appears in a different form - as demonstrated by the views of Ibn Taymiyyah (m. 728/1328). As a hadith expert, he understands the obligation of *amar makruf nahi munkar* as an integral part of Islam (Ibn Taymiyyah 1976). Furthermore, this figure, who became a figure of purificative reforms tried to explain the concept of *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* by basing on the verses of the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet.

As a person who was never willing to accept the official religious position of the Muslim rulers of his time, Ibn Taymiyyah became a critical ulama from outside the circle of power (al-Matroudi 2006). His critical attitude towards the rulers is part of his efforts to implement the *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar*. Furthermore, his critical attitude was also shown to the ulama whom he considered to have committed deviation of what was done literally by the Salaf generation. Although

Ibn Taymiyyah lived in the classical era of relatively late Islam (read: living in the 8th century Hijri / 14th AD), he was considered an ulama who purified Islam and inspired the emergence of the Islamism movement in the days afterward (Hasan 2008).

Ibn Taymiyyah is a person who believes that amar makruf is an obligation that must be carried out by *ulil amri* (Arabic: *ulū' l-amr or waliyyu 'l-amr*), with the interpretation that the ulama is the figure that best represents the word. He said, "*Ulil Amri*, i.e., the ulama from each group, its rulers, and their parents, must make *amar makruf and nabi munkar* to common people based on what was ordered by Allah and the Rasul's" (Ibnu Taimiyah 1976, 15). Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah placed the ulama in the highest position in the *ulil amri* hierarchy, above the authorities and other socio-political figures.

The classification of authority holders amar makruf and nahi munkar's obligations in the above gradations show Ibnu Taimiyah's position as an ulama above the rulers and elders of Muslim groups. Presumably, this awareness was the main reason for him to be reluctant to compromise with the rulers during their lifetime because he saw that the Muslim rulers committed a renege that he had to oppose. That is why it is not surprising that in his lifetime, Ibn Taymiyyah often opposed the authorities and had to experience life in prison. It can be said his life is often spent from prison to prison.

Hard and isolated life, made Ibn Taymiyyah did not have much time to do an in-depth study of his views on the teachings of Islam - including in it the concept of amar makruf and nahi munkar. His view came only from the verses of the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet with few simple interpretations. That can be seen in his book, *Al-Amr bi al-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahy 'an al-Munkar*. The book is a treatise that he specializes in talking about the concept of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar*. As a person who writes in a state that is not conducive, he writes spontaneously without an adequate topic structure, so it seems to jump here and there. It is also the reason his study of this topic not too in-depth and well-organized.

Ibn Taymiyyah also wrote another book related to the concept complexly titled *Al-Siyāsah al-Syar Siyyah*. In the book, Ibn Taymiyyah talked about political *fiqh* as a counter-concept to the political concepts of the ulama who tried to conceptualize the idea more cooperatively. In this book, Ibn Taymiyyah also talks about *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar*, but the discussion does not have a depth of explanation comparable to the book mentioned above - although both have the same weaknesses: less argumentative and relatively literal in interpreting canonical religious texts.

Ibnu Taimiyah's relationship with the authorities and the strategy of explaining the concept of amar makruf and nahi munkar related to

the representation of *ulil amri* who has the authority to carry out the obligation is a form of knowledge politics that is outside the circle of political institutions. Knowledge politics like this is a different strategy from what is done by *ulama* like al-Ghazali. The latter is called *amar makruf nahi munkar* by involving the participation of the authorities as political patronage of knowledge. In this context, al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah presented a conflicting politics of knowledge to obtain discursive authority in Islam related to *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar*. The politics of knowledge and its relation to patronization not only determine the *ulama's* *ulama* position in the practice of the obligation but also affect the effectiveness of the explanations associated with the obligation.

Of course, the political polarization of knowledge does not only come from representations between al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah. Some *ulama* also present the politics of knowledge in the polarization model above. Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Mawardi (m. 1058) who wrote the book *Al-Aḥkām al-Shulṭhāniyyah* (1989) was a person who explicitly gave an explanation of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* in depth. At the end of the book mentioned above, he explains this topic with the name *ḥisbah*. Presumably, al-Ghazali was inspired by al-Mawardi when explaining the concept of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* under the name *ḥisbah di Iḥyā'*.

Besides al-Mawardi, his teacher al-Ghazali named Dhiyau al-Din 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini (r. 478/1085) also did the same thing. The *ulama*, known as Imam al-Haramain, wrote the idea of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* in general in his book, *Giyāṭts al-Umam* (1979, 176-177). Unlike al-Mawardi, al-Juwaini does not associate *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* with the concept of *ḥisbah* by *ulil amri*, which is related by him in the context of the ruler.

Thus, there are at least three Sunni *ulama* who conduct knowledge politics in the concept of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar*. Although al-Mawardi and al-Juwaini were *ulama* who preceded al-Ghazali in conceptualizing the concept in the relation of political patronage and the authorities, both wrote it in political discourse. That is, both of them talk about it in political discipline and the Muslim obligation to appoint a ruler. While al-Ghazali wrote it in Sufism discourse and to revive Islamic sciences so that the integration of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* as knowledge politics is more visible than its predecessor. If his predecessors were more likely to be conceptualizing political practices, al-Ghazali was more likely to conceptualize Islamic teachings and knowledge.

If the representation of some of the *ulama* above is a conceptualization of *amar makruf nabi munkar* who has a patronization of power and discovers his discursive form of maturity in the hands of al-Ghazali,

Ibn Taymiyyah, as already mentioned, showed the opposite. Like al-Ghazali, he was also not alone in formulating the concept discursively. Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyah (m. 751/1350) was one of the pious people who was deeply influenced by Ibn Taymiyah's ideas in depth and tried to spend his life developing the thoughts of his teacher. As a person who admired Ibn Taymiyyah since his meeting when he was young, Ibn Qayyim spent the rest of his life accompanying his teacher. Therefore, his life is not far from the state of his teacher: opposed by many Muslim rulers and scholars, so they have to move from prison to prison (Caterina Bori & Livnat Holtzman 2010). He is of the view that a Muslim, in this uncertain period, should not provide support to the government, even if he is forced to use the right tactics (Cook 2004, 141).

However, unlike his teacher, who wrote in a way that was not systematic and seemed less argumentative, Ibn Qayyim was able to write in-depth. His book *Al-Thuruq al-miukmiyyah fi al-Siyāsah al-Syar' iyyah* (1428 AH) was an attempt to write *siyasa fiqh* which continued the efforts of his teacher in his book, *Al-Siyāsah al-Syar' iyyah*. In answer to questions that arise from the people of Tripoli, this book is a counter-effort to the concept of *fiqh siyasa* from scholars such as al-Mawardi, al-Juwaini, and al-Ghazali. In other words, it is a conceptualization outside the political system.

Although Ibn Qayyim broadened the conceptualization of Ibnu Taimiyah's religious, political thought, the first attempt was more accommodating to his polemic opponents, as seen in the use of the term "*hisbah*," which appeared straightforwardly in his book, *Al-Thuruq al-Ḥukmiyyah*. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah, however, was more assertive in conceptualizing *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* as a politics of knowledge outside the power system compared to his students who were more accommodating and appropriative. From the above explanation, it becomes reasonable why the discursive confrontation finally found its culmination in the figures of al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah. Both treated the 'discursification' *amar makruf nabi munkar* as a politics of knowledge from a confrontational epistemological frame.

### **AMAR MA'RUF NAHI MUNKAR NORMALIZATION AS A PRACTICE OF AUTHORITY**

As a politics of knowledge, the practice of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar* presupposes a representative epistemological conceptualization. It is necessary to provide adequate arguments about the importance of these obligations in the Islamic discursive community and the Islamic public. As a convention, the discussion about conceptual normalization is only sufficient in general for what

is done by al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah by conducting a conditional development of several ulama.

In *Ihyā'*, al-Ghazali without giving any explanation associates *amar makruf nabi munkar* with the term *ḥisbah*. The context of this association provides the implied explanation that the first term has been explained with the second term as an established tradition of explanation in the *fiqh siyasah* discourse that was systematically pioneered by al-Mawardi. Al-Ghazali said that the concept of *ḥisbah* is a concept that is able to provide a comprehensive explanation of *amar makruf* and *nabi munkar*. Al-Ghazali explained that *ḥisbah* had four components that had to be present for the practice to be fulfilled as a normalization process. The four components are 1) the doers of the so-called *muḥttasib*; 2) the person who is the object of the discourse called the *muḥttasab 'alaih*; 3) the issue of the problem which is the object of the discourse called the *muḥttasab fiḥ*; 4) the act of the discourse itself (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 307). This order changes in the explanation, because of number three changes to number two. It shows that the issue of the discourse of al-Ghazali was more of al-Ghazali's concern than the person who was his object.

In al-Ghazali's view of the first component, the performer of the discourse must be a Muslim *mukallaf* (bound by religious obligations) capable of carrying out these obligations. With that provision, al-Ghazali has issued categories which contradict him such as a mentally challenged person, children, and non-Muslims. Of course, the explanation for the issuance of some categories above varies. *Taklif* as a condition of eligibility expels crazy people and small children from the eligibility of the *ḥisbah*. The first is considered improper because *ḥisbah* requires serious and sincere reasoning so that a mentally challenged person will not be able to do it. Whereas a small child, who is not yet mature, does not have an obligation to accept the *amar makruf nabi munkar*, but if he is able to distinguish between the *makruf* and the *munkar*, he may do so. The condition as a Muslim to do the Shari'a is to exclude non-Muslims from these obligations. For al-Ghazali, faith is an essential requirement in carrying out the sermon because this obligation is intended to defend religion. Non-Muslims do not have this interest, so they are not obliged to do so. Regarding the explanation of the eligibility conditions above, al-Ghazali does not require the permission of a ruler. In other words, anyone as long as he is a Muslim, converts, and has the ability must do *amar makruf nabi munkar* (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 308-320).

In explaining the ability as the feasibility of carrying out these obligations, al-Ghazali made a detailed description of the conditions that aborted these obligations because they were considered incapable. In this context, he classifies liabilities based on capabilities

as mentioned in the historical hadith of Abu Sa'id al-Khudhri above.

Al-Ghazali considers that there are five levels of *ḥisbah*:

1) inform about the evil that must be shunned and the virtues that must be done; 2) giving advice gently; 3) give a loud warning; 4) prevent or forbid by force; 5) frighten with threats or give a blow (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 311). The explanation illustrates that the level formulated by Al-Ghazali with what is in the hadith experiences a striking difference. The difference is not only related to the number but also the stages of *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar*.

If in the hadith there are three levels of action, then al-Ghazali considers there are five. Of course, the last number can be taken from the first, but al-Ghazali does not explain why he translated it into five. Presumably, he only took the substance of the hadith as a foundation to be developed in a logical discursive context. This consideration becomes reasonable when it is supported by the way al-Ghazali reverses the stages of *amar makruf nahi munkar*. If in the hadith that stage begins with a hand that symbolizes strength or power and ends with the verbal symbol of a persuasive approach, then al-Ghazali starts with a persuasive approach and ends with a ban on coercion and threat with a blow. The stages presented by al-Ghazali indicate persuasive appropriation.

For the second component, al-Ghazali said that the issue of the problem that was the object of the *ḥisbah* was all the neglections that were apparent at the time for those who were doing the *ḥisbah* (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 320). Al-Ghazali uses *munkar* instead of the word *maksiat* (immoral), arguing that the first word is more general than the second. He gave an example if someone saw a small child drinking wine, even though it was not included immoral (read: because a child is not yet mature, he has not entered the age of *taklīf*), but it includes a *munkar* which must be opposed (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 320). Furthermore, if we look back on the authority of the text, *munkar* is the sound of the canonical text on which this obligation rests.

What needs to be noted from al-Ghazali's explanation, he considers that the *munkar* that is covered up by those who commit *munkar*, *ḥisbah* is not permitted. He gave an example; if there are people who do *munkar* in his house, then he closes the door, it should not be applied □ *ḥisbah* because Allah forbade to do that as referred to in the QS. Al-Hujarat (49): 12. It shows that the practice of *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* as normalization of the authority of knowledge only applies in the public sphere.

The third component, the object which is the target of the obligation of the Shariah, is human (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 323). Al-Ghazali did not even require the religion and age of people who were the object of this obligation. Anyone who appears in the public sphere is in

denial in terms of sharia; then it must be opposed - even if there is a mentally challenged person who is in denial must also be opposed. It seems that al-Ghazali was not very interested in talking in detail about the object of *hisbab*. He was more interested in deepening the explanation of the discourse itself. The deepening that he did on this topic was based on the stage of the explanation he had done in the first component when he explained the person who did the sermons. That deserves attention in this context, al-Ghazali developed stages of this obligation starting from 1) giving understanding; 2) prohibiting; 3) advising; 4) giving a loud warning; 5) berating; 6) committing physical violence; 7) threatening hitting; 8) hitting; 9) using weapons; 10) using assistance and troops (al-Ghazali t.t., ii / 324).

Of the ten stages described by al-Ghazali, the first five are verbal obligations, while the next five use physical violence. The appeal of al-Ghazali's explanation above is his assertiveness in fulfilling his obligations by involving troops. Thus, he involves the authorities to conduct *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* in the most severe stages. The ruler, as the patronage of the ulama, is the highest step of this obligation. Furthermore, the explanation emphasized the dualism of the ulama and the authorities in carrying out these obligations in the public sphere. Islam as a practice of piety and knowledge politics is not only present in the private sphere, but also the public sphere. In other words, this obligation has presented Islam as a public religion.

Al-Ghazali's explanation above shows his efforts to conceptualize *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* systematically. That was his contribution in providing explanations to the topics he discussed in many of his books. Al-Ghazali was a pious person who can systematize knowledge. He can ground his explanation in practical examples that are found by Muslims every day.

Ibn Taymiyyah as a representation of opposition ulama had a different approach. He conceptualized *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* outside the power system. In a less conducive situation, Ibn Taymiyyah explained this concept in a short, straightforward way, and tried to find its justification in the Qur'an or Hadith. Ibn Taymiyyah argued that *amar makruf* was a feature of the Muslims which was exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad SAW because when it is mentioned in the Qur'an about this privilege, it was always followed by the practice of *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* (Ibnu Taimiyah 1976, 11). According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the obligation applies to all humans on earth (Ibn Taimiyah 1976, 65). Although the above obligations apply to all humans, these obligations are enforced using sharia as a benchmark. It can be tracked by paying attention to all of Ibn Taymiyyah's book relating to *amar makruf nahi munkar*. Ibn Taymiyyah considered that Allah did not accept any charity unless

it was based on the foundation of Islam. He based his views on QS. Ali Imron (3): 85, which states that God only accepts Islam as a true religion.

In the narration he built, Ibn Taymiyyah implies the importance of making a correct explanation of amar makruf and nahi munkar that are under Islam. This way of thinking places the ulama in a vital position — especially when it comes to the term *ulil amri*. For him, what is meant by that term is, “ulama of each group, its rulers, and their parents” (Ibn Taymiyah 1976, 15). Ulama is the highest authority to do the amar makruf nahi munkar, which is then followed by the authorities and the elders. These are people who are obliged to set an example of doing that duty well. Their authority is needed when talking about amar makruf and nahi munkar in the sense of giving punishment to those who are declared to be out of sharia (compare Ibn Taymiyah 1418).

With his spontaneous and concise style of explanation, Ibn Taymiyyah did not have the time (and also the opportunity) to carry out mapping related to topics either in the area of amar makruf or nahi munkar.

However, to trace these two things within the Shari’a framework, we can see from the existence of benefits that are more prominent than damage (Cook 2004, 153; Ibn Taymiyah 1976, 17). This aspect is the essence of all forms of amar makruf nahi munkar. Starting from the benefit of religion, faith, and good deeds are the most significant things that must be put forward in *amar makruf*. On the contrary, *Syirik* is the greatest evil that must be rejected. *Syirik* means: worshipping God besides Allah, be it angels, *jinnns*, graves, or statues (Ibn Taimiah 1976, 16). These things, in turn, make room for the purification movement in its various forms.

This purification is the normalization of nahi munkar which finally found its strong form in the modern era with the patronage agreement between Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (m. 1791) - as a religious figure who was strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Saud - as a successful tribal chief establishing a Saudi dynasty that is more famous for Saudi Arabia (Cook 2004, 178). The normalization of the patronal amar makruf amar nahi no longer rejects the patronage of the authorities as was the principle of Ibn Taymiyyah in his time. He has experienced dynamic development. In the context of this shift from anti to pro-ruler, *amar makruf nahi munkar* committed by Ibnu Taimiyah and his followers can be concluded that the appearance of political patronation is not an absolute appearance in the doctrine. The condition only occurs if a ruler has not been found to attract him as a partner of authority that forms the dualism of power and knowledge as a practice of hegemony or as a practice of truth.

### FRAGMENTATION OF ISLAMIC AUTHORITY AND CONSERVATISM

It is well known that Islamic organizations, both representing traditionalism and modernism, had long existed before Indonesia's independence, and played an important role in orienting its members in social, political and religious life since the early 20th century. Muhammadiyah, for example, was founded in 1912, Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) in 1923, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926. The emergence of these organizations at least reflected the trends and expressions of Islam at that time. Meanwhile, Islamic religious institutions formed because of their links with the state, such as the Ministry of Religion (Kemenag), the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) were only established in 1945, 1975 and 1991, respectively. Although the formation of the Ministry of Religion is often seen as a form of political concession for Islamic groups to play a broader role in the state (Boland 1982), the formation can also be seen as an attempt to participate in 'intervening' the formation of Islamic discourse among Muslim citizens (Ichwan 2009).

It is a reminder that the state as an institution of power, always wants to instill its political, legal, and administrative legitimacy in every citizen, including in religious matters. However, the authority established by the state is only one of the many religious authorities that exist. Although the state is dominant in the context of political power, it has not necessarily enjoyed a hegemonic position in the mastery of religious discourse. Due to religious authority has long been rooted in society and the democratization of authority in Islam has allowed the emergence of new authorities.<sup>11</sup> The state as a 'secular institution' certainly do not have substantial capital to build religious authority when compared to ulama or ulama institutions outside the country.

In this case, we need to look at the position of the ulama concerning the state whether ulama is included in the structure of the state, support the interests of the ruling elite or even whether they are outside the structure of the state and act as the opposition. However, reading the position of ulama is undoubtedly not as simple as reading binary opposition: inside or outside the state structure. Expressions of ulama's position in public spheres, as Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2002, 179) said, are very complex, diverse and often contradictory if only read from the glasses above.

The New Order Government (Orba), for example, was very hard in building a pluralistic image of the Indonesian nation but remained bound in a unified nation by adopting a SARA (Ethnic, Religion,

11 Look at the example in the case of determining the beginning and end of Ramadan fasting. The state has always tried to unite the voices of Muslim citizens but has never been successful because Indonesian Muslims follow the direction of the religious organizations they follow than the state (Ikhwan 2015, 94-97).

Race, and Intergroup) policy. This policy is intended to suppress polemic and debate about SARA in the public sphere (D’Haenens, Gazali, and Verelst 1999, 130). The New Order government did not hesitate to use a coercive approach to ensure this policy works. In this context, the discourse of civil Islam (civil Islam; Hefner 2000) which accommodates ideas about democracy, religious-social plurality, and compatibility between Islam and Pancasila surfaced and gradually became a hegemonic religious discourse that moved to the middle. Religious thinking by ulama such as Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur), Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Dawam Raharjo colored the national religious discourse. However, they are not always in harmony with the New Order government; in some cases, they are critical of the government.<sup>12</sup>

After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, every citizen conducted good public policy as a result of democratic contestation. In contrast to the New Order era in which the state intervened a lot in political, social and social issues, in the Reformation era civil society and Islamic organizations gained more extensive space to express their aspirations and even criticisms of the government and the state. The relationship between religion and the state began to be heavily debated for its legitimacy in open spaces. The bitter experience of Pancasila indoctrination in the past (New Order 1966-1998) made the country appear passive in the first decade after 1998 reform amid the emergence of alternative discourses that discussed the relationship between religion and the state.

Islamism is one of the most striking phenomena in the context of democratization in Indonesia and contributes to the widening of the “fragmentation of political and religious authority” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). The Islamists here are Muslims committed to political actions to fight for what they call the ‘Islamic agenda’ (Piscatori 2000, 2). They appear as new figures who are very vocal in public forums and effectively become new competitors for mainstream political and religious authorities. Islamists compete with old political authorities by offering new political ideas by popularizing alternative political discourses such as the *Khilafah*, state sharia (Hilmy 2010; Machmudi 2008), and the superiority of Muslim citizens. Islamism also confronts the old religious authorities by offering alternative religious discourses in various styles: *jibadi*, *tahriri*, *salafi*, *tarbawi*, and popular Islamism (Hasan 2018).

12 Gus Dur, for example, was very critical of the Suharto government who initiated the Kedung Ombo development project in Central Java, which required several residents of villages to move from their homes. Also, Abdurrahman was very critical of the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI), which was seen as an attempt by the government to co-opt the Islamic civil power for its political interests (Barton 2002).

The new ulama initially emerged as a figure working outside - although still related to - the mainstream religious structures and institutions. If the mainstream ulama is a source of legitimacy and guardian of religious and political *doxa*, then the new ulama is an inferior social group that seeks to push *doxa* into the realm of argument contestation.<sup>13</sup> In the Indonesian context, recognition of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and the diversity of ethnic groups and religions are the *doxas* held by mainstream ulama. Other religious-political discourses legitimize the *Khilafah* and the idea of Sharia in Indonesia. It is an effort to shift the *doxa* into the realm of opinion, i.e., the contestation of discourse.

In Indonesia, the Islamist group is indeed not a large Islamic group when compared to mainstream Islamic groups. However, they were relatively successful in bringing alternative Islamic discourse into the framework of public Islamic religious discourse. This ideology that struggled to build this 'Islamic order' - including establishing an Islamic state, the application of sharia law and specific religious moral standards for Muslim societies - succeeded in spreading and attracting the attention of the broader community through various media and ways: books, magazines, pamphlets, internet, studies religion on campus and school, and trainings (see Hasan 2018).

This fact explains how Islamism, which offers a far more conservative discourse than the idea of civil Islam developed and found its popularity among urban Muslim communities in particular. The "*Bela Islam*" campaign which involved massive demonstrations at the National Monument (Monas), HI Roundabout and other strategic places indicated the conservative strength of Islam in the capital. This movement that exploited the issue of religious defamation did not only succeed in bringing down Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (BTP, or at that time better known as Ahok) from the 2017 Jakarta elections and sending him to prison, but mainly showed the power of conservatism in defining Islamic orthodoxy.

After that, conservative symbols and discourses became a vital force in the national political struggle. It is proven, for example, by President Joko Widodo's move to actively engage in political communication and consolidation with the ulama, including from conservative groups, especially after the rise of 'Islamic defense' actions that are politically closer to the opposition. Responding to these developments, the President has become more intensive in portraying himself as a Muslim close to Islam and ulama. The climax

13 The term *doxa* was popularized by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, to refer to the general rules and beliefs that must be taken for granted as undisputed truth. *doxa* forms the basis for action and parameters for assessing the legitimacy of action or position (Bourdieu 1977, 159-70).

is with the decision of Joko Widodo - with the support of politicians who brought him forward in the 2019 Presidential Election - proposing the chairman of MUI, K.H. Ma'ruf Amin, as his Vice-Presidential Candidate. As is known, K.H. Ma'ruf Amin is a conservative ulama who has become an essential figure in the Islamic action movement that has succeeded in overthrowing BTP. It explains how conservative Islamic discourse becomes an essential expression in the public sphere and the national political world. As a consequence, public spheres becomes crowded with the ulama contestation in its variety of the spectrum: progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical and extreme (Burdah, Kailani, and Ikhwan 2019).

### **IMAGINATION ABOUT THE CORRUPT SYSTEM**

The emergence of Islamic discourse around the Islamic system (*al-nizham al-Islami*) is based on the perception that power, government, and social systems in many Islamic countries have strayed far from religious teachings. Therefore, Islamism emerged to voice the supremacy of the Islamic system and Muslim society in the era of the nation-state.

The nation-state has opened new episodes in the political, legal, and social history of Muslim societies. The nation-state emerges as a system of power that builds political sovereignty based on 'worldly' ties: race, ethnicity, history, language, and other items related. This trend places serious emphasis on the concept of the ummah, which in theory is Islamic religious bondage that does not recognize geographical, social strata, ethnicity, and race boundaries (see Piscatori 1986). In this era, modernization and secularization emerged as idioms and jargons that offered progress and freedom. The bondage of religion system and the success of the secularization of the state and political power started to fade. Also, the public sphere encourages and isolates religion to be in the private sphere. The state built a unified legal system and formed a law enforcement apparatus that works coercively in upholding the legal order adopted by the state in order to strengthen its existence.

The fact of the emergence of nation-state in the Islamic world is a response to "hegemonic modernity" (Hallaq 2009) which forces elites in Muslim societies to abandon or reduce attachment to Sharia as a political, legal and social order. This development is not without a reaction from the ulama and Islamist groups who want the supremacy of Sharia over any system. The 'battle' between Sharia and the nation-state is considered as a contestation in which the latter takes the position and authority of the first.

Related to this disharmony, Wael Hallaq (2009, 361-66, 2011, 17-21) provides an interesting analysis. First, both sharia and state

belong to the same type (genus); both are “machines of governance” that are designed to organize society and resolve disputes that have the potential to threaten an order built both by the state and sharia. Second, sharia and the state both claim the highest sovereignty. In Islamic legal theory, politics (*siyasah*) and government must be subject to sharia, not vice versa. Meanwhile, the nation-state emerges as a totalistic entity with laws that claim ultimate sovereignty and require that politics, government, and the elements within it submit to their authority. Third, both systems work in opposite directions. The movement of the nation-state is centered, while sharia moves in all directions. Hierarchy in the nation-state is structural, in the sense that if a state institution can not solve a problem, it will be directed to a higher state institution.

Meanwhile, in sharia, there is no structured and tight hierarchy as in the state hierarchy. Even if the hierarchy exists, it is epistemic. A judge (*qadib*) in a trial (*maqamah*) will refer to the *mufti* - which is a ‘private agent’ outside the structure of the state - to seek answers to an issue because the mufti is considered to be more in control of Islamic legal arguments. In this context, sharia habitat is a social universe because Islamic law develops and is dynamic in the social environment of society, not the state structure. Fourth, although sharia and the nation-state have the same goals, both have different targets. The nation-state systematically wants to form “good citizens” who obey the laws and disciplinary rules set by the state. Meanwhile, in sharia obedience to God and the establishment of sharia itself is the main target.

If sharia in Muslim societies has the highest authority claim, then the ulama is the primary agent who maintains and articulates the sharia in theory and practice. Ulama became the spearhead in grounding sharia as a legal and moral system in the lives of Muslim societies that were packaged to uphold the ethical and preventing evil (*al-amr bil-ma'ruf wal-nahy 'an al-munkar*). For this reason, the rejection of (in part) the ulama of the new social and political order needs to be seen in the perspective of “*amar makruf nabi munkar*.”

In the history of the modern Indonesian state, the role of Islamic ulama and leaders in the effort to “uphold sharia” had begun before the declaration of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. The success of the ulama in obtaining a national political stage was inseparable from the role of the Japanese colonial government, which made ulama patrons of power from the natives. They replaced the aristocratic class which had long been a patron of the Dutch colonial government. The contestation between Islamic groups and ‘secular’ nationalists can be traced to the formulation of the philosophy, basis and state constitution in the forum for the Preparation of Preparatory

Efforts for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI). Contestation continued at the Constituent level (1956-1959) which ended with a deadlock and the background of the issuance of the 1959 Presidential decree which gave President Sukarno full authority to take strategic security measures (Boland 1982), including against efforts to fight groups carrying flags of Islam.<sup>14</sup>

Islamic groups that contributed to the suppression of communism - which was an essential political patron for Sukarno - after the G30 S / PKI hoped that the new regime under Suharto would accommodate the aspirations of 'Islamization of the state.' However, it was unrequited because the New Order government under Suharto avoided 'political acrobatics' just like Sukarno did.<sup>15</sup> The New Order administration, which focused on national security and development programs, was supported by the military and technocrat power. This regime puts severe pressure on every political movement that is suspected of being a left-wing (Communist) or a right-wing (Islamist). As a result, many ulama withdrew from the political battle of 'Islamization of the state' and switched to the 'Islamization of society' strategy, which relied heavily on education and da'wah. In other words, ulama were pushed from the 'center' and switched to playing the role of 'peripherals,' whose impact could be felt precisely with the increasing religious awareness of the community in subsequent periods (Ricklefs 2001, 343).

The New Order government certainly could not dismiss Islam and ulama as such considering Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world. The context of nationalist authoritarianism in the style of the New Order gave rise to Muslim ulama and scholars who were able to move to the center because of their 'progressive' thinking which in many ways was able to offer alternative avenues for state relations, Islam and Muslim societies. On the other hand, this progressive Islamic discourse emphasizes the compatibility between Islam and the state and "Pancasila democracy." Ulama or religious leaders who can move at this center offer Islamic discourse and trends which are often referred to as civil Islam.

However, the collapse of the regime that underpins Islamic

14 Resistance to the Sukarno government indeed cannot be said to adequately represent the ulama's aspirations in general because the government also accommodates Islamic parties (such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Masyumi parties before being disbanded) in the government structure that shows the representation of ulama or ulama aspirations in the country. The contestation that occurs is considered as a difference of views regarding whether Islam must explicitly become the state's identity or not.

15 Sukarno was very persistent with political ideas that combined Nationalism, Religion, and Communism (Nasakom). This idea was inspired by his old writings on nationalism, Islam and Marxism, three elements which he considered to be the main political force, which, if it were able to work together would bring the Indonesian state to glory (Sukarno 1984).

civil discourse is followed by democratization, which brings fresh air to Islamism, which offers conservative Islamic discourse. The strengthening of conservatism in the public sphere, especially in big cities with influential urban culture (Ikhwan 2019; Muhrisun 2019; Nurlaelawati 2019), hints at the emergence of Islamic trends that play a role as anti-thesis of civil Islam which had gained vast space in the New Order era. Islamism argued over the relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state, which was considered final. The Islamist group gave a discourse that pushed the sharia to move to the “middle,” which is to make it the basis for the state and government system.

The return of the “seven words” in the Jakarta Charter is a starting point for the struggle of Islamist groups to enter Islamic identity in the country and end the domination of the secular system. Thousands of masses gathered in 2002 outside the Parliament building to urge parliament to approve the agenda (Hasan 2008; Hosen 2005; Hilmy 2010). The effort of Islamization through parliamentary lines seems not as easy as a walk in the park because the number of representatives of parties that are in line with the Islamist agenda in parliament is not significant; even political support from Islamist parties tends to decline from the 1999 elections to 2014 (Ikhwan 2015, 120). Because it failed at the parliamentary level, many Islamists turned their attention to cultural Islamization by establishing religious assemblies in the community, schools, campuses, mosques both within the community and the environment of government and state-owned institutions, and establishing educational institutions.

Islamization from below seems to have less resistance because of the tendency of the people towards public piety to increase in the Reformation era. In a democratic climate, symbols and expressions of Islamic piety began to be widely used in government and parliamentary circles, especially ahead of general and regional elections. The phenomenon of the Regional Head Election (Pilkada), for example, has prompted some elites to take pragmatic manoeuvres to gain support from conservative Islamic groups that have strengthened with proposals for Shari’alization. Political elites are competing to approach Islamic scholars and organizations that have strong networks in the regions. The consequence is that when in power, the political elite ratifies Sharia Regional Regulations (Perda) governing public order, social matters, religious obligations and religious symbols (Bush 2008).

It is worth remembering that besides Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) there are no political parties that openly reject the Indonesian state system and voice the global Islamic system of government which they call “the *Khilafah*”. Through various media - pamphlets, books, internet and social media - HTI openly propagates the *Khilafah*

as the only legitimate political system in Islam. As part of a global political organization under Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), HTI also promotes the delegitimation of democracy not only as a corrupt system but also an “infidel system” that is contrary to Islam. This view is based on the understanding of democracy as a system of power that places the highest authority in humans, so that it contradicts the *Khilafah* which asserts high power in God through Islamic law (Zallum 1990, 2, 40–41). By HTI activists, democracy is often referred to as “virtue predators”. In 2017, the disbandment of HTI was not immediately followed by the disappearance of the *Khilafah* discourse and the changing of the system among the public.<sup>16</sup> Felix Siau, for example, is an ex-HTI activist who still enjoys the freedom of lecturing religious topics and distributing his books in public.

Outside political parties, open rejection of the state system is demonstrated by jihadis and hard-line Islamic groups under the influence of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ba’asyir himself was a fugitive during the New Order government because of accusations of involvement in the Darul Islam network and his rejection of the Pancasila and the state flag which was considered as a representation of *thāghūt* (kufr). Returning from exile in Malaysia in 1998, Ba’asyir was thrown into prison for alleged involvement of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) - the Ba’asyir organization was deemed as terrorist by the international community - in the Bali bombings and bombings of several churches in the early 2000s. When he was released from prison in 2006, Ba’asyir formed the Jemaah Ashorut Tauhid (JAT), which is a JI splinter organization. In 2010, Ba’asyir returned to prison for alleged involvement in terror plans and military training in Aceh. In 2019, the Joko Widodo administration plans to release Ba’asyir for reasons of age and health. However, the plan failed because Ba’asyir continued to reject the oath of loyalty to the state of Pancasila.

Survey data show that 71.56 per cent of Indonesian ulama accepts the idea of a nation-state, 16.44 per cent reject, and 12 per cent were not identified. The data shows a high enough acceptance rate. Even so, a rejection of 16.44 per cent cannot be underestimated. However, such a massive rejection cannot be interpreted as a rejection which ends in a desire to replace the state system. The rejection here includes the ulama’s reservative position on specific aspects of the state due to certain factors such as dissatisfaction with the ruling government (See the writings of Noorhaidi Hasan, and Ahmad Rafiq and Roma Ulinuha in this book).

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16 16 *Al-Kaffah Bulletins* which were indicated to have written and distributed by Tahri-ri activists are still circulating in the mosques ahead of Friday prayers.

## DEMOCRATIZATION, ISLAMICATION AND POLITICS OF THE ORTHODOXY

The primary thing about the consequences of democracy is the opening of the arena of contestation and public participation. Democratization requires the development of a plurality of power, authority and public discourse. Therefore, it is tough for us to imagine a particular group that can monopolize power and discourse. Political figures compromise to rule and establish patronage with the ulama, who are important religious and cultural agents in a society that have experiences in religious intensification, and also a global phenomenon of “religious deprivatization” (Casanova 1994). In this context, religious figures - both old and new - contest each other in defining what Islam is and contributing to what they call “true Islamic teachings” (orthodoxy).

The above phenomenon led to the emergence of “public Islam”, namely the very diverse appeals and conceptualizations of Islam as religious teachings and practices by the figures from different professional backgrounds and social classes: ulama, lecturers, public intellectuals, politicians, employees, university students, students, and the general public who participated in the above appeal to public debate (Salvatore and Eickelman 2004, xii). The intensification of the contest which has implications for the destabilization of political and religious authority encourages relevant figures to play “orthodoxy politics” by building the legitimacy of authority and producing and spreading certain religious discourses in the hope of being able to set standards for religious actions. The Islamization of society and politics in a democratic climate and freedom of the press has led to massive public participation in discrediting public benefits issues in which Islam plays a “distinguishing factor” in the configuration of social and political life.

We will see how democratization facilitates ulama to carry out orthodoxy politics by spreading religious discourse which they consider right, and rejecting or even denouncing religious understanding and behaviour which they consider to be heretical, morally and secularly corrupt. Some ulama even did not hesitate to conduct action intervention by seeking an excuse that it comes from the Qur'an dictum on *amar makruf* and *nahi munkar*.

One striking phenomenon is the shift in orientation within the body of the MUI. The democratization that facilitates the freedom of individuals and groups helped encourage the MUI to transform its role from *Khadim al-ūkūmah* (government servant) to *Khadim al-ummah* (servant of the people). This shift then raises the question, who is the “people” here. The emergence of radical and hard-line

Muslim groups in the Reformation era provided the context for how the MUI defines the Ummah. Several puritan and conservative Muslim figures gained essential positions within the MUI. The MUI also started issuing 'Muslim liberal' groups and issued edicts opposing religious liberalism, pluralism, secularism, Ahmadiyah activities, and interfaith prayer. This development explains that MUI tends to be more accommodating towards a more puritanical and conservative Islamic discourse (Ichwan 2013). The colours of conservatism and puritanism can be seen from the data related to the tendency of intolerance which is quite high among MUI ulama (26.19 per cent) and also anti-citizenship attitudes (32.14 per cent).<sup>17</sup>

Even more interesting to note, MUI's "orthodoxy politics" is not only limited to the discourse with the issuance of fatwas and *tausiyah*; The MUI widens the role of '*amar makruf nahi munkar*' by condoning demonstrations through the Ukhuwah Islamiyah Forum (FUI) which is one of the forums that become a stage for radical and puritan groups to express their rigid religious views and rhetoric accusing Muslim groups in outside them as *munafiq*, *fasiq* and *kafir* groups (Ichwan 2013, 62). The latest incident involving the MUI (figure) was the accusation of 'blasphemy' which flagellated Ahok for his phrase "being lied to using Al-Maidah letter (5): 51" at one of the events in the Thousand Islands. MUI's Religious Opinion and Attitude about blasphemy helped strengthen action against Ahok in the political year leading up to the 2017 Jakarta elections and left essential issues related to citizenship issues.

Outside the MUI, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), for example, is often referred to as the 'sharia police' street because without authorization the state is often involved in taking coercive action against elements of society or government which they consider to have supported the spread of immorality and irreligiousness in Muslim societies. Founded on August 17, 1998, shortly after the New Order government was toppled by ultra-conservative ulama, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab and K.H. Misbahul Anam, FPI is one of the hardline Islamic organizations that popularized the Ahlussunnah doctrine in a literal and narrow understanding. FPI's involvement in attacks on stalls, shops, night clubs and other entertainment venues which they consider to be a hotbed of immorality (Fealy 2004, 114) in a democratic climate is supported by conservative ulama discourse that views the inability of state institutions to crack down on so-called religious immorality.

The FPI attack on the Playboy Indonesia (PI) magazine office in 2006 is an example of how the ulama, Habib Rizieq Shihab, delivered the role of orthodox politics and legitimized coercive action which

<sup>17</sup> See also the writings of Moch Nur Ichwan and Nina Mariani Noor in this book.

should have been delivered by the state. PI is considered to spread ‘pornographic’ content, which could damage the morality of the nation. The PI editor clarified the content of the magazine had been adapted to fit Indonesian culture by eliminating aspects of pornography and eroticism. However, the image of Playboy magazine in western countries that often displays eroticism is used as a parameter by conservative ulama to be vocal, and FPI for sweeping or intervening (Kitley 2008). Opposition to the publication of pornographic content is indeed not something unique in Muslim societies; even in liberal societies, this problem also sparked public debate. However, the debate is more related to the problem of regulating the public sphere to prevent social damage caused by the distribution of specific content among vulnerable groups of society (Kitley 2008, 98).

The attack by FPI which received widespread media attention was the “Monas Incident”, which was a peaceful action initiated by the “National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief” (AKKBB) on June 1, 2008, to coincide with the anniversary of Pancasila. By its bearer, this action is a response to the rise of intolerance in the era of democratization carried out by specific community organizations on the pretext of religion. Not long ago, the AKKBB action was attacked by a group of FPI attribute masses who destroyed the action facilities and injured several participants. The Commander of the FPI Islamic Warriors Command, Munarman, rejected the action at Monas as a commemoration of the anniversary of the Pancasila. According to him, the act had been provoked by Ahmadiyya, which was considered a heretical group and endangered the faith of Muslims. Munarman argued that the FPI action was a response to the government being slow in deciding to dissolve Ahmadiyah, which was declared heretical based on the 2005 MUI Fatwa.<sup>18</sup>

Conservative Islamic discourse and practices that are increasingly popular in the public sphere have an unpleasant effect on social, religious minority groups and women’s activist groups. The ban on the construction of non-Muslim places of worship in the middle of Muslim-majority communities is still a hot issue in which conservative religious figures are the most vigorous opponents. Also, Sharia Regulations that are the result of political negotiations between (prospective) regional authorities and certain ulama groups tend to regulate and limit women’s movements (Bush 2008). In surveys and interviews, it also appears that conservative and radical ulama tend to reject women from occupying leadership or public positions in which intensive interaction between the sexes is inevitable.

The orthodoxy of ulama’s politics increased significantly to Muslim minority groups such as Shiites and Ahmadis. Conservative

18 <http://arsip.gatra.com/artikel.php?pil=23&id=115274> accessed on April 23 2019.

and hardline ulama consider the two groups as heretical (and even considered to have left Islam), and their existence is seen as threatening Islamic creed. The group's activities in the Muslim community are seen as an effort to "spread heresy" more broadly. The formation of the National Anti-Shi'a Alliance (ANNAS) in 2014 by conservative and hardline clerics, for example, can be understood as one of the political media of the orthodoxy of the ulama related to the Muslim minority. ANNAS emerged with the slogan 'saving the faith of the Ummah', and this slogan later developed in public discourse related to the pro-Islamic and anti-Islamic dichotomy. Pro-Islam is associated with Muslims who are in line with orthodoxy politics. Meanwhile, anti-Islam is associated with those who are not in line with or against orthodoxy politics.

The dichotomic discourse, which is packaged in "*jihad amar makruf nabi munkar*", is gradually becoming a hegemonic discourse in several areas. The condition has made other Islamic groups who disagree with ANNAS' orthodoxy political agenda and strategy unable to express their thoughts. Thus, they will be accused of being "anti-Islam" or "supporters of heresy" which connotes very negatively in the eye of the public. Since ANNAS was formed and active, the Shiite movement space in Bandung, for example, has narrowed significantly. Shia ulama no longer enjoy freedom in religious events and are forced to withdraw from public religious participation (Ikhwan 2019, 56).

The Ahmadiyya community was also being cornered. The majority of ulama in Indonesia view Ahmadiyah as teaching outside the belief of Islam. They referred to the 2005 MUI fatwa. The Ahmadiyah polemic continued to roll out among the community and became a national issue. Islamist groups who were also included in the government cabinet encourage the government to take decisive steps related to Ahmadiyah immediately. In 2008 a Joint Decree (SKB) was signed by the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General and the Minister of the Interior. It contained a ban on the preaching activities of the Ahmadiyah. The decree is considered to be a victory of the current conservatism and political Islamization for the government, especially in the period leading up to the general election, in which, the political calculation is a separate consideration.<sup>19</sup>

SKB 3 Minister No. 3 of 2008 seems to be legitimate for the issuance of local government regulations. In West Java, for example, Governor Ahmad Heriyawan (PKS) signed Governor Regulation no. 12 of 2011 concerning a ban on the activities of the Ahmadiyya Community in West Java. On January 5, 2019, the Ahmadiyya Jamaat launched 19 SKB 3 Ministers of 2008 can be seen as a pragmatic step of the incumbent government to gain votes in the 2009 Election. As a result, the incumbent and his party won fantastic votes in the Presidential and Legislative Elections, although it is not easy to estimate the role of the 3 Ministerial SKB in the acquisition of incumbent votes.

the book *Haqiqattul Wahy* at the Mubarak mosque in Bandung. However, it was disbanded by several mass organizations that called themselves the NKRI Guarding Association. They claimed that the action was carried out in order to escort Governor Regulation no. 12 2011 and SKB 3 Minister no. 3 of 2008.<sup>20</sup> From the above incident, we can conclude that orthodoxy politics began to be associated with the slogan ‘defence of the state’.

### **AMAR MA'RUF NAHI MUNKAR BETWEEN MAINSTREAM AND PERIPHERAL ULAMA**

Post-2014 elections the dichotomy between mainstream and peripheral ulama is getting sharper. Mainstream ulama are those who have long played the role of intellectual figures in the articulation of Islam. They generally occupy essential positions in state institutions, lead large Islamic organizations, or lead Islamic educational institutions with a vast network. Mainstream ulama are those who enjoy most of the state policy. Meanwhile, peripheral ulama are those who are not / less acclimated in state policy and lack of space in society at large. They are generally very harsh and critical of the state and the ruling ulama elite.<sup>21</sup>

The polarization was even sharper with the involvement of ulama and ulama symbols in religious, political actions such as 212 (2 December 2016) and similar actions that mobilized thousands of masses at Monas to sue Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's on charges of blasphemy against Islam.

Peripheral ulama become essential figures in action. They continue to play the stage and drama “Defending Islam” to assert their authority and win public space. Ahead of the 2019 Presidential Election, peripheral ulama also made the stage “*Ijtima' Ulama*” by supporting presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto, and vice presidential candidate, Sandiaga Uno, to replace the incumbent, Joko Widodo. Even after the Presidential Election, *Ijtima' Ulama* continued to delegitimize the General Election Commission (KPU) which favour the incumbent in the temporary vote count.

It should be noted that the two ulama groups above have the same interests, i.e., ensuring the role of Islam in people's lives. They agreed with the dictum *amar makruf nabi munkar* or *hisbab* as a principle to keep Muslim communities in the corridors of religious teachings.

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-46767823> accessed on 7 January 2019.

<sup>21</sup> Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2002, 178–79) refers to the first group as “ulama establishment”. However, they do not have to be understood as figures who always support all state policies, because they always have a vision of the importance of the position of Islam in society and the importance of their role as religious authorities. Meanwhile, the second group is called “opposition ulama” who are very critical of each figure establishment.

However, they have different views regarding how to implement the dictum. Mainstream ulama tend to encourage the implementation of *amar makruf nabi munkar* in the corridors of the constitution and hand over the enforcement aspects to the authorities, especially the state apparatus. Their views have been colored by the articulation of *amar makruf nabi munkar* Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, by emphasizing the importance of the creation (or preservation) of public benefit. In other words, mainstream ulama conceptualize the implementation of *amar makruf nabi munkar* in the corridor of existing systems and traditions.

Responding to the understanding of a group of CSOs that allow the use of violence by non-state parties in the implementation of *nabi munkar*, a prominent ulama leader, believes:

That [*nabi munkar*] is mandatory, but does every condition apply absolutely right? Just look at al-Ghazali saying how truly *nabi munkar* can be implemented. It must be clear, and not have a worse effect. The situation must be examined first. *Udkbulū fi s-silmi kāffah*. Why use *fi 's-silmi*, which means peace? Why not directly *udkbulū fi 'l-Islām*? Because what is expected is peace, not Islam. Well, from there it is transparent so that *amar ma'ruf* cannot be *nabi munkar* but instead causes another mischief.<sup>22</sup>

In contrast, peripheral ulama are very persistent in constructing narratives and stages that display the message of “ulama centrality” above the state. Dominated by conservative and hardline ulama, this peripheral ulama did not hesitate to delegitimize legitimate state institutions and mainstream ulama authorities that were not in line with their thinking, and took unilateral actions with the argument “defending religion and people” and *amar makruf nabi munkar*. When viewed from its ideological roots and character, peripheral ulama are closer to Ibn Taymiyah’s thought which emphasizes the centrality of the ulama’s authority, refuses to cooperate with rulers with differing views and political affiliations, and delegitimizes symbols and state systems if it is not following their way of thinking.

## CONCLUSION

Post-government of the first four caliphs of Sunni Islam (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali), the state leader is no longer a reference or the central authority in religious matters. Furthermore, political institutions are in the hands of the caliph or amir, while religious institutions are in the hands of ulama. The case of the inquisition (polemic of the status of the recency of the Koran) involving four

<sup>22</sup> Interview with an NU figure in Bandung on 9 October 2018.

caliphs of the Abbasid dynasty: al-Makmun (r. 218/833), al-Mu'tashim (r. 227/842), al-Watsiq (m. 232/847), and al-Mutawakkil (m. 247/861), actually is not an attempt by the state to establish religious authority. The incident is an attempt by the state to side with the rationalist ulama group (*Mu'tazilah*) who are at odds with the group of scriptural scholars (*ablul hadith*; Hurvitz 2002). Classical Islamic history shows that the state tends to surrender matters of religious law to judges (*qadhbī*), who are still inferior epistemologically hierarchically compared to ulama who live in the community and are not bound by the state. From this, we understand the long-standing 'secularization' in the history of classical Islam in which the caliph holds political authority while the ulama hold religious authority.

The position of ulama in the state also influences how they conceptualize the dictum *amar makruf nahi munkar*. Al-Ghazali is an example of a significant mainstream ulama at that time who self-developed in a state institution. Due to this background, he initiated the implementation of the *hisbah* by linking it with the authorities and state apparatus. Meanwhile, Ibn Taymiyyah is an example of a peripheral ulama who stands as a state opposition. This background also influenced how he *conceptualized amar makruf* and *nahi munkar* by placing the ulama - not the ruler or the state - as the highest authority without compromise.

The position of the ulama above can help us in reading the polarization of ulama in Indonesia in the current democratic context. Mainstream ulama tend to disagree if the implementation of orthodoxy politics is carried out unilaterally, or it denies the function and role of the state apparatus. Their position is based on an understanding of the importance of the system as a guarantor of public benefit. Unilateral actions, even with good intentions from an internal religious perspective, are seen as damaging to the benefit. Meanwhile, peripheral ulama often play orthodoxy politics by ruling out the existing system. This phenomenon is considered as the politics of ulama to build public legitimacy over the state.

Democratization broadens and emphasizes the function of the public sphere. Because Islam is a plural tradition, there is no single conception of the public sphere among Muslims. Conservative ulama tend to understand the public sphere as an ideal sphere to discipline Muslim communities and affirm religious identity. Therefore, for conservative ulama the public sphere is not a contestative sphere for argumentative ideas as conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas, but rather as a performative sphere where Islamic supremacy is used to regulate social interaction (Kitley 2008, 102-3), and the politics of religious identity is used to justify position oneself and delegitimize the position of the opponent.

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## ISLAMIC TELEVANGELISM IN THE REVELATION OF NEW RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

*Najib Kailani & Sunarwoto*

One of the discussions that emerged in religious and media discourse was the emergence of new figures who were active in conveying Islam through various media such as lectures, writing and training. In contrast to the characteristics and character of the previous Islamic authorities who regularly obtain education from authoritative and strict Islamic institutions, these new religious figures came from secular educational backgrounds. The previous authority appeared in turbans, and when they made a speech, it was full of Qur'anic quotations and traditions. However, the new figures presented themselves in casual clothing and used many terms closely related to the world of young people and urban Muslims. The attractive performance and packaging have made these new figures attract a broad audience in the Muslim community, especially urban Muslims.

The main argument put forward by ulama regarding the new religious authority is that the emergence of new media not only has given rise to the fragmentation of religious authority but has also eroded and replaced the old or traditional authority. Continuing the discussion, we argue that the new media does not undermine the traditional religious authority or the ulama and that traditional ulama can survive thanks to their struggles with new media precisely. In this chapter, we show that traditional religious authorities can adapt to new media and even contest in colouring the Islamic discourse of urban Muslim communities in Indonesia.

An important issue that also emerged in the discussion of religious authority and new media was the discourse of televangelism. Although televangelism was born and flourished in America, globalization has enabled everyone in the world to absorb, talk about and enjoy meeting ideas, media, technology, people and finance like an 'imagined world' (imagined world; Appadurai 1996). Olivier Roy (2004, 39) in his book *Globalized Islam* states that globalization has

necessitated the many similarities that occur between religious figures and discourses carried out by Protestant Christians and contemporary Islam such as born-again forms of religiosity. This similarity can be seen from the religious discourse carried by new Indonesian Muslim preachers, such as “*Hijrab*” which sounds like “born-again Christian” in Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians and suggestions for self-fashioning.

In Muslim countries, the phenomenon of televangelism has emerged with the development of information technology from television to the internet. In contrast to the phenomenon of Christian televangelism in America and Europe which is seen as “supply-side religion”, which is presenting religion among secular societies or societies experiencing religious privatization, in this chapter we propose the argument that Islamic televangelism in Indonesia is more likely to come from the term of Bryan Turner ‘s ‘Pietization’ (2010), which is encouraging personal piety through the discourse of “*Hijrab*” by sacralizing daily life such as consuming Islamic literature, Islamic fashion, Islamic housing, Islamic housing, halal products, Islamic banking and so forth.

This chapter aims to elaborate on the discussion of religious authority and new media in contemporary Indonesia. There are two things that we will highlight in this paper, i.e., first, the meeting of religious authorities and new media in which ulama believe creates religious authority fragmentation, and secondly about televangelism and Islamic televangelism in contemporary Indonesia which shows the melting of the boundaries of Islamic discourse with aspirations of modern life and the promotion of the commodification of religion as a medium of expression and articulation of piety.

Also, this chapter seeks to read and theoretically reflect research data on “Ulama Perceptions of the Nation-State” (2019)<sup>23</sup> which includes the “new ulama” category in the variant of respondents and informants. In general, research findings reveal that Islamic intellectual discussions such as the relationship between religion and the state appear to be absent from religious discourse carried by the new religious authority. Instead of linking Islamic discourse with the problem of diversity in Indonesian society, both interfaith and interreligious, the new religious authorities echoed more conservative personal piety practices that are in line with the market such as wearing hijab designed by Muslim women designers, settling in Islamic housing, refusing to shake hands with the opposite sex and recommendations for early marriage.

23 The research was initiated and carried out by PUSPIDEP-Postgraduate UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta in collaboration with PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP in 2018. The research was conducted in 15 cities in Indonesia. Further, see Ibn Burdah, Najib Kailani and Munirul Ikhwan (2019).

This chapter will first outline a discussion of religious authority, new media and celebrity culture by presenting theoretical discussions. Furthermore, the discussion will focus on the phenomenon of Islamic televangelism and televangelism in the Muslim world.

Finally, we will elaborate the development of Islamic televangelism from radio, television to the internet in Indonesia, including describing some traditional religious authority figures who have survived and coloured the landscape of religious authority in contemporary Indonesia.

### **RELIGION AUTHORITY, NEW MEDIA AND CELEBRITY CULTURE**

Scholars (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Eickelman and Anderson 2006; Turner 2007; Echchaibi 2007, 2011) show that the emergence of new media has contributed to the fragmentation of religious authority. According to them the rapid mass education in Muslim countries and the availability of Islamic literature both print and virtual have made it easier for many people to access Islamic readings without having to refer and ask directly to the ulama. This situation, in turn, presents a more democratic form of religion in which religious interpretations become diverse and no longer single. In other words, access to religious knowledge is no longer owned by the religious elite or commonly called ulama. Knowledge democratization takes place where all people have the same right to control and even claim power over religious knowledge.

Besides, this fragmentation is also believed to erode the old authority held by those who received special religious education such as madrasa or, Islamic boarding schools. Thus, they were able to understand the primary religious texts, especially the Qur'an and Hadith. Fragmentation results in the loss of ulama's monopoly over religious authority. The consequence is the birth of 'new authority.' Olivier Roy (1994, 90) refers to this authority as lumpen-intelligentsia or 'new intellectual'. They are religious figures who do not have an adequate Islamic education background. However, with the mastery of modern media, they can gain full recognition from the public.

The thesis about the fragmentation and the collapse of the authority of traditional ulama due to new media is not fully proven. It is true fragmentation occurred, but traditional ulama authority still plays an important role. Referring to the case in Central Asia, primarily, Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2002, 2; 2009) argued that traditional ulama authority persists and can adapt to changing times. In the Indonesian context, the appearance of many new figures commonly called "celebrity ulama" is indeed easy to encourage us to conclude the decline in the religious role of old figures such as *Kyai*, *Tuan Guru*, and *Buya*. The cosmopolitan celebrity ulama rival them.

Moreover, many of these celebrity religious teachers do not have adequate religious, educational backgrounds, commonly referred to as “preachers”.

The influence of celebrity ulama is arguably powerful in society, even exceeding local figures. However, it should be noted that the celebrity religious ulama come from diverse educational backgrounds so that it cannot necessarily be categorized as lumpen intelligentsia. Some of them have a strong Islamic educational background and are arguably following a clear line of religious scholarship.

Their authority is different from the authority of the *dai* who are pursuing clerical careers, especially in the aspect of the source of the claim. Traditional ulama claim their authority is based on the ability to access and interpret Islamic texts directly while *dai* claimed their authority through their function as a mere messenger of Islamic teachings.

In addition to giving birth to a new discourse of authority, the media also created a ‘celebrity culture,’ which is a celebrity-based culture or centered on the fame of people created by the media (media-generated fame); see Henderson 1992, 2005; Epstein 2005). This culture also applies to religious figures or ulama who enter the media industry. Celebrity culture is what gave birth to the so-called “celebrity ulama” or “celebrity *Kyai*.” If observed, this nickname implies two different sources of authority. One is a religious claim; the other is fame or fame. The relationship between celebrity and authority itself is not always seen as opposing to one another. The relationship can often be reciprocal. A person’s authority can make him a celebrity, and the celebrity can also gain authority. Applied in the context of religious authority (Islam), we can see the appearance of religious teachers or ulama in public can lead him to become a celebrity. We can also see a new phenomenon, i.e., celebrities who, thanks to their da’wah activities, are then recognized as *Ustaz*.

Of course, the source of authority of religious experts and celebrities is different. According to Frank Furedi (2010, 493), the appearance of celebrities is inseparable from the difficulty of society relating to the issue of authority. He is important not only because he has the “quality to attract attention,” but also because it is a “reference for others” (point of reference to others; Furedi 2010, 495). In this context, it can be understood why we often see celebrities working in da’wah being a source of religious reference. Their ability to attract the attention of many people gives birth to what Lynn Schofield Clark (2012, 115) refers to as a consensus-based authority, namely the ability to articulate widely accepted views and provide rational interpretations of events (Clark) 2012, 116).

## DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA

Being authoritative in a religious tradition always refers to the criteria and standards that are relatively agreed upon by the religious tradition. In Islam, the religious authority refers to figures who receive a strict Islamic education and have a chain of Islamic scientific traditions that can be accounted for. Also, they generally memorized and mastered in-depth the Qur'an and hadith (foundational texts) as well as classical texts in Islam. By this measure, they are called ulama or mufti, which are a source of reference in responding to religious problems faced by Muslim communities.

In the context of Indonesian Islam, Kaptein (2004) points out that there are some typologies of the authority of the fatwa ulama, namely traditionalists, modernists, and collectives. Kaptein said that the first type refers to individual forms of the fatwa that are considered to have the authority to issue Islamic fatwas. Kaptein gave an example of how Indonesian Muslims (read: the archipelago) collected questions related to daily life and brought it to a prominent Syafii ulama in Mecca, Ahmad Dahlan (r. 1888) who produced a fatwa collection entitled *Mubimmāt al-Nafā' is fī Bayān As'ilat al-Ḥadīts* as a reference for Indonesian Muslim religion at that time.<sup>24</sup>

Whereas the modernist type, related to the decentralization of fatwas, is to give freedom to individuals to issue fatwas without having to refer to the mufti in Mecca. Kaptein represents this second type with the phenomenon of Ahmad Hassan, the founder of Islamic Unity (PERSIS) while the collective fatwa is associated with the phenomenon of Bahtsul Masail, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah Tarjih Council and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), which is a forum for ulama from the three organizations to respond to the current problems of Muslims in Indonesia.

Ulama with strict religious education criteria and of course have in-depth religious knowledge in Indonesia are commonly referred to as 'Kyai.' In some areas outside Java such as Lombok and Kalimantan, they call it 'Tuan Guru.' They are generally affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama organizations, whose main base is in rural areas.

In addition to being called a *Kyai*, the term '*Gus*' also complements the vocation of religious authority among traditional Muslims. The term '*Gus*' is closely related to the figure of the fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia and former PBNU chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid, who is commonly called Gus Dur. The greeting '*Gus*' refers to the figure of a pesantren Kyai's child. Some famous figures who are often called '*Gus*' include Gus Dur and Gus Mus or Kyai Musthofa Bisri.

In the 90s, Islamic authority was also dominated by Muslim intellectuals who came from Islamic tertiary institutions such as IAIN

<sup>24</sup> On the collection of this fatwa, see Kaptein (1997).

(now UIN) and the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). These figures participated in Islamic discourse for the urban middle class through executive Qur'an recitation and television recitation programs such as "Wisdom of the Dawn" and others. The emergence of the term Muslim intellectuals in the discourse of Islamic authority in Indonesia cannot be separated from Suharto's politics which at the time was trying to embrace reformist Muslim groups to gain political support (Hefner 2000). Among the names of Muslim intellectuals who often convey Islamic views in public are Nurcholis Madjid, Kamaruddin Hidayat, Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Jalaluddin Rahmat, Quraish Shihab, and Nasarudin Umar (see Howell 2008).

In addition, Indonesians are also familiar with the terms '*dai*' and '*mubaligh*' (see Howell 2008; Millie 2017). This term seems to come from Arabic, which means 'the person who invited' and 'the person who delivered.' They act as preachers or religious advisors. The terms *dai* and *mubaligh* appear to be heavily used in the 1990s, especially attached to several figures who actively gave lectures via radio and cassettes. Their popularity is underpinned by their compelling and fascinating rhetorical ability to convey religious messages. They usually fill religious spheres in urban areas. Some figures who are attached to the nickname include Zainuddin MZ, Syukron Makmun, and Qosim Nurzaha. Nevertheless, the term '*Kyai*' or '*Kyai Haji*' is also embedded in the front of the names of some of the figures above. Probably, the overlap in the mention of '*Kyai*' and '*dai*' is related to the background of those who come from Islamic boarding schools.

In addition, in the late 1990s, the term '*Ustaz*' began to be used in conjunction with the terms '*dai*' and '*mubaligh*.' The term *Ustaz* seems popular in *balaqab*-based study groups on campuses and urban Taklim groups that are close to Tarbiyah, Salafi, and Hizb ut-Tahrir groups. In contrast to the preachers and preachers, the *Ustaz* call generally refers to figures who received religious education from universities in the Middle East, both Al-Azhar University, Imam Muhammad Ibnu Saud University, and Madinah University.

Besides men, the landscape of religious authority in Indonesia is also enlivened by women preachers. They are usually called as *ustazab*. Among the famous *ustazab* figures in the community are Lutfiah Sungkar and Mamah Dedeh. Both of them actively filled Islamic programs on television in Indonesia.

In its development, the term *Ustaz* seemed to replace the call of *dai* and *mubaligh*. The term or name of *Ustaz*, in turn, is not only given to those who participate in the Qur'an recitation in the halaqah groups but instead refers to the lecturers who fill the television and internet screens. This phenomenon is read from terms that are often

embedded in new figures in Islamic da'wah such as 'Ustaz Celebrity,' 'Ustaz Million Followers' and 'Ustaz YouTube.' Some famous figures called *Ustaz* include *Ustaz* Arifin Ilham, *Ustaz* Yusuf Mansur, and *Ustaz* Abdul Somad. Also, the shift in these names underlines the power of the media and celebrity culture in giving birth to new religious figures. Recent trends have revealed the popularity of the names of popular speakers such as UJE (*Ustaz* Jeffry Al-Bukhori), UAS (*Ustaz* Abdul Somad), and UAH (*Ustaz* Adi Hidayat).

### DISCOURSE OF ISLAMIC TELEVANGELISM AND TELEVANGELISM

As a discourse, televangelism first appeared in America marked by the use of radio and television as a medium for da'wah among evangelical Christians in the 1970s. Jose Casanova (1994) connects the phenomenon to the failure of secularization theory. It states that the more modern the society, religion will lose its influence in the public sphere or experience privatization. The secularization theory, which was so strong in the 1960s, was revised by Casanova. He proposed several religious phenomena that influenced the public, one of which was the emergence of a Christian conservative group (Christian Right) in America. Casanova argues that instead of religion being privatized, it has experienced 'deprivatization' or become a public religion.

One example that Casanova put forward in his book *Public Religion* is Evangelical Christian 'Moral Majority' under the leadership of Jerry Falwell. Through a television program, Jerry Falwell invites Americans to embrace Christianity because modernity is seen to have damaged the traditional values of society. A recent study by Susan Harding (1992, 2000) shows the significant influence of Falwell in the religious landscape in America. The 'Moral Majority' subsequently transformed into 'Southern Baptist' and Falwell stood out in the realm of American televangelism.

Although Casanova's argument was very influential in debating secularization theory, Bryan Turner (2010, 2011) said that the facts presented by Casanova were very public and political and had a tendency that religion in the private domain had disappeared. Continuing the discussion, Turner asked the question, what about religion in the private sphere? Did it really disappear or appear in another form?

Turner (2010, 2011) explained that secularization are categorized in two forms, political secularization and social secularization. Political secularization, according to him, is the doctrine of the separation of religion and state which in specific contexts has been criticized by Casanova. Whereas 'social secularization' according to him, is how religion entered the private sphere in the form of lifestyle and religious practices. Turner called this matter 'Pietization,' which is the practice

of godly lifestyles, which is closely related to the consumption of religious goods (commodification of religion). Turner said that the practice of piety triggered the development of ‘low-intensity religion’ or religion with low intensity.<sup>25</sup>

Turner’s view of ‘pietization’ is closely related to the latest televangelism discourse that uses market logic (economic model of religion) to package religious messages that are under the tastes of modern society. In the context of market religion, televangelists play the role of ‘religious entrepreneurs’ who seek to supply religion in brands, packages that can be accepted by religious consumers. In theory, it is referred to as ‘supply-side religion,’ which presents as many religions as possible in accordance with the tastes of modern society so that they embrace religion (Einstein 2008; Gauthier, Woodhead and Martikainen 2013; Turner 2014).

Among the forms of ‘supply-side religion’ are self-help gurus and motivational books. One of the televangelist figures that get the attention of ulama to study is Joel Osteen (Einstein 2008; Sinitiere 2012). Known as Osteen’s, the “smiling preacher,” succeeded his father to lead John Osteen Lakewood Church. He was more likely to be a self-help guru or motivator than a Christian priest or preacher. Instead of having an educational background in literature, Joel Osteen received a marketing education and was, therefore, able to package religious messages following the tastes of contemporary society. The books he wrote also appeared in the form of motivation rather than religious books. Most of his books are best-sellers on the market and are easy to find in bookstores and international airports. One of his best-selling works in the New York Times entitled *Become a Better You: 7 Keys to Improving Your Life Every day*. Also, his church programs looked like celebrity programs such as “*An Evening with Joel*.”

Olivier Roy (2004) said that in the era of globalization, modern religion was characterized by the character of ‘de-territorialization.’ Explicitly Roy said that globalization had necessitated the realization of the similarity of forms, methods, and discourse of contemporary Islam between Protestant Christians and Islam (Roy 2004). However, he underlined that this does not mean that Islam adopts Christianity. In the last two decades, ulama have paid much attention to the phenomenon of the emergence of Islamic televangelism in many Muslim countries.

In Egypt, several ulama (Bayat 2007; Echchaibi 2007; Moll 2012; Atia 2013; Jung, Peterson and Lei Sparre 2014) have examined the figure of Amr Khaleed, an accountant who began a career as an event

25 Pandangan Different views on the practice of piety in the context of secularization which have considerable influence among scientists are Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, and Charles Hirschkind. However, we will explore the debate at this moment.

host in a television talk show with leading Egyptian ulama, Yusuf Al-Qardawi. Because of his informal appearance and slang language style, Khaleed, in turn, became a popular television lecturer among young Egyptians. Besides Khaleed, several other popular preachers in Egypt included Khaled al-Gendy and Muhammad Abdel Gawad (Zaied 2008).

In Kuwait, there is the figure of Tareq Al-Suwaydan who is a celebrity lecturer and motivator through the Islamic television channel Al-Resalah. Al-Suwaydan invited young Muslims to become business people and entrepreneurs. The content of his lecture was heavily influenced by the work of Stephen R. Covey, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* (Echchaibi 2007). In Saudi Arabia, there is a trendy preacher who is popular among young people named Ahmad Al-Shugairi. This engineering graduate from an American university runs a popular television program called *Yalla Shabab*. The program was also said to have received high ratings in young Saudi viewers (Nasr 2011, 182; Wright 2011, 176-184).

### **ISLAMIC TELEVANGELISM IN INDONESIA**

In Indonesia, the phenomenon of Islamic televangelism cannot be separated from the establishment of private television in the 1980s, which allowed many preachers to have the opportunity to deliver da'wah. The past was dominated by TVRI, the only state-owned television station. The presence of new television stations opened up space for the preachers to convey Islam to a broader public audience than before.

Nevertheless, television is not the only media that gave birth to televangelism. Radio also played an essential role in the history of televangelism, which later gave birth to the phenomenon of the "electronic church." In Indonesia, before the private television station was born, radio preceded television in giving birth to preachers who were widely known in the Indonesian Muslim community. The following explanation will explain the role of radio, cassette, and television in giving birth to televangelists in Indonesia.

### **THE ROLE OF RADIO, CASSETTES AND TV**

Until around the end of the 1980s, radio, cassettes, and TV were prevalent media for the spread of Islam in Indonesian Muslim communities. Arguably, radio became the earliest modern medium used in broadcasting Islam. In the period before independence, national Muslim figures such as Haji Agus Salim filled Islamic religious programs on various radio stations. The Sultan of Surakarta established a radio station that broadcasts not only entertainment and news but also Islamic religious programs such as the Qur'an and religious lectures (see Wiryawan 2011).

After the independence period, many Muslim figures appeared to deliver Islamic lectures on radio stations. Among the radio stations that are famous for their religious lectures are RRI Jakarta, Kayu Manis radio (Jakarta), and Kenanga Radio (Yogyakarta). Besides, radio stations in regions in Indonesia also broadcast Islamic religious lectures.

These Islamic lecture programs on the radio have given birth to Muslim figures who achieved national popularity. Among the distinguished lecturers at the time were Buya Hamka (d. 1981), KH Qasim Nurzaha (d. 2013), and K.H. AR Fachruddin (d. 1995) from Muhammadiyah. Later in the 1980s, the most popular speaker on the radio was K.H. Zainuddin MZ (d. 2011) known to the public as “Dai of A Million People.”

Besides radio, another essential media in the spread of Islam is the cassette. At that time, Tilawatil Quran, Islamic songs, and lectures can be accessed by the public through tapes that are widely sold. The religious lectures of Buya Hamka and Qasim Nuzeha, for example, were recorded on tapes and sold. However, the most successful dissemination of religious lectures in the form of cassettes is probably Zainuddin MZ. His lecture tapes were played in most corner of the country, both in homes (via tape) and on radios.

The coming of the internet era does not necessarily make radio obsolete for the spread of Islam. Referring to the Solo case, as written by Sunarwoto (2013, 2015), radio is still an essential medium for Islamic propaganda until now. A large number of radios in Solo has given birth to celebrity preachers at the local level. There is not enough data on the background of all preachers on radio and cassettes. However, when referring to famous names, it can be said that they generally have a relatively strong Islamic primary education. Buya Hamka, who is a well-known writer, is also known as an ulama who produces profound Islamic works such as *Tafsir Al-Azhar*.

Qasim Nurzaha probably included exceptions. He has no background in formal Islamic education or boarding. He studied Islam among the late ulama Abdul Gaffar Ismail, who came from Padang and died in Pekalongan in 1998. From this teacher, he learned, among others, the yellow book. In short, he studied Islam informally (see Maulana, 2008).

In addition to radio and cassettes, a prominent media for the spread of Islam is television. Until the mid-1980s, Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) became the only television station in Indonesia. Therefore, not many preachers were born who filled broadcasts of Islam on television at that time. Only in the late 1980s did several private television stations stand up to give more space for Islamic lecture programs (Rakhmani 2016).

Television lecturers who were popular at that time also generally became speakers on television. AR Fachruddin, Qasim Nurzaha, and

later Zainuddin MZ are examples. The emergence of Islamic lectures on television has given rise to a phenomenon called televangelism. Julia Howell noted that the phenomenon that emerged in Indonesia since the 1970s was marked by the emergence of Islamic lecture activities on television. According to Howell, Muslim televangelists were different from Egyptian televangelists, who were traditional ulama. The 1980s televangelists, according to Howell (2008), consisted of public intellectuals who wore businesslike suits or luxurious batik-like the ones worn by the secularly educated elite. Many of them have pesantren education and at the same time higher education universities and study social sciences.

The preachers were generally referred to as *Kyai* or *Buya* (for the context of West Sumatra). There is one interesting thing about the covers of Zainuddin MZ's lecture tapes. On some of the covers of the tapes, the title "*Ustaz*" is listed before the name Zainuddin MZ. However, Zainuddin MZ during his career as a preacher was better known as a *Kyai* than an *Ustaz*. From a historical point of view, the popularity of the *Kyai* in Indonesia and especially Java did precede the popularity of the *Ustaz* title. The dominant public imagination motivated public acceptance of Zainuddin as an ulama rather than as an ulama at that time about the figure of a religious figure.

Before the internet era, the participation of female preachers on television was arguably not too much. Two of them are very famous. The first was the late Ustazah Lutfiah Sungkar (d. 2015) who was famous for giving lectures on the Conditioning of Faith on Indonesian television. According to Karlina Helmanita (2002), the appearance of Lutfiah Sungkar in the world of da'wah is a new phenomenon, which is not derived from Islamic educational backgrounds. The second and still very active today is Mamah Dedeh. She graduated from IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and was born into a santri family. Furthermore, her father is a *Kyai*.<sup>26</sup>

### PREACHER PLUS MOTIVATOR

As Akh Muzakki (2012, 50-52) notes, in the era of Islamic televangelism in Indonesia, the educational background is no longer a big problem for the audience in evaluating preachers. Muzakki stated two main things

that caught the attention of the audience, namely personality and social appropriateness. It is where the new dai-dai appears, replacing the popularity of the old *dai* above. Aa Gym, Jeffry Al-Bukhori, Yusuf Mansur, and Solmed (Sholeh Mahmud) are among the new preachers who later dominated television lectures (see Watson 2005; Hasan 2009; Hoesterey 2016; Kailani 2018b). Their preachings were more

<sup>26</sup> The research of Mama Dedeh can be seen in Sofjan and Hidayati (2013).

focused on matters of personal piety. As Moll said, this type of preach relies on the persuasive power of “storytelling” taken from the Qur’an and related to the daily lives of Muslims.

In addition to storytelling, the appeal of these new televangelists lies mainly in their expertise in packaging religious messages so they can be consumed by audiences who also have new aspirations in religious matters that are modern and entertaining. This packaging is called by some ‘*Da’wabtainment*’ (Howell 2014; Rakhmani 2016), which is a combination of religious advice and entertainment. It is in line with the development of evangelical Christian and Neo-Pentecostal televangelism in America which appears more as ‘self-help teachers’ than preachers, contemporary Muslim televangelists in Indonesia also often appear as motivators or trainers rather than lecturers or combinations of both (preacher-cum-trainer). Howell (2013, 2014) mentions that late modernity has made many religious categories appear stable and remain fluid. Howell points out that the boundary line between the preacher and the trainer appears blurred and overlapping. Taking the case studies of Aa Gym and Ary Ginanjar, Howell said that although Aa Gym is better known as a preacher, the content is dominated in motivational nuances than religious lectures. On the other hand, Ary Ginanjar, known to the public as a trainer, developed his training with Islamic content rather than motivation (see Rudnycky 2010).

Kailani (2018a) shows that the figure of an Islamic televangelist who combines preachers-cum-trainers is not typical of the post-Reformation Islamic phenomena in Indonesia. He revealed that the phenomenon had begun since the late 1990s as seen in the figures of Imaduddin Abdurrahim and Toto Tasmara. After the Reformation, this phenomenon is increasingly apparent in the landscape of the new religious authority in Indonesia as seen in figures such as Syafii Antonio, Yusuf Mansur, Felix Siauw and Salim A Fillah, most of whom are active in writing Islamic motivational books but also convey them through lectures and motivational training.

Besides television, internet technology also shapes the practice of Islamic televangelism. These new preachers appeared and received a huge welcome. They made the internet and especially social media as a medium to spread their lecture videos. The internet allows anyone to upload lectures. This is where we see the appearance, in terms of Denis J. Bekkering (2001, 103), the “*intervangelists*”, namely the preachers who make the internet as the primary medium for spreading their lectures. This phenomenon of *intervangelism*<sup>27</sup> arises along with new facilities that make it possible to upload videos to the internet such as Youtube. This phenomenon gave birth to famous

27 Bekkering does not use the term “*intervangelism*” but only refers to “*intervangelism*”.

preachers such as UAS, UAH, Felix Siauw, and others..

The most important thing to underline is that Intervangelism gives birth to more preachers than television. The production of lecture videos no longer depends on the television industry and has become like a home industry that can be done by anyone who has internet access. They generally consist of young preachers who come from various educational backgrounds. From the gender side, we can see that more and more women are participating in this religious lecture activity. Among the examples are Ustazah Pipik, Ustazah Indadari, Ustazah Peggy Melati Sukma and Ustazah Oki Setiana Dewi.

### **TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY AND NEW MEDIA: FOUR CASES**

There are at least four essential examples to prove that traditional ulama remains steadfast amid the emergence of new Islamic figures. They are *Ustaz* Abdus Somad, *Ustaz* Hanan Attaki, *Ustaz* Adi Hidayat and *Kyai* Anwar Zahid. These four religious figures became famous thanks to their lectures on social media. They are arguably reaching celebrity degrees and are therefore worthy of being called '*Ustaz* celebrities'. They have a better Islamic knowledge education compared to other ulama celebrity and have strong scientific tradition roots. Thus, the legitimacy of these four figures is different from other figures such as Aa Gym or Felix Siauw, who do not have the legitimacy of classical scientific traditions.

#### *Abdus Somad*

*Ustaz* Abdus Somad (UAS) cannot be entirely referred to as a new authority.<sup>28</sup> He has a history of Islamic education that is arguably qualified as an ulama. He took a traditional boarding school education. After that, he studied Islam in one of the most important centres of Islamic education in the Islamic world, namely Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt. He then continued his Islamic education also at one of the essential Islamic universities in the Islamic world, namely in Morocco. Inevitably, the three Islamic educational institutions are places where prospective ulama build Islamic scientific authority. Ideologically, he was born from the traditional Islamic organization Al-Washliyah.

UAS has a very diverse audience in terms of Islamic ideology, ranging from traditionalists to modernists, from among activists and non-activists. On February 22, 2018, UAS participated in religious lectures among traditionalists at the Krapyak Islamic Boarding School in Yogyakarta.<sup>29</sup> On the next day, February 23, 2018, he moved to

28 A comprehensive scientific study of *Ustaz* Abdus Somad was conducted by Dony Arung Triantoro (2019).

29 See video footage of his lecture at Pondok Krapyak at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZ112ocgb5k> (accessed 12 April 2019).

lecture Tarbiyah activists in Jogokaryan, which was located next to the Krapyak Islamic Boarding School. He also gave lectures in modernists groups. Acceptance of UAS in various audience groups is what distinguishes it from Hanan Attaki and Anwar Zahid.

*Ustaz Adi Hidayat*<sup>30</sup>

Ustaz Adi Hidayat (UAH) comes from modernist family background, namely Muhammadiyah. He also received the Darul Arqam Muhammadiyah pesantren education in Garut, West Java. Also, he studied with ulama in West Java. He studied tertiary education at UIN Jakarta. Just like UAS, he graduated from a Libya Islamic education institute.

UAH audiences are generally young people who access their lectures on social media. With a modernist background, he is more accepted among modernists. He is recognized as a Muhammadiyah preacher. UAH is also popular among Tarbiyah activists.

*Ustaz Hanan Attaki*

Ustaz Hanan Attaki is not entirely a new authority.<sup>31</sup> From his educational point of view, it is clear that he can access the primary sources of Islam, the Qur'an and hadith as well as others directly. He graduated from the Usuluddin Faculty of Tafsir at Al-Azhar University, Egypt. He inherited the Islamic scientific tradition that has developed for centuries at the university.

Hanan Attaki's audience is not as diverse as UAS audience. He is famous among Tarbiyah activists and young people, especially netizens. He is not popular among traditionalist Muslims, even though he has an Islamic educational background from the Middle East.

*Kyai Anwar Zahid*

KH Anwar Zahid represented the traditional authority of par excellence.<sup>32</sup> He had traditionally received ulama status from pesantren. Unlike other figures above, KH Anwar Zahid has never been educated abroad. He is more famous among his audience as an ulama rather than an '*Ustaz*' like Abdul Somad and Hanan Attaki. It means that Anwar Zahid built his religious authority on the Islamic tradition, which has a long history in the pesantren tradition. One important note from Anwar Zahid is that he did not come from an elite boarding school. Thanks to his oratorical abilities and educational

30 See the biography of Ustaz Adi Hidayat in <https://custom.com/islami-store/biography-and-performance-ustadz-adi-hidayat-lc-extraordinary-profile> (accessed April 5, 2019).

31 About Ustaz Hanan Attaki and his missionary camp, see Ibtisam Han (2018) 32 For a scholarly review of Anwar Zahid's monk, see Kiptiah (2017).

32 For a scholarly review of Anwar Zahid's monk, see Kiptiah (2017).

background of his pesantren, Anwar Zaid was able to climb the ladder of popularity as a celebrity ulama. He then founded a boarding school named Pondok Pesantren Asy-Shafi'iyah in Bojonegoro, East Java.

Anwar Zahid's audiences, who are traditionalist Muslims affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), are arguably more ideologically limited. He is not well-known among the modernist or Tarbiyah activists. Even the figure and style of his lectures often get harsh criticism from both these circles. Humour and language style often do not suit the audience of both circles.<sup>33</sup>

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a theoretical discussion with empirical evidence about the encounter of religious authority with new media which has implications for the fragmentation of religious authority and the birth of new religious authority. Scholars point out that the fragmentation of authority in Muslim societies is a consequence of the advancing middle-class Muslim education and the increasingly sophisticated media and communication infrastructure. Islamic interpretation is no longer monopolized by traditional authorities or ulama but involves ordinary people who can access Islamic readings as a source of reference for daily life (*objectification of religion*).

Nevertheless, this article also explains that the existence of new media and new Islamic authority does not necessarily undermine the existence of traditional authority. Referring to Qasim Zaman and presenting several case studies such as the Ustad Abdus Shomad and Anwar Zahid phenomena, we argue that instead of disappearing, traditional religious authorities can survive and adapt to new media.

In addition, the discourse of Islamic televangelism seems to have much in common with that carried out by Protestant Christian televangelism such as "born-again Christian" which is in line with the idea of *bijrab*. This chapter also reveals that Islamic televangelism in many Muslim countries, including Indonesia, shows a 'pietization' discourse in which the expression and articulation of Islam appear to be intimate in the consumerism lifestyle. In other words, Islamic televangelism has presented a form of religion that is close to the market (market friendly) through the sacralization of daily life by consuming religious items.

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33 This oratorical difference between modernist and traditionalist lecturers has been researched in depth by Keeler (1998); and Millie (2012; 2013).

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## **SURVIVAL STRATEGY AND ACTIVITIES OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN MINORITY AREAS**

*Ro'fah & Eva Latipah*

Ulama and religious leaders play a central role in negotiating Muslim positions against non-Muslims in areas where Muslims are a minority. As a representation of Muslims, ulama are the spearhead of Muslim relations with the majority group. They play a role in voicing aspirations and ensuring that Muslim interests are accommodated. Internally, Muslims themselves play the role of educators who shape understanding, thinking patterns and expressions of Muslim religious identity. In the context of the nation-state, the main argument that we build in this chapter is that the acceptance of ulama towards the nation-state and its high dimensions in these areas should be seen as a 'survival strategy' to ensure their existence as a minority. Ulama wants to show that Muslims are good citizens of the country and good citizens of the city and even become an essential player in the process of nationalism development in local and national areas. In this effort, ulama and Muslims in minority areas undertake various negotiating steps to strike a balance between the need to express their Muslim identity on one side and remain a good citizen on the other side.

This chapter is based on research data on "Ulama Perceptions about the Nation-State," specifically from four cities in Eastern Indonesia, namely: Kupang, Denpasar, Ambon, and Manado. These four cities are representations of areas where Islam is considered a minority, or in the case of Ambon, because of its history, "prioritized" (Noor 2019). Reading the religious dynamics (Islam) in these areas indeed cannot be separated from Muslim and non-Muslim relations as the majority group; Protestants in Ambon, Kupang, and Manado, and Hindus in Denpasar. Although recent developments show an increasing number of Muslims in these areas, culturally and politically Muslims still position themselves as a minority.

## CHANGES IN MUSLIM DEMOGRAPHY

Most of the literature argues that Islam entered Indonesia in the 13th century through traders from Gujarat, India, although scientists insisted on defending Arabic and Persian theories (Azra 2006). The dominance of Islam in Indonesia occurred at the end of the 15th century with the establishment of 20 Islamic empires. Catholic Christians were brought into Indonesia by the Portuguese, especially on the islands of Flores and Timor (Boelaars 2005). The Dutch introduced Protestant Christians in the 16th century AD. The area of animism in Eastern Indonesia and other parts is the leading destination of the Dutch people, including Maluku, Nusa Tenggara, Papua, and Kalimantan. Christianity spread through the coast of Borneo. Missionaries arrived in Toraja, Sulawesi. The Sumatra region was also targeted by missionaries, especially the Bataks (Goh 2005).

Religion in Indonesia plays an essential role in people's lives. It is stated in the ideology of the Indonesian nation, Pancasila, in the first principle, 'Belief in the one and only God' is the result of a compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and a secular state. Several religions collectively influence various fields such as politics, economics, culture, and even education (Intan 2006; Hosen 2005; Seo 2013). To date, there are six recognized religions in Indonesia based on the Explanation of Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1965 concerning Prevention of Abuse and/or Blasphemy of Article 1', namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (Marshall 2018; Shah 2017).

According to the results of the 2010 Indonesian population census of 87.18 percent of the 237,641,326 inhabitants of Indonesia are Muslims (Gross 2016), Protestants 6.96 percent, Catholics 2.9 percent, Hindus 1.69 percent, Buddhists 0.72 percent, Confucius 0.05 percent and 0.13 percent other religions, and 0.38 percent were not answered or not asked. Based on this data, it is evident that Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world (Shah 2017). Most of the Muslims in Indonesia are in the western part of Indonesia, such as on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Madura, and Kalimantan. For the Eastern region, many Muslim residents settled in the Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and North Maluku regions. However, Muslims in the East are not the majority, but the minority.

Islam in Eastern Indonesia is a developed research area, but it still receives less attention compared to Western Indonesia. Some Eastern regions such as East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), Papua, Makassar, and Maluku are often considered as Christian or Catholic enclaves, and Muslims are the minority. There is no explanation regarding this phenomenon, but there are some historical records that might

help. Some studies show that Islam entered the Eastern region a little later than the Western area of Indonesia, although - as said - Islam came first or at the same time as Catholicism. Studies of Fok (1997) and Hueken (2008) for example show that Catholic missionaries invaded the territory of Timor in 1642 through Flores and then in the 17th century 2500 East Timorese converted to this religion. The 17th century, according to Ardhana (2000), also became a time for Islam to enter the NTT region through Ternate (Maluku) and Gowa in Sulawesi. In other words, Islam entered Maluku and Sulawesi much earlier. The kingdom of Ternate, for example, became an Islamic kingdom in the 15th century, while the kingdom of Goa in Makassar had existed since the 14th century. From data on the entry of Catholics in NTT, Christian domination in this area may have been due to the success of the Portuguese invaders in converting residents to Catholics. Meanwhile, Islam remained concentrated in the areas where the entry routes of Islam were Flores, Alor, and Ende.

The dominance of Hindu religion and culture in Bali can also be drawn to the era of colonialism. According to Suhadi (2019,366), the Dutch government created Bali based on their vision as a Hindu island surrounded by the surrounding Islamic islands. This vision arose because of the “trauma” the Dutch faced various Islamic movements in Java and Sumatra. In other words, Bali is positioned by the Dutch as an opposition to Islam. Dutch government continued to build policy in order to control and maintain Bali based on the objectives and initial vision. Up till this day, the traditional village government system that was formed in 1920 continues to leave its influence.

It is essential to underline that the latest statistical records in the four regions clearly show an increasing number of Muslims. Kupang BPS data, for example, in 2013 recorded an increase in the number of Muslims by 11.06 percent. This percentage brought Islam as the third-largest religion after Protestant and Catholic. Similar conditions occur in Denpasar. The Statistical Census Office in Bali shows that in 1972 the number of Hindus reached 92.93 percent of the total population. There does not appear to be any record of the number of Muslims in the data. The latest data, in 2010, showed the percentage of Hindus fell to 83.46 percent, while Muslims accounted for 13.37 percent. The same condition also happened in Manado.

In 1999 the number of Manado Muslims made up 49 percent of the total population, while 51 percent were Christians. Interestingly, The Statistical Census Office (BPS) data for 2018 records that the Muslim population is only at 37.78 percent, which ranks second after Christianity, which is adhered to by 54.32 percent of the population.

Data from the four cities in this paper show that the increase in

the number of Muslims is due to migration, not conversion. Bali, Manado, Kupang, and Ambon are urban areas that attract migrants from various regions, and the majority of migrants are Muslim. However, of course, the conversion factor is not entirely gone. Even though on a small scale, the conversion is still one of the causes of the increase in the number of Muslims considering interfaith marriage is a common practice in minority areas both in the history of the spread of Islam then, or in the present context. In many cases religious marriages impact on the conversion of either from other religions to Islam, or vice versa. It is the consequence for Muslims in several areas, especially Kupang and Manado that it becomes a sensitive issue and often categorized as Christianization efforts.

Is the majority-minority conversation always related to quantity? Sociologist Louis Wirth in 1941 published *Morale and Minority Groups*. He argued about the classification of minorities, not about statistic instead of the othering processes or differences in treatment received by those who were considered to be different both socially and culturally. This difference is then emphasized by the participation barriers experienced by this group. Wirth (1941) expressly states, “Your people could be” apart “and marginalized even if you made up 60 percent of the population”. The phenomenon described by Wirth might, in some aspects, reflect Ambon’s experience. Data from Noor (2019) illustrates that Ambon city since the beginning of its history cannot be said to be an Islamic minority because the Muslim population is already significant. In the latest developments, even slowly Islam appears to be the majority. However, Noor stressed the efforts made by the colonial government to prioritize Muslims through the religious polarization policy adopted by the Portuguese occupation and continued during the Dutch period. In this policy, the preference of the colonial government was given to Christian groups, so it was not surprising when the Japanese invaders arrived in this region. Muslims welcomed them enthusiastically hoping that discrimination against Muslims would diminish. What happened was the continued geographical segregation between Muslims and non-Muslims who were the legacy of colonial policies, and contributed significantly to the Ambon riots in 1998. This polarization later became the focus of the post-riot Christian Muslim reconciliation program by using or reviving local traditions, especially *Pela Gandong*.

The dynamics and mentality of the majority-minority become even enjoyable if we look at the narrative of resistance voiced by Muslims in Kupang and Manado. Some informants in Kupang state that Islam is the oldest religion in East Nusa Tenggara and therefore the “strength” of Islam as part of NTT culture is not in doubt. Some of the informants even showed their “suspicion” of statistical data

that put Islam in the third position, assuming that this was a policy of marginalization. They feel the number of Muslims is significant enough to usher in Islam as the second largest religion in NTT. Another informant stated that although Muslims minorities, they are a substantial minority because from the beginning, the economic and social role of Muslims in NTT and Kupang, in particular, was quite dominant. This statement may not be without reason given that Muslim immigrants from Sulawesi, Java, and Sumatra are in control of crucial sectors such as basic needs. The strong economic position of these newcomers, according to some parties, has led to the social jealousy of indigenous people towards Muslim immigrants, which were one of the factors behind the 30 November 1998 tragedy.

The Manado Muslim narrative turned out to be not much different. Although statistics show that the number of Muslims is at 37.78 percent, second only to Christians at 51, some Manado Muslims feel that their number is 50: 50 compared to Christians. From Eva Latipah's exposure (2019), the increase in the number of Muslims in Manado was also caused by migration, especially the designation of this area as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In 10 years, Manado has become the center of economic activity in Eastern Indonesia as well as the gateway to the Asia Pacific. Of course, it invited immigrants from outside the region, especially Java and Sumatra, to participate in the increasingly crowded Manado market.

Demographic changes as can be seen above certainly have an effect not only on diversity but also on other social aspects, including majority-minority relations. From the above explanation, it is clear that the confidence of Muslim communities in these regions increased and then gave rise to a "narrative of resistance" to the minority position that they had been experiencing. Among the narratives of resistance that can be identified are, firstly, claims of the number of Muslims who do not always conform to statistical data to reject minority labels, or at least secondly, self-identification as a dominant minority; a minority that dominates important sectors in economic and social life.

### **RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR AND RELIGIOUS ENTREPRENEUR IN MUSLIM MINORITY AREA**

Ulama occupy a vital place in the lives of Muslims. In many ways, the ulama is seen as occupying religious positions and authority as the inheritors of the authority of the Prophet Muhammad (*al-amulamā' warattsattu 'l-anbiyā'*). Therefore ulama are highly respected. Their opinions are seen as authoritative in a variety of issues, not just religious matters but problems in other fields, including education. Ulama have played an essential role in the development of Islamic

education in Indonesia long before engaging in national politics, through the establishment of various pesantren, with the yellow book as the curriculum (Noorhaidi 2019). Ulama in this context are people who have a formal religious education background, i.e., studying and exploring religious texts. They specifically came from educational institutions such as Islamic boarding schools, leading Islamic universities in the world (Al-Azhar, Ibn Saud, Tarim Hadramaut), state institutions (State Islamic Universities / State Islamic Institutes of Religion) or those who studied specifically through the strict tradition of Taklim assemblies. Ulama have knowledge in the fields of *fiqh*, monotheism, Sufism, or Islamic education and other Islamic fields. With this educational background and knowledge, they have the authority to convey religious messages and are recognized by their congregants (Suhadi & Miftah Suseno 2019). Ulama like these are called religious scholars.

The religious scholar is also an educator. Many ulama work as educators and are known as “*Ustaz*.” The title *Ustaz* precedes names that have historically been used for respected teachers and artists, most often musicians. *Ustaz* is also used to refer to teachers, educators, or experts. Even in Arabic-speaking countries, the word *Ustaz* refers to a university professor or lecturer.

Overall, Indonesian ulama who were respondents in the research in 15 cities (Burdah, Kailani and Ikhwan 2019) who were the sources of this chapter have educational levels as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Levels of Indonesian Ulama Education

Figure 1 shows that the majority of ulama in 15 major cities in Indonesia have a Doctorate degree (32.2 percent), followed successively by ulama who have a Masters degree (30.4 percent), Bachelor degree (29.95 percent), and high school degree (5.4 percent). In one of the Muslim minority regions, the majority of ulama have a Masters degree (30 percent), a Bachelor degree (30 percent), and a Doctorate degree (24 percent), and a high school degree (6 percent).

Level of education can affect the way of thinking, attitude, and

behavior. The higher the level of education, the more extensive and in-depth knowledge gained. Ulama with higher education level gains knowledge and experience more broadly and deeply compared to ulama who have lower education level. With the broader and deeper knowledge and experience in theology, it enables them to be more open and more adaptive to different knowledge and other experiences. Ulama are more receptive to differences of understanding. Borrowing the term Allport, in such conditions, individuals have religious maturity. It is proven that ulama in Indonesia have a high level of acceptance (71.56 percent) of the concept of the nation-state. Even the level of acceptance in Muslim minority areas has a higher tendency (26.44 percent) compared to metropolitan cities (22.89 percent) and mainstream Muslim cities (22.22 percent).

Ulama in this context are also those who do not have a rigorous level of education but have religious knowledge obtained through available and easily accessible sources, such as translation books, studies, and listening to and following the Qur'an recitation in new media such as television and various social media (YouTube, Whatsapp, Facebook, Vlog, etc.). Thus they have religious authority because they are seen as able to package religious messages in an exciting manner conveyed to the broader community (Suhadi & Miftah Suseno 2019). Scholars like this are termed, religious entrepreneurs.




Figure 2. Educational Background of Ulama: Islamic Boarding Schools and Non-Islamic Boarding Schools

In Figure 2 above, it can be seen that the number of ulama with non-pesantren education background is higher (70.22 percent) compared to ulama with pesantren education background (29.78 percent). It means that more ulama have been selected as the subjects of this study with non-pesantren educational backgrounds compared to those with pesantren education backgrounds. It is a strong indication of how the development of science and technology has a powerful influence on the way how religious knowledge spread, and how Muslims do their religious procedures. In one Muslim minority region, 80 percent of ulama are religious entrepreneurs, the rest (20 percent) are religious scholars, with ages ranging from 29-40 years to 60 percent (Latipah 2019).

Pesantren is a place where a person learns about the fundamental and core beliefs of Islam and the teachings of ritual practices that form the basis of Islamic worship (Dadan Muttaqin 1999). Islamic boarding schools are also educational institutions and teachings of Islam which are generally carried out with a non-classical system. The Kyai teaches Islamic religious knowledge to his students based on books written in Arabic (Sajoko Prasojko 1982). Pesantren is one of the Islamic education systems in Indonesia with unique characteristics and is considered the oldest Islamic education institution (Nurun 2007). In Indonesia, pesantren education is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Religion, Directorate of Diniyah Education and Islamic Boarding Schools (Kemenag 2016). The Directorate of Diniyah Education and Islamic Boarding School has the scope of covering: formal education pathways (formal *diniyah*, *muadalah* education units, and *ma'bad 'ali*) and non-formal (madrasa *diniyah takmiliyah*, Alquran education, and equality education programs and Islamic boarding schools as organizers and education unit; Tempo 2018).

Then where did these ulama get their religious knowledge? As stated above, they obtained religious knowledge from various translation books, followed and listened to the Qur'an in new media such as television and various social media (YouTube, WhatsApp, Facebook, Vlog, etc.). Indirectly these findings indicate that religious entrepreneurs have more presentations than religious scholars.

This finding is in tune with the majority of the inhabitants of the earth today, which is the millennial generation, those born from 1980-2000. The earth's population is currently dominated by millennial generation (87 percent). Religious entrepreneurs are the millennial generation of ulama who have different characteristics from previous generations ranging from culture, attitudes, behavior, and other things. It also impacts on the culture, attitudes, and behaviors of its diversity. It occurred because millennials live in a time in which

everything is available. They use what has been discovered by the previous generation, namely generation X. For the millennial generation, learning religion can be done through various media with the help of technology, or more precisely using social media. In the millennial era, young people like digital-friendly *Ustaz*. Therefore it is not surprising that today millennial ulama have more followers because they use social media as a place to preach.

Technology-based Islamic learning resources is one of the reasons today's *Ustaz* have left the Islamic boarding school and studied religious knowledge from various media. Their reasons are quite diverse. In general, they prefer to study religious knowledge through the internet due to efficiency. According to them, the internet has become a complete source of religious learning. Whatever information is needed is on the internet. One *Ustaz* in the Muslim minority said that *'pesantren are strongly bound only in terms of relations with the Kyai who are the repositories of knowledge. Now, the source of knowledge is wide open, so access to knowledge no longer needs a cleric — Kyai, now more as a source for seeking blessing'*.

### **ACCEPTANCE OF ULAMA: SURVIVAL STRATEGY**

Once again, ulama in Indonesia have a high level of acceptance (71.56 percent) of the concept of the nation-state. Even the level of acceptance in Muslim minority areas has a higher tendency of 26.44 percent, compared to metropolitan cities (22.89 percent) and mainstream Muslim cities (22.22 percent). Why did this happen? What is the explanation? Ulama in minority areas gave different reasons for their acceptance in various national dimensions. However, in general, this acceptance needs to be seen as an effort and survival strategy amid the culture of the dominant group.

The Bali case reflects this phenomenon quite clearly. The high level of acceptance of Balinese ulama towards the idea of Pancasila as a state ideology, choice of nonviolent action, freedom of choice of religion, freedom of worship, and freedom of association are their survival strategies amid the dominant culture and the rise of Hindu identity politics. It can be seen more clearly in the acceptance and negotiation of Balinese Muslims towards the revitalization of Hindu culture which is now carried through the movements and policies of *Ajeng Bali*, which supports Bali as a world tourist destination. *Ajeng Bali* is a movement to strengthen Hinduism as an identity politics that aims to preserve Balinese religion, culture, and language — at the same time, becoming a bulwark against the flow of Muslim immigrants and increasingly striking expression of Islamic identity. One of the manifestations of *Ajeng Bali* is the obligation for school students and government employees to wear traditional clothes on certain days.

In practice, Balinese Muslims negotiate by accepting the policy, but at the same time modifying the use of clothing to suit Islamic guidance. The result is the use of Balinese kebaya complete with Kamen (below) but still wearing the hijab (headgear) for girls. Meanwhile, male Muslim students and employees continue to wear Balinese-style headgear because there are no Islamic rules that forbid the wearing of headgear for Muslims. In general, Balinese Muslims also accept the consequences of living in Bali as a world tourism destination that is very open. The Government of Bali pays homage to freedom for tourists as one of the best services to tourists.

In Kupang, 70 percent of Ulama are moderate towards the nation-state. The results of Ro'fah's interview (2019) with Kupang ulama, identified that acceptance occurred because of an agreement. The agreement became an important point in the acceptance of Muslims towards the Republic of Indonesia, with the normative reason that the Koran never explicitly talked about the concept of the state or the ideal state form. Kupang's Muslim identity as the 'son of the nation,' which has the same role and rights as part of Indonesia, is another reason why Kupang scholars accept the concept of the nation-state. Loyalty to a legitimate government is another reason why Kupang scholars accept the nation-state. For them, loyalty to a legitimate government is one of the teachings they profess. Regarding the survival strategy described earlier, loyalty to local government - the majority of which are non-Muslims - provides a more realistic picture. For Kupang Muslims, although they want Muslim leaders, they show good acceptance of local leaders who are predominantly non-Muslim. As long as non-Muslim leadership is considered to accommodate Muslim interests, there is no reason to reject them, moreover, according to further scholars, the real condition of Muslim citizens does not allow them to have Muslim leaders. At the same time, the scholars also interpreted that the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were fixed prices that could no longer be negotiated, and therefore, the formalization of Sharia in Indonesia was seen as insignificant.

A similar thing happened in Ambon, in which 97 percent of the ulemas accepted the nation-state for a number of reasons. Mutual agreement as the Indonesian nation is one of the reasons. For them, the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are in line with Islamic teachings. The Founding Fathers have considered many things when choosing a democratic country, not an Islamic state even though the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. With the form of the state as it is today, the duty as a Muslim and an Indonesian citizen is to fill the spaces created in this democratic state system.

The Manado ulama who accepted the concept of the nation-state were as much as 90 percent (27 out of 30 ulama). Concerning the ideology of Pancasila, they accept the ideology unconditionally as a symbol for a pluralistic nation. For them, Pancasila is a pillar of unity in diversity and fundamental principles that unite the diverse Indonesian nation. They believe, in the basis and philosophy of this country, there is the essence of Islamic values. The exciting thing is that ulama do not solely monopolize the argument for nationalism used as a basis for support for Pancasila on the social basis of nationalist organizations. Some ulama come from conservative circles, who use nationalist and diversity arguments to support Pancasila.

Manado ulama consider that women's leadership in the public sphere should not be questioned any longer because it is clear from a normative-theological point of view. Especially if we look at the history of the Prophet Muhammad, how Ummu Hindun led the war and the Prophet agreed about the condition. Ulama's views in Manado as a whole show a pro-democracy attitude. Democracy does not conflict with Islamic values; even the principles in a democratic system have long been practiced in Islam. Democracy has led to several forms and means, which until now are considered the only system that guarantees safety for the people.

### **ULAMA: AUTHORITY AND EDUCATION INSTITUTION**

Education can be an indication of the strength of the spread of the teachings of Islam in a region. In Muslim minority areas, Islamic education is not easy to obtain. Specific negotiations are needed so that Islamic education in minority areas can develop dynamically. The dynamism of Islamic education in Muslim minority areas can be seen from the development of religious organizations. The development of religious organizations is a strong signal of how the development of Islam in Muslim minority areas is taking place. In the four cities studied, it appears that all have different types of Islamic organizations. NU and Muhammadiyah as mainstream Islamic organizations grew dynamically in the four cities, coupled with various other organizations both national and local. Religious organizations appear in order to accommodate and accommodate the diversity of styles of thinking, interests, orientation, and goals of adherents of Islam.

In one Muslim area, the minority organization of Islamic education is the same as that held in the majority region, which is held formally and informally. Non-formal education is organized by a number of religious organizations such as NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), Muhammadiyah, Youth Care Mosque (PPM), Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI), Islamic Studies Assalam (SIAM), Wahdah Islamiyah Sulut (WS),

Nurul Huda Mosque Youth, Indonesian Mosque Youth and Teenager Communication Agency, Syarikat Islam, and the North Sulawesi Indonesian Ulama Council.

Ulama, both as religious scholars and religious entrepreneurs, have a significant role in the existence of Islamic education in Muslim minority areas, both formal and non-formal education. In the context of this study, Islamic education also cannot be separated from its role to facilitate the acceptance of national values, especially in the dimension of tolerance. In other words, Islamic education is directed to bring value to peace through various negotiating steps carried out.

In the case of Denpasar, as examined, Suhadi (2019) efforts to build a Muslim Islamic identity through education are considered auspicious. In the city of Denpasar, at least four elementary schools are structurally or culturally part of the Integrated Islamic School Network which is believed to be affiliated with the Tarbiyah movement. The existence of these four schools indeed cannot be separated from the passion of Muslims to have their educational institutions. One of the caretaker said the purpose of establishing an Islamic school is to offer a different moral system so that it can provide appropriate moral demands for Muslim children and adolescents in Bali. Concerns about moral degradation and moral chaos, which become the dominant narrative among educators are felt to be more urgent in the Balinese context because of the dominance of tourism. Although some teachers are aware that the SJIT network is often associated with the teachings of intolerance and anti-Pancasila, they say the accusations are baseless.

Kupang also has an SDIT which, although running well, does not appear to have a dominant influence on the Islamic map. The former headmaster of SDIT was one of the informants in this study who pulled him into the radical category because of his disagreement with democracy and Pancasila. Hidayatullah is a madrasa who plays a more significant role in Muslim education identity, and its management is directly involved as the administrator of the NTT and Kupang MUI. Although the Hidayatullah college network is often also associated with the Tarbiyah movement, it is not clear in the Kupang case. Madrasa, home to Muslims in NTT, even employs young teachers from Nura-based Madura. It is also interesting to observe Muhammadiyah University in Kupang, also known as Krismuha (Christian Muhammadiyah) because the students consist of Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims dominate some faculties. Nevertheless, educational institutions in Kupang still have a role as a center of movement and Muslim presence, especially in the case of Muhammadiyah universities, which are geographically located in Muslim enclaves.

In Manado and Ambon, ulama in two categories and educational institutions act as facilitators and messengers of peace, not only to non-Muslims but also related to radicalism and intolerance within the Islamic body itself. Manado, as one of the most isolated cities in Indonesia, has several educational institutions that carry out deradicalization efforts. The city has four primary boarding schools, namely: Al-Khaerat Islamic Boarding School, Istiqomah Islamic Boarding School, Assalam Bailang Islamic Boarding School, and Kombos Islamic Boarding School. The Kombos pesantren, in particular, has a reasonably structured deradicalization program with evident patterns and strategies.

Kombos Islamic Boarding School is another name for Pondok Karya Pembangunan (PKP) which was officially established on July 21, 1977, during the Suharto era as president. This pesantren was located on Jalan Arie Lasut, East Kombos, Singkil District, Manado, North Sulawesi, which was approved by the Governor of North Sulawesi at the time, namely Hein Victor Worang, an Indonesian religion (Mukti Ali) at the time. It was here that the center-region negotiations began with a mutual understanding-mutual interest style so that pesantren were given space in Manado to transmit religious knowledge and preserve Islamic traditions while producing ulama. On the other hand, Christians give more space (legitimacy) to keep controlling the local political system with their maritime identity.

The existence of the Kombos pesantren was mobilized for the benefit of the regeneration of Muslims in Manado and migrants. The target is for the students to become assets of national development who are pious, capable, dynamic, and skilled following the ideals of national development. Initially, this pesantren was formally named the Islamic Education Institute. Given such a name to show the symbol of Islam towards Islamic educational institutions, given that in Manado the majority are non-Muslim. However, the process of representation of the Kombos educational institution did not give birth to a dichotomy between interfaith and ethnic dichotomies in Manado let alone to the point that trans-national Islamic movements tried to uniform the diversity of public life institutions. It is indicated that for 41 years the Kombos pesantren has survived thanks to the character of its inclusive locality and the participation of Muslim communities and the influence of its charismatic leader, K.H. Rizali M. Noor.

The Kombos pesantren Genealogy initially led to the atmosphere of Islamic education in Java as the "Capital" of the Islamic Boarding School in Indonesia because its leadership was an alumnus of one of the oldest PTKIN in Indonesia namely IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, the Tarbiyah Faculty. However, in the middle of the

journey there are differences in a direction related to the arena there are differences in the attitudes of each pesantren institution in interpreting the dimensions of nationalism and religiosity related to national and state life systems. It has encouraged the leadership of the Kombos Islamic Boarding School to change its course in managing Islamic boarding schools as Islamic education, from the nuances of the pesantren system in Java to the pesantren system which is adapted to the life system of the nation and state.

The situation of the Kombos Islamic Boarding School in Manado is relatively stable, not trapped in radical actions and global terrorism. Kombos pesantren appear in the public sphere through *Kyai* and *Santri*. Furthermore, they do not experience deprivation, disorientation, dislocation, and negativism towards the surrounding community. His motive is none other than to establish a spirit of unity and oneness. Unity in this context is to see cultural wealth as a reality, and unity refers to government politics (Abdillah 2015).

Understanding the dynamics of Islamic education in Kombos Islamic Boarding School can be traced through its actions in responding to the wave of Islamism through three main movements namely: political ideology movement, demographic-accommodative movement, and programmatic-associative movement (Rusli 2016).

### IDEOLOGY-POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

Ideologically Kombos pesantren tend to adhere to the understanding of 'torang samua basudra' and 'Si Tou Timou Tumou Tou'. It was particularly evident during the Poso riots in 2000. Upon these events, the leadership of the Kombos pesantren (K.H. Rizali M. Noor) readily developed communication with various elements of the community and government. The Kombos pesantren at the time was the center of dialogue between Muslims and Christians in Manado. One of the Kombos Islamic Boarding School alumni comments (Rahman Mantu, 2015):

"Every time there is a conflict between religions both in other areas and in Manado, K.H. Rizali M Noor (as leader of the Kombos Islamic Boarding School) always picks up momentum. He initiated to invite non-Muslim leaders and communities to dialogue, and the dialogue was held at the Islamic Boarding School."

The above action implies that in responding to the flow of Islamism that wants to strike the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, the ideology used by Kombos pesantren has a top-down pattern, then the values in the expression 'torang samua basudra' (we are all created by God to be brothers) and 'Si Tou Timou Tumou Tou'

(humans live to humanize other humans) is bottom-up internalized. It has implications for the existence of synergy between K.H. Rizali M. Noor with the students and the people of Manado who are very diverse and prone to conflict in the name of religious ideology.

Other events that occurred in 2010, when K.H. Rizali M. Noor is running for deputy mayor candidate paired with Louis Nangoy, S.H. (as a candidate for mayor) for the period 2010-2015, in which each departs from an independent track. Of course, this raises the pros and cons. The counter group considers that if K.H. Rizali M. Noor was elected, then the boarding school education order will be abandoned. The pro-group considers that step K.H. Rizali M. Noor is right because there will be Muslim representatives who make, determine, and oversee Islamic education policies with a spirit of tolerance, moderate, inclusive, and empower plurality. This phenomenon shows the awareness of K.H. Rizali M. Noor as leader of the Kombos Islamic Boarding School to build an Islamic education system through local political channels in Manado. The ideological-political movement that has been carried out by the leader of the Kombos Islamic Boarding School shows that a political pathway is a tool for the success of the administration of education in Manado, especially Islamic education.

### **DEMOGRAPHIC-ACCOMODATIVE MOVEMENTS**

The Kombos Islamic Boarding School conducted the demographic-accommodative movements by studying population dynamics such as population size, criteria and distribution, and analyzing changes in population as a result of transmigration. It is done to control students (*Santri*) who will enter the Islamic education institution (pesantren). Based on the results of this identification, Kombos pesantren conducted a reasonably rigorous selection in order to filter out the spread of hard-line Islamic ideologies structurally, systematically, and massively. Kombos Islamic Boarding School only accepts male students. One consideration is that many of the perpetrators of acts of radicalism and terrorism are men.

Although the selection is quite strict for prospective students, the Kombos Islamic Boarding School also accommodates local people and migrants who want to enter the boarding school. In this context, the Kombos pesantren puts forward a horizontal-oriented social relationship pattern, namely a pattern of relationships that promotes harmony with others as an essential and valuable thing in life (Department of Culture and Tourism 2005). Kriesberg (in Tri Ratnawati 2015) reinforces this by stating that the higher the level of interaction and interdependence among conflicting parties, the smaller the chance for new conflicts to emerge in the community.

### **ASSOCIATIVE PROGRAMS MOVEMENT**

Kombos Pesantren, in this case, consolidates with various parties who have a strong influence to mobilize the masses, such as with the Kodim, the Governor, formal educational institutions (schools), police, army, religious leaders, community leaders, and mass media. Consolidation with Kodim 1309 / Manado, for example, was carried out in the activities of promoting radicalism and terrorism. It is not enough with the Kodim so that this activity is genuinely socialized to all lines, and schools are also involved. In this case, anti-radicalism and terrorism socialization are carried out through educational curricula, providing training, and regeneration. Likewise, the provision of seminars and dialogues on anti-tolerance by making the Governor of Manado as a guest speaker and the Governor said that the mass media has a big hand in preventing anti-tolerance. Besides, the North Sulawesi Coordination of Terrorism Coordination Forum (FKPT) was invited to work in synergy with the local government (Almunauwar 2016).

Aside from Islamic Boarding Schools, Islamic organizations certainly have a very significant role in providing education to Muslims in minority areas. NU in Manado, for example, has a role that is quite urgent and significant because the activities programs carried out by NU are in line with government programs, namely maintaining harmonious relations between religious communities (Dondokambey 2018). Harmony was accomplished as a result of a good understanding from the community about the importance of living in diversity in North Sulawesi. One of the things this organization does is that if other religious communities organize religious celebrations, Banom NU takes part in guarding. Vice versa, if Muslims do an activity, non-Muslims do the actions as carried out by Muslims (Mukafi 2017). Likewise Muhammadiyah. After experiencing several phases of development, beginning in the 2000s and continuing to the present, the role of this organization in Manado focused on efforts to mediate tensions that could potentially arise due to social, economic, and political friction (Sandiah 2018).

Youth Care of the Mosque represents the movement of Muslim youth in Manado who are active in prospering the mosque and also bears the responsibility of spreading Islam and strengthening nationalism. Their slogan is the love of religion and also the love of the Republic of Indonesia. They believe that loving religion is the same as loving the country, and therefore defending Islam means having to prosper Indonesian people (Boalemo 2017). Both of these responsibilities are manifested through activities carried out by Youth Concerned Mosques such as the Pioneer Youth Training Program.

The implementation of these activities is an effort to maintain and make the activities of the mosque free from activities that spread slander, hatred, and understandings that are anti-Pancasila or intolerant (Setiawan 2017).

Ambon is an example of the efforts of religious leaders who played an essential role in the peace movement until the city became a success story of Muslim-Christian dialogue in Indonesia and ranked 5th as the most tolerant city in Indonesia. Abidin Wakano from the Muslim community and priest Jacky Manuputty from tare two central figures who initiated interfaith dialogue and made peaceful provocateurs. This movement has become a combination of various interfaith organizations in the city of Ambon and then on a larger scale into a broad community-based movement. This movement has succeeded in building a collective awareness of the community to create Muslim-Christian peace, which was torn apart in the bloody conflict of 1999-2002, which claimed the lives of thousands of Ambonese.

## CONCLUSION

As explained above, the acceptance of ulama in Muslim minority areas towards the concept of the nation-state and its dimensions is quite high, even higher than the ulama in Muslim-majority areas. This acceptance can be explained as a survival strategy, an effort to ensure that the dominant group can accept the existence of Muslims. The reception aims to provide meaning that Muslims are good citizens and local citizens: recognizing Pancasila, recognizing the authority of the leader even though he/she is a non-Muslim, and accepting differences and maintaining tolerance.

Education organized by Islamic organizations in these regions also appears to be directed to carry the mission of acceptance and survival above, specifically facilitating Muslim relations as a minority with a dominant group. These efforts are carried out through negotiation and modification made in their Islamic education activities. The *Krismuha* (Christian Muhammadiyah) phenomenon in Kupang is a real sample of these negotiations and modifications. The above conditions show that the ulama can adapt to the local context to become a national guard.

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## **A VIEW OF THE NATION-STATE FROM THE PERIPHERY**

*Ahmad Rafiq & Roma Ulinnuha*

The main objective of this chapter is to see how local elements in several cities in Indonesia contribute to the way the local ulama view of the nation-state, both the concept and the practice in Indonesia. The locality of the ulama in this context is seen as the “*pinggir*” (edge or periphery; Bulliet 1995) which places itself before the concept of nation-state politics and political practices in Indonesia. The concept of margin in this paper does not mean backwardness or secondary class; instead, it marks the negotiation of abstract space between local interests and identity and the center, which is imagined as the power that builds the main narrative and political practice in the nation-state. These negotiations place local specialties and history at the margins as forming elements of interests and identities that build a local perspective to deal with the center. In dealing with the center, margins commonly use a central marker with a load of marginal interests (Bulliet 1994; Appadurai 1996).

The negotiations referred to above triggered the development of various attitudes of local ulama towards the concept of the nation-state in Indonesia. This paper outlines these attitudes into two main sub-topics, locality, and reservation. What is meant by locality is the attitude of the ulama towards the concept of a nation-state which is intertwined with various considerations which pivot on the social, cultural, and historical basis of local communities. The embodiment of the ulama’s attitude can take the form of acceptance with requirements; also, of course, there is resistance or even rejection as a form of reservation. Reservation in this research is an incomplete acceptance of the nation-state both because of the gap in conceptual understanding and acceptance of the ongoing political practice. This distance is influenced by the relation between the edge and the center above. Nevertheless, locality and reservations at the edge provide a dynamic space for understanding the attitude of accepting

or rejecting the nation-state. Another argument of this paper is that the form of ulama moderation in the form of acceptance in the aspects of inclusive, tolerant and democratic values are agreed upon by citizens in the context of the nation-state becomes stronger and more meaningful when the local elements can sustain the ulama's attitude of consideration in the form of custom, cultural politics and local identity politics.

The dynamics of the distinctive local elements in the research target cities that were observed could affect the attitude of the ulama's acceptance of the concept of the nation-state, such as the value of equality, human rights, and other contemporary issues. In this paper, it will be distinguished between the context of cities where Muslims are a minority, such as Denpasar, Manado and Kupang, and the contexts where Muslims are the majority, such as Aceh, Padang, and Banjarmasin. In this local context variant, the ulama's attitude may not be accepting or tends to be both conservative and negotiative. The research shows that tolerance to different religious groups is one of the factors that predominantly influences these attitude variants and needs serious attention from local authorities, both government and religious institutions. In peripheral and central relations, local authorities largely determine the distribution of values to the community in the context of the reproduction of the socio-cultural context (Bourdieu 2000), primarily planting broad educational values in educational institutions, local indigenous communities, kinship, and family.

This article, first of all, describes the local elements in various forms of culture in the form of customs, habits, wisdom, and conventions<sup>34</sup> that are believed to be sources of reference, both by the authorities and the community. The locality is related to the context of the research of the attitude of the nation-state ulama, including democratic values, equality, inclusiveness, moderation, state forms and contemporary issues such as women's leadership, immunization, religious minorities, and local politics. In the second part, it examines the tendency of ulama and their attitude to the concept of the nation-state derivative to describe the forms of reservation and typology.

### **LOCALITY AS A RESERVATIVE FACTOR**

Before exposing the forms of locality, the reading of local elements and their relevance is needed for the orientation of this ulama's research. Locality in this chapter is understood as something that is not static but always in the process of production and reproduction,

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<sup>34</sup> Convention is a shared world in the form of unwritten social habits that function as a damper to individuality, fostering awareness and social solidarity. For more see (Asad 2018, 103).

which involves power relations. Ulama's reservation of the nation-state in the local context means how the ulama responds to the idea of the nation-state differently from the "official" state narrative because of the different experiences of the locality they have. This difference affects their views on state-building.

Besides, cultural politics and ethnicity are two things that often underlie identity politics in the local realm. Identity politics is enough to contribute the ulama's response to various Indonesian issues. The Denpasar ulama, for example, amidst the strengthening of the Ajeg Bali, which is a Balinese Hindu identity politics, is quite high in accepting the pro-system and anti-violence dimension. However, their acceptance of the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship is low. The strengthening of Balinese Hindu identity can be seen from the formalization of clothing attributes as in Hindu rituals that are emphasized by Governor Regulation (Pergub) No. 79 of 2018 concerning "Day of Use of Balinese Traditional Clothing." The dimension of locality in the form of the application of adat in Denpasar's public sphere implies a willingness to manage differences and tolerance within an Indonesian frame. In the Governor's Regulation, such as the Denpasar City Convey research report, on Thursday and certain days (Purnama, Tilem, and the anniversary of Bali) all employees in government institutions, teachers, education personnel and students are required to use traditional Balinese clothing. Among the goals of traditional Balinese clothing, the policy is to "recognize the aesthetic, ethical, moral, and spiritual values embodied in Balinese culture" (Article 3 c). The regulation also mentions provisions regarding elements of traditional Balinese identity for both men and women. The men wear "*destar (udeng)* headgear" and women should have a "neat hairdo" (Article 4).

Regarding social practice in Denpasar, Suhadi said the tolerance of Muslims to use Balinese (Hindu) traditional clothing was part of their survival strategy in the midst of the dominant culture and the rise of the Ajeg Bali identity politics. Muslims do not reject it but try to negotiate. This form of negotiation took the form of acceptance of the Balinese traditional dress policy, while still questioning its form (Suhadi 2019).

The context of the case of cultural politics in Denpasar explains the meeting between those considered similar to religious practices, such as religious-traditional clothing and public spaces where different religious adherents meet, with the degree of seriousness of the management of religion in the public sphere. The breadth of consciousness of being Indonesia faced with cultural politics, which then responded in various forms of negotiation at the praxis level. The locality dimension can be a source of conflict and unacceptability

in multicultural societies, starting from the view of other entities as being other. But of course, discriminatory challenges due to the adoption of a locality that is similar to religion, will not turn into a more serious disintegration problem, if understood and then managed in a national narrative. There is a need for a “language” of an accommodative and peaceful locality in order to overcome tribal-religious egoism for Indonesian reasoning. Religion seems to need to be subdued, borrowing the concept of Abdurrahman Wahid, to the common interests of the whole nation through transformation by reformulating the views of human dignity, alignment before the law and intrinsic solidarity among fellow citizens (Wahid 2004, 333). The role of religious leaders, including ulama in Denpasar, is a vital element in efforts to establish social integration.

After exposure to resistance in the cultural context of the Ajeg Bali culture, the exposure to the context of the locality element is then focused on the city of a thousand churches in North Sulawesi, namely Manado. The dialectical fragment of the Muslim minority in Manado presents aspects of locality in the form of the *Torang Samua Basudara* adage (we are all brothers; Latipah 2019). Several events that appeared indeed disturbed the development of the nation-state, such as the ban on the implementation of Muslim worship in 2015 by local authorities. However, attitudes that promote Indonesian-ness are more emphasized by all parties. An adage of the ties of equality of brotherhood is symbolized in the *Torang Samua Basudara*, and it is certainly not a walk in the park.

There are two keywords as a follow up from the dimension of locality in Manado, namely harmony and peace. These two aspects of moderation can be observed historically, from how Islamic da'wah began, especially among the inhabitants of the Javanese-Tondano village to various areas around the city of Manado. The success of the early ulama's strategy indicated that adaptation of locality could take place, certainly with a few notes of challenges. In turn, the spread of the first generation of ulama reduced the inclusiveness of religious paradigms through various religious institutions such as pesantren and Koran training. According to Latipah (2019), they are students and descendants of Kyai Modjo, Kyai Rifai, and Besari Maspekeh. The practice of supporting locality in religious activities is a choice of topics with an attitude of tolerance by considering the plurality of Manado people with ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. Another tolerance value in the form of cooperation in organizing religious activities such as Maulid of the Prophet, Isra 'Mi'raj, and 1 Muharram involving non-Muslim parties. Greeting on celebrating religious festivals such as Christmas and Eid al-Fitr have also been carried out by some young people and religious institutions. Amid

the challenges of separation between fellow citizens, some of the activities that have been carried out can support the *Torang Samua Basudara* adagium.

The element of locality in the city of Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara, is further linked to the attitude of the Muslim minority towards tolerance and nationality-Indonesian values. Ro'fah (2019) notes that multicultural communities in Kupang need tolerance support. One of them is in the form of cultural practices to build houses of worship and religious celebrations. While religious adherents celebrate religious holidays by carrying out religious rituals, other religious communities strive to maintain a conducive situation so worship can take place solemnly. Another form is awareness and agreement for a long time in providing halal culinary for Muslims at community events. The shift in views from exclusive to inclusive is an essential marker in this socio-cultural context (Masuzawa 1998, 78). Two principles of knowledge and respect become social capital that emerged at the local level.

Other social practices include marriage between adherents of different religions, for example, between Muslims and Christians and Catholics. This paper does not discuss further the law on marriage and the response from both parties which certainly needs a separate discussion, but the culture of interfaith marriage is one of the meeting points in which the Kupang community can greet each other in close form through family and community interactions. The practice of tolerance in the form of kinship is an essential marker of locality in Kupang, which ultimately fosters an understanding within the frame of cultural tolerance (Ro'fah 2019).

In the confines of plurality, the meaning of Islam in the form of a stronger Islamism is entirely related to local politics and identity politics that are spreading. The support of the cultural dimension that has long been maintained for the social integration of the people of Kupang has the potential to be eroded and threatened, including pluralistic kinship relations that can be cracked. The issue of a unique and different identity becomes essential, as Charles Taylor said when the state began to adopt the transformation of the status-based system into a system of alignment as a fellow citizen (Tayob 2009, 75). On the other hand, local political interests, can fracture peace and harmony if every element of society and the state is not careful in observing the developing issues and figures who are meddling by borrowing political sentiments of ethnic and religious identity.

Locality cases with a background in Muslim minorities, such as in Denpasar, Manado and Kupang, arouse awareness of the use of religious hegemony by certain authorities. Furthermore, they are close to the background of religious politicization. In addition to

local issues such as the penetration of religious customs and the dichotomy of public-private space, national issues, such as the 212 Movement, regional head election and also the presidential election, are exposed through religious activities via the media, and affect the cohesiveness of the nation-state node. The attitude of respect, tolerance and equality is no longer meaningful when the principle of interests strengthens and puts forward the defence of religious and ethnic communities as a basis for thinking and acting. The situation obscures the urgency of religion in playing a role in accepting differences and the principle of respect (Machasin 2009).

Symptoms of disintegration can undoubtedly tear the building of Indonesianness. The Indonesian structure is painstakingly composed of kinship and respect among fellow citizens over the background, interests and struggles of the authority of certain religious and ethnic groups. If the social practices of kinship and brotherhood as a form of the thick locality are successfully carried out, the building of Indonesianness can continue to be maintained. Conversely, if ignored and referred to as normalization, something that usually happens, calm and peace of harmony among fellow citizens in the sense of citizenship can be reduced. The willingness to move from private interests to sacrifice for the realization of a balanced public order, as alleged by Genevieve Zubrzycki (2010), deserves consideration. In certain stages and cases, the ulama's attitude tends to be resistant, with an accommodative and negotiative acceptance. It can be seen in the tendency of the attitude of some ulama who are categorized exclusively and rejectionist in Denpasar, Manado and Kupang (Suhadi, 2019; Latipah, 2019, Ro'fah, 2019). Ulama in minority areas, such as in Denpasar, Manado and Kupang, shows an attitude of tolerance that is still being developed for the structure of Indonesianness.

### **LOCALITY IN MUSLIM MAJORITY CITIES**

The prominent locality elements in Ambon and Surakarta are generally community-based. Cultural activities carried out by young people are essential markers in Ambon, while pesantren play a role as a network of moderate ulama. Ambonese young people paved the way for tolerance with a foothold in cultural arts activities and other activities supported by religious leaders, such as the Peace Provocator Movement, Interfaith Journalists, Caring Women Movement, Cross Faith Hip-hop, Cross Faith Bloggers, Ambon Movement, Cross Faith Dance Studio, Lintas Faith Photographer, as well as dozens of other groups of young people who are motivated because of their hobbies (Noor 2019). The community in Surakarta has a cross-professional background, such as the Islamic Boarding School Assalam, Islamic Boarding School Al-Islamic Boarding School,

Islamic Takmirul Boarding School, Al Firdaus educational foundation, Al-Azhar educational institutions, Nur Hidayah Foundation, Darul Hidayah Foundation and many other institutions that generally have religious views moderate. Also, they are generally affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, MUI, LDII and others. They have excellent communication with the state, also a robust ideological network as well (Hasan 2019). The challenges in the two cities revolve around how to maintain harmonious relations between religious communities, primarily Islamic and Christian relations. In this context, the contribution of scholars as part of religious leaders is an important part.

Exposure to relations between religions in Ambon and Surakarta, especially Islam and Christianity, is also seen in the value of harmonious symbolism in the city of Palangka Raya. Mosques and churches were built side by side like the Kalimantan Evangelical Nasaret church which is adjacent to the Al-Azhar mosque on Jalan Galaksi and the Borneo Evangelical Church Efrata which is closely adjacent to the Nurul Iman Mosque on Jalan Sangga Buana (Kailani 2019). The closeness of the location between Islamic and Christian places of worship is a valuable representation amidst the strengthening of ethnicity politics. In this level, religion can play a role as an attachment of differences (Bustaman-Ahmad 2002). Aside from being symbolic, other aspects that can be observed bring up the practice of organizing religious celebrations so that all can run smoothly and conducive, as in 2015 the Christmas and Maulid holidays of the Prophet Muhammad occurred sequentially on December 23 and 24.

Apart from Ambon, Surakarta, and Palangka Raya, the next element of locality is seen in the dynamics in the cities of Padang and Aceh. Both have strong Islamic roots. The role of traditional leaders and their synergy with the ulama are characteristic of the religious-social landscape. In the Minang Muslim community, for example, Mamak's role is quite central as the authority holder for the control of adat-religious values; to be a Minang is to be Muslim and influence the attitude of tolerance and nonviolence of the people (Ulinnuha 2019). The oral culture and the value of Islamic boarding school can be seen as valuable aspects for the harmony of attitudes, including attitudes toward the nation-state. Reservative aspects that emerge from Padang's ulama are built from values that are instilled in the family and kinship system. The adat Minang saying *adat menurun, syara' mendaki* in the context of the city of Padang is an essential marker of why aspects of violence are becoming marginal in the midst of strengthening Islamism. While forms of respect for the government system, tolerance and democracy are understood more discursively by the Minang people of Padang.

The relation between religion and ethnicity in the city of Aceh can be identified within the framework of ethnoreligious nationalism. Becoming Aceh is becoming Muslim, which at some stage influences the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition to the Acehnese, identification as Muslims also applies to the Gayo, Alas, Kluet and Tamiang Malays. The challenge that arose in Aceh was how the people and authorities of Aceh respond to the concept of nation-state and citizenship. Management of diversity in the midst of strengthening Islamic identity needs to be continued (Ichwan 2019). As in Aceh, local identity in the form of ethnoreligious nationalism can also be identified in the context of Banjarmasin (Rafiq 2019), Jakarta (Nurlaelawati 2019) and Makassar (Muhrisun 2019).

### **ISLAM, MULTICULTURAL LOCALITY AND NATION-STATE**

Regarding the case above, the localities build their heterodoxies on the nation-state doxa in Indonesia. The heterodoxy was formed based on three things: local history, ethnoreligious identity, and the paradox of identity. The existence of some relatively rejectionist ulama in Solo, for example, was shaped by local religious history which placed religion and state concepts in a holistic view. This view is displayed in the form of social activism that lasts a long time through existing Islamic educational institutions (Hasan and Aijudin 2019). Aceh's local history also led the ulama in a position that was precisely balanced between acceptance and rejection (Ichwan 2019). The same thing also applies to the memory of ethnoreligious unrest in Ambon as one of the main footholds of the position of local ulama towards the nation-state doxa, which is dominated by acceptance of it (Noor 2019). They see the concepts and practices of the nation-state from their own historical experiences.

Local history, in turn, also influences the formation of ethnoreligious identities in various localities. Aceh, Padang, Banjarmasin, and Makassar, to name a few, mark their ethnicity as well as religious (Islamic) symbol. For example, the strong relationship between *adat* and *syara'* (read: Islam) in Padang, becomes the world view (*weltanschauung*) of ulama in Padang to understand the nation-state's doxa and the political and state practices in Indonesia that place religion (Islam) and the state as two inseparable items. It is a religion as attached to social regulation (Latif 2007). In Banjarmasin, the history of the transformation of a flooded identity in the 16th century that was synonymous with mass conversion into Islam also made ethnic identity one unity with religious (Islamic) identity. In turn, becoming a Banjar is becoming an Islamic. In ethnoreligious identity in both cases, urging is seen as part of religion, the way of the state is often measured by the limits of understanding of religion

(Islam). This ethnic-diversity identity increased to ethnoreligious nationalism, where the character of local ethnicity (religious) marked the attitudes of the ulama towards the concept and practice of the nation-state.

In the third character of locality, the paradox of identity, together with ethno-religious identity that seems to be exclusive, practices of national and state life at the local level, cannot escape from the reality of the diversity of society in which an ethnic group dominates. Diversity can be in the form of ethnicity or religion which is triggered, among others, by the flow of migration and the advancement of information technology today. In general, the above ethno-religious identity does not limit the physical space of migration of people from various other ethnic groups in Indonesia. Migration can be triggered by many factors, ranging from economic, political, cultural, historical, and others. Advances in information technology also allow inter-ethnic meetings to be more intensive without any space limit. Baumann (1999) coined the term for the above situation as a multicultural riddle. Inter-ethnic group meetings that inevitably make the relationship of ethnicity, state, and religion into a puzzle, or even an endless maze. All people who are in it are connected at once separate with their respective identities. Even so, the connection moves in two different directions but always together. The two directions are the strengthening of ethnic identity, as well as the fusion of ethnic identity into a new dynamic identity, also known as the identity paradox. When ethnic identity strengthens in an open locality, at the same time that identity, unconsciously, opens itself to change as a result of meeting with another identity.

Baumann exemplifies this paradox in the transformation of ethnic, religious, and statehood identity of followers of the Nation of Islam in the United States. It was established as a movement to criticise against 'masters' in slavery using religious symbols (Islam). The movement was transformed into a new Afro-American centric religious movement that was different from the religions of 'masters' and other Islamic practices (read: mainstream). In the process, they are required to meet with other Muslims outside of their initial positioning of the "master". Furthermore, they have been Americanized after generations of settling in the United States as slaves. They have always been "marginal" towards mainstream Islam and America in the process of cross-cultural encounters. This situation led to a second transformation by loosening the Afro-American divider into universal Muslim liberation from slavery. In the end, they transformed again into the "new" citizenship of the United States together with the "masters" they had previously criticized.

This identity paradox also occurs in religious, ethnic groups in Indonesia that underlie the way of the view of some ulama towards

the nation-state. For example, departing from the romanticism of the historical relations of religion (Islam) and power, such as Aceh, Padang, and Banjarmasin, ethnoreligious identity becomes a political identity in asserting their position towards others. In each of the localities, we can find narratives of religious history that separate them from the invaders by transforming profane identities into Islamic markers. In Banjarmasin found documents of basic Islamic studies before Indonesian independence forbid wearing round white hats and ties generally worn by the Dutch. Before the phase of independence, physical identification is undoubtedly no longer valid. They must build new identity markers as part of Indonesian citizens. No document was explicitly found about the first statement, but religious, and state behavior openly showed this transformation. Even so, ethnoreligious identity (Islam), is faced with the diversity of ethnicity, culture, and also religion in the presence of fellow nationals today. This situation established the paradox of identity, in which openness can coincide with a closed attitude.

Local ethnoreligious is transformed into the perspective of ethnoreligious nationalism, which is, seeing their national identity in the eyes of local ethnoreligious. Borrowing Eriksen's (1993) idea, this identity is encompassed by social, historical, and cultural settings. By being influenced by the history and local experience, in this case negotiating identity by building each narrative to see the center of the nation-state Doxa.

The peripheral areas created local history, ethnoreligious identity, and identity paradoxes underlie heterodoxy. Criticism is not always anti-thesis about orthodoxy, but it is negotiations on the margins of doxa which are at the center of the mainstream. This negotiation is the peripheral reservation for the central nation-state doxa. Reservation issues that are built up from the peripheral can be mapped in the explanation below.

First, reservation is a result of the relationship between majority and religious minorities. In this context, there are two issues of reservation, Proportional justice, and hegemonic appropriation. The first can be found in several cities with a Muslim majority background. Proportional justice means the composition of rights and obligations as citizens based on the number of religious adherents. It has made the acceptance of non-Muslim citizenship rights restricted, for example, either by priority argument or by absolute rejection. Each ulama in the local stream refers to the character of the majority of Muslims in their respective regions, to determine the preferences of regional leaders or even national leaders who must come from the majority group of religion (Islam) even though it is not a requirement in the constitution. In this context the paradox of identity referred to

above is very pronounced, in which local ethnoreligious identity is not entirely merged in the identity of open citizenship in the main Doxa of the nation-state, but also it is not rejected entirely.

On the contrary, as happened in the case of Bali and Kupang, local ulama negotiated their perspective on the nation-state doxa with hegemonic appropriation. It is called hegemonic appropriation to state that the hegemony that occurs is not solely due to the pressure that enters the unconscious that controls behavior. The pressure in this context comes from the vast stream nation-state doxa narrative with all its derivatives at the local level. Hegemony coincides with the process of appropriation, which is recognized as a way to survive in a diverse community. It often arises, according to Khaled Abou El Fadl (2002), when religion is seen as a central dynamic in public legitimacy and cultural significance. This situation gave birth to a positive attitude of tolerance, although some still hold suspicion of the majority. In this context, the acceptance of minority religious groups at the local level is relatively shaped by the weak bargaining position of the majority.

Even so, the pattern of hegemonic appropriation does not always occur in the relationship between majority and religious minorities. It can also happen to an Islamist (or pseudo-Islamist) view amid active narrative streams of moderation or nationalism, such as the position of some ulemas in Makassar. Muhrisun (2019) called it conditional acceptance, in which their acceptance of Pancasila and democracy in the nation-state was due to the current context of space and time, which could not be rejected. It is an important note that the Pancasila clause began at the level of the concept addressed discursively (Bisri 2009). Thus, the reservation was made to negotiate the personal and local views of the ulama towards the mainstream of the nation-state in Indonesia with its derivative concepts.

In line with the hegemonic appropriation above, majority and minority relations also encourage the strength of religious and ethnic-based nationalism (religious-ethnonationalism) in several regions. Some ulama at the local level use ethnoreligious identity to understand and assess their position with the nation-state Doxa. In this position, normatively, most of them accept the concept of the nation-state. At the same time, they gave a negative assessment of current (state) political practices. Views like this can be found in several cities, both Muslim majority, and minority. Their local practical interests as Muslims are taken into consideration to assess existing state practices. For example, ulama in several cities, such as Jakarta, Padang, Banjarmasin, and Solo received an extensive narrative that the government in power was not entirely successful in protecting the interests of Muslims in Indonesia. With diverse marginal interests,

there is a gap between local ulama's understanding of the nation-state and their acceptance of the political practices that take place in the central narrative stream.

This distance is not always born because of the hegemony of new media information, but the local history of each region also shapes it. Local history strengthens the flow of reservations, even rejections, in some areas, such as Solo and Padang. In Hasan and Ajiudin's report, the local history of religious education institutions in Solo (which is related to the social activism of the founders and their caretakers) formed a perspective that is relatively averse to the concept of the nation-state. Meanwhile, the historical dynamics of religious and customary relations in Padang place them on the romanticism of the ideal relationship between religion and state and assess the relationship of religion and state in current state practices in Indonesia. Even though they are both idealizing history, the view that developed among some ulama in Padang is not related to social activism like in Solo.

## CONCLUSION

In the issues above, the periphery position is not always black and white towards the grand narrative of the nation-state Doxa, which is imagined as the center. Instead, margins use central symbols in the local sense to negotiate their position. It has led to the relatively high number of nation-state revenues in all research reports that have been carried out in the context of this paper, without denying the existence of opposing groups. In the views of local ulama, the grand narrative of the nation-state is a tool to negotiate their respective local interests based on their respective identities and history. With these assumptions and phenomena, a massive influx of diverse localities in Indonesia tends to be accommodating to the central narratives of the nation-state doxa so that peripheral and central negotiations can continue.

As part of these negotiations, side reservations also coincided with the presence of local resilience who reject the nation-state. Two major patterns of local resilience take place in the form of alliances and literacy. For example, in Kupang with a composition of a Muslim minority, local ulama build alliances not only with fellow Muslims but also with groups among non-Muslim majorities. In Ambon and Manado, to name apart, the local customs which bind cultural relations have so far been used as media to build joint alliances. These alliances are built formally or culturally not always in the interests of nation-state acceptance but as demands for local dynamics.

In some cities, several ulama entered into the discourse of acceptance of the nation-state or its derivative concepts, such as

human rights, religious freedom, and gender equality, through the literacy movement. Some of these literacy movements use local and traditional instruments, such as strengthening local culture as a continuation of cultural alliances that occurred in Ambon, Manado, and Padang. Others use contemporary tools and media as campaign media for their ideas and movements for broader literacy. The second thing is found dominant in various local praxis such as in Palangkaraya, Banjarmasin, Makassar, and Solo.

Finally, localities in Indonesia view the concept of the nation-state from the margins, without denying the small amount of resistance that exists. It is a space for the expression of identity, history, and local interests to negotiate with the mainstream of the nation-state narrative, which is imagined as the center. The center for the peripheral is both an opponent and a friend. Thus, he/she is accepted but also rejected.

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### **EPILOGUE**

*Ibnu Burdah*

After reading the research results presented in the chapters of this book, two things immediately come to mind, i.e., a feeling of optimism about the future of the nation-state of Indonesia on the one hand, and a cautious attitude on the other. This optimism was born at least from the large number of ulama's acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state, which was 71.56 percent, even though the complexity of the Reformation era which was supported by a wave of globalization and new media has created a situation that directly or indirectly has accumulated challenges that have never happened before to the nation-state of Indonesia foundation. Acceptance of scholars with a figure of this size also provides hope for Indonesia's future amid weakening confidence in the capacity of countries in the world in general in solving the significant problems of humanity.

The results of qualitative research through in-depth interviews with more than 160 ulama in fifteen cities in the country also reinforce this optimism. Almost all of the ulama interviewed accepted the necessary foundation of the nation-state namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the Republic of Indonesia, despite varying gradations and qualities, ranging from conceptual-ideological acceptance to realistic acceptance of acceptance based on the reality that cannot be denied. Reservation did occur, but the ulama did not discuss these essential matters except regarding the addition of the first principles with seven words, as stated in the Jakarta Charter.

However, the number of 16.44 percent of ulama who reject the concept of the Indonesian nation-state with its various supporting principles, as discussed in this book, indeed cannot be taken lightly. Especially if some of the ulama were not identified, the number becomes more massive. The rejection also has a diverse gradation. Starting from the rejection of a small part of its supporting principles such as citizenship and tolerance to a complete rejection

accompanied by acceptance of the possible use of means of violence. Almost all of the rejection is not an ideological rejection of the entire essential building of the Indonesian nation-state. Only 2.3 percent was categorized under radical rejection, which means in principle rejecting the foundation of the Indonesian nation-state as a whole. However, they did not accept violent means to achieve their goals, and only 2 percent was categorized under extreme rejection because they expressed similar rejection accompanied by acceptance of the possible use of violence. The amount of 2 percent is certainly not small because they are ulama who have influence and followers. However, if we examine the researcher's analysis in this book, we can conclude that excessive alarming of the situation of the Indonesian nation-state today and in the future need not occur. Vigilance is the right attitude in dealing with situations that are not as urgent as described by several other types of research in the country.

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The position and influence of the ulama in the social, political, and cultural dynamics of Indonesian society are enormous. The role of ulama experiences its ups and downs. This is due to the development of social and political conditions, such as the 212 movement along with other similar movements. However, the ulama has proven to be the central role on the national political stage. The post-Movement situation has created a new big stage for parties called or referred to as "ulama," *Ustaz*, *Kyai*, or other similar designations, right in the middle of the public space of the country. The process towards the 2019 Election, which involves the ulama very intensely both as a source of legitimacy, support, and even as an actor directly, further proves this conclusion. In the midst of the strengthening of the centrality of the ulama and the existence of some ulama rejecting the foundation of the nation-state, there is no more appropriate attitude to accompany the optimism above except to build vigilance that is measured along with the right and accurate attitude.

The vigilance that must be built is not to spread fear and anxiety. Excessive alarming to the future of the nation-state has the potential to pose a threat to the foundations of democracy that have been painstakingly built for about two decades, even decades earlier. Such vigilance must be developed without undermining the achievements of our democratization which have procedurally reached the mature stage. A genuine regime change through the ballot box without any significant shocks for several times is clear evidence of the maturity of our democracy. Only a few Muslim-majority countries from the tip of Southeast Asia in the east to Morocco in the west end can reach that

stage. Therefore, this achievement must be treated as well as possible without damaging it by spreading fear with excessive alarming.

It is noteworthy, the sizeable number of ulama who reject the nation-state of Indonesia obtained through quantitative research above, to a lesser or greater extent, is corrected by the results of qualitative research. Based on qualitative reports of local research in fifteen cities in the region and national reports in this book, it is found that the facts are quite “entertaining” and dismiss excessive alarming that most rejection of the nation-state does not depart from rejection conceptually and ideologically, but the rejection is based on other things. According to the data partially elaborated in this book, the rejection of the nation-state is closely related to the views of the ulama on the ability of the Indonesian government to improve people’s welfare, due to complications and political fragmentation before the election, dissatisfaction in various policies, primarily related to Muslims, issues that difficult to be accounted for (hoax), and other things beyond ideological-conceptual considerations. Ideological rejection of the foundation of this country fundamentally after in-depth interviews according to qualitative research reports is minimal to say almost not found. Therefore, this research undoubtedly seeks to confirm optimism about the future of the Indonesian nation-state, although it remains accompanied by proportional vigilance.

Optimism also should not make us complacent. The challenges to the future of the Indonesian nation-state will not recede if they look at the patterns found in the results of this study. Moreover, we should take a cautious attitude. These challenges include the siege of Islamism, which has penetrated deeply into the joints of life through diverse paths. The increasingly conservative Indonesian Islamic pendulum and the rise of identity politics, and the strengthening of ethnic sentiment in parts of the country. While strengthening the pressures of globalization, challenges must be carefully considered.

The first challenge is the wave of Islamism that continues to grow despite the complex dynamics and ups and downs in the history of this country. The number of Islamist groups is tiny when compared to the number of mainstream Islamic followers in Indonesia. The birth of Islamist groups is also far more recent when compared to the formation of mainstream groups. However, amid the swift current of democratization supported by the extensive use of new media, the Islamic discourse they are pushing for, has influenced many things including the shifting of the authority of the ulama from traditional to “media” ulama and the vision of Muslims about the nation-state. Discourses such as Islam *Kafab* (totality), *Hijrah* (moving), *Ghazwu 'l-fikr* (war of thought), and Shariatisation have greatly influenced the vision and political attitudes of the urban Muslim community. In

particular, towards the nation-state foundation and the values that support it. The discourses which were initially a strategy of small groups in dealing with the country then, in turn, developed into a new significant foothold for Muslims in viewing the nation-state.

Unfortunately, along with the process of melting the authority of the ulama, ulama institutions, especially the MUI, also experienced a shift in the direction that was less favourable for strengthening the principles of the nation-state. The new Fatsun as “servants of the people”, not “servants of the regime” as happened during the New Order era, has slowly put this institution closer to the axis and aspirations of Islamist groups. At a certain level, this institution not only appears as a source of legitimacy for some Islamist groups in intensifying specific issues which in practice violates the principle of the nation-state especially tolerance and citizenship, but this institution also seems to have become a tool for the group’s politics.

A few years ago, it might have been the “culmination” of the development of Islamism that had developed decades earlier. Transnational Islamism that spread its influence through the internationalization of the Palestinian issue and other issues of the Islamic world then gets its link with the remnants of the aspirations of local “Islamism”, the new atmosphere created after the reform, the massive use of new media. Thus it gave birth to a new stream of Islamic conservatism. And, the last few years have been an important point in which Islamism in its clear form, the ideals of the establishment of an Islamic state or *Khilafah*, gained a solid counter back from both the people and the government of Indonesia. This research also shows the small appropriation of ulama in the cities of the country towards the idea of the *Khilafah* or other ideas of Islamism, and on the contrary, shows their firm rejection of the “hard” agenda of Islamism even though the rejection had various gradations. The Indonesian government’s actions to dissolve HTI CSOs through the revocation of their legal entity by the Minister of Law and Human Rights through Decree Number AHU-30.AH.01.08 in 2017 is quite in line with the aspirations of many scholars in cities in the country in this study.

However, Islamism as a political strategy both by the figures who believe it and by groups who do not believe it is likely to be a challenge for the future of this nation-state, especially in efforts to develop democracy.

Therefore, soon, it is unlikely that the “hard” agendas of Islamism to change the nation-state either with the *Khilafah* or the Islamic state will receive adequate support, especially in our public spheres. However, the soft agenda of Islamism such as the NKRI Syari’ah or the return of the seven words in the first principle of the Pancasila as the

Charter of Jakarta seems to be an important and long-term discourse even though the issue of the Islamic State or the *Khilafah* might be able to get another place if major events have the potential to occur and change things. However, the appropriation of the *Khilafah* and the strict agenda of Islamism that is different from a small number of scholars in the country is potential and latent. The issue might get a new space if there is a situation that leads to extraordinary changes in the social and political landscape in the country. In short, the threat of social and political fragmentation of this nation in the future, if it appears, will likely lead to two major dichotomies, namely between supporters and opponents of Islamism in its finer forms and more adapted to the foundations of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila.

However, the current situation with uncertainty due to the flow of information media and the flow of democratization with various associated impacts has given space for the ideology of Islamism to survive and even develop. In this new environment, Islamism gained its form in the form of thought, discourse, action and movement which saw Islam as not only a religion but also a political ideology and the totality of living systems. Islamism continually seeks to push for the idea of the superiority of Islamic textual sources and Islamic ideas over human-made ideologies. When Islamist ideologues try to adapt the ideology of Islamism to the new environment and push those ideas to the Muslim public, the ulama must still try to survive as guardians of religious traditions while fending off the tide of Islamist pressures. In a new environment that is dynamic and full of uncertainty, the endurance of ulama as guardians of tradition as well as giving legitimacy of Islam to the nation-state will continue to be tested by the persistence of Islamists to push for the ideas of the *Khilafah* and other Islamist ideas.

The next challenge for the nation-state of Indonesia in the future, which appears in this study is the strengthening of ethnic sentiment. Indonesia, which is constructed from various ethnicities, is a fact that cannot be denied. Ethnic diversity is what makes the “national colour” of Indonesia more unique when compared to the concept of nationality in other places in general. The multi-ethnic Indonesian nationality is knitted and built gradually by the equality of fate and a long history of struggle alongside geographical unity in the archipelago. National development is certainly not done yet, and the vision of Muslim nationality between one region and other regions varies greatly. Due to the historical experience of each region and other influencing factors. However, the increase in ethnic sentiment, especially in several regions outside Java, poses a challenge to the principles of sustaining the Indonesian nation-state, especially in

matters of citizenship and tolerance. The space of freedom provided by the era of democracy, regional autonomy, and the abundance of currents of information at a certain level has encouraged the strengthening of ethnic sentiments which are then intertwined with religious and political issues for power struggles. In many areas, this kind of complexity is very pronounced in the results of this study, mainly since this research was conducted during the political years.

Some areas, such as Palangka Raya and Aceh show intense symptoms in this direction. Ethnicity wrapped in religion and political power is one source of challenges to the principles that underpin the nation-state. The Aceh case shows that the issue of ethnicity clad in religion or vice versa has provided authentic challenges to the nation-state of Indonesia even since the early days of the founding of the Republic. Bandages of ethnicity and religion that were not accommodated were once embers of the “resistance movement” that coloured the long history of relations between Jakarta and this region. Therefore, the analysis done in Aceh shows that the application of certain sharia in Aceh becomes a channel of aspiration and at the same time buries the fire of resistance against the Republic of Indonesia both based on ethnicity and religion, even though the potential might not fade away.

Likewise, Palangka Raya and several other regions that attach ethnicity to certain religions have a considerable influence on the acceptance of the principle of citizenship equality and tolerance. The relationship between ethnicity and religion in Palangka Raya does experience certain dynamics, which are quite interesting. Certain religions and ethnicities are parallel, but at other times, religion overcomes ethnic identity or vice versa. Ordinary Muslims are identified with the Banjar ethnicity, while Protestant Christians are often identified with the Dayak ethnicity. The Sampit conflict that has shocked this country shows that ethnic identity is firm and even goes beyond religious identity. However, during the regional elections, for example, religious identity was often far more prominent than the issue of ethnicity. It shows that ethnicity sentiments in several regions are potential sentiments which can be strengthened at any time and become a severe challenge to the principles of citizenship and tolerance which are essential pillars of the concept of Indonesian nationality. The problem is even simpler if it is then wrapped in religious sentiment and gains momentum both by scheduled events such as local elections and national elections and by events that are not scheduled for example personal conflicts of different ethnicities.

Another challenge to the nation-state foundation in the future, which is also strongly reflected in this research is the strengthening of identity politics along with the dominance of Islamic conservatism

in the country in general. The strengthening of conservatism is understandable because the wave of Islamism movement in the country that brought it to the Ikhwani, Salafi and others took place some 40 or 30 years ago. The seeds that are spread through movements such as *balaqab*, Qur'an recitation, and others have yielded tangible results, namely Indonesian Islam, which is believed to be more conservative. Conservatism at a certain level becomes an extraordinary attraction for politicians to carry Islamic symbols that appeal to the masses. This attitude in some areas is reflected in the actions of the ulama actors who are at odds with the government. Conservatism at a certain level then becomes a strategy to exert pressure on the government and at a certain level also influences their attitude towards the concept of the nation-state. Unfortunately, the political strategy sometimes strikes the principles that underpin the building of the Indonesian nation-state, especially citizenship and tolerance. Minority groups in Islam, especially Shiites and Ahmadis, are often victims of identity politics from "political" ulama who choose or are indeed conservative.

An equally important note is the factor of political affiliation vis-a-vis the government in the current Indonesian political context. Their political positions also influence ulama perceptions related to the nation-state, especially on their derivative values as both opposition and supporters of the ruling group. Those who can enjoy the benefits of their position in government tend to have a higher acceptance of the values of the nation-state than those who tend to oppose the government. Those who are in the line of opposition tend to be harsh with whatever comes from the government and, regrettably, this will also affect their perception of the nation-state. Hard attitude and conservatism then become a kind of strategy for some scholars in dealing with the government and the scholars who are considered supporters of the government. Unfortunately, the rejection of the government clad in Islamic conservatism or vice versa Islamic conservatism clad in opposition to the government often sacrifices essential values in the building of the nation-state especially the values of equality of all citizens and tolerance.

In closing, anxiety about the future of the Indonesian nation-state does not need to be developed even though early detection of the sources of threats to the nation-state is still essential. However, the results of this study indicate that the resilience and sustainability of this nation-state today and hopefully in the future must be viewed optimistically; optimism that is based on facts that can be accounted for. The source of the greatest threat to the concept of the nation-state according to the results of this study is intolerance and discrimination, not extremism let alone terrorism, although these four things sometimes form a gradation ladder. The higher the intolerance,

the higher the possibility to be extreme even though the distance between the two gradations is quite far. *Wallābu a' lam.*

# ULAMA AND THE NATION-STATE

Comprehending the Future of Political Islam in Indonesia

This work is not only valuable for understanding how the position of Indonesian ulama today is facing the nation-state but also analyzing the direction and challenges faced by Indonesia in the context of the strengthening influence of political Islam. Ulama is one of the essential figures that colours the social dynamics, politics, and nationality of Indonesia from time to time. Indonesia's current politics proves this again.

This book is a continuation of the first book that has been published previously, *Ulama, Politics, and National Narrative: Fragmentation of Religious Authorities in Indonesian Cities*. If the first book presents research findings in fifteen cities in Indonesia by emphasizing the local dynamics colouring the relationship of ulama and nation-states in each city, the book presents ten thematic analysis chapters of the research results, plus theoretical dialogue and reflection for the findings of field facts.



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