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

THE MILLENIUM MOSQUES

A New Direction for Religious Literacy

Editors:
Jajang Jahroni & Irfan Abubakar

Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta

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

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A New Direction for Religious Literacy
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ENRICHING RELIGIOUS LITERACY IN MOSQUES: AN INTRODUCTION

Jamhari Makruf & Idris Thaha

This book, *The Millennium Mosques: A New Direction for Religious Literacy,* attempted to fill the void in literacy for mosques. Recent published studies on religions, especially in Indonesia, have been dominated by books that discuss mosques from the historic, cultural, artistic and architectural point of views. Not many books have discussed the educational function of mosques especially when this vital function is linked to how mosques become a fertile ground for sowing the seeds of radicalism and intolerance in the nation's religious life.

As will be elaborated in this book, in a few cities in Indonesia post-reformation, mosques have been exposed to ideas and views filled with radicalism and intolerance. The *khatib* (preachers) and the *muballigh* (missioners) through various conventional and normative methods deliberately deliver these ideas and views and thus, enrich the mosques with these during Friday sermons and any religious sermons. Here they insert, for example, the idea of rejecting Pancasila as an ideology and the Republic of Indonesia which has been established by the nation's forefathers. Advices on *aqidah* (Islamic creed), *ibadah* (worship/pray), and *akhlak* (morals) are only used as a medium to deliver their radical and intolerant religious messages.

Mosques and other places of worship play a vital educational role. Mosques are not only used as a center of religious activities, but also educational, including social-political and economic-commercial, activities. During his move to Yatsrib, which is now

known as the city of Madinah, the Prophet Muhammad SAW built a mosque and turned it into a center of his religious activities to build an Islamic civilization. The Prophet used the mosques to teach the new Muslim converts basic knowledge on the religion they had just embraced. This lesson in Islamic history shows that in its early development, mosques were the medium for spreading the Islamic messages or missionary work as well as teaching and learning Islam. Mosques were then further developed into the center of Islamic studies famously known as "*Masjid Jami*". This *Masjid Jami* was developed into an Islamic institution known as "*al-jami'ah*" (a university). Therefore, it can be said that mosques are the root of higher education institutions although not all mosques have the function of a *jami'* or become higher education institutions.

Recently, however, the role of mosques has gone beyond worship and missionary work. Mosques are now complemented with schools or *madrasah* (after-school religious classes), health centers such as clinics, public services such as weddings and commercial centers such as shops, banks, offices, storages and other business activities. Mosques become the Islamic community's source of not only knowledge, faith and belief, but also economy. These activities are all done to optimize the roles of mosques and to turn mosques into one of the most important centers to bring back an Islamic civilization.

In Indonesia, especially in Jakarta, the Al-Azhar Grand Mosque in Kebayoran Baru is an example of a good mosque. The mosque has various educational facilities starting from a kindergarten to a university. Although not as successful, two other mosques in Jakarta: Islamic Center Mosque located in Kramat Tunggak, a former prostitution complex, and Sunda Kelapa Mosque, are also good examples.

What about other mosques in Indonesia? Optimizing mosques is a must and a hope for the Muslims. There are thousands of mosques built both in rural and urban areas across the country. The grand mosques are built in the provinces, regents/cities, or districts while smaller mosques are built in the neighborhoods and villages. Mosques are also built in educational institutions (schools, campuses, Islamic boarding schools), government institutions as well as private and state-owned companies.

The roles and functions of these mosques need to be optimized to shape the belief and the characters of the Muslim community. Since most mosques in Indonesia are autonomically managed, the managers - the *takmir* (administrator), the *imam* (the leaders of the prayers), and the *khatib* (the preachers), who are normally members of the community, have the autonomy to optimize the roles of the mosque according to their understanding of Islam. Therefore, it is not unusual for some mosques to be branded radical and intolerant since the managers themselves embrace such view. The Islamism of a mosque can be said to be a reflection of the view of the managers and will affect the advancement of religious literacy in the mosque. It can be clearly seen that mosques have played a vital role in shaping, promoting and establishing religious literacy in the community.

Conducted by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) in UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, this study discusses mosques in the millennium era and links mosques to such roles. The study may contribute to the improvement of education and the understanding of religious literacy among the youth and may lay the groundwork to increase the roles of present-day and future mosques.

We hope that mosque's managers - the *takmir,* the *imam,* and the *khatib* - may also increase their roles in spreading the peaceful words of a *rahmatan lil-'alamin* (merciful) Islam to their congregation so that the religious literacy in the mosque does not create division and animosity among the Muslims and towards the believers of other religions.

Jakarta, January 2019.

FOREWORD FROM THE EDITORS

Jajang Jahroni & Irfan Abubakar

As the largest Muslim country in the world, according to Indonesia's Ulama Council, Indonesia has an estimated 800,000 mosques spread across the country. Therefore, there is roughly a mosque for every 200 Indonesian Muslims and the distance between mosques is around 500 m. This statistic may show Indonesian Muslims' degree of piety. A survey conducted by CSRC (2011) found that 99% of Indonesian Muslims claimed that they performed daily prayers although they didn't do them regularly. This mandatory ritual, however, is not truly reflected in the social life. Another survey conducted by Rehman dan Askari (2010) on "how Islam are Islamic countries" revealed an irony. From 208 countries researched, Indonesia ranked 140. Although how religion affects social life is still debatable, it is clear that Islamic teaching emphasizes on the religion's benefits to social life and humanity. If we place our hope in mosques in optimizing their roles in shaping the community's characters, the *takmirs* no doubt have the same hope. They view mosques as more than a place of worship, but also an ideal place for educating religious literacy. The question is what and how religious literacy is taught in mosques. A few studies concluded that lessons in religious literacy in mosques only covered *ibadah (*worship/pray*), aqidah (*Islamic creed*)* and *akhlaq (*morals*)*.

These themes are delivered normatively by the *ustadz* - an Arabic term for Islamic scholars/teachers - or *kyai* - an Indonesian term for Islamic scholars/teachers - through sermons. However,

not many of sermons discuss social-humanity themes such as science and technology, work ethos, literacy, peace, conflict resolution, etc. from the perspective of Islam. While all accept the concept of a peaceful Islam, only a few discuss this concept in the mosque. In big cities such as Jakarta, only 8% of all *takmir*s allow Muslim academicians to become speakers in mosques (CSRC, 2010).

Most of us were shocked when we learned that mosques had a tendency to be radical. We were also shocked to find religious intolerance practiced by a few mosques. The politization of mosques in the midst of heated election campaigns had clearly created a division among the community. The latest study done by CSRC UIN Jakarta in 2018 on religious literacy in mosques in 7 cities took its data from interviewing the *takmirs* and their two main partners: *khatib* and *imam*. The study found that the religious literacy was given traditionally through sermons discussing the topics of *ibadah, aqidah* and *akhlaq*, but issues of social and humanity were almost never discussed in-depth especially from the perspective of Islam.

According to al-Syami, a Ushul Fiqh scholar from the University of Sudan, in his book titled *Fiqh al-dîn* and *al-tadayyun* (2018), our mosques carried out the *Fiqh al-dîn* education but did not pay enough attention in *Fiqh al-tadayyun* education. While *Fiqh al-dîn* provided the basis for religious understanding from the main texts of Islamic teaching: the Qur'an and the Hadiths, *Fiqh al-tadayyun* provided perspectives and inspirations on how the religion had been practiced in its social-historical contexts. *Fiqh al-dîn* developed the normative belief while *Fiqh al-tadayyun* gave inspiration, enriched perspectives and strengthened wisdom in practicing the religion in the context of constantly changing life.

Moore (2010), an expert in culture from the Harvard University, emphasized that the global community had to increase its religious literacy since a good quality of religious literacy might improve relationship among members of community on the basis of mutual understanding and respect.

This book discusses religious literacy practiced in mosques, the challenges the mosques face and actions taken by the mosques. The researchers, the mosque and religious literacy observers discuss these issues from a slightly different perspective. Irfan

Abubakar explores the issues from the historical perspective by tracing back the phases of establishment, progresses and regresses of religious literacy and the roles of mosques in Islamic history. He talks about how Muslims in the past initially practiced *Fiqh al-dîn* and *Fiqh al-tadayyun* in their daily life together with the Prophet and his Companions. Referring to Moore's theory (2010), Irfan differentiates religious learning and learning about religions. Moore further explains that while the first is normative-sectarianist, the latter is contextual-objective. Viewing it from these concepts, the writer attempts to capture snapshots of contemporary religious literacy practices in a number of mosques in Indonesia.

In the second chapter, Jajang Jahroni analyzes the popularity of Salafism in Indonesia in the last decade and looks at its influences in mosque's politization phenomenon which has become a hot topic nowadays. Is it true that Salafism threatens the harmonious life of the Muslim community in Indonesia? This is, of course, an interesting topic to discuss. Similarly, Rita Pranawati looks at radicalism in mosques and its root causes. She specially discusses the meaning of the survey finding which discovered that 40% of the mosques in DKI Jakarta had been infiltrated by a radical ideology.

In Chapter 4, Abdul Wahid zooms in on tolerance in mosques and its influences in the formation of a multicultural community. In this chapter, Wahid closely looks at the practice of tolerance discourse in mosques in Mataram City, NTB. He discusses the answer to a worrying question: Does the construction of an Islamic Center in Mataram equal to the formation of a multicultural community in Pulau Seribu Mosque? In the final chapter, Afthon Lubi discusses the relationship between mosques and the millennium generation. In this digital era, the Muslim youth are involuntarily sucked into a digital life. They learn from *ustadz* Google, listen to *khatib* Youtube and conduct their Islamic studies with preachers in Instagram. Have they left mosques or have the mosques left them?

This book attempts to explore the possibility of building a new direction in religious literacy in our mosques.

We hope you enjoy reading this book!

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Mosques and Religious Literacy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective in Indonesia

Irfan Abubakar

A. INTRODUCTION

As the largest Muslim country in the world, according to Indonesia's Ulama Council, Indonesia has an estimated 800,000 mosques spread across the country. Therefore, there is roughly a mosque for every 200 Indonesian Muslims and a mosque every 500 m of distance. This statistic shows why many think that Indonesian Muslims are devout Muslims. 99% of Indonesian Muslims claimed that they performed daily prayers but only 78% claimed they did them regularly.[1] This spirit of obeying Allah by performing the compulsory religious rituals, however, is not shown in the practicality of Islamic teaching in the social and humanity dimension. A survey conducted by Rehman and Askari (2010) on how Islam are Islamic countries revealed an irony. From 208 countries surveyed, Indonesia only ranked 140.[2]

From the data above, a question needs to be asked. What roles do mosques play in increasing the Muslims' social religiousness? Although there are no national data that show Indonesian Muslims' perception on the functions of mosques, a few studies conducted in Indonesian cities may provide a brief picture. CSRC UIN Jakarta conducted a survey in 2010 on mosques' administrator (*takmir*)

1 Winfried Weck, Noorhaidi Hasan, and Irfan Abubakar, *Islam in the Public Sphere: The Politics of Identity & the Future of Democracy in Indonesia* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2011). p47.

2 Scheherazade S. Rehman and Hossein Askari, *How Islamic Are Islamic Countries?*, Global Economy Journal 10, no. 2 (2010).

in DKI Jakarta and found that almost all *takmir* (98.8%)[3] looked at mosques as not only a place of worship, but also an ideal place to educate the values of Islam. The survey also found that religious education generally related to the topics of *ibadah* (worship/pray), *aqidah* (Islamic creed) and *akhlaq* (morals) and only 70% of the mosques discussed social issues in the community. Moreover, 96% of the administrators said that these Islamic topics were delivered using a unidirectional method i.e. sermons and only 38% said that they were given through discussions held in their mosques.[4] In average, the Islamic teachers giving the sermons or holding the Islamic studies had the same religious perceptions as the administrators (74%) while only 8% allowed Islamic academicians to give sermons.[5] Therefore, it can be concluded that religious education in mosques prioritizes normative religious literacy, but only a few consider the social context for learning religious literacy.

The issues of religious literacy and its influences on the religious mindset of the community have drawn the attention of the scholars. Moore (2006) from Harvard University conducted a study on this topic in a few countries including Indonesia, India, Pakistan and the US and found that the quality of the religious literacy affected the behaviors of the followers. He concluded that one of the causes in the increase of Islamophobia among the US citizens was the poor quality of religious literacy on Islam and its traditions. Moore coined the term "religious illiteracy" to describe the phenomenon and the increase of extremism, radicalism and intolerance among the Muslim community closely linked to religious illiteracy towards the religion (Islam) itself.[6]

What does religious literacy mean? Moore defines religious literacy as an ability to fully understand the teaching of a religion beyond its normative doctrines, but also how the religion is applied in the social reality. He believes that the poor religious literacy in few countries is due to the lack of latter ability. Moore states that the first ability is gained through religious learning while the latter is through learning about religion. He also observes that

3 Ridwan al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal Di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta Dan Solo* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010). p76.
4 *Ibid*. pp80-82.
5 *Ibid*. p87
6 Diane L Moore, *Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach*, World History Connected 4, no. 1 (2006), p14.

absolutism in religion is derived from poor religious literacy on the practical context of the religion in a social reality.[7]

The same definition of religious literacy is apparently used by al-Syami (2018) in his book titled "*Fiqh al-dîn wa al-Tadayyun*." Al-Syami differentiates "*Fiqh al-dîn*" which refers to the ability to understand the ideal doctrines of the religion stated in the holy books and "*Fiqh al-tadayyun*" which refers to the understanding on how these ideal doctrines are applied in the ever-changing social-historical contexts.[8]

From the contexts mentioned above, this paper tried to explore the formation and development of Muslims' religious literacy and the roles of the mosques in it. With a historical approach, this paper traced back the formation, the development, the progress and the regress of religious literacy in the history and analyzed socio-political factors influencing them. The paper also looked at the continuation and the changes of mosque's roles in religious literacy dynamics throughout the history of Islam. The first part discussed the formation of religious literacy at the time of the Prophet and his Companions. This part discussed how the first Muslim community understood Islam through written God's revelations and how the Islamic teaching was applied in its unique historical context. In other words, this part discussed *Fiqh al-dîn* and *Fiqh al-tadayyun* in the present day by comparing the religious literacy before and after the death of the Prophet. After the death of the Prophet, religious interpretation lay on the shoulder of the Companions who became the leaders of the Muslims in the absence of the Prophet.

The second part attempted to explore the development of religious literacy in Umayyah and Abbasiyah era. This part specially discussed the roles of mosques in advancing religious literacy throughout the 8th - 11th Century CE. This part also analyzed how the meeting of the Muslim community with the Greek, Roman and Persian culture advanced the practice and the dynamics of religious literacy at that time. In addition, this part looked at the regression of religious literacy qualitatively and the socio-religious factors behind it. The third part of this paper discussed general opinions of the present roles of mosques in Indonesia in the advancement of religious literacy for the Muslims.

7 *Ibid.*

8 Abdul Raqib Sholeh al-Syami, *Fiqh al-Dien wa al-Tadayyun,* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2018).

The paper tried to answer the question of the quality of *Fiqh al-dîn* and *Fiqh al-tadayyun* of the stakeholders of mosques and to see whether the religious literacy in the regression era helped form the present religious literacy in mosque. The final part discussed the data from CSRC UIN Jakarta: The survey in 2010 and the study in 2018 on religious literacy in mosques in 7 cities.

B. MOSQUE AND RELIGIOUS LITERACY AT THE TIME OF THE PROPHET AND HIS COMPANIONS.

The word "*masjid*" or mosque that we know today refers to a building where the Muslims pray. Linguistically, the root of the word "*masjid*" is an Arabic word "*sajada*" which broadly means a place to bow/pray. Therefore, any place, as long as it is permissible for praying, can be called *masjid*. This broad meaning is also mentioned in a Hadith narrated by Abu Said which says, "The Earth is a *masjid* and is sacred, except for graveyards and washrooms." Al-Mahlawi narrated that the Prophet and his Companions held the first Friday prayer in Wadi Rahuna, a open place around 4 km from the city of Madinah. This was the first time the Prophet delivered his Friday sermon.[9]

Also, although the main function is a place to perform the five compulsory daily prayers and the Friday prayer, since the time of the Prophet, the mosques has also been used as a place to learn Islam for the Muslim community or is now famously known as a "religious literacy" institution.

In the later development, there are two words referring to the place of worship for the Muslims: *masjid* and *mushalla*. Although initially these two words were used interchangeable, the Sunni scholars differentiated *masjid* and *mushalla* by formulating more descriptive requirements related to *masjid*. One of the requirements is a *masjid* has to stand on a donated land/building (*a waqf*) while a *mushalla* does not. Therefore, *mushalla* can change its function and can be sold by the owner.[10]

9 In his Friday sermon, the prophet emphasized the importance of maintaining the faith on Allah and His Prophets, the importance of having the fear of God (taqwa) and staying away from sinful deeds, as well as an encouragement to always do good deeds in order to live happily in this world and the next, Hanafi al-Mahlawi, *Amakin Masyhurah Fi Hayat Muhammad* (Dar Alim al-Kutub, 2003).

10 Muhyiddin al-Nawawi, *Minhaj Al-Thalibin Wa Umdatul Muftin* (Dar al-Minhaj, n.d.), p170.

Religious literacy: Fiqh al-Dîn wa al-Tadayyun

The phrase "religious literacy" or "*mahw al-umyah al-dîniyyah*" in the modern Arabic language cannot be found classic Arabic-Islam literature, but lexically, has a similar meaning with "*tafaqquh fî al-dîn*". This phrase is written in the Qur'an Surah Al-Taubah 122 in its verb form, "*liyatafaqqahû fî al-dîn*" (to learn about their religion).[11] Another similar phrase with its derivation, "*faqqaha-yufaqqihu*" (to make someone understand) is also mentioned in a few Hadiths.[12] From the same root word, the phrase "*mutafaqquh fî al-dîn*" or the more popular word, "*faqih*" (*fuqaha'* in a plural form) is a term used to refer to people who are literate. The word "religion" in the phrases "religious literacy" and "*tafaqquh fî al-dîn*", however, has two different scopes of meaning. In "*tafaqquh fî al-dîn*", the word "religion" has an exclusive meaning, i.e. Islam and more exclusively, "the laws of Islam" (*Fiqh*)[13] while in "religious literacy", as defined by modern scholars such as Moore, the meaning is not limited to the main teaching of the religion, but also the practical application of the religion. In addition, religious literacy also includes the understanding of religious traditions or at least the traditions of well-known world religions.[14]

The Arabic term, which is close to Moore's definition above, has been introduced recently by al-Syami, an Ushul Fiqh scholar from the University of Um Durman in Sudan, which is "*Fiqh al-dîn wa al-Tadayyun*". Al-Syami differentiates the meaning of the two. The first, "*Fiqh al-dîn*" means that the understanding of religion

11 Ibn Katsir in his interpretation explained that this verse was given to respond to the fact that all members of the tribes went to war in Tabuk. This verse was given to explain that it was the will of Allah that not all left for war. Some had to stay behind with the prophet to continue their study on Islam so that after the soldiers returned to their tribes from the war, they could learn about Islam from the people who stayed behind and learned from the prophet. See Ismail Ibn Umar Ibn Katsir, *Tafsir al-Qu'ran al-Azhim* (Islam Kotob, 1968). Surah al-Taubah [9] verse 122.

12 The word "*yufaqqihu*" (to make someone understand) appears in a famous hadith narrated by Bukhari dan Muslim, "*Man yuridillâhu bihî khairan yufaqqihuhû fî al-dîn*" (If Allah wishes to bless a person, He will make such person understand the religion well). The word "*yatafaqqahûn*" (to gain knowledge) is also mentioned in a hadith narrated by Thabrani. The word is the synonym of "*yata'allamûn*" (to learn). In this hadith the Prophet encourages knowledgeable people to share their knowledge (*yufaqqihûn/yu'allimûn*) to their neighbors who are less knowledgeable and for those who are less knowledgeable to learn from the more knowledgeable. See Nuruddin al-Haitsami, *Majma' al-Zawaid wa Manba' al-Fawaid,* (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Araby, n.d.), p164.

13 Wahbah al-Zuhaili, *Al-Fiqh Al-Islamy Wa Adillatuhu* (Damaskus: Dar al-Fikr, 1985). pp15-17; Cyril Glasse, *The New Encyclopedia of Islam*, 3rd edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

14 Moore, *Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach*.

derives from its sacred main sources. In the context of Islam, this means that it is the understanding of the Allah's revelations as written in the Qur'an and the words of the Prophet Muhammad SAW as written in the compilation of Hadiths. Meanwhile, "*Fiqh al-tadayyun*" means that the understanding of the Muslims' attempts throughout the history to interpret the messages within Allah's revelations and the Prophet's words in various religious discourses and to apply them in various aspects of life. According to al-Syami, in short, "*Fiqh al-dîn*" is the knowledge of ideal life while "*Fiqh al-tadayyun*" is the literature of the religion in our life limited by time and place.[15] In Moore's perspective, "religious literacy" emphasizes on the second concept but both concepts are interrelated and required to improve of the quality of religious literacy.[16]

At the time of the Prophet, the broad meaning of religious literacy was practiced in the form of reading, writing and the understanding of the Qur'an activities and this practice had started even though the Qur'an was compiled and put in writing after the death of the Prophet. There are evidence from historical records that show that activities to write the verses of the Qur'an had been done at the time of Prophet, especially involving Zaid bin Tsabit, one of around 60 literate Muslims at that time.[17] Historically, the activities to gain a deeper understanding of Islam (*tafaqquhfi al-dîn*) were first held in the Prophet's house in Makkah and the houses of his Companions especially Zaid bin Arqam (Darul Arqam). However, after he moved to Madinah (622 CE), the literacy activities were focused in mosques where all Prophet's followers would gather and listen to his sermons. It is said that the Qur'an was first recited in Bani Zuraiq Mosque.[18]

After the Prophet and the Muslim community permanently stayed in Madinah, the *tafaqquh fi al-dîn* activities were centralized in Nabawi Mosque. Here the Allah's revelations were not only delivered in Friday sermons, but also though recitation and memorization of Qur'anic verses. On the Prophet's suggestion, the

15 Al-Syami, *Fiqh al-Dien wa al-Tadayyun*, pp3-4
16 Moore, *Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach*.
17 Muhammad Mustafa Al-Azami, *The History of The Qur'anic Text: From Revelation to Compilation: A Comparative Study with the Old and New Testaments, First Edition* (Leicester: UK Islamic Academy, 2003), pp68-69.
18 Ahmad bin Abdul Wahhab al-Nuwayri, *Nihayatul Arab fi Fununil Adab* (Beirut), p312.

most important part of the Nabawi mosque - the Suffah or the rear part of the mosque located on the northeast - was turned into a place where the Companions learned more about Islam directly from the Prophet. Later on, the students learning in Nabawi Mosque, among which were the famous Abu Hurairah and Abu Zar al-Ghiffari, were known as the Ahlu al-Suffah (the People of the Suffah) since they spent most of their daily life in there.[19]

C. LITERACY ON ISLAM AND OTHER RELIGIONS

Before knowledge of Islam developed and became established in the 8th and 9th Century CE, the Muslim community's understanding on religious literacy only covered the ideas of God, the essence of humanity, Judgement Day, praying, morals and ethics in social interaction among the family and the community, as well as with the non-Muslim groups. The themes for religious narrations recited to the Muslims were taken from the verses of the Qur'an revealed through Muhammad as the *Rasulullah* (the God's Prophet). According to Lapidus, the objective of narrations on Islam delivered by the Prophet, especially during the period in Makkah, was to transform the spiritual piety of the individuals to create an emancipatory social change. In other words, at that time, the religious literacy taught by the Prophet to the people of Makkah is to raise their awareness of the social injustice in the community and to turn them into free individuals and individuals who were capable of freeing other individuals.[20]

Furthermore, the topics on religious literacy delivered by the Prophet was not only limited to Islam, but also the religions before Islam. The Qur'an Surah al-Ghafir [50]:78 mentions that among the many prophets sent by Allah before the Prophet Muhammad, only a few of them were mentioned in the Qur'an while the rest were not. Al-Tabari in his interpretation of the Qur'an mentioned that there

19 According to al-Kattany, there were around 900 Companions stayed in the Suffah. Aside from learning the Qur'an directly from the Prophet, they also learned Arabic literacy i.e. reading and writing. See Muhammad Abdul hayy al-Kattany, *Al-Taratib al-Idariyyah* (Syirkah Darul Arqam), pp43-44; Also see Muhammad Mustafa Al-Azami, *The History of The Qur'anic Text: From Revelation to Compilation: A Comparative Study with the Old and New Testaments, First Edition* (Leicester: UK Islamic Academy, 2003), p60; Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, et al., "*Early History of Islamic Education and Its Expansion in the State of Kelantan Malaysia*," Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 8, 11 (2012), pp55–56.

20 Ira M. Lapidus, *Sejarah Sosial Umat Islam*, vol. 1 & 2 (Jakarta: PT RajaGra_indo Persada, 1999). pp33-35.

were 8000 prophets sent before the Prophet Muhammad and 4000 of them were sent to the people of Israel.[21] The Qur'an also narrates people from different religions at the time of the Prophet especially the Jews and Christians and describes the Muslims' interactions with them. The Qur'an describes this relationship as dynamics. Although mostly peaceful and in harmony, there were tensions and conflicts sometimes occurred. The presence of the Jews and the Christians were acknowledged sympathetically in a number of Qur'anic verses as Ahlul Kitab (the People of the Book). Other parts of the Qur'an, however, describe conflicts and strong animosities between the three followers of these Abrahamic religions.[22]

Aside from that, as Hourani stated, the relationship between the followers of the three religions at this period was more open than the subsequent periods.[23] The Prophet's policy to build a good relationship and to work together with the Jews and the existing tribes in Madinah in a political consensus, the Madinah Charter (*watsiqah madinah*), shows that the early Muslim community understood and applied the ideal Quranic concept of religious harmony.[24]

Aside from the Quranic verses, members of the Muslim community at that time also understood Islam through the speeches, actions and approvals/disapproval given by the Prophet or Hadiths, all of which are believed to be the guidance on how to live in an Islamic way. These Hadiths helped the Muslims at that time understand the application of Quranic teachings in their life and relation to followers of other religions.

Meanwhile, Although the Muslim community had a very strong awareness on religious diversity since they themselves experienced it, they did not have enough awareness of the internal plurality. Different understanding on Islamic doctrines could easily be resolved by the Prophet who they believed to have a direct access to the only source, i.e. Allah. However, since from the beginning, the Prophet had informed them on the potential of internal plurality. One of the narrations mentions that the Prophet Muhammad SAW foretold that the Muslims would be split into 72

21 Al-Tabari, *Tafsir al-Tabari: Jami'ul Bayan 'an Ta'wil Ayil Qur'an* (Muassasah al-Risalah, n.d.).

22 Charles A. Kimball, *Muslim-Christian Dialogue*, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, accessed on January 22, 2019, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/print/opr/t236/e0567.

23 Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1992), p59.

24 Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (University of Chicago Press, 1979).

sects (Another narration mentions 73). Another narration adds that all would not be saved except one which is the one who follows the main body of the Islam (*jama'ah*) and who follows the (Islam of) the Prophet and the Companions. This Hadith predicts not only the internal plurality in Islam, but also that of experienced by the Jews and the Christians.[25]

How did the early Muslim community perceive this internal plurality? There are not enough historical data that can help us verify this. Some of them might understand that what the Prophet said was a warning to all of them to unite and to avoid divisions while some others might see this as an explanation from the prophet that plurality in religions including Islam was an inevitable social-historical reality and therefore, they needed to be more tolerance towards differences.

Three centuries later, the Sunni scholars developed a sectarianist interpretation of the aforementioned Hadith in their Islamic literature works. One of these scholars was al-Baghdadi (d. 1037 CE) who wrote a book titled *al-Farq bayn al-Firâq* (Differences among Islamic Teachings).[26] In his book, al-Baghdadi interpreted the Hadith by listing 100 Islamic sects; more than the Prophet's prediction. Al-Baghdadi concluded his analysis by emphasizing that among all, the one which would be saved was Sunni (al-Baghdadi was a Sunni).[27] The sectarianist interpretation of the Hadith continues until today.

Nevertheless, not many present-day Muslims interpret the Hadith from a social-historical perspective. Borrowing the terms used by al-Syami (2018), the sectarianist interpretation of the Hadith sees Islam from the ideal perspective (*Fiqh al-dîn*) and not from its contextual historical perspective (*Fiqh al-tadayyun*).[28] A handful of Islamic religion teachers in Indonesia today promote the sectarianist interpretation and analyze Islam as done by al-

25 There are many *sanad* (the backings of a narration) on this hadith on the division among the Muslims with some variation of the texts. One of them was narrated by Abu Dawud "Abu Hurairah RA said: "*Rasulullah SAW said, 'The Jews were divided into seventy one (71) or seventy two (72) sects and the Christians were divided into seventy one (71) or seventy two (72) sects, and my ummah will be divided into seventy three(73) sects*.'" See Abu Dawud, *Sunan Abi Dawud* (Dar al-Risalah al-'Alamiyyah, n.d.).

26 Ibn Thahir al-Baghdadi, *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq wa Bayan al-Firqah al-Najiyah* (Maktabah Ibn Sina), http://archive.org/details/FP0431. (accessed on January 24, 2019).

27 Al-Baghdadi, Fauzan Saleh, *Teologi pembaruan: pergeseran wacana Islami Sunni di Indonesia Abad XX* (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2004), pp100-101.

28 Al-Syami, *Fiqh al-Dien wa al-Tadayyun*.

Baghdadi - as a part of their religious duty which is to find out among the Muslims who will go to hell and to paradise.[29]

Compiling the Verses of the Qur'an: The Core of Religious literacy

The activities aimed at gaining a better understanding of Islam continued and were held by the surviving Companions in mosques long after the death of the Prophet. Their strong commitment to practicing the teaching of Islam was shown by applying the Qur'an in their daily life and continuing the religious literacy education taught, recommended and modelled by the Prophet. The Qur'an literacy was considered the most important compared to other literacies.

The function of Qur'an itself relates literacy. First, the word "the Qur'an" linguistically means a book or something that must exist in all literacy practices.[30] Second, the first word revealed by Allah to the Prophet was "*Iqra*" (Read) and followed by the phrase "'*allama bil al-qalam*" (to teach knowledge with a pen or a written language). This shows that literacy is God's order.[31] Third, many Hadiths emphasize the importance of Qur'an literacy.[32] Not only that, the Muslims see the Qur'an as more than a reading material but the source of laws which regulate their worldly affairs and needs such as affairs related to inheritance.

Before the compilation of the Qur'an, the texts that contained the verses of the Qur'an were spread among many of the Prophet's Companions and followers even though a few of the Companions were not as literate as the others. One example was when the Caliph Abubakar, who was considered the closest to the Prophet, was not able to solve all legal disputes brought to him. Malik in

29 As represented by the view of al-ustadz Jawas below: Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, *Kedudukan Hadits Tujuh Puluh Tiga Golongan Umat Islam, Almanhaj* (blog), accessed on January 23, 2019, https://almanhaj.or.id/453-kedudukan-hadits-tujuh-puluhtiga-golongan-umat-islam.html.

30 According to Blake and Blake, the experts on literacy generally linked literacy and the written language, not the spoken language. See Blake and Blake, *Literacy and Learning: A Reference Handbook*, p x.

31 Al-Qur'an Surah al-'Alaq [96]: Verse 1-5.

32 Some of the hadith on this matter: narrated by Utsman bin 'Affan and Ali bin Abi Thalib, the Prophet said, "The best among you are those who learn the Qur'an and teach it; narrated by Ibn Mas'ud, the Prophet said, "Whoever recites a letter from the Qur'an, he will receive one good deed as ten good deeds like it; and a hadith that says that the Prophet said that a person who memorizes the Qur'an and learn it is the person who is most ready to learn the salah. See Muhammad Mustafa Al-Azami, *The History of The Qur'anic Text: From Revelation to Compilation: A Comparative Study with the Old and New Testaments*, First Edition (Leicester: UK Islamic Academy, 2003), p56.

the book of *Muwatta'* narrated that an old lady complained to the Caliph that she did not get an inheritance from his deceased grandson. She remembered that the Prophet mentioned that a grandmother would get 1/6 of the grandson's inheritance. The Caliph Abubakar did not directly decide but asked the opinion of two other Companions to prove whether Prophet really said it. The two Companions confirmed the old lady's statement.[33]

This *Fiqh al-dîn* situation as illustrated above brought about the urgency to compile the many verses of the Qur'an in a complete written document. Abubakar Shiddiq, the First Caliph (632-634 CE), based on the suggestion of Umar bin Khattab, who later became the Second Caliph (634-644 CE), ordered Zaid bin Tsabit to compile the texts of the Qur'an scattered in various written media. This order has become the important milestone in the development of religious literacy in Islamic history until now.[34]

What is interesting here is that the order from the Caliph Abubakar to compile the Qur'an was an example of how Islam was practiced in reality or *al-tadayyun*. After suggested by Umar, the Caliph Abubakar did not directly carry out the suggestion, worried that the action was not according to the will of Allah and His Prophet since the Prophet himself never explicitly ordered his Companions to compile the Qur'an. Nevertheless, considering its importance for the preservation and continuation of Islam, the Caliph agreed to the suggestion. Therefore, this order was considered *ijtihad* since there was no precedence at the time of the Prophet.

Subsequently, Zaid bin Tsabit, with a guidance from the Caliph Abubakar, compiled the texts meticulously, verified them with the *qurra'/huffaz* (the memorizers of the Qur'an). He then wrote them on paper-like sheets (*shahf*) and bound these sheets into one bundle (*suhuf*).[35] It is important to note that the Nabawi

33 Malik ibn Anas, Muwatta' Malik, bab *al-Far'id*, accessed January 24, 2019, http://archive.org/details/waq5776_906; Al-Azami, The History of the Qur'anic Text. p79.

34 Zaid bin Tsabit, who was also known as the Prophet's secretary, said that the Prophet has passed away before the book of Qur'an was made. See Ibn Hajar al-Asqalany, *Fathul Bari* (Al-Maktabah al-Sala_iyah), p12.

35 One of the reasons why Umar bin Khattab persistently encouraged Abubakar Shiddiq to approve the policy of compiling the texts of the Qur'an was the facts that many *qurra'* died in Yamamah war. Umar worried that in the future, there would be more deaths due to wars. If Abubakar did not compile the texts soon, Umar worried that most Qur'anic revelations would be lost or changed. See Al-Azami, *The History of The Qur'anic Text*, p78 and 83; al-Imam al-Bukhari, *Shahih al-Bukhari* (Dar ibn Katsir, n.d.), *Jami'ul Qur'an*, hadits No 4986.

Mosque became the silent witness of the compilation project as narrated below:

> "Ibn Hajar narrated that according to Abu Dawud who heard it from Hisyam bin Urwah, the Caliph Abubakar said to Umar and Zaid, "Both of you sit in front of the mosque's door (Nabawi Mosque). When somebody brings the texts of the Qur'an along with two witnesses, document the texts."[36]

Throughout the period of the Caliphs Abubakar Shiddiq and Umar bin Khattab, the Islamic state expanded its political territory until much farther regions such as Damascus, Syria, Palestine, Kufah, Basra, and some parts of Egypt. These regions were parts of Byzantium and Sasanian Empires in Persia. Along with the expansion of the political territory, there were demands from the old Muslims and the new Muslim converts to improve their understanding on the religion. The Caliph in Madinah and the officials in the new regions saw the needs to preserve the values and the cultures of Islam among the increasing Muslim communities. They decided to send the memorizers *(qurra')* to teach Islam to the Muslims in these regions. The learning process of the Qur'an at that time mimicked the model shown by the Prophet, which was done in mosques.

It was narrated by Al-Dzahabi that Abu al-Darda' who was sent by the Caliph Umar to Damascus eventually stayed in the city for a long time and the Islamic study group *(halaqah)* he built in Damascus Mosque was attended by many students. It was recorded that he had approximately 1600 students under his tutelage.[37] This huge social demand to learn Islam caused a shift in the characteristic of religious literacy i.e. from literacy as a cultural instrument to a functional one. It was impossible for Abu al-Darda' to effectively teach the Qur'an to his 1600 students on his own. Therefore, there were demands to produce new cadres who could teach the Qur'an.[38]

A challenge that the third Caliph, Utsman bin Affan (644-655 CE), faced was to create a standardized recitation *(mushaf)* of

36 Al-Asqalany, *Fathul Bari.* Hal. 14; Al-Azami, *The History of The Qur'anic Text*. p80.
37 Syamsuddin Muhamamd bin Ahmad al-Dzahabi, *Siyar A'lam al-Nubala* (Muassasah al-Risalah), pp344-346.
38 *Ibid*, p21.

the Qur'an in the midst of different and varied Qur'an recitations among the regions. This was especially important since the expansion during the Caliph Ustman era covered some areas in the Africa continent which were Tunisia and some parts of central Asia such as Azerbaijan. In addition, the history recorded the Muslims' was sensitive towards this diversity and well-aware of the threats that may cause a change in the authenticity of Islam and its teaching. The Muslims saw this negative change happening to the Judaism and Christian texts and they did not want this to happen to them. Therefore, they responded to this threat by proposing a standardization. The Companions also appreciated the Caliph's decision to standardize the recitation of the Qur'an. This standardized version of the Qur'an was multiplied and spread in the regions under the Islamic state by involving the teachers of the Qur'an.[39]

Mosques, Openness, and the Orthodox Institution

After the political centers moved from Madinah to Damascus during the Umayyah Dynasty and then moved again to Baghdad during the Abbasiyah Dynasty, the religious narration in Islam developed into a more systematic, discursive, and plural narration. It also involved a large number of specialists (*ulama'*) from various branches of Islamic disciplines. Mosques continued to play an important role in Quran literacy. At this period, however, the religious literacy activities had been transformed into intellectual practices full of discussions, in-depth studies and publications of various religious themes: theology, laws and mysticism. At the time of the Prophet dan the Companions, religious literacy was solely based on the Qur'an, the Hadith and *ijtihady* practiced by the Companions. After exposed to traditions outside of Islam such as Christian theology, Greek philosophy, Roman laws and administrations, religious literacy changed its dynamics especially in the methods of discussion and argumentation. All traditions mentioned above influenced the Muslims in different time and place in their efforts to apply the ideal teaching of Islam written in the Qur'an.[40]

39 Al-Azami, *The History of The Qur'anic Text*, pp87-97.

40 Lapidus, *Sejarah Sosial Umat Islam;* Hourani*, A History of the Arab Peoples;* Rahman*, Islam.*

At the time of the Prophet dan his Companions, mosques were used to spread the teaching of Islam in the form of advices and sermons. Considering they were the only public institution at that time, mosques were not only used to represent the religious values, but also as a medium for public relation. Until the Umayyah Dynasty, it was the Caliphs' and the governors' task to be the preachers in mosques and therefore, the sermons during that time were not always about religious advices, but also governance issues and instructions from the government to its citizens.

This changed during the Abbasiyah Dynasty when the Caliphs no longer acted as the preachers. The function was replaced by scholars (*qadhi*) appointed by the Caliph as his representative. This policy was understood as a pattern of Abbasiyah Caliphs to use the practical sides of the religion to build a relationship between politics and religion. A few experts thought that the policy was taken by the Abbasiyah Caliphs to emphasize their stand on the values of Islam since the Caliphs in Umayyah Dynasty were thought to be less Islamic by the scholars.[41] As an example, while Ziyad bin Abi Sofyan, the Governor of Basra and Kufah, delivered a sermon in a mosque in Kufah to convince the residents to take the oath of allegiance *(bay'at)* to Yazid, the son of Muawiyah, as a Caliph to replace his father, he was mocked by the congregation and some even threw pebbles at Ziyad.[42]

In the second half of the 8th Century CE or around the 2nd Islamic year, the issues of religion faced by the Muslims became more complex as the social life in urban areas became more cosmopolitan. As mentioned before, religious literacy in mosque initially emphasized on basic literacy, read-write and the understanding of the Qur'an based on the guidance of the Prophet and the construction of Quranic meaning was not yet a discursive need. Around this time, however, the scholars began to discuss and to interpret the Qur'an in a new way which is by using a rational thinking or common sense (*ra'yu*). Through rational interpretation, they developed new discourses related to the issues of theology, laws and mysticism. These activities brought about more specific scholarly categories according to the issues discussed: theology (*mutakallimun*), laws (*fuqaha*), and asceticism (*sufi/zahid*). A

41 Dale Hoiberg, *Students' Britannica India* (Popular Prakashan, 2000). p236.
42 Akbar Shāh Ḵẖān Najıƀ ābādī, *History of Islam* (Vol 2) (Darussalam, 2001). pp37-41.

few historians such as Makdisi and Lapidus categorized them into linguistics (*lughawiyyun, nuhat*) and rhetoric (*balaghiyyun*) although they were considered more as the support of religious knowledge.[43] There was also philosophers (*hukama*), but this category was perceived as marginal among the scholar community who concentrated more in mosques or *madrasah*s.[44] According to Lapidus, the philosophy and knowledge discourse, aside from music and art, did not develop well among the religious community, but acknowledged by the government: the Caliphs, the governors, the princes, and other government officials.[45]

Until the 10th Century CE, before independent madrasahs were established, mosques were still a dominant religious institution to discuss and learn religious literacy. One interesting fact about that time is that there were many discussions and even debates in interpreting the issues of theology and laws. The religious debates took place in Islamic circles (*halaqah)* held by grand mosques.

One famous debate in the history of Islam that happened at that time was a theological debate between to scholars: Hasan al-Bashri and Wasil bin 'Atha'. It was told that a person in the circle asked the opinion of Hasan al-Bashri on the status of a Muslim who committed a major sin while at the same time, put forward the opinions of the Khawarij and Mur'jiah group. Wasil bin 'Atha' refuted his teacher's opinion and put forward a new idea which was also different than Murji'ah and Khawarij. He thought that the person who committed the major sin could not be called a Muslim or an infidel (*kafir*), but somewhere in between (*manzilahbayn al-manzilatain*). After the debate, Wasil bin 'Atha' abandoned his teacher and the circle and formed his own. Hasan al-Bashri said that Wasil bin 'Atha' had separated himself from his group (*i'tazala*). This was said to be the beginning of the Muktazilah sect, a rational Islam theology sect which was dominant during the first Abbasiyah Dynasty.[46]

The debate between Hasan al-Bashri and Wasil bin 'Atha' illustrates the dynamic of religious literacy at that time. These

43 George Makdisi, *The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West* (Edinburg University Press, 1990).
44 Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi Dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru* (Jakarta: PT Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002).
45 Lapidus, *Sejarah Sosial Umat Islam*.
46 Rahman, *Islam*, p120.

classic scholars attempted to apply the interpretation of Islamic principles in an environment which was open and tolerant towards differences of opinions in theological issues which today is considered sensitive. Differences in opinions are rife in a legal domain (*Fiqh*). Schacht believes that at the beginning of the formulation of Islamic legal system, before the schools of thought (*mazhab*) were established, the scholars shows an open and tolerant attitude towards different legal opinions and schools. Schacht explained that the tolerant attitude was the characteristics of the Islam practice at that time.[47]

After the end of the *ijtihad* period and the schools of Islam and theology had been established, religious literacy became stagnant marked by the increase of *taqlid,* or the unquestioning acceptance of legal decisions without understanding the basis of those decisions and followed by a sectarianist institution in theology. The peak of this period was marked by the increase of an orthodox religious thinking where prescribed Islamic measures were standardized and institutionalized. As a result, the Sunni sect was established as an orthodox Islam built based on Asy'ariyah theology and the four Schools of Islam (Syafi'iyah, Hanafiyah, Hanbaliyah and Malikiyah).

Anything outside these standards were considered heterodox (*bid'ah*). The Syi'ah was considered outside of these correct Islamic standards since it rejected the consensus (Ijma) which accepted the leadership of the four Prophet's Companions as the lawful Caliphs. This orthodox view could be seen in the heresiography literature from prominent Sunni scholars. Al-Asy'ari (d. 935 CE), al-Baghdadi (d. 1037 CE), al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE), and al-Syahrastani (d. 1125 CE) were among the prominent Sunni scholars who elaborated the criteria of correct and misguided Sunni Islam.[48] There were so many heresiography works which listed down the Islamic teachings which were misguided and a few experts even referred Islam as a religion whose teaching was too focused on the misguidance of other religions in order to establish and maintain the purity of the religion.[49]

47 Joseph Schacht, *Pengantar Hukum Islam* (Jogjakarta: Penerbit Islamika, 2003), p50.

48 Among the works of the classic ulama which discuss the measures of pure aqeedah are: *Maqâlat al-Islâmiyyîn wa al-Ikhtilâf al-Mushallîn* karya Asy'ari, *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq* karya al-Baghdadi, *Fayshal al-Tafriqah bayn al-Islâm wa al-Zandaqah*, and *Fadhâ'ih al-Bâthiniyyah wa-Fadhaâ'il al-Mustazhiriyyah* oleh al-Ghazali. See Saleh, *Teologi pembaruan*, p78.

49 John B. Henderson, *The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish and Early Christian Patterns* (Albany: State University of New York, 1998), p12.

Mosques: Kuttab, Halaqah until Jami'ah

Mosques as a religious literacy institution for Islam continued to play its role although Madrasah, another literacy institution which is separated from mosques, began to emerge.[50] Mosques themselves, aside from continuing the tradition of *halaqah* and study groups, also began to hold religious education classes for primary school-age children called *kuttab* (literacy school). Until the beginning of the 10th Century CE, almost all mosques had *kuttab* where children learned basic Islamic literacy. They learned to write the Quranic verse and then fully learned the Qur'an. They also learned the aritmatics. Almost all classic Muslim scholars either in laws, theology, linguistic, rhetoric, history and philosophy and other disciplines had their basic education in *kuttabs*. One famous scholar was Ibnu Sina (Avicenna), a famous philosopher and medical scholar. The writer of *Qânun Fi-al-Tibb* (the principles of medication) even conducted special research on education in *kuttab* and wrote an important summary on the methods of children education.[51]

After graduating from *kuttab,* children who had reached their adolescence might continue their education in bigger mosques or *jami'* for advanced religious literacy. In jami' mosques, they learned Islamic laws and theology. In a few *jami'* mosques, they also attended study groups (*halaqah*) for Arabic language grammar, Arabic poetry, logic, algebra, history, and even biology.[52] Wardenburg recorded that a few mosques developed into famous learning institution attracting hundreds to thousands of students. These mosques also built libraries that collected various Muslim scholars' literary works.[53]

If one mosque can hold tens or even hundreds of study groups, you can imagine the crowd and the enthusiasm of the students there. Al-Muqaddasi, a geography expert in the 10th Century, narrated that he and a few of his friends attended one study group in a mosque at the time between Maghrib and Isya prayer. When he and his friends were in the middle of a discussion, he heard

50 A.L. Tibawi, *Islamic Education* (London: Luzac and Company Ltd, 1972), p24.
51 M. S. Asimov and Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Age of Achievement*: Vol 4 (Motilal Banarsidass, 1999).
52 F.B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp150-151.
53 J. Waardenburg, *Some Institutional Aspects of Muslim Higher Learning* 12 (n.d.): pp96–138, p98.

somebody shouting at him, "Turn your face around to face the class." He then realized that they were actually sitting in between two classes. He counted that there were around 110 study groups in the mosque.[54]

The *halaqah* tradition in di mosque continued to be practiced up until the 14th Century attracting a large number of students. Ibn Batutah (14th Century CE) recorded that more than 500 students attended study groups in Umayyah Mosque.[55] The 'Amr ibn al'Asy Mosque near Cairo had more than 40 study groups and the main Cairo Mosque held around 120 study groups.[56] Certain mosques developed advanced religious studies or similar to a present-day higher education institution—perhaps such as STAIN or IAIN in Indonesia. This advanced study institution was famously known as *al-jami'ah* scince it derived from the phrase "*jami* mosque" or "*al-jami'*". Until today, the Arab community still refers to universities as *al-jami'ah*. *Al-Jami'ah* offers a few advanced religious studies although the legal studies (*Fiqh* and *ushul Fiqh*) are offered the most.

According to Makdisi, in 10th Century, a few mosques in Baghdad combined mosques and accommodations for students of laws coming from out of town. One of the patrons of this *al-jami'ah* was Badr ibn Hasanawaih (d. 1014/1015 CE), a governor in a few provinces under the Buwaihi Dynasty. Makdisi said that the reason why the accommodations for students were built was because these students could not stay in the mosque, but they needed to spend years completing their legal studies.[57] This policy seemed to adopt the tradition of the Prophet who built a mosque connected to his house. This close link between mosques and al-*jami'ah* (universities) can be seen today in al-Azhar University in Cairo, Zaytuna University in Tunisia, and Karawiyyin in Fez.

Dying Tradition of the Criticism

With the end of the *ijtihad* era along the institutionalization of the Islam orthodox represented by the Sunni, the tradition of creative thinking and synthesizing once dominating the 8th - 10th began to

54 A. S. Tritton, *Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages* (London: Luzac and Company, n.d.), p100.
55 K.A. Totah, *The Contribution of the Arabs to Education* (New York: Columbia University, 1926), p45.
56 *Ibid*, p43.
57 George Makdisi, *Islamic Schools, in Dictionary of the Middle Ages* (Charles Scribners and Sons, 1988), p65.

subside slowly replaced with imitative religious literacy activities filled with the works of the major Islamic scholars crowned to the independent thinkers (*mujtahid).* Mosques continued to hold literacy classes: *kuttab*, *halaqah* and *jami'ah*, but the contents only presented dogmatic religious perspective. According to Azra, *al-jami'ah* at that time held advanced studies as the institution of higher learning, but not as research universities, a nomenclature which is being discussed nowadays. When seen from today's perspective, *al-jami'ah,* which is the oldest university in history, is actually only a madrasah.[58] In madrasah or jami'ah, the students learned *al-'ulum al-islamiyyah* or *al-'ulum al-diniyyah* (religious knowledge) with a special emphasize on *fiqh* (laws), *tafsirs* (interpretation) dan *hadiths*. In the olden days, these kinds of studies involved logic (ijtihad) although according to Azra, *ijtihad* here meant new interpretation of the established and agreed doctrines. Non-religious knowledge such as pure science was not dominant and took less priority than the religious knowledge.

Once there was a time when general knowledge became the curriculum of madrasah, which was during the time Masaal-Makmun, a Caliph in Abbasiyah Dynasty ruling between 813-833 CE. Al-Makmun himself was a follower of the rational Muktazilah sect. However, after the end of the Muktazilah sect and replaced with al-Asy'ariyah as the pillar of the Islam orthodox, the mathematic and science no longer became part of the madrasah and *jami'ah* curriculum but learned privately at homes. Branches of knowledge which were considered subversive were considered counterproductive to the establishment of the Sunni doctrines especially in theology and laws.[59]

At this time, Islamic education either in madrasah or *jami'ah* did not include politic and its relationship with religions in its curriculum. Even though there were a lot of madrasahs with a political affinity with the ruling government, they did not include political literacy in the curriculum. Nevertheless, attention to political literacy was not absent in the Muslim community proven by the presence of a famous classic political literary work. Two of the works were *al-Ahkamal-Sulthaniyyah* (Governance in Islam)

58 Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi Dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru*. p. viiiix.

59 Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi Dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru*. p. viiiix.

written al-Mawardy (d. 1072 CE) and *Nasihat al-Mulk* (a political guidance for sultans) written by al-Ghazaly (d. 1111 CE).[60] The lack of criticism in religious literacy was institutionalized with the emergence of madrasahs established by the ruling government with an affinity to a certain sect and school of thought. The most famous madrasah was Nizamiyah Madrasah built in Baghdad and surrounding areas in 11th Century CE. The madrasah buildings were built by Nizamul Muluk, a famous advisor in Seljuk Dynasty. A few scholars such as Ignaz Goldziher believed that Nizamul Muluk had a political interest when he built the madrasah. As a follower of Asya'ariyah, Nizamul Muluk wanted to turn the madrasah as an official institution to spread the Asy'ariyah ideology in its regions.[61] Makdisi, however, rejected the Goldziher's opinion and believed that the madrasah did a lot of Islamic studies and did not focus only on Asy'ariyah theology. As cited by al-Faruque, Mustafa Jawab favored Goldziher's opinion that Nizamul Muluk was a follower of Asy'ari and established Nizamiyah Madrasah to spread the Syafi'i Mazhab in general and Asy'ariyah ideology specially. In an undocumented statement, Mustafa Jawab said that the phrase Abu al-Hasan al-Asy'ari was written at the gate of the madrasah and perhaps at the gate of all Nizamiyah Madrasah. Although available sources did not clearly state the official role of Nizamiyah in Asy'ariyah propaganda, it can be said that al-Asy'ariyah teaching was spread by Nizamiyah with the approval from its forefathers through a few of its main teachers such as Abu Ishaqal-Shirazi and Imam al-Ghazali, and other teachers.[62]

D. MOSQUE AND RELIGIOUS LITERACY IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

It looks like the Islamic literacy institution in the early Islam era dominated by the *fiqh, aqidah,* and *akhlak* discourse was maintain in the mosques' literacy until today. This can be seen in the result of a study conducted in several mosques in Indonesia for the past few years. One of the surveys was done by CSRC UIN Jakarta in 2009 in 250 mosques in DKI Jakarta (the total of mosques in Jakarta is 2831). The survey revealed that the majority

60 *Ibid*. p. viii-ix.
61 Muhammad Al-Faruque, *The Development of the Institution of Madrasah and the Nizamiyah of Baghdad*, Islamic Studies (1987), p259.
62 Al-Faruque. p260.

of the mosques in Jakarta discussed laws (93%), creeds/theology (86%) and morals (84%) during their sermons or Islamic studies while only 25% discussed philosophy. The topic of history was also allowed (64%)[63] followed by *tasawuf* (49%).

Another recent study conducted by CSRC UIN Jakarta in 35 mosques in 7 cities in Indonesia also revealed the same with the topics of *fiqh, ibadah, aqidah and akhlaq* dominating the narration given by the khatib and *muballigh*.[64] Islam in mosques is not much different than the religious discourse presented in the media. A national CSRC survey in 2011 in 10 cities shows that 93-94% of the Muslims read information on the pillar of faith and the pillar of Islam, followed by morals (88%), the laws on halal food (87%), and the laws of marriage and divorce (67%) online.[65]

From Modern "Kuttab" until the Halaqah of Jalalayn Tafsir

Until today, people still believe mosques are the ideal institution for teaching religious literacy to the Muslims. A survey conducted by CSRC (2010) in Jakarta found that 98.8% of mosque administrators followed the same thought.[66] In a qualitative study in 7 cities (CSRC, 2018), a number of mosque administrators in Banda Aceh, Palembang, DKI Jakarta, Manado, Ambon, Tasikmalaya-Garut and Mataram also agreed.[67] In Jakarta, religious literacy was mostly given through a non-formal Islamic study group called *majelis taklim* (98%), and Friday sermon (74%). More than half the mosques in Jakarta had afternoon Islamic schools (TPA/TKA) (53%) and Mosque youth activities (42%).[68] Ironically, almost 100% of the administrators of mosques in big cities such as Jakarta believed that it is important for the

63 Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF, *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p79.

64 CSRC UIN Jakarta Team, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di 7 Kota di Indonesia* (DKI Jakarta, Tasikmalaya & Garut, Banda Aceh, Palembang, Manado, Ambon, dan Mataram) (CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, 2018).

65 Noorhaidi Hasan and Irfan Abubakar, *Islam di Ruang Publik: Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Demokrasi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2011).

66 Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF, *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p76.

67 CSRC UIN Jakarta Team, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di 7 Kota di Indonesia (DKI Jakarta, Tasikmalaya & Garut, Banda Aceh, Palembang, Manado, Ambon, dan Mataram)* (CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, 2018).

68 Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p83.

religious literacy activities to be done in mosques, but only 40% of the mosques had a library even though the collection was very limited.[69]

The afternoon Islamic school or TPA in Indonesia resembles the early Islam's *kuttab* with children age 6 - 14 as its students.[70] The lesson given in TPS is reading the Qur'an with various methods adopted to suit the psychological and linguistic needs of Indonesian children. The most famous method used is *Iqra'* which comprises of 6 levels aimed at preparing these children to read the Qur'an well. A number of TPAs also teach Arabic letter writing with the *imla'* method. Other materials taught are memorizing short Qur'anic verses, salah recitation and prayers. A few TPAs also teach lessons in Islamic creeds and the laws for compulsory Islamic rituals. Therefore, TPAs have become models for modern mosques which function to provide an introduction to basic Islamic literacy. Based on the survey in Jakarta (CSRC, 2010), it can be concluded that 53% of the mosques had implemented basic Islamic literacy for the Muslim community.[71]

Aside from TPAs, only 1/4 of the mosques in Jakarta gave lessons using the discussion method[72] and the more common method than discussions and/or training is unidirectional method[73] by reading and explaining the meanings from Arabic literature especially the *tafsir* and *fiqh* books (42%).[74] This passive method of learning derived from the *halaqah* model commonly done in the pre-modern Islam era (since the 14th Century) and after the *ijtihad* method in the *Fiqh* and *ushul Fiqh* was no longer used. This is proven by the popularity of the Jalalayn Tafsir book which is used as a reference for mosques in Jakarta (45%). This tafsir is a literary work written in the 15th Century by two Cairo-born Sunni scholars Jalaluddin al-Mahalli (d. 1459 CE) and Jalaluddi al-Suyuthi (d. 1505 CE).

The Roles of Mosques: Ibadah, Akidah, and Akhlak

It is really interesting to see how the preachers in mosques present the dominant Islamic discourse as described above.

69 *Ibid,* p82.
70 *Ibid,* p76.
71 *Ibid,* p81.
72 Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p82.
73 *Ibid,* p83.
74 *Ibid*, p76.

Although there are no data illustrating the general trend for the mosque's literacy capacity across Indonesia, the survey conducted in mosques in Jakarta may provide a brief illustration of the quality of religious literacy of urban mosques. The result of the survey, however, cannot be said to represent the reality in other big cities. The survey conducted by CSRC UIN Jakarta (2010) on mosques in DKI Jakarta shows that most mosques in Jakarta (70%) discussed the issues of worship and morals by considering the socio-politic contexts in the community while 28% discussed these topics without linking them to the issues or actual events in the community.[75] For the literacy perspective, the fact shows that 70% of the mosques in Jakarta thought that mosques had to point out the obvious link between religion and socio-political life while 28% failed to see the urgency of showing this link in mosques.[76]

In a few small cities with a more conservative socio-religious culture, mosques were not used to provide an understanding of the link between religion and social life to their congregation. In Tasikmalaya, for example, it is found that a number of mosques did not allow the preacher to bring up issues aside from worship or creed. The researcher explains that the mosque congregations in Tasikmalaya, both young and old, responded negatively to preachers who brought actual socio-political issues in mosques. *Ustadz* Dede Muis, one preacher interviewed, admitted the resistance:

> "When I pray in various mosques and listen to the sermons, the contents of the sermons are mostly *taqwa* (belief in Allah), the tips for *taqwa* and its explanation. The same topic being discussed over and over again. Everywhere. But when a preacher is delivering a sermon, then he brings up a trending issue, which is booming and famous in the community… it becomes, I think, like a mockery and the congregations do not think it is important. We as congregations as the preachers need to pay attention to this so that we understand more a about the congregations."[77]

75 On the indicators of religious literacy according to the modern perspective, see Moore, *Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach*.

76 Mohamad Nabil, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kabupaten Garut dan Kota Tasikmalaya* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, August 2018).

77 *Ibid.*

According to the report, the educational backgrounds of most khatibs in Tasikmalaya city were mostly Islamic boarding schools or higher educations. Unfortunately, after they completed their education, they did not make efforts to enrich their religious literacy leading to their lack of socio-political knowledge in Islam. This prevented these khatibs from discussing such discourse in ways that were more presentable to their congregation. Consequently, this lack of knowledge and less-than-presentable ways created a certain prejudice around the khatibs who made attempts to bring up socio-political issues in their sermons causing a resistance among the congregation.

There might be earlier attempts from the khatibs to bring up actual socio-political issues but instead of providing an enlightenment, he caused confusion and uncertainty to the congregation and caused the congregation to have a negative opinion on the khatibs. This resentment, in turn, became the reason why these khatibs were reluctant to bring up the issues of socio-religious literacy.[78]

This caused the youth in Tasikmalaya city to feel indifferent towards the issues of religious literacy in mosques. They considered these topics boring and irrelevant towards their real life. Alternatively, they were more interested in learning Islam from the *ustadz* who gave their sermons in digital media since these *ustadz* were considered more able to answer their needs in religious literacy.[79]

The Absence of Political Literacy in Mosques

Aside from that, the report of the research done in 7 cities by CSRC UIN Jakarta (2018) revealed that most mosques did not see the importance of discussing the relationship between Islam and politics. Is Islam compatible with democracy? Does Pancasila agree with Islam and so on? Nevertheless, the *khatib, takmir* and *imam* were generally familiar with this issue. Most were able to accept Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and democracy and some were even able to put forward the argument that Pancasila agreed with Islam or democracy with Islam. There was almost no one who thought that Pancasila or NKRI had to be replace with the

78 *Ibid.*
79 *Ibid.*

khilafah system.[80] The above finding was still consistent with the result of the CSRC survey in 2010 which revealed that the *takmir* of the mosque in Jakarta generally (89%) thought Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is the best model.

They also thought the democracy was a good system (78%). However, the survey found that most respondents were ambivalent when asked about the obligation to fight for the Islamic state and the Islamic caliphate state *(khilafah Islamiyah).* Most agreed that there was such obligation including those who stated that they accepted Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. 21% agreed that it was important to establish a Islamic state and 32% agreed that they needed to establish the caliphate state.[81] The same ambivalence could also be seen in the survey on the Muslims in 10 cities (CSRC, 2011). Almost 96% of the respondents accepted Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and 87% did not mind the democracy system in Indonesia. However, when asked whether they supported the establishment of the Islamic state and the caliphate system, almost one third agreed.[82] Then, can it be said that one third of Indonesian Muslims are radical?

Looking at the above data, it is not easy to generalize Indonesian Muslims' perception on the Islamic ideology. The CSRC team in the survey then tried to expand the cluster analysis with a series of questions that represented the Islamism indicators and that showed the non-Islamic or cultural perception. From the analysis, it can be concluded that 80.1% had a cultural tendency while 19.9% had an Islamic perception.[83]

The mixed feelings were mostly caused by their failure to understand the contextual relationship between Islam and politics. Most believed that Islam must be understood contextually and literally. As a consequence, they could not reject the idea of the Islamic state and the Caliphate since both concepts were taught in the Islamic main texts and the Companions of the Prophet

80 CSRC UIN Jakarta Team, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di 7 Kota di Indonesia* (DKI Jakarta, Tasikmalaya & Garut, Banda Aceh, Palembang, Manado, Ambon, dan Mataram) (CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta,Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, 2018).

81 Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*. (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p91.

82 Weck, Hasan, dan Abubakar, *Islam in the Public Sphere: The Politics of Identity & the Future of Democracy in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp53-54.

83 *Ibid*, p52.

fought to establish them. On the other side, these Muslims were also being realistic and realized that the caliphate system or the Islamic state would be easy to implement in Indonesia due to unfavorable situations and conditions.

This perspective was shown by Syarifuddin Maspeke, an activist of a *Tadzkir* Body in Gorontalo. Ubed Abdillah Syarif, in his report, stated that Maspeke agreed that the Muslims must be tolerant towards the non-Muslims. He agreed that the Muslims must fight to establish Islamic sharia, "*qishas*", and "*jihad*" although he did not deny that these ideas would be difficult to implement in Indonesia.[84] Therefore, as stated by one of the sources from Mataram city in NTB, there was no other option but to accept Pancasila and democracy although it was accompanied with the hope that the values of Islam could still live in the society.[85]

The ambivalence shown by most Muslims in regard to the relationship between Islam and politics should prompt the mosques to take an active part in improving their literacy on the issue. The study done by CSRC UIN Jakarta (2018), however, showed that the mosque management did not see the urgency of this matter although it was something that they had the ability to do. It seemed like they were not taught that the mosques were a civil institution whose function was to inhibit civic values among their congregation.[86] They thought that this was the responsibility of the government, the member of the House of Parliament, the lawmakers, and major Islamic organizations to convey this message in public domains outside the mosques. When they discussed politics, they had the obligation to convey the Islamic morals in politic leadership. They were obligated to advise their congregation on how to respond to the politics by reminding them to act fairly, to put their trust in Allah, to be responsible and honest, to fulfil their promise, to maintain unity, to respect

84 Ubed Abdilah Syarif, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Manado*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, August 2018).

85 Abdul Wahid, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Mataram*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, August 2018).

86 Hendro Prasetyo, Ali Munhanif, dkk., *Islam Dan Civil Society: Pandangan Muslim Indonesia* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama dan PPIM-IAIN Jakarta, 2002); Editor Kultur, "Civil Islam and the Challenge of Multicultural Society: Interview with Robert W. Hefner," *Kulturthe Indonesian Juournal for Muslim Cultures*, 1, 1 (2000), pp83–90.

each other and so on.[87] In this context, the presence of a radical ideology propaganda or the presence of a preacher campaigning for a certain political position can be seen as a form of subversive against the commonly understood function of the mosque.

Diversity Literacy and the Influences of Social Context

So far, there have been no data at the national level that allow a generalization of the literacy on religious diversity both internal and outside Islam at the mosques in Indonesia. However, initial data from the research done in 7 cities by CSRC UIN Jakarta (2018) revealed that from around 100 mosque's stakeholders (imam, khatib, takmir, congregation) interviewed, most seemed to show that they were aware of the religious diversity reality in both internal and outside Islam in Indonesia. Generally, aside from understanding the reality, they also made efforts to promote respect towards differences among Islamic groups especially differences in rituals among Islamic mass organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU.[88]

They also showed that they did not want to emphasize on differences among Islamic group as long as they were still within the corridor of *Ahlussunnah wal-Jama'ah*. In Tasikmalaya city, for example, the congregation were used to play with an imam and to follow his ritual without questioning the mazhab of the imam. The same was done in Manado, Garut and Mataram. It was common to see 23-rakaat or 11-rakaat tarawih salah performed in the same mosque.[89] Tensions, however, could still be felt when members of Muhammadiyah and NU were at a disagreement in al-Muttaqin Mosque in Tasikmalaya city although it could be settled thanks to the involvement of the prominent figures from both mass organizations.[90]

87 Idris Hemay, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Palembang* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, August 2018).

88 CSRC UIN Jakarta Team, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di 7 Kota di Indonesia* (DKI Jakarta, Tasikmalaya & Garut, Banda Aceh, Palembang, Manado, Ambon, dan Mataram)" (CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, 2018).

89 Mohamad Nabil, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kabupaten Garut dan Kota Tasikmalaya*; Syarif, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam Dan Khatib di Kota Manado.*

90 Mohamad Nabil, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kabupaten Garut dan Kota Tasikmalaya* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, August 2018).

The stakeholders of mosques in Ambon understood the importance of tolerance and unity and preached this in their sermons. They understood that they needed to discuss religious literacy and to adjust the themes of their sermons with important events happening in the community. The purpose was perhaps so that the religious texts could be understood easily through social contexts.[91] For example, the theme of peace *afsyus-salam wa shilularham* (Spread Peace and Maintain Brotherhood) - a theme that all takmir or khatib understood - was introduced in a Eid Fitr Get-Together in mosques where the concept of respect towards differences and diversity was explained by referring to the Quranic verses interpreted contextually as shown by one of the administrator in Unpatti Mosque in Ambon below:

> … We are "*kuntum khaira ummah ukhrijat linnasi*". *Khairu ummah* or the best of followers is like the Javanese philosophy "*Ing Ngarso Sung Tulodho, Ing Madyo Mangun Karso, Tut Wuri Handayani*." From something good we hope more good people will come out of it to those who are not. With this hope, *insyallah* we will all be good. But with *khaira ummah*, we position ourselves as good people and force other people to follow us, then it is impossible. The meaning of "*lakum dinukumwaliyadin*" is very clear; "Your religion is for you and my religion is for me".[92]

The respect towards differences with other religions and within Islam is closely linked to the social context surrounding the mosque's stakeholders. The enthusiasm of mosque administrators and the khatib in Ambon in spreading the message of tolerance and unity takes root from the conflict happening throughout 1999-2001 that tore the communities apart. The Muslims and the Christians in Ambon learned in a hard way not to repeat this conflict and promote peace among them. One way to do this was by promoting the values of peace and harmony in their religious narration.[93]

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91 Au, *Literacy Instruction in Multicultural Setting*. p9.

92 Muchtadlirin, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Ambon* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, dan UNDP, August 2018).

93 *Ibid*.

The social context may also explain why the stakeholders in Manado's mosques emphasize tolerance with the Christian community in one side and among the Muslims in another. According to Syarif, as a minority among the Christian majority, the Muslims must behave well and maintain the reputation as a tolerant city. The Muslims supported the local government's policy through the Ministry of Religious Affairs to monitor Friday's sermons especially those which discussed the relationship between the Muslims and the Christians. They also needed to tolerate differences within the Muslim community since as a minority they needed to unite to protect their socio-political interests and gave out a positive image to the Christian community of their unity.[94] This, however, caused suspicion among the Muslim community that might lead to division as it showed hasty decision and the lack of commitment to discuss a new kind of religious phenomenon.[95]

One example is how the mosque activists in Ambon dealt with the issue of "Indonesian Islam" who based their arguments on questionable information taken randomly from social media. A famously known activist was even affected by this questionable information and chose not to address the issue academically when in fact, the issue of "Indonesian Islam" may become a trigger to discuss religious literacy especially to see the relationship between the universal doctrines of Islam and their application in the context of changing time and space. This discussion never took place since the emphasis on harmony had dampened the academic interest and critical thinking to increase the religious knowledge.[96]

Although the stakeholders of the mosques realized the importance of tolerance towards the non-Muslims, they failed to link this realization with the importance of increasing their knowledge on religions and other beliefs. In Garut and Tasikmalaya city, for example, the stakeholders did not see the importance of

94 Ubed Abdillah Syarif, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam Dan Khatib Di Kota Manado.* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

95 According to Dinham, the seriousness of understanding and discussing religion and the symptoms of religiousness is one of the indicators of religious literacy. Dinham and Francis, *Religious Literacy: Contesting an Idea and Practice.* p11.

96 Muchtadlirin, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Ambon*. (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

interacting with the followers of other religions. They themselves lived in Muslim-majority areas and did not see the urgency to conduct an inter-religion dialog. Their attitude was solely based on the guidance given by the Islamic texts on how to act towards the non-Muslims socially. In terms of aqidah and belief, however, they adhered to the principle of *Lakum Dînukum Waliyadîn* which affected their understanding on non-Muslim related matters. One example of this was the Christmas greeting which most believed to be forbidden (*haram*).[97]

In Garut, students from a Christian school once visited the Garut Grand Mosque to expand the students' knowledge on mosques. The Takmir of the Garut Grand Mosque received the students well outside the mosque but did not allow the students to enter claiming that he had to maintain the purity of the holy mosque. This alarming attitude shows the importance of religious literacy among the people.[98] Historically, the passive relationship between the Muslims and the Christians has a deep root in Indonesia. According to Ismatu Ropi, the conflicts and the tension between the Muslims and the Christians in Indonesia peaked from the 16th Century to the beginning of the 20th Century due to the feeling of safety that the followers of each religion claimed to need and economic and political factors. A study conducted by Ismatu Ropi found that the Muslims' literature on Christianity was mostly based on the literature written by Muslim writers, but not many read those written by Christian writers. Also, they were influenced by Christianity literature and discourse among classic and modern Muslim writers.[99]

The stakeholders of the mosque tend to limit religious discussions and interactions. They strongly believed that interactions with non-Muslim only apply to social and non-religious matters. They had a positive attitude towards matters related to mu'amalah outside aqidah and worship. In a few cases, this positive attitude has turned into something helpful. One example of this is the attitude of the mosque administrators

97 Mohamad Nabil, "Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kabupaten Garut dan Kota Tasikmalaya." (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

98 *Ibid.*

99 Ismatu Ropi, Depicting the Other Faith: A Bibliographical Survey of Indonesian Muslim Polemics on Christianity, *Studia Islamika Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies,* 1, 6 (1999), pp77–120.

in Sunda Kelapa Mosque, Central Jakarta and Raya Mosque in Bintaro, South Jakarta. Both mosques are actually located next to a church. When the church is not able to accommodate parking for its congregation, these mosques allow their parking space to be used for that purpose and vice versa.[100]

Mosques and the Preservation of Sunni Orthodox.

If people among the Sunni mazhab are able to show respect towards each other, the same attitude is not extended towards other sects such as Jamaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), Syi'ah, and other minority Islamic groups. Mosques are really used as a fortress that protects the millennium-old Sunni orthodox sect that began since the death of Abu Hasan al-As'yari (10th C).

The survey conducted on the mosques' takmirs in Jakarta (2010) shows a strong resistance towards the Ahmadiyah sect. From all respondents, only 2% believed that the Indonesians needed to be more tolerant towards this sect while 57% stated that the sect needed to be banned. The rest of the 42% thought that the members of the sect needed to be guided back to the right path.[101]

How good are the takmirs' access to literature on Ahmadiyah and Syi'ah? The takmirs in Tasikmalaya and Garut generally did not have access to literature on these sects outside the information given by the local Ulama Council. The takmirs themselves had little or no prior knowledge on the background, history and existence of these sects. They blindly believed that these sects and their followers were heretics merely based on the *fatwa* given by the local Ulama Council in their regions.[102] The central MUI itself had branded Ahmadiyah Qadiyan heretics in 1980. After 2000, a few Islamic groups were seen voicing anti-Ahmadiyah campaigns

100 Fahmi Syahirul Alim, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di DKI Jakarta* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

101 Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF, *Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*. (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p96.

102 Mohamad Nabil, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kabupaten Garut dan Kota Tasikmalaya.* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

especially in Ahmadiyah pocket areas. In 2002, in Kuningan, a small town in West Java, people wanted the civic rights of members of Ahmadiyah sect to be limited.[103] When the campaign attracted a lot of attention, in 2005 the central Ulama Council reiterated the heretic fatwa on this sect[104] and the news of this fatwa quickly spread in various mass media. The CSRC survey in 2011 shows that 65% of all communities were familiar with this fatwa and therefore, it can be said this fatwa formed a negative public perception on Ahmadiyah. This fatwa also strengthened the rejection and reluctance to understand this sect objectively.[105]

The Muslims in Mataram and Aceh also rejected Ahmadiyah and Syi'ah sects since they believed that these sects violated the correct Islamic creeds[106] albeit this perception was solely based on their minimum knowledge on these sects. One of the reasons why this perception was allowed to be formed was because the moment the stakeholders of the mosques learned about this information from the media, they quickly built a prejudice surrounding these two sects and they never made any attempt to discuss this issue with Ahmadiyah followers in Mataram. However, even though the Muslims in these areas rejected the two sects, they did not hold anything against the followers and did not use the mosques to provoke hatred towards these sects.[107] Rejection towards Ahmadiyah and Syi'ah also occurred in Manado and Ambon. The takmirs, khatibs and imams there generally believed that the Muslims must remind the followers of Ahmadiyah and Syi'ah to return to the right path. Some even did not see these sects as an issue as long as they did not spread their teachings and recruited the mosque's congregation.[108]

103 Irfan Abubakar, et al., *Laporan Penelitian Ujaran Kebencian (Hate Speech) Dan Penanganannya oleh Polri dan Pemerintah Daerah (Pemda) di Indonesia* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta dan The Asia Foundation, 2016); Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *Ahmadiyah dan Keindonesiaan Kita* (Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2011).

104 Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, *Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy Paramadina Foundation, 2015). p33.

105 Weck, Hasan, and Abubakar, *Islam in the Public Sphere: The Politics of Identity & the Future of Democracy in Indonesia*. p31

106 Wahid, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Mataram*.; Nurchalis Sofyan, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Banda Aceh*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

107 Wahid, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Mataram.* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

108 Ubed Abdillah Syarif, *Laporan Riset Needs Assessment Literasi Keagamaan Takmir Masjid, Imam dan Khatib di Kota Manado.* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

If the khatib, imam, and takmir know and understand the differences among different *mazhab*s, between Muhammadiyah and NU, or about Syiah, the millennial congregation or the younger Muslim generation is not. They only know very basic knowledge of Islam such as the number of *rakaat* for Tarawih salah and determination of Ramadan and Syawal months. As a result, some believed that Ahmadiyah and Muhammadiyah were the same while some others could not explain what *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah* was.[109] This lack of knowledge on the differences among Islamic groups can actually bring about a positive impact, which is the strengthening of social cohesion among the Muslims, and a negative impact since it also prevents the millennial to learn about other religions as a socio-religious phenomenon without having the need to convert to another religion. Borrowing Moore's term, devout followers of religions only understand religions as something spiritual, but not as a social phenomenon. In other words, they only do a religious study, but not a study about religions. Why aren't religious people interested in expanding their understanding on religious literacy in the broad sense? According to Moore, the religious sectarianism has this perception: people who learn about religion or belief outside their own are thought to be on the verge of converting even when in reality, they don't necessarily want to.[110]

E. CONCLUSION

Mosques have played a vital role in the formation, development and establishment of religious literacy in the Muslim community since the time of the Prophet Muhammad until today. However, the quality of the Muslims' religious literacy in terms of *Fiqh al-dîn* and *Fiqh al-tadayyun* is very much influenced by the socio-historic factors and the dynamic of the actors in presenting and implementing Islam in their own era. Prophet Muhammad took great attention in religious literacy seen from the provision of a special room in Nabawi Mosque for *taffaquh fi al-din* activities. The Prophet improved religious literacy among the Muslims at that time not only by doing it verbally in the form of sermons and advices, but also through his behaviors and wisdoms. The

109 *Ibid.*
110 Moore, *Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach.*

"Charter of Madinah" is a concrete example of how *al-tadayyun* was practiced in relation to peace and tolerance among religions.

After the death of the Prophet, mosques have consistently continued their role as the only religious institution for religious literacy education. The Companions of the Prophet also played an important role in establishing a strong foundation for religious literacy built by the Prophet. Abubakar Shiddiq and Umar bin Khattab had performed an *ijtihad* when they complied the verses in the Qur'an even though there was no direct order from the Prophet. In this case, *al-tadayyun* involved an ability and courage to perform an *ijtihad* by interpreting the general principles of Islamic teaching for the benefit of mankind in the future.

After the political expansion of Islamic kingdom and the Muslim community needed to interact with the Greek, Roman and Persian culture and tradition, the religious literacy in Islam quickly grew into a systematic religious discourse and pluralism fueled with discussions and debates especially in theology and laws. The establishment of *mutakallimun, fuqaha*, *hadith* experts, and *tafsir* experts at this era reflected the quality of good *Fiqh al-din* and *al-tadayyun.* Creativity in using abundant resources from other traditions to solve various legal, theological, and mysticism issues became the main characteristic of religious literacy in the 8th until 11th Century. Mosques were the medium for religious studies and the tests of theological and legal arguments, as well as language which was often considered to be an instrument to discuss religious discourses logically.

However, this period of creativity gradually deteriorated and was replaced with a *taqlid* tradition towards the opinions of the previous *ulamas*. Since the 12th Century, there was almost no creative and independent thinker among the fiqh and theology experts. This era, along with the subsequent eras, religious literacy was full of sectarianist theology discourses and followed with the institution of Sunni orthodox. Mosques as a religious literacy education institution progressed after the establishment of *kuttab* and *jami'ah*, the foundation of universities in the Islamic world although their function in *Fiqh al-tadayyun* was not as dominant as they were once. Mosques had become a religious institution whose main function was to establish the Sunni orthodox teaching. Ever since the establishment of *Madrasah* in the 11th

Century, the Sunni orthodox institution, with its sectarianist and *jumud* characteristic, had become unshakeable until the modern time. One positive influence that came of from this era was the fact that this sect was able to unite the Muslims and prevent their division into different religious sects while at the same time, it weakened Muslims' intellectual ability to appreciate differences and plurality.

Religious literacy in Indonesian mosques today mostly reflects the continuation of the Sunni orthodox tradition. Almost all mosque's stakeholders have shown a negative perception towards sects that are considered heterodox, especially Ahmadiyah and Syiah, and a passive attitude towards building cross-faith dialogues with other religions. Attempts to improve religious literacy education among the youth through the establishment of after-school madrasahs in mosques also help to establish the normative characteristic of religious literacy by emphasizing more on *Fiqh al-din* and less on *Fiqh al-tadayyun*.

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Salafi's Islamism Media and the Politization of Mosques in Indonesia

Jajang Jahroni

The politization of mosques often happens in Indonesia. The incidents are often provoked by the missionary work of the Salafi followers who emphasize on the religious purification. As a result, general religious discourses are tainted with words such as *kafir* (infidels) and *shirk* (worshipers of other Gods but Allah). This type of missionary work is clearly rejected by groups of traditional Muslims who have long practiced religious rituals rooted from local traditions. The Salafis, who began to appear in 90s, play an active role in today's movement of Islam. They receive helps from various donors in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia.

Since the 1998 Reformation, the Salafis have begun to appear in a public domain. They build *madrasah* (after-school religious classes) and mosques and involve in various social activities. This paper explores the religious discourse developed by the Salafis and how other Muslim groups, especially the traditionalists, respond to the Salafi's missions. It also explores how mosques as a strategic Islamic institution become the toughest "battle ground".

A. THE CHANGING SOCIAL LANDSCAPE

In the past two decades, a number of Islamic organizations and the urban Muslims have worked together out of mutual interests. It can be said that Indonesia's urban landscape has changed into a place where the new model of Islamism is undertaken. This

process is called "Urban Santrinization",[1] - a sociological term referring to the emergence of educated and well-off Muslim groups. These groups are the ones who bring religion back into the public domain[2] and contribute the current civic values.[3] The Salafis are part of this development. Since they have the opportunity to get involved in the social and political structure, they automatically take part in the creation of the social discourse. Through this discourse, they hope to influence the formulation of public policies, to distribute the power they obtain according to their interests and to maintain their authority as a new player (Eickelman and Piscatori, 2004).

The change in the urban landscape is the result of economic development done since the New Order regime started. Since its appearance in the late 60s, the regime had developed the economy to suit its interests and objectives which were to cool down the political turmoil in Indonesia, which had previously undergone a lengthy political crisis after the bloody *coup d'etat* in 1965. One of the policies taken by the incumbent President, Suharto, was to appoint a panel of economic experts led by Widjojo Nitisastro, as the advisor. The target was to revive the national economy, to stabilize Rupiah, the national currency, to slow down the rate of inflation and to formulate long-term policies. The results were amazing. In just a short time, Suharto was able to overcome the economic issues and Indonesia underwent a rapid progress. In the subsequent years, the economic growth tends to remain steady at around 7% annually.[4]

The landscape of urban life in Indonesia began to change dramatically in the 80s. The centers of economy began to appear in and out of Java Island. The new generation of Muslims was born and raised in the New Order education. This new generation plays an important role in the formulation of public policies. They are active in social transformation and tend to distance themselves from practical politics. After Pancasila was enacted as the sole

1 Aswab Mahasin, "The Santri Middle Class: an Insider's View," dalam Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp138-144.

2 Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1994).

3 Robert W Hefner, *Civil Islam and Democratization in Indonesia*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

4 Robert W Hefner, *Civil Islam and Democratization in Indonesia*, pp40-72.

principle for social and political life in the early 80s, many Islamic groups shifted from politics to social activities.[5] This shift marked the new era in an Islamic civil life, a new format of Islam which encourages participation in the formation of public life. This new model of Islam is considered suitable for sustainable development in the democratic system.[6]

Politization of Bid'ah

The strengthening of the Salafi group in Indonesia brings new problems to the country's religious life. One of the problems is the emergence of the term *bid'ah* (innovation in religious matters) in the religious discourse universe.[7] The Salafi's *da'i* (preachers) often use this term to reject various rituals performed by the traditional Muslim groups, which according to their view, stray away from the right path shown in the Qur'an and al-Sunnah. From the altar and the podium, TV and radio shows, the Salafi *ustadzs* (teachers) warn the Muslims on the danger of *bid'ah* and the threat of hellfire for perpetrators. The Salafis also recommend the Muslims to return to the correct path of Islam shown in the Qur'an dan al-Sunnah, and avoid *takhayul* (superstition), *bid'ah* and *khurafat* (unislamic beliefs). Returning to the Qur'an and al-Sunnah and emphasizing on following Salafi's norms are the rhetoric of the Salafis and this is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia (Noer, 1973; Taufik, 1971).[8]

At the beginning of the 20th Century, Muhammadiyah and Persis - both of which are Muslim modern groups influenced by the Salafism - had the same campaign. They warned the Muslims of the danger of several rituals such as *tahlil* (the chanting of certain prayers) and visiting graveyards. The campaign was done so massively that it caused a long-term conflict lasting until the end of the 60s and a social division between the modernists and traditionalists. Along with the progress in education, a better relationship between the two groups socially and modernization

5 Robin Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: The Case of the Nahdhatul Ulama", Ph.D. Dissertation. (University of Washington, 2002).

6 Robert W Hefner, *Civil Islam and Democratization in Indonesia*, pp40-72.

7 Jamhari dan Jajang Jahroni (eds), *Gerakan Sala_i Radikal di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004).

8 Fauzan Saleh, *Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in Twentieth Century Indonesia, a Critical Survey*. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001); Howard M Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia*, (Cornell University: SEAP, 1970).

of Islamic institutions was built, and this conflict began to fade at a certain level. The division therefore was not as strong as before.[9]

The anti-*bid'ah* campaign resurfaced in the 90s when students studying in campuses in Saudi Arabia began to return to Indonesia. Actually, the campaign did not accuse the traditionalists directly, but the traditionalists felt that this campaign was directed towards them since it reminded them of the dark time in the past when they were accused as the group that performed *bid'ah* or, even worse, syncretism. To respond to this accusation, the traditionalists counter-accused the Salafis that they were actually the Wahabi - a derogatory term to describe another side of Islam which some consider treating women unfairly - and that Salafis were a Saudi agent which tried to turn Indonesia's Islam into Wahabi's.[10] The impact of his religious conflict was so immense that it affected the inter-religion harmony in Indonesia. The issue was even more complicated in the rural areas since often times, the traditionalists and the Salafis lived as neighbors. In fact, in a few regions, this nearly caused the two groups to get into physical confrontations.

"The Battle Ground"

As the most important Islamic institution, for the past few years, mosques have become a "battle ground" for the Salafis and the traditionalists to expand their influence on the Muslims. Added with the fact that the management of the mosques have so far been weak, mosques are known to be misused by different groups for this purpose. A number of studies confirmed that radical groups used mosques to spread their ideologies and to recruit new members.[11] Realizing that their mosques became the target of the Salafis, at the beginning of 2005, NU and Muhammadiyah certified

9 Robert W Hefner, *Civil Islam and Democratization in Indonesia.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Azyumardi Azra, *Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism*. (Melbourne: Centre for the Study of Contemporary Islam, Melbourne University, 2005); M. Sya_i'i Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Contest between "Radical-Conservative Islam" dan "Progressive Liberal Islam," dalam Eric Tagliacozzo, *Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement*, *and the Longue Duree*, (Standford: Standford University Press, 2009), pp349-385.

10 Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest of Identity in Post New Order Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2008), pp263-282; Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baik Islam Radikal*, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1998, 2005).

11 Ridwan Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (eds.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid, Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp261-282.

their mosques and warned the Salafis not to meddle in their affairs. In urban areas, this concern was addressed by the managers of the mosques by stipulating some rules. Announcements were posted on the walls of the mosques giving a warning that their mosques were only open during prayer times, especially at daytime, and all activities had to be reported to the mosque's management.

Conflicts and competitions for mosques do happen among the Muslims.[12] However, certifications on mosques to prevent a one-sided claim is a new phenomenon. On one side, this shows the high level of tensions between the groups and on the other, the importance of mosques in shaping the religious discourse. Although unlike churches, mosques have never been built based on a certain religious denomination, in a reality, Muslim groups control their mosques so that the worship will be done according to their belief and understanding.

This further forces each Muslim group to build mosques. In the 50s and 60s, followers of Muhammadiyah in Ciputat separated themselves from the traditionalists and built their own mosques. Recently, due to urbanization, new mosques have been built since the old mosques could no longer accommodate the growing number of congregation. The number of mosques in Indonesia hence doubled from 392,044 in 1997 to 643,843 in 2004 (64% increase). This was mostly caused by the Salafis, as a new player, building mosques to support their missionary work. With the Middle Eastern countries funding them, the Salafis were able to build new mosques in many places. As a result, the conflicts and the frictions between the two main groups became unavoidable. It is worth noting that mosques were generally managed informally. Therefore, whoever has religious knowledge may get the chance to become the *khatib* (preacher) and may discuss various issues starting from religious affairs to politics or for political mobilization. Those who know Indonesia's situation well will

12 Patrick D Gaffney, "Authorities and the Mosque in Upper Egypt: Islamic Preacher as Image and Actor," In William R. Roff, *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning. Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse*, (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), pp199-225; Kees Van Dijk, "Comparing Different Streams of Islam, Wrestling with Words and De_inition," In Jajat Burhanudin and Kees van Dijk (eds.), *Islam in Indonesia, Contrasting Images and Interpretation*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), pp15-24; Hew Wai-Weng, "Cosmopolitan Islam and Inclusive Chineseness," In Chiara Formichi (ed.), *Religious Pluralism, State and Society in Asia*, (Abington: Routledge, 2013), pp175-190.

agree that on each Friday, during the Friday prayer, the common topic of the sermons is one Muslim group attacking another.

Fighting over Mosques

Realizing their importance, the Salafis began to build mosques at the late 90s. Initially, the construction of the mosques could be materialized with the aids from the Middle Eastern countries designated for mosque construction. Based on a hadith from the Prophet narrated by Ibn Majah that says that "To whoever build mosques in this world, Allah will build a house in paradise for him", the Salafis formed a special division within their organizational structure that regulates aids for mosque construction. The amount of disbursed varied from around Rp40 million, which is enough to build a small mosque, to Rp200 million to build a middle-size mosque.

Building a mosque is not as easy as people imagine it would be. Having the money for it does not mean the mosque can automatically be built. This is because a mosque is a symbol of unity. In an area, the availability of a mosque is important for the Muslims to perform their Friday prayer obligation. If there are 40 adult males in an area, a mosque must be built, and they must perform the Friday prayer in that mosque. If there are fewer than the number, the males must perform the prayer in the nearest mosque. This rule, however, does not make building a mosque easier. So long as the old mosque can still accommodate, or there is at least one in the area, rather than building a new one, the Muslims prefer to renovate or just enlarge the current mosque.[13]

Knowing this fact, the Salafis preferred to build their mosques in new residential areas far from other Muslim residential areas. They would first build their own enclave and then build their own mosques dan madrasah therein. This way, they were able to avoid the tension and the conflict with other Muslim groups. If other Muslim groups would like to build mosques, the Salafis were willing to provide the funding after the Muslim group submitted a proposal to the Salafis with the requirement that the mosque was built at least one kilometer away from the nearest mosque and this distance requirement might vary depending on the density of the population in the area.

13 Ridwan Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (eds.), *Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid, Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp317-357.

In Java Island, especially in densely populated areas such as housing areas or apartments in big cities, mosques can easily be built, and each Muslim group may build their own mosque. Outside Java Island, it is a different issue. In Aceh, for example, the one-mosque-one-area rule is still applied, made it difficult for the Salafis to penetrate the area.[14] In general, Salafi's mosques are different that the mosques built by other Muslim groups. They emphasized on function than on structure. People who do not know the Salafis well would think that this emphasize on function was due to budget limitation. This is not true. In places where the Salafis had a solid financial resource, they would still build their mosque by emphasizing on the function.

One example is the Wahdah Islamiyah mosque in Makassar. The construction of this mosque started in 2005 and had not been completed when this survey was conducted in 2011. This two-story mosque was built with a simple architecture and could accommodate around 1000 congregation. The first floor was used for offices and classrooms and the second was for the praying room. The doors and windows were not completed, and they were painted with only one or two light colors. The light colors were also chosen for the walls and the floors to give the atmosphere of calmness and tranquility. The room inside was square in shape and plain without any calligraphy. The Salafis believe that any decoration may disrupt people's concentration when they pray. A wall clock that showed prayer times was hung on the wall and the *mihrab* (a small niche on the wall that shows the direction of the prayer) was also made simple.

The mosques that Salafis build would have the name of the donor such as Zaid ibn Hamad Mosque, Muna al-Farsi Mosque, etc. Some even had the names of the Salafi's ulama such as Jamil al-Rahman Mosque. This naming was not an issue for the Salafis, but not for others since they prefer to name the mosques based on *al-asma al-husna* (the Names/Attributes of Allah) such as al-Nur Mosque, Baiturrahman Mosque, etc. Sometimes, if the Salafis provided funds for the construction of the mosques, they prefer to name the mosques according to their way. The local Muslim groups who also use the mosques rejected this idea. This issue

14 Sabirin, "Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pasca Tsunami Berbasis Meunasah." Thesis. (Universitas Gajah Mada, 2009).

was then solved by putting the name of the donor in an inscription on the wall of the mosques while the official name of the mosques was taken from *al-asma al-husna*. The Salafis would claim that the mosques they helped to construct were Salafi's mosques even though the residents in the area were not Salafi's followers. They would also send their *da'i* to these mosques to teach knowledge on more Puritan Islam. These *da'i* normally emphasized lessons of *tauhid* (the oneness of Allah) combined with the hadith, specially related to daily deeds. With this strategy, the Salafis directed the locals to Salafism. After *tauhid*, the da'i introduced the danger of *bid'ah* and *shirk*. The locals might reject this idea if they thought it attacked their traditions. However, it all depended on the skills of the *da'i.* If the da'i was skilled and could overcome this issue, the congregation would grow larger.

Religious Polemics

Polemics often happen when the theologists or scholars question the validity of a religious doctrine or practice.[15] The purpose is to revive the orthodox way by referring to authoritative sources of religion. In Islam, these polemics do not only relate to religious doctrines, but also practices. In Indonesia, for examples, there are many differences in religious practices starting from how to do the ablution until how to perform hajj. These differences are caused not only because of the method for the reference of the practice but also the social contexts where the texts were interpreted and understood. The back and forth movements from texts to practices are always necessary. If the texts represent the universality of Islam, the practices represent the locality and the particularity. These movements never end and keep on changing across time. The Muslims continue to interpret and re-interpret the texts which then create the Islam reformation.[16]

Compared to other Islamic sects, the Salafis emphasize on the importance of religious purification. They are the revivalists who would like to return the Muslims to the authentic resources

15 John R Bowen, *Muslim through Discourses: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp229-288; Clifford Geertz, 1976; Mark R Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta*, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989).

16 Fauzan Saleh, *Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in Twentieth Century Indonesia, a Critical Survey*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001).

as the references for their religious practices. This emphasize has been reiterated in their history. When Islam was considered a threat by the Hellenistic civilization, the Salafi ulama fought hard to maintain its purity. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of Salafi *mazhab*, was one of the prominent figures that pulled the Islam's pendulum back to the main texts by making the hadith as the second important text and the Qur'an as the first, in the system of its *mazhab*. He preferred to refer to the hadith than the *qiyas* (analogy) in religious matters even though the hadith was considered weak. This method contradicted the method of Abu Hanifah, the founder of Hanafi *mazhab*, who referred to *qiyas* as the main method. Due to this difference, the Hanbali *mazhab* was very literal in its interpretation of the main texts while the Hanafi *mazhab* was very rational. Ibn Taymiyya continued this puritanism spirit and he was considered the founder of the Salafi mazhab just like Ibn Hanbal.

Ibn Taymiyya was very concern with the reality that Islam had been penetrated by foreign elements. He asked the Muslims to return to the Qur'an and al-Sunnah. In the modern era, the idea of the Islamic revival could be found in the teachings and thoughts of ide Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahabism. Just like his predecessors, he asked the Muslims to uphold the *tauhid*, and to leave all forms of *bid'ah*. He lived in the desert of the Arab peninsula where idolatry was practiced everywhere. For this reason, he denounced the practice of shirk and *khurafat* (Al-Rasheed 2008: 22-58).

In Indonesia, the new intensive Islamism efforts began in the 14th Century (Reid, 1993). Historical records show that the conversion to Islam only covered the recitation of *syahadah*, circumcision, and not eating pork while the behaviors and religious practices did not change. The community limited itself with what they called synthetic mysticism.[17]

When Dutch researchers conducted research on Islam and the local culture at the end of the 19th Century, they found that the people practiced various local rituals. This practice did not change in mid 20th Century as reported by many anthropologists

17 Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*, (Norwalk: East Bridge, 2006).

conducting research around that time.[18] Based on this evidence, it can be understood that at the beginning of the 20th Century, the Islamic reformists such as Muhammadiyah and Persis took the purification of the rituals as their main theme. The rituals that they considered to be a deviation such as *Bid'ah*, which means innovation in religious matter, beliefs and practices, which were not practices during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, became the target of their campaign and they wanted to return these deviated practices to the correct practices mentioned in the Qur'an. In a hadith narrated by Bukhari and Muslim, the Prophet said, "Whoever innovates something into this matter of ours that is not a part of it, it will have it rejected." In another hadith narrated by Muslim, the Prophet said, "The most evil matters are those that are newly invented for every newly invented matter is an innovation. Every innovation is misguidance and every misguidance is in the Hellfire."

Based on this hadith, the majority of the Muslims believe and agree that *bid'ah* is forbidden. The problem is that the ulama's interpretations are different and these opinions are split into two groups. The first believes that *bid'ah* covered all rituals which do not have their precedence during the time of the Prophet and the Companions. Generally, the Salafis are in this category. The second believes that the prohibition for *bid'ah* only cover the rituals which are considered *bid'ahsayyiah* (bad *bid'ah*) while *bid'ah hasanah* (good *bid'ah*) are allowed. Izzuddin Abd al-Salam (662 H/1262 CE), a famous Syafi'i ulama, even thought further. He divided bid'ah into 5 categories: *bid'ah wajibah* (obligatory *bid'ah*), *bid'ah mahrumah* (forbidden *bid'ah*), *bid'ahmandubah* (recommended *bid'ah*), *bid'ah makruhah* (disliked *bid'ah*), and *bid'ah mubahah* (allowed *bid'ah*).[19] The second concept is more popular since it was created to accommodate the belief that Islam has to flexible and should be able to absorb local elements which may contribute to the spread of Islam. Without this concept, the practice of Islam will be too rigid.

The ulama have practiced the second concept of *bid'ah* for centuries. This is why Islam spread quickly in Indonesia which

18 Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (2),1960.

19 Arif Zamhari, *Ritual of Islamic Spirituality: a Study of Majlis Dhikr Group in East Java*, (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), pp25-35.

was previously dominated by the Hindu-Buddha civilizations. Nahdatul Ulama (NU), which claimed to be the successor of the missionary work done by the *wali* (the first group of ulama to spread Islam in Indonesia), continues this missionary method. It is important to mention that many rituals practices by NU can be categorized as *bid'ah* although NU claims that the *bid'ah* they do are *bid'ah hasanah*, which are needed by the traditionalist Muslims since it allows Islam to be an open and rich religion. One example is reading the Qur'an without the rhythm. This is considered *bid'ah* since there was no precedence during the time of the Prophet and the Companions. This practice, however, is not only allowed, but also recommended.

This *bid'ah* typology is very useful, but at times, very difficult to implement. This is because first, the line between "good" and "bad" is only a matter of perspective. The modernists and the traditionalists have long discussed this issue, but a consensus had never been reached. Second, the term "*bid'ah hasanah*," as used by the traditionalists, seems to have strayed too far from the Islam orthodox.

In practice, this category may have "strayed" from the principles of Islam, which emphasize on the balance of the worldly and spiritual life and forbid any excess in anything. For example, based on a number of sources, in each haul (anniversary) of a *wali* in Pati, Jawa Tengah, the fabric that covers the graveyard of the wall is put in auction and sold for a very high price. In 2012, a rich merchant from Surabaya bought it for Rp275 million. It was said that the fabric was used for many purposes. Some said that it was given as a gift while other said it was used as a talisman. This is what makes the criteria of *bid'ah hasanah* becomes vague.

In the last few decades, Muhammadiyah has been a modernist organization and has been "soft" in their missionary work.[20] In 2004, it reformed its missionary method from the puritan to cultural method. With this new method. the organization expected to play more important role in the community. This shift was an important milestone for the history of the organization which was previously known as a hardline reformist. Even with this change, Muhammadiyah followers still maintain distance with a number

20 Zuly Qodir, *Muhammadiyah Studies: Reorientasi Gerakan dan Pemikiran Memasuki Abad Kedua*, (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2010).

of (old) rituals such as the death ritual. They prefer not to do the *tabarruk* ritual or asking for blessings from a grave. The main reason for this is the fear that they might commit a heresy which is considered a major sin in Islam. The Salafis strongly forbid the *tabarruk* ritual since not only it does not have a clear guidance in the main texts, it may also disrupt the sincerity of the prayer although they say that they still believe in Allah. According to the Salafis, many people who do this ritual, instead of asking for blessing and contentment from Allah, ask these from the deceased *wali* - something which is forbidden.

The problem is now very clear. The Salafi campaign rejects *bid'ah* since it is closely linked to the fundamental principle of Islam which is to uphold the *tauhid* and to eradicate heresy, a theme that the revivalists always strive for. Many Salafi followers claim that the *tabarruk* practice found in many places in Indonesia deviates from the Islamic laws. Although the people who perform *tabarruk* may believe that blessings may be obtained by using the deceased *wali* as the mediator, the Salafi followers believe that this is still unacceptable.

The Salafi preachers aggressively attacked all corrupt Islamic practices which can be found in the community. In many occasions, they state that Islam orders all Muslims to worship Allah directly and not use a mediator. Before Islam came, the ancient paganistic religions did allow people to worship their God through the mediation of something or someone. This is what the Qur'an said about the people of Mekkah who considered it to be shirk. When the people of Mekkah was asked why they worshipped idols instead of Allah, they replied: "We worship them so they (the idols) can bring us closer to God." The Salafis also think that what remains from the paganistic religion was integrated into the *tawajjuh* doctrine i.e. the followers begin their spiritual journey by visualizing the face of their teacher for a spiritual transmission. (Trimingham 1998: 211)

Shirk and Kafir

The words shirk and *kafir* or infidels are very serious accusation and the Muslims understand this. In the olden days, the modernists rarely used these words to attack the traditionalists but the term TBC - *takhayyul*, *bid'ah* and *khurafat*. With this term,

the modernists wanted to make the traditionalists synonymous with an infectious, but curable disease TBC. At the time, public perception towards this disease was so bad that the sufferers had to be isolated. By comparing *bid'ah* perpetrators with the sufferers of TBC, the modernists were trying to provoke the Muslims to stay away from this corrupt practice. The use of the TBC term also shows that the traditionalists had very little general knowledge on health especially on the cure of the infectious disease TBC.

To get back at the modernists, the traditionalists do not use the terms *kafir* or shirk. Instead, they use the term "anti-tahlil" which means people who do not want to pray for the deceased members of their family. The term is often followed with an expression "Just like a dead dog. Not a human." This expression insults the Muslims since dogs are considered dirty animals and nobody wants to die like dogs. That is why many still prefer to perform the *tahlil* which is the last noble thing the family can do for their deceased member of their family so he/she can rest in peace.

The Salafis now use the term *kafir,* which means to erase, to close, to be ungrateful and is often wrongly translated into English as "disbelief" or "unbeliever" or people who do not believe in Allah, to attack other Muslims who perform the *bid'ah* rituals. In the Qur'an, the term *kafir* and its derivative is mentioned many times to mark a danger that needs to be avoided by all Muslims. The meaning of the word *kafir* refers to the pre-Islamic practice of farmers sowing seeds on the ground. *Kafir* or *kufr,* in this context, means to hide and to cover, but it also means people that have their heart covered so they no longer believe in Allah (QS al-Baqarah [2]: 7).

This term is then used to refer to the people in Mekkah and the *ahl al-kitab* who were the Jews and the Christians who did not accept Muhammad's prophethood (QS al-Bayyinah [98]: 1). In the history of Islam, the term kafir first used by the Khawarij, who after the Siffin War (657 CE), refused the leadership of Ali ibn Abi Thalib, the fourth Caliph, and the other candidate, Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan. The Khawarij believed that both candidates were kafir since they did not want to adhere to the Qur'an and al-Sunnah. In the modern era, the revivalist Wahabi used this term to refer to the Muslims who practice all forms of bid'ah. It is worth mentioning that the incident Muslims accusing other Muslims of kafir had

never happened in Indonesia. On one side, the Salafis use this term to show the deep friction and on the other, to encourage alliances and sharpen the socio-political friction among the Muslims.

A number of conflicts with different levels of violence have happened in many areas, which can be safely assumed between the traditionalists and the Salafis. Feeling consistently under attack by the Salafi, Said Aqil Siradj, the head of PBNU, created a list of Salafi's foundations which promote religious extremism. He thought that the Salafi's ideology is a threat to the nation and the country and he asked the government to stop the flowing of fund from the Middle Eastern countries which is received by the Salafi.

At the lower level, the "battle" also happened between the Salafis and moderate Islamis higher education institutions. The Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) and Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) became the targets of the Salafis. In 2002, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, a Salafi preacher and writer, accused IAIN as an institution which encouraged its students to convert to another religion (Jaiz 2002). He believed that IAIN taught its students liberal thinking which caused them to be negligent towards their religious obligations. This type of accusation is nothing new. IAIN has been a target of critics for a long time and is considered to be a secular institution which poisons the thinking of the younger Muslim generation.

Meanwhile, JIL, FUI (Forum Umat Islam) and the Salafi's radical wing in Bandung, West Java, condemned Ulil Abshar Abdalla, the NU coordinator and youth intellectual, and accused him of being a *murtad* (leaving Islam). Therefore, he was "allowed" to be killed. It is important to say that JIL is a forum which regularly holds seminars and conferences on the importance of inter-religion dialogues and pluralism as well as working together with Muslim and non-Muslim organizations. His presence provoked many Muslim groups since this organization promoted secularism and liberalism among the Muslims. The attack on Ulil reflected a poor relationship between the traditionalists and the modernists in Indonesia.[21] The Syi'ah and Ahmadiyah cults were also attacked by the Salafi. The Salafi believed that the Syi'ah cult was kafir since

21 M. Sya_i'i Anwar, "Political Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Contest between "Radical-Conservative Islam" and "Progressive Liberal Islam," dalam Eric Tagliacozzo, *Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Duree*, (Standford: Standford University Press, 2009), pp349-385.

they insulted the Companions. The Syi'ah rejected all Companions excpet Ali bin Abi Thalib and his followers. At the higher level, this issue was not only between the Salafi and Syi'ah, but also between the Sunni and the Syi'ah cult. This dispute was derived from the issue of authority after the death of the Prophet. From this polemic, the conflict moved to politic.

The history also shows that there has been a long-time conflict between the two groups. Now the Salafis accused the Syi'ahs of being the actor behind various political conflicts in the Middle East which killed a lot of Sunnis. Likewise, the Syi'ahs accused the Sunnis of being the puppet of the dictators in the Middle East. The Salafi also accused the Ahmadiyahs of being a non-Islamic sect and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of Ahmadiyah, of being a false prophet. Along with other Muslim groups, the Salafi demanded Ahmadiyah to proclaim itself as a non-Islamic sect (Burhani, 2013). Based on the explanation above, it is clear that the issue of bid'ah can easily shift from the religious domain to social and politic. This issue disrupts the harmony among the Muslims and the relationship between the majority and the minority groups. It can also encourage the emergence of radicalism. Hate speech addressed towards the minorities such as Ahmadiyah and Syi'ah also may provoke other Muslim groups to be violent and may disrupt a healthy religious life.

The Book of al-Tauhid

The Salafi has been using the terms kafir and shirk for centuries and more than other written works, the al-Tauhid Book, written by the founder of Wahabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, is an important book that discusses this issue. In Saudi Arabia, this book is used as the main reference in their religious teaching to shape the Salafism ideology. Through its alumni who return to their own countries, this book is introduced to other parts of the world. This book is taught in many Salafi madrasah across Indonesia. While other books have been replaced, this book has been used for decades and almost indispensable since it contains important Salafism principles. Interestingly, the beauty of this book lies in its simplicity. Each chapter and sub-chapter is written systematically and contains the important points complemented with the verses of the Qur'an, the hadiths of the Prophet, and a glossary for difficult words.

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's thoughts were shaped and influenced by the time and the place he lived in the rural area of Uyainah, in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Rasheed 2002:14-38). There and then the practices of Islam were interwoven with mystical elements which tainted the purity of the *tauhid*. People came to the *syaikh* (the Islamic scholar) to ask for blessings and then the *syaikh* gave them a talisman or a spell. The graveyards of the *wali* also became a shrine. This was the reason why he wrote the *al-Tauhid* book which was meant to purify the *tauhid* (the Oneness of Allah) from various forms of shirk which is to worship someone or something other than Allah.

In the pre-Islamic era, shirk was marked by all forms of idol worshipping. This was then change into the worshipping of items such as talismans and spells. Ibn al-Wahhab explained in his book, "Mu'adz ibn Jabal said: I am guiding the camel that the Prophet is riding on. He asked me, "O Mu'adz, do you know the right of Allah from his creations? I replied: Allah and His Prophet know better. He said: the right of Allah from His creations is that they worship him and do not worship others. And the right of the creations from their Creator (Allah) is that He will not punish those who never worship others."

> "… Imran ibn Husain said that the Prophet saw a man wearing a talisman in his hand. The Prophet asked what that is. The man said: This is a talisman from a shaman. The Prophet told him: Take it off. Take it off. It will not give you anything but worries and fear. When you die and you still wear the talisman, you will be at a loss." "Ibn Mas'ud said: I heard the Prophet said: talisman and *tamimah* are shirk."(Narrated by Ahmad and Abu Dawud)."

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was very concerned with the practices that can taint the purity of the tauhid. He strongly rejected philosophy since it required the use of logics and mysticism mediated by the teachers. According to him, this practice was corrupt. Spiritual experiences can only be reached through prescribed rituals such as the compulsory prayers and not through mystical speculations. The revivalist Wahabi put forward the theme of kafir and shirk in their talks and they are consistently repeating this theme

to remind the Salafi of their danger. In many occasions, Salafi preachers bring up this theme to their Muslim audience mentioned the words kafir and *musyrik* (the people who perform shirk) from the podium. One of the causes of the hate speeches in the religious discourse in Indonesia is the Salafi preachers since they use these words to attack other Muslim groups so much so that they are called Salafi Takfiri. Bin Baz, one of the Saudi's contemporary ulama and the prominent mufti in Saudi Arabia thought that the Ahmadiyahs are kafir.

> "Qadian is a kafir because he believes that Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet and has received revelations. This is against the principles of Islam. He and his people are against Allah and His Prophet. They are kafir although they fast and pray. They falsely believe they are Muslims."

Qadiani is a group of Ahmadis who believe in the continuation of the revelations after the death of Prophet Muhammad and their presence sparked a controversy among the Muslim. In 1982, Rabithah 'Alam Islami issued a fatwa inspired by Bin Baz who thought that the Ahmadiyah was not an Islamic sect. This fatwa influenced Muslims all over Sunni's world who generally belong to the Rabithah sect. In the past few decades, Ahmadiyah members have often been publicly prosecuted in Indonesia and become the targets of religious radicalism. This prosecution was escalated by the Salafi who brought back the fatwa. Not all Salafi groups approve of the prosecution and a number of people argue that the use of kafir is Allah's prerogative right since only He knows whether a person is a kafir or not. The Muslims believe that the Ahmadiyah has deviated from the *aqidah* (the Islamic creeds), but it does not mean that they are allowed to be prosecuted.

The Wahdah Islamiyah, a big Salafi group in East Indonesia, believes that the Ahmadis need to be guided back to the correct Islam in a wise manner. At the same time the Wahdah reminds all Muslims to build a good relationship not only to the Ahmadiyahs, but also to other Muslim groups including the Syi'ahs. Hasyim, a Wahdah Islamiyah preacher, mentioned a conference held by the UIN Makassar that he attended in Makassar. He and his friends were involved in a heated debate with the Syi'ahs. The conference

also invited several prominent Syi'ah members from Bandung and one of them was Jalaluddin Rakhmat. Ustadz Jalal, his nickname, is one of the founding members of IJABI (Ikatan Jama'ah Ahl al-Bait Indonesia). In the discussion, a young Wahdah ustadz asked why Ustadz Jalal only used Syi'ah sources in explaining the Companions and ignored the Sunni's sources. Ustadz Jalal was speechless and cannot explain why. Eventually, he said that he would study the Sunni's ulama books again. The discussion ended without any fuss.

Many Salafi groups, according to Hasyim, believe that Syi'ah is kafir since they look down on the Companions. The Wahdah carefully responded to this accusation. Hasyim commented further, "We never use that term [kafir]. Never. We preach according to the way taught by the Prophet. The Qur'an said that preaching must be done wisely, which is to give advice, to give good examples, and to argue if necessary. This is what we have been doing all this time. However, this does not mean we are soft. Frankly, the Wahdah has received a lot of criticism from other Salafi groups. They claim we are not the Salafi, but the Sururi, and so on. We don't listen to this type of criticism. It is no use." Wahdah is a Salafi group which can be categorized as a reformist Salafi and not the revivalist. Although it puts pressure on the importance of an authentic Islam, Wahdah avoids the use of derogatory terms such as kafir as it thinks the terms are not productive towards its missionary work. It believes in the Salafi's teaching guidance, the Salafi Manhaj, but it also emphasizes on the unity of the *ummah*. Islam forbids the Muslims from accusing other Muslims kafir or shirk. In one of the hadiths, the Prophet said: "Whoever accuses his brother kafir, this accusation will return to him. If the accusation is true, then it is true. If it is not, the accusation will return to him. The person who makes the accusation is (the one who is) kafir," (Narrated by Muslim). Based on this hadith, Wahdah advises its preachers to be careful using this term in their sermons since the implication is very dangerous.

B. PURIFICATION VERSUS CAPITALIZATION

The Salafi understands *bid'ah* as an absolute concept. The piety can only be obtained by performing standard religious rituals such as salah, fasting and reading the Qur'an. This type of piety is

called the *shariah* piety and it is different from the traditionalists' mystical piety (Woodward, 1989; Woodward, 2010). The Salafis strictly reject religious rituals such as tahlil and tabarruk. If the traditionalists' rituals are performed in areas where the traditionalists and the Salafis co-exist, people who are forced to attend these rituals will only stay silent during the rituals. They will not recite any prayers until the rituals are completed.

The absence of the Salafis from the traditionalists' rituals affects the Salafis' movement. Since the Salafis has a readily available pool of funds that can be used for many purposes, they use it to fund their education and social institutions as well as other programs that they consider important. However, their refusal to attend the collective rituals limits their social interaction within the community since they can only strengthen social networks and civic values if they attend their activities.

Different from the Salafis, the rituals of the traditionalists perform are varied. The traditionalists tend to relate these rituals with broader social political issues which may benefit them. This is called the capitalization of the rituals. Tahlil, for example, is an example of a collective ritual. During Tahlil, people recite Surah Yasin and other prayers for around 30 minutes. In practice, this simple ritual may turn into an effective method of a social fabrication. The elders and village officials are always in attendance and the younger generation also attend albeit with a different purpose. The ritual will be even more crowded if there is food served (Muhaimin, 1995).[22]

After the ritual has finished, the attendees normally pick a certain topic to discuss. The topic may relate to a social or political issue. It is clear that the religious reason is not the only reason why people attend this type of ritual. They also use this occasion to socialize. People might put forward new ideas during the discussion and the elders who possess many experiences and knowledge may start the discussion by mentioning current issues in the community such as the weather or drought. Others will respond to this issue by saying that the experts have warned them

22 Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (2), 1960, pp228-249; John R Bowen, *Muslim through Discourses: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp229-250; Robert W Hefner, *Civil Islam and Democratization in Indonesia*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp104-125.

the danger of global warming, the greenhouse effect, etc.

In a different occasion, the discussion may relate to local politics such as the upcoming election, the incumbent village head's nomination and a new nominee as the contender. The discussion will end when the elders stand up signing that the host needs to rest. This type of discussion sounds meaningless, but a number of studies have shown that as an institution, Tahlil has contributed to the strengthening of civic values among the traditionalists (Mujani, 2003).

Another example of the collective ritual is the *haul* (anniversary) which also becomes an effective way of social and political mobilization. This would have a stronger effect if it is held to commemorate the death of the *wali*s or prominent community leaders. The *haul* of Abdurrahman Wahid, a former President of Indonesia and the main figure in NU, held at the end of December, is always attended by many people and becomes a social and political event. Thousands of people - entrepreneurs, politicians, bureaucrats and common people - come to his house in Ciganjur, South Jakarta, for this event. Before the 2014 and 2019 election, many politicians attended the *haul* with the purpose of gaining political supports and votes from the traditionalists.

When the writers were still studying in a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Cirebon, West Java, tens of thousands of people attended the hauls of the *masyayikh* and the founders of the *pesantren*. Students, alumni, officials, politicians, celebrities, and even people from out of town were also in attendance. Before the main event, people decorated the *pesantren* and did a lot of repairs to the building. They erected a big stage near the Grand Mosque where the guests would listen to a speech given by an important person. Meanwhile, along the roads to the *pesantren*, the merchants would offer their products to the visitors. During the *haul*, which normally took place after the Friday prayer, the visitors went to the tombs of the *masyayikh* to pray for them. Then the haul ended. Other activities, however, just began. The visitors went to see the *kyai*s, to pay them a visit, to ask various religious questions or just to chat with them accompanied with light snacks. They can meet their former classmates and chat with them on various topics including serious political issues.

The Politization of Rituals

The politization of rituals refers to rituals which are held in a certain context and the people holding the rituals use this opportunity to negotiate with and to exercise their power on other groups.[23] To understand the motives of the people, we cannot see only the forms of the rituals, but we need to see further in the historical background and the social structure where the rituals are held. In this relationship, Hefner explains:

> "To understand the meaning of myths and rituals, we need to look further than the symbolism that can be found in the medium of the rituals as if their significance is embedded since the beginning. The image as the "vehicle" of the symbolism as can be seen in a number of definitions on cultures masks the roles of the actors in understanding their world." (Hefner 1989: 20).

A number of rituals have a deep root in the history of a community that carries out these rituals. The Gayo tribe in Aceh says that the medication or harvesting ritual is their characteristics and it is difficult for people to say otherwise.[24] Meanwhile, the Muslim Hui tribe in China developed their national identity through rituals and changed the idea of a homogeneous China (Gladney 1998). In Java, the politicization of rituals has been around for a long time and the social groupings have been formed based on the ritual practice.

In Indonesia, the traditionalists, the modernists, and the Salafis are equally involved in the politization of the rituals as a part of their identities. Back then, it was easy to differentiate the groups by simply asking these questions: Do you do *qunut* or not? Do you do *tahlil* or not? Do you do *tabarruk* or not? If the answer is yes, it can be guaranteed that the group is traditionalists. A long time ago, the traditionalists did 23 *raka'at* for the *tarawih* prayer (20 *raka'at for tarawih* and *3 raka'at f*or *witir* prayer). This issue once caused serious debates and even conflicts between the two

23 James L Peacock, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam*, (Berkeley: University of California Press,1978); Hefner, 1985; John R Bowen, *Muslim through Discourses: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

24 John R Bowen, *Muslim through Discourses: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society,* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p229.

groups. In the 1980s, many traditionalist groups began to do 11 raka'at of tarawih although it does not mean they turned into modernists. They explained that the 11 raka'at also had a good and acceptable *fiqih* (legal) basis.

In the Ramadhan month, the time when the Muslims do the tarawih prayer, the traditionalists and the modernists group themselves and this is unavoidable. The modernists pray in their mosques and so do the traditionalists. In places where religious grouping is not important such as in campuses, the mosque administrator will give both groups a chance to do the tarawih prayer according to their beliefs. Therefore, after the modernists complete their 11 raka'at of prayer and leave the mosque, the traditionalists will stay and continue the prayer until 23 raka'at is completed. This phenomenon is almost never seen outside campuses since each mosque is controlled by a certain group.

Although people's perception on a number of rituals may change, their perception on other rituals may not. This is true for the traditionalists in regard to tabarruk and tahlil. They keep on performing these rituals until now. Meanwhile, the modernists still avoid them. Tahlil may be an important variable to differentiate the traditionalists and the modernists.

On the other hand, the *hisab* (determination of the beginning of Ramadhan and Syawal) is an important characteristic of the modernists. While the traditionalists use the rukyat method, the modernists, especially Muhammadiyah, still use the hisab method. Often times, the followers of Muhammadiyah, since they use the hisab method, celebrate the Eid Day one day earlier than other Muslims who prefer to celebrate the Eid Day on the date set by the government, which in this case, is the Ministry of Religious Affairs. However, when the Ministry of Religious Affairs is controlled by the followers of Muhammadiyah, Muhammadiyah and the government celebrate Eid Day on the same day while the followers of NU, who use a different determination method, begin their fasting or celebrate Eid Day one day later.

The controversy on the rituals re-emerged and reached its peak with the presence of the Salafis. The political reason behind this was through the rituals, the Salafis did not only define itself, but showed its power to the other groups. The politization of rituals normally happen on rituals that are held publicly and draw

the public's attention. More than other rituals, Friday prayers are an important event where the Salafis shows their strengths since they are held regularly and involve a lot of Muslim groups. Mosques then become the locus where politics and the identity of a group interweave, and they also become a strategic Islamic institution which profoundly influences the Muslims.

Friday prayers are collective rituals and various symbols related to them become the source of disputes. One of these symbols is the first *adzan* (the call for prayer). A number of Muslim groups use the first *adzan* while others consider it as a *bid'ah*. It is important to note that the origin of the first *adzan* is not based on the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad but based on a decision made by Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second Caliph. Umar believed that the number of Muslims increased, and they were widely spread under his leadership. The second adzan, the real adzan, was recited just before the khatib delivered his sermon and was considered not enough to call people to pray. The Caliph then had the idea of turning the first adzan into the first call until the Muslims had enough time to prepare and to leave for the mosque in time. When he put forward this idea to the other Companions, they agreed. Since then, the first adzan was formally legalized. When the modernist movement appeared at the end of the 19th Century, they abolished the first *adzan*.

The reason why they abolished this was the fact that people knew time or created the clock and they should have known that the Friday prayers were held around 12 o'clock. This rule was carried out in all modernist's mosques to let the congregation know that they were modernist's mosques. The traditionalists, on the hand, preferred to keep the first adzan and they also use a *bedug* (drum) to mark the beginning of the prayer time. Though the modernists rejected the use of *bedug* and considered it as a *bid'ah*, it is still the symbol of traditional (Indonesian) Islam until now.

The competitions on symbols in Salafi's mosques are even more intense. However, there is no first adzan and there no *bedug* since both are considered a *bid'ah*. One hour before the beginning of each prayer time, the locals are expected to cease their normal activities and around 12 noon, the *muazin* stands up and recites the adzan. The khatib then stands and is ready for his sermon. The physical appearance of the Salafi khatibs (preacher) may be like

the modernists or traditionalists. They grow long beard and have black spots on their foreheads. They wear a *gamis* (a robe) and a *sorban* (a male headdress). The main characteristic of the Salafi sermon, however, can be found at the beginning of the sermon:

> Alhamdulillah (Praise be to Allah). We have to be grateful to Him. We have to ask for His help and His mercy. Let us all ask Allah to protect us from our own wrongdoings and our lack of good deeds. Whoever Allah guides will never be lost and whoever Allah leads astray, no one will be able to guide them. I testify that there is no god, but Allah and I testify that Muhammad is His messenger. The best of the words are Allah's words, the best of guidance is His Prophet Muhammad's guidance. The worst of actions is bid'ah; All things new are bid'ah, and all bid'ah are heresy, and all heresy belong to th hellfire.

This is the most common opening in the Salafi's sermons. The Khatib always reminds the congregation to adhere to the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad's guidance. This opening is rarely found in the traditionalist's mosques but is very common in Salafi's mosques. While Salafi's sermons are mostly taken from the sermons of the Prophet and the Companions, the traditionalist's sermons are more varied since they use a variety of sources.

Although the Salafi khatib begins his sermon with *hamdalah* and *shalawat*, they do not use the word *sayyidina* in front of the Prophet's name. This word also differentiates the traditionalists and modernists. The traditionalists always attempt to interpret the verses in the Qur'an and then add notes or explanations on the texts they read. The Salafis, on the other hand, only read the texts, from verses to verses, from hadith to hadith. They quote directly from the texts. If they want to add anything, they only quote the Salafi's ulama's opinions.

Different from the followers of the Syafi'i mazhab - the mazhab which is followed by most Indonesian Muslims - who read *basmalah* loudly when they recite the surah al-Fatihah, the Salafis, which is close to the Hanbali mazhab, do not. They read basmalah softly and do not recite it when they read the surah. The Salafis place their hands on the left side of the chest - right above the liver

- and extend their legs for the male looking down on the place where they rest their head. The Salafi's *ruku'* (bow) is longer and they press their heads harder when they bow. As a result, they have dark spots on their foreheads. The Salafis are mocked by other Muslim groups saying that the dark spots on their heads do not necessarily mean a higher degree of faith. The traditionalists claim that the bow mark/dark spots (QS al-Fath [48]: 29) means that the faces of the people with the bow mark will light up in the afterlife out of sheer joy of meeting their God.

Generally, the Salafis pray close to each other and create no gaps in between the people praying. They believe that Satans are the ones who fill in these gaps. Their feet touch and are even placed on top of each other. Before they pray, the imam will check on the *shaf* (gaps/lines) and straighten the lines if they are not straight or close the gaps if they are still gaps. The Imam will not start the prayer until this is done. The close gaps and straight lines show a strong unity among the Muslims and it is said that the Muslims are like a strong building (QS ash-Shaff [61]: 4). "Straighten the *shaf* because a straight *shaf* is a part of a perfect salah." (Narrated by Bukhari)

Also while the traditionalists perform *wirid* (a loud recitation of prayers) and other good deeds after salah, the Salafis do not. After salah, the Salafis sit and recite the prayers slowly and softly. After that, one by one the congregation stands and leaves the mosque quickly. It is said that after salah, the Muslims must spread out on the face of the earth to seek Allah's blessing (QS al-Jumu'ah [62]: 10). After salah, they don't shake hands, but shake hands in other occasions. They consider shaking hands after salah a *bid'ah* since there is no hadith which narrates the Prophet Muhammad shaking hands after the compulsory prayers. In a number of Salafi's mosques, there are even a list of things that are forbidden after salah and one of them is shaking hands.

C. CLOSING

The Salafi developed a Puritan religious discourse among the community by campaigning the danger of *shirk* and *bid'ah* and asking the Muslims to maintain the purity of the *tauhid.* The Salafi's religious understanding is very literal. They emphasize on the words in the holy texts. A good deed is therefore not

considered valid if the words or the verse in regard to the good deed are not clearly stated in the Qur'an or *al-Sunnah*. If the words or the verse cannot be found in the main texts, the opinions of the Salafi ulamas should only be used as references.

This type of missionary work provokes the anger of the traditionalist Muslims who are very flexible in their interpretation of the Qur'an dan al-Hadith. They allow the practices of rituals originated from local traditions and have a different interpretation of *bid'ah*. Out in the open, the two opposing groups often meet and fortunately, physical confrontations have been avoidable most of the time. Not so long ago, however, when the Salafi campaign was very aggressive, the traditionalists warned the Salafi not to use the mosques for this purpose. Due to its importance to the Islamic community, mosques often become "a battle ground" between the Islamic groups and the mosques are used in politics to form and to preserve the authority of certain Muslim groups. Through mosques, they also try to influence other groups.

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Examining the Root of Radicalism in Mosques

Rita Pranawati

A. MOSQUES AND THEIR ROLES IN HISTORY

Since Islamic civilization began, mosques have played an important role in Muslims' life. Mosques have allowed the Muslims to meet face-to-face, to create a bond among them and also to unite their thoughts. Throughout the history, mosques have not only been a center of worship, but also a center of Muslim empowerment as well as civilization. In mosques, the Islamic missionary work, or well-known to the Muslims as *dakwah*, is planned, formulated and spread.

Linguistically, a mosque means a place to bow heads to worship Allah SWT. This is because a mosque is *isimmakan* from *sajada yasjudu, sujudan*. Although a hadith narrated by HR Bukhori says that people can bow their heads in any place as long as the place fulfills the requirements (of a place to pray), to gather the Muslims in one place, the Prophet Muhammad built the first mosque, the Quba Mosque, after he moved to Madinah.

The Qur'an Surah al-Taubah [9]:108 says that the Muslims are advised to pray in a mosque if they want to become one of the pure people and if they want to purify themselves. Aside from that, a hadith narrated by HR Bukhori Muslim says that the Prophet says, The earth has been made for me a mosque and a means of purification.[1] This means that mosques are not only made as

1 Muhammad bin Ismail al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut: Dar Ibn Katsir al-Yamamah, n.d.), p.335; Also see Muslim bin al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim (Beirut: Dar Ihya' at-Turats al- Araby, n.d.), p.523 in Agus Sunaryo, Masjid dan Ideologisasi Radikalisme Islam: Menyoal Peran Masjid Sebagai Media Transformasi Ideologi, AKADEMIKA, Vol. 22, No 01 January-June 2017.

a place to bow (pray) but also a place for other activities which reflect our devotion to Allah SWT. Religious rituals do not only have spiritual meanings but also social, economic, education and even political meanings.[2] This is shown in the Qur'an Surah Al-Jin Verse 18: "Mosques belong to Allah, so do not invoke anyone with Him."

If mosques were only for praying, the Prophet did not need to take so much efforts in building them. The historical evidence shows that in mosques, the Prophet built the community's social life, to regulate not only relationship among people in the community, but also relationship among people, nature and *hablum minallah*. Mosques became the place to learn, to hold discussion, to discuss strategies for wars, to look after the casualties for wars until to receive guests from other countries.[3]

After the Quba Mosque, the next mosque that *Rasulullah* built was the Nabawi Mosque. In the Nabawi Mosque, *Rasulullah* intensively gave lessons and taught classes there. The lesson might about laws and rules, society, and the sources of Islamic teachings. A group of people, the *ahl al-Shuffah,* also used the mosque to learn the religion specially. Furthermore, the Nabawi mosque was also the center of Islamic information, the place to settle legal matters and disputes in the community, and the center of social and political activities.[4]

Mosques were also one of the places used by the incumbent rulers to solidify their power and dominance. Through sermons and religious literacy[5], the Abbasiyah and Umayyah Dynasty or Syiah and Sunni used mosques directly and indirectly for their propaganda. One example was the naming of the Caliph that the preacher or the mosque supported at the end of their Friday sermon. Another example was the Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo which was the main mosque in its era. It was established by the Fatimiyah Dynasty to increase the Syiah influence in the region.

From the explanation above, it can be seen that mosques have not only been the center of compulsory religious rituals and

2 *Ibid*

3 Haidz Dasuki, *et al*, Ensiklopedi Islam, III, (Jakarta: PT Ichtiar Baru, 1994), p.176; Also see M. Quraish Shihab, Wawasan al-Qur'an, (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), p.462.

4 Aziz Muslim, Manajemen Pengelolaan Masjid, dalam Jurnal Aplikasia (Aplikasi Ilmu-ilmu Agama), Vol V, No. 2 December 2004, pp.105-114.

5 Amelia Fauzia, "Faith and the State: A history of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia" PhD Dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2008, pp.59-77.

the places for learning Islam, but also the driver of social and economic activities in the community. During the Prophet's era, the Quba Mosque was used as the place for teaching Islam and the Nabawi Mosque was used to strengthen the community.[6] The Prophet himself showed the people how to strengthen the many roles of the mosques - as the center of religious education, the center of missionary work, as well as the center of community and economy.

After the death of the Prophet until the golden era of the Abbassiyyah dynasty, there were not big changes in the roles of the mosques. The main functions of the mosques stayed the same which were the centers for missionary work, social, economic and educational activities. During this era, however the mosque also served a particular function for the government. It became the central place for the government to hold discussions among government officials and between the government and the community.[7]

Wherever there are Islamic communities, there will mosques. Based on the data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, there are 31 provincial mosques, 4,305 big mosques, 851 historical mosques, 486 municipal mosques, 203,506 village mosques, dan 3,611 registered public mosques.[8] The vice president, Jusuf Kalla, who is also the Head of Indonesia's Council of Mosques, mentioned that the number of mosques in Indonesia was around 800 thousand[9] - an extraordinary number with a tremendous potential to develop the Indonesian Muslim specifically and Indonesia in general.

While before mosques used to be managed by the leaders of community or the state, now they are self-managed by community. Different mosque managerial styles or preferences especially in Indonesia have lessened the inclusivity of the mosques. Some mosques are managed by the community and very open while some look as if they belong to a certain group of people. Mosques such as village mosques, government mosque, state-own enterprise

6 Sidi Gazalba, Masyarakat Islam: Pengantar Sosiologi dan Sosiografi, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1976), p.150.
7 Shihab, Wawasan al-Qur'an, p.463.
8 http://simas.kemenag.go.id/, accessed in January 2019.
9 https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1144964/cerita-jk-pamer-ke-raja-arab-saudi-jumlah-masjid-di-Indonesia, accessed in January 2019.

mosque, and campus mosques are examples of mosques exclusive to certain areas. Some believe that the exclusivity of the mosques was due to the ideology/cult of the mosque managers and this exclusivity allows a certain degree of radicalism to infiltrate the mosques. Therefore, it is very important for us to maintain the mosques' moderatism.

B. THE INDICATORS OF RADICAL MOSQUES

Thedorson states that radicalism is an approach without compromise due to dissatisfaction on ongoing social and political issues and a desire to carry out fundamental and new changes, including leadership issue.[10] Radicalism is also a form of dissatisfaction on the existing order and system and a desire to change them with new and comprehensive (radic) ones. Aside from that, this approach believes that it is the only correct approach and ignores others and therefore, results in irrational attitudes and justifies violence (in its approach).[11] The radicals possess a closed mentality so it is common for them to use violence to achieve their goals. The most extreme measure from the radicals is terrorism.[12]

Islamisme is tendency for the Muslims to put forward Islam as an ideology.[13] A contemporary Islamisme cannot be separated from the challenges of globalism and modernity which exist in today's world. Efforts to implement Islamic traditions in the modern era make them sort and choose what comes from modern life but have different views in seeing modernity, its challenges and solutions.[14] The radicals' efforts to implement Islamic traditions in this modern era prompt them to separate and select ideas that are originated from a modern life even though their views on modernity, challenges and solutions might be different.[14] The meaning of this sentence is not clear. There are 5 ideological

10 M. Zaki Mubarok, Geneologi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran, dan Prospek Demokrasi, (Jakarta: LP3ES), p.53.

11 Horace M. Kallen, Radicalism, dalam Edwin RA Seligman, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol XIII-XIV, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1997), pp.51-54.

12 Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p.7.

13 William E Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards A Typology" in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.19 (1987). pp.307-335

14 Ridwan Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp.23-42.

issues put forward by the radicals[15]:

***First*, the government system** which includes the *khilafah Islamiyah* and Islamic State versus democracy. In the issue of the government system, the radicals reject democracy, which they consider a western concept, and view the *khilafah* system as the best choice. They believe that *khilafah* system is built on three foundations: sovereignty is not at the hands of the people but based on *Sharia* (Islamic laws), people's power is represented by the caliph, and the caliph is mandated (by the people) to formulate *Sharia*-based laws.[16] They also believe that Allah's laws are the limit of all political power while democracy allows humans to have an absolute authority.[17]

Our forefathers founded the Republic of Indonesia to unite a diversified Indonesian nation from Sabang until Merauke. Indonesia gives its citizens the freedom to practice their religions. If Indonesia changes its current republic system to the *khilafah* system or an Islamic state, it would mean that it no longer commits to the consensus made by the forefathers, which is the freedom to practice their religions.

***Second*, the implementation or the formalization of Islamic Sharia** versus a democratic constitutional system. The implementation of Islamic Sharia means the implementation of Islamic laws, including the Islamic criminal laws. Although Indonesia is not an Islamic country, it allows the Muslims to practice their religion in the community. For example, Islamic religious courts are established by the government to allow Muslims to implement the Islamic laws. This law, however, does not apply to all citizens. Indonesia has national laws, including criminal laws, which are enforced to all citizens. The formalization of Islam Sharia may mean that non-Muslims will be marginalized and forced to obey the Islamic laws. This may disrupt the nation's harmony. The implementation of Islamic criminal laws may also deny the existence of national laws formulated based on the framework of democracy.

***Third*, jihad against the enemy of Islam**. Jihad for the radicals means fighting for the enemies of Islam, which may be

15 Ibid, pp.23-42.
16 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, Bogor: PTI, 2003, pp.201-210
17 Ibid, pp.23-42.

the western countries or Islamic groups working with the West seeking to destroy Islam. Jihad also means the comprehensive enforcement of Islamic Sharia. Jihad is implemented in Indonesia since the radicals believe that Indonesia is *darul harbi* (a war zone). The moderates, however, think otherwise. To them, Jihad means *jihadunnafsi*, or jihad against desires. They also reject jihad as a physical war through the use of violence and terrorism.

Fourth, **gender equality**. The Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad placed women as an equal to men. The radicals, however, think that women's place is at home taking care and educating the children, as well as dedicating their lives to the family. Since family is very important, if women choose to do their activities outside of their homes, they will be influenced by the western cultures. This may in turn affect the moral of the family. The radicals clearly reject the leadership of women in public domains, including the seat of presidency since it is against Islamic teachings.[18]

Meanwhile, the moderates think that the issues of gender and sex need to be differentiated. Surah An-Nisa [4]: 34 does say that *arrijalu qowwamuna 'alannisa* (Men are the protectors of women). This surah however cannot be read on its own. The next verse explains the requirements, which is "… since Allah has granted them some advantages over another and since men spend some of their wealth".[19] Leadership in this matter is not related to the gender, but the ability and qualification.

***First*, pluralism** is a belief on diversity and plurality. The radical Islamists reject pluralism since it places all religions as equals. They also claim that other religions and other groups that do not share their views are infidels. The goal of pluralism is to build a positive view on plurality and tolerance, to avoid hate speeches, to respect minorities' rights and to respect the freedom of religions.[20] The moderates actively promote tolerance as an effort to maintain plurality while the radicals prefer to avoid and despise other religions or call other religions infidels.

18 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Jakarta, LP3ES-KITLV Jakarta, 2008

19 Nasaruddin Umar, Argumen Kesetaraan Jender Perspektif al-Qur'an, Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001, pp.21-22, 150-151.

20 Ridwan Al-Makassary dan Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), pp.40-41.

To find out more about the level of radicalism practiced in a mosque, the researchers dug deeper into the perception of the Takmirs or the mosque administrators, as well as the religious education and management practiced by the mosque. The researchers also believed that it was important for them to find out the potentials for the elements of radicalism to enter the mosque. For this purpose, they looked at the current management for the religious activities, funding, the selection criteria for the preachers, decision making processes, determination of religious education materials, the method for religious teaching, and the current state of religious education students. The mosque management becomes the key to see whether the mosque is moderate, has been infiltrated by radicalism, or is managed by the radical groups. Furthermore, to verify whether the mosque belongs to the moderates or radicals, the researchers looked at the content of the sermons, the existing information media in the mosque such as bulletin boards and the topics discussed in Islamic study groups.

C. MOSQUES AND THE CHALLENGE OF RADICALISM

A few studies on mosques have illustrated how the mosques were infiltrated by radicalism. Since the time of the Prophet until now, mosques have faced different challenges. In Indonesia, for example, the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) group promotes *jihad* through mosques. One particular example was Imam Samudra and Jabir who met in Al-Furqon mosque in Kramat in an Islamic discussion group session and later on, Imam Samudra recruited him to be the member of Darul Islam.[21]

Propaganda of certain ideologies often happens in mosques. Even moderate groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU have been deceived by the radicals' activities in mosques.[22] Often times, the radicals change the way religious rituals are performed since these rituals are not according to the rituals they practice and other times, they change the symbols in mosques since these symbols are not in line with the radical's belief. Furthermore,

21 Ken Ward, "Indonesian Terrorism: From Jihad to Dakwah" in Greag Feally dan Sally White (eds), Expressing Islam, Religious Life, and Politics in Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p.216.

22 Abdurrahman Wahid, ed., Ilusi Negara Islam, Jakarta: Desantra Utama Media, 2009, p.191.

since the members of these radical groups show dedication to the mosque such as coming to the mosque on time for prayers and contributing to the mosque's maintenance, the mosque's congregation often feels sympathetic towards them. Since they also like to involve their friends in the mosque's activities, the Takmir has no objection in including them and their friends in the mosque management. In time, the radicals are able to take control of the mosque management and decide who can or cannot give sermons in the mosque. Although this case did happen in Pati, this is also happening in mosques in other regions as well.[23] The next part will discuss the findings of the studies done by CSRC and P3M on mosques and the infiltration of radicalism in mosques.

a. The Study on Mosques by CSRC

The study conducted by Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah on mosques and the promotion of peace in Poso, Ambon, Ternate, and Papua revealed that grand mosques in each city played a vital role in promoting peace and preventing conflicts[24] even though this role was not optimized and short term. Mosques had not implemented systematic programs to promote peace in mosques and among the Muslims and still held on to their traditional roles which are a place of worship, to preserve the morals and the fight of the Muslims. Sadly, when reading the history of Islam taught in schools and history books, it is difficult to picture Islam as a religion that promotes peace.

However, Islam is a religion of *rahmatan lil-'alamin* (a blessing for the world), not of war. According to Irfan Amalee, Muhammad SAW only spent 10%, or 800 out of 8000 days, of his prophethood life to lead the Muslims' political life, either as the head of the military, legal matters and state[25], and spent 40% to perform his social roles which were as a prophet, a humanist, an investor, an investment manager, a shepherd, a merchant, and an educator. The rest of the 50% was spent to perform his personal roles which were a noble person, an intellectual, a father and a husband. This

23 *Ibid*, p.29

24 Ridwan Al-Makassary, Amelia Fauzia, and Irfan Abubakar, Masjid dan Pembangunan Perdamaian, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010).

25 Irfan Amalee, Komikirfan, https://www.instagram.com/p/BqZimb9Bhsa/, accessed in January 2019.

means that his missions were more to materialize a more peaceful Islam.

The conflicts should have forced grand mosques to take the role of a house for the Muslims. They should have become a medium to unify these heterogenic people to guard them against the infiltration of radicalism. Although grand mosques were supposed to be moderate, they were not able to implement this fully. During conflicts, the presence of the Jihad Soldiers in Ambon, for example, was considered a part of the conflict's negotiation.[26]. Although in time of peace the moderates took back the control of the grand mosques' management, the mosques still accommodated radicalism. For example, the Salafi group members still became the teachers in after-school Islamic schools in Ambon or the Salafi Wahabi became the tutors of Islamic study groups in Poso. A study conducted by CSRC UIN Jakarta, which mapped the ideology of mosques in Jakarta areas, found that 21% of the mosque's Takmirs agreed that it is their obligation to establish the Islamic State and 32% said that it is their obligation to fight for *khilafah* (the caliphate system). Meanwhile, 89% agreed that Pancasila and the 1945 constitution as the best model and 78% believed that democracy is the best government system.[27]

In relation to the Islamic Sharia, 14% of the Takmirs agreed that they need to fight the government that does not implement Islamic Sharia and 31% agreed that Indonesia must implement the Islamic criminal laws. 74%, however, disagreed that the most important jihad is war and 89% believed that *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* may not be enforced with violence. The latest data revealed that even though radicalism had somehow influenced the Takmirs in Jakarta, they still disapproved violence to enforce *amar ma'ruf.* This is a good sign since these Takmirs still made efforts to preserve the moderatism. In the meantime, the existing potential for radicalism needs to be managed so that it does not become stronger.

In terms of mosque management, 59% of the Takmirs were not involved in the selection of discussion topics although 93%

26 Ridwan Al-Makassary, Amelia Fauzia, dan Irfan Abubakar, Masjid dan Pembangunan Perdamaian, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.34.

27 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.91.

said that they oversaw the topics. Generally, 88.4% of the Takmirs conducted open discussions, 11.2% conducted closed ones, while 0.4% did not know.

The finding above confirms that mosques are a potential ground for radicalism since the Takmirs are not involved in the selection of topics and some mosques allow closed discussions.

A study conducted in mosques in Solo found that generally, mosques are moderate and have an open and transparent management.[28] However, radicalism can still infiltrate certain aspects of the mosques. Exclusive mosques, such as Gumuk Mangkubumen Solo Mosque, do not allow general public to enter and to hold discussions inside the mosques. From the 'uniform' that they wear, it can be clearly seen that this mosque is managed by FPIS activists and when the researchers asked for an interview, the congregation refused since they claimed that the imam had represented them.[29] This exclusivity may allow radicalism to infiltrate.

Most moderate mosques are affiliated with Muhammadiyah and NU and they have created a mechanism which allow them to control and manage their mosques closely. One type of control is determination, including supervision, of Imam and khatib by the Takmir. In practice, however, although strict rules have been enforced, attempts to infiltrate these mosques can still be seen. Kottabarat Mosque, for example, is a Muhammadiyah mosque and a group of high school students, without the presence of the Takmir, use this mosque as a place for informal *halaqah* in the afternoon. During afternoon prayer time, a stranger might pray in the mosque and becomes an impromptu imam of the prayer. This stranger might ask the male students to lift their pants higher (*isbal*), a custom which is not practiced by Muhammadiyah.[30]

Studies in mosques conducted by CSRC UIN in a few cities post conflict or in cities with a potential for conflicts in Jakarta also revealed the same result: most mosques are moderate with a potential of radicalism to infiltrate. While active infiltration in

28 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.91.

29 Rita Pranawati, Masjid Muhammadiyah Kottabarat: Tantangan Gerakan Islam Moderat, in Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, p. 121.

30 Benni Setiawan, Masjid Al-Islam Gumuk Mangkubumen, Basis Eksklusivisme Islam, in Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF, pp.257-259.

mosques can be seen in Poso and Ambon, in Jakarta, this activity can only be seen in a small number of exclusive Islamic studies.

The Takmirs may become the key to the mosque management. They should control the mosque's activities, determine the preachers, the topics for the sermons, and Islamic classes' curricula, and supervise the education practices and rituals in mosques. To prevent radicalism, mosques need to be managed systematically and the functions of the mosques and their Takmirs become really important.

b. The Study on Mosques by LP3M

Based on a study conducted by *Lembaga Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat* (LP3M) on 100 mosques: 35 mosques in the ministries; 28 mosques in government institutions; and 37 mosques in state-owned enterprises, 41 mosques were indicated to have been influenced by radicalism.[31] This study collected its data from Friday's sermons, bulletin boards, wall magazines, and calendars.

This study found that 53.44% of the mosques had low level of radicalism, 27.22% had moderate and 42.34% had a high level of radicalism. The topics that contain the elements of radicalism were hate speech (73.6%), hatred towards the minorities (21%), a negative view towards other religions (21.17%), a positive view towards the caliphate system (18.15%), a negative view towards the minorities (7.6%) and a negative view of women leadership (1.1%). Furthermore, 64% mosques in state-owned enterprises and 36% mosques in the ministries were found to have held a positive view the caliphate system.

The map of radicalism in mosques can be seen below:

31 P3M, "Studi Terhadap 100 Masjid Kementrian, Lembaga, dan BUMN", power point, Jakarta, 2018.

Graph 1

The Map of Radicalism in Mosques



The graph above shows that that State-Owned Enterprise mosques are the most vulnerable to radicalism (57%) followed with the ministry mosque (29%).

Based on the level and on the number of mosques in each category[32], government institutions have the highest level of radicalism (75%) followed with the State-Owned Enterprise and the ministries with each 33%. Meanwhile, State-Owned Enterprise have the most mosques with high level radicalism (62%). Although the government institution mosques have the lowest level of radicalism (42%), they have the most intensity for radicalism (75%). In the ministry mosques, the differences among the levels of radicalism are not wide with 25%, 33%, and 42%.

Graph 2

The Level of Radicalism in Mosques



32 The mosque category based on the level: 21 State-Owned Enterprise mosques, 12 ministry mosques, and 8 institution mosques.

From the graph above, it can be seen that mosques managed by government institutions are the most vulnerable towards radicalism even though their management is supposed to be under the control of the state. State-Owned Enterprises, which are under different government ministries, are also vulnerable against radicalism. Being under the control of the government does not guarantee that the mosques are free from radicalism.

Radicalism seen in these government mosques suggests that there are underlying issues of management within the mosques. Are the Takmirs radical? Is their budget limited so that they don't have any control on sermons, selection of khatibs and religious education there? Does the leadership pay any attention on them? It does not look good on the government if the government ministries, institutions, and SOE preach negative contents. The study itself revealed that 64% of SOE mosques and 36% of ministry mosques discussed the caliphate system topic.

This topic was even repeated 18 times in 11 mosques in the ministries, government institutions and SOEs. As government apparatus, they must show their love and devotion to the Republic of Indonesia and HTI, a religious organization that promotes the establishment of the caliphate system, has been banned by the government based on Law Number 2 Year 2017 on Mass Organization. Preaching a pro-caliphate content is an outright violation of the law.

One of the most popular topics related to radicalism discussed in these mosques was hate speeches. As government mosques, these mosques should not promote any negative views towards minorities and other religions or a positive view towards the establishment of the caliphate system. Islam discourages hate speeches since they lead to conflicts. Another topic that was discussed in these mosques was women leadership.

Looking at the facts above, the mosques in the ministries, government institutions, and State-Owned Enterprises need to restructure their management. These mosques also need to increase their capacity by providing the 'correct' religious education curricula and sermons, by being selecting their preachers more carefully and by taking more control over these mosques. The National Intelligent Body is now beginning to get

more involved in preachers' education for these mosques.[33]

D. MOSQUES AND THE NATIONHOOD RESPONSIBILITY

When looking at how radicalism influences mosques and Takmirs, there are two points that they need to remember. One, nationalism and Islamism do not contradict each other, and the Republic of Indonesia is the form that was selected for the nation. Second, all Indonesian citizens must prioritize the national interests and peace. Since many Takmirs and preachers often neglect these two important points when performing their duties, their thoughts, attitudes and actions deviate from the visions and missions of the mosque.

In regard to the issues of nationalism and Islamism, all Indonesian Muslims possess two important identities: they are Muslims and Indonesians. Before independence, many groups and prominent national figures emphasized that Indonesia was a Muslim country since it was stated in the Jakarta Charta that Indonesia is "A religious country with an obligation to carry out the Islamic sharia for its believers." When independence was proclaimed, two groups - the secularists and the Islam nationalists - put forward their own ideologies to respond to the Charta. Eventually, Soekarno, through the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959, re-stated his commitment to the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila and the people of Indonesia became the citizens of the Unified Republic of Indonesia regardless their religions, tribes, languages, and cultures.[34]

Uncertainty often occurs when people become aware that there are new thoughts or knowledge that collide with their religious or national identity that they have had their whole life or have gotten to know better in their adulthood. This awareness often appears alongside the realization that Islamic laws must be upheld, that Islamic laws are the only source of laws and that they must make maximum efforts to practice Islam in their day-to-day life. If not, their Islam is not perfect.

33 "BIN Bina 50 Lebih Dai Terkait 41 Masjid Terpapar Radikalisme", Koran Tempo Online, 20 November 2018, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1148119/bin-bina-50-lebih-dai-terkait-41-masjid-terpapar-radikalisme/full&view=ok, accessed in January 2019.

34 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.29

The facts above make people realize that the Islam that they have been practicing all their life is not entirely according to the teachings of Islam. This realization may lead them to radicalism. However, we need to understand that aside from the Muslim identity, we also have another important identity – Indonesian. The second identity, however, is not as applicable as the first one since it is more normative and quite invisible. Therefore, the Islamic doctrines may appear stronger than the nationalism doctrines.

This uncertainty does not need to happen because Islam came to Indonesia as a blessing to the all nations. Islam teaches us to love our nation or *hubbul wathon minal iman* and the love for our country is a part of our faith in Allah. The first pillar of the nation, which is "There is Only One God", acknowledges a diversity in Indonesia. Indonesia Muslims are allowed to practice their rituals without any objections. The government even facilitates the Muslims. They are allowed to marry, to divide their inheritance, and to get a divorce in an Islamic way. What about the implementation of Sharia laws in Indonesia? The scholars had a very flexible view on Islamic criminal laws. Imam Syafi'i believes that the death penalty or *qishash* for murderers is optional and depends on the family of the victim. Imam Hanafi states the same thing about hand-cutting punishment for thieves. Muhammad Syahrur, a law expert from Syria, states that the Islamic criminal laws are the maximum punishment, but lighter punishment may be given to the perpetrators.[35]

Muhammadiyah's and Nahdatul Ulama's commitment to guarding the Republic is a proof that the Islam moderate groups do not contradict Islamism and nationalism. A Muslim who lives in Indonesia must practice his/her religion and at the same time, guard the vision of a *rahmatan lil-'alamin* Islam.

The Republic of Indonesia, a consensus made by all people in Indonesia, must be guarded by all citizens, including the Takmirs and preachers. They must stop all religious cults and ideologies which wish to replace the Republic and stop all forms of radicalism. If they support the efforts to replace the Republic with the caliphate system or an Islamic State, they will support the effort to diminish Indonesia.

35 Ridwan Al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (ed.), Benih-benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2010), p.27

All parties, including the Takmirs and preachers, have the obligation to put the nation's and the country's priorities on top of their own or their group. Unity is the foundation for the nation to build and progress. If the Takmirs and preachers are able to do this by not spreading hates towards or discriminating against other groups, we will become a peaceful nation and will be away from intolerance, which is the root of radicalism.

Islam came to this country in peace and this can be seen in the meaning of the word Islam itself which is *dien as-salaam*, a peaceful religion. Therefore, it should the visions and missions of the Takmirs and preachers to maintain peace. Peace can mean the efforts to prevent division among the Muslims internally or among religions. The contents of the sermons and religious education in mosques should remain moderate to maintain its peaceful mission. Peace does not mean the Muslims have no problem, but the Muslims are able to solve conflicts well.

In this digital era, it is important that the Takmirs and preachers ask their congregation not to make truth claims based on their own assumptions. People using truth claims often refuse to listen or accept other people's opinions. This is, of course, not the openness expected from the Muslims who are encouraged to spread the words of Islam in good ways (*mauidhoh hasanah*) and to argue in good ways (*wajadilhum billati hiya ahsan*). The Takmirs and preachers need to teach their congregation to promote peace as taught by Islam.

Islam introduces the process of *tabayyun* to gain accurate information and to seek good solutions. Islam encourages all parties to hold discussions to reach a peaceful solution. Muslims should quickly judge when they hear new information. They also need to refrain themselves from giving hate speeches. Therefore, sermons that promote peace will aid the efforts to prevent intolerance and radicalism.

E. THE IMPROVEMENT OF MOSQUE MANAGEMENT

The Takmirs and preachers have a large control over the missionary work in mosques. The Islam missionary works and its progress at the grassroot level is determined by how the Takmirs and the preachers run the mosques. They are in control over the tranquility and peace among the community. Therefore, they

need to have correct attitudes and a clear direction towards the mosque management.

Quantitatively, Indonesia has a large number of mosques and when used well, this potential may not only progress the country, but also prevent radicalism. All mosques – both community and government mosques - need to be managed well and should not be managed traditionally. Many choose to be Takmirs simply because of a calling, not professionalism when in fact, the job of a Takmir requires skills since it faces a lot of challenges and complexity due to the technological advances.

Based on the qualitative and quantitative studies on mosques and their potential for radicalism, to maintain moderatism and to prevent radicalism, we need to pay attention to these following aspects:

a. Mosque Leadership

Mosques need a leadership committed to its management. The position of Takmirs is not a social one but requires devotion and time. Without this, radicalism can easily seep in. Takmirs need to be committed to the visions and missions of the moderate mosque and of Islam as a *rahmatan lil alamin* religion. Without sound knowledge, the Takmirs will not be able to select the correct ideology and preachers when providing religious education to their congregation.

Aside from that, the leadership needs to establish clear rules, both in authorities and in serving terms, to be transparent to the community by producing periodical reports. Transparency in mosque management is important to increase community participation and to build trust between the mosque and the community. The transparency also means that the mosque does not belong only to a group of people, but all Muslims. However, this does not mean that all Muslims can be khatibs or preachers in the mosque. People who do not share the mosque's ideology cannot be the khatibs or preachers and the Takmirs should have the control over this matter.

b. Mosque management

Mosques with moderate visions and missions allow them to bring benefits to the community and to materialize a *rahmatan*

lil-'alamin Islam. For this purpose, mosques need to translate theses moderate vision and missions into technical day-to-day implementation such as determination of the mosque's supporting system, management, religious education curricula and activities, as well as the people who are in charge of religious education and activities.

Each mosque needs to have a person, who is always on standby in the mosque, in charge of day-to-day implementation. This person should not only in charge of cleanliness, for example, but also can represent the Takmir during prayer times or other activities. If he possesses an ideology which is other than moderate, he may perform rituals which are not in line with the mission of the mosque when this person takes the role of the *Takmir, imam,* or *khatib.*

The Takmir is generally in charge of the mosque management, but it is important for the Takmir to create a more structured management in his effort to gain more control of the mosque by appointing a person in charge of each sub activity such as one person in charge of cleanliness and another for the selection of imam, khatib and the preacher. All these can be done to prevent the elements of radicalism to enter the mosque's activities.

The mosques also need to prepare religious education curricula and activities through sermons and discussion groups. They also need to select information that goes into the mosques such as news in bulletin boards. They need to select which contents can be displayed or not since they need to ensure that the contents are in line with the mosque's missions.

In practice, most mosques do not have any specific contents for their religious education. They leave it to the khatibs to select the contents of the sermons when in fact, there are so many contents, albeit not all suitable, can be selected by the khatibs such as khilafah, jihad, and the establishment of the Islamic state. When the mosques are selective with their curricula for religious education, they select the right content for their congregation. With this, they may prevent hoaxes, maintain peace, and encourage their congregation to become good and tolerant citizens. All these need to be done since the contents that the mosques provide today, which are *ibadah mahdah, aqidah* and *akhlak,* are still not able to tackle the issue of radicalism.

In relation of the religious teaching activities, the Takmir may provide activities that support the efforts to empower the congregation and to create a friendly Islam. Religious education can be provided for people all ages starting from adults, teenagers and children and it can also be provided for both males and females. For teenagers, for example, the lessons can be made more interesting to cater to their needs and era by holding a peace camp that teaches a peaceful Islam. Aside from that, discussion groups can also be developed. Is it going to be one directional or bidirectional? All these creative activities can be used to increase the congregation's knowledge and at the same time, to tackle radicalism and to promote moderatism.

The programs held in mosques should not be restricted to worship and religious education since mosques have an obligation to serve the community. Mosques need to hold programs that are able to empower the community such as healthcare, entrepreneurship, and social security. These programs may prevent radicalism since they improve the community's welfare. A few mosques have made the efforts to run the mosques independently by providing work and managing their own finance.

The mosque and the Takmir need to determine the criteria for the selection of *imam, khatib,* preachers, and other people supporting mosque's activities such as the teachers for the after-school programs. These criteria are important to maintain the mosque's moderatism and the mosque may become the medium for the teaching of moderate Islam for its congregation. Without these criteria, the chance of radicalism to seep in becomes larger.

In terms of financial management, the mosque must prioritize transparency. The mosque's bank account must not belong to an individual since the account consists of public fund. The mosque needs to prepare periodical reports on funds derived from the congregation such as ZIS (*zakat, infak, sedekah*) and spent by the mosque so that the mosque may ensure that it does not receive funds from groups carrying a certain ideology and the mosque are able to maintain the trust given by the congregation.

c. The Mosque Management Control System

The Takmirs are fully responsible for the day-to-day running of the mosque to ensure that the mission of Islam as a blessing

of the world can be realized. They need to be well informed of all activities inside the mosque, the people inside it, the contents of the sermons, the implementation of the sermons, and discussion groups' activities. The Takmirs need to know all activities in the mosque, especially those conducted by outsiders to prevent the infiltration of radicalism. The Takmirs also need to control the *imam, khatib,* preachers, until the teachers for after-school programs in order to keep the mosque moderate. If there is any indication that what they preach/teach deviates from the principles of moderate Islam, the Takmirs must know, clarify, warn, and even replace them. The content of the sermons or teaching materials must also be free from radicalism, violence and division. The Takmirs will be the last fort that guards the mosque against radicalism.

F. CLOSING

Mosques will always be the reflection on the conditions and the circumstances of the Muslim community. They have important roles in the nation's development because they are not only a place to pray but a place for education, religious teaching and empowerment. These important roles allow the mosques to empower grassroot Muslims since they are large in number and they are spread across the nation. Mosque's roles, however, are more than just related to the internal mosque's affairs and the Muslim's affairs. Mosques are important to guard the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. This vital role needs to be managed well through a good mosque leadership, management and control system. If mosques are run with full commitment and an awareness of its many roles, the Islam, which will bring blessings to the universe, will be materialized. When radicalism begins to seep into mosques, the *Takmir* and the mosque administrators will be the last fort that guards the congregation.

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Mosques, Religious Tolerance Issues, and Strengthening Multicultural Communities

Abdul Wahid

A. PREFACE

The concern of the public and the state towards the contemporary development of Islam in Indonesia found another manifestation when the Ahok case spread in Jakarta. The hustle and bustle surrounding the case reveals something that is considered another character of Islam and its people, disrupting the public's perception of its basic character *as al-dien al-salam* (religion of peace). Since the case has rolled into the public sphere, the hardening of religion represented by utterances of hatred fulfills the cognition of the *Ummah* and becomes part of the dish of information in the organs of the *Ummah*, including mosques and educational institutions. The hatred speech is a form of intolerance that is able to create a whole other dimension of radicalism such as negative attitudes towards others, negative attitudes and hatred towards minorities, negative attitudes towards female and non-Muslim leadership, and negative attitudes towards the democratic system even to the basis and form a legitimate country while affirming a positive attitude towards the caliphate form of government. The survey results released by the Center for Islamic and Community Studies (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (October 2018) shows the high level of intolerance opinion towards other religions from school teachers, which is 63.07%, while the tolerance opinion is 36.93%.

Another survey conducted by the National House and Development of Islamic Boarding Schools and Communities Association from September 29 to October 21, 2017 shows that there are dangers of

radicalism that are lurking in mosques in Jakarta - especially mosques that operate in government institutions, ministries, and state-owned enterprises (BUMN). Of the hundred of mosques surveyed, there were 41 mosques that voiced the notion of radicalism, namely thoughts or movements that wanted fundamental change, regardless of other groups that were different. The radicalism that was found in this survey occurred in three levels: low, medium and high. Low levels of radicalism, in the form of disapproval of intolerance but understand the existence of it, moderate level of radicalism in the form of agreement with intolerant actions, while high level radicalism does not just agree to intolerant actions, but also provokes the people to act intolerantly.

The findings above are acknowledged to be indicative and not conclusive, therefore they need further exploration and more exploratory explanations so that we are not trapped in misguided generalizations. This is more important because it involves the existence of mosques which are in fact important institutions for the integration of the people and their sources of knowledge and religious practices. Also, it must be admitted that the above findings take place in a specific context, namely the situation of the capital, Jakarta, which is in the midst of being noisy due to the prolonged Ahok case. In fact, the hardening of religious ideas that developed in mosques, the findings of several recent studies are alleged to be more in conjunction with religious perceptions of intolerance in a political context. The case of the Barokah Indonesian Tabloid - which contains a negative campaign related to the presidential election - is the latest example of the non-sterility of mosques, even for certain contexts which is considered strategic, as part of the metabolic system and public knowledge circulation. Even Vice President Yusuf Kalla - who is also General Chair of the Indonesian Mosque Council - is concerned about the circulation of unhealthy information for the people in mosques, including through lectures and sermons.[1]

The *qital* jihad propaganda to uphold the Islamic state and the blasphemous narrative of the democratic government as *thaghut* is not the dominant narrative in sermons at the mosque. It can be said that hard-line religious narratives that are thicker are intolerance towards adherents of different religions or beliefs. Although some

1 http://nasional.tempo.co "Soal Tabloid Indonesia Barokah, JK: Beredar di Masjid Itu Salah" (27 January 2019

people tend to see a causal link between intolerance and radical ideology, some others still see the two symptoms can still be separated. In other words, not all intolerant attitudes and behaviors will ultimately lead to religious radicalism, although in religious radicalism there must be an element of intolerance.

In a number of observations about intolerance among Muslims, there was a tendency for preachers and worshipers to be more prepared to stand in line with Christians and other religions than with interreligious adherents such as Ahmadis and Shiites. Lately, intolerance targets have also been addressed to the LGBT community. In a more micro picture, there is a tendencyof the strengthening of conservatism in religious behavior of the congregation. Recent studies have shown that quite a number of millennial Muslims have begun to believe that saying merry Christmas is *haram*, even though they previously considered it normal. Why does religious intolerance in both the big picture and the small picture appear to be strong in the narrative of da'wah in the mosque? Are these symptoms caused by the strengthening of puritan *salafi* ideology or the consequence of strengthening political identity among Muslims mainly because of the strong exposure to cultural globalization? This paper tries to understand more closely by tracing the causes and manifestations of Muslim contestation in the public sphere from time to time in the context of history in the country, and how the mosque should play itself in the midst of strengthening issues of intolerance and radicalism in the midst of current growing multicultural society.

B. THE RETURN OF CONSERVATISM AND THE MANIFESTATION OF INTOLERANCE IN MOSQUES

The social history of Islam in Indonesia from ages past is characterized by an antagonistic relationship with the state, thus giving birth to a typical Indonesian ideologization of Islam. As can be seen later, that ideologization is linked to global Islamic movements both based in the Middle East, especially Egypt, as well as those from Asia themselves such as India. Historically, the practice of da'wah has experienced ups and downs since the colonial era, also in the later eras both in the Old Order and in the New Order. The defeat of political Islam in the early days of

the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) with the elimination of the Jakarta Charter as the basis of state ideology was followed by relentless struggle by Islamic ideological organs, especially Masyumi, until finally this Islamic political party scattered and dispersed. Islamic political power then kept operating under pressure, so it underwent an underground strategy which later emerged again through the DII/TII phenomenon in several places in Indonesia. The agenda was clear, namely establishing an Islamic state, not just coloring the style of national politics like the previous Islamic political style, but replacing the Pancasila ideology by using violence. The political response of the ruling regime was also clear, namely the eradication of elements of Islamic politics and the perpetual suspicion of the state and society against the rise of Islam as a formal political power.

The dynamics of this contestation took place even more interestingly in the New Order era. The Soeharto regime took over the concern for political Islam, even though its manifestation of power was also used to cripple the early New Order political opponents. But soon after, since 1967, the apparent intimacy changed when the Soeharto regime developed a secular political style that was considered contrary to Islamic political ideals. Instead of recovering the power of Islam, the ruling regime even silenced it by implementing single-principle politics, resulting in the tacit activities of Islamic preaching. Political Islamic figures were silenced as the channels of their movements in the form of missionary activities were abandoned. This situation forced moderate Muslim scholars to advance to the arena by offering a new strategy for developing Islam, namely a cultural strategy pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid, Ahmad Wahib, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Djohan Efendi, and others from the exponents of the Islamic Neo-modernism movement[2]. In the 1970s the Islamic thought movement succeeded in opening cultural barriers so that the New Order was absorbed into or open up to Islam even though it remained alert.

But in the midst of this situation, at the beginning of the 1980s another current emerged, namely the globalization of

2 Greg Barton, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo-Modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahid, dan Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta: Paramadina-Pustaka Antara, 1999).

the Islamic movement (now called the transnational Islamic movement) from the Middle East which also broke through the impasse of ideologization of Islam. This current formed a new intellectual movement based in campus mosques such as the Salman Mosque in ITB, Arif Rahman Hakin UI Mosque, and UGM Salahuddin Mosque. This current was colored by the presence of a wave of Muslim scholars who studied in Egypt who returned to the country bringing along the ideas of Islamism as developed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They later became challengers of the hegemony of modernist Muslim scholars who had been entrenched in participating in constructing the power of the New Order. This new movement has become more connected with Iran's Revolutionary fever which has swept the world since 1979. This new ideological Islamic movement went underground on the issue of Islamic radicalization exhaled by the ruling regime. In 1981 the specter of radical Islam manifested in the form of the Jihad Command was crushed.

One of the impacts was the re-silencing of Islamic activities, especially from campus mosques, as well as the suppression of Islamic identity in public spaces in the form of the banning of headscarves. Later in the next decade, the 1990s, Islamization in terms of the strengthening of Islamic role and identity in the public sphere found another momentum when the regime gave a breath of fresh air. At that time the New Order had a weakening support from secular groups, so the Soeharto regime changed direction in the form of re-establishing connection with Muslim forces through the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). Here is the irony - or attraction – of the dynamics of the Islamic movement. On one level, Islamic activism based on campus mosques that had been silenced but still able to clandestinely created new activism that is able to bring activism the academic realm to the society. Some of them formed alliances - or new synthesis - preaching with the presence of Tabligh Jamaah groups from India, Salafi, also Wahabi. Although some of the exponents of the campus mosque activists became ICMI birth attendants such as Imaduddin Abdurrahim (Salman ITB) and Amin Rais (Salahuddin UGM), their ideas of making ICMI were not entirely modern as they were thought of by Neo-modernism proponents, but strengthened the idea of Islamism in the New Order strategy. That is why

Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) needed to give criticism to ICMI. On another level, as is evident, the New Order affair with the new Muslim scholar legitimized the problem of the New Order generals who have been "greened" by ICMI fever. From here, on the critical days after the fall of the New Order regime, a new Islamic power was born with the mantle of Pamswakarsa. This group came to be known as the Islamic militia which emphasized the identity of their Islamic observance openly in the public sphere, in contrast to the segmentation of other peoples.

As for the segmentation of other people, especially those based on universities, at the same time, they felt that they were not part of the ummah, their identity or reference group were students, and their Islamic obedience was not expressed openly, they tended to be secularized. Kuntowidjoyo sees this backward trend as a momentum for the birth of a new generation of Muslims who are different from before, but with a new contestation. Its birth was not a thickening of identity that united the people, but it actually created friction, that was the segment of the people called Muslims without mosque, born on May 21, 1898. [3]

Immediately after the birth of this new Muslim segmentation, the internal contestation of the *ummah* between the islamized and the secularized emerged. The first dynamics in such a way, morphed or developed new cells, then met and shared the vision and identity with the Muslim middle class from another current (graduates from the Middle East), which formed their intellectual base in the homeland through LIPIA Jakarta, a form that we know as Islamists. They became articulate *mujahid da'wah* that filled the resource gap in mosques, and acted as the main actor of *amar makruf nahi munkar* that occurred in public spaces. While the second, groups of secular-moderate Muslim scholars, move away from the masses, got out or bounced out from mosques, forming their own organs organically while taking distance from the authorities and religious organizations. Their social involvement tends to be expressed through the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or the empowerment of communities. They are a minority that no longer has an alliance with the people, aka alienated – not to be said to be frustrated with the development

3 Kuntowidjoyo, *Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-Esai Agama, Budaya, dan Politik dalam Bingkai Strukturalisme Transendental* (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2018), pg. 130.

of the *ummah*. Even though they are a minority, they were successful in creating a new religious tendency, namely religion without a mosque, where religious knowledge and expression are anonymous. They themselves or the generation they created study religion from anonymous sources, such as television, VCD, books, magazines, seminars, lectures, and in this millennial era through internet-based social media sources.

In their journey, these two groups are not always opposite to each other, because of deflections and shift that happens in these groups so that each other are mutually intersect. There are times when they meet in one level from the same transnational movement. The first group that had begun to surge into mosques increasingly cemented itself in the structure of the mosque, while the second group began to find new awareness and mobilize themselves through the new religious era. So they are forming elements of the new Islamic movement again. Some of them were part of Salafi or Wahabi who later began to master the sources of people's knowledge, virtual and factual including mosque pulpits.

Metropolitan cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Semarang, Makassar, and Medan, as well as big cities, Solo, Yogyakarta, Padang, Manado, etc. are the birthplaces of this new generation. They find sociological conditions that are good for their religious mobilization and expression. The meeting of their thoughts with the transnational movement is not only possible, but makes them intimate, because this last movement also moves through the channels that are the similar as what this new generation of Muslims are going through. The mobilization of these groups so that they become clumped into Islamic forces, as described by Ricklefs, is catalyzed by the emergence of mobile and rhetorical reformers, but simple in their thinking (as in easy-to-understand) such as Ja'far Umar Thalib and later Abu Bakar Baasyir.[4] They became exponents of New Islamism which was later stigmatized as the basis for intolerance and radicalism.

In Jakarta, the case of blasphemy that was surrounding Ahok and resonated with the 2017 Jakarta Election must be acknowledged as the momentum of the return of the phenomenon of religious conservatism among this new generation. In that situation, Jakarta was filled with the

4 M.C. Ricklefs, *Mengislamkan Jawa: Sejarah Islamisasi di Jawa dan Penentangnya dari 1930 sampai Sekarang* (Jakarta: Serambi, 2013), pgs. 649-657

production of speeches of hatred, not only to the person (Ahok) but widened to religious (Christian) and ethnic (Chinese) affiliation and spread to other religious concepts, such as *takfir*, heresy, conspiracy, and so on. Mosque pulpits eventually become a means for conservatives who are already entrenched in the elite of the mosque to spread exclusive religious understanding.

C. MODERATE MUSLIM SHIFT: CONTESTATION AND MOSQUE INTEGRATION IN LOMBOK

The birth and development of a new generation of conservative, fundamentalist and radical Muslims, as well as a moderate, secular, and liberal urban Muslim middle class, recently did not only occur in metropolitan cities and medium cities, but also in small cities. The growth patterns are different from each other, but what is clear is that their growth is fast because it is supported by internet-based contemporary media that tends to be transcendental, overcoming space. In Lombok, for example, especially the city of Mataram, the dynamics of the movement of the people also took place in various styles, both taking manifestations of contestation and integration. Then how does this dynamic affect the image of the mosque today?

It has to be admitted that along with the strengthening of religious conservatism in *ummah,* there is a tendency that the role of moderate Muslims in the development of ummah through mosques is weakened. This tendency confirms Kuntowidjoyo's statement above that it is indeed the choice of locus and the realm of moderate Muslims activity, also secular-liberals are no longer mosques but social institutions or independent communities that do not have an affiliation with the people. Likewise, those who are expected to fill that void, such as academics / lecturers / experts from the State Islamic University, for example, seem to experience what Nichols calls "the death of expertise"[5]. They tend to interact with their own peers rather than hacking empowering relationships with the people. The same problem is experienced by modernist scholars from the NU or Muhammadiyah circles, who suffer from what Ricklefs identifies as "the legalistic complexity of

5 Tom Nichols, *Matinya Kepakaran: Perlawanan terhadap Pengetahuan yang Telah Mapan dan Mudaratnya* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2018).

traditionalism and intellectuality of modernism."[6] It is true that people in this group give sermons in their local mosques, but this happens sporadically, not controlled by a social vision planned in an organized manner through academic work on campus based on serious social analysis. It is also not sustainable, but only as a routine activity to abort social obligations. The campus mosque of UIN Mataram, for example, is not a place for lecturers or Islamic studies students to present Islamic knowledge that is open to the general public, nor as a place for cadres of mosque activists as carried out by the Salman Mosque ITB or UGM Salahuddin Mosque. In other words, the important task of Islamic studies to produce public intellectuals failed to be implemented. In this case, the Mataram University (Unram) campus mosque is the opposite, giving public services by opening access to the general public to be able to pick up some religious knowledge from campus' scholars.

It even becomes an alternative for the development of community cadres that color mosques around the city of Mataram. However, the presence of the Babul Hikmah Unram mosque activist in the midst of the struggle of the people tends to strengthen Islamic orthodoxy, again because of the weak tradition of Islamic studies in Indonesian style among them because of the dominance of Islamic studies from the Middle East. It is evident that this gave birth to many da'wah activists affiliated to PKS or other da'wah organizations with similar views.

The alienation of moderate Muslims from the mosque clearly represented the defeat of the modernists in the arena of *ghaz al-fikr* (war of thought) and the victory of the orthodoxy. This encourages a shift in the function of the mosque as a public space of communication between various segments of the *ummah* so that what was previously inclusive became exclusive. The experience of the Great At-Taqwa Mosque in the city of Mataram Lombok is an example where the mosque experienced a significant shift in terms of community clumping and identity thickening, as well as the contestation of the people who accompanied it. This mosque is a mosque that is the pride of Mataram residents and even residents of West Nusa Tenggara as a whole. Ten years ago this mosque still showed plural characteristics, with pilgrims from various teachings and communities. There is no prominent color

6 M.C. Ricklefs, *Mengislamkan Jawa: Sejarah Islamisasi di Jawa dan Penentangnya dari 1930 sampai Sekarang* (Jakarta: Serambi, 2013), pg. 659

other than the combination of various religious and ethnic identities that exist. But this has changed since the Jama'ah Tabligh group - one of the Islamic revivalist movements that emerged from India - found a comfortable place in the mosque. At first they occupied the corners of the mosque (*jawiyah*), which after each prayer in congregation, would be set up as a space to teach their exclusive teachings. On every Friday night this mosque becomes crowded by the religious congregation that wear long black robes and white skull caps who came from various parts of the city, as if they are attending a congress. Over time this mosque became synonymous with the Tabligh Jamaah because of the dominance of the religious and cultural identities that appeared from the congregation. The colorful scenery diminishes. At first, these groups were only filled the quiet corners, now almost all of the space available are occupied, including the *mihrab* and *mimbar*, and only left a little for other groups. I don't know where the other plural pilgrims go. What is clear is that the last group lost the feeling of comfort in the mosque. Although the pulpit of the Friday sermon still maintains the plural tradition, but soon after Friday the other pilgrims returned home, the Tabligh Jamaat group remained with their busy activities holding *halaqah* to strengthen their religious commitment.

Obviously this illustrates a transformation that is being experienced by mosques and worshipers around us. One impact is that moderate Muslims represented by their scholars lose the opportunity to speak to pluralistic people or communities without certain religious ideologies to promote inclusive attitudes. Tabligh Jamaat is another thing, they are more progressive, because they have the ideology and the thick hierarchy of religious understanding that they get from the teaching and experience of *halaqah* and *khuruj*. But how about the people who are indecisive, where do they get the space and opportunity to strengthen their commitment to obedience if there is no source of knowledge that speaks to them? Where did the moderate religious authorities needed by the people go against this hardening of the religion?

The withdrawal of moderate Muslim groups from mosques has become its own issue that are regarded to pave the way for extreme religious teachings.

The people are seemingly losing a source of knowledge that can fulfill their thirst of religious literacy. But, there is an

encouraging development when an Islamic Center is established in the heart of Mataram City. Although there is an impression that the establishment of the Islamic Center not far from the At-Taqwa Mosque will only smooth the way for the Tablighi Jamaat group to fully control the mosque, at least moderate Muslim groups have rediscovered a vehicle to return to the mosque. The Islamic Center, which was inaugurated in 2016, does indeed function as a public space where all people from various backgrounds interact with each other. Aside from being the center of Islamic activities, the Islamic Center serves as a mosque that can get back the people who were bounced from the at-Taqwa mosque to re-associate themselves with the mosque. Not only the *ummah*, but also the religious authorities who lost their stage, once again re-entered the arena of the arena of Islamic thought on the Land of A Thousand Mosques. Doctors of Islamic studies from Islamic tertiary institutions in the country that are known as moderates again became actors in the practices of recitation and Friday sermons at the Islamic Center. They become agents who can offer material relating to the promotion of peace and tolerance, also offer each other ideas with the tendency of exclusive material from the Salafi or Wahabi groups. So far, the battle of ideas or dialectics of rethinking is once again becoming lively and the *ummah* have paradigmatic or perspective options in seeing and interpreting its religious teachings. Moderate-minded Muslim scholars have regained a hegemonic position, especially because the government's support for the existence of the Islamic Center is very significant.

D. MOBILIZATION OF MODERATE MUSLIM SCHOLARS

With the Islamic religious authorities achieving a hegemonic position to apply intellectual leadership of the *ummah*, one of them is through the existence of accommodating religious institutions such as the Islamic Center, it does not mean the mosque is free from the worry of the existence of intolerance. In the case of Mataram, this strategy was effective for one thing, namely the enthusiasm of the Muslim middle class to return to the mosque, not for anything else but, namely the thickening of ideological religious identity. At least it has not been

touched, in the sense that the persecution of religion still exists and continues. This argument is reasonable, because in the context of Islam, Lombok is portrayed as having a friendly and tolerant Islam - with the Islamic Center as its manifestation - at the same time acts of persecution against other groups still occur, such as the assault of the Ahmadiyya group in East Lombok in May 2018. Ironically, the attack took place on the third day of Ramadan, a day when every Muslim must be worshipping and spread mercy and affection.

This means that the mobilization of moderate Muslim scholars must be the main strategy. Because, if we trace the acute problem faced by the people, especially the mosque-based people, is the absence of an authority that has an individual autonomy in developing inclusive religious interpretations, what happens is actually the thickening of religious beliefs through the practice of absolute truth claims[7] who were expelled from his hometown in Lombok and apprehensively accommodated in the Transito complex of the city of Mataram, clearly confirms this: that they are victims of claims of exclusion that should not have occurred. Consider the bitter confession of an Ahmadi who has been displaced for 12 years:

> "We are not exclusive, but are excluded. There used to be an Ahmadi in Pancor (East Lombok) praying together at the mosque, the person was lifted and plunged into a pool, and they said that the mats used for prayer by Ahmadis could not be washed anymore, more unclean than dogs. "[8]

The mobilization of moderate Muslim scholars, and their distribution in mosques and other community institutions, enables the existence of a practice of healthy dialogical religious communication among the people. The pockets in which the scientific authority resides, such as the higher education of Islamic religion (PTKI) must be broken down so that their expertise and social praxis can touch the enclave

7 See Abdul Wahid, *Pluralisme Agama: Paradigma untuk Dakwah dan Mediasi Konlik* (Mataram: Lembaga Pengkajian – Penerbitan Islam dan Masyarakat IAIN Mataram, 2016), pgs. 67-87

8 Excerpt from the report of Rohmatin Bonasie, BBC Indonesia, "Apa yang membuat jamaah Ahmadiyah sembahyang di masjid sendiri, tidak bersama Muslim lain? " in http://www.bbc.com. 21 Februari 2018

of the people who are lacking from sources of religious epistemology. Thus dialogue at the crucial level, namely intellectual dialogue, must be part of the practice of mosques today. This project is unavoidable for two reasons. *First*, Indonesian society is sufficiently prepared for the intellectual institutions needed for this model dialogue, in the form of mature epistemological sources and spread in various pockets of Islamic studies, namely paradigmatic sophistication that allows people to be invited to see Islam or other religions historically and realistically.[9] *Secondly*, in this millennial era where information is overrunning the community, it is presumed that there is a new approach so that the knowledge received from various abundant sources can be confirmed by other understandings, so that enlightenment can be born.[10]

It must also be reminded, the mobilization of moderate Muslim scholars is complementary to the same efforts to revitalize traditional scholarly roles, such as *tuan guru* in Lombok society or *kiai* in Javanese society, and so on. This last group is the old authority that is still hegemonic and will continue to reproduce and inherit their authority over the people through the established system they created. Do not let the Islamic moderation project undermine the order and relationship between the power of the *ummah* and weaken the position in facing the challenges of intolerance or radicalization. In the context of Lombok society, for example, the strengthening and weakening of the position of *tuan guru* is very influential on social stability. Case in point, the attack on minority groups, again Ahmadiyya, ten years ago (2008) occurred because of a lack of sensitivity or unwillingness of the *tuan guru* to deliver religious messages through Friday sermons or *fatwas*. On the contrary, social violence can be controlled by their involvement in conflict management.[11] That is why they must experience not only

9 Amin Abdullah, for example, offers a normativity and deep historicity approach in seeing the religious phenomena of Muslims, with which can be divided which must be interpreted as something that can change and which is absolute. Because of this, the established approach at PTKIN can prevent the emergence of extreme, radical and fundamentalist understandings. See Amin Abdullah, *Studi Agama: Normativitas atau Historisitas?* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999).

10 Haidar Bagir, for example, offers an effort to restore the sufistic aspect in the understanding and religious practice of people because this aspect prioritizes harmonization not only human relations with God but also to fellow human. Lihat Haidar Bagir, *Islam Tuhan Islam Manusia: Agama dan Spiritualitas di Zaman Kacau* (Bandung: Mizan, 2017), pg. 45

11 Jeremy Kingsley, "Pelopor Perdamaian atau Perusak Perdamaian?: Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, Kepemimpinan Agama, dan Proses Perdamaian di Lombok, Indonesia," dalam *Kegalauan Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Kewarganegaraan pada Masa Pasca-Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2011), pg. 110.

synergy but a synthesis of their dialectical interactions with other scholar groups. With this dialectical interaction, the *tuan guru* as a religious elite will have a unique view of the reality of the people and society, and the ability to transform that view into social vision and movement. Therefore the expansion of the *tuan guru's* dialectic field certainly gave birth to a combination of traditional *ulama* traditions with modern Muslim scholars, a necessary synthesis for today's heterogeneous-multicultural society.

E. ULAMA TRADITION AND MOSQUE'S PUBLIC SPHERE FUNCTION

The resignation of the *ulama* tradition is clearly underway in the Muslim community in Indonesia. The absence of moderate Muslim scholars on the basis of the *ummah* (mosque) on one hand, and the penetration of the practical and ritual traditions of the transnational movement such as the Tablighi Jamaah on the other hand, have an effect on the dynamics of the tradition of the *ulama*. Tabligh worshipers who are increasingly hegemonic in mosques, carry the tradition of da'wah through the experience of social interaction (*khuruj*) and ritual and avoidance of dialogue.[12] Meanwhile, moderate Muslim scholars who are increasingly slow to interact with mosques, cut off the channel for the flow of fresh Islamic knowledge to the people. Of course these revivalist and modernist groups each do what Bowen calls inward focusing (internal reinforcement) while looking outward (strengthening social vision).[13] Are there two types of motion and style that can synergize or synthesize?

It seems that what is being put in motion by the Islamic Center (Hubbul Wathan Mosque) NTB is a copy of this kind of project in Indonesia. *Tuan Guru* Bajang Teacher (TGB- former governor of NTB) as a central figure behind the Islamic Center is being portrayed as a champion of moderate Muslims. It is true that as presumed, the TGB has returned to the pulpit after a long time

12 Regarding the character of the preaching of the Tabligh Jama'at in a global context, see Jan A. Ali, *Islamic Revivalism Encounters: A Study of Tabligh Jama'ah* (New Delhi: Sterling, 2012), dan dalam konteks lokal, lihat Muhammad Irfan Hasanuddin, "Wajah Kontemporer Dakwah Islam Indonesia: Pengalaman dari Jamaah Tabligh di Palopo-Sulawesi Selatan, Indonesia" dalam *Muslim Subjectivity: Spektrum Islam Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Insan Mdani, 2017), pgs. 72-112.

13 John. R, Bowen, *A New Anthropology of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

to conduct the task for the community as he was kept busy by the task of the government bureaucracy. He again sharpened his sharpness as a qualified cleric (as a *tafsir* and *hafidz* expert) as well as making the grand mosque a new magnet for Muslims. Not about the TGB itself as an individual, his presence in the Islamic center is a symbol of the presence of the government in religious affairs in a more intense manner, this is a kind of semiotics for the movement of "desecularization" in the bureaucratic body, especially the government of West Nusa Tenggara. For this phenomenon, a scholar joked, "TGB is preparing a red carpet to become a hegemonic at the Islamic Center before his tenure as governor ends soon".

It cannot be dismissed that, in fact, TGB is indeed more intensely going up the pulpit both as preacher and speaker or resource person in studies after Friday or dawn lectures. But what's interesting is that soon after that, a layer of moderate Muslim scholars from universities, government institutions, and Islamic boarding schools was formed, which began to be excited about returning to the Islamic Center to share the same role as TGB. Therefore, academically, this phenomenon can be observed as the return of moderates to mosques as communicators or public scholars.

The charm of the TGB as a moderate *ulama,* Qur'anic interpreter - *hafid* of a high caliber is even more prominent than him as a governor. For Muslims on the island of Lombok, the identity of *ulama* is enough as an attraction to return to the mosque. For militant Muslims, the involvement of the TGB in the famous 212 action some time ago was enough to find patronage within him for their identity and religious activities. In this style, TGB became a model for the mobilization of moderate scholars, and became an inspiration for the emergence or return of religious resources in the struggle of the *Ummah*. So, what is the meaning of the strengthening of this religious tradition for mosques and the development of multicultural societies?

Lombok is one example of a growing multicultural community in Indonesia. The growth of multiculturalism is accelerated with its leveraging sectors such as tourism and regional growth that are increasingly open. The dynamics behind the development of society are of course strong, in the form of tug-of-war between cultural conservatism and modernity which requires dynamic openness. There

seems to be some confusion in this growth, reflected in various efforts to strengthen ethnic and religious identity of certain communities, and the fusion of social relations among certain other communities. Conflict and integration also often occur, one after another, between villages, ethnicity and inter-religion. The most visible conflict that has a religious dimension can be seen from the events of religious riots where Christians were subjected to the fury of religious sentiments that occurred on January 17, 2000 (known as Event 171). Another event that became a sign of religious dynamics was the attack on Ahmadiyah and Salafi groups that occurred several times in Lombok, and several acts of terrorism in Bima (Sumbawa Island).

The challenge of multiculturalism is certainly a part of the process of society development. The multicultural society is assumed to be characterized by the nature of inter-community relations that can take place harmoniously and productively. This can happen if the members of each community open themselves to understanding diversity and diversity. This condition allows diversity to be regarded as a potential and a social capital for development. This condition of diversity in Kuntowidjojo's term is called positive pluralism.[14] On the other hand, the interaction of multicultural society also creates a wide space for the emergence of abstruseness, in the form of relations and interactions both individually and communally, latent and manifest. The manifestations can be in the form of attitudes and actions of intolerance, disrespect, and hatred towards other groups.

To obtain a positive effect from the treasure of diversity, of course the concepts of mutual understanding, mutual exchange, sharing, and the pattern of mutualistic symbiotic relations must be the entry point for social interaction. But there are always things that prevent community members from understanding and sharing with each other. The most important obstacle in plural inter-community relations is the development of stereotypes in daily inter-community relations. The stereotype in question is a generalization of certain characters labeled by a group by another group. The stereotype can be in the form of a positive social character and can also take the form of negative social characters. The latter is often the obstacle to the liquidation of inter-community relations which at a certain level can open the way for a tragic and prolonged conflict, as experienced by the Ahmadiyya group.

14 Kuntowidjoyo, *Identitas Politik Umat Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).

Other obstacles are prejudice, ethnocentric or egocentric attitudes, and absolute truth claims. Prejudice is the negative attitude toward information regarding a person or group that creates a misunderstanding between them. Ethnocentric attitude is the attitude of emphasizing cultural-ethnic identities and projecting them as the most suitable thing to embrace. Herein lies power relations, co-optation, negation, and oppression. This is more dangerous because it will shape a character of a closed society.

These barriers can of course be active and work if behind them are interests that are usually momentary and social-political communication that is biased and unwise. Those who play the activating panels are usually elite political groups that also have vested interests.

Because claims, prejudices and stereotypes arise from cognitive limitations and social motivations, this can be minimized by initiating an awareness process through providing information and knowledge about the intricacies of social and cultural life. Cultural dialogue and social contacts in public spaces will open opportunities for mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation between groups of people. If a certain amount of knowledge has been made in the minds of the people, then the people's mind-set regarding the reality around it also changes, which then followed by changes in attitudes and behavior in relating with each other. The process of awareness through the provision of correct knowledge and information to the public is considered relatively effective, because theoretically a person's attitude and behavior is very much determined by the knowledge and information that is in his mind. This intellectual or informative awareness approach has a significant impact on maturing one's social attitude in the community. This approach is what we call intellectual dialogue. In the context of Muslim communities, mosques or Islamic centers are intended public spaces. The place can be a meeting room as well as a battleground for various religious thoughts to find a synthesis node for the maturation projection of the *Ummah*.

Communication efforts, transfer of perspective, and transformation of attitude, of course, must be supported

by political morality and politeness of communication from the elite. Here leadership factors play a very decisive role. Because it is the leadership that has the function to develop knowledge and understanding, motivation and guidelines for a community. Leadership can produce teachings, morality, values, and behavioral models. Especially if the leadership is clothed with political power, it will produce social engineering and design, regulations, mechanisms, role organizations, and tools that allow all of these efforts to move in a massive, fast, and precise manner. It seems that the figure of the *ulama*-ruler as reflected in the TGB is a historical need in the midst of this chaotic age.

We can expect a big role from the religious elite and society. The elite play a role in eroding prejudice by way of dialogue both intellectually or sitting together for solving the problems of socio-cultural life that are faced by community. For example, we use various means and media to erode prejudice planted among communities. In religious communities like us, religious forums play an important role in cultivating positive values. Therefore, if you want to sow certain insights or ideas, the role of the *da'i*, *khatib*, *kiai*, *tuan guru*, *santri's* elite, or other religious leaders is very central and strategic. The actual manifestation is of course the mosque and its pulpits, alongside modern communication devices.

If the intensity and quality of inter-congregational meetings, between religious elites and the grassroots, then we can hope to build new insights and perspectives on the reality of the social-cultural-religious diversity that are needed to life together in a multicultural society. In this context like, the presence of religious leadership in a broader realm - social and even political, has a very strategic meaning. With the expansion of this religious role, the *tuan gurus* have the opportunity to transform world views, ideas, and visions into more concrete and actual movements and programs for the sake of harmonious and productive shared life.

F. CLOSING

The mosque has experienced a long social history and dynamics together with the tendencies and phenomena of the life of the people and the nation. In a historical context, filled with struggle, the mosque grew to become a center for fostering people and

leadership cadres. At the same time, the mosque is a representation of the struggle among the *ummah* who are currently developing. The mosque in undergoing a process of conservatism, even radicalization through its elite who are promoting the hardening of Islam. But that tendency must be seen in a specific context, as part of the excesses of the political struggle of the people. Therefore, there is still an opportunity to revitalize the mosque through the mobilization of moderate Muslim scholars to re-implement the leadership of the *Ummah* through the mosque. At the same time, the mosque has become a field of contestation for various groups to strengthen their hegemony over the people and to look for forms of identity. The groups that fight in it are diverse, both local religious movements and the transnational movements.

There is a tendency for stagnant mosques, or the decline of the religious scholar tradition, in carrying out the task of empowering the *ummah*, especially in terms of Islamic religious education. But the Muslim community in the country has always had the opportunity to make a turning point for the strengthening of the mosque-based religious tradition. To return to its *khittah* as an alternative place to study Islam, or a place where people find patronage, mosques must receive the support of human resources and other resources of the *ummah*. The deployment of moderate Muslim scholars can be a projection to increase the role of the mosque to be even greater, especially in minimizing the tendency of intolerance in society.

The projection of the mosque as a source of knowledge of the *ummah* is as important as the projection of mosques as a public space of communication. Mosques can be an alternative institution for developing people's understanding of their religion properly, for example by changing the function of the mosque to "urban/rural boarding schools" as well as city parks. Mosques should be aware of other social groups that are building a multicultural society. In order not to grow unattended, mosques and people involved in mosque development are demanded to respond to that development intelligently, which is by installing a multicultural and modern paradigm so that it becomes part of a multicultural culture that is full of harmony. It is true that mosques have become an arena of ideological struggle among Muslims themselves, therefore mosques must be aware of this

by continuing to increase awareness of the elite of the mosque so that their response is able to counteract the potential conflict of this struggle.

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Millenials and Mosques in The Digital Age

By: M. Afthon Lubbi Nuriz

A. INTRODUCTION

Several studies concluded doubting the passion of Muslim millennials toward religion in general and mosques in particular. Are these doubts based on accurate facts and data found in reality? These conclusions must be continuously tested since social phenomena are the object of continuing research from time to time. The fact shows that *pesantren* as an Islamic educational institution where mosques are the center of its activities was flooded by new and of course young *santri*. The number of *pesantren* and *santri* increased dramatically each year[1]

Not only *pesantren* but also public schools integrate the Ministry of Education and Culture curriculum with the Islamic curriculum and use "Integrated Islamic Schools" as their name. They grew significantly and competed with other public and private schools. This demonstrates how high the passion of today's millennials toward religion. Nowadays, the young generation is very keen on attending *Taklim* assemblies held at mosques. This is confirmed by the proliferation of religious studies for the younger generation in mosques, especially in big cities.

1 Data of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, stated that in 1977 the number of *santri* was around 677,394, in 1985 the number increased to 1,084,801, in 1997 it increased to 1,770,768, in 2001 it rose to 2,737,805 *santri*, it kept on increasing in 2005 to 3,464,334 *santr*i, and the last record number rose to 4,290,626 *santri*. An increase in the number of *santri* was also followed by a very high number of Islamicboardingschools. seehttps://pbsb.ditpdpontren.kemenag.go.id.

The mentioned facts are undeniable but need to have a further examination. Unlike other major religions in the world, there is a new phenomenon in Islam that shows the passion for religion is no longer dominated by the elderly. The younger generation of Islam also seemed eager to learn religious teachings. *Tabligh Akbar* events that have famous great speakers like Ustadz Abdul Somad are undeniably strengthened the fact that the younger generation's religious passion has increased significantly in recent years. Events that have youth Islamic personality are always flooded by milennials, especially in big cities, such as Bandung, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta

According to a report by Fitriyan Zamzami and Harti iany Praisra which was published by *Republika* shows that this is not merely a local phenomenon. *Republika* quoted the results of a leading survey agency, *PEW research* that conducted a survey about religiosity in the United States of America. It was stated that the followers of religion are from various ages and backgrounds interviewed regarding the tendencies of each community. Leaving a religion is a general trend in the U.S. The older generation considers religion very much important in their lives compared to millennials born in the range 1980-2000. The Protestants, 55% of parents consider religion to be very important compared to 45% of the younger generation. While in Catholicism, numbers of the ratio are very sharp, 61% of parents are compared to 39% of the younger generation. Still in the United States, the trend reverses The Muslim community. More young people consider religion to be very important in their lives. As many as 66% of the young generation of US Muslims regard religion very important compared to 64% in older people [2]

As reported by the *Republika* , while the younger generation of other major religions have a lower percentage on how often they go to their house of worship compared to its older genearation, Islam shows that 44% of the younger generation go to Mosques more often than 42% of the older group. Moreover, the range of religiosity perception percentage between Muslim youth and their parents are not high compared to other religions. This condition does not only occur in western countries where there is a decrease

2 Fitriyan Zamzami dan Harti iany Praisra report in an article "Fenomena Hijrah Pemuda: Membalik Stigma Muslim Milenial", Republika, 30 November 2018.

in Christianity, but Muslim majority countries also experiencing a similar phenomenon where the younger generation is getting more excited to study their religion. *Tabah Foundation* from the United Arab Emirates in collaboration with *Zogby Research Service* held a large-scale survey regarding the views of the millennial Muslim generation in 2015. The sample countries are Morocco, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Bahrain, and Kuwait.

The results turned out contradictive to the initial assumptions about the religiosity of the younger generation. 100% of the millennials of these four countries embrace Islam because they conclude the truth about religion themselves., and not just because of heredity. The number of millenials with similar views is 90% in Egypt, UAE and Palestine, and 77% in Maroko.[3]

In Indonesia, researches on the younger generation and religion have been taken seriously. The latest one is a research conducted by The Center for The Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UIN Jakarta in 2018. In general, this research concluded that the attitudes and behavior of Muslim youth on religious issues especially radicalism do not indicate a steady tendency. The research also claims that the younger educated Muslims tend to adhere to attitudes and conservative religious behavior with communal, scriptural and puritan style. Even so, the basic attitude of the millennial generation is open to values and principles of moderate religiosity with a high appreciation of individual freedom and human rights although limited by religious norms and culture[4]

In addition, the results of research from *Youth Labs* that were reported in the book *Generation Phi*: "Understanding Millennials, Changers of Indonesia" This research that targeted various groups of young people in various regions of Indonesia concluded that there is an increasing trend of religiosity for millennials . Through in-depth interviews conducted to a number of speakers, religious perceptions of the younger generation's answers on surveys are very dominant. According to Najib Azca, [5][5] this phenomenon can be understood with the emergence of migration trends lately.

3 Fitriyan Zamzami and Harti iany Praisra, "Fenomena Hijrah ...., Republika, 30 November 2018.

4 Chaider Bamualim, dkk. *Kaum Muda Muslim Milenial: Konservatisme, Hibridasi Identitas, dan Tantangan Radikalisme*. (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2018). page. 247.

5 Sociologist of Gajah Mada University.

According to him, *hijrah* is a social phenomenon that marks the phase of crisis in humans, especially the younger generation, who leads to the desire to transform yourself from bad to become better. The indicators are measured by the changes of religiosity.

The migration or *hijrah* of the young generation also often characterized by adopting the Middle East lifestyle. There are expressions and articulations of the young generation that imitate Arabic language and customs which are sometimes contradictory to customs and culture that have already existed in Indonesia. According to Najib, this is because they are more receptive than the older generation, or in other words, they are more accommodative to change.[6]

This paper will try to examine the relations of Muslim millennials in Indonesia with a mosque as a place of worship for Muslims by using the generation theory approach in sociology. The question that will be tried to answer is how to understand the young generation of millennial Muslims who are experiencing the phenomenon of *"hijrah*" at this time. Generation gap is thought to be the cause of the gap between the older generation and the younger generation who is hybrid in identity.

Other important questions that will try to be answered include how the mosque should be a bridge between generations in the digital age, the role of generation young Muslims in prospering mosques, and how mosques should facilitate the activities of the younger generation who is experiencing a significant advance in communication and information technology in the era of today's pop culture.

Gap Generation: How to Understand Millennials

Studies on the relationship of the Muslim millennials and mosques in the present era are an important academic effort that requires various approaches from various scientific disciplines. For Muslims, both, young people and mosques, is the most strategic key that will determine progress or the withdrawal of civilization in the future. The young generation as the only successor and mosque as a place for nursery for dai, khatib, lecturers, and even scholars, all of whom must be *rahmatan lil-'aalamiin* according to

6 Fitriyan Zamzami and Harti iany Praisra, "*Fenomena Hijrah ....*, Republika, 30 November 2018

the command of the Qur'an. In the Indonesian context, Muslims must have a good national understanding that delivers Islamic and Indonesian-ness in the worship ritual room called the mosque and also above da'wah pulpits that have shifted from the podium to television and now migrate massively to the digital pulpits with all the ease and attractiveness. The problem faced is the lack of knowledge of the old generation about how to treat the millennials that live in a very different era and challenge.

From the perspective of the theory of generation or also called The sociology generation, [77] young millennial Muslims are those who were born around 1981-1995 or called generation Y, after that is the generation of Z born around 1996-2010. It needs to be noted, that this generation was born from the conditions of technologically developed countries like the United States. If this is brought into Indonesia, the division of the period does not apply because the factors of exposure to information and communication technology to the population of Indonesia are in different time interval compared to developed countries.

It can be concluded that the term millennials in Indonesia is not exactly the same with the term millennials in the generation theory above, but the coverage of millennials in Indonesia can be withdrawn to young ages that are born after 1995 to 2010 (Gen Z in the Generation theory). After this period or after the year 2010, the spread of information technology and communication is almost evenly distributed throughout the world. The generations born in the era of information and communication technology explosion almost have similar characteristics. They are called the Alpha generation. It is believed that this generation was conceived and born being exposed to digital technology, or their parents have at least introduced the gadget to their children when still in the cradle. Why is this important to be alluded in this paper? Because this often becomes a problem for ustadz, lecturers, and dai, in determining the appropriate religious teaching method for today's young generation. What is the problem? *Generation gap*.

7 According to this theory, people are significantly affected by the socio-historical environment (in particular, important events that involve them actively) during their youth; based on shared experience, social groups onturn influences events that shape futugenerations. Jane Pilcher, "Mannheim's Sociology of Generations: an Undervalued Legacy," BJS Volume 45 Issue No. 3, 1994, Pp. 482-484.

Based on the author's experience, millennials often protested on events that use *da'wah* in the digital era as a theme, especially, when they are recognized as a generation that gain information only from Google or Youtube.

They also do not accept the assumption of them reading the Qur'an only to the internet and not to *kiai* at mosques or pesantren. Unfortunately, this kind of thing often becomes a contemporary mockery done by the older generation towards the younger generation, or by groups that feel they have learned Islam perfectly by visiting *kiai*, for example, the term "*My Kiai is not Mbah Google* ". This particular sentence, if studied academically, was caused by a lack of understanding of the generation gap problems. The more the millennials receive an unpleasant treatment about how they get their source of information , the more they will become resistant to the negative ways that remind them they are in search of finding a *Qur'an* teacher.

They will feel more fun and comfortable watching lectures that are filled with verbal violence delivered in interesting rhetoric. They will also be easily amused by extremist narratives that are delivered in an emotionally appealing speech.

On the other hand, the old generation lecturers are not able to keep up with times and regenerate young Muslims that are nationalist and always promote peaceful discussions when handling conflicts in society.

The above experience is confirmed by Nicholas Carr's note in his phenomenal book "The Shallows", a book that questions the impact of the internet on how humans think. In his book, Carr made a young man named Joe O'Shea, a student majoring in Philosophy and the former chairman of the Florida State University student union as an example. Joe was able to convince the public that humans are able to keep up with the rapid pace of information and technology. "I do not read books", said Joe. "I open Google and I absorb as many needed information very fast"

He claimed that he felt no need to open chapters in books because with Google Book Search he could find anything he needs instantly. For this reason, he thinks that sitting quietly and turning over pages of a book does not make sense. "Not a good utilization of time because we can get information faster through websites" He stated that once we learn to become an advance online hunter,

books are no longer needed.[8]

Joe's statement above is not different from what is felt by the Indonesian millennials today. This fact is an important note for every religious preacher in facing the challenges of *da'wah* in the digital age where unfiltered information can influence the young generation that does not have critical thinking as their immunity and safety net towards ideological doctrines that endanger themselves and their community. One of these doctrines is the ones that contain religious extremism narratives that teach violence.

So, the generation gap must be well-understood by all, in this case, the lecturers or religious preachers. Every generation has its own perspective and it depends on the socio-historical environment in their youth which forms characteristics and shapes the present and future generations. Every generation's point of view can not be forced to be implemented on others. For instance, baby boomers cannot impose their will on millennials and vice versa. In terms of religion, more effort is needed to bridge the differences in generations so that the millennials as the successor of human life have sufficient religious provision to face challenges in the future.

The "Hijrah" phenomenon

An interesting matter to discuss besides the phenomenon itself is the terminology. Historically, the word *hijrah* is the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Madinah to save lives and the faith of Muslims who get physically abused by the tribe of Quraysh. From a linguistic perspective, the word means moving from one place to another for a purpose. In the hadith text, the Prophet Muhammad reminded his followers about the purpose of *hijrah*. Emigrating for God or just for the pleasure to find the love of our life, both of these conditions are considered *hijrah,* and the results depend on the intention of the person. But of course, the migration referred to by the Prophet Muhammad is migrating to Allah, where the Prophet reminded his people not to emigrate to follow worldly passions. Up to this point, the terminology *hijrah zaman now (nowadays migration)* needs to be reviewed. Why there is a huge number of people, especially the

8 Carr, Nicholas. *The Shallows: The Internet undermines How We Think?* (Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2011). p. 5.

younger generation, attending events with *hijrah* as the theme?

The question is what is the migration for? Where are they going? Is there a group of people that threaten their faith as the history of *hijrah* the Prophet Muhammad to Medina? Or is it just the extremist ideology about the doctrines of Darul Kufr and Darul Islam in new packaging? Where young Muslims are invited to move from the nation which is considered not implementing the *Shari'a* Islam to the Islamic State (Islamic State), or *Hijrah* by changing the constitution of this country with Caliphate ideology. This matter should be questioned because the *Hijrah* that is referred to as a transition from bad to good actually has an established religious term in Indonesia, *"Taubat"* and *"Insyaf"*. It was proven by how events that used *Taubat* and *Insyaf* as the theme were becoming notpopular. These terms are now being changed to a new more attractive term for the younger generation who are in a wave of pop culture. The words *Taubat* and *Insyaf* seem old, while the word *hijrah* seems more up to date. The sentence *"Let's Hijrah"* has more kick than *"Let's repent",* this is why the *Hijrah Fest* that was held at the Jakarta Convention Center in November 2018 did not use the term "Taubat *Fest*" or "Insyaf *Fest*" to attract visitors.

This *Hijrah* phenomenon is actually a positive one although the word repetance or *Insyaf* is more appropriate to be used for this phenomenon. The word *Taubat* or *Insyaf* means moving from the dark past to a brighter one while the word *Hijrah* as described above does not math this social change. The word *Hijrah* is more about a displacement of geographical position while *Taubat* is more about self transformation. The confusion in the meaning of the word *hijrah* in Indonesia can also be proven by comparing it to the use of the word *hijrah* on other countries or even to countries that use Arabic as the official language. Is this word is also intepreted as self transformations in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt, or in other Muslim countries such as, Malaysia, Brunei, Bangladesh,Pakistan, etc.? If studied further, the term *hijrah* emerged from the puritanism movement that wants the *Khilafah* as a joint constitution of the world's Muslims without any barriers of the nation-state.

We still remember how Al-Qaeda tried to persuade the young generation of Muslims around the world to move to places like Afghanistan and Iraq to do jihad against non-Muslims and the

apostates. ISIS which is even bigger than Al-Qaeda also called for a move (*Hijrah)* to form an Islamic State. Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS have similar ideologies, namely *jihadists* and *Salafi,* and both of them also emphasize on *Hijrah*. The only difference between them is the organizational structure which always results in *baiat* of leaders claims that could have the effect of killing one another.

The first article distributed by ISIS was *"A Call to Hijrah"*[9] that used English. This article was their call to Muslims all over the world, especially the younger generation to join them. The word hijrah is a communication strategy using religious symbols as an easy-to- understand main narrative for readers. According to Guy Fricano, the word *Hijrah* is a re-perception or also reinterpretation to manage "Respect" or "Pride" of Muslims.[10] ISIS and other *Khilafah* guardians have been using the word *Hijrah* as a tool to deceive the faith of Muslims that instinctively defend their religion because of pride and respect, and this requires *Hijrah*. If the project for the Islamic *Hijrah* calls fails, then *Hijrah* can be reached by initiating the *Hijrah* of the mind through indoctrination, such as moving from a democratic governance system that is considered infidel because it is man-made to the system of khilafah government which is considered as God's command.

In plain view, those who campaigned for *hijrah* Indonesia are mostly those who support the concept of an Islamic state promoted by Hizbut-Tahrir although they all have different answers regarding the relation of the state and religion when they are asked about it. Especially in today's young generation pop culture, state and religious issues become ambiguous because of how aggressive political camps competing to attract the young generation. This ruins the unity of the younger generation of the nation.

These various religious views, or what is referred to by CSRC UIN Jakarta as identity hybridization makes the phenomenon of migrations Muslim millennials is difficult to map because these religious views are not steady. A magnifying glass is needed to see radical movement cells clearly and how narratives are spread along with religious lectures on a pop culture events. We have to be careful in making accusation regarding this matter because it can backfire.

9 The Islamic State, Dabiq Issue 3: A Call to Hijrah, (2014). iles/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-3-the-call-to-hijrah.pdf. Diakses January 2018.

10 Fricano .Guy. *"Horizontal and Vertical Honour in the Statements of Osama Bin Laden", Critical Studies on Terrorism 5*, (2012), P.1-21.

B. HYBRIDATION OF MILENNIAL GENERATION IDENTITY

An important finding of the UIN CSRC research in Jakarta is that the younger generation of Muslims is experiencing a phenomenon which is called identity hybridization (hybridation of identity)[11] Theoretically, identity hybridation is actually not a new phenomenon. Social and religious observers have used this term to read the phenomenon of Islam, including in Indonesia. One of them is Carool Kirsten[12] who uses the term cultural hybridity to read and understand the development of Islam in Indonesia.[13]

Identity hybridization of the millennial generation can be understood as a new phenomenon caused by a mixture of cultures, traditions, values and principles held by young people as a result of the interaction process between a person or group of young people with the context and tradition that surrounds them. In addition, young people tend to be accommodating and open to new values from friends, family, teachers, the environment, educational institutions, organizations, and others. As a result, millennials have different identities or can also be called unique and even genuine. This authenticity does not occur amid the Islamic discourse contestation, but it occurs due to how fed up they are with the swift flow of infromation of religious issues that are dominating the social media, a place where these millennials become a digital native. This saturation makes them look for new alternatives that can represent their anxiety in seeking religious identity. It is this boredom which is successfully filled by lecturers who were able to combine young people's passion and Islam in pop culture. They even successfully capitalized so it becomes a very large commodity and market.

Muslim millennials have a very strong relationship with the digital age. In fact, they are digital natives whose life is very difficult to be separated from the internet. Social media is a best

11 The definition of *hybridization of identity* is the existence of a religious identity of the millennials as a result of crossing affiliation and religious orientation based on the religious socio-political dynamics they witnessed and the interaction of the young generations and with their social environment See Chaider Bamualim, et al., Youth Millennial Muslims: Conservatism, Identity Hybridization and the challenges of Radicalism, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2018). h 69.

12 He is a lecturer at University College London (UCL) and author of Islamic books in Indonesia: *The Contest for Societies, Ideas and Values.*

13 Kirsten, Carool. *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Societies, Ideas and Values*, Oxford University Press, USA: 2015, Pp. 47-49

friend and a place for these millenials to study religion. Digital friendly religious figure is easier to be accepted because they can be accessed whenever and wherever these millennials want. The data that was collected by CRSC UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 18 districts and cities showed the presence of social media has reduced the role of religious education in family,educational institutions and organizations.[14]

Social media is used massively by the young generation, including as a mean of religious learning. This explains why social media reduced the role of schools and family activities in studying religion. CSRC UIN's Jakarta research concluded that millennials generation has the independence to search for information, including what media they want to use as their source of information, whether online or offline. Some names of Ustadz have long been widely known by the public and the young people in Indonesia, names like Yusuf Mansur, Habib Rizieq Shihab, the late Jefry Al Bukhori, and Abdullah Gymnastiar. The power of social media also gave birth to new and popular figures or those who are also called as "*ustadz viral"* or viral cleric. Hanan Attaki, Adi Hidayat, Abdul Somad (a million da'iviewers), Khalid Basalamah, and Felix Siaw are just a few of the names. There are also other famous names in certain provinces, such as Ustadz Evie Effendi and Jujun Junaidi in West Java and Salim A Fillah in Jogyakarta.

The only cleric or Islamic figure from abroad who was mentioned in the survey is Zakir Naik. Whereas for ustadzah who are popular among them are Mama Dedeh, Okky Setiana Dewi, and Umi Pipik[15] although they are not mentioned as many as the Zakir Naik.

There are many reasons why the names of these teachers became the choice of young Muslims who are close to the internet. Of course, the reasons are varied, one of which is popularity. Some of the names mentioned above have been or often appears on TV and is popular with the public, like Aa Gym and Yusuf Mansur. They often take part in TV events. Besides appearing on TV, they

14 Chaider Bamualim and friends "Muslim Milenials: Conservatism, Identity hybridation and the challenges of radicalism". Center for The Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC), Februari 2018. p. 26.

15 Chaider Bamualim and friends "Muslim Milenials: Conservatism, Identity hybridation Hibridasi and the challenges of radicalism". Center for The Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC), February 2018. p. 26.

also appear on YouTube and becoming a source of inspiration for the people. Some other ustadzs also appear on non-mainstream TV and others only on youtube but are still gaining popularity.

Their popularity is getting stronger because they are figures whose theme lectures are not too heavy and easy to understand. They are also becoming more popular because of excellent oration skills, sense of humor and the ability to present a very contextual theme to fulfill the thirst and enthusiasm of young people. The question is whether these clerics are digital- friendly and an active social media user, or is there an agency that supports the presence of these clerics to appear more on social media. In this context is actually a struggle in production and reproduction of discourse occurs. Muslim youths are very attached to the internet and social media. Internet convenience is the reason why they chose to look for religious information through ustadz-ustadz in cyberspace.[16]

This convenience means that it can be used by anyone and at any time. The theme can also be adjusted to meet the young people's expectations. Search engines will help them quickly to find what they want without having to come to Qur'an recitation. They can listen from afar. If they missed it, they can replay the video of the cleric or their favorite cleric. Another reason is the appearance of these preachers on social media is more interesting. The contents are up to date and relate according to the psychology of young people, so they are easily enter the minds of young people. The theme used is also a very typical young people themes, such as how to relate with the opposite sex, encourage achievement, and "migrate" towards better Islam. The material was delivered clearly, so that it is easy to understand.

The identity hybridization of this millennials Muslim generation can be a bonus but can also be a threat. As a bonus, Millennial Muslim youths are used to various contestation of Islamic discourse in cyberspace. They do not have a single religious view and they are also enriched with plenty of reliable information regarding the understanding of *madzab ikih* with *furuiyyah* as its nature as well as understanding *madzhab akidah* with *ushuliyyah* as its nature.

If this generation is able to manage information that enters their heads well, they will not only be a generation that is moderate and

16 *Ibid*, h. 27.

tolerant with different views and beliefs, but they are also able to present appropriate Islamic discourses and practices that are needed for this era. But on the contrary, if the narrative that is shaping the perspective of the millennials is singular and tends to be extreme-radical, then this will be a serious threat to humanity, especially Indonesia in the future.

C. MOSQUE AS A GENERATION BRIDGE IN THE DIGITAL ERA

There are many challenges for mosques today. Among them is: radicalism that freely enters and even controls the mosques, religious intolerance that is marked with anxiety and they believed as something that has weakened their *akidah* just simply because opening a dialogue with people from other religions, the politicization of the mosque that is used for electoral interests and winning a certain political groups, insufficient religious and nationality literacy of mosque administrators , as well as the lack of managerial aspects in the digital age, especially weak financial accountability that reduces public trust for the mosque manager.

As a result, the mosque became a hotbed of radicalization and intolerance which in recent years has been exploited by politicians, as well as the lack of financial contributions from the public due to public distrust towards the mosque management, which has opened opportunities for the entry of foreign funds that have a hidden agenda for Indonesia's sovereignty. Apart from all of that, although Millennials are having a huge passion for religion, mosques run by older generations in general have not been able to become a bridge and container that manages and directs the Muslim youths or so-called "teenage mosques" towards national National Character Building, which can make Islamic and fun Indonesian-ness. It is common in Indonesia for mosques to be managed by old generations.[17] Some mosques are even being made by retirees to fill the rest of their lives after quitting work.

For the older generations, of course, it is positive for them to get closer to God and become equipped to live in the afterlife. However, the older generations tend not to have the creative

17 UIN Jakarta CSRC Team, Literacy Needs Assessment Research ReportMosques, Imams and Khatibs in 7 Cities in Indonesia (DKI Jakarta, Tasikmalaya & Garut, Banda Aceh, Palembang, Manado, Ambon and Mataram) "(CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, 2018).

power to manage mosques in the latest era. The older generation is not the only common one to manage a mosque in Indonesia. The mosque is also managed by people who have other activities besides taking care of the mosque, both as office employees, entrepreneurs, etc. Their time is very limited for the mosque. There are not many mosques that place an innovative and creative young people in important positions in the organizational structure of the mosque. The research conducted by UIN Jakarta CSRC in collaboration with PPIM discovered that it is rarely found mosques that have programs for the younger generation except for study program (TPQ) for young children.

However, in big cities like Jakarta and Bandung, the younger generation has gotten more room to develop themselves. Although the number is not significant , this can be used as a role model for other mosques in Indonesia. One of the programs was found by Fahmi Syahirul Alim who was doing research on mosques in Jakarta. He found some creative programs that can be a bridge for the older and the younger generations. One of them is "Warung Pintar" in Bintaro Jaya mosque. This program is iniated by the young people in the mosque organization that developed an entrepreneurial department and has become a hangout place for young people. Besides providing more income to the mosque, this program attracts more young people to come to the mosque. They also invited many young artists, such as Teungku Wisnu, Dewi Sandra, Tomi Kurniawan to do a talk show with the young people around the mosque.

Fahmi also noted other programs that advocate national values. For example, "Gerakan Pemuda Subuh", this program is held after subuh on Saturdays and Sundays. It also invites moderate lectures, such as Utadz Syamsi Ali from America and Ustadz Evie Effendi. The theme is "Knitting Ukhuwah in Diversity".[18]

One of the programs that became a bridge for the old and the young generations is the program in Sunda Kelapa Mosque. RISKA (Remaja Masjid Sunda Kelapa) or The Youths of Sunda Kelapa Mosque had provided a platform for the younger generation since 1974. RISKA has a legendary slogan "Muda Gaul dan Berkarya"(

18 Alim, Fahmi Syahirul. Report Needs Assessment Religious Literacy of Mosque Takmir, Imam and Khatib in Jakarta "(Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, PPIM UIN Jakarta, Convey Indonesia, and UNDP, August 2018).

young, outgoing, and work)and various other youth programs. They define themselves as a progressive youth group in studying Islam and exploring their hobbies in arts, sports, journalism, health, and social activities. In the organization's it is stated, "An Islamic Youth Organization where youth come to learn Islam and explore their interests in Art, Sport, Journalism, Health and Social Activities.[19]

One of the programs is SDTNI (Studi Dasar Terpadu Nilai Islam) or an integrated basic studies of Islamic values. This is a four-month weekly program for the young people that come from many backgrounds in Jakarta. There is the BMAQ program. Bimbingan Mahir Baca al-Qur'an. This was held for the young people who want to improve their ability in reading the Qur'an. There is also RISKA PEDULI or RISKA CARE, social activity to support unfortunate children or the victims of a natural disaster.

There are also many interest and talent development programs for young people. Programs, such as archery, cooking class, outing class, self- defense, vocal class, sewing, etc. Other than those programs mentioned, these teenagers were able to inspire other teenagers from other mosques by inviting them to come to The Muslim Youth Night Event. A Qur'an recitation event that was also inserted with a workshop and a photography training.

Although there are concerns about the strengthening of the radicalism phenomenon in the mosque as reported by P3M in the results its research in 2018 that mentioned shocking findings that 40% of mosques in Jakarta have been exposed to radicalism, there is still hope.

If it is put in the form of a scheme,then the relationship between the mosque and the young generation can be mapped into three things; problems, solutions ,and media as the connecting bridge.

Graph 3.

19 *Ibid.*

Digital Media as The Generation Bridge



First, the occurrence of some problems include mosques and young people. Problems, such as radicalism, intolerance, religion politicization,the weakening of nationalism, and the generation gap between the elderly and young. Second, the solutions to these problems are digital literacy, interest and development programs for young talent that support Islamic and Indonesia-ness capacity building.

Third, is the use of digital media by mosque administrators which connects and combines the older generation and the young generation in one social media forum of the mosque community (community-based). It can be in the form of a WhatsApp group, Facebook, or the kind where young people can express their opinions and ideas. Whereas the older generation can accept their creative ideas and at the same time can monitor and oversee the discourse of thought which is accepted and developed among young people. This way, mosques in the digital era can be a connecting bridge for the older generation and the younger generation with the help of communication and information technology in platforms such as, WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, and so on.

This model can be developed by moderate religion patrons to embrace the young generation that is seeking for digital-friendly religious figures. Community based strategy enables the older and the young generation to meet and exchange ideas to find a solution to a problem around the mosque and religion. This way, the concern towards digital media that contains extremism narratives can be reduced the older generation with the generation gap melting approach, at least the gap between generations can be minimized continuously.

Digital media is a necessity that cannot be avoided by the older

generation in inviting the younger generation. Digital media must instead become a propaganda media used by mosques to invite young children to fill mosque shafs.

D. CONCLUSION

The passion of the Muslim millennials towards the mosque is sufficiently high. This is confirmed by the high number of religion studies for young people in mosques, especially in big cities. The Muslim younger generation seemed to be more eager to study religion than the older generation. In big cities like Bandung, Jakarta and Yogyakarta, events that used the passion of young people and Islam as a theme always flooded with visitors, especially millennials.

There are not many mosques that place innovative and creative young people in important positions such as in the organizational structure. However, in big cities like Jakarta and Bandung, the younger generation have gotten more room to develop themselves. Although the number is still not significant, this can be used as an example for other mosques in Indonesia. One of the programs was found by Fahmi Syahirul Alim who was doing research on mosques in Jakarta. He found some creative programs that can be a bridge for the older and the younger generations. One of them is "Warung Pintar" in Bintaro Jaya mosque. This program is iniated by the young people in the mosque organization that developed an entrepreneurial department. There are also other programs that advocate national values, for example, "Gerakan Pemuda Subuh", this program is able to wash away the fear of the rise of radicalism that is targeting the young people. There are also many interest and talent development programs for the young people. Programs, such as archery, cooking class, outing class, self defense, vocal class, sewing, etc.

Although there are concerns about the strengthening of the radicalism phenomenon, there is still hope. Solutions that can be done for these problems are religion literacy, nationalism literacy, digital literacy, interest and development programs for young talent that support Islamic and Indonesia-ness capacity building. The use of digital media by mosque administrators is also important to be put into consideration. Generation gap can solved by using digital media that connects and combines the

older generation and the young generation in one social media forum of the mosque community (community based). It can be in a form of a WhatsApp group, Facebook, or the kind where young people can express their opinions and ideas. Whereas the older generation can accept their creative ideas and at the same time monitor and oversee the discourse of thought which is accepted and developed among young people. This is where mosques in the digital era can become a bridge between the older generation and the younger generation.

The identity hybridization of this millennials Muslim generation can be a bonus but can also be a threat. As a bonus, Millennial Muslim youths are used to various contestation of Islamic discourse in cyberspace. If this generation is able to filter information that enters their heads, they will not only become a generation that is moderate and tolerant with different views and beliefs, but are also able to present appropriate Islamic discourses and practices that are needed for this era. But on the contrary, if the narrative that is shaping the perspective of the millennials is singular and tends to be extreme-radical, then this will be a serious threat to humanity, especially Indonesia in the future.

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Abdul Wahid, born in Bima City 1971, is currently a lecturer at UIN Mataram and Director of the Alamtara Institute, social-cultural studies institution and publications in West Nusa Tenggara. He is known as a socio-cultural analyst, involved in geliat literacy and culture driven by various communities in Lombok and Sumbawa. Graduated with a degree in Arabic literature from IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya (1994), master of religion from UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta (2000), and master of education from Yogyakarta State University (2002). Involved in culture studies at the University of Northern Iowa, USA (2004-2006), and after joining the fellowship program at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore (2012) and the Partnership program in Islamic Education Scholarship at Australian National University,Canberra (2014) finally won a doctorate in cultural studies at Udayana University (2016) with a dissertation on Islamization-Christianization in Mbawa-Donggo, a marginal society and prone to conflict in West Nusa Tenggara.

His intellectual interest is fairly extensive. It is seen from the works and diverse activities. His academic work, among others Records of Resistance (2000), Ahmad Wahib, Doctrine and Struggle Social Reality (2004), Waitress Children Learn to Serve (2008), Tendensi Teks (2009), Jara Mbojo: Cultural Horses (2011), and Religious Pluralism: Dialogue Paradigm for Conflict Mediation and Da'wah (2016), as well as several book chapters and journal articles. With the research team of the Center for the Study of Religion

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After joining CSRC in 2003, Irfan was sent to study conflict resolution at AMAN's School of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Bangkok, Thailand (2005). His interest in the conflitc issues led him to take the Advance Course in Security Studies at APCSS, Honolulu, Hawaii (2015). This Gontor boarding school graduate has written and edited many books and training modules around a variety of themes, ranging from Philanthropy Islam, Islam and Peace, Conflict Resolution, Islam and Human Rights, to Islam and democracy. He also researches and writes several articles in the media about the Hate Speech issue. Thanks to his works in 2011 Irfan was named by the Indonesia Campus Magazine Campus (August, Vol. 5) as one of the 20 Indonesia's top academics (for the humanities) under the age 45 of years old. As a hate speech expert, in recent years Irfan Abubakar has been regularly asked to be a guest speaker at various seminars and training participated by POLRI officers. He can be contacted via email: irfanaab@yahoo.co.uk or irfan.abubakar@uinjkt.ac.id

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M. Afthon Lubbi Nuriz, is a young researcher at CSR UIN Jakarta. Born on June 3, 1987 in Jatirokeh Village, Kec. Songgom, Kab. Brebes. He completed his education at Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor in 2007. After serving in his alma mater as a lecturer, he continued his undergraduate studies at the Department of Islamic Communication Faculty of Da'wah of the Islamic University of Bandung. Currently, this researcher who is also a principal and takes care of santri at Almanar Azhari Islamic Boarding School, Limo, Depok is completing his thesis on the

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Besides this book, he also contributed to the writing of several other books / modules, including titled Peace Education at Islamic Boarding School with Islamic and Human Rights Perspectives (2016), Counter Narrative Extremist: Islamic Boarding School Voice for Peace and Tolerance (2017),Pesantren Peaceful Message (2017), and Religious Literacy book Takmir Masjid, Imam, and Khatib (2018) published by CSRC in collaboration with PPIM UIN Jakarta. He was also involved as researchers and writers in a national survey of the effectiveness Socialization of the Four Pillars of National and State Life in collaboration with the Indonesian MPR Review Board in 2018. His great interest in understanding generation changes especially Muslim millennials was poured out in some National media and National private television as a source of public discussion and talk show. In addition, he also actively contributes in religious literacy training religious for khatib, preachers, and mosque takmir, as well as advocating for students from Jabodetabek about peace education in Islamic boarding schools with Islamic and human rights perspectives. The author can be contacted via email: afthonlubbinuriz@gmail.com.

Rita Pranawati, born in Kebumen 6 April 1977. She finished her master's degree in Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies (IIS), Post-graduate program of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (2006) and her second master at Monash University Australia in the field of Sociology with an Australian Leadership Award (ALA) scholarship as well as the recipient of the Allison Sudrajat Award. She had been with CSRC Jakarta in the issue of democracy, human rights, Islamism, peace building, and women and children since 2006. She was actively involved in Religion and Human Rights tranings starting from making the beginner to advance level training modules for young Muslim leaders among Islamic boarding schools in 22 cities in Indonesia (2009-2013). The Alumni of Indonesia Australia Moslem Exchange Program (MEP) is also actively involved as a facilitator in the Pesantren for Peace (PfP) program for pesantren throughout Java from 2014-2016. She also

became a trainer for the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP) on human rights and gender issues.

Rita also explored the issue of children and families when she was the head of the Nasyiatul Pusat Aisyiyah Center and joined the Muhamdiyah Children Center in Aceh. She also became a commissioner for the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) since 2014-2017 and was re-elected as a commissioner for the 2017-2022 period. She became the commisioner of family and alternative care and right now she is the Deputy of the Central Leadership Social Services Assembly of Muhammadiyah and Coordinator of the Legislative-Socialization Division from the Central Council for Law and Human Rights of Aisyiyah. She is also a lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Prof. University Dr.Hamka (UHAMKA). She can be reached via: pranawati_rita2000@yahoo.com.

ABOUT CSRC

Center for the Study of Religion and Culture/CSRC (Pusat Kajian Agama dan Budaya) is a research and research institution in the field of religious and socio-cultural, established based on the Rector's Decree of UINSyarif Hidayatullah Jakarta on April 28, 2006. This is a development of the cultural field at the Center Language and Culture (PBB UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1999-2006) due to the increasing demands for developing religious studies and research (especially Islam) in socio-cultural and political relations. The purpose is to know and understand what important roles can be contributed by religion to realize the community order that is just and prosperous, strong, democratic and peaceful.

The importance of this development can be seen from the increasing role and influence of religion in the public sphere. From day to day, religion is not only a conversation of various levels of society, at the national or international level, but also its influence is getting stronger in the public sphere, amid the swift currents of modernization and secularization.

One proof of the strengthening of religion in the public sphere is the growth of religious characterized identities, symbols, and social institutions. The expression of Islam must be recognized for establishing a strong place in public. However, Islam is not the only entity, there are also other entities that helped enliven the face of our public space. As a teaching, source of ethics, and inspiration for the formation of social institutions, Islam often appears in its

diverse expressions because it is practiced according to the multi-interpretation of Muslim communities in various backgrounds. Due to this variety, different interpretations and streams emerged; as a consequence, the teachings and values of this noble religion often practiced in a distinctive color and feel. Sometimes, it appears in various portraits of exclusivism, but not infrequently also present as a source of social ethics, an inspiration for the development of scientific knowledge and technology, mediators for social integration, as well as motivator for civil society socio-economic empowerment. Islam also influences the formation of social institutions, politics, economics, and education that are more or less contributed positively to national development. In this context, the presence

Islam in the public sphere does not need to be a concern. Otherwise, this kind of Ethics and religious ethos needs to be appreciated by society and supported by all parties, especially the government. The presence of CSRC aims to revitalize the role of religion in that particular context. Religion must be actualized in the form of ethics and ethos at the same time, in order to color the formation of a good and accountable system .In the future, a careful religious transformation is necessary to be done to answer the challenges faced by the people, which from day to day seems increasingly complex, in the middle of the swift wave of social change and globalization. Considering the flow of change takes place faster than the ability of the people to upgrade its capacity, then it needs the right strategy.

In accordance with its duties and roles, CSRC tries to contribute to the research, information and training sector and facilitates various initiatives that can encourage the strengthening of civil society through policy development (policy development) in the field of social religious and cultural. Hopefully, in the future, the Islamic institutions will be developed into centers of productivity of the people (production center), and not actually a social burden (social liability). Thus, it is hoped that Muslims can enhance their role in socio-cultural life and economy positively and constructively



We certainly do hope that mosques can optimize their role in shaping the character of society. Most mosque *takmirs* also express this hope. They generally consider mosques to be not just places of worship, but also ideal vehicles for educating religious literacy.

The burning questions remain: what on earth is religious literacy and how is it actually practiced in mosques? Several studies have found that religious literacy in mosques revolves around issues of worship, *aqidah* and morals. These themes are conveyed normatively by *ustadz* or *kiai* through sermons or lectures.

However, only few of them discuss socio-human themes from an Islamic perspective; such as development of science and technology, work ethic, nurturing reading habits, promotion of peace, conflict resolution, and so on. While most of these ustadz or kiai do accept the concept of *rahmatan lil-'alamin*, only a few of them have discussed its application in mosques.

This book examines religious literacy that takes place in mosques, the challenges that are faced by many mosques, and how they react to them. This book attempts to open a discourse on the possibility of building a new direction for religious literacy in our mosques.

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CONVEY INDONESIA

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