

Editor:
Idris Thaha &
Didin Syafruddin

A large, stylized graphic of a human head profile in grey, facing right. Inside the head, there are grey sound waves of varying heights. Below the head, a photograph of a modern building with a green roof and a wide staircase is visible. The title 'Voice of Sehayan' is written in a colorful, cursive font across the middle of the page.

Voice of Sehayan

The Viewpoints of People's Representative
on the State's Role in Religious Education

Yunita Faela Nisa | Sirojuddin Arif | M. Zaki Mubarak | Yufi Adriani |
Fikri Fahrul Faiz | Faiqoh | Idris Thaha | Didin Syafruddin

Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta
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Voice of Senayan

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on the State's Role in Religious Education

Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta

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Translation and Proofreading Team : Berli Arta, Abdul Haris, Raden Ayu Fathonah, and Mahurni

Editor : Idris Thaha dan Didin Syafruddin

Author : Yunita Faela Nisa, Sirojuddin Arif, M. Zaki Mubarak
Yufi Adriani, Fikri Fahrul Faiz, Faiqoh, Idris Thaha,
Didin Syafruddin

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responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CONVEY.

FOREWORD

This book is the result of the 2019 national survey of the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta regarding the views of Indonesian members of Parliament about the role of the state in religious education in Indonesia. This survey is one of the programs in a series of CONVEY 3 programs, carried out in collaboration between PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP Indonesia. The presentation in this book consists of six chapters that explain the survey findings.

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However, above all, we as writers are fully responsible for any mistakes and shortcomings of this book. Hopefully, this book will be greatly useful.

The Author Team

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD/ART	Articles of Association / Bylaws
Bamusi	Baitul Muslimin Indonesia
DPR RI	House of Representative of Indonesia Republic
FPDU	Daulatul Ummah Association Faction
GBHN	The Outlines of State Policy
ICMI	Association of Muslim Scholars of Indonesia
Manipol/Usdek	Political Manifestations / the Constitutions 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Personality
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
P4	Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing Pancasila
PAN	National Mandate Party
parpol	Political Party
Partai Gerindra	Great Indonesia Movement Party
PBB	Crescent Star Party
PDI	Indonesian Democratic Party
PDI Perjuangan	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
pemilu	General election
pileg	legislative elections
pilkada	regional-head elections
pilpres	Presidential election
PK	Justice Party
PKB	National Awakening Party
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party
PMP	Pancasila Moral Education
PNI	Indonesian National Party
PPP	United Development Party
RPJMN	The Medium-Term National Development Plan
SD	Elementary school
SR	People's school

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta State Islamic University (UIN) focused on the views and policies of the Republic of Indonesia's Representative House members regarding religious education. Indeed, scholars have not conducted many surveys on this topic, both in Indonesia and abroad.

Studies on politics during the Reformation period focused more on discussing the electoral aspects of the house representatives and political parties' roles in general. For example, studies concerning the strategy of winning parties in legislative elections, presidential elections, regional-head elections, political party campaigns and communications, political recruitment and cadre, political party finance, their role in the legislature, and something like that.

Studies on the religious orientation of members of the legislature and political parties, which are seen as part of the political culture, have not been done much by many experts. Likewise, concerning the aspects of national education, studies on the role and work of parliamentarians and political parties in that field have not frequently been conducted either.

Another aspect often studied by some related researchers and academics, particularly the political parties in the Reformation era, concerns the congruence of political parties' ideology with the policies they carry out. This study discusses the extent of consistency between the political parties' programs and the realization of policies - especially

when the political parties have won the general elections (elections) and become the political parties controlling the government. This, of course, also includes how much the values carried by a party or party ideology, through its cadres playing a role in policy formulation: whether ideology is still the determinant, less determining, or not functioning at all?

Political party cadres who are assigned in the executive or government have a strategic role not only in determining the dynamics of political life in society but also in formulating or implementing public policies. They become important actors whose function is to aggregate the interests and political aspirations of the citizens. When they win the election, they have a very crucial role in determining the form of policy because they gain the authority to formulate and implement policies.

Their interest is not limited to those within the circle of executive positions. When they experience defeat in elections, and they do not have strategic positions in the government, they can still play an important role in shaping public policy in the legislature. Political party cadres - who are elected as representatives of the house- who mean the positions in parliamentary institutions still have the function of providing checks and balances for the government. They can also formulate legislation, including matters related to religion and religious education (Mujani & Liddle 2018 and Muhtadi & Mietzner 2019).

Regarding religious life in Indonesia, in recent years, the role of legislative members has been demanded to determine the direction of policy in the midst of the emergence of exclusive religious groups, closed-minded attitudes, anti-citizenship, anti-state, even pro-violence in society (PPIM 2016, 2017, 2018 and Puspidep 2017, 2018). The results of the PPIM study (2018) show that at the level of attitude/opinion, 58.5% of students and students have religious views that tend to be radical, and 51.1% have religious views that tend to be internally intolerant. Externally, 34.3% of students and students show religious understanding that tends to be intolerant. Among religious teachers, the results of the PPIM survey (2019) exhibit that based on implicit measurement tools, 63.07 percent of teachers have religious views that are intolerant of followers of other religions. The use of a more explicit measure of religious intolerance does

not show much difference. The second measure shows that nearly 57 percent of teachers have religious views that are intolerant of followers of other religions.

In accordance with one of the duties of the Indonesian Parliament to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation, this institution is expected to play an important role in caring for diversity, including through education. However, only a limited amount of information has been obtained about the attitudes and views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on this matter. The previous study of members of the legislature focuses more on the political aspects of the legislature, such as the interaction between the president or executive and the legislature within the framework of a multiparty presidential system (Hanan 2014). Several researchers have attempted to look at other issues such as the performance of legislators and public trust in them (INSIS 2013; FORMAPPI 2018; Indonesian Survey Circle 2018; and Poltracking 2017). However, very few have systematically studied the individual views of each member of the DPR on important issues in national politics or public policy, particularly those related to religious education.

This survey is intended to fill the gap. This survey is part of a larger study aimed at exploring the views of members of the national Parliament on religion, nationality, and religious education. This research covers the following matters: a) the perceptions of members of the Indonesian Parliament on religion, democracy, and nationality; b) their attitudes and views on national issues in religious education; and c) their attitudes and views on religious education policies, especially in public schools.

In addition, this survey is part of a series of activities from a larger program entitled “Countering Violent Extremism, Convey”. This activity is intended to increase opportunities and efforts to make the survey results for policies and advocacy for countering radical extremism. The results of this survey can be valuable inputs to formulate policies that can be implemented in an effort to counter violent extremism in Indonesia, in the form of laws and regulations, the National Medium-Term Development Plan, and other relevant policy products. The results of this survey can also be valuable input for efforts to increase the role of the Indonesian

parliament members in passing better public policies related to issues of religion, nationality, and religious education in Indonesia.

In a broader context, a survey of the views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on issues of nationality or public policy can make a very significant academic contribution to the study of public policy politics in Indonesia, especially policy politics in the legislature. The absence of a systematic record regarding the policy choices of each member of the Indonesian Parliament in the several votes that have been carried out in the Indonesian Parliament has made it difficult for researchers and the public in general to understand the actual attitudes and views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on important issues in this country. In this context, this survey is very important and necessary to understand and explain the extent to which members of the Indonesian Parliament agree or disagree on important issues that are of public concern and what matters influence the attitudes and views of each member of the Indonesian Parliament. in these matters.

In this book, a report on the survey results, the discussion is limited to the views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on issues and policies on religious education. In general, this book is intended to examine the views of legislative members on the efforts that can and should be made to build national resilience and prevent violent extremism through religious education in Indonesia. In the socio-political context of a pluralistic society like Indonesia, religious education is expected to be free from discrimination and acts of violence. Moreover, religious education is expected to contribute to efforts to strengthen tolerance, harmony, mutual understanding and understanding, and collaboration between religious communities and between followers of different faiths.

THE SPECTRUM OF RELIGION-AND-STATE RELATIONS

The politics of religious education policy can be explained in terms of the relationship between religion and the state. Educational institutions, especially public schools, are public spaces that are under state control. Therefore, the format of religious education in state schools will be heavily influenced by the attitudes and views of policymakers, including members

of the legislative body, on the relationship between religion and the state. Those who want religions to have a bigger role in the state tend to provide a large space for religious education in schools. Conversely, those who want a minimal role for religion in the state tend to limit the existence of religious education in public schools or organize religious education in such a way that the role of religion in politics can be more controlled. This difference in view, in turn, influences one's policy choices, not only on whether or not religious education is necessary but also on whether these different views can affect the extent of how religious education is taught to students.


In some countries, the important role of education in shaping future generations has made schools a strategic arena for various parties to voice their interests (Skeie 2006: 19; Kuru 2007: 569; and Schreiner 2005: 8). This conflict stems not only from differences in religious views held by each party but politically rooted in their different attitudes or views regarding the relationship between religion and state. However, it should be understood that this contradiction cannot be described simply as a conflict between those who facilitate or otherwise limit religion in education. As well as variations in views on the relationship between religion and state, a person's attitude or views on religious education can have a wider spectrum than the two major trends (facilitating versus limiting).

Systematically, variations in attitudes or views on the relationship between religion and state can be described in the continuum of the relationship between religion and state as depicted in Diagram 1.1. If the right side represents the position of the party that gives space to religion in the state, then the left side shows the position of the party that limits the role of religion in the state.

Theoretically, there are two diametrically opposite extreme positions. The extreme left position diagrammed the position of those who are anti-religious or reject religion as a whole in the country ("anti-religion"). On the other hand, the extreme right is the party that unites religion and state (the 'religious state'). This latter position can be found in a country based on religion such as Saudi Arabia or Iran in the Islamic

world or the Vatican in the Catholic world. Conversely, antipathy to religion can be found in communist countries such as China, Cuba, and North Korea (Kuru 2007: 570).

Diagram 1.1 The Relation between Religions and the state



Right between these two extremes lies what can be called a ‘religion-neutral’ position that the state does not limit religion’s existence in the public sphere nor does it facilitate the role of religion in the state. However, the state provides space or freedom for its citizens to express their religious attitudes or views in the public sphere, including in public schools, as long as it does not violate the rules in force in the country (Kuru 2007).

Apart from these three positions, the continuum of the relationship between religion and state can still contain, at least, two other positions. First, the position between “anti-religious” and “religion-neutral”. Although they do not completely reject the existence of religion in the state, those in this position have a tendency to limit the role of religion in the state. In this survey, we refer to it as ‘*laicite*’ (Kuru, 2007). In contrast to the ‘religion-neutral’ position, *laicite* has a more negative attitude towards the role of religion in the state or public sphere. In many ways, *laicite* supporters actively seek to limit religion’s role in public areas such as public schools.

Second, between the positions of “religious neutrality” and “religious state,” there is a position that shows a tendency to be “friendly with religion.” Although it does not make religion the basis of the state, this position provides relatively large recognition or space for the role of religion in the state. The manifestation of these political attitudes or views can be seen in the state’s attitude towards religion in several European countries such as Denmark, England, and Greece, which give recognition to one major religion that has been established in society (Kuru, 2007).

By placing 'religion neutrality' as the middle point in the pattern of the relationship between religion and state, this survey opens a broader and more open space to discuss the various existing views regarding religious education in public schools. In contrast to the views of some groups who tend to classify different views on religious education into two major perspectives: religious and secular, this survey's perspective does not rule out attitudes or views between or outside the two perspectives. Besides, this survey's perspective is also open to the possibility that the pattern of debates related to religious education may differ from one issue to another.

VARIATIONS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION MODELS

To further portray the variation in the views of policymakers on religious education, it is important to explain that confessional religious education does not seem uniform. How or to what extent the religious content is taught is more or less influenced by the religious views held by the in-service teachers or more fundamentally influenced by the government's religious policies (the state) in power. Regarding the politics of the relationship between religion and the state, as previously discussed, theoretical professional religious education can be further divided into two major models as follows: interventionist and accommodationist.

First, the educational model is built on the awareness that religion and politics are two inseparable things. Within the relationship framework between state and religion, as mentioned above, this perspective represents those who want the leading role of religion in the state as found in religious states. In this kind of country, religious education is closely related to the importance of maintaining the role of religion in the state. From the ruling party's perspective, this policy choice makes much sense because the government or regime in power needs to spread religious values that support their power. Under its nature, we can call such a model an interventionist model of religious education.

The interventionist model of religious education can be found in religious states and non-religious states. In the latter case, the desire to gain or maintain political domination can lead certain religious groups to

use state policy as an instrument of power. As a result, the model of religious education applied can take an interventionist form that gives majority religious groups privileges to gain or maintain political domination in the country.

In terms of the category of confessional religious education, the state can choose another policy model that respects religious differences or diversity in society. So, the religious education provided still aims to provide an understanding of specific religious values to students. However, the state does not give privileges to a particular group or religion. On the other hand, the state or schools provide equal space for all religious groups to provide or receive religious education following their religious values. The state or school's prominent role is to facilitate, not intervene, or doctrine particular religious views towards students. This education model is often known as an accommodationist model of religious education policy. In the perspective of the relationship between religion and state, this accommodationist model of religious education represents political attitudes or views that are “accommodative” or friendly to religion.

In contrast to the model of confessional religious education, the educational model based on religions is under the view that emphasizes the neutral role of the state in religious affairs. Since the state does not prioritize one particular religion, the most sensible solution is to teach universal religious values that might be taken from any existing religion in schools or society. As previously mentioned, the educational model according to religions does not emphasize the need to internalize the religious values of one particular religion in students. On the other hand, religious education is intended to introduce a variety of existing religions so that students can take lessons from the universal values taught by each religion or, at least, can better understand the heterogeneity of existing religions.

Discussions on religious education cannot be completely presented without considering the position of those who reject religious education or religious-related matters in public schools. For this group, religion is seen as a private matter for citizens that the state should not interfere. Having this reason, they reject religious education in public schools.

Religious education should be provided by the family or society, not by the government, the state, or schools. This view is in line with the *laicite* viewpoint in the relationship between religion and state. In this survey, such views are referred to as “reluctance” towards the state’s role in religious education. This reluctance is manifested in the form of a desire to reduce religious education or eliminate it in public schools.

In some cases, those who support the neutrality of the state in religious affairs also agree to reduce or eliminate religious education in schools because the provision of religious education services to particular religious groups can be seen as a state’s tendency to support these religious groups. However, in contrast to *laicite*, which actively wants to exclude religions from public schools or public areas in general, the religious neutral attitudes or views still open the opportunity for students’ or teachers’ religious expression. As previously mentioned, the religion-neutral position does not completely reject matters of religion in the school environments. Promoters of this position to a certain degree can still accept certain religious expressions in the school environments.

Based on the purpose of education and the teaching material, in general, religious education can be divided into three models, namely (1) education into religion, (2) education about religion, and (3) education from religion (Schreiner 2005). Education into religion is an educational model that teaches certain religious values to students.

Education about or from religion does not emphasize the formation of religious piety in individual students but rather introduces the diversity of existing religions (including religions other than those of students) or teach students to take lessons from each religion taught as universal values. This model of religious education is also known as non-confessional religious education. This educational model aims to form students or citizens who are obedient and practice their religious teachings. Therefore, this educational model requires teachers who have a good understanding of their religion. Just like the student’s condition, the teacher will also teach religious subjects according to their religion.

In contrast to the education into religion, education about or from religion does not emphasize the formation of religious piety in individual

students. However, religious education is more intended to introduce the diversity of existing religions (including religions other than those believed by students) or teach students to take lessons from each religion being taught. In the literature on religious education studies, this religious education model is also known as non-confessional religious education.

Due to its non-confessional nature, this educational model of or of religion does not require religious equality between a teacher or student's religion and the religious lessons given or studied. A teacher who is Muslim can teach Christian religious subject matter or vice versa. Likewise, Muslims can learn about Islam from religious teachers who are Christian or vice versa. It is possible because religious education aims not to internalize religious values in students but rather to provide an understanding of the various religions that exist. Instead of teaching religious values or teachings according to the religion held by each student, the non-confessional religious education model might emphasize universal values contained by various religions.

STATE AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICY

Debates about religious education can be influenced by various factors, including political dynamics or competition between ideological groups within a country (Kuru 2009). For this reason, due to the large political influence, the focus of conflict among groups regarding religious education in public schools can differ from country to country. For example, in the United States, conflict involves competition between proponents of passive secularism who want a neutral role for the state in matters of religious education and some religious conservatives who want a greater role for religion in public schools. In Turkey, what is happening in the competition between *laicite* supporters, who actively seek to exclude religion from the public sphere, and 'religion-neutral' supporters who want a more neutral role for the state open up space for citizens' religious expression in public spaces, including public schools (Kuru 2009).

Similarly, the differences in the focus of contention can even be found within one country. One particular group may accommodate religion's role on one issue and still show a contradiction in other matters. Therefore, a

broader and more detailed perspective is needed on the important issues in religious education and how a person or policymaker behaves in these issues. In addition, given the importance of internal political dynamics, it is also necessary to look further into the suitability of the methodological tools used to portray one’s views on religious education policies with the variety of views that may exist in the country.

In Indonesia, as documented by many researchers, the political dynamics in the early years of state formation resulted in Indonesia being a country that was in many respects “friendly to religion.” Indonesia is not a religious state nor a secular state. Several provisions in the constitution and other regulations as well as state institutions clearly give recognition and space for religion in the life of the state. With regard to education, the state facilitates religious education in public schools. More than that, the state is actively involved in facilitating religious schools’ implementation through one particular ministry, namely the Ministry of Religion (Ropi 2017).

Without denying the broad spectrum of the relationship between religion and state - as previously mentioned, this survey on the politics of religious education policy in Indonesia can focus on four possible political options, namely *laicite*, religious neutrality, accommodative, and interventionist (religious state) (see Table 1.1). In this regard, models of religious education policies, as discussed in the previous section, can also be categorized further by taking into account the four political positions. The following is a summary of the characteristics of each political choice regarding the state’s roles in religious education:

Table 1.1 Differences in the Four Optional Roles of the State on Religious Education

Laicite	Neutral	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Viewing religion as a private matter and the state not interfering in it.	Supporting the neutrality of the state in religious matters.	Supporting a state that considers several religions equally important, but not only the majority religion.	Supporting religion and politics to be integrated.

Laicite	Neutral	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Actively excluding religion from public schools.	Opening the opportunity or closing it for all existing religious groups.	Supporting the state facilitates several nationally recognized religions.	Viewing religious education as closely related to the interest in maintaining the majority religion's role in the state.
Reducing the portion or eliminating religious education in public schools.	Supporting religious education for the universal values of humankind.	Supporting religious education provided only by state-recognized religious groups.	Giving privileges to the majority religion to maintain dominance in various fields.

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

Religion has had a major influence in forming the party system in Indonesia, including on its cadres. At least two major socio-religious groups (modernist and traditionalist) expressed their political participation in Masyumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Party in the 1955 elections. These religious parties played a significant role. Apart from these two Islamic political parties, the 1955 election also resulted in two major political parties; The Indonesian National Party (PNI) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). These two political parties represent nationalist (and scholars and communist (and lower class) groups. Each political party represents the largest group in the ideological and socio-economic system of Indonesian society. Through the 1955 elections, as indicated by a number of groups, the party system in this country was first formed.

In several ways, the Indonesian party system has changed in line with implementing the 'Open List' system in the election of members of the Indonesian Parliament. Some evidence shows that this system has a major effect on reducing the role of political parties in aggregating voter votes because competition in legislative elections does involve not only competition among political parties but also triggers competition among candidates in one political party. In addition, the emergence and sinking

of new parties and the proliferation of money politics in elections also eroded the existing party system, so that the relationship between voters and political parties became more flexible, and ideological influence was reduced (Ufen 2008). Muhtadi (2019) also found that voters' party identities have continued to decline since the Reformation period.

However, religion's influence is still visible in grouping political parties in Indonesia, even though the party system has undergone many shifts. The study of Fossati, Aspinall, Muhtadi, and Warburton (2020) shows no other issues that have a significant role in differentiating the ideological positions of political parties apart from religious issues. However, how this happens or how religion influences the formation of party identity or ideology has not received proportional discussion.

This survey is intended to fill this gap by examining two mechanisms by which the influence of religion in the party system contributes to the viewpoint map of members of the DPR RI on religious education policies. First, this survey looks at how the political party identities influence DPR RI members' views on education policy. Second, as an alternative explanation, this survey also looks at the extent to which the parties' socio-religious composition (religious cleavage) can explain the view map of members of the DPR RI on religious education policies.

Both of these aspects view the influence of political parties' affiliation, which places their representatives in the legislature based on one's views on religious education. However, they differ in seeing how the party grouping should be carried out. The first mechanism assumes how far a party sets religion or nation as the main determining factor shaping the party's political views. It does not mean that those putting religion above the nation as the main factor in forming party identity do not have a national commitment or consider the nation as the main shaping party identity do not have religious commitment. This difference refers more to how religion or nation is put forward in shaping party identity.

In line with this assumption, this study classifies parties based on the extent to which religion or nation shapes party identity. Based on the social history of parties, party policy lines as written in the statutes and bylaws. Moreover, the party elites' surveys help this current survey

classify existing parties into four groups, namely nationalists, religious nationalists, Traditionalist Islam, and modernist Islam. If the first two groups belong to the parties that put the nation first to forming party identity, the last two groups, in turn, are the parties that prioritize religion over the nation in shaping party identity.

Regarding religious parties, this survey differentiates them into traditionalist Islam and modernist Islam based on the different religious views held by the main socio-religious groups that establish the party. Traditionalist Islam includes the National Awakening Party, formed by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) group with religiously traditionalist views. Modernist Islam includes the United Development Party, the Prosperous Justice Party, and the National Mandate Party. The main groups that formed these parties came from modernist Muslims, whose religious views tended to be more puritanical than traditionalist Islamic groups.

In this survey, the United Development Party was included in this category considering the great influence of the Masjumi elements who were modernist Islam in the formation of parties, especially after NU declared to leave the United Development Party sometime after the party's formation. It is true that after the New Order, many high-ranking party officials came from NU circles. However, as shown by the results of a survey conducted by Fossati, Aspinall, Muhtadi, and Warburton (2020) - which shows that parties with the tendency of conservative religious-political views tend to be as conservative as PKS or PAN - shows the great influence of modernist Islamic religious views in PPP. Meanwhile, PKS and PAN can be included in the modernist Islam category, given the character of religious views that form these two parties' main formation. If Muhammadiyah figures drove PAN's formation, the formation of PKS was handled by those involved in many campus da'wah movements that were ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Two parties are classified into the nationalist party group, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the NasDem Party. Both parties explicitly mention the nation as the main thing in shaping their political views. Slightly different from the nationalist groups, religious-nationalist groups try to include religious ideas in their

nationalist view. In this case, the survey included three parties, namely the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the Democratic Party, and the Party of Functional Groups (Golkar), into the religious-nationalist group. Suppose Gerindra and Democrat explicitly state these religious nationalist tendencies in their Statutes / Bylaws (AD / ART). In that case, Golkar shows this ideological tendency not only in the party structure but also in party political activities or attitudes, which accommodate religious groups' interests. Fossati, Aspinall, Muhtadi, and Warburton's (2020) survey shows that as far as the relationship between religion and state is concerned, Gerindra, Democrats, and Golkar tend to have close political views, which tend to be more conservative than the political views of the PDI-P and NasDem elites.

In contrast to the model of party grouping based on political identity, party grouping based on religious differences (religious cleavage) focuses more on the religious composition of the party elites. In the Indonesian context, religious cleavage can be simply defined based on the party elites' proportions. In this study, it can be seen from the number of Indonesian Parliament members who have a religion other than Islam. Although this survey received a response rate of only 64.6 percent - more about this non-response rate is explained in the next section - the non-response rate is random so that the data collected can be considered representative of all members of the Indonesian Parliament. With regard to religion, the religious composition described by the results of this survey diagrams and the actual composition of religion in every party, except the Democratic Party.

As shown in Table 1.1, there is no significant difference between the religious composition of the parties in the Indonesian Parliament and the religious composition shown by the results of this survey, except the Democratic Party. For example, the PPIM UIN Jakarta survey shows that the proportion of non-Muslims in the PDI-P is 48.68 percent, while the Indonesian Parliament's actual proportion is 44.53 percent. The survey results also did not show a significant difference between the proportion of non-Muslims in the PAN elite in the Indonesian Parliament by 4.54 percent. Furthermore, the proportion of Indonesian Parliament members

from PAN who were non-Muslims whom the PPIM UIN Jakarta survey enumerators could interview was 5.88 percent.

Table 1.2 The proportion of Party Elites Having Religions Other than Islam

No.	Party	Proportion of Non-Muslims Indonesian Parliament	Proportion of Non-Muslims (PPIM survey)	Party Category
1.	PDI Perjuangan	44.53	48.68	Very Heterogeneous
2.	NasDem	20.34	20.51	Heterogeneous
3.	Golkar	12.94	15.91	Heterogeneous
4.	Gerindra	7.69	6.38	Quite Heterogeneous
5.	Democrat	12.96	6.25	Quite Heterogeneous
6.	PAN	4.54	5.88	Quite Heterogeneous
7.	PKB	5.17	3.85	Quite Heterogeneous
8.	PKS	0	0	Homogeneous
9.	PPP	0	0	Homogeneous

Based on variations in the proportion of Indonesian Parliament members who are non-Muslim in each party, this survey further categorizes the existing parties into four categories. The first category is ‘Highly Heterogeneous.’ It refers to parties with a very high proportion of non-Muslims in the party elite (> 40 percent). As seen in Table 1.2, only one party falls into this category, namely the PDI-P. The second category is the parties with a high proportion of non-Muslims in the party elite (15% < 40%). NasDem and Golkar belong to this category. This category can be called the “heterogeneous” party. The next category is the parties with only a few party elites with a religion other than Islam (30% < 15%). This group can be called a ‘Quite Heterogeneous’ group and includes

four parties: Gerindra, Democrat, PAN, and PKB. Finally, two parties do not have non-Muslim members in the party elite, namely PKS and PPP. In this report, both parties were categorized as “Homogeneous.” This study further investigated how these different types of parties affect the members’ views of the Indonesian Parliament on religious education policies.

RESEARCH METHODS

This book was written based on the results of a complete survey or census of the Indonesian Parliament members for the period of 2019-2024, which had 575 people. The data collection was carried out through face-to-face interviews with each respondent and was collected by trained enumerators from 21 October to 17 December 2019 with a response rate of 68.1%. In other words, this research succeeded in interviewing 380 members of the Indonesian Parliament. This study conducted a spot check mechanism of 100% of the data obtained in ensuring data quality. There are ten incomplete data from the data that has been obtained so that 370 (64.6%) data were analyzed.

In terms of the research method, this study can be categorized as an elite survey. Those interviewed are political elites who have their own social and demographic characteristics, which are different from society’s social and demographic characteristics in general. For the elite survey, experts stated that a response rate of 64.6% is still acceptable. However, to further ensure that the data we collected is of quality and reliability, we further assessed whether the non-response in this survey was random or not. For that, we carried out several tests by examining differences in proportions or means of several variables. First, we use several available variables, namely the sex and age of members of the Indonesian Parliament, to check the extent to which the non-response rate in this survey affects the analysis results. Second, we also examine differences in proportions and/or averages for political party variables.

Regarding gender and age, the test results show a 5% significance level in which there is no significant difference in the proportion based on sex between the legislative members who responded or were interviewed

(370 people) and the total members of the DPR RI for the 2019-2024 period (575 people). Likewise, if seen according to the legislature's age, the test results show that there is no significant difference in the average age of responding legislators and the total number of legislators. Thus, it can be concluded that the non-response is random (according to gender and age variables).

The same results were obtained after the test had been carried out on each group of political parties. In each political party, it is known that there is no significant difference in the proportion according to sex and the average age between the responding legislators and the total members of the legislature. It can also be concluded that non-response also spreads randomly in each party group (according to gender and age variables). Thus, based on the conditions described previously, it can be concluded that the non-response in the study was random. Therefore, statistically, it can be said that the non-response bias is relatively small.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS

As previously stated, this survey covered 370 people out of 575 members of the Indonesian Parliament. Based on the statistical test we presented, demographically, there is no significant difference between the survey respondents' socio-demographic conditions and the socio-demographic conditions of members of the Indonesian Parliament. Per the proportion of female legislative members in the Indonesian Parliament (2019-2024), which earned 20.5 percent or 118 out of 575 people, the proportion of female respondents in this survey reached 21 percent. Of the 370 legislators who were successfully interviewed, 78 were women.

In terms of party, the respondents who were successfully interviewed in this survey came from all Indonesian Parliament parties. Except for the Golkar Party, this survey was only able to interview 54.1 percent of Indonesian Parliament members who came from this party, and the proportion of respondents who were successfully interviewed from this party ranged from 60.2 percent to 89.7 percent (Table 1.3). The largest proportion comes from the National Awakening Party (PKB) - this survey

succeeded in interviewing 52 people from 58 members of the Indonesian Parliament who came from the National Awakening Party.

Table 1.3 Proportions of Respondents Based on Political Party Affiliation

No.	Party	The number of Representative	The Number of Respondents	The Percentage of Respondents
1.	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan)	128	77	60,2
2.	Golkar Party	85	46	54,1
3.	Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra)	78	47	60,3
4.	Nasdem Party	59	39	66,1
5.	National Awakening Party (PKB)	58	52	89,7
6.	Democratic Party (PD)	54	35	64,8
7.	Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	50	33	66,0
8.	National Mandate Party (PAN)	44	34	77,3
9.	United Development Party (PPP)	19	17	89,5
	Total	575	380	66,09

This survey also includes all commissions in the Indonesian Parliament. As shown in Table 1.4, the proportion of Indonesian parliament members that could be interviewed from each commission ranges from 52.94 percent to 78.43 percent. The commission with the least proportion of respondents is Commission I, which is in charge of defense, foreign affairs, communications, information technology, and intelligence. Meanwhile, the commission with the largest proportion of respondents was Commission IX, responsible for health and labor issues. In relation

to the focus of this survey study which is religious education, there are two related commissions, namely Commission VIII and Commission X. Commission VIII is in charge of religious, social, disaster and women's empowerment and child protection, while Commission X is in charge of education, sports, and history. In Commissions VIII and X, this survey successfully interviewed 75.47 and 67.31 percent of commission members, respectively.

Table 1.4 The proportion of Respondents Based on Membership in the Commission

No.	Commission	The number of Members	The Number of Respondents	The Percentage of Respondents
1.	Commission I	51	27	52,94
2.	Commission II	50	33	66
3.	Commission III	53	29	54,72
4.	Commission IV	54	40	74,07
5.	Commission V	52	32	61,54
6.	Commission VI	54	32	59,26
7.	Commission VII	51	33	64,71
8.	Commission VIII	53	40	75,47
9.	Commission IX	51	40	78,43
10.	Commission X	52	35	67,31
11.	Commission XI	51	29	56,86

In terms of religion, the non-Muslim respondents' proportion is also in line with that of the Indonesian Parliament members who are non-Muslim. As shown in Table 1.4, 61 respondents (16.49%) have religions other than Islam. This figure also reflects the legislature members proportion who have faiths other than Islam in the Indonesian Parliament, which was about 17.03% (98 of 575 people).

Table 1.5 Composition of Respondents Based on Religion / Belief

No.	Religion	Number	Percentage
1.	Islam	309	83,51
2.	Protestant	28	7,57
3.	Catholic	19	5,14
4.	Hindu	9	2,42
5.	Buddha	4	1,08
6.	Other Religions / Beliefs	1	0,27
	Total	370	100

Furthermore, this survey's socio-demographic composition presented in Table 1.6 shows that based on ethnic backgrounds, the largest ethnic group is Javanese (32.43% of respondents). When viewed from several tribes that have quite a lot of representatives in the Indonesian Parliament, this survey results show that the four largest tribes have representatives who occupy the major portions by 63.25 percent of the total seats in the Indonesian Parliament. Apart from Javanese, these tribes are Sundanese (12.43 percent), Malay (6.49 percent), Batak (5.95 percent), and Bugis (5.95 percent). Meanwhile, if we look further based on the origin of the electoral districts, around 54.05 percent of respondents came from the Java regions, including Banten, the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, and the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The rest (45.95 percent) come from various regions or islands outside Java.

Table 1.6 Composition of Respondents Based on Ethnic Background

No.	Tribes	Number of Respondents	Portions of Respondents in Percentage
1.	Aceh	9	2,43
2.	Ambon	6	1,62
3.	Arab	2	0,54
4.	Bali	9	2,43

No.	Tribes	Number of Respondents	Portions of Respondents in Percentage
5.	Banjar	7	1,89
6.	Batak	22	5,95
7.	Betawi	11	2,97
8.	Bugis	22	5,95
9.	Dayak	7	1,89
10.	Java	120	32,43
11.	Madura	6	1,62
12.	Malay	24	6,49
13.	Minang	15	4,05
14.	Papua	7	1,89
15.	Sasak	3	0,81
16.	Sunda	46	12,43
17.	Chinese	6	1,62
18.	Others	48	12,97
	Total	370	100

Based on age, this survey results indicate that the majority of the Indonesian parliament members are between the ages of 41 and 60. As shown in Table 1.7, the proportion of respondents belonging to this age category is 66.22 percent of the total respondents. Only a few young people, especially those less than 41 years old, were elected to be members of the Indonesian Parliament. This survey results indicate that the proportion of respondents who are below 41 years old is only 17.83 percent. This figure is only slightly higher than the proportion of those aged 61 and over, which reached 15.95 percent.

Table 1.7 Composition of Respondents by Age

No.	Age Group	Number of Respondents	Portions of Respondents in Percentage
1.	<= 30 years	18	4,86

No.	Age Group	Number of Respondents	Portions of Respondents in Percentage
2.	31 – 35 years	16	4,32
3.	36 – 40 years	32	8,65
4.	41 – 45 years	49	13,24
5.	46 – 50 years	70	18,92
6.	51 – 55 years	72	19,46
7.	56 – 60 years	54	14,59
8.	61 – 65 years	30	8,11
9.	>= 66 years	29	7,84
	Total	370	100

BOOK SYSTEMATICS

This book consists of six chapters. Chapter I generally describes the reasons for the importance of selecting problems in this survey. Surveys regarding the people's representatives' views in the legislature on issues and policies of religious education are still very rare. This survey is needed as an effort to build national resilience and prevent violent extremism through religious education in Indonesia. Religious education in public schools must be free from discrimination and acts of violence, which in turn can strengthen tolerance, harmony, and peace in diversity.

Chapter II describes the development of the relationship between religion and state in Indonesia and the political policies, including religious education matters. After the New Order, certain groups tried to fight for Islam to become a reference for formulating political policies. The government during the Reformation era tried to include policies on religious education into national education policies.

Chapters III, IV, and Chapter V are the core discussion results of the survey findings. This chapter describes the views of the Indonesian Parliament members on several important issues in religious education in public schools. For example, religious education is related to national

insight, religious education curriculum, and understanding of religious diversity in religious education.

This book closes with Chapter VI, which presents the conclusions from the survey results. This survey proves that just a few Indonesian Parliament members have serious concerns about religious education and sufficiently religious views on the state's role in religious education. The views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on the state's role in religious education are influenced by the political parties that are their political tools.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL PARTIES AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICIES

This chapter discusses and describes the relationship development between religion and state in Indonesia in general, both during the Old Order, New Order, and Reform era. The relationship between the two has had its ups and downs from time to time, which seems not to end. There are efforts to keep making Islam the basis for formulating political policies, especially in the religious education field. The policies on religious education, particularly those related to the national education objectives, issued by the government appear to vary from regime to regime. The government considers it essential to include religious teaching for students in schools into the national education policy.

ISLAM INFLUENCES STATE POLICY?

The development of Islam and politics in post-New Order Indonesia found varying forms, both in the legal sphere involving political institutions at the national level and in society's informal sphere at the local level. This development is not only influenced by the complexity of past historical experiences but also related to contemporary responses, which are often pragmatic. This development cannot be separated from social and political changes - from a situation marked by the restriction of freedom to a situation marked by liberal democratic practices. In this regard, it is often discussed that the political change from the New Order to

the Reformation marked the breakdown of the old political system, which opened up enormous opportunities for the emergence of various forms and political expressions of society. Such phenomena are often expressed with the exaggerated joy of political euphoria.

In such a condition, it is understandable why “Islamic fundamentalism” arose during the historical development of modern Indonesia, which was not as vibrant as it was during the post-Soeharto (New Order) era. One of the bases for evaluating the emergence of “Islamic fundamentalism” is that many parties wish to reaffirm Islamic formalism in all aspects of life, including political life. This spirit, namely the formalization of Islam in various aspects of life, is not necessarily consistent with the basic view of religious fundamentalism

Anything related to the issue of religious revival today tends to be interpreted as the emergence of fundamentalism. The emergence of several political parties in Indonesia that use Islam as the basis and platform, color, and symbol, has also been used to measure the emergence of fundamentalism and Islamist politics (Platzdasch 2009).

In the Indonesian context, several things should be considered in relation to the rise of fundamentalism and Islamist politics. First, the so-called revival of political Islam. Therefore, many people associate it with Islamic fundamentalism - it is not something scary. If support for the Jakarta Charter in parliament can be treated as a measure, then only about 87 people support the idea. The number came from PPP, the Crescent Star Party (PBB), and several small political parties that were members of the Soulatul Ummah Persyarikatan Faction (FPDU) after the 1999 elections (Salim 2008: 94).

Second, the Islamic aspirations are also not monolithic, like people's understanding of Islamic law. That is why the desire to impose Islamic law in a number of districts/cities takes a very elementary form. Even the Islamic Sharia Enforcement Committee in Makassar finds it difficult to formulate the substance to be enforced, even though it has received support from most of the area's political forces.

Third, religious fundamentalism should be viewed at least two levels: the level of thought and action level. The development phenomenon of

Islamic religious movements outside the parliament shows that all groups perceived as having radical ideologies suggest a strong Islam-based influence. All of them seriously want Islamic law to apply in Indonesia. However, there are sharp differences in the substance of what is meant by Islamic law among them.

Despite the fact that these organizations share the same concerns about Islamic law, it cannot be concluded that they agree on all aspects related to the application of Islamic sharia. Like Islamic groups in the past, they seem to have quite different views on this issue. Because of the problem of differences, the issue of Islamic sharia has never been discussed and exposed in more detail. For example, what Islamic sharia is, how Islamic sharia is understood and interpreted, which interpretation should be taken and followed, how it is applied, etc.

The difficulty in equating all Muslims' understanding of Islamic law has prompted these Islamic groups to express their views in a relatively general tone. Since the fall of Soeharto's government, basically, they have only called for the need to implement Islamic law in all aspects of life. It is done peacefully through the dissemination of ideas and thoughts, both written and spoken.

In connection with such matters, the emergence of regional regulations with the nuances of sharia in several regions is equally controversial. Some examples of regional regulations with the nuances of sharia, among others, are regulations concerning the compulsory reading of the Qur'an for students and brides; Muslim and Muslim dress; prevention and overcoming immorality; prohibition on selling and retailing liquor; to the prohibition of prostitution. All of this is an indication of the view of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in its various formalistic forms, even though the problem of alcoholism or prostitution, for example, is not a mere issue related to sharia.

The debate on Islamic law is closely related to the development of discussions about the relationship between state and religion, especially Islam, in Indonesia, which has experienced various ups and downs. Very frequently, the issue of religion and the state has become an important issue that appears in the history of this nation's journey that has not

been resolved. The extent to which the state is allowed to accommodate religious values and affairs in the formulation of government policies, and to what extent and in what aspects the state does not need to interfere, the boundaries are still not completely clear. As long as the boundaries are still unclear, the area will be a place of constant contestation between those who want a more significant role for the government in religious affairs and those who want to limit it. If we look further, the debate regarding religion and the state has been going on since before independence, the formative period after the proclamation to the deadlock in the Constituent Assembly in 1959, the beginning of the New Order to the period of the Reformation government.

In this regard, we need to precisely understand how state policies can change in giving room to religion and the development of Muslims' aspirations. The change tended to be antagonistic in the New Order's early days until it became more accommodating in the future. This fact has underlined that state policy on religion is very dynamic. However, during the New Order era, the state-controlled and determined all policies because of the powerful and centralistic power, then, in the aftermath of the state policies regarding religion were no longer the result of government accommodation but were determined by the struggle and competition between political forces. Especially by the political parties in the parliament. Within such a framework, we must place the emergence of many legal rules or government regulations that in nature are increasingly religious.

The strong desire to set Islamic touch to state policy can be understood from various perspectives. In the Muslim aspirations' context, this phenomenon, at least, shows that the largest group of Muslims are not satisfied with previous agreements. They feel they are the most disadvantaged. That is why aspirations to bring the state closer to Islam always arise if there are opportunities and opportunities. Meanwhile, from the elite's perspective, especially as happened since the early days of the Reformation, there is a growing view that accommodating Islamic aspirations is socially and politically important, both from electoral and other considerations. If we look from another point of view, it could

also be that the policies in parliament are considered more beneficial to Islamic interests, and one of the impacts could be the strengthening of religious conservatism among Muslim politicians (Feilard 2017). What is happening now is not the tendency of politicians' attitudes and views to become increasingly secular (Liddle and Mujani 2009), but rather the opposite current.

THE DEBATE ON ISLAM AND THE STATE: A POLITICS GETTING CLOSER TO THE "RIGHT"

The history of politics in Indonesia records some tensions and disputes involving political parties in parliament. Some of them were caused by ideological tensions. During the New Order era, PPP, which was considered to represent Islam's power at that time, often criticized government policies considered deviating from Islamic teachings. For example, the Marriage Bill case (1974), the inclusion of belief in The Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN), Guidelines for the Living and Practicing of Pancasila (P4), and the single principle policy of Pancasila for all mass organizations and political forces (Effendy 2009). With policies that tend to be "secular," it is not uncommon for some Islamic elements to accuse the government of running anti-Islamic politics.

This situation has begun to change, especially since the early 1990s. The government that was considered by some circles to be hostile to Islam has changed its direction to become a supporter of Islamic agendas. In fact, the government has sponsored many projects that are considered by some - especially nationalist groups, to be Islamization projects. Policies such as the establishment of Islamic banking (Bank Muamalat Indonesia), the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI), the ratification of the Religious Courts Law and the National Education System Law, as well as filling positions in government bureaucracy which Muslims increasingly occupy, are considered as evidence of the changing face of an increasingly Islamist government.

Entering the democratic transition in the late 1990s, "ideology" showed signs of reviving again. This view is based primarily on some Islamic groups' aspirations who want to revive the Jakarta Charter through the

amendments to the 1945 Constitution. PPP and PBB have become important elements for their efforts to return to the Jakarta Charter, although later this initiative did not receive much acceptance from other parties and ultimately failed to materialize. Even so, in several controversies over the preparation of other regulations in the parliament, some Islamic political parties continue to try to influence the ideology in it, for example, in the discussion of the bill “anti-pornography and porn action.” The government policy at the level of regulation-making, in general, proceeds with the previous policy, which provides room for accommodation of political interests of Muslims. However, it has to go through a negotiation process which is sometimes quite difficult in parliament.

Another interesting phenomenon during the Reformation era was a shift in the “nationalist-secular” political parties’ behavior, which began to move towards a more central, “less secular” ideological spectrum. The most obvious example is the PDI Perjuangan which was strived to improve its negative self-image to be more accepted by the Muslim community at the beginning of the Reformation. The image that the PDI Perjuangan as a secular party is even considered anti-Islamic is, of course, very detrimental to the electoral party. PDI Perjuangan then moves to reach into the spectrum of “right” ideology by accommodating many aspirations of political interests among Muslims (Idris 2018). PDI Perjuangan, for example, formed a right-wing party called Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi) and invited a number of Muslim activists to work through his party. The shift of the PDI Perjuangan pendulum from the “nationalist-secular” ideological spectrum towards a more “less secular” center by accommodating Islamic aspirations and some Muslim elites is also seen in the tendencies of other nationalist political parties such as the Democratic Party, the Gerindra Party and the Nasdem Party which assert themselves as religious-nationalist parties.

For Islamic political parties in parliament, a shift in the nationalist political parties that are more accommodating to Muslims’ political interests will certainly be a challenge in the future. At least five Islamic political parties existed and were quite influential in the Reformation era, namely: PPP, PKS, PBB, PKB, and PAN. These Islamic political parties adopt

various methods and strategies in facing the increasingly fierce and sharp competition within the internal Islamic political parties and the secular political parties that tend to move towards the middle. On the one hand, they are required to be successful electorally, and this often forces them to behave pragmatically in facing the political interests of the ummah, but on the other hand, they also continue to affirm their identity as parties with Islamic identities. Some of them managed to win votes and survive to become a reckoned Islamic political party, and some failed to get voter supports and were knocked out of their seats in parliament.

It is important to note that although they are grouped in the same religious identity group among Islamic political parties, they often take different paths in their political practice. They, for example, differ in responding to political issues, determining their position on a particular policy, and dealing with political coalition issues. This difference in political practice, in turn, makes Islamic political parties unable to compete with nationalist political parties in winning votes.

EDUCATION AS A BATTLE ARENA: SOME THEORY AND PRACTICE IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES

According to Cesari (2014), there are several major themes of Islamic education regarding religious and socio-political relations in a number of countries in Muslims such as Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Pakistan, and Turkey—the five countries that are known to be not and less democratic according to the scales of Freedom House. These themes include (1) ummah vis-à-vis the nation. Reference to the ummah in Islamic textbooks is directed to legitimize the state. Its main purpose is to strengthen national identity; (2) Islam is singular and monolithic; (3) Islam as a religion that is always persecuted and threatened; (4) Islam as a superior religion; and (5) inadequate or even ominous descriptions of Christianity and Judaism. It mainly concerns these two minority religions' contribution and role in the nation's history and culture.

The education system is one of several important tension and competition areas involving social and political forces, not only in Muslim countries but also in several secular Western countries (Kuru 2009: 8 and

Bader 2007: 155). Kuru noted that there are at least six controversial issues related to state policies regarding education that have emerged in three secular countries (France, Turkey, and the United States), namely: (1) the imposition of clothing and religious symbols by students in public schools; (2) religious promises and prayers in public schools; (3) private religious education; (4) religious instructions in public schools; (5) community funding for private religious schools; and (6) religious arrangements in public schools.

In Muslim countries, fierce battles over education and religion are evident in Tunisia and Egypt. Before the Arab Spring, political struggles involving the state (which tended to be secular) and Islamist groups were intense in the two countries. In Egypt, especially during the reign of Husni Mubarak, education policy prioritized strengthening Egyptian national identity. On the other hand, for Islamist groups against the Mubarak regime, the goal of Islamic education should be directed towards forming solidarity with the global Muslim community or the ummah. The government will also never give up its control to ensure that the educational curriculum, including religious education, also justifies its policies. Not to mention, the power struggle in the education system also involves religious streams within Islam itself. In some predominantly Sunni countries and governments by Sunni groups, there is often a misrepresentation of the Shia and negative images. The opposite is also true in Shiite majority countries. However, in general, what is often marginalized in most Muslims is the description of Sufism.

THE ISSUES OF TEACHING RELIGION IN SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES

In a number of countries in Europe and America, the realm of education policy has also become a battleground. The views of various groups of society are divided. The difference in views is whether religious education is necessary or not taught in state schools, and what is the emphasizing point of the material when it is then taught. Furthermore, other considerations can be what is the goal of religious education, and how it impacts the secularism that operates in these countries. and

various other aspects. The debate in religious education is divided into three views or attitudes: supporting, rejecting, and being neutral.

For political parties and social groups that support religious education, including Islam, it is necessary to teach schools based on at least two interests: religion and non-religion. Those who are motivated by religious reasons or interests argue that religious education needs to be organized to increase students' piety and faith (religiosity). They consider the influence of anti-religious secularism as a serious threat. This view is voiced by political parties, among others, by many Liberal Party politicians in Australia (who have a conservative tendency compared to the Labor Party), Conservative Party politicians in the UK, and Republican politicians in the United States. Outside the political parties that often speak out are churches and a number of religious organizations (especially evangelicals in the United States). Their attitude can be classified as conservative because it mainly puts down the need for religious education as a kind of da'wah tool to cultivate one's faith. For them, students need to get lessons according to their religion or only one religion.

Some groups with a more liberal view also see religious lessons need to be taught, but not for the narrow purpose of simply increasing students' faith and religiosity. Open religious education is primarily intended to strengthen tolerance, social integration, and strengthen citizenship. Those who support religious education based on several secular or non-religious reasons (strengthening of religiosity) state their argument that the state needs to provide religious education in schools for several considerations. Among them:

First, the fulfillment of human rights principles: all students have the right to access religious lessons in schools.

Second, insight into religion — through education about religions — is important to understand global phenomena: immigrants, international conflicts, economic relations, culture, and many else.

Third, religious education — whose curriculum is determined by the government and certified teaching staff, and so on — is also needed to strengthen students' critical attitudes towards religious interpretations that lead to extremism.

Religious lessons in schools need to be given not to increase faith or encourage religious people to be better but to find out about religions and beliefs that are practiced and developed in society.

Meanwhile, groups that oppose the provision of religious education in schools also have some arguments. Among others:

First, religious teaching in public schools is considered to be against the principles of secularism. For them, religion is a private matter. Religious lessons are included in the realm of the family, not state policy. This attitude is the view of several political forces in France who want to maintain assertive secularism or firm secularism (Kuru 2009).

Second, some political party politicians — especially those from the liberal class — oppose the holding of religious lessons in schools because they tend to be indoctrinated in one direction, which actually reinforces exclusivism and extremism.

Third, they also strongly reject the imposition of religious symbols, such as the hijab for Muslim women, in public spaces, including schools, because they are considered contrary to the principles of secularism and liberalism. In France, which adheres to assertive secularism, wearing the veil for women is considered a form of women's oppression and freedom. The political attitude in France is different when compared to the British government's attitude, which allows religious groups to express their religious identity under the pretext of freedom of expression, respect for multiculturalism, and pluralism. The liberalism adopted by Britain is different from the French liberal understanding. British liberalism is more humanistic and supports expressions of multiculturalism and pluralism (Laborde 2008).

Fifth, they also disagreed if the state-financed or provided funding assistance for privately-run religious schools.

Meanwhile, those who choose a neutral position also base themselves on some important reasons. Among them:

First, whether or not religious education should be taught is under the agreement among schools, parents, and the community. In some cases, they disagree if the Federal Government makes religious education

mandatory nationally. However, they can agree or allowed it if the state decided it.

Second, the state does not need to interfere, or if it does, the scope is limited: it does not interfere with clothing. For example, letting schools oblige Muslim female students to wear the veil and others.

Third, they will support religious education in schools with many prerequisites like the material to strengthen citizenship.

DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA

Support for religious education emerged from some suggestions and views by Liberal Party politicians in Australia. They put forward two reasons why religious education needs to be taught in public schools. First, education in Australia is teaching students towards the left or secular too much. The Judeo-Christian heritage must be better reflected in the curriculum (religious education — pen.). Second, the portion of religious education is still very small in the curriculum.

For them, the state is allowed to intervene in preparing the religious curriculum, which is generally seen as a policy consequence in providing financial support for these religious schools. Some goals of government intervention in the curriculum, among others, are to ensure religious teaching materials are in line with the constitution. Furthermore, they are also to strengthen tolerance and respect diversity. The government can also involve religious organizations in the curriculum preparation process and its efforts to improve teachers' competence.

However, some wanted the government not to be interfering too much. For this group, the government may not interfere in the preparation of the religious education curriculum. However, the process should be entirely based on school policy, religious organizations, and local communities.

The opposite attitude against religious education in public schools was conveyed, among others, by the Christian organization Access Ministries. There are several reasons they put forward. First, public schools in Australia must be secular institutions. Less than 30% of the population has a clear religion. Second, religious education must be the decision of the family, not school. Third, the decision on what portion of

religious education should be under the central government's authority. The determination of whether or not religious lessons should be submitted to local schools and local communities. Lastly, the material given is one way from teacher to student, without the possibility of discussion.

DEBATE IN ENGLAND

Based on applicable regulations, all public schools in the UK must teach religious education by referring to the agreed syllabus. However, the fact is that more than a quarter of secondary schools no longer teach religious education (Yusuf & Sterkens 2015).

The British government provides assistance to religious schools, but the funding support is only intended for Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish schools but does not apply to religious schools in the Muslim community (Parekh 2008: 336). There are several reasons why certain religious schools are funded. It is because these religious schools (Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish) inculcate basic religious principles for students, develop critical analysis skills, provide secular knowledge, and prepare their students for the life of a democratic and secular society.

The reason why the funding assistance for religious schools does not apply to Muslim religious schools is based on historical reasons. Muslim religious schools were also exempted because the curriculum was still dubious to the British government. The policy, which Parekh considered as discriminatory, however, received harsh criticism from the Muslim community.

The British government has also banned schools that only teach religion in their curriculum (2018). Such an education model is deemed not to meet Ofsted's educational standards — Office of Standards in Education, Child Services and Vocational Services. The ban is also intended to prevent children from being brainwashed by extremist teaching. The regulation applies to schools of all religions. Regarding clothing, the government does not regulate what students should wear, even though the clothes or clothing are considered to express religious symbols and identities. However, the government has criticized schools for requiring Islamic school students to wear the veil or burqa.

The pros and cons of opinions regarding religious education in a number of European countries also involve many religious minority groups, including those who come from Muslim immigrants. As Bader (2007) notes, Muslim minority communities in the West have great concern for religious education and religious instruction in schools. One of the reasons, in the view of this Muslim minority, the national education system in Western countries is strongly influenced by majority bias (whether it comes from secularist or Christian values — pen.).

RELIGIOUS OR SECULAR?

To further discuss what kind and how the state or government's role is related to religious education in a broader context, other religious matters will be deeply influenced by the values or principles held firmly by each country. The categorization formulated by Kuru (2009) helps explain this discussion. Kuru divides state-religion regimes into four types, namely: (1) a religious state; (2) a country with official religions or a state with established religions; (3) a secular state; and (4) an anti-religious state.

In terms of the state's attitude towards religion, the first type is the religious state, where the government officially favors one religion—for example, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Vatican. Meanwhile, “a state with one official religion,” even though it recognizes the existence of religions, grants privileges to one religion that is declared as the official religion - generally the religion that is adhered to by the majority of citizens. Some countries which belong to this type are Greece, Denmark, and England. As for the secular state, it neither supports nor takes sides with any religion. It includes countries such as the United States, Turkey, and France.

Meanwhile, the type of state that is anti-religious is officially hostile towards all or many religions. Communist countries such as China, North Korea, and Cuba are in a position of hostile countries to these religions. In Kuru's view, the first type of regime is categorized as a religious state, while the other three types are secular regimes.

In many secular states themselves, there are variations in the state's approach to religion. According to Kuru, the ideological struggles in these secular countries have shaped state policies, in general, that fall under two

different types of ideas about secularism, namely assertive secularism, and passive secularism. A more assertive type of secularism is embraced by France, which is characterized by a firm stance on removing religion from its public role and confining it to the private domain. Meanwhile, the United States applies the idea of passive secularism, which still provides room for accommodation for religious visibility in the public sphere. Kuru calls strict secularism a comprehensive doctrine, and passive secularism emphasizes the neutrality of the state.

In contrast to Kuru, which focuses on the state, Yavuz (2009) tries to create the types of political party ideology in terms of attitudes and views towards religion and nationality. Through his study of political parties in Turkey, Yavuz divides the ideological background of political parties into three categories: (1) nationalists who carry the ideology of nationalism, (2) conservative with the formulation of a synthetic ideology between Turkish (nationality) and Islam, and (3) Islamists with Islamic ideology.

For nationalist political parties, religion is a private matter and is an important component of national culture. Meanwhile, in the political parties' view of synthesizing religion and nationality, religion is positioned as a communal and private issue. The state should also be free from the influence of religions, but it should be allowed to intervene to maintain the continuity of religious values. Meanwhile, Islamist political parties believe that the system does not differentiate between public and private ones. They also always emphasize the need for Islamic values to be present in the public sphere. Besides, they also want religious aspirations to contribute to influence and shape the political landscape. No less important, Islamists have an obsession with Islamizing everything they encounter in modern life.

How to place Indonesia in relation to the spectrum of religious and state relations? It is clear that Indonesia is not a religious country like Iran or Saudi Arabia. The nation's founders and subsequent governments consciously did not want Indonesia to become a religious or theocratic state. Indonesia is also not fully categorized as a secular country, especially when considering the many religious elements accommodated in the

constitution and legislation. In a number of cases, Indonesia has clearly shown an interventionist attitude in religious matters.

Indonesia's position seems to be close to the type of secular state that provides much accommodation for the values and interests of dominant religions, especially Islam. Therefore Indonesia can belong to a state which Kuru termed a "state with an established religion." Some other experts have different opinions. For example, Cesari (2014), instead of positioning Indonesia as a secular state, takes into account the nature of a more democratic regime (after the Reformation period), accommodation of religious values in several state regulations, and policies that provide rooms for religion to play a role in public space. He thinks that it is more appropriate to call Indonesia an unsecular democratic state.

The typology of the three-party ideologies presented by Yavuz is similar in several ways to the broadly accepted division of political party ideologies in Indonesia. The division of party ideology in post-New Order Indonesia generally resulted in at least three party models: (1) political parties with the nationalist ideology that tended to be secular; (2) nationalist-religious parties or political parties that first define themselves as nationalists but accommodate many religious interests, and (3) political parties with Islamic ideology. Even though Indonesia's context is far different from Turkey's, especially in terms of the application of the strict principles of secularism in the country, in several ways, it has similarities in the characteristics of the existing party ideology.

THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL EDUCATION: INCREASINGLY RELIGIOUS

However, do the political parties have serious attention to the development of religious education (Islam)? After all, political parties, especially in the era of democratic reform, played an important role in the policy-making process, especially in relation to religious education in Indonesia, both through their representatives in the government and the legislative body.

In history, the founding fathers have actually placed education as an important element in building this nation. In the Presidential Cabinet, which was formed a few days after the proclamation, education became

a serious concern of the Minister of Teaching, whom Ki Hajar Dewantara then held. The government sincerely had high hopes for the success of education in the country. For a newly independent Indonesia, the education field was a strategic means to catch up with other nations by producing many educated people. The importance of education for the nation's development is seen in national education goals as contained in Article 3 of Law Number 4 of 1950 concerning the Basics of Education and Teaching in Schools. Education and teaching aim "To develop capable moral people and citizens who are democratic and responsible for the welfare of society and the country."

The phrases "democratic" and "democracy" that appear a lot in the articles of the law along with their explanatory parts show that the content of these regulations is very much influenced by the spirit of the times. After Indonesia's independence, the nation's founders aspired to make the Indonesian nation a modern democratic state, neither fascist nor feudal as many have feared. That spirit animates the formulation of the national education law in that formative period.

The role and function of education that the government carried out was not solely to educate citizens or prepare skilled workers to fill employment opportunities, but - through government intervention, education is often used to legitimize government policies. In some authoritarian governments, the method often used is through indoctrination in schools. This method is intended to form students' attitudes and their ways of thinking that reflect the ideology of the rulers. In such a situation, education is no longer a discursive space that is free, dialogical, and educating but provides legitimacy or justification for the ruling government. For instance, during the Guided Democracy era, President Soekarno clearly tried to control education policy to support his conceptions: the Political Manifestation / UUD 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Personality - known as Manipol / Usdek. At that time, national education's direction and goals could not be separated from the big goals of the revolution that Soekarno had proclaimed, namely against imperialism, colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism.

In Presidential Decree Number 19 of 1965 concerning the Principles of the Pancasila National Education System, it is clearly illustrated how the politicization of national education supported the ruler's ideology. In Government Regulation Number 19 of 1965, it is stated that the function of education is as a tool of revolution, Pancasila and Manipol Usdek (the political manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and its basic elements) as the basis for animating national education (Article 1). The purpose of education is intended to produce Indonesian Socialist Man, as stated in Article 2 of the National Education Goals:

The aim of our National Education which is organized by the government or by the private institution, from preschool to tertiary education, is to produce moral Indonesian socialist citizens who are responsible for the implementation of Indonesian socialist society, just and prosperous both spiritually and materially and those with the spirit of Pancasila.

Decree Number II / MPRS / 1960 concerning the Outlines of the National Development Pattern also formulated national development policies' objectives. It is stated in Article 2 (5): "To carry out policies and a national education system aimed at the formation of experts in development in accordance with the requirements of Indonesian Socialist people, who have noble character."

After examining the objectives of national education in these two regulations, which emphasize the realization of a "socialist citizen" and a "socialist man," it is clear that the influence of President Soekarno's conception zealously called for revolution for the formation of a socialist society in Indonesia. This conception was also directly instructed to be taught through Pancasila and Manipol (Political Manifesto) subjects at the college to tertiary level. For some of his critics, such education policy is considered a politicization form of national education by the regime directed to shift towards the "left."

At the beginning of the New Order, with a government model that shared a centralistic and semi-authoritarian tendency, the politics of education in Indonesia could not be separated from the government's mindset. The New Order ruler's orientation focused on creating an "ideology of order and development" as the antithesis of the previous

situation, which was considered chaotic. The New Order government intended to depoliticize education as the antithesis of the previous policy. Education was no longer a tool of political revolution but a means of preparing skilled workers who were ready to fill jobs. However, in practice, the politicization of education was still ongoing. The New Order imposed a highly centralized and uniform education policy. Indoctrination through educational means continued to form a “Pancasila man”; no longer a “socialist man” like in the Old Order era.

All students are required to take Pancasila Moral Education (PMP) subjects at all levels of education. PMP subjects’ material and learning process are one-way in nature, the interpretation is very state-centric, and the enthusiasm is based on justifying government ideology and policies. For some parties, especially Muslims, the New Order’s educational policies, which lasted until the 1990s, were considered secular. Several upheavals and actions had emerged as a response to this policy, especially after the single principle policy of Pancasila was enacted. Muslims were worried that religion might be increasingly marginalized in education. There was growing suspicion that the teaching of Pancasila would replace the position of religious teaching in schools. This disappointment was followed by dissatisfaction with Islamic groups regarding Muslim female students’ prohibition from wearing Muslim clothing (veiling) at school.

In 1989, the New Order enacted Law Number 2 of 1989 concerning the National Education System (Sisdiknas). Although causing controversy in society, some political experts see the new regulation on education as the beginning of a shift in government relations with Islamic groups.

The relationship between the government and Islamic groups indeed changed from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Previously, the relationship was more tenuous and often conflictual, then starting in the late 1980s, President Soeharto began to show a positive approach to Islamic groups. In the realm of social, political, and economic policies, the spirit of the government’s partisanship with the “interests of the people” was increasingly clear. The birth of Law Number 2 of 1989 is interpreted as a form of accommodation and support for Islamic groups’ aspirations.

This Law, particularly Article 4, for example, states that the objectives of national education are:

... to educate the nation's life and develop Indonesian people as a whole, namely people who have faith and obedience for God Almighty and virtuous, have knowledge and skills, are physically and mentally healthy, have a solid and independent personality and a sense of social and national responsibility.

The Draft Law's deliberation process on the National Education System did not run smoothly in the parliament and received various responses from the public. Some aspects of the bill are considered controversial and thus have been rejected by several groups. One objection concerns the clause regarding religious teaching in schools. Several secular nationalist politicians, represented by politicians from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), reject this provision, while other factions, both Muslims in Golkar and PPP, strongly support it. Some parties who criticize law Number 2 of 1989 believe that the education regulation tends to side with the interests of the majority religion or Islam. The emergence of the words "believe" and "devoted" in national education objectives is considered evidence of this partiality.

After the New Order regime fell in the late 1990s and Indonesia entered the democratization era, there were many essential changes in the national political constellation. The role of the state is no longer as strong as in the previous period. The multi-party system that has come into effect has created new actors from political party elites, especially in the parliamentary arena.

After the first election during the Reformation era in 1999, political parties played a highly decisive role in formulating national policies, both political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and religious. Some educational regulations that were formed during the Reformation period, especially Law Number 22 of 2003 concerning the National Education System, show in-depth the influence of the parliament's political parties. The discussion on the Draft Law on the National Education System during the democratic transition was quite vigorous, and there were tensions between the factions in the parliament. The difficulty of the discussion was intended so that the resulting law would better accommodate the party's

votes and interests. In the discussion of Article 3 in Law Number 20 of 2003, for example, several factions in the parliament made an agreement after going through a long compromise regarding the goals of national education; namely: "... for the development of the potential of students to become human beings who believe and obey God Almighty and have a noble character. They are healthy, knowledgeable, capable, creative, independent, and become democratic and responsible citizens."

However, not all factions were willing to accept this formula. PDI-Perjuangan rejects the Bill on National Education System. In their political view, the contents of the draft Bill on the National Education System are very visible in favor of the interests of certain religious groups, in this case, the aspirations of Muslims, and do not reflect the plurality of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Meanwhile, for other political parties, the National Education System Law is considered the best result that can be achieved and represented all society's aspirations.

Table 2.1 Objectives of National Education

Regulation	Goals To Be Achieved	Key Words
UU No. 4/1950	Forming capable and moral human beings and democratic citizens who are responsible for the welfare of society and the country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moral human, • Democratic citizens
PP No. 19/1965	To create moral Indonesian socialist citizens responsible for the implementation of the Indonesian Socialist Society, who are just and prosperous both spiritually and materially and who have the spirit of Pancasila.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socialist citizens, • Socialist society with Pancasila spirit
UU No. 2/1989	Educate the life of the nation and develop Indonesian people as a whole, namely humans who have faith and devotion to God Almighty and virtuous, have knowledge and skills, physical and spiritual health, have a stable and independent personality and a sense of social and national responsibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indonesian people • Humans who have faith and devotion to God Almighty

Regulation	Goals To Be Achieved	Key Words
UU No. 20/2003	To develop the potential of students to become human beings who believe and obey God Almighty, have a noble character, are healthy, knowledgeable, capable, creative, independent, and become democratic and responsible citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People who believe and obey God Almighty • Human Morals • Democratic Citizen

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: FROM LIBERAL TO CONSERVATIVE

Teaching religion to students in schools is one of the important concerns in national education policy. The government incorporates religious teaching clauses into national education regulations (see Table 2.2). The existence of provisions regarding religious teaching in schools is, at least, necessary to the government to show that the ongoing national education is not “anti-religious” nor too secular. However, if we deeply examine various regulations, several policies tended to shift towards a conservative from the formative period after the post-proclamation to the Reformation period.

From several regulations and laws related to national education, Law no. 4/1950 contains a more liberal spirit in implementing religious teaching. This law provides the authority for students and their parents to choose whether to take religious lessons or not.

Regarding religious teaching in public schools, Law no. 04/1950, in particular Article 20, states: “1. In public schools, religious lessons are held; parents decide whether their child will attend the lesson. “The explanation in this article states that “... adult students may decide whether they are willing to participate or not (in-pen.) in religious studies.” Based on the article’s contents and the explanation, there is no obligation for students to attend religious lessons at school. This policy can be seen as a form of respect for students’ rights and, at the same time, showing a more democratic attitude. This article is reaffirmed in the following regulations, among others in Decree No. II / MPRS / 1960. In Article 2 (3), this MPRS Decree states;

Establishing religious education as a subject in schools ranging from public schools to state universities with the understanding that students have the right not to participate if the guardian of the student/adult student expresses their objection.

Based on Article 2, the government determines religious education to be a subject that applies from the public school level (at the elementary school level) to state universities. However, the guardian of the student or adult student still has the full right to take the religious subject or not.

Significant changes to the provisions appeared in the regulations after the Old Order regime's end under President Soekarno. Decree No. XXVII / MPRS / 1966 concerning Religion, Education, and Culture eliminates the rights of guardians of students and adult students in determining religious education subjects' choice. The implication is that students must attend religious lessons. However, on human rights grounds, the MPRS decree still provides a little freedom for students, namely choosing religious lessons according to their beliefs or preference.

In Chapter, I Article I of Decree No. XXVII / MPRS / 1966, stated:

Amending the dictum of MPRS Decree No. II / MPRS / 1960 Chapter II Article 2 paragraph (3), by eliminating the words "... with the understanding that students have the right not to participate if the guardian of the student/adult student expresses their objection ..."

so that the sentence is stated as follows "set religious education to be a subject in schools ranging from elementary schools to state universities."

In the elucidation of the article, it is stated that: "(a) All religions recognized by the government are given an equal opportunity; (b) For tolerance and based on human rights, every student is free to choose religious studies according to his beliefs/preferences."

During the New Order era, the issue of religious teaching in schools, as stated in the bill on the National Education System in 1988-1989, sparked heated debates in parliament. The main point that sparked debate was concerned with the suggestion that students receive religious instruction in accordance with their religion. This clause is intended to apply not only to public schools but also to private schools. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), which resulted from a fusion of nationalist parties and Christian-Catholicism, rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, other factions

provided support. After going through tense stages, in the end, this clause did not appear in the articles of the 1989 National Education System Law, but it was enforced through Government Regulation (PP) No. 28 of 1990 concerning Basic Education. In Government Regulation Article 16 (1) concerning student rights, it states: "... (students have the right) to receive religious education in accordance with their religion ..."

For the PDI, the new provisions on religious education and the formulation of the articles in Law no. 28/1990 were considered to benefit certain religious groups — the majority of Muslims and disadvantaged minorities. The stipulation of this formulation in the National Education System Law is considered evidence of a shift in the government's attitude, which is more accommodating to Islamic interests, including some other policies.

Some PDI Perjuangan politicians were reiterated for almost the same reasons during the discussion of the Bill on National Education System in the Reformation era. The article on religious education, which was later ratified, became part of Law no. 20 of 2003 concerning the National Education System is considered very inclined towards Islamic groups' aspirations, even compared to the prevailing regulations.

According to Law no. 20/2003, particularly Article 12 states, "(1) Every student in each education unit has the right to a. get religious education in accordance with their religion and are taught by educators of the same faith. ", It is stated in the explanation, "Educators and/or religious teachers who are of the same faith as students are facilitated and/or provided by the government or local government according to the needs of the education unit ..."

For supporters of this provision, this article's existence is considered an appreciation of human rights, and it should be implemented to respect adherents of different religions. However, according to the PDI Perjuangan perspective, this provision has basically violated the principle of diversity and endangers the sustainability of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Some PDI-P politicians have even bluntly stated that the National Education System Law is very Islamist. For that reason, the PDI-P

continues to insist on having the Law on National Education System be revised.

Table 2.2 Provisions for the Teaching of Religion in Schools

Regulation	Important Points of Article and Explanation	Nature and Conditions
UU No. 4/1950	At state schools, religious lessons are held; parents determine whether their child will attend the lesson. Adult students may decide whether to participate or not (in, pen.) Religious lessons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious lessons are arranged only for public schools. • The rights of parents and adult students regarding religious lessons.
Tap No. XXVII / MPRS/1966	Setting religious education to be a subject in schools ranging from elementary schools to state universities. For tolerance and on the basis of human rights, every student is free to choose religious lessons according to their beliefs/preferences.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religion teaching in all schools. • Students are free to choose religious lessons.
PP No. 28/ 1990	Students have the right to receive religious education in accordance with their religion.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious education in schools according to the religion of the students.
UU No. 20/ 2003	Every student in each education unit has the right to receive religious education in accordance with his/her religion and is taught by educators of the same faith.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious education in schools according to student religions • Religion teachers must be of the same faith as students

POLITICAL PARTIES: IDEOLOGY AND POLICY

Feith and Castle (1988) divided the political parties that won the 1955 election into five political thought schools: radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, Islam, democratic-socialism, and communism. The division describes the currents in terms of the tension between

traditional heritage and their relation to the modern world, especially the West and its ideas.

The two political scientists say that there is a dual nature of Indonesia's traditional heritage. The fact that Javanese traditions are older and so closely interwoven with Hindu and Buddhist traditions was clearly different from Islam. In the view of the two experts, PNI was included in the category of radical nationalism intersecting with Javanese traditionalism, the NU Party with an Islamic ideology that was linked to Javanese traditionalism, the Masyumi Party as an Islamic political party that was intersecting with democratic socialism, while the PKI represents the ideology of communism which intersects with Javanese traditionalism.

During the New Order era, especially after the party fusion in 1973, the splitting of political parties became simpler. Only three political forces were allowed to participate in the elections: PPP, Golkar, and PDI. Islamic-based political parties joined the PPP, and nationalist and Christian political parties formed the PDI. While, Golongan Karya or Golkar — which refused to declare itself a political party, was a combination of a number of workmanship mass organizations. The New Order government used Golkar as its electoral political machine. It is not surprising then that a hegemonic party model was formed, which was marked by Golkar's absolute victory in all elections in the New Order era.

Significant changes in the party took place in the era of democratic Reformation after the New Order's fall in 1998. More than 40 political parties were registered as participants in the 1999 election. Evans (2003) divides the ideological lines of political parties in Indonesia simply by dividing two ideological categories, namely Islamic and secular, placed in the horizontal axis, and elitist and populist within the vertical axis. On an ideological line, Evans stated that Indonesia's social spectrum is divided into "left" or secular and "right" or religious circles, with the most basic differentiation of how to place religion before the state. The secular circle is an entire entity that refuses to specialize in religious entities, especially Islam, in relation to the state. Meanwhile, religious groups are those who support religious transformation in the state. Examining the 1999 elections, PDI-P represents a secular or leftist entity, while PPP, the

Justice Party (PK), PBB, and other Islamic parties represent religious or right entities.

The study of political parties and religious education inevitably encourages us to examine the link between the ideologies adopted by the relevant political parties and the policies in parliament's legislative process. It is also interesting to know how politicians in the parliament understand the ideology of their party and carry out their legislative functions in the way of the ideology of the party they represent well.

There is a general assumption that political parties with a strong ideological character will exert a strong influence on their politicians by making party ideologies a firm guide when they discuss and formulate policies. The outcome of the policies enacted by itself seemed full of the ideological nuances of the drafters. It is not the case for political parties based on stronger pragmatism, which is typical of most political parties in modern electoral democracies; the influence of party ideology on its members and policies appears to be more flexible.

From various studies, many findings confirm the waning role of ideology as a consideration in political parties' policy-making in a number of European countries in the last few decades. This condition coincides with political parties' tendency to adopt a "catch-all" political orientation increasingly. For them, the most important goal in electoral democracy is none other than to get the most votes so that they can win elections and hold the government. For that reason, political parties must act flexibly, accommodate, compromise, be pragmatic, be inclusive, and continue to open up to voters from any segment.

In general, studies on political party policies emphasize, among other things: the extent to which the party's program is consistent with the realization of policy - if the political party wins the election and becomes a party in government and the extent to which ideology plays a role in providing guidance for policy formulation: is it still a filter? And control in policy planning or even the interests of political individuals involved in the political process that dominates party policy. As a consequence, political parties' ideology is demanded to be elastic or more pragmatic.

This political reality is certainly different from the traditional party phenomenon, which places ideology as the main guide. This kind of political party struggle to win elections and gain power is intended as a way to realize the main or ideal values (ideology) through the policies they make. Meanwhile, the catch-all party has a more nuanced “following” the tastes of the moving community. Therefore, ideological parties have the spirit to make changes and transform society into a better one.

Politicians—party arms who are closer to the voting community are automatically required always to be responsive to the aspirations that are constantly evolving and rapidly changing. Instead of promoting an approach based on their party’s ideology, politicians must demonstrate their ability to adapt to voters’ trends and desires if they are to succeed.

Carefully observing and adjusting to public aspirations is very important for political parties and politicians in determining policies, including drafting legislation. In this aspect, politicians in parliament sometimes differ from the ideological lines that are used by their parties in the legislative process and in responding to issues that develop in society. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a lack of commitment by politicians to party ideology or evidence of weakening party control over their members so that they can act as they wish. However, it also does not rule out that such a situation shows the flexibility that a party has, which contributes to the party’s survival.

This political phenomenon shows a shift in political parties’ spectrum, moving from either the left or right to the center. However, the phenomenon of “political parties heading toward the middle” cannot simply be interpreted as party ideology’s death. Although they are not as popular as the catch-all political parties, the political parties that emphasize ideological allegiance are also alive and able to survive the increasingly tighter electoral competition.

Even so, several research findings confirm the existence of party ideology, especially seen by the congruence between party ideology and the types of policies passed (Kleingemann, Hofferber & Budge 1999). Early studies of the relationship between campaign promises and policies towards political parties in Indonesia during the Reformation period

found similar results: congruence (Putra 2004). A more specific case study on PPP can be seen in A. Bakir Ihsan (2014) and a study on PDI-P in Idris Thaha (2018). The emergence of Islamic sharia-nuanced regional regulations in various regions at the beginning of the Reformation - which involved Golkar politicians who played a dominant role in determining these regulations compared to those from Islamic parties - is an interesting study (Buehler 2016). The phenomenon of the emergence of the Shari'a regulations issued by local governments shows that, at first glance, movements appear to be ideological expressions, but in reality, they are not. Pragmatic motives are clearly more prominent; to gain sympathy for the elections in the elections' electoral process.

A number of theories help explain the dimensions of political party behavior and the attitudes of politicians. According to Miller and Strom (1999), the goals formulated by the party will influence their behavior. The objectives of political parties can be simply divided into three categories; (1) the goal of gaining government positions (the office-seeking party); (2) the policy-seeking party; (3) get the most votes in the election (the vote-seeking party). Politicians' attitudes — as “officers” of political parties — in parliament in drafting laws and their attitudes in responding to a number of actual issues can be understood more precisely by placing them in a three-goal scheme. Then check which priority the political parties are concerned.

The attitudes and policies adopted by politicians also need to be put in the framework of cost-benefit considerations. In facing a number of policy choices, politicians who occupy public offices are encouraged to maximize their profits and minimize losses by selecting selectively and measurably the various available alternatives (Geddes 1994). The fundamental advantage for politicians in public officials is that they get better promotions than before and can maintain the power that they have held. If the aspirations and demands of the public are in line with their interests, and of course, also provide benefits, then a politician will be glad to follow up those wishes into policy. Conversely, if they consider that it will carry significant loss risks, then a politician will choose to avoid it.

CHAPTER III

DEMOGRAPHY OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

This chapter describes the demography of the Indonesian parliament members who were the survey respondents in detail, and it also discusses their views and attitudes on essential issues in religious education. The respondents' demographics are divided into five parts, namely: political parties, electoral districts, religion, educational history, and gender. In analyzing Indonesian parliament members' attitudes towards state policies in religious education, this survey uses Kuru's (2009) theory, which differentiates the attitudes of respondents into four categories: laicite, neutral, accommodating, and interventionist.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS BASED ON POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties play an important role in graphing legislative members' attitudes and rationales to provide answers to each of the questions given. Different ideologies of political parties influence different perspectives in responding to issues of religious education. This survey was initially successful in interviewing 380 members of the Indonesian Parliament for the period 2019-2024. However, after going through the spot check process, the data was not used and was not included for analysis (10 people).


This survey, thus, involved 370 respondents from nine political parties who met the parliamentary threshold in the general elections (elections) in 2019 (Table 3.1). Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle was the party that had the most respondents in this survey, with 76 people (20.54 percent). Meanwhile, the proportion of the Indonesian parliament members from the United Development Party was in the smallest position with 17 people (5.49 percent) in this survey.

Table 3.1 Composition of Respondents Based on Political Parties

No.	Political Parties	Quality	Percentage
1.	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)	76	20,54
2.	Golongan Karya Party (Golkar)	44	11,89
3.	Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra)	47	12,70
4.	National Democratic Party (NasDem)	39	10,54
5.	National Awakening Party (PKB)	52	14,05
6.	Democratic party (Demokrat)	32	8,65
7.	Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	29	7,84
8.	National Mandate Party (PAN)	34	9,19
9.	United Development Party (PPP)	17	4,59
Total		370	100


When asked about religious education, the members of the Indonesian Parliament had various responses according to their origin of the political parties. Most Indonesian Parliament members agreed and even strongly agreed that there are no serious religious education problems, especially PKS by 68.97 percent and NasDem by 51.28 percent, for example. However, the majority of Indonesian parliament members from PKB (59.62 percent) and PDI-P (55.26 percent) said they both disagreed and also strongly disagreed that there were no problems in religious education (Graph 3.1).

Graph 3.1 View on the Problem in Religious Education Based on Political Parties




Members of the Indonesian Parliament were also asked about the religious education material taught in schools, like religious education materials on national insight and understanding of religious diversity. With regard to the national perspective in religious education, there are no significant differences among respondents from all political parties. The majority of the Indonesian Parliament members disagreed or strongly disagreed that religious education materials had been less encouraging to increase national insight. Among others, NasDem showed 82.05 percent, and PDI-P gained 52.63 percent (Graph 3.2).

Graph 3.2 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on National Vision Based on Political Parties




Similar patterns are found when it comes to an understanding of religious diversity. Most Indonesian Parliament members disagreed or even strongly disagreed that religious education materials did not provide a good understanding of Indonesia’s religions diversity (PKS with 93.1 percent, and PDI-P with 68.42 percent) (Graph 3.3).

Graph 3.3 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on the Understanding of Religious Diversity Based on Political Parties




Similar trends are also seen in terms of responding to matters related to the religious education curriculum in which there is no significant difference among members of the Indonesian Parliament from all political parties regarding this issue. The majority of the Indonesian Parliament members disagreed and strongly disagreed that certain religious groups could not include their religious views in the religious education curriculum (Demokrat with 81.25 percent and PDI-P with 57.9 percent) (Graph 3.4).

Graph 3.4 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on Religious Education Curriculum Based on Political Parties




Using Kuru's theory (2009), this survey focuses on the attitudes of members of the Indonesian Parliament towards state policies in religious education from their political parties' perspective. Regarding the attitude of members of the Indonesian Parliament towards the policy of implementing religious education, there is no significant difference when this issue was observed from the origin of the political parties. In terms of questions about religious education in general, most Indonesian Parliament members from each political party accommodated by emphasizing that religious lessons must be given in accordance with the religion of each student. This attitude was represented, among others, by the PAN Faction (97.06 percent). Only a few were interventionists who thought that religious instruction for the majority group deserved special attention from the government. However, when viewed in more detail from the political party side, 31.03 percent of the Indonesian parliament members from the PKS Faction were interventionist (Graph 3.5).

Graph 3.5 The Attitude of Members of the Indonesian Parliament towards Religious Education in Public Schools




However, the attitudes of members of the Indonesian Parliament were varied when they were asked about the availability of places of worship in public schools. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament had an interventionist attitude by considering schools as only prioritizing places of worship for religions where the majority of students were involved (PPP with 88.24 percent), (PKS with 72.41 percent), (PAN with 64.71 percent), (PKB 51.92 percent), and (Gerindra with 44.68 percent). However, most respondents from the PDI-P (53.95 percent) and NasDem (41.03 percent) were neutral in their opinion that schools were sufficient to provide shared spaces that could be used by all students regardless of religion (Graph 3.6). Meanwhile, most Indonesian Parliament members from Democrats are divided into two groups who are neutral and accommodating, each with 34.38 percent. Accommodationist, in this case, tends to encourage schools to provide houses of worship for each religion adhered to by the students.

Graph 3.6 The Attitude of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on the Availability of Houses of Worship in Schools




Different attitudes among respondents from various political parties were also found when asked about policies on religious activities in schools. Regarding extracurricular activities, most Indonesian parliament members were neutral in their view that these activities were intended to encourage understanding and cooperation among different religious groups. However, most respondents from PKS (41.38 percent) were accommodating, which argued that schools needed to facilitate extracurricular religious activities for each student’s religion (Graph 3.7).

Graph 3.7 Attitudes of Members of the DPR RI about Religious Extracurricular Activities in Schools Based on Political Parties




Similar attitudes were also found about religious holidays. The majority of the Indonesian parliament members were neutral. Meanwhile, most respondents from PKS (44.83 percent) were interventionist in their support for schools to only schedule religious holidays for most students' religions (Graph 3.8).

Graph 3.8 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Concerning Religious Holidays Based on Political Parties




The different attitudes among the political parties were also expressed when it came to the provision of religious books. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament who came from PPP (58.82 percent), PAN (58.82 percent), Gerindra (55.32 percent), and PKS (55.17 percent) were neutral by supporting the provision of religious books in order to ensure that religion as a way of life is deeply ingrained in the student. On the other hand, most Indonesian parliament members from the Democrats (46.88 percent) and NasDem (43.59 percent) had accommodating attitudes that schools needed to provide religious books for each religion professed by students in schools. Meanwhile, the majority of respondents from PKB (40.38 percent) and PDI-P (36.84 percent) were neutral in agreeing to provide religious books only if the books taught universal religious values that could be applied by all students (Graph 3.9).

Graph 3.9 The Attitude of Members of the Indonesian Parliament towards the Provision of Religious Books based on Political Parties



Different attitudes among political parties are also found when it comes to the ideal religious teacher. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament from PAN (64.71 percent), Gerindra (61.70 percent), Golkar (56.82 percent), PPP (52.94 percent), Democrats (50 percent), and PKS (48.28 percent) were accommodating the view that religion teachers should be able to have a good understanding of the religion they adhere. Meanwhile, most members of the Indonesian Parliament from PDI-P (52.63 percent), NasDem (46.15 percent), and PKB (42.31 percent) were neutral and had the view that religious teachers should be able to teach material on interfaith dialogue. (Graph 3.10).

Graph 3.10 The Attitude of Members of the Indonesian Parliament towards Religious Teachers in Schools



DEMOGRAPHICS OF MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT BASED ON ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

This section analyzes how electoral districts are a factor influencing the attitude of survey respondents regarding important issues in religious education. This survey succeeded in gaining respondents from 34 electoral provinces. Of the total 370 respondents involved, West Java became the electoral district with the largest proportion with 17.57 percent, followed by East Java (17.03 percent), Central Java (11.89 percent), North Sumatera (55.95 percent), Banten (3.78 percent), and Jakarta (3.24 percent). Meanwhile, the Bangka Belitung Islands, North Kalimantan, North Maluku, and Papua had the least percentage of respondents with 0.27 percent each.


Table 3.2 Composition of Respondents Based on Electoral Areas

Islands	Province	Quantity	Percentage
Sumatera	Aceh	8	2.16
	North Sumatera	22	5.95
	West Sumatera	11	2.97
	Riau	5	1.35
	Jambi	7	1.89

Islands	Province	Quantity	Percentage
Sumatera	South Sumatera	8	2.16
	Bengkulu	2	0.54
	Lampung	12	3.24
	Bangka Belitung Islands	1	0.27
	Riau Islands	2	0.54
Java	Jakarta	12	3.24
	West Java	65	17.57
	Central Java	44	11.89
	Yogyakarta	2	0.54
	East Java	63	17.03
	Banten	14	3.78
Nusa Tenggara and Bali	Bali	8	2.16
	West Nusa Tenggara	9	2.43
	East Nusa Tenggara	8	2.16
Kalimantan	West Kalimantan	8	2.16
	Central Kalimantan	2	0.54
	South Borneo	4	1.08
	East Kalimantan	9	2.43
	North Kalimantan	1	0.27
Sulawesi	North Sulawesi	2	0.54
	Central Sulawesi	3	0.81
	South Sulawesi	18	4.86
	Southeast Sulawesi	3	0.81
	Gorontalo	2	0.54
	West Sulawesi	3	0.81
Maluku and Papua	Maluku	3	0.81
	North Maluku	1	0.27
	West Papua	7	1.89
	Papua	1	0.27


In terms of the origin of the electoral districts, more than half of the respondents came from Java (200 respondents or 54.1 percent), and the rest of them were from Sumatera (78 respondents or 21.1 percent), Sulawesi (31 respondents or 8.4 percent), Nusa Tenggara, and Bali (25 respondents or 6.8 percent), Nusa Tenggara & Bali, and Kalimantan (24 respondents or 6.5 percent). Meanwhile, Maluku and Papua had the lowest proportion with 12 respondents or 3.2 percent (Table 3.2).

Graph 3.11 The proportion of Members of the Indonesian Parliament based on Electoral Districts




In making the analysis results easier to comprehend as to how the Indonesian parliament members responded to important religious education issues, respondents' answers were categorized based on their regional origins. Regarding the problems in religious education, respondents' answers varied from the perspective of their electoral districts. Most members of the Indonesian Parliament coming from Maluku and Papua (66.67 percent), Sumatera (64.10 percent), Kalimantan (54.17 percent), and Nusa Tenggara & Bali (52 percent) strongly agreed and agreed that there were no serious problems in religious education. However, the majority of the Indonesian parliament members from Sulawesi (54.84 percent) and Java (50.50 percent) disagree and also strongly disagree if there were no serious problems in religious education (Graph 3.12).

Graph 3.12 Views of the Problems in Religious Education Based on Electoral District




Meanwhile, with regard to national insight, members of the Indonesian Parliament have no significant differences according to the respective constituencies of respondents. Most members of the Indonesian Parliament from each region disagree and at the same time strongly disagree that so far, religious education has not promoted nationalism (Sumatera with 82.05 percent, Nusa Tenggara and Bali with 76 percent, Sulawesi with 67.74 percent, Jawa with 65.50 percent, Maluku and Papua with 58.33 percent, and Kalimantan with 54.17 percent) (Graph 3.13).

Graph 3.13 The views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on the National Vision Based on Electoral District




Similar attitudes can also be seen from the question of understanding religious diversity. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament from each region strongly disagreed and disagreed that the religious education did not provide an understanding of the diversity of religions in Indonesia (Kalimantan with 83.33 percent, Sumatera with 80.77 percent, Java with 80.50 percent, Sulawesi with 77.42 percent, Nusa Tenggara & Bali with 72 percent, Maluku & Papua with 66.67 percent) (Graph 3.14).

Graph 3.14 The views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on the Understanding of Religious Diversity Based on Electoral District




There is no significant difference from the views of members of the Indonesian Parliament according to their electoral districts regarding the religious education curriculum. The majority of respondents from each region disagreed and strongly disagreed that some religious groups could not include their religious views in the religious education curriculum (Sumatera with 76.92 percent, Sulawesi with 70.97 percent, Kalimantan with 66.67 percent, Java with 66.50 percent, Nusa Tenggara & Bali with 60 percent, Maluku and Papua 58.33 percent) (Graph 3.15).

Graph 3.15 Views on Religious Education Curriculum Based on Electoral Districts




Using the theory of Kuru (2009) to see the attitudes of members of the Indonesian Parliament towards state policies in religious education, this research found a different trend when it analyzed the respondents' electoral districts. With regard to religious education in public schools, all regions are dominated by accommodationist attitudes. The majority of respondents that came from Kalimantan (87.50 percent), Sumatera (84.62 percent), Jawa (84 percent), Sulawesi (83.87 percent), Maluku and Papua (83.33 percent), and Nusa Tenggara and Bali (80 percent) viewed that religious instruction should be given in accordance with the religion of each student (Graph 3.16).

Graph 3.16 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on Religious Education Based on Electoral Areas




However, according to their area of origins, members' various answers of the Indonesian Parliament were revealed regarding the availability of worship places in schools. The majority of the Indonesian parliament members who came from Sulawesi (58.06 percent), Sumatera (53.85 percent), and Java (43 percent) showed an interventionist attitude considering that schools needed to prioritize places of worship for the religions of the majority of students. Meanwhile, most respondents from Nusa Tenggara and Bali (52 percent), Maluku and Papua (50 percent), and Kalimantan (45.83 percent) were neutral (Graph 3.17. they tended to have places that could be used by all students regardless of religion, or the school does not provide any religious places of worship in the school.

Graph 3.17 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament regarding the Availability of Houses of Worship Based on Electoral Areas




Various answers were found regarding the respondents' electoral area and the religious activities implementation in schools. The majority of Indonesian parliament members from all electoral districts were neutral in organizing extracurricular activities in schools (Maluku and Papua with 75 percent, Sumatera with 69.23 percent, Kalimantan with 66.67 percent, Nusa Tenggara and Bali with 60 percent, Sulawesi with 54.84 percent, and Jawa with 53.50 percent) (Graph 3.18).

Graph 3.18 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament about Religious Extracurricular Activities in Schools Based on Electoral Areas




However, regarding the celebration of the big day, few Indonesian Parliament members from all electoral districts are neutral. Only members of the Indonesian Parliament from Kalimantan had the majority of accommodationist attitudes—they think schools need to facilitate every celebration of all religious holidays. In this regard, other regions have a neutral stance that considers the celebration of religious holidays should be intended to foster interreligious understanding (56 percent of Nusa Tenggara and Bali, 55.50 percent of Java, 50 percent of Maluku and Papua, 47.44 percent of Sumatera, and Sulawesi 38,715) (Graph 3.19).

Graph 3.19 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament regarding the Celebration of the Holidays Based on Electoral Areas




Different attitudes of the respondents from different regions can also be seen from the policy of procuring religious books. The majority of Indonesian parliament members from Maluku and Papua (58.33 percent), Sulawesi (54.83 percent), Sumatera (46.15 percent), Kalimantan (45.83 percent), and Jawa (39 percent) had an interventionist stance in supporting the provision of religious books to ensure that religion as a way of life is truly embedded in students. Only Nusa Tenggara and Bali were dominated by accommodationist attitudes - suggesting that schools provide religious books for each religion professed by students in schools (Graph 3.20).

Graph 3.20 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Concerning the Provision of Religious Books based on Electoral Areas



In terms of the ideal figure of religious teachers in public schools, various attitudes can also be found when the respondents were classified based on their electoral areas. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament from Sulawesi (61.29 percent), Kalimantan (58.33 percent), Sumatera (55.13 percent), and Jawa (44.50 percent) viewed that the ideal religious figure was the one who had a good understanding of the religion embraced. Only Nusa Tenggara and Bali were dominated by neutral attitudes (56 percent), seeing the ideal religion teacher as the one who could teach the subject matters on inter-religious dialogue (Graph 3.21).

Graph 3.21 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Regarding Ideal Religion Teacher Figure Based on Electoral Regions



DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS BASED ON RELIGION

This section examines how religion is a factor influencing the attitudes and views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on important issues in religious education. Of the 370 respondents who responded, 309 respondents (83.51 percent) were Muslim, 28 respondents (7.57 percent) were Protestants, 19 respondents (5.14 percent) were Catholics, 9 respondents (2.43 percent) were Hindus, and 4 respondents (1.08 percent) believed in Buddhism. Only 1 respondent (0.27 percent) answered the choice of the column “Religion/belief,” namely “None of them.” Meanwhile, none of the respondents in this survey were religious or Confucian (Table 3.3).


Table 3.3 Composition of Respondents Based on Religion

Religion/Belief	Quantity	Percentage
Islam	309	83,51
Catholic	19	5,14
Protestant	28	7,57
Hindu	9	2,43

Religion/Belief	Quantity	Percentage
Buddha	4	1,08
Confucianism	0	0,00
Other Beliefs	0	0,00
None of them	1	0,27

When the respondents were asked about problems in religious education, they answered differently according to religion. Most of the respondents who were Muslim (55.34 percent) and Catholic (52.63 percent) strongly agreed that there were no significant religious education problems. However, most respondents who were Hindus (66.71 percent) and Protestants (60.17 percent) said they strongly disagreed and disagreed that there were no problems in religious education. Meanwhile, Buddhist respondents divided their views on this matter, 50 percent agreed, and 50 percent disagreed (Graph 3.22).


Graph 3.22 Views Related to Problems in Religious Education



Various answers were also found regarding the issue of national insight. The majority of respondents who were Muslim (72.49 percent), Catholic (63.16 percent), and Hindu (55.56 percent) strongly disagreed and also disagreed that religious education did not encourage an increase in national insight (see Graph 17). However, most respondents who were


Protestants (57.14 percent) strongly agreed or agreed that religious education had been less encouraging to increase national insight. Meanwhile, Buddhist respondents divided their views on this matter that 50 percent strongly agreed or agreed, and 50 percent disagreed (Graph 3.23).

Graph 3.23 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on the Nationalism Based on Religion




Different views are found regarding how religious education material provided a good understanding of religious diversity when the study analyzed the issue based on the respondents' religious background. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament from every religion (100 percent of Buddhist, 81.23 percent of Muslims, 71.43 percent of Protestant, 68.42 percent of Catholic, and 66.67 percent of Hindu) had disagreed and strongly disagreed that religious education had not provided a good understanding of the diversity of religions in Indonesia (Graph 3.24).

Graph 3.24 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on the Understanding of Religious Diversity Based on Religion




Regarding the religious education curriculum, various responses were found when analyzed based on the respondents' religious background. Most Indonesian Parliament members who were Hindu (66.67 percent) and Catholic (52.63 percent) strongly agreed that certain religious groups could not include their religious views in the religious education curriculum. On the other hand, most Indonesian Parliament members who were Buddhist (75 percent) and Muslim (72.17 percent) disagreed and strongly disagreed with this statement. In this case, respondents who were Protestants were divided into two, 50 percent strongly agreed and agreed, and 50 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed (Graph 3.25).

Graph 3.25 Views on the Religious Education Curriculum Based on Religion



Regarding the attitude of members of the Indonesian Parliament on religious education policies in the state schools, most religions showed an accommodationist attitude. All respondents who were Buddhist (100 percent) and Muslim (85.67 percent), Catholic (84.21 percent), Protestant (75 percent), and Hindu (55.56 percent) viewed that religious lessons must be given according to each student’s religion. Islam is the only religion followed by interventionist respondents, with a total of 9.39 percent. In this case, interventionists considered that religious instruction for the majority group deserved special attention from the government (Graph 3.26).


Graph 3.26 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament about Religious Education in State Schools Based on Religion



Different opinions were seen when respondents were asked about policies regarding the availability of places of worship in public schools. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament who were Catholics (68.42 percent), Protestants (67.86 percent), and Hindus (55.56 percent) showed neutral attitudes. They believed that the school was sufficient to provide a common space that could be used for worship by all students regardless of their religions or that the school did not need to provide a place of worship at all. Meanwhile, the majority of respondents who were Buddhist (75 percent) had an accommodationist attitude — seeing that schools needed to provide a place of worship for each of their students’ religions. Meanwhile, most of the respondents who were Muslim (48.87 percent) expressed an interventionist attitude — schools were only


sufficient to provide a place of worship for religions where the majority of students adhered to (Graph 3.27).

Graph 3.27 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Regarding the Provision of Houses of Worship in Public Schools Based on Religion




Regarding the policy of celebrating religious holidays in public schools, the Indonesian Parliament’s response is varied according to their religious backgrounds. The majority of respondents who were Protestant (53.57 percent), Catholic (52.63 percent), and Muslim (50.81 percent) chose to be neutral, namely that the celebration of religious holidays should be intended to foster understanding between religious adherents. On the other hand, the majority of respondents who were Hindu (55.56 percent) tended to be accommodating by stating that schools need to facilitate each religious adherent to celebrate their respective religious holidays. Buddhist respondents split into two; some were neutral, and the others were accommodating — 50 percent each (Graph 3.28).

Graph 3.28 Views of the Indonesian Parliament Members regarding the Celebration of Religious Holidays in State Schools Based on Religion




A slightly different trend was found in relation to the respondents' attitude towards the idea of implementing religious extracurricular activities at school. Almost all Indonesian Parliament members were neutral that extracurricular activities were intended to encourage understanding and cooperation among different religious groups (100 percent of Buddha, 73.68 percent of Catholic, 60.71 percent Protestant, and 54.05 percent Islam). Only Hindu respondents whose attitudes were divided into being neutral and accommodations by 44.44 percent respectively (Graph 3.29). In this case, the accommodationist attitude meant that schools should facilitate extracurricular religious activities for each student's religion.

Graph 3.29 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Regarding Religious Extracurricular Activities in State Schools Based on Religion



Various attitudes among respondents were also found when they were asked about the procurement of religious books. The majority of Indonesian parliament members who were Muslim (45.95 percent) tend to be interventionists that supported the provision of religious books to ensure that religion as a way of life was truly embedded in students. Most legislators who were Buddhist (50 percent) and Protestant (46.43 percent) stayed neutral that book procurement is only allowed to teach universal religious values that all students could apply. Meanwhile, the majority of respondents who were Hindu (55.56 percent) had an accommodationist attitude suggesting that schools provide religious books for each of the students' religions in the school. In this case, Catholic respondents' attitude chose a neutral and accommodationist attitude by 36.84 percent for each (Graph 3.30).


Graph 3.30 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on Religion Books Provision based on Respondents' religions



Regarding the ideal religious teacher, diverse attitudes between respondents were also found. The majority of respondents with different religious backgrounds showed a neutral attitude. Members of the Indonesian House of Representatives who were Hindu (77.78 percent), Buddhist (75 percent), Protestant (57.14 percent), and Catholic (52.63) said that religious teachers should be able to teach the learning materials about dialogue among religious believers. Meanwhile, the majority of respondents were Muslim (52.43 percent) with an accommodationist

attitude — assessing that every religion teacher must be able to have a good understanding of the religion they profess (Graph 3.31).

Graph 3.31 The Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Regarding Ideal Religion Teacher Figures Based on Religion



DEMOGRAPHICS OF MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT BASED ON EDUCATION LEVEL

This section analyzes how the Indonesian Parliament’s education level affects their attitudes and views regarding important issues in religious education. Of the 370 members of the Indonesian Parliament who were involved in this survey, 68 respondents (18.38 percent) had the latest education level doctoral degrees, 161 (43.51 percent) gained master degrees, and 127 (34.32 percent) had undergraduate education, 3 (0.81 percent) Diploma education, and 11 respondents (2.97 percent) graduated from high schools (Table 3.4). In making it easier to present the research results, the high school, diploma, and bachelor’s categories were grouped into the same group.


Table 3.4 Composition of Respondents Based on The Latest Education Level

Education Level	Quantity	Percentage
High School	11	2.97
Diploma	3	0.81

Education Level	Quantity	Percentage
Undergraduate	127	34.32
Master	161	43.51
Doctoral	68	18.38
Total	370	100

When they were asked about their views on religious education problems, the responses of members of the Indonesian Parliament according to their latest education level seemed different. The majority of respondents whose last education level was undergraduates or below (56.03 percent) and master (52.80 percent) both strongly agreed and agreed that there were no significant problems in religious education so far. Meanwhile, most Indonesian members with doctoral degrees as their latest education level (51.47 percent) actually said that they both strongly disagreed and at the same time disagreed that there was no problem (Graph 3.32). This figure shows that the higher the level of education of members of the Indonesian Parliament, the more they agreed that there had been serious religious education problems.


Graph 3.32 The views of members of the Indonesian Parliament on Problems in Religious Education Based on Education Levels



In terms of the issue of national insight, the response of members of the Indonesian Parliament had no significant difference according to the


level of education. The majority of the Indonesian House of Representatives members (undergraduates & below with 63.83 percent, master degrees with 74.53 percent, and doctoral degrees with 66.18 percent) said they disagreed and strongly disagreed that religious education materials did not encourage an increase in nationalism (Graph 3.33).

Graph 3.33 Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament concerning National Insights Based on Education Levels




The same attitude was also found related to understanding religious diversity. Most members of the Indonesian Parliament from all categories of education levels chose to disagree and strongly disagree that religious education did not provide a good understanding of the diversity of religions in Indonesia (undergraduate & below with 63.88 percent, master degrees with 72.05 percent, and doctoral degrees with 69.12 percent (Graph 3.34).

Graph 3.34 Views of Members of the DPR RI on the Understanding of Religious Diversity Based on Education Levels



Regarding certain religious groups and curricula, no significant differences were found when analyzed based on their education level. The majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament said that they disagreed and strongly disagreed that some religious groups could not include their religious views in the religious education curriculum (undergraduates & below with 63.83 percent, master degrees with 72.05 percent, and doctoral degrees with 69.12 percent) (Graph 3.35).


Graph 3.35 Views on the Religious Education Curriculum Based on Education Levels



According to the level of education, there is no significant difference in the attitude of Indonesian members regarding the policy of religious


education in public schools. The majority of members of the DPR RI in all categories of education had an accommodationist attitude considering that religious students should be given religious education according to the religion of each student (undergraduates & below with 83.69 percent, master degrees with 85.71 percent, doctoral degrees with 80.88 percent) (Graph 3.36).

Graph 3.36 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on Religious Education Based on Education Levels




A similar trend was also found when respondents were asked about the availability of places of worship. Most of the members of the Indonesian Parliament from all categories of education level were interventionist in the view that schools should prioritize places of worship for the religion of the majority of students (undergraduate & below with 46.81 percent, master degree with 41.61 percent, and doctoral degrees with 38.24 percent). However, as shown in Graph 3.37, the higher the level of education, the smaller the proportion of respondents who were interventionist.

Graph 3.37 The attitude of members of the Indonesian Parliament Regarding Availability of Houses of Worship Based on Education Level




Concerning the implementation of religious activities in schools, there is no significant difference in the respondents' attitudes when it is scrutinized based on education level. The majority of Indonesian parliament members (undergraduates & below with 52.48 percent, master's degrees with 55.28 percent, doctoral degrees with 64.71 percent) were neutral towards implementing religious extracurricular activities in schools. They preferred that religious extracurricular activities were intended to encourage understanding and cooperation among different religious groups. However, as shown in Graph 3.38, the higher the level of education, the greater the neutral attitude's proportion and the lower the accommodationist attitude.

Graph 3.38 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Regarding Religious Extracurricular Activities in Schools Based on Education Levels




Similar responses were also found when the respondents were asked about the holiday celebrations. Most Indonesian Parliament members were neutral that the implementation of religious holidays was held to foster interfaith understanding (undergraduates & below with 51.77 percent, master degrees with 50.93 percent, doctoral degrees with 48.53 percent). However, Graph 3.38 shows that the higher the level of education, the less the neutral attitude's proportion, and the more the accommodationist attitude.

Graph 3.38 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Concerning Celebration of Religious Holidays in Schools Based on Education Levels




However, different attitudes among respondents were found when asked about religious books' procurement when it was observed based on their education level. The majority of the Indonesian Parliament members with the highest education level of undergraduates and below (44.68 percent) had an interventionist attitude supporting the provision of religious books to ensure that religion as a way of life is truly embedded in students. Meanwhile, most legislators with the highest education levels of master degrees (54.55 percent) and doctoral degrees (54.55 percent) were accommodating by suggesting that schools provide religious books for each religion of the school students - see Graph 3.39.

Graph 3.39 Attitudes of Members of the DPR RI regarding the Procurement of Religious Books Based on Education Levels



With regard to the ideal religious teachers in schools, the majority of members of the Indonesian Parliament from all levels of education were accommodating as they viewed that every religion teacher must have a good understanding of the religion they profess (undergraduates & below by 43.97 percent, master degrees by 54.55 percent, and doctoral degrees by 53.55 percent). Only a small proportion was neutral and interventionist. However, as shown in Graph 3.40, respondents who had the highest education level of master and doctoral degrees had a lower proportion of interventionist attitudes by 9.09 percent, respectively, than those with undergraduate certificates and below (20.57 percent).

Graph 3.40 Attitudes of Members of the Indonesian Parliament Regarding Ideal Religion Teachers Based on Education Level



CHAPTER IV

THE HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN INDONESIA

This chapter discusses and explains in more detail the views of members of the Indonesian parliament regarding religious education in Indonesia. The Indonesian parliament members responded to important questions regarding religious education taught in public schools, which the government fund. The questions covered several issues such as national insight, the religious education curriculum, and the problem of religious diversity in religious education. This chapter also describes the diverse views of the Indonesian parliament members on the role of the state in religious education, which was influenced by political parties' ideology.

VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT ON IMPORTANT ISSUES ON RELIGIOUS EDUCATION


This survey explicitly highlights crucial issues related to interreligious relations in Indonesia. For this purpose, this survey asks how far the respondents agree or disagree with the following points: religious education material does not encourage the improvement of national insight; certain religious groups cannot include their religious views in the religious education curriculum; and religious education does not provide a good understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia


This survey also asks the views of the Indonesian parliament members on whether or not there are important issues in religious education in

Indonesia. In addition to exploring the general views of members of the Indonesian parliament on issues that exist in religious education, this question is intended to further examine the extent to which issues related to increasing national insight, religious views of minority groups, and understanding of religious diversity have received special attention from the Indonesian parliament members. RI.

Graph 4.1 shows the various views of the Indonesian parliament members on important issues in religious education. Regarding the development of national insight in religious education, around 30.08 percent of respondents to this survey stated that they strongly agree and agree that religious education has not encouraged national insight. Meanwhile, around 31.62 percent of respondents stated that they strongly agreed and agreed that certain religious groups could not include their religious views in the religious education curriculum. The proportion of respondents who strongly agreed and agreed with the statement that there were problems in religious education decreased slightly when they were asked whether religious education had provided a good understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia. Only about 20.54 percent of respondents stated that they strongly agreed and agreed that religious education had not provided a good understanding of Indonesia’s religious diversity.

Graph 4.1 Views on Important Issues in Religious Education






However, when the respondents were asked further whether there were any significant problems in religious education in Indonesia, not all respondents stated that there were serious problems in religious education in Indonesia and considered these matters as part of the problems in religious education. Only 173 people out of the 370 Indonesian parliament members were respondents to this survey, and 46.75 percent of respondents stated that there were serious problems in religious education (see Graph 4.1). Furthermore, some members stated that a lack of national insight, the difficulty of certain groups in including their religious views in the religious education curriculum, or a lack of good understanding of religious diversity were essential issues in Indonesia’s religious education.


Regarding the lack of increasing national insight into religious education, the results of this survey indicate that of the total respondents, only around 19.46 percent of respondents stated that the lack of religious education in providing an increase in the national insight of students was a serious problem in religious education (Graph 4.2).

Graph 4.2 Increasing National Insight in Religious Education



Regarding the existence of certain groups that face difficulties in including their religious views or beliefs in the religious education curriculum, the previous analysis results also show that of the total respondents, only about 15.9 percent consider this a serious problem. Finally, it is also important to note that only 12.16 percent of respondents consider the lack of schools to provide a good understanding of the religious diversity in Indonesia as a serious problem in religious education (Graph 4.3).

Graph 4.3 Religious Diversity in Indonesia in Religious Education



So far, many circles have shown the emergence of intolerant religious attitudes or views in the school environment. However, not many members of the DPR RI see serious problems in religious education. These problems, for example, the lack of an increase in national insight, the difficulty of certain groups in including their religious views or beliefs in the curriculum in schools, and a lack of understanding of religious diversity

in Indonesia. The proportion of respondents who think that the lack of religious education provides an increase in national insight (19.5 percent), it is still difficult for certain groups to include their religious views or beliefs in the religious education curriculum (15.9 percent), and the lack of religious education in providing an understanding of religious diversity as a serious problem (12.16 percent) is much smaller than the proportion of respondents who stated that there were no serious problems in religious education (41.62 to 44.86 percent, depending on the problem being asked).

Table 4.1 describes the results of the regression analysis (logit) on matters that might affect the views of members of the Indonesian parliament on these issues. This table makes it easier to further understand the views of the Indonesian parliament members on these issues. In this case, to facilitate discussion, the variation in views of members of the Indonesian parliament on national insight, access to certain groups to incorporate their religious teachings into the curriculum, and understanding of religious diversity was simplified into two, namely (1) admission of a serious problem; and (2) other attitudes or views. The results of our regression analysis are shown in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Factors Affecting the Views of Members of the Indonesian Parliament on Important Issues in Religious Education

	National Insights	Access to Certain Groups	Diversity of Religions
Commission	0.94 (0.33)	1.14 (0.45)	0.60 (0.24)
Democrats	1.53 (1.24)	3.57 (4.18)	1.93 (2.45)
Gerindra	2.06 (1.54)	4.64 (5.18)	2.52 (2.94)
Golkar	1.20 (0.93)	4.48 (5.06)	3.89 (4.39)
NasDem	1.16 (0.94)	3.90 (4.49)	3.95 (4.66)

	National Insights	Access to Certain Groups	Diversity of Religions
PAN	0.97 (0.86)	1.92 (2.43)	1.98 (2.52)
PDI-P	4.25* (3.00)	9.26* (10.03)	7.90# (8.66)
PKB	2.93 (2.07)	5.31 (5.81)	4.27 (4.71)
MCC	-	-	-
PPP	0.48 (0.59)	6.19 (7.52)	4.56 (5.89)
Religion	0.56 (0.23)	0.58 (0.25)	0.98 (0.49)
Java	1.62 (0.53)	1.60 (0.53)	1.21 (0.45)
Very Heterogeneous Religions	0.14* (0.11)	0.13* (0.10)	0.26 (0.25)
Very Heterogeneous Ethnicities	3.95# (2.96)	4.95* (3.83)	4.75 (4.53)
N	370	370	370
Log Likelihood	-161.36	-148.88	-123.79
AIC	364.72	339.76	289.58

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; # $p < 0.1$; The coefficient shows the odds ratio in which PKS became the reference group. Apart from these variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling for the influence of ages and genders.

The regression results show that political parties can explain the different attitudes of members of the Indonesian parliament on important issues in religious education. In all of these models, the regression results show that respondents from PDI-P had a tendency of 3.25 times to 8.26 times greater than respondents from PKS to state that the lack of national insight in religious education, difficulty access for certain groups to include their religious teachings in the curriculum, and a lack of understanding

of religious diversity in Indonesia was a serious problem in religious education. In the first model (National Insight) and the second (Access to Specific Groups), the effect of PDI-P is statistically significant with a significance level below 0.05; however, in the last model, the influence of PDI-P was statistically significant with a lower level of significance, which is below 0.1.

Apart from political parties, their diverse experiences also influenced respondents' views on issues that were considered important in religious education. However, as the regression results show, there are some things to note about the effects of this diversity experience. First, compared to a socially homogeneous environment, only very heterogeneous environmental conditions have an effect on respondents' views. Meanwhile, those who live in homogeneous and somewhat heterogeneous areas do not show a significant difference in their assessment of the existing problems in education related to national insight, access of certain groups to include their religious views in the curriculum, and understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia.


Second, it is also important to remember that ethnic and religious heterogeneity have different influences in shaping people's views. Respondents who live in areas that are ethnically heterogeneous tend to be more sensitive to the problems that exist in religious education, especially regarding the importance of national insight and the difficulties faced by certain groups. In the case of national insight, those living in highly ethnically heterogeneous areas were almost 3 times more likely - although only statistically significant at $p < 0.1$ - than those living in ethnically homogeneous environments to claim that religious education was lacking national insight and considered it as a serious problem. Meanwhile, in terms of opportunities to include certain religious views in the religious education curriculum, respondents living in ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods were almost 4 times more likely - and statistically significant at $p < .05$ - than those living in areas that were homogeneous ethnically.

However, in contrast to ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity on the contrary actually makes one insensitive to the lack of national

insight in religious education and the difficulties faced by certain groups to include their religious views in the religious education curriculum. In the last issue, for example, those living in a religiously heterogeneous environment actually tend to be around 87 percent less than those living in a religiously homogeneous area to be able to see that certain groups face difficulties in including their religious views in the religious education curriculum.

The regression results also show no significant difference between respondents who were in the commissions that deal with religious and education issues (Commission VIII and Commission XI) and respondents from other commissions. This is simply seen in the following cross-tabulation. Like the respondents from the commissions, those from the commission dealing with religion and education, namely Commission VIII and Commission X, also have relatively low attention to matters related to the national insight. The difficulties that some particular groups still face include their religious views or beliefs in the educational curriculum and understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia as previously mentioned.

Graph 4.4 Crucial Issues in Religious Education Based on the Commissions



THE VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION


To capture the views of members of the Indonesian parliament on religious education policies, this study specifically uses several questions that ask questions that are directly related to the implementation of religious education in schools. This includes increasing the duration of religious lessons, adding classrooms for religious lessons, installing religious symbols, praying together at schools, religious lectures at schools, supplying religious books, providing religious teachers, training religious teachers, and ideal religious teacher figures. Each question provides four answers that illustrate the diversity of their political attitudes about the implementation of religious education in public schools.

As previously mentioned, this survey differentiates a person's orientation in religious education policies into several categories, namely *laicite* or reluctant, neutral, accommodationist, and interventionist. We try to see the existence of this category in several issues related to religious education, such as the existence of teachers, classrooms, prayer activities together, and the installation of religious attributes or symbols in public schools. Obtaining the various views, especially at the minimum number of those who chose to be the *laicite* category—except for one particular question - this report combines the *laicite* and “neutral” categories into the “neutral” category to ease the process of analyzing the survey results.

This survey results indicate that members of the Indonesian parliament have diverse views for each question category. For questions regarding religious education in general, most of the parliament members were accommodating, emphasizing the state's importance to provide proper religious education for every student according to their respective religions or beliefs. Only very few Indonesian parliament members showed an interventionist attitude prioritizing the interests of the majority religious groups in terms of religious education. Very few were also “neutral” towards the existence of religious education in public schools. Similar trends were also found in matters related to organizing joint prayer activities in schools and providing religious teachers. As seen in Graph 4.5, accommodationist tendencies dominated respondents'

attitudes regarding the existence of religious education in general and in organizing praying together in schools and providing religious teachers.


Graph 4.5 Accommodationist Tendency in Religious Education



As seen in Graph 4.6, it is clear that the majority of respondents showed an interventionist attitude in providing places of worship in public schools, training for religious teachers, and supplying religious textbooks. This shows that many Indonesian parliament members agreed that the state or schools pay enough attention to the majority. In the Indonesian context, interventionism in the provision of worship places can be understood because of the differences in ritual procedures among official religions. While Islam as a religion that is adhered to by the majority of the population requires its adherents to pray during the day (Dzuhur and Asr prayers) for students, there is no similar obligation in other religions.

However, this is different from the provision of religious books and training for religious teachers. In this case, the interventionists believe that religion is something regulating students' life as a whole. As shown in Graph 4.6, around 42.16 percent and 55.13 percent of respondents, respectively, stated that they supported the provision of religious textbooks and training for religious teachers as an effort to make religion a source of life for students. A large amount of this interventionist tendency can affect the religious culture in schools, considering that religions contain a variety of interpretations that can differ from one another. Interventionist tendencies can result in the prioritization of one particular religious understanding over another.

Graph 4.6 Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education




It is interesting to note that for other policies, this survey found that the proportion of the Indonesian parliament members who expressed a neutral stance in education policy was very large or even the largest. Being neutral means that the state or government provides space for students or citizens to show their religious expression without the state taking part in facilitating it except for general things in nature or applying to all citizens regardless of their religion or belief.

In Graph 4.7, it can be seen that this tendency is found in terms of increasing religious lessons, adding religious classrooms, installing religious symbols in schools, celebrating religious holidays, extra-curricular activities, and religious lectures. In line with the trend in the last issue (religious lectures in schools), 38.92 percent showed a neutral tendency, and almost a third of respondents (32.97 percent) stated that the ideal religious teachers were those who not only taught good religious lessons in accordance with the religious teachings of students but also could teach material for interreligious dialogue. Based on the theoretical framework we have previously described, this shows a tendency to be 'neutral' in describing the ideal religious teachers.


Graph 4.7 Neutral Trends in Religious Education

Addition Hours for Religious Lesson




1=Neutral; 2=Accommodationist; 3=Interventionist

Addition Class Room of Religious Lesson




1=Neutral; 2=Accommodationist; 3=Interventionist

Religious Symbols in Schools




1=Neutral; 2=Accommodationist; 3=Interventionist

Celebration of Religious Days in Schools




1=Neutral; 2=Accommodationist; 3=Interventionist

Religious Extracurricular Activities



1=Neutral; 2=Accommodationist; 3=Interventionist

Religious Preaching in Schools



1=Neutral; 2=Accommodationist; 3=Interventionist

To explain the variation in the views of the Indonesian parliament members on religious education policies, the following sections explain the regression results on both political and non-political factors that influence the respondents' views on religious policies. Table 4.2 specifically shows the results of the regression on matters that might influence the tendency to be interventionists in religious education. In the case of the provision of religious textbooks, for example, the regression results show that political party affiliation affects the respondents' views. Compared to respondents from PDI-P, respondents from PAN, PKS, and PPP have a greater tendency to be interventionists than neutral. The greatest trend was found for respondents from PPP. Compared to respondents from PDI Perjuangan, respondents from PPP have a tendency of more than 3 million times greater to be internationalist than neutral. In addition, respondents from PPP also had a tendency of more than 2 million times greater than

respondents from PDI-P to be accommodating rather than neutral in terms of providing religious textbooks.

Table 4.2 Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education

	Provision of Religious Books		Religion Teacher Training	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Commission	1,10 (0,37)	1,19 (0,38)	0,50 (0,44)	0,54 (0,48)
Democrats	1,14 (0,64)	1,94 (0,60)	1,41 (0,65)	2,55 (0,69)
Gerindra	1,03 (0,54)	0,91 (0,57)	2,07 (0,58)	1,43 (0,66)
Golkar	1,80 (0,54)	2,05 (0,54)	1,97 (0,56)	1,62 (0,63)
NasDem	2,05 (0,60)	2,60 (0,59)	0,83 (0,56)	1,10 (0,62)
PAN	4,99** (0,73)	3,06 (0,75)	6,05*** (0,83)	3,53 (0,91)
PDI-P	-	-	-	-
PKB	0,90 (0,50)	0,48 (0,53)	1,19 (0,51)	0,89 (0,59)
MCC	5,41** (0,75)	3,46 (0,77)	3.847.686*** (0,26)	7.750.343*** (0,26)
PPP	3.113.902*** (0,31)	2.312.202*** (0,31)	1,11 (0,80)	1,79 (0,85)
Religion	4,50*** (0,47)	2,18** (0,44)	1,49 (0,45)	0,96 (0,50)
Java	0,44** (0,33)	0,64 (0,34)	0,50*** (0,34)	0,61 (0,38)
Heterogeneous Religion	2,25* (0,44)	3,64*** (0,48)	0,67 (0,49)	1,28 (0,55)
Very Heterogeneous Religion	9,07** (0,91)	3,85 (0,91)	1,30 (0,86)	0,21 (1,01)

	Provision of Religious Books		Religion Teacher Training	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Ethnic Heterogeneous	0,29** (0,60)	0,16*** (0,62)	0,77 (0,62)	0,52 (0,67)
Very Heterogeneous Ethnicity	0,23 (0,91)	0,36 (0,79)	0,26 (0,91)	0,82 (0,94)
Constant	0,38 (0,79)	0,45 (0,79)	15,89*** (0,91)	5,57* (0,99)
AIC	792,18	792,18	744.41	744.41

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ The coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio PDI-P becomes a reference group. Apart from these variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling for the influence of age and gender.

In terms of religious teacher training, the regression results show that respondents from PAN and PKS had a greater tendency to be interventionist than neutral. As seen in the table, respondents from PAN had a tendency more than 5 times greater than respondents from PDI-P to be interventionist rather than neutral in terms of religious teacher training. Meanwhile, compared to respondents from PDI-P, respondents from PKS have almost 4 million times greater tendency to be interventionist than neutral in religious teacher training. The table also shows that respondents from PKS also tend to be more than 7 million times greater than respondents from PDIP to be accommodating rather than neutral in terms of religious teacher training.

Apart from political parties, other factors that contributed to the interventionist attitude of the Indonesian members in providing religious textbooks and training for religious teachers were religion, their original regions, and social conditions of residence. The regression results show that compared to respondents who are non-Muslim, Muslim respondents had a 3.5 times greater tendency to be interventionist than neutral in the provision of religious books. Meanwhile, compared to respondents from outside Java, respondents from Java had a smaller tendency to be interventionist than neutral in terms of providing religious books. Compared to those who lived in areas with homogeneous ethnic

backgrounds, respondents who lived in areas with heterogeneous ethnic backgrounds also had a smaller tendency to be interventionist than neutral in the provision of places of worship.

In contrast to ethnic heterogeneity, the heterogeneity of place of residence according to religion has the effect of increasing a person's tendency to be interventionist rather than neutral. The regression results show that those who live in a religiously heterogeneous environment have a 1.25 times greater tendency than those who live in a religiously homogeneous environment to be interventionist rather than neutral in the provision of religious textbooks. The positive influence of religion in interventionist tendencies increases along with the increasing heterogeneity of the religious environment in which they live. Respondents living in a very heterogeneous religious environment had a tendency more than 8 times greater than those living in a religiously homogeneous environment to be interventionist rather than neutral in the provision of religious textbooks.

However, the influence of the heterogeneity of the living environment, both religiously and ethnically, did not affect respondents' views on religious teacher training policies.

Table 4.3 shows the tendency to be neutral among DPR RI members in religious education policies. From several policy areas, the neutral tendency has received quite a lot of support, the view of the ideal religious teacher figure and the addition of religious lesson hours to some extent provide an illustration of the extent to which political parties influence the neutral trend in religious education policies.

First, political party affiliation has again become one of the important factors explaining the attitude of members of the Indonesian parliament regarding the ideal religious teacher. Compared to respondents from PKS, respondents from Democrat, Gerindra, Golkar, NasDem, PDI-P, and PKB had a greater tendency to be neutral than interventionist. The biggest trend was shown by respondents from NasDem and PDI Perjuangan. Compared to respondents from PKS, respondents from NasDem had a tendency that is almost 11 times greater to be neutral than interventionist in determining the ideal religious teacher. Slightly smaller than the tendency to be neutral

towards NasDem respondents, respondents from PDI-P had a tendency of more than 8 times greater than respondents from PKS to be neutral than interventionist in determining the ideal religious teacher figure.

For the policy of adding religious lesson hours, only respondents from PDI-P show differences with respondents from PKS. Compared to the last group of respondents, respondents from the PDI-P tend to be 3 times more likely to be neutral than to be interventionist in responding to the proposal to increase religious study hours.

Table 4.3 Neutral Trends in Religious Education

	Ideal Religion Teacher		Addition of Learning Hours	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Commission	1,10 (0,41)	0,94 (0,36)	1.53 (0,36)	0.97 (0,39)
Democrats	3,83* (0,80)	2,01 (0,63)	2.59 (0,69)	0.94 (0,76)
Gerindra	7,06** (0,80)	4,53** (0,63)	1,64 (0,63)	1,21 (0,65)
Golkar	4,71** (0,79)	4,14** (0,62)	1,34 (0,64)	0,81 (0,67)
NasDem	11,85*** (0,82)	3,58* (0,70)	1,80 (0,65)	0,46 (0,71)
PAN	0,62 (1,00)	2,12 (0,60)	1,40 (0,71)	1,68 (0,70)
PDI-P	9,35*** (0,75)	2,92* (0,62)	3,13* (0,65)	1,05 (0,71)
PKB	8,20*** (0,74)	2,36 (0,61)	0,99 (0,59)	0,52 (0,63)
MCC	-	-	-	-
PPP	2,54 (0,94)	2,11 (0,75)	0,80 (0,75)	0,47 (0,82)
Religion	0.38* (0,53)	1,63 (0,54)	0,13*** (0,78)	0,34 (0,85)

	Ideal Religion Teacher		Addition of Learning Hours	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Java	1,38 (0,36)	0,75 (0,32)	1,10 (0,31)	0,71 (0,34)
Heterogeneous Religion	1,40 (0,53)	0,62 (0,45)	2.63** (0.40)	2.10* (0.45)
Very Heterogeneous Religion	0,35 (1,03)	0,51 (0,93)	3.43 (0,85)	2.81 (1,00)
Ethnic Heterogeneous	0,35 (0,68)	0,47 (0,61)	0.96 (0.47)	2.18 (0.57)
Very Heterogeneous Ethnicity	0,53 (1,06)	0.96 (0,96)	0.97 (0,77)	0.92 (0.95)
Constant	1,49 (1,07)	2,01 (0,95)	1.428 (1,04)	1.45 (1.17)
AIC	756,79	756,79	756,84	756.84

p<0.1; **p<0.05; *p<0.01. The coefficient shows that the Relative Risk Ratio of PDI-P becomes a reference group. Apart from these variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling for the influence of age and gender.*

THE VIEWS OF MUSLIM POLITICIANS IN THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

This section specifically discusses the 309 Indonesian parliament members who participated in this survey who stated that they were Muslim, particularly concerning their views on religious education. It is important to note that Islam has various religious traditions. In Indonesia, in particular, it is known that two types of religious traditions have the greatest influence, namely Muhammadiyah and NU. Apart from these two religious traditions, there are still several other Islamic religious groups that also exist in society. This includes, among others, Nahdlatul Wathan, al-Washliyah, and Alkhairaat. Meanwhile, many Muslims do not feel close to any Islamic organization.


Among members of the Indonesian parliament, particularly those who participated in this survey, NU and Muhammadiyah were the two

most followed or practiced religious traditions. At least 46.49 percent of respondents claimed to be close to the religious tradition of NU, and 14.32 percent of respondents said they were close to the religious tradition of Muhammadiyah. The rest, 4.86 percent admitted to being close to other religious traditions outside NU and Muhammadiyah, and 34.32 percent said they were not close to any Islamic religious traditions.

This section focuses on those who felt close to Muhammadiyah and NU and those who did not feel close to any Islamic organization. This was due to several considerations, especially the relatively small number of respondents who felt close to religious traditions which did not belong to Muhammadiyah nor NU compared to other groups.

With the limitations mentioned earlier, Graph 4.8 shows the distribution of Muslim politicians based on the religious traditions they follow. First, those who claim to be close to the religious tradition of Muhammadiyah supported PAN to be the most elected political party. There was 41.51 percent of respondents who claimed to be close to Muhammadiyah as affiliated with PAN, and then followed by PKS (20.75 percent). Apart from the two, many respondents who claimed to be close to the Muhammadiyah tradition chose to be affiliated with Gerindra and Golkar. Their proportions respectively: 13.21 percent and 11.32 percent of respondents.

Graph 4.8 Distribution of Muslim Politicians in the Indonesian Parliament




Those who claim to be close to NU's religious traditions were mostly affiliated with PKB and PDI-P. 29.1 percent of respondents who felt close to NU were affiliated with PKB, while around 15.7 percent were affiliated with the PDI-P. Following these, the two political parties chosen by many respondents who feel close to NU were NasDem and Golkar by 11.63 percent respectively. They feel close to NU's religious traditions.

Meanwhile, those who stated that they were not close to any Islamic tradition came from Gerindra, Democrat, and Golkar. They chose the political parties to be their political affiliation. At least 25.76 percent of respondents stated that they were not close to any Islamic religious tradition as being affiliated with Gerindra, and another 22.73 percent stated that they were affiliated with the Democrats. Next, the second most popular political parties were Golkar and PDI Perjuangan. Moreover, 13.64 percent of respondents that admitted to not have any close relation to any Islamic tradition were affiliated with Golkar, then 12.12 percent of other respondents who were not close to any Islamic tradition stated that PDI-P was their political affiliation.


In simpler terms, the political affiliation of these Muslim politicians is shown in Graph 4.9. If those who felt close to the Muhammadiyah tradition were concentrated in modernist Islamic parties, those who felt close to the religious tradition of NU were spread over all kinds of parties, with the largest proportion in traditionalist Islamic and nationalist parties. Meanwhile, respondents who felt close to other Islamic traditions were more concentrated on religious nationalist parties. And, respondents who did not feel close to any of the Islamic religious traditions prefer to be affiliated with modernist Islamic parties.

Graph 4.9 Distribution of Muslim Politicians Based on Party Political Identities



Meanwhile, if we analyze the distribution of Muslim politicians in the Indonesian parliament by taking into account the heterogeneity of political parties, the differences in tendencies between religious traditions, especially between Muhammadiyah and NU, the information obtained is quite clear. As seen in Graph 4.10, the proportion of Muslim politicians who felt close to the NU tradition decreased in line with the less heterogeneity of a party socio-religiously. On the other hand, the proportion of Muslim politicians who felt close to Muhammadiyah decreased in line with the increasingly heterogeneous social and religious parties.


Graph 4.10 Distribution of Muslim Politicians Based on Party Heterogeneity




The differences among respondents who felt close to Muhammadiyah and those who felt close to NU were again seen in several issues related to religious education. Graph 4.11 shows that the proportion of respondents who claimed to be close to NU appears to be slightly larger than the proportion of respondents who claimed to be close to the Muhammadiyah tradition in terms of acknowledging issues related to national insight, the minority rights to include their subject matter in religious education, and the issues of religious diversity in religious education. However, gaining the relatively small number of these differences, this study considers the extent to which these differences are significant will require more in-depth statistical testing.

Graph 4.11 Views of Muslim Politicians on Important Issues in Religious Education


Lack of Increasing the National Insights



Problems of Particular Groups




Lack of the Understanding of Religious Diversity



In terms of religious education policies, the results of this survey indicate that in several respects, respondents who felt close to the NU tradition showed a tendency to be less interventionist or more neutral than


those who felt close to the Muhammadiyah tradition. This can be seen, for example, in the provision of places of worship and the provision of religious books in schools. Regarding the provision of places of worship, 58.49 percent of respondents who claimed to be close to the Muhammadiyah tradition showed a tendency to be interventionist. In contrast to this, “only” 44.77 percent of respondents who claimed to be close to the NU tradition showed an interventionist tendency in similar ways. The two groups of Muslim politicians also showed a similar attitude towards the provision of religious books. If 50.59 percent of respondents claimed to be close to the Muhammadiyah tradition stating that they preferred an interventionist attitude in terms of providing religious books, “only” 41.28 respondents from the NU group stated the same thing (interventionist tendencies) (see Graph 4.12).

Graph 4.12 Interventionist Tendencies in Religious Education Among Muslim Politicians



Regarding the addition of religious lesson hours and a description of the ideal religious teacher, respondents from the religious traditions of Muhammadiyah and NU also showed a slight difference in percentages. In both cases, the proportion of respondents from the Muhammadiyah group who stated a ‘neutral’ tendency was much smaller than the proportion of respondents who chose the same stance from those who felt close to NU (see Graph 4.13).

Graph 4.13 Neutral Trends in Religious Education Among Muslim Politicians



POLITICAL PARTIES AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION POLICIES

The results of some regression analysis discussed in the previous sections show that political party affiliation is related to the views of members of the Indonesian parliament on religious education policies. Respondents from political parties such as PKS and PPP showed a greater tendency to be interventionist. While those who came from parties such as PDI-P and NasDem showed a greater tendency to be neutral.

What explains the differences? In order to answer this question, this section looks further at the extent to which the differences between the political parties can explain the variation in views of members of the Indonesian parliament. The answer to this question will be useful not only to further explain the differences in views between members of the Indonesian parliament on the direction of religious education policy but also to explain what are the fundamentals of the differences among political parties in relation to their position in religious education policy.

As previously mentioned, in order to deeper investigate the differences between the political parties and their influence on the views of the Indonesian parliament members on religious education policies, this report looks at two things, namely political identity and religious heterogeneity of parties. Political identity in this discussion refers to the extent to which religion or nation is the basis or main reference for political parties in formulating their identity. Meanwhile, religious heterogeneity in this study refers to how heterogeneous a party is based on the religion

held by its members or political elites. In this report, the heterogeneity of parties will scrutinize how many members of the Indonesian parliament believed in religions other than Islam in each party. Based on these two issues, the political parties in the Indonesian parliament can be grouped as shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Party Classification in the Indonesian Parliament

Party Category I (Political Identity)		Party Category II (Heterogeneity of Religion)	
Type of Party	Party	Type of Party	Party
Modernist Islam	PAN, PKS, PPP	Quite Heterogeneous	Democrats, Gerindra, PAN, PKB
Traditionalist Islam	PKB	Heterogeneous	Golkar, NasDem
Nationalist	PDI Perjuangan, NasDem	Very Heterogeneous	PDI-P
Religious Nationalist	Demokrat, Gerindra, Golkar	Not Heterogeneous	PKS, PPP

Although they are still related, the two classification systems have important differences. If the second classification ignores the differences between religious traditions in Islam - by combining PAN and PKB in one party type, the first classification will ignore religious heterogeneity within the parties. In terms of religious composition, PAN which is rather heterogeneous is different from PKS and PPP which are not heterogeneous. PDI-P and NasDem also have very different religious heterogeneities. However, which of the two classification models can better explain the differences between political parties in viewing religious policies is an empirical issue that requires further examination. That is why this report further analyzes the extent to which the two classification models explain the different views of members of the Indonesian parliament regarding religious education.

Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 below show the results of the multinomial regression analysis on the influence of political party identity and religious heterogeneity, respectively, on interventionist tendencies in

education policy. These two factors - the identity of political parties and the heterogeneity of religion - explain the various views of the Indonesian parliament members on religious education policies well. Table 4.5 shows that respondents from modernist Islamic parties have a greater tendency than respondents from nationalist parties to be interventionist rather than neutral in religious education policies. Table 4.6 shows that respondents from non-heterogeneous parties have a greater tendency than respondents from very heterogeneous religious parties to be neutral rather than interventionist in religious education policy.

However, the AIC figure in each model in Table 4.5 is always smaller than the AIC number in each model in Table 4.6. This result shows that the model that uses party political identity as the independent variable (Table 4.5) has a better ability to explain the variations in the data. In other words, party political identity better explains the different views of the Indonesian parliament members in issues of religious education policy than the heterogeneity of parties in terms of religions.

Table 4.5 Party Political Identity and Interventionist Tendencies in Religious Education Policy

	Provision of Religious Books		Religious Teacher Training	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Modernist Islam	5,37*** (0,54)	3,08** (0,55)	4,88*** (0,56)	4,50*** (0,59)
Traditionalist Islam	0,71 (0,45)	0,35** (0,49)	1,30 (0,47)	0,84 (0,54)
Nationalist	-	-	-	-
Religious Nationalist	1,36 (0,38)	1,12 (0,37)	1,99* (0,38)	1,70 (0,42)
AIC	784,87	784,87	739,73	739,73

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio

The nationalist party is the reference group. In addition to the above variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling the effect of commission membership, region of origin, age, sex, and social conditions of the residence.

Table 4.6 Party Heterogeneity and Interventionist Tendencies in Religious Education Policy

	Provision of Religious Books		Religious Teacher Training	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Quite Heterogeneous	1,56 (0,42)	1,22 (0,38)	2,07 (0,42)	1,43 (0,48)
Heterogeneous	1,88 (0,47)	2,21* (0,46)	1,97 (0,46)	1,62 (0,51)
Very Heterogeneous	-	-	-	-
Not Heterogeneous	8,80*** (0,73)	5,78*** (0,74)	0,83* (0,73)	1,11** (0,76)
AIC	790,32	790,32	742,59	742,59

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. The coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio. The “very heterogeneous” party is the reference group. In addition to the above variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling the effect of commission membership, regions of origin, age, sex, and social conditions of the residence.

In contrast to Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, the following two tables show the results of the multinomial regression on the influence of party political identity and religious heterogeneity within parties on the tendency of the Indonesian parliament members to choose religious education policies. Each model using party political identity or religious heterogeneity within the party can explain the different views of the Indonesian parliament members in formulating religious education policies. In the case of the description of the ideal religious teacher, Table 4.7 shows that respondents from Islamic nationalist, traditionalist, and religious nationalist parties have a greater tendency than respondents from modernist Islamic parties to be neutral rather than interventionist. However, in terms of additional religious study hours, only respondents from nationalist parties had a greater tendency to have a ‘neutral’ view than respondents from modernist Islamic parties than interventionists in terms of additional religious study hours.

Compared to the two models in Table 4.7, the two models in Table 4.8 can also explain the effect of religious heterogeneity on the variations in the

tendencies of the Indonesian parliament members in formulating religious education policies. Compared to respondents from non-heterogeneous parties, respondents from quite heterogeneous, heterogeneous, and religiously heterogeneous parties had a greater tendency to have a neutral tendency than an interventionist tendency. In the case of additional religious lesson hours, the second model in Table 4.8 can also explain the data well. This model shows that only respondents from very heterogeneous parties have a greater tendency to take a neutral view rather than interventionists than respondents from non-heterogeneous parties in formulating educational policies.

However, if we investigate further, we can find that each model in Table 4.8 consistently has an AIC value that is greater than the AIC value in each model in Table 4.7. Taking into account that both of them have the same number of independent variables in the analysis, this difference in the AIC number indicates that the two models in Table 4.7 have a relatively better ability to explain the variation in the data.

Table 4.7 Party Political Identity and Neutral Tendencies in Religious Education Policy

	Ideal Religion Teachers		Addition of Learning Hours	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Modernist Islam	-	-	-	-
Traditionalist Islam	7,05*** (0,58)	1,43 (0,51)	0,97 (0,46)	0,50 (0,51)
Nationalist	8,89*** (0,52)	1,91 (0,44)	2,33* (0,43)	0,67 (0,49)
Religious Nationalist	4,42*** (0,49)	2,10** (0,37)	1,69 (0,39)	0,94 (0,41)
AIC	743,80	743,80	742,76	742,76

p<0.1; **p<0.05; *p<0.01. The coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio. The “modernist Islam” party has become the reference group. In addition to these variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling the effect of commission membership, regions of origin, age, gender, and social and environmental conditions.*

Table 4.8 Party Heterogeneity and Interventionist Tendencies in Religious Education Policy

	Ideal Religion Teachers		Addition of Learning Hours	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Quite Heterogeneous	3,12** (0,52)	1,99 (0,42)	1,56 (0,43)	1,26 (0,46)
Heterogeneous	5,36*** (0,59)	3,01** (0,50)	1,71 (0,48)	0,85 (0,53)
Very Heterogeneous	6,36*** (0,64)	2,15 (0,57)	3,41** (0,58)	1,35 (0,66)
Not Heterogeneous	-	-	-	-
AIC	759,44	759,44	748,05	748,05

p<0.1; **p<0.05; *p<0.01. The coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio. The “non-heterogeneous” party is the reference group. In addition to these variables, regression analysis was carried out by controlling the effect of commission membership, regions of origin, age, gender, and social conditions of the residence.*

In general, the discussion in the previous sections points out several important points. First, the results of this survey show that there are not many members of the Indonesian parliament who pay great attention to issues related to nationalism, the access of certain groups to include their religious views in the religious education curriculum, and understanding of religious diversity in religious education. Of the 370 respondents to this survey, only 19.46 percent of respondents considered the lack of providing national insight into religious education as a serious problem. The proportion of respondents who considered that the lack of providing a good understanding of diversity in Indonesia was a serious problem was even smaller, namely only 12.16 percent. In the context of increasing views and even intolerant or exclusively religious behavior in the school environment, this is less encouraging news for the Indonesian parliament as an institution, which one of its functions is to care for the diversity of people in this country, and also for the wider community.

Second, the survey results also show that there are quite diverse views among members of the Indonesian parliament on the role of the state in religious education. The majority of respondents to this survey tended to be

accommodationists in policies related to the basic format of religious education. This includes religious teaching, group prayer activities, and the provision of religious teachers. However, the respondents expressed a more diverse view regarding other aspects of religious education. Many respondents indicated an interventionist tendency in the state or school policies regarding the provision of religious facilities, religious books, and training for religious teachers. Meanwhile, in matters related to the enrichment of religious education, many respondents showed a neutral tendency in setting the role of the state in education.

In some cases, these varied views provide little room for the community to get political support for efforts to build a more inclusive and respectful culture among people of different religions in schools. However, in the midst of increasing intolerant attitudes or opinions in the school environment, the relatively large proportion of respondents who hold interventionist views on crucial matters such as training for religious teachers and the provision of religious books should be considered separately. In the midst of the dominance of accommodationist views in policies related to the format of religious education, the relatively large interventionist tendency which allows the state to further regulate the religious life of citizens or students in schools does not provide greater space for efforts to create a school culture to be more inclusive and to respect the diversity of existing religions among students.

Third, the survey results also indicate that political parties had a considerable influence on how members of the Indonesian parliament see the role of the state in religious education. Differences in political party affiliation partly explain the differences in respondents' views on the direction of religious education policy. In other words, the respondents from certain parties have a greater tendency to be interventionist or neutral than those from other parties. In the case of providing religious books in schools. Also, the results of the logit regression analysis showed that compared to respondents from PDI-P, respondents from PAN, PKS, and PPP had a greater tendency to be interventionist than neutral in terms of providing religious books in schools. Similar trends were also found in the case of religious teacher training except for respondents from PPP.

Furthermore, regarding the characteristics of political parties that influence the different views of respondents, this survey found that the political identity of parties had a fairly close relationship with the views of the Indonesian parliament members on the role of the state in religious education. Respondents from nationalist parties had a greater tendency to show a neutral view in religious education policies than those of modernist Islamic parties, especially in the case of additional religious study hours. On the other hand, respondents from modernist Islamic parties had a greater tendency to be interventionist in religious education than respondents from nationalist parties, particularly in the provision of religious books and training of religious teachers. The results of this study provide a clearer picture of the political map in the Indonesian parliament related to the position of political parties and the related things to understand the role of the state in religious education. This picture is provided for the public and especially elements of civil society who pay attention to issues of nationality and diversity in religious education in public schools.

For the record, the results of this survey indicate that the Indonesian parliament as a state institution that plays an important role in formulating the direction of religious education policies shows an unclear attitude or position in addressing the problems of intolerant attitudes in the school environments. Regardless of the relatively small proportion of the Indonesian parliament members who considered issues related to increasing national insight, understanding of religious diversity, and the access of certain groups to include their religious views in the educational curriculum as important issues that need serious attention, many members of the Indonesian parliament had an interventionist tendency in positioning the role of the state in religious education.

Some of these points indicate the importance of the Indonesian parliament's efforts to increase the understanding of its members about fundamental issues in religious education, especially regarding the important role of the Indonesian parliament in maintaining diversity and maintaining national unity and integrity. Political parties also had a big responsibility to prepare their cadres to serve in the parliament, especially those who will be on commissions dealing with education and religious issues. The members must be able to understand the intricacies of religious education issues and to respond to the existing problems properly, particularly those related to national and religious issues

and the increasing symptoms of religious intolerance. Without the active role of the legislature to oversee the direction of government policies and the effects of this, it will be difficult for this country to overcome the problems that arise due to increasing religious intolerance and to create a school culture that is tolerant and respects each other between different religions.

In addition, realizing the big challenges faced by the Indonesian parliament in overcoming some of its internal weaknesses. Legislators and political parties need to provide wider democratic control to various elements of civil society to voice their aspirations and interests in formulating regulations related to the implementation of religious education in public schools. At the central level, the Indonesian parliament and political parties need to open up a wider space for participation for civil society in the deliberation process of the revision of the Law on the National Education System which is starting to be proposed by several groups. Democratic control needs to be given not only to representatives of the large groups in number but also to those who have been marginalized or discriminated against in the matters of religion so that the rights of minority groups in religious education are maintained.

This democratic space needs to be opened up not only at the national level but also at the local level and even at the school level. The formulation of school rules or policies related to the implementation of religious education needs to provide the widest possible space for community representatives, especially student guardians to maintain and ensure that every student, regardless of their religions, receives religious education services and good treatment in the school where they are learning. This is necessary to create a school culture that is friendly with diversity and is more respectful of the differences that exist among students and around the school environment in general.

CHAPTER V

GENDER AND THE PARLIAMENT'S VIEW ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

This chapter presents the survey results with a focus on themes related to gender issues in formal education, important issues in religious education, and the role of the state in religious education. This discussion is to determine whether there is a tendency in each gender when they view the three-issue themes raised in this survey. In an elite survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta in 2019, it was stated that at least 78 (21 percent) of the respondents were women and 292 (79 percent) were men from 370 members of the Indonesian Parliament.

This chapter also describes the attitudes and views of the members of Commission VIII and Commission X on these three themes. These two commissions deal with religious and educational issues. Commission VIII deals with the fields of religion, social, disaster and women's empowerment and child protection. Commission X deals with the fields of education, sports, tourism, and the creative economy. The two commissions were chosen because the areas they are dealing with are the focus of this research, namely the role of the state in religious education. The total number of respondents from Commission VIII was 40 people including 10 women (25 percent) and 30 men (75 percent). Meanwhile, the total

number of respondents from Commission X was 35 consisting of 9 (26 percent) women and 26 (74 percent) men.

VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT ON GENDER ISSUES IN FORMAL EDUCATION

In previous chapters, Kuru (2009) argued that at least six controversial issues related to the relationship between state policy and education emerged in secular countries (France, Turkey, and the United States). Those are; the use of clothing and religious symbols by students in public schools; religious promises and prayers in public schools; private religious education; religious instructions in public schools; community funding for private religious schools; and religious arrangements in public schools.


Although Indonesia is neither a religious country nor a secular country, the issues mentioned by Kuru also influence the relationship between state policies and education. In Indonesia, the state is actively involved in providing religious education in public schools. Furthermore, the active role of the state in providing religious schools is facilitated through the Ministry of Religion (Ropi 2017). The significant role of the state in intervening in the understanding of religion in schools is also influenced by issues related to the imposition of clothes and religious symbols in schools. One of them is about allowing female students to wear the headscarf in public schools in the late 1980s (Ropi 2017: 184). Previously, there was a ban on the wearing of the headscarf in public schools.

The differences between men and women in the social environment provide different experiences for the two genders to think and act in accordance with the gender demands that exist in their environment (Millet 1970: 31). Regulations in dress and restrictions on access to public spaces for women are forms of gender demands faced by women. In the context of formal education, this gender demand is not only about the issue of dress, but also other issues such as the separation of study and common spaces (such as auditoriums, parking lots, canteens, libraries, etc.) between men and women. .


In this survey, specifically, there are five questions related to gender issues in formal education. Respondents were asked to answer agree or disagree with: 1) Separation of classrooms between men and women; 2) Separation of common space based on gender; 3) Women must wear skirts and men must wear trousers; 4) Gender equality and discrimination are discussed in religious education; and 5) Women should not hold leadership positions in the state.

Graph 5.1 shows that there are no significant differences, both for women and for men, in terms of the division of places between males and females in formal education. It can be seen that 80.2 percent of men and 84.6 percent of women disagree with the idea of segregating classrooms between males and females. This is in line with the findings that 92.3 percent of women and 86.6 percent of men disagree with the separation of shared spaces (such as auditoriums, parking lots, canteens, libraries, etc.) based on gender. When the data was broken down based on Commissions VIII and X (see Graph 5.2), it was similarly found that 80 percent of the women and 66.6 percent of the men of Commission VIII did not agree with the separation of classrooms between men and women. And 77.8 percent of women and 69.2 percent of men from Commission X disagree with this statement. Meanwhile, regarding the separation of shared spaces, the survey results showed that the findings were greater, namely that 90 percent of women and 83.4 percent of men from Commission VIII did not agree. Moreover, 100 percent of the women and 88.4 percent of the men from Commission X disagreed with that idea.

Graph 5.1 View of Separation of Shared Space in Formal Education



Graph 5.2 The View of the Segregation of Space in Formal Education Based on Commission VIII and X




When the respondents were asked for their views on how to dress, they have different points of view. Women (60.2 percent) disagreed that women should wear skirts and men should wear trousers, while 57.5 percent of men agreed with this point of view (see Graph 5.3). However, based on the data based on Commission VIII and X, 70 percent of women and 86.3 percent of men in Commission VIII and 55.5 percent of women and 76.9 percent of men in Commission X agree with this point of view.

Graph 5.3 The View of the Way to Dress up




However, other findings indicate the support for the view of the inclusion of material on gender equality and discrimination in religious education. 83.3 percent of women and 80.1 percent of men agreed with this statement (see Graph 5.4). This support is also getting stronger based on Commission VIII and X that 80 percent of women and 83.3 percent of men in Commission VIII and 77.8 percent of women and 88.5 percent of men in Commission X agree with this idea.

Graph 5.4 Views on Gender Equality Materials



Not only support for gender equality material in religious education, the support of women as state leaders also received equal approval from 96.2 percent of women and 86.3 percent of men (see Graph 5.5). Based on Commission VIII and X, 90 percent of women and 86.7 percent of men in Commission VIII and 100 percent of women and 92.3 percent of men in Commission X do not agree that women should not hold leadership positions in the state. This means that they agree to women occupying leadership positions in the state.

Graph 5.5 Views of Women as Leaders



GENDER SUPPORT IS GOOD, BUT IS IT ENOUGH?

The survey data presented earlier shows quite good support from Indonesian parliament members for several gender issues in formal education. From each of the questions, there is no significant difference between men and women. Overall, the survey data shows that there is high support for not separating classrooms and shared spaces in schools; the inclusion of gender equality and discrimination materials in religious education; and women to become leaders of the state.

With regard to material support for gender equality and discrimination in religious education, this can be a starting point for discussing what gender equality and discrimination materials can be included in religious education. One concept that can be offered is for example by doing qira'ah mubadalah. Qira'ah mubadalah is to read Islamic texts that are re-understood by placing male and female partnerships in an equal position as the full subject of human life (Kodir 2019). This is necessary to understand human relations in a fair and balanced manner.

The Indonesian parliament members provide support for these four issues. However, regarding the dress code, there is a significant difference between men and women among the Indonesian parliament members regarding that women must wear skirts and men must wear trousers. The women disagreed, while the men agreed. However, when the data were disaggregated by Commission VIII and X, both men and women agreed with the statement.


The issue of how to dress is closely related to how gender roles are attached to a person. Women are considered feminine if they wear a skirt and men are considered masculine if they wear pants. The outward appearance of a person is believed to correspond to the gender role that one should have. Therefore, the assumption that women wear skirts shows their feminine gender roles and vice versa for men. In reality, gender roles are not always this rigid (Baber and Tucker 2006), and the way a person dresses does not necessarily indicate a person's femininity or masculinity.

VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT BASED ON GENDER ON IMPORTANT ISSUES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Important issues in religious education in this survey are broken down into four questions about agreeing or disagreeing: The material of religious education does not encourage an increase in national insight; Certain religious groups cannot include their religious views in the religious education curriculum; Religious education does not provide a good understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia; and there are no significant problems in religious education.


Disaggregated data between male and female gender (see Graph 5.6) regarding religious education material does not encourage an increase in national insight, 66.7 percent of women and 69.5 percent of men view that they disagree with this statement. Meanwhile, disaggregated data based on Commission VIII and X and their gender also show similar things. 80 percent of women and 80 percent of men in Commission VIII disagreed and 55.6 percent of women and 57.7 percent of men in Commission X disagreed with this statement. This data shows that there is no significant difference between the gender of men and women in seeing this issue.

Graph 5.6 Religious Education Materials




Similar results are also found in the question about whether certain religious groups cannot include their religious views in the religious education curriculum? There are 60.3 percent of women and 70.5 percent of men who disagree with this statement. When the data were disaggregated based on Commission VIII and X, the same thing was found that 80 percent of women and 66.7 percent of men in Commission VIII, and 66.7 percent of women and 73.1 percent of men in Commission X disagree with this statement (see Graph 5.7).

Graph 5.7 Diversity of Views in Religious Education



The statement on religious education does not provide a good understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia, 83.3 percent of women and 78.5 percent of men disagree with this statement. When the data were disaggregated by Commission VIII and X, 90 percent of women and 73.4 percent of men in Commission VIII gave the same viewpoint. This is in line with the 88.9 percent of women and 73.1 percent of men in Commission X having the same viewpoint (see Graph 5.8).


Graph 5.8 Understanding of Religious Diversity in Religious Education



While in Graph 5.9 shows that 47.4 percent of women and 54.8 percent of men agree that there are no significant problems in religious education. Meanwhile, 52.5 percent of women and 45.3 percent of men stated the opposite. This shows that there are opposing viewpoints among the gender. However, disaggregated data based on Commission VIII and X show that 60 percent of women and 56.7 percent of men in Commission VIII disagree with this point of view. Meanwhile, 66.7 percent of women in

Commission X and 65.3 percent of men in Commission X agreed with this point of view.

Graph 5.9 The View of No Significant Problem in Religious Education



The findings based on gender-disaggregated data for all members of the parliament can be concluded that nearly 70 percent of both male and female gender both view that religious education material is sufficient to encourage an increase in national insight. Data from more than 60 percent of both men and women disagree with the assumption that certain religious groups cannot include their religious views in the religious education curriculum. Data of more than 70 percent of both men and women disagree with the statement that religious education does not provide a good understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia. Both men and women have an almost equal percentage composition in agreeing and disagreeing with the statement that there is no significant problem in religious education.

The findings based on gender-disaggregated data in Commissions VIII and X can be concluded that 80 percent of both men and women in Commission VIII stated that they did not agree that religious education did not encourage the improvement of national insight. Data on more than 50 percent of both men and women in Commission X stated the same thing. Data from more than 60 percent of both men and women in Commission VIII disagreed with the statement that certain religious groups could not include their religious views in the religious education curriculum. And data from more than 60 percent of both the male and female genders from Commission X do not agree with the above point

of view. Regarding whether religious education does not provide a good understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia, data above 70 percent of both males and females in Commission VIII disagree with this statement, and above 70 percent of both males and females in Commission X have the same opinion. While the data is disaggregated on no significant problems in religious education, data above 50 percent of both the gender of men and women in Commission VIII disagree with this point of view, and data above 60 percent of both men and women in Commission X states that the same view.

The things that need to be underlined from the findings previously described are at least two things. First, both members of the parliament as a whole and in Commissions VIII and X who handle the field of religion and education do not see any significant problems in religious education in Indonesia concerning the issue of national insight, respect for religious diversity, and the acceptance of other religious perspectives in the religious education curriculum. This needs to be given serious attention because of the large amount of data in the field that shows the many cases of violations of minority groups in exercising their rights to freedom of religion and belief (Wahid Foundation 2020). Second, there is no significant difference between the gender of women and men in viewing important issues in religious education.

THE VIEWS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION ARE DIVIDED BY GENDERS

How do members of the Indonesian people view the role of the state in religious education? This survey inquires about the format of religious education, changes in religious lesson hours, additional religious classrooms, installation of religious symbols in schools, activities for praying together at schools, celebrating religious holidays in schools, providing houses of worship in schools, religious extracurricular activities in schools, religious lectures in schools, provision of religious teachers, and training for religion teachers. The answers to the questions answered by the respondents were grouped according to three categories, namely interventionist, neutral, and accommodationist. The reluctant

category/laicite are grouped into one into neutral because few people choose the 'reluctant' category and to make it easier to read survey results.


The grouping of these categories is based on the relationship between religion and state which is graphed in the form of a continuum. The far-left position shows that there is no state intervention in religion, while the far-right position shows the opposite. Between these two extreme positions, there are categories such as reluctance, neutrality, accommodationist, and interventionist (religious state). The tendency for a neutral view to give the position of the state does not impose limits on the existence of religion in the public sphere but also does not facilitate the role of religion in the state. The accommodationist tendency tries to provide space for all religions to be accommodated in public spaces. The interventionist tendency tries to give more space to the majority religion. Meanwhile, the reluctant group tends to have a more negative attitude towards the role of religion in the state or public sphere (Kuru 2007) - as explained in the section.

From the definitions that have been presented, based on the disaggregated data of men and women (see Graph 5.10), the tendency to have an accommodationist view of religious education is on issues related to praying together in schools with 88.5 percent of women and 87.7 percent of men. The accommodationist tendency in this context means that prayer activities should be carried out in accordance with the religion and beliefs of each student. Another accommodationist trend is on the issue of the format of religious education which is supported by 92.3 percent of women and 81.8 percent of men. The issue of providing religious teachers was also dominated by 74.4 percent of women and 66.8 percent of men who provided accommodationist support. The accommodationist tendency in the educational format referred to here is that religious lessons must be given according to the religion of each student. Meanwhile, in the provision of religious teachers, the accommodationist tendency is indicated by the agreement that all students need to get religious lessons in accordance with their respective teachings.

And finally, on the issue of religious lectures in schools, 55.1 percent of women and 50.3 percent of men were categorized as accommodationists. The attitude of the accommodationist tendency here is that schools need

to facilitate the holding of religious lectures for each religious group in the school. Accommodationist support in these issues certainly shows respect for religious diversity in schools by respecting and providing for the needs of students according to their respective religions.


Graph 5.10 Accommodationist Tendency in Religious Education Based on Gender



Meanwhile, the interventionist trend in religious education based on genders can be seen in two issues which are training for religion teachers and the provision of places of worship in schools (see Graph 5.11). There were 65.4 percent women and 52.4 percent men who showed an interventionist tendency on the issue of training for religion teachers. The interventionist attitude in question is that training for religion teachers is needed because religion is the most important source for building character students. Moreover, 42.3 percent of women and 43.2 percent of men showed an interventionist tendency on the issue of providing places of worship in schools. This tendency is indicated by the agreement that it is appropriate for schools to prioritize places of worship for religions adhered to by the majority of students. The tendency to support interventionists needs special attention. This is because the attitude of prioritizing the

interests of the majority religion can be the beginning of ignoring other minority religions and beliefs.


Graph 5.11 Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education Based on Gender



The tendency to have a neutral view in religious education based on gender-disaggregated data can be found in four issues, namely: changes of religious lesson hours, the installation of religious symbols in schools, religious extracurricular activities in schools, and religious holidays in schools (see Graph 5.12). There were 60.3 percent of women and 51.1 percent of men showing a neutral tendency on the issue of changing religious lesson hours. The neutral tendency here is that religious lessons are sufficient while providing an understanding among religious believers gets less attention.


There are 70.5 percent of women and 84.2 percent of men showing a neutral tendency in the installation of religious symbols in schools. Although on this issue there are significant differences between the men and women, in which women show an accommodationist tendency of 21.8 percent. In terms of the support for the neutral trend, the respondents agree that the display of religious symbols should be intended to provide interfaith understanding to students. Meanwhile, the accommodationist tendency here is shown by those agreeing with the statement that state schools should display the religious symbols of each religious group in the school.

Graph 5.12 Neutral Trends in Religious Education Based on Gender



Meanwhile, in religious extracurricular activities in schools (see Graph 5.12), 52.6 percent of women and 56.8 percent of men showed a neutral tendency that religious extracurricular activities should be intended to encourage understanding and cooperation between different religious groups. And finally, 56.4 percent of women and 49.3 percent of men showed a neutral tendency on the issue of celebrating religious holidays in schools. In this case, what is meant by being neutral is that the celebration of religious holidays should be intended to foster understanding among religious followers.

Graph 5.13 Accommodationist and Neutral Tendencies in Religious Education Based on Gender




In Graph 5.13, an almost balanced trend between accommodationist and neutral is shown in religious education based on gender-disaggregated data on the issue of adding religious lessons. There were 42.3 percent of women and 44.9 percent of men showing an accommodationist tendency and 44.8 percent of women and 47.3 percent of men showing a neutral tendency. The accommodationist attitude is the need to add more classrooms so that all students can attend religious education in accordance with their religion. Moreover, the neutral tendency referred is that there is no need to add more classrooms, it is enough to use existing class facilities.

Meanwhile, data is disaggregated by gender, and Commissions VIII and X show that there are five categories that display accommodationist tendencies. First, in the issue of education format, 90 percent of women and 83.3 percent of men in Commission VIII and 88.9 percent of women and 88.5 percent of men in Commission X stated that religious lessons must be given according to their respective students' religions. Second, on the issue of praying together at school, 80 percent of women and 93.3 percent of men in Commission VIII and 100 percent of women and 88.5 percent of men in Commission X provide the support that prayer activities should be carried out in accordance with religion and trust of each student.

Third, on the issue of providing religious teachers, 60 percent of women and 76.7 percent of men in Commission VIII and 66.7 percent of women and 65.4 percent of men in Commission X agreed that all students need to receive religious lessons in accordance with religious teachings respectively. Fourth, on the issue of adding religious classrooms, 40 percent of women and 43.3 percent of men in Commission VIII and 77.8 percent of women and 61.5 percent of men in Commission X agreed to add more classrooms so that students can participate in religious education in accordance with the religion they profess. In this issue, there is actually a combination of views that are significant among women in Commission VIII. There are 30 percent neutral and 30 percent interventionist more concerned with the majority group than other religious groups, and a significant combination among male gender in Commission VIII which is 50 percent neutral.


Graph 5.14 Accommodationist Tendency in Religious Education Based on Gender and Commission VIII and X



Fifth, on the issue of religious lectures in schools, 60 percent of women and 66.7 percent of men in Commission VIII and 44.4 percent and 42.3 percent of men in Commission X agreed that schools need to facilitate the holding of religious lectures for each religious group in schools. In this issue, there is actually a significant combination, namely 55.5 percent

of women and 50 percent of men in Commission X tend to be neutral, agreeing that preaching is not allowed unless the preaching materials teach universal religious values for all students.

Chart 5.15 Neutral Trends in Religious Education Based on Gender and Commission VIII and X




Data disaggregated by gender and Commission VIII and X on the major themes of religious education, there are four issues that show a neutral tendency (see Graph 5.15). This can be seen that 60 percent of women and 36.6 percent of men in Commission VIII and 44.4 percent of women and 50 percent of men in Commission X show a neutral tendency on the issue of the change of learning hours. It means that the hours of religious lessons are sufficient, however, it is lacking to provide an understanding of anti-religious believers. There are 60 percent of women and 76.7 percent men in Commission VIII and 33.3 percent women and 96.1 percent men in Commission X showing a neutral tendency on the issue of installing religious symbols in schools. The neutral tendency that is the display of

religious symbols should be aimed at providing understanding between religious practitioners to students. In this issue, 44.4 percent of women in Commission X actually show an accommodationist tendency that supports providing space for each religious group to display religious symbols at school.

Meanwhile, 50 percent of women and 53.3 percent of men in Commission VIII and 66.6 percent of women and 73 percent of men in Commission X show a neutral tendency by agreeing that religious extracurricular activities should be intended to promote understanding and cooperation among different religious groups. Finally, on the issue of celebrating religious holidays in schools, 70 percent of women and 56.6 percent of men in Commission VIII and 44.4 percent of women and 50 percent of men in Commission X show a neutral tendency. This neutral tendency is shown through the agreement that the celebration of religious holidays should be intended to foster understanding among religious followers. However, on this issue, there is actually a significant combination of females in Commission X with 44.4 percent showing accommodationist tendencies and a significant combination among males in Commission X with 42.3 percent of men showing a tendency accommodationist.

Graph 5.16 Interventionist Trends in Religious Education Based on Genders and Commission VIII and X



Meanwhile, data disaggregated by genders and Commission VIII and X, there are two issues that show an interventionist tendency, namely the provision of places of worship in schools and training for religious

teachers (see Graph 5.16). We can see that 50 percent of women and 50 percent of men in Commission VIII and 44.4 percent of women and 38.5 percent of men in Commission X show an interventionist tendency in the first issue. What is meant by the interventionist tendency here is that the respondents agree that it is appropriate for schools to prioritize places of worship for the religions of the majority of students. Furthermore, 60 percent of women and 46.7 percent of men in Commission VIII and 77.8 percent of women and 69.2 percent of men in Commission X agree that training for religious teachers is needed because religion is a source most important for building students' character.

From these findings, it can be concluded that in the various issues raised in this survey, members of the Indonesian parliament, both as a whole and those in Commissions VIII and X, provide various perspectives that show their tendency to be either interventionist, neutral, or accommodationist. This trend of support shows a mix of understandings that can have an influence on how the state's role towards religion, especially in this context, is religious education and practice in the formal school environment. Another thing that needs to be noted, gender-disaggregated data does not show a significant difference between the gender of men and women.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This chapter outlines some of the important findings from a survey of the Indonesian Parliament members for the 2019-2024 term. The results of the survey with a total of 370 respondents conducted in 2019 can be summarized in the following points;

First, this survey results prove that not many Indonesian parliament members pay great attention to nationalism related-issues, the access of certain groups to include their religious views in the religious education curriculum, and an understanding of religious diversity in religious education. At least 19.46% of respondents considered the lack of providing national insight into religious education as a serious problem. The proportion of respondents who considered that the lack of a good understanding of Indonesia's diversity was a serious problem was even less, by 12.16%.

In terms of gender segregation, almost 70 percent - both men and women consider that religious education material is regarded sufficient to encourage an increase in national insight. More than 60 percent, both men and women, agreed with the view that certain religious groups cannot include their religious views in the religious education curriculum. Furthermore, more than 70 percent of men say that they disagree with the statement that religious education does not provide a good understanding of Indonesia's religious diversity.

This finding is, of course, a warning to the Indonesian parliament as a legislative body that has the function of caring for the diversity of society

in Indonesia. This finding becomes a more serious problem related to the increasing views and behavior of exclusively and religiously intolerant in the school environment, which should be of concern to respected councilors.

Second, this survey results show that members of the Indonesian parliament have quite diverse views on the state's role in religious education. The majority of respondents to this survey showed a tendency towards accommodationist views in policies related to religious education's basic format. Among other things, includes religious instruction, collective prayer activities, and religious teachers' provision. On the other hand, many of them showed a tendency towards interventionist views in the state or school policies regarding the provision of religious facilities, religious books, and training for religious teachers. Meanwhile, in matters related to the enrichment of religious education, many of them showed a tendency towards a neutral view in placing the state's role in education.

When viewed from the segregation of men and women, it can be concluded that 88.5 percent of women and 87.7 percent of men tend to accommodationist views in religious education, for example, the problem of praying together at school. Regarding the problem of providing religious teachers, 74.4 percent of women and 66.8 percent of men also tended to have an accommodationist view. Meanwhile, the interventionist tendency in religious education based on gender can be seen in two issues: training for religious teachers (65.4% women and 52.4% men) and the provision of worship places in schools (42.3% women and 43.2% man).

Amid the dominance of accommodationist views in policies related to the format of religious education and the relatively large number of interventionist tendencies - which allow the state to regulate further the religious life of citizens or students in schools, does not provide more generous space for efforts to create a school culture which is more inclusive and accommodates the diversity of religions that exist among students.

Third, this survey results also conclude that the political parties have a significant influence on their members when the members of the Indonesian parliament take a look at the role of the state in religious education. The differences in the affiliation of political parties explain

their different views on the religious education policy direction. Those from certain parties had a greater tendency to be interventionist than those from other parties. In the case of the provision of religious books in schools, for example, the results of the logit regression analysis showed that those from PAN, PKS, and PPP had a greater tendency than those from PDI-P to be interventionist or to be neutral in terms of providing religious books in schools. The same thing — except for those from PPP — was also found in the case of religious teacher training.

Regarding the characteristics of political parties that influence the differences in respondents' views, this survey found that parties' political identity has a fairly close relationship with the views of members of the Indonesian parliament on the role of the state in religious education. Those from the nationalist parties have a greater tendency than those of the modernist Islamic parties to show a neutral view in the policy of religious education, especially in the case of additional religious instruction hours. On the other hand, those from modernist Islamic parties have a greater tendency than respondents from nationalist parties to be interventionist in religious education, particularly in the provision of religious books and training of religious teachers.

The findings of this survey indicate that there are serious challenges for the Indonesian parliament in the future. As a high-ranking state institution that plays an important role in formulating the direction of religious education policy, the Indonesian parliament is required to increase the understanding of its members about fundamental issues in religious education, especially regarding the important role of the Indonesian parliament in maintaining diversity and national unity and integrity.

Because members of the Indonesian parliament are directly connected to the political parties that have allowed them to be representatives of the people, political parties have a big responsibility to prepare their cadres to serve in the Indonesian parliament. Moreover, for those whom their political parties assign in commissions dealing with education and religious matters, they should at least understand the intricacies of religious education issues well and respond appropriately

to existing problems, particularly those related to national and religious issues, especially diversity and increasing trends of religious intolerance.

Members of the legislature are required to increase their active role in overseeing the direction of government policy and the effects it causes. Without their active role, it will seemingly be difficult for this country to overcome the problems that arise due to increasing religious intolerance and creating a school culture that is tolerant and respects the followers of different religions.

Another big challenge is that legislators and political parties need to provide a wider room for democratic control for various civil society elements to voice their aspirations and interests in formulating regulations related to the implementation of religious education in public schools. The Indonesian parliament and political parties need to open a wider space for civil society participation in the discussion process for the revision of the National Education System Law proposed by several groups. Democratic control needs to be given to representatives of large groups in number and those who have been marginalized or discriminated against in religion matters so that the rights of minority groups in religious education are maintained.

This democratic control room needs to be opened not only at the national level but also at the local level and even at the school level. The formulation of school rules or policies related to the implementation of religious education, for example, needs to provide the most expansive space for community representatives, especially student guardians, to maintain and to ensure that every student, regardless of religion, receives religious education services and fair treatment in the school where they study. It is necessary to create a friendly school culture with diversity and is more respectful of the existing differences among students and the school environment.

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ABOUT AUTHOR

Yunita Faela Nisa - The Coordinator of 2019 PPIM Survey on Voices from Senayan: The Views of Legislative Members on the Role of the State in Religious Education. As a researcher of PPIM UIN Jakarta, her experience in the Course on Advanced Statistics and Research Methodology at Guelph University, Ontario, Canada, and Massey University, New Zealand, has supported her in all research conducted. Yunita is also a lecturer at the Psychology Faculty of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta).

Sirojuddin Arif - The Researcher of 2019 PPIM Survey on Voices from Senayan: Views of Legislative Members regarding the State's Role in Religious Education. He has a doctorate in political science from Northern Illinois University, USA, with extensive research experience in both the political and social fields. Siro also works as a researcher at the SMERU Institute.

M. Zaki Mubarak - A Survey Researcher at PPIM UIN Jakarta. His analyses and research as to Islamism in Indonesia have given more colours to many social science journals. This Doctoral Candidate in Political Science from Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) also serves as a lecturer at the Social and Political Sciences Faculty of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta).

Yufi Adriani - A Survey Researcher at PPIM UIN Jakarta. Yufi has been involved in PPIM research since 2018. Her dissertation examines the happiness of Indonesian Muslim adolescents. She earned a doctorate in psychology from Deakin University, Australia, and now she serves as a

lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta).

Fikri Fahrul Faiz - A researcher at PPIM UIN Jakarta. He gained his master's degree in international security from the University of Sydney, Australia. He has an interest in the issue of radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia. Daily, Fikri also serves as the project secretary for the CONVEY (Countering Violent Extremism for Youth) Indonesia.

Faiqoh - A master's graduate from The International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam in The Hague, The Netherlands. She has working experience in youth participation, child protection, peacebuilding, gender mainstreaming, and prevention of intolerance and violent extremism. Faiqoh works at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta) as a gender specialist.

Idris Thaha - A senior researcher at PPIM UIN Jakarta. He is a Doctor with a dissertation published as a book under the title "*Islam dan PDI Perjuangan: Akomodasi Aspirasi Politik Umat* (Islam and PDI Perjuangan: Accommodation for Political Aspirations of the People)." He has rich experience in social and political research in Indonesia. On a day-to-day basis, Idris serves as a lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta).

Didin Syafruddin - This PPIM UIN Jakarta senior researcher earned his doctorate in Value and Cultural Studies in Education, majoring in Integrated Studies in Education from McGill University, Montreal, Canada. His dissertation was entitled "*Mencari Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan a Multirelation Indonesia* (Searching for Indonesian Multirelation Citizenship Education)". On a daily basis, Didin serves as a lecturer at the Tarbiyah Faculty of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta).

VOICE OF SENAYAN

The Viewpoints of People's Representative
on the State's Role in Religious Education

This book is about the perspectives and policies of the parliament members in Indonesia relating to religious education. The study topic has not been carried out by many academics, both from within the country and abroad. This study is urgently needed to build national resilience and prevent violent extremism through religious education in Indonesia. Religious education in public schools must be free from discrimination and acts of violence as it is intended to strengthen tolerance, harmony, and peace in diversity.



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