

# POLITICS, ULAMA AND NARRATIVES ON NATIONHOOD:

Fragmentation of Religious Authority  
in Indonesian Cities

Noorhaidi Hasan, Suhaidi, Najib Kailani, Munirul Ikhwan,  
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# TRANSLITERATION

## Konsonan

ء	‘	ز	z	ك	k
ا	a	س	s	ل	l
ب	b	ش	sy	م	m
ت	t	ص	sh	ن	n
ث	ts	ض	dh	و	w
ج	j	ط	th	ه	h
ح	h	ظ	zh	ي	y
خ	kh	ع	‘	ال	al and ‘l
د	d	غ	gh	ة	ah
ذ	dz	ف	f		
ر	r	ق	q		

## Vokal

Panjang	آ	ā	Short	ا	a
	إي	ī		ي	i
	أو	ū		و	u

Dobel	يـ	īy (akhiran ī)	Diftong	أَي	ē
	وـ	ūw (akhiran ū)		أُو	ē



## PREFACE

Post-1998 democratization provides a platform for new figures from various educational, professional, and ideological backgrounds to participate in contesting the position of Islam in the state and society of Indonesia. These new figures offered new religious discourse and habitus and pushed public welfare issues and interpretations of Islam into a public discussion. They opened the debate about the relation between religion and the state which was considered 'the end' with a variety of alternative offers which were popularized through public spheres, such as schools, campuses, mosques, *taklim* (Islamic forum) assemblies, radio, television, internet, and social media. However, this does not mean that old religious figures withdraw themselves from the public stage. Developments in the public spheres show the contestation of authority between religious figures who compete for public influence, and the state, in this case, follows closely the growing discourse among figures called "*ulama*" to be considered in determining policy and political direction.

This book reviews the dynamics of religious politics and perceptions of the ideas of the modern nation-state and derivative concepts such as tolerance, citizenship, and nonviolence by emphasizing attention to local dynamics. With a focus on research in 15 cities (Medan, Jakarta, Bandung, Surakarta, Makassar - which represent the metropolitan city of Islam - Banda Aceh, Padang, Surabaya, Palangka Raya, Banjarmasin - which represent the city with the tradition of mainstream scholars - Pontianak, Denpasar, Ambon, Manado, and Kupang - which represent cities with distinctive Muslim minority issues), this study wants to see the extent to which local social, political and religious contexts influence the



views of Islamic scholars who are important political agents in a climate of populist democracy related to the relationship between religion and the nation, the politic system, and the relationships among citizens.

The local context of each city presents diverse and interesting dynamics that are not always congruent with the national political and religious context. The imagination, argumentation, and reservation of ulama (Islamic scholars) on the idea of nation-state in each city are influenced by a distinctive intellectual, ideological, political, social, and religious background. The national context naturally influences local dynamics at a certain level, especially in cities where ulama and their communities follow national political and religious issues.

This book is one of the products from surveys and research on the perceptions of ulama about nation-states conducted by researchers from the Center for the Study of Islamic Democracy and Peace (PusPIDeP) and the Postgraduate Program of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. This research is part of the Indonesian CONVEY Program initiated by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Before the field research was conducted, several workshops were held to finalize the theory, instruments, and research methods. Qualitative instrument workshops were held in Surakarta in August 2018 by inviting several speakers including Yusuf Rahman, Jajang Jahroni, Ema Marhumah, Jazilus Sakho ‘, and Syamsul Arifin, representatives from Convey-UNDP-PPIM Utami Sandyarani, Dirga Maulana, and Sachiko Kareki. This workshop emphasizes the need to hold a workshop specifically for quantitative instruments which were not actually included in the proposed plan. However, for the success and the smoothness of research, a quantitative instrument workshop was finally held in Yogyakarta by inviting speakers, namely Ismatu Ropi, Miftahun Ni'mah Suseno, and Maria Widagdo. This workshop also emphasized the implementation of a national consolidation workshop by inviting representatives of research assistants from 15 cities. The workshop held in Yogyakarta aims to establish communication and understanding with local assistants regarding the strategies and ways of research work in the field.

The study involved 15 main researchers from diverse fields of Islamic studies and social sciences: Islamic politics, urban Muslim anthropology, inter-faith studies, study of the Koran and hadith, Middle Eastern studies, Salafism, minority studies, Islamic law, social work, and psychology. The

field research took place from September to October 2018. To improve the analysis, the workshop on the results of the research was held in Surakarta by inviting several speakers, including Prof. Al Makin, Saiful Umam, and Jaya Dani Mulyanto. To finalize local reports, one workshop was held in the same city.

Before this book was published, the results of the research were presented in two cities, Makassar and Banda Aceh in November and December 2018 by inviting resource persons Prof. Kadir Ahmad, Wahyuddin Halim, Fuad Jabali, and Reza Indria, before finally being launched in Jakarta in January 2019 by inviting keynote speakers Prof. Jamhari Makruf and Ahmad Suaedy. The seminar results of this research are important not only to share the research findings, but also to get responses and input from experts, scholars, and society in general. This feedback and input are certainly an important consideration for us in writing this book. This book is expected to be able to contribute to reading perceptions, arguments, and reservations of ulama in seeing the ideas of the modern nation-state, especially in the context of populist democracy.

This research is a result from the contribution, hard work, and dedication of the 15 researchers, namely Noorhaidi Hasan (Surakarta), Suhadi (Denpasar), Najib Kailani (Palangka Raya), Munirul Ikhwan (Bandung), Moch Nur Ichwan (Banda Aceh), Muhammad Yunus (Medan), Euis Nurlaelawati (Jakarta), Roma Ulinnuha (Padang), Ibnu Burdah (Surabaya), Sunarwoto (Pontianak), Ahmad Rafiq (Banjarmasin), Rofah Muzakir (Kupang), Nina Mariani Noor (Ambon), Eva Latipah (Manado), and Muhrisun Afandi (Makassar). The success of the research that resulted in the development of this book could not have been conducted if it weren't for the role of the research assistants who have worked hard to help researchers in the field. These assistants are Marzi Afriko, Murni Barus (Banda Aceh), Musdalifah, Rahman Mantu (Manado), Syamsul Arif Galib, Rusdianto R (Makassar), Purjatian Azhar, Muhammad Irfan (Medan), Mhd Yazid, Ujang Wardi (Padang), Muhammad Ihsanul Arief, Nur Qomariyah (Banjarmasin), Muhammad Lutfi Hakim, Rizki Susanto (Pontianak), Supriadi, Muhammad Iqbal (Palangka Raya), Zet A Sandia, Ardiman Kelihu (Ambon), Ahmad Al Amin, Ismaul Fitriyaningsih (Denpasar), Umar Sulaiman, Aziz Marhaban (Kupang), Fahmi Muhammad Ahmadi, Ronni Johan (Jakarta), Cucu Surahman, Mokh. Iman Firmansyah (Bandung), Chafid Wahyudi, Mahbub Ghozali (Surabaya), and Anas Aijudin, Mibtadin (Surakarta).

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Yogyakarta, January 20, 2019

# INTRODUCTION

## Studying the Public Islamic Discourse and Ulama' Nationality Politics in Indonesian Cities

*Najib Kailani, Munirul Ikhwan, Suhadi*

The phenomenon of religious radicalism in various parts of the world has encouraged intellectuals and policyholders to pay attention to the position of religion in discussions about public sphere. If previously they were so convinced by the theory of secularization which stated that modernity based on rationality and technology would make religion disappear in public life, now religion began to be seen as an important factor in the discourse of public spheres (Casanova 1994; Turner 2012). Religion in the context of public spheres is projected to create equal communication space in order to find “civic virtues” in building peaceful lives (Hirschkind 2001; Habermas 2006).

In the context where Indonesia is predominantly Muslims, public discourse seems inseparable from the role of ulama. Ulama have long proved themselves to be important figures who influence politically, sociologically, and culturally towards the historical dynamics of Indonesian society. One of them is their articulation and interpretation of religious and the nation's relationship. Religion and the nation's relationship which was considered ‘the end’ with the concept of the Pancasila nation began to be widely discussed and debated in the public spheres of the Reformation era. The demands of the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter) strengthened, as militant Islamic groups emerged shouting the application of sharia and holding radical actions in the public spheres. The decentralization policy made the situation even more complicated. Contestation over the symbols of Islam occurs both at the central and local levels (Sulistiyo 2009), which resonates in the desire to implement Islamic law through the Shari'ah Perda (Bush 2008).

In the first decade after the 1998 Reformation, the country appeared to be uneasy in responding to the emergence of alternative discourses which discussed the relationship between religion and the nation by proposing sharia as the basis of state law. The bitter experience of Pancasila indoctrination in the past (New Order 1966-1998) seemed to be behind the uncertainty. In such a transition situation, new figures (read: new religious authorities) appear more freely to appear and move in public spheres - schools, campuses, mosques, *majelis taklim* (Islamic forum), radio, television, internet, and social media - to popularize alternative political discourse in a variety of styles: Jihadi, Tahriri, Salafi, and Tarbawi (Hilmy 2010; Machmudi; Hasan 2018).

New religious figures or “new ulama” generally work outside - although they are still related to mainstream religious structures and institutions. If mainstream ulama are the source of legitimacy and guardians of *doxa* - borrowing Pierre Bourdieu’s term to designate an arena that must be accepted as such (undisputed truth) - then the new ulama is an inferior social class that is trying to push *doxa* into the realm of contestation arguments, namely the realm of binary opposition relations between orthodoxy (‘right’ opinion) and heterodoxy (‘heretic’). In other words, the new ulama class seeks to shift and erode the integrity of *doxa* whose truth is undoubted (beyond questions) to the realm of opinion- that is the arena of truth contestation - with the hope that their offer of opinion will someday emerge as a new *doxa* (Bourdieu 1977, 164–69).

In the context of Indonesia, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and accommodating plurality of ethnic groups and religions is *doxa* which is not only held firmly by the state but also legitimized by mainstream scholars. Therefore, the emergence of alternative political-religious discourses that legitimize the global publicity system (read: *khilafah*) or the Indonesian idea of “Islamic law” can be understood as an attempt to enter the discursive field and, thus, shift or erode *doxa*. Both established religious authorities - who fully control and guard the *doxa* - as well as the new religious authorities who claim the established interpretation of the old religious authority are in fact not homogeneous.

Meanwhile, within the spectrum of the old religious authority itself, fragmentation of authority occurred. They generally encourage moderate Islamic discourse and support the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Meanwhile, among religious authorities, new fragments are wider and unstable. The spectrum includes those who recognize the

NKRI but approve the issue of the application of Islamic law (sharia NKRI) to those who aspire to uphold an Islamic state or caliphate.

In addition, changes in political constellations and configurations that occur in a steady manner in the era of electoral democracy lead to increasingly strong struggles and contestations of religious authorities. During the General Election, the Legislative Election or the Presidential Election critical moments arise where competing political figures play religious symbols and issues for their electoral interests (Ahnaf et al. 2015). The events that occurred during the Jakarta Election, for example, clearly show how the accusations of blasphemy addressed to Basuki Tjahja Purnama or Ahok, these figures were able to mobilize thousands of people. In the event, it was also said that there were demands of the application of sharia and *khilafah* as an alternative to overcome various problems of the nation.

#### **ULAMA AND NATION-STATES: DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGIES**

The definition of ulama in this book includes both traditional religious authorities and new religious authority. Traditional religious authority refers to people who have a formal religious education background in the sense that they study and explore Islamic texts specifically, both through educational institutions such as pesantren, the world's leading Islamic universities, such as al-Azhar, Ibn Saud, Tarim Hadramaut and UIN / IAIN as well as those who study specifically through the assembly traditional strict Islamic forum. With this educational and knowledge background, they gain authority in conveying religious messages and are recognized by their worshippers.

In addition, the landscape of Islamic religious authority is also characterized by the emergence of new figures or commonly referred to as new religious authorities because of the rapid development of educational institutions and new media. Compared to other figures, these new figures generally gained religious knowledge through available and easily accessible sources such as translation books, recitation, and listening and following recitations in new media such as television and the internet. In academic studies, this new religious authority is also called a religious entrepreneur because of their ability to package religious messages through various media such as writing, training, and short videos and delivered through new media to reach a wider audience.

This book is the result of research and surveys in 15 cities that are intended to measure acceptance (acceptance) and rejection (rejection)

of ulama in the nation-state. In this study, ulama are grouped into seven characteristics based on their acceptability and debate on the concept of nation-states. These seven characteristics are progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme. Progressive is an active non-violent, pro-system, tolerant and pro-citizenship cleric. Exclusively are anti-violence and pro-passive systems, but are actively tolerant and pro-citizenship. Moderate is the category of ulama who are passive anti-resistance, pro-system, tolerant, and pro-citizenship. Meanwhile, conservatives are ulama who are anti-passive, pro-system, and tolerant, but active anti-citizenship. On the scale of tolerance, exclusive ulama were approved as anti-resistance and pro-system ulama but were active in intolerance and anti-citizenship. Radicals refer to the character of ulama who are anti-passive resistance, but anti-active, intolerant, and anti-citizenship systems. And lastly, the extreme points to the active ulama, who are anti-system, intolerant and anti-citizenship.

In order to measure the ulama outlooks towards nation-states, an outlook scale is used and developed from four-dimensional concepts namely pro-system, anti-violence, tolerance, and pro-citizenship. The pro-system dimension is defined as an outlook and understanding that respects and accepts the nation-state system, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, NKRI, and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. In this dimension, there are also pro-government aspects which are outlooks and understandings that respect and accept the format of government, the legitimacy of the ruling government, namely the government chosen through electoral democracy and open to aspects of community participation from various political and social backgrounds. Furthermore, the pro-system also means the outlook of accepting legal products produced by referring to the state constitution by involving the government and parliament and placing the Constitutional Court as the highest institution in deciding and reviewing on the inconsistencies of the regulation with the constitution.

The dimensions of anti-violence are defined as outlooks that pay attention to the promotion of life and the right to live (Satha-Anand 2017) and explore anti-violence outlooks at the personal level both real and latent (Galtung 1969). While the tolerance dimension is limited in the context of religious tolerance, which is defined as the outlook of a person in accepting differences in religion and belief in the context of social life. Tolerance itself emphasizes on the form of acceptance of other religious beliefs or called external tolerance and differences in understanding within a religious group or also called internal tolerance (Woolf & Hulsizer 2002).

The pro-citizenship dimension is the outlook of acceptance of the principle of citizenship which includes several basic principles such as the principle of justice which refers to a form of justice and equality for all citizens before the law, the principle of recognition which refers to the country's recognition of individual diversity, and the principle of self-deterrence which emphasizes the right of individuals to make decisions on their own behalf as citizens without any intervention and control from other parties, including the country. In addition, there is also a solidarity principle that refers to the capacity of individuals to unite with others to fight for what they are entitled to as citizens (Lister 2008).

In the pro-citizenship dimension, there are two important elements. Firstly, pro-democracy is an outlook or view that respects and actively encourages current democracy as a system of government where political sovereignty is controlled by the people and directly controlled by the people (Campbell 2008).<sup>1</sup> Second, pro-human rights namely outlook and views that recognize human rights that refer to human rights as stated in the Indonesian Constitution (amended 1945 Constitution). More specifically, the human rights included here are preserved in accordance with the context of the study of *ulama*, namely the level of acceptance of the basic concepts of human rights, religious rights, and non-discriminatory treatment.

This book is based on group-based surveys with respondents from groups of *ulama* or Muslim religious leaders. This survey involved 450 respondents in 15 cities (30 cities each). Because there is no data on the population of Indonesian *ulama* - both by state and private institutions - the data collection on the population of *ulama* in each city is the first step taken. The sampling method in this study uses a proportionate static random sampling technique by considering the distribution of respondents' sampling adequately from each group of *ulama* and the character of the city.

The grouping of strata is based on the background of the religious organization/movement where the distribution and variation of respondents in each city is determined by looking at the following four categories: First, mainstream *ulama* who are closely associated with MUI, NU / Muhammadiyah / Persis (adapting to the local context ), with the priority of *ulama* who have a boarding school base and / or become leaders / thinkers from the campus environment. Second, *ulama* from

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1 The author would like to thank Muhrisun Miftahun Ni'mah Suseno for giving many ideas for the making of research instruments.



the “new” Islamic movement (Salafi, Tarbawi, or Tahriri) who have the potential to make the nation-state still a polemic in its discourse and movement. Third, ulama/figures from minority groups within Islam, such as Syi’ah, and Ahmadiyah. Fourth, new ulama who tend to be religious entrepreneurs, usually are relatively young (less than 40 years old), and most of whom are millennial generations.

In addition, elections are also based on age, gender, and education level. The proportion used is 50% of the ulama population data in each region obtained from the initial mapping conducted by researchers with their research assistants in each region, and then a random process is carried out by considering the representation in each of these strata, so a sample of 30 ulama in each city/location of the research. This survey uses a 95% confidence level limit, and it is known that the standard deviation is 33.69, the standard error is 1.59 with a margin of error of 3.11. The measurement of the characteristics of ulama uses an outlook scale consisting of 70 items with Cronbach alpha reliability level of 0.98.

As a result, survey respondents consisted of 76.22% men and 23.78% women. Total respondents who claimed to have affiliated to NU (including Fatayat, Muslimat, Ansor, etc.) amounted to 22.22%, Muhammadiyah (accounting for Aisyiah, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, etc.) of 15.78%, Ahmadiyah and Shia 5.33% and the remaining 35.56% comes from various ulama affiliated with various organizations or movements both at the national and local levels with a total no fewer than 40 organizations or groups. Based on this research, the educational background of the ulama who were respondents to this study was well educated. The largest percentage of respondents had a doctorate degree (31.31%), followed by those who had a master degree (30.63%) and a bachelor degree (29.28%). While those who only graduated from high school only amounted to 6.08%.

In-depth interview is carried out to explore the results of the survey and examine the things that have not been answered by the survey. Interviews involved 10 informants from 30 survey respondents. The interviews were conducted with key informants by considering the representation of the group of ulama and other unique findings from the survey.

## **ABOUT THE BOOK**

The book seeks to map and discuss the perceptions and views of ulama from various backgrounds of social, political affiliations and religious affiliations about the format of nation-states, along with the

basic concepts that support them in cities around Indonesia. In addition, it also provides an overview of the position of Indonesian ulama on the format of the present-day nation-state of Indonesia such as progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme as described above. The research was conducted in 15 cities, namely Medan, Jakarta, Bandung, Surakarta, Makassar, Banda Aceh, Padang, Surabaya, Palangka Raya, Banjarmasin, Pontianak, Denpasar, Ambon, Manado, and Kupang by involving 15 researchers who conducted fieldwork in each city.

This book is arranged in three headings based on the characteristics of the city, namely: *Ulama in the Metropolitan City of Islam: Media Contestation and Public Conservatism* which presents the writings of Noorhaidi Hasan and Anas Aijudin (Surakarta), Munirul Ikhwan (Bandung), Euis Nurlaelawati (Jakarta), Mohammad Yunus (Medan) and Muhrisun (Makassar). Then, *Ulama in the Mainstream City: Moderatism, Ethno nationalism and the Citizenship Problem* display the writings of Moch Nur Ichwan (Banda Aceh), Najib Kailani (Palangka Raya), Roma Ulinnuha (Padang), Ahmad Rafiq (Banjarmasin) and Ibnu Burdah (Surabaya). Finally *Ulama in Minorities Muslim Cities: Progression, Tolerance and Shadow of Islamism* which presents the writings of Sunarwoto (Pontianak), Suhadi (Bali), Ro'fah (Kupang), Nina Mariani Noor (Ambon) and Eva Latipah (Manado).

In the metropolitan city of Islam, Hasan and Aijudin in his writings o the thought of ulama in Solo who rejected the nation-state by endorsing the use of violence to realize an ideological and political vision in the city of Solo. According to them, there are three main factors that underlie the views of ulama, namely, historical, social, and religious activism. Through a long dynamic, intertwined with social, economic, and political changes in Solo, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has become a symbol of the marginal resistance to the state. The discourse of resistance to the state that resonates among ulama is more akin to the discourse of social protest that resonates more broadly especially when security forces tried to eliminate terrorist movements. Their radicalism acts as a frameworkwork with claims of amar makruf nahi munkar (the order to do things that required good faith based on Islam).

While Munirul Ikhwan explained that scholars in the city of Bandung tend to be conservative. According to him the discourse of religious conservatism is spreading in the Islamic public because conservative ulama play an active role in the arena of discourse contestation through

various means and media. In his writings, Ikhwan said that although the level of idea acceptance of the nation-state was quite high in Bandung, which was 56.67% - with a rejection rate of 23.34% and an unidentified 20%, the discourse of mainstream ulama was not dominant and could not control the Islamic discourse in the public sphere.

Besides Ikhwan, Euis Nurlaelawati had the same perspective as him. She wrote about Jakarta ulama who also pointed out the issue of public Islamic conservatism in Jakarta. Nurlaelawati stated that the context of the political arena triggered the strengthening of the articulation of conservatism. In fact, this political arena on several issues has changed the outlook of religious groups that are considered moderate, namely the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Umat Islam (the Islamic Unity group), which are moving towards an increasingly conservative direction.

In addition, Islamism also contributes to the national narrative of the ulama as described by Yunus and Muhrisun. In his study of ulama in the city of Medan. Yunus points out that political patronage plays a very important role in shaping religious tendencies in the city of Medan. According to him, without a deeply rooted Islamic tradition, religious tendencies are strongly influenced by national and local political issues. Meanwhile, Muhrisun revealed that there was ambiguity in the understanding of several ulama regarding the democratic system. They define democracy differently from what is understood in the constitution. According to Muhrisun, the current political system in Indonesia makes the discourse of rejecting democracy not getting much support from the public. In some cases, rejecting democracy can be interpreted as a suicide attempt that is counterproductive for campaigning.

In Islamic metropolitan cities, ulama tend to be characterized by conservatives and the nuances of Islamism appear to have a strong influence on their articulation and expression, in cities where Islam is the mainstream, the problem that surfaces are related to issues of moderation, reservation, and ethno nationalism. Moch Nur Ichwan in his writing about Acehese ulama stated that the absence of identified extremists in Aceh made the ideology of Islamism which rejected the total concept of the Indonesian nation-state not to be the dominant and hegemonic ideology. Ichwan argues, there are two reasons it occurred. First, there were no ulama who continued the struggle of *Darul Islam* to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Islamic State of Aceh, or the Islamic Kingdom of Aceh. Secondly, there were only a few ulama who joined and supported the Free Aceh Movement(GAM)'s struggle. This was evident when ex-

GAM established the local political party *Partai Aceh* (PA) and the *ulama* organization of the Nanggroe Aceh Ulama Council (MUNA) in 2009.

Whereas Kailani who wrote about *ulama* in Palangka Raya found that *ulama* are more reserved towards the concept of nation-states especially in the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship. According to her, the lack of acceptance mainly occurs in the issue of inter-faith relationships, especially the relationship between Islam-Christian and other religious minorities. Despite accepting the validity of electorally elected non-Muslim leaders, most of them stated that non-Muslim leadership tended to override the aspirations and interests of Muslims. The same goes for religious minorities. The majority of *ulama* agreed to recognize the existence of Kaharingan, but rejected the existence of Ahmadis and Shiites.

The same thing also surfaced in Rafiq's study of *ulama* in Banjarmasin. According to him, among Banjarmasin *ulama* there is also a reservation for nation-states especially in the issue of tolerance and citizenship. Among the issues of reservation that surfaced in Banjarmasin was the strong conception of proportional justice among the *ulama* there, namely the understanding of justice based on the proportion of the number of informants. On the one hand, proportional justice provides balanced rights to each community group in a democracy according to the population. On the other hand, proportional justice removes the human rights inherent in individual citizens because of their humanitarian entity, not in relation to other human beings based on numbers.

While Burdah in her writings on *ulama* in Surabaya said that the reception of Surabaya *ulama* against the concept of the Indonesian nation-state and its derivatives were very strong even though almost all of them also had various records. The acceptance of Surabaya *ulama* on the principle of nonviolence - that is, rejecting the legitimacy of the use of means of violence in achieving goals - is very high. However, there are views that seem inconsistent, especially in relation to outlooks towards minority groups that are considered heretical. The acceptance of the *ulama* of the nation-state was also influenced by local articulation as seen in the Roman Ulinnuha writings on *ulama* in the city of Padang. According to him, the proverb *adat menurun, syara' mendaki*, which is held by Minang *ulama* as a point of harmony between Muslimness and the common sense of the citizen facilitating Islamic moderation in the city of Padang.

In contrast to findings in metropolitan cities of Islam and mainstream Islam, *ulama* in cities with Muslim populations as a minority show

relatively strong acceptance of the nation-state. Sunarwoto in his article about ulama in Pontianak said that Pontianak ulama showed a positive outlook towards the idea of the nation-state. Nevertheless, Sunarwoto also stated that a reservation by ulama occurred on several matters including outlooks towards the Muslim minority. According to him, the outlook of Pontianak ulama towards the minority seems ambiguous. A strong outlook is shown against minorities who are deemed not in accordance with “true Islam” or considered as heretical. The same thing does not happen to minorities who are within the limits of “true Islam”. “The truth” here can be interpreted as Sunni Islam which is the mainstream Islam in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, Suhadi in his writings on ulama in Denpasar cited the high acceptance of ulama to the pro-system and anti-violence dimensions but had low acceptance in the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship. Suhadi suspects that the low acceptance of tolerance and citizenship among Balinese ulama is related to the reaction of Muslims towards the strengthening of Bali’s Hindu identity politics. According to him, the strengthening of the *Ajeg Bali* movement which has pushed into the political realm and local cultural policy has demanded Balinese Muslims to negotiate with the situation. The cultural policy is very clear in favor of the dominant culture that exists.

If Bali is characterized by Hindu-Islamic relations, Ro’fah in his writings on ulama in Kupang states that the dynamics of Muslims in Kupang are related to the relationship between Islam and Christianity. Ro’fah said that in general the acceptance of Kupang ulama towards the ideas of the nation-state along with their derivative concepts was relatively strong. However, reservation and contestation also color this acceptance as seen in the emergence of an imagined Islamic state and the application of sharia which are considered as solutions to the “problem” of the nation. According to him, this matter can be referred to as the position of Muslims as a minority and see Islamic leaders and countries as the entry point to become politically stronger.

Meanwhile, Nina Mariani, who researched ulama in Ambon, said that the strong acceptance of Ambonese ulama against the nation-state was somewhat related to the rather dark experience of Islamic-Christian relations in 1999-2002. The bloody event has aroused awareness of Ambonese citizens to continue to foster harmony and brotherhood, restored what has been hurt in the past by preserving local cultural wisdom such as *pela gandong*, *salam sarani* (a harmonious bond between Moslems

and Christians in Ambon) in respecting other religion. Meanwhile, Eva Latipah who wrote about ulama in Manado said that the feeling of being marginalized was still strongly felt in the narrative of Manado ulama. According to him, several Manado ulama considered that some discriminatory treatments still occur, especially related to the difficulty of obtaining permits for conducting religious events in public. On the other hand, it is easy for Christians to obtain permits for organizing Christian religious events.

The diversity of the context and arguments of ulama in 15 cities as seen in the above writings gives us an understanding of how rich and complex the narrative of the national ulama is in Indonesia. The local atmosphere as well as the national political discourse color each other's articulations, interpretations, and perceptions of ulama about the nation-state. By presenting various local dynamics of ulama in 15 cities, we hope that this book will become an alternative reference for ulama and observers who have an interest in Islamic issues and contemporary politics in Indonesia.

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# ULAMA IN ISLAMIC METROPOLITAN CITIES:

Contestation, Media, and Public Conservatism





# ISLAM AND POWER: Measuring the View of Surakarta Ulama against the Nation

*Noorhaidi Hasan dan Anas Aijudin*

Ulama are important figures that characterize the religious, social, political, and national dynamics of Indonesia from time to time. The trace of their involvement in rolling the national discourse can be seen long before Indonesia's independence. In the *Alim Ulama* National Assembly in 1935 in Banjarmasin, for example, ulama who joined the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) explicitly issued a fatwa that Indonesia would later stand as "Darussalam", a safe and peaceful country. Likewise, when various events occurred before independence, the ulama had become the cornerstone of the teachers and layers of the foundation of Indonesia's national ideology. The role of K.H. Wahid Hasyim (NU), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah) and Kasman Singodimejo (Masyumi), to name a few figures, were very important in encouraging negotiations which eventually led to Pancasila being established as the basis of the Indonesian state.

The success of the ulama in playing the politics of nationality cannot be separated from their ability to spread religious ideas and knowledge through planting habitus. As "a system that is durable, disposable, structures that function in structuring structures", habitus guides a person to act or not to act. It becomes embedded social values and is built through a long-term socialization process (*longue-durée*). Habitus is a principle that "produces and regulates practices and representations that can be adjusted objectively without assuming the ultimate goal and/or revealing the mastery of operations needed to achieve them" (Bourdieu 1995). In other words, habitus is a structure that is accepted through the experience of figures in internalizing the objective structure of the social world.

Ulama produce religious knowledge in a broad sense, not only covering theology, morals, *fiqh* (*Fiqh* is an Islamic jurisprudence. *Fiqh* is often described as the human understanding of the sharia, that is human understanding of the divine Islamic law as revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah), and proposals of *fiqh*, but also all kinds of performative and non-discursive knowledge, as well as other forms of knowledge, including prayer, rituals, and worship practices. Putting religion as discourse (Asad 1986) and the practice of mediation (Meyer 2006; van Bruinessen 2003), it is impossible to separate the discursive and non-discursive dimensions and ignore the reciprocal interactions between the dimensions of discursive and non-discursive knowledge production. Moreover, there is a complex and interrelated relationship between the production of knowledge and power. Michel Foucault (1980) explains how modern society can reduce power from knowledge, and vice versa. The knowledge possessed by individuals can create power like a spreading network. Foucault uses the term genealogy to refer to intellectuality and local memories that allow us to build historical knowledge about the struggle of life and use that knowledge tactically in everyday life.

This article aims to examine how ulama perceive and understand the nation-state. Closely connected with Islamism (Kepel 2006), the perceptions and understanding of ulama about the nation-state, in turn, determine the ways they produce discourses and knowledge that are disseminated to the public and habituated through social practice. This dynamic will be seen specifically in the context of Surakarta, a city that attracts the attention of observers and researchers. In this city, a variety of radical movements and terrorist organizations grew after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. Examples include the Surakarta Islamic Youth Front (FPIS), Solo Islamic Army (LUIS), Laskar Hizbullah, Laskar Jundullah, and the most phenomenal, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which is considered responsible for acts of terrorism in Southeast Asia (Abuza 2003; Pavlova 2007).

As explained by Muhammad Wildan (2013), the combination of historical, sociological, and economic-political factors has an important role in fostering radical movements and organizations in Solo. Wildan specifically points to Solo's peculiarities related to ethnicity, economy, and religion. For him, the intensity of *da'wah* encouraged the instant process of a lower class of *abangan* which was economically, socially, and politically deteriorating amidst the middle-class growth and industrialization. They finally chose Islam as a way out of economic, social, and political agitation that was felt and involved in radical movements.

## ULAMA IN THE DYNAMICS OF SURAKARTA HISTORY

The role of the ulama certainly cannot be ignored in coloring the social and economic dynamics of Surakarta. They grow to become important agents of change who actively respond to various developments and problems that develop in the community, including when facing crucial moments related to the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia which adheres to the nation-state system. Surakarta is one of the kingdoms that has the sovereignty and tradition of independent power before deciding to join the Republic of Indonesia (Djoebagio 2017). The efforts of the ulama to develop nationalistic-style Islamic education in Surakarta seemed to play a significant role in waging a nationalist discourse that strengthened the process of integrating Surakarta Sultanate into the Republic of Indonesia.

In the Surakarta Sultanate constitutional system, the ulama is an important pillar that occupies the position of “*Tafsir Anom*”, the king’s advisor in matters of religion and other matters. *Tafsir Anom* is a respected religious official position. Prof. K.H. Muhammad Adnan, who once held this position, was known as a charismatic ulama who was productive in writing books in various scientific fields, such as interpretations, jurisprudence, Sufism, philosophy, and education and was active in developing religious-based education in Indonesia. In his capacity as an advisor, *Tafsir Anom* certainly gave suggestions that inspired Sunan Pakubuwana X to establish the Mambaul Ulum Madrasah in 1913. The aim was to become the center of Islamic religious education in Surakarta and automatically become a place for ulama candidates. From Mambaul Ulum, there were great ulama like K.H. Ali Darokah (Al-Islam), K.H. Syaifuddin Zuhri, K.H. Masykur, K.H. Munawir Syadzali (Minister of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia), Prof. K.H. Muhammad Adnan (Al-Muayyad), and Prof. Baiquni (Atomic Expert). They are avant-garde ulama who have a large role in the history of Surakarta, and even Indonesia.

The development of the Mambaul Ulum madrasa along with the establishment of the Islamic Trade Union (SDI), led by H. Samanhudi. SDI is an organization that brings together Muslim entrepreneurs who share the ideals of the struggle to strengthen the economy among the natives. Although SDI is an entrepreneur’s organization, the role of the ulama is considered to be vital. The organization later developed into the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) in 1912 under the leadership of HOS. Cokroaminoto (Latif 2006). Following the birth of SI, in 1914 the communist *Sarekat*

People's Movement (SR) emerged. Led by H. Misbach, a famous mubalig (Islamic preacher), the movement tried to pressure the Surakarta Sunanate Palace and the colonial government to take a stand with the welfare of the community (Djoebagio 2017).

Among traditionalist ulama, in 1918 K.H. Mansyur Giri Kusumo founded the Popongan Islamic Boarding School, Tegalondo Klaten, which developed the *Thariqah Naqsabandiyah Khalidiyah*. In a relatively short period of time, the pesantren had succeeded in printing young *kyais* (Islamic scholar) who later established Islamic boarding schools in various regions in Surakarta. One of them is K.H. Umar Abdul Manan, who founded Al Muayyad Mangkuyudan Islamic Boarding School in 1947. The school grew rapidly and brought forth to a few branches, such as Al-Muayyad Windan Makamhaji Islamic Boarding School, Al-Barokah Juwiring, Siroju Tholibin Brabu Grobogan, Al-Wustho Mangkunegaran, Walisongo Sragen, Miftahul Ulum Karanganyar, and Al Istiqomah Kartasura Sukoharjo.

Modernist ulama also established Islamic boarding schools and colleges, even before their traditionalist counterparts. K.H. Imam Ghozali, for example, founded the Jamsaren Islamic Boarding School and the Al Islam Islamic College Foundation in the 1920s. This college has an education program that combines religious and general knowledge and it still exist until now with 27 branches spread throughout Surakarta and the surrounding districts. The education is organized from kindergarten, junior high school, MTs, MA, high school, and *madrasah diniyah*. The same educational model was also developed by K.H. Naharus Surur in the 1970s who founded the Takmirul Islamic Boarding School, Laweyan Solo. Just like the Jamsaren Madrasah, Takmirul Islam also organized education with a modern pattern, a combination of boarding and modern education.

A new development took place in 1972 when Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who at that time were affiliated with the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), established the Al-Mukmin Ngruki Islamic Boarding School. This Islamic boarding school developed rapidly and soon became known as the center of Islamic activism which actively suggested the discourse about the establishment of an Islamic state while opposing the government and the power system in Indonesia. The thoughts and movements of the two jihadi-style founding ulama resounded, even more, when the narrative of dissatisfaction and resistance to Suharto's rule began to take shape in the late 1970s. Involvement in

NII finally led them to the court. To avoid arrest, they fled to Malaysia, where they began to draw up the power to establish JI. Their progress in Indonesia has again gotten a momentum when the post-reform political structure is open. Together with other Islamists such as Muhammad Thalib, Irfan S. Awwas, and Sobarin Syakur, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) in August 2000, which aimed to encourage the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia (Jamhari 2004). They also did not hesitate to demand the replacement of the nation-state system with the Caliphate.

However, this togetherness did not last long due to different views on the concept of leadership among the congregation inside MMI. The peak occurred in 2007 when some of them separated themselves and formed the Jamaat Ansjarul Tauhid (JAT). The emergence of ISIS in 2014 made the JAT once again divided into two: the Ansharu Khilafah (JAK) Jamaah who declared *bai'at* (a term for the appointment or appointment ceremony of a leader) to ISIS, and the Ansjaru Syariah Jamaah (JAS) which refused to support the al-Qaeda terrorist organization (Cf. Jones 2005; Oak 2010; Solahudin 2013). Both followers of JAK and JAS consider Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as an important and respected figure.

Other modernist ulama who are quite important are Abdullah Thufail Saputra, a preacher and batik trader who succeeded in establishing the Qur'anic Interpretation Assembly (MTA) Foundation in 1972. Centered on Jl. Ronggowarsito Mangkunegaran, MTA brings the understanding of Islamic purification with a call back to the Qur'an and Sunnah. At present MTA is led by Ahmad Sukina, Abdullah Thufail's direct student. Until 2018, MTA has grown widely, owning several network media; radio, television, and magazine.

Meanwhile, Abdullah Marzuki, a contemporary ulama with Abdullah Sungkar and Abdullah Thufail, founded the As-Salam Modern Islamic Boarding School and the Tiga Serangkai printing press in Surakarta. This Islamic boarding school has a modern curriculum design that incorporated the Islamic curriculum with a general curriculum while developing a purely Islamic design, but acceptable to local culture and expressing tolerance. Currently Assalam Islamic Boarding School has developed rapidly, successfully establishing Goro Assalam Shopping Center, Tiga Serangkai printing center, health center, pharmacy, and various other modern business branches.

Arab descendant ulama in Solo are equally important in developing Islamic da'wah. In general, Arab descendants were divided into Ar-

Rabithah and Al-Irshad. Ar-Rabithah, which brought together ulama from *alawiyin*, tended to develop traditional patterns, while Al-Ershad, which brought together non-*alawiyin* ulama, was close to the tradition of purification. Both groups of Arab descendants each have Islamic education institutions based in Pasar Kliwon. Ar-Rabithah owned the Ar-Rabithah Al-Alawiyah school under the Diponegoro Educational Foundation, while Al-Ershad established a school called Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah. Some of the prominent Arab ulama in Solo today include Alif Basamol (Chairman of Al-Ershad), Habib Syeh bin Abdul Qodir Assegaf (Majelis Ahbabul Mustafa), and Habib Naufal Alaydrus (Majelis Arraudah).

In the 1980s a map of Islamic activism in Solo developed more complex with the presence of the Tarbawi and Salafi movements. Tarbawi, who was developed by Egyptian alumni with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (IM), entered Solo by building small groups called halaqoh in various universities, especially Sebelas Maret University Surakarta (UNS). While the Salafi was developed by LIPIA alumni and universities and Islamic study institutions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Divided into haraki, apolitical and jihadi patterns (Wiktorowicz 2006; Muhtadi 2012; Fealy 2012), they built ma'had (an Islamic tertiary institution based on the pesantren) and Islamic teachings around Cemani and other areas in Surakarta. In tertiary institutions, Tarbawi conducted a regeneration process through the Student Association of Indonesian Muslim Student Action Organization (KAMMI) and the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK). High militancy is a factor in their success in developing themselves. The Tarbawi movement is noted to have developed not only at the UNS, but also at the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS), Surakarta IAIN, Surakarta Mambaul Ulum (IIM) Islamic Institute, Islamic Batik University (UNIBA), Surakarta University (UNSA), Universitas Slamet Riyadi (UNISRI) and other campuses. Many KAMMI and LDK activists became sympathizers and even administrators of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

While the Salafi movement developed through educational institutions and boarding schools. Ahmas Fais Asifudin, Abdul Malik, Muhammad Na'im, Ayip Asifudin, Khalid Syamhudi, and Aris Sugiantoro were important figures behind the establishment of Imam Bukhari Gondangrejo Islamic Boarding School, Al-Ukhuwah Sukoharjo, Ibnu Abas Masaran, Al-Madinah Simo Foundation, Ibnu Foundation Taimiyah Grogol, Ittibaussunnah Klaten, Darussalaf Sumberlawang, and

Al-Ausat Jati Karanganyar. These *pesantren* developed the Salafi ideologies that are centered on the doctrine of *tashfiyah* (self-cleansing) and *tarbiyah* (education). Besides through education, Salafis also developed their ideology through media channels, such as magazines, newsletters, books, radio, and television.

## REFUSING THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM

Based on an understanding of the historical complexity and map of religious movements that developed in Surakarta as described above, and the competition for gaining authority, it is not surprising that almost one-third of Surakarta ulama have a view of rejecting nation-states with varying degrees of resistance, radicals to extremes. They can be referred to as opposition ulama, borrowing the term Zaman (2002, 180) who actively campaigned for the enforcement of sharia and even the Caliphate. Among them, there is a sizeable number, namely 4 out of 30 scholars, rejecting the nation-state to the extreme. While those who reject radically also 4, and exclusively 1 cleric.

Those who reject, extremely justify the path of violence as an alternative to the rejection. Their presence intersected with groups that developed the jihadist understanding. While those who reject radically believe that there is no room at all for Muslims to recognize the system of nation-states even though they do not justify the path of violence. Ulama who refuse exclusively still provide little space for the nation-state even though in principle they could not accept the existence of the system. In the context of social reality, ulama from these three categories interact with each other and often have conflicting views, although at some point disputes in terms of strategy embody their respective ideological views. The boundaries between categories are very thin.

The description above was obtained from surveys and interviews with 30 ulama from various organizations and religious tendencies, including NU and Muhammadiyah, and various organizations affiliated with both, plus MUI, LUIS, *Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang*, *Jamaah Al-Islah Gumuk*, *Laskar Pemuda Ka ' bah Mega Bintang Solo*. Four respondents were women who were active in Muhammadiyah, Muslimat NU, and the Campus Da'wah Institute. Most have bachelor, master, and even doctorate degrees, except for seven respondents who only completed formal education until high school. They all have the capacity to be ulama because they are active in various religious studies or religious movements which are followed by hundreds or even thousands of followers.



Outside of the nine ulama, there are twenty (20) ulama, or two-thirds of ulama, who accept nation-states with varying levels of acceptance. They can be referred to as establishment ulama (Zaman 2002, 180). Three of them accept nation-states with progressive, inclusive-level acceptability, 15 with moderate acceptability and two with conservative acceptability. However, as guards of religious orthodoxy, they generally try to be careful when contextualizing their religious ideas with the present situation. This is certainly inseparable from the atmosphere of rejection of the nation-state which resonates quite widely in Surakarta and is supported by the existence of oppositionist ulama who at the same time try to continually expand their base of influence among the people. One of the remaining respondents was not identified.

### ISLAM AS DĪN WA DAULAH

Ulama who reject the nation-state generally believe in the unity between Islam and power (*din wa daulah*). This view they developed in a more ideological direction, such as the obligation of purely monotheism, *walā' wa barā'*, following the principle of *ḥākimiyyah*, and the obligation to jihad. Voiced in the framework of the struggle to save the ummah from immorality (*al-amr bi 'l-ma'rūf wa 'l-nahy 'ani 'l-munkar*; Jawas 2012), they believe Islam is a religion built on *tauhid*, which includes *rubūbiyyah*, *ulūhiyyah*, and *asmā' wa 'l-ṣifāt*. Tawhid for them means that Allah is the Creator who must be worshiped and glorified. In the sociological realm, this view demands the regulation of life in the world with laws that have been revealed by God, and reject all ideologies of human creation, be they Pancasila, capitalism, communism, socialism, and others, all of which are considered as pagan systems.

In terms of leadership, these ulama wanted a model of Imam leadership, which has absolute authority, as well as the realization of God's will. Accepting the model of Imam leadership is seen as evidence of consistently following the principle of *al-walā' wa al-barā'*. Muslims are forbidden 'to anyone except to Allah, through the implementation of Islam kaffah and reject the existence of *walā'* in the nation-state and other forms of government outside the sharia system. They also want a single interpretation in understanding Islam, leaving aside the reality of diversity that exists in each locality of the Muslim community. This single interpretation then forms a homogeneous religious pattern. For example, when responding to Ahmadis and Shiites, they believe both are heretical and misleading, even seen as a real threat to Islam.

Such a single interpretation also affects the rejection of pluralism that exists in people's lives. As a discourse born in a democratic system, pluralism is seen as a notion taught by the West to destroy the faith of Muslims. This thought encouraged them to believe that there are restrictions on the basic rights of citizens and the rejection of non-Muslim leaders. They consider non-Islamic citizens to be put into two categories; namely the infidel *dzimmī* or the infidel *ḥarbī* who must always be controlled by the Muslim rulers. The totality of the Islamic system for ulama with extreme views must be fought to achieve the glory of Muslims.

As the culmination of the Islamic understanding of the ulama is the obligation of jihad among Muslims. Following the views of Azzam Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda ideology, they believe that jihad is the main practice for Muslims, more than prayer, zakat, fasting or other hajj and worship (Azzam 2016). Jihad in this context is interpreted as a total battle against the enemies of Islam, which allows Muslims to do anything to achieve victory (Ba'asyir 2011; Mahmud 2017). So far there have been two targets for their jihad, namely the West, which has been regarded as always hostile to Muslims, and the Indonesian government which is considered as a pagan and *thaghut* government. These ulama also require the existence of *i'dād* in preparation for real jihad. Still following Azzam's (2016) view, they believe *i'dād* must be carried out thoroughly, starting in schools, mosques, homes to military camps.

### **VIOLENCE AS A SOCIAL PROTEST**

In the Surakarta city context, the thought of ulama who rejected the nation-state by endorsing the use of violence to actualize ideological and political visions that were built on three main factors, namely, historical, social, and religious activism. Through long dynamics, intertwined with social, economic, and political changes in Surakarta, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has become a symbol of the marginal resistance to the state. Consistency and a strong vision of the obligation to establish an Islamic state as an alternative to a democratic country made Abu Bakar Ba'asyir able to attract many followers from the lower middle class and persevered as the main authority of various jihadist organizations which were transverse in Surakarta. These include *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), *Jamaah Ansharu Taubid* (JAT), and *Jamaah Ansharu Khilafah* (JAK).

The discourse of resistance to the state that resonates among ulama is more akin to the discourse of resonating social protests that are increasingly

widespread precisely when security forces try to roll up terrorist movements. Through *Densus 88* (anti-terrorist Indonesian law enforcement), they actively arrested terrorist suspects. This law enforcement responded due to the radical Surakarta ulama movement. The ulama acted on the notion that there is proof of the state's arbitrariness against Muslims and how the state prioritizes more on non-Muslims concerns. Radical ulama attribute their claims to, for example, education policies that are liberal, excessive facilities to non-Muslim educational institutions, regulation of the use of loudspeakers in mosques, and protection of groups deemed heretical such as Shia and Ahmadiyah. These ulama see most Muslims being ruled out, while non-Muslims, especially Christians, get privileges.

The accumulation of disappointment then relates to the global jihad discourse as developed by Al-Qaeda with its main enemies, the United States, and the West. When contextualized with local issues such as corruption, economic domination by foreigners, marginalization of Muslims, the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the discourse of global jihad can give rise to the image of martyrdom wrapped in images of heroism and heroism. Not surprisingly, Surakarta has always been a knot of acts of terrorism that took place in the last two decades, from the Bali Bombing I and II, the bombing near the Australian Embassy, Marriott Bombs, and Ritz Carlton Bombs Jakarta, to smaller scale actions, such as the Police Bombing in Cirebon (2012), the Bombing in Polresta Surakarta (2016), the Bombing on Jalan Thamrin Jakarta (2016), and finally the Suicide Bombing in Surabaya (2017).

Like an iceberg, a network of jihadist ulama moves more underground through closed cells. On the surface, they are only seen as several organizations, such as LUIS, an Islamic paramilitary organization that is active in voicing the need to adhere to civil society. Active cells below the surface are far more numerous. Jihadist networks are scattered in various organizations, paramilitary groups, and religious groups around Solo, such as the Ansharu Daulah Center (ADC), Jamaah Ansharu Daulah (JAD), Jahbat Nusrat (JN), and Solo Hisbah Team. The ADC is an important network linking Abu Bakar Ba'asir's thoughts with Islamist activists after the JAT was officially divided into two, Jamaah Ansharu Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansharu Syariah (JAS) in 2014. The organization was led by Muhammad Sholeh Ibrahim, an Islamist activist who also works as a teacher at Al Mukmin Ngruki Ponpes.

The ADC actively publishes jihad bulletins distributed around the Cemani area, Pasar Kliwon, Grogol, and Surakarta, containing an

invitation to the public to support changes in the system of government, from the democratic system to being a Khilafah Islamiyah, in which life is managed by God's law, not a man-made law, as they claim.

In addition, there is also the Hisbah Team which actively encourages the establishment of Khilafah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Ideologically the Hisbah Team is close to Al-Qaeda's thinking in Afghanistan. Agus Junaidi, the chairman, also became chairman of Jabhat Nusra (JN) Indonesia, an Al-Qaeda wing organization. In its history, the Hisbah Team has a track record of violence and terrorism. The case of shooting the Singosari Police Station and the bombing of the Solo Kepunthon Church are examples. The group was founded by Sigid Qurdowi, a jihadi activist who was shot dead by Densus 88 in 2012. As a paramilitary organization, the group was also active in carrying out sweeping in what they claim to be *amar makruf nahi munkar* (commanding the good and forbidding the evil).

As well as through JN, extremism also developed among JAD followers (Jamaah Ansharu Daulah). The organization led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir originated from a split in the JAT body because of the choice of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who pledged to support ISIS. While still at the JAT, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had the same thought and saw that this country was a *thaghut* country, which had to be replaced with a Khilafah system. JAD grew through recruiting members in a hidden and neat manner. They also foster several *taklim* assemblies which would then contribute potential cadres to the organization.

Through the Daulah Islamiyah Supporting Forum (FPDI) jihadist activists rallied support for ISIS. FPDI actively campaigned for the Caliphate which was founded by Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi as the only major political force that must be followed by all Muslims. For them, pledging to ISIS is a must for every Muslim, and anyone who does not want to worship will not be considered as a Muslim.

#### **TAKING THE PATH OF DIFFERENT REFUSAL**

The rejection of the nation-state system with a slightly lower level than described above is surprisingly prominent among mainstream scholars. At the level of discourse, ulama who are considered to have exclusive views rejected the concept of the nation-state but did not justify the way of violence in the rejection, while accepting the legitimacy of the ruling government in Indonesia. The rejection was based on the understanding that the nation-state is a Western system imposed on Muslims to make them powerless against Western domination and arbitrariness. While

the government in power gets its power through legitimate elections by the people, is considered to have the legitimacy to govern. There is ambivalence and inconsistency in the perspective of exclusive ulama because it does not completely reject the system of nation-states, but at the same time shows a commitment to fight for the realization of a more Islamic system based on Islamic law.

In general, the issues that have become the pressure of exclusive ulama over the past five years have been the issue of the threat of the Shia and the Indonesian Communist Party. Both issues coincide with the “prosperous mosque” program, which is organized by DSKS, with the aim of cleaning up the views that are seen as deviant. Both issues are basically a means to gain support from the wider community, especially from the military. The issue of the rise of the PKI always appeared every September, where exclusive circles held various activities, such as seminars, recitation, and film operations on the atrocities by PKI in Indonesia. In addition, they also printed pamphlets, bulletins and various posters which essentially condemned the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Indonesia. The anti-PKI issue was appointed by Laskar Hisbullah Sunan Bonang who stated that Indonesia is now in a state of emergency to be influenced by communist ideology. They enter the elements of lower society, developing a discourse that the communists will rise again and carry out power struggles in Indonesia. Apart from the PKI issue, what they questioned was the issue of the threat of the Shia and the Ahmadiyah. Among these exclusive ulama say that Shia and Ahmadiyah are not Islam so they must be fought because their teachings are heretical. The true Islam for them is in line with the *Shari’a* of religion as practiced by the Messenger of Allah and the generation of *al-Salaf al-ḥālīh*. Shia is believed to have tarnished Muslims by slandering, stating companions of the Prophet are infidels, and even disuniting Muslims.

Likewise, Ahmadiyah, both Lahore and Qadian groups, are seen as not part of Islam; cannot be accepted as a Muslim. Although claiming to be Muslims, their Shahada (an Islamic creed, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, declaring belief in the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as God’s prophet) was perverted. Their presence is seen as an attempt to divide the unity and integrity of Muslims in Indonesia. It is not surprisingly that the Ahmadiyah has always been the target of anger and violence since the beginning of the Reformation, as happened in Ciekeusik Banten, Parung Bogor, Mataram NTB, and Manis Lor Kuningan.

The objection of exclusive ulama to the nation-state is related to their views on the position of Muslims and non-Muslims. For exclusive circles, the existence of non-Muslims must be respected, including their freedom to worship, but with a record that they may not carry out activities that exceed their rights as a minority before many Muslims. The issue of building permits (IMB) for houses of worship is the entry point for violence that they often do. They often monitor unlicensed churches and even disperse worship activities in malls, homes, and shophouses.

Salafi ulama are also considered as exclusive ulama who always weigh current issues by bringing back the thoughts and vision of the past, without criticizing at all. For example, when looking at the position of non-Muslims in the nation-state government system, they still refer to the concept of infidel *dzimmi* and infidel *harbi* (Jawas 2012). The Salafi group developed in three major nodes, namely the Salafi community which networked with Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Boarding School, which consisted of Al-Ukhuwah Islamic Boarding School Sukoharjo, and Ibnu Abbas Assalafy Masaran Sragen. This network has strong resources, both human, financial and network resources. They communicated quite well with local governments such as in matters of licensing and pursuing compulsory education programs for basic education. They also participated in various activities held by the government, such as the Tilawatil Alquran Selection (STQ), Sports and Art Week (*Porseni*), and other activities.

In contrast to the Salafi network that has ties with the Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Boarding School, the Salafi network connected with the Al-Madinah Foundation developed educational institutions, *taklim* assemblies, and media, including radio and bulletins. In addition to the two networks above, there are Salafi networks which claim to be pure *Salafi*, especially those affiliated with the Ibnu Taymiah Islamic Boarding School in Cemani Sukoharjo, with the main character, Ayip Saefudin, former secretary of the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah Communication Forum (FKWJ). Some of these Salafi networks are the Ittibaussunah Klaten Foundation, Al-Ausath Jaten Karanganyar, and Darus Salaf Gemolong Sragen.

Salafi ulama have a political view that rejects the nation-state system but leaves some space to be accommodated. They see that Indonesia will become prosperous if the *Shari'a* is carried out faithfully through the purification of monotheism and daily worship activities. If not, then the result will only enrich corruption, collusion, and injustice. Therefore,

the solution given is to implement Islamic lawfully in the context of *Indonesianness*. The application is as much as possible endeavored to be able to go through legislation so that it has a strong carrying capacity. In addition, along with radical circles, Salafi ulama also object to the existence of Shiites and Ahmadis in Indonesia. On various occasions, it was stated that these two groups were heretical because they considered friends as infidels, idolized Ali bin Abi Talib, validated the marriage *mu'ah*, and hated Sunnis. Therefore, the network of Salafi *pesantren* sometimes establishes alliances with various paramilitary groups in Solo in many activities, especially anti-Shia and Ahmadiyah campaigns.

Outside of nearly 30 percent of ulama who reject the nation-state system with varying rejection as described above, Surakarta has ulama who accept nation-states with varying levels of acceptance. The number reaches 70 percent. They can be categorized as conservative, moderate, and inclusive ulama. Conservative, moderate, and inclusive differentiation based on the level of their reservation on the nation-state system, with high, medium, and low reservation levels, respectively. In this context, reservations can be understood as part of their efforts to negotiate the limits of rejection and contextualize their existence, especially in the face of a group of ulama who reject the nation-state.

Conservative ulama are understood as ulama who accept the national reality today, such as the NKRI as a system of government, Pancasila as an ideology, accepting diversity of citizens as a social reality, and rejecting violence in solving problems in society. The acceptance of this conservative-minded ulama is accompanied by certain conditions, for example, the NKRI without *Ahmadiyah*, sharia NKRI, NKRI without Shia and others. This conservative scholar, on the one hand, wants to maintain Islamic scientific orthodoxy, but on the other hand, they try to adjust to various developments in society. It is this ambiguous outlook that often makes conservatives feel uneasy in giving verdicts on developing social and religious issues, even most returning to orthodoxy in *fiqh*.

Quantitatively the percentage of conservative ulama in Surakarta is far below the moderate ulama, which reaches 50 percent, although there are still some objections to democratic principles that are sourced from the West. Moderate ulama generally accept the reality of the nation-state. National issues such as the ideology of the Pancasila, the system of the NKRI government, the role of women in the public domain, the issue of permits for places of worship, the rights of the minorities including the belief groups get serious attention. These various problems are weighed



with the great interests of the Indonesian people, by promoting outlooks that uphold national unity above the primordial interests of their religious organizations. In the view of moderate ulama NKRI is the final form of agreement of all elements of the Indonesian nation. This departs from the realization that this country is fought not only by Muslims, but also by all components of the nation. Therefore, the country's most suitable ideology is Pancasila. Pancasila was established as a noble treaty of the Indonesian people so that the existence of this ideology must be maintained.

For moderates, Islamic ideology is a utopia. However, they also reminded that the design of Pancasila should be interpreted as open and dynamic. One must use their common sense so that it does not lead to the sacralization of Pancasila. Learning from the New Order era that defined Pancasila with a single interpretation of government, moderates, on the contrary, encouraged people to have a sense of openness and be pluralistic towards Pancasila. Moderates say that the Indonesian nation must develop into a pluralistic nation, but can manage it as an integrative force. Islam as a blessing for every human being must be practiced in real life. Islam in the view of the ulama is centered on efforts to provide good services and progress for the society.

Moderate ulama reject all forms of violence. As a solution to overcome various problems that arise in society, they emphasize the need for productive dialogue. For example, when there are cases of violations of the church's building permit, they reject ways of violence in resolving the issue, instead they prefer taking legal channels in accordance with the applicable rules. In the view of the moderates, the government that is legitimately elected by the society is a government that is legitimate according to Islamic teachings, not an infidel or *thaghut*. Therefore, the position of this government is the same as *ulil amri* in the Islamic jurisprudence concept, where the government must be obeyed and respected. It really does not whether the leaders are Muslims or non-Muslims, because what is most important is the performance of leaders in guaranteeing the freedom of citizens to develop their potential.

In regards to this condition, moderate ulama appreciate the people of Solo who have set a very good example. In the city of Solo, the head of the government is a non-Muslim, FX. Rudi Hardiatmo, who was elected in the Surakarta Mayor's election in 2016. The election of Rudi Hardiyatmo as mayor could not be avoided by the Islamic community, because the mechanism of democracy had produced this decision. Therefore, Muslims



have to accept and respect the existence of this non-Muslim leader. Moreover, moderates have the principle that all citizens must be fully respected, their rights should not be reduced at all, even if they are not Muslims. They can also become public officials, in accordance with the principles of democracy that require equality of all citizens. Moderates believe that Muslims are also obliged to uphold humanity because it is not merely taught by Islam, but it is the foundation what makes a good Muslim. Therefore, whatever the reasons for all the differences that exist in society must not be resolved by means of violence, whether it is through oppression, persecution, or other acts of violence. Islam for them is a religion of mercy, love of peace and strongly supports harmony and dialogue.

The network of moderate ulama is widespread in Islamic boarding schools, socio-religious organizations, academics, educational institutions, independent associations, professionals, traders, and communities that are very broad beyond the boundaries of class, sex, gender, profession, ethnic background, and education. For example, Assalam Solo Islamic Boarding School, Al-Islam Islamic Boarding School, Takmirul Islamic boarding school, Al-Firdaus Education Foundation, Al-Azhar Educational Institution, Nur Hidayah Educational Foundation, Darul Hidayah Foundation and many more institutions that have moderate views. Ulama groups in this category come from various religious ideological affiliations, both Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, MUI, LDII, and others. They communicate well with the government, and they also have a strong ideological network.

Intersecting with moderate viewers, some Surakarta ulama developed a progressive, inclusive mindset. They not only maneuvered in discourse but arrived at the praxis of the humanitarian movement. In the category of ulama the issue of nationality is a matter of warm discussion, in the corridor of *maqāṣid al-syarī'ah*. Various developing national problems were addressed in a dialogical manner, for example, the issue of civil service among the believers. Scholars in this category have a progressive-inclusive perspective. Ulama in this category encourages countries to attend and provide civil services to all citizens, without discrimination. Likewise, with the issue of gender equality, these inclusive scholars have a more advanced perspective. The female ulama in Solo, for example, think that there are equal rights between men and women in the management of shared public spheres. There should be no male domination over women, and vice versa. The differences in gender roles must be positioned in the

context of a shared consensus between men and women so what emerges is justice.

Most female ulama are classified as inclusive-progressive. They strongly criticized religious patterns among Islamists who pushed women into confinement in domestic space. Female ulama like Hj. Khusniatun (PP. Jamsaren), Hj. Kamila Adnani (PP. Istiqomah), Hj. Lilis Agung Suhada (PP. Singoudiro), Hj. Murtafiah (PP. Al Muayyad Windan), and Hj. Sebah wal Afiat (MT. Jamuri) for example, has given an example that women can also be a driving force of various fields, including in matters of religious education. The female ulama in Solo lead *pondok pesantren*, *majelis taklim*, educational institutions, scholars, entrepreneurs, and other common occupations. These female ulama came out of the confines of a religious understanding that has made women isolated to domestic spaces. From this role, it is seen that female ulama are fighting gender injustice caused by stereotype cultural aspects and misogynistic interpretation models.

Inclusive ulama also consider that the NKRI and the 1945 Constitution are the final forms and noble agreements of the Indonesian people. This agreement may not be changed for any reason, including the offer as an Islamic state. For inclusive ulama, Islamic countries must be maintained as Darussalam, a safe and peaceful country, not Darul Islam, a state that is based on Islam. Even progressive-inclusive ulama tend to reject all forms of Islamic formalization in the country because Islam among these circles must be positioned as social ethics in society so that Islamic substance can be felt by every citizen. The demand for the implementation of the formalization of Islamic law for the progressive-inclusive ulama would underestimate the meaning of Islam itself.

Progressive-inclusive ulama view that Islam must be applied in the context of certain localities. Uniformizing the pattern of Islam will only reduce the meaning of Islam itself. They encourage people to set an example of becoming good neighbors with non-Muslims. The meaning of neighbor is that all people can respect each other and work well together with another religious background. There may be occasional problems, but they will be resolved through dialogues. For these ulama, the government must provide the same services, both to Muslims and non-Muslims, to the extent that they are in accordance with applicable law. This condition is in accordance with the basic rights guaranteed for its existence, namely the rights of religion, the right to life, morality, descent, and work. This shows that there is no conflict between human

rights and Islam, so what must be done is to harmonize human rights and Islam in positive legal instruments in Indonesia. Included in this matter is a guarantee of the freedom of the Shiite minority and Ahmadiyah. Minority rights must be fulfilled and may not be violated. This view is widely developed among ulama affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, PP. Al-Muayyad, MT. Jamuro, MT Jamuri, Majelis Ahbabul Mustafa, Ar-Raudah Assembly, Majelis Al-Hidayah, and many other institutions.

### CONTESTATION, NEGOTIATION, AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM

Contestation, negotiation, and acceptance of issues of social and religious life in Surakarta have made this city dynamic. At least this is influenced by the factor of openness of political structure as a result of negotiations between various religious, social, and political forces.

Ulama who reject democracy, the ideology of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia in an evolutionary manner is still growing with patterns that are always changing, such as the pattern of recruitment carried out both through educational institutions and *taklim* assemblies. These ulama also develop discourse through various religious activities such as *tablig akbar*, discussions, demonstrations, and the media. The publications conducted to focus on strengthening the ideology of resistance to the state, for example, the obligation to establish the *Khilafah Islamiyah* as a requirement of the faith and Islam of a believer.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, for example, has since become a part of DI / TII and NII, Amir Jamaah Islamiyah, Amir MMI, then Amir JAT and Jamaah Ansharu Khilafah (JAK) consistently say that it is impossible for Islam to prosper without preaching and jihad. Islam must be fought through confrontation with unbelievers, in this case, the legitimate government. The current deterioration of Muslims is caused by the state system that is wrapped in disbelief and *thaghut*. Therefore, the obligation of all Muslims is to restore the state system to become *Daulah Islamiyah*, where all citizens' rights will be guaranteed in the law which is *syar'i*.

Even so, the openness of the political structure has made the ulama who rejected the idea of this nation-state no longer had the ability to build massive and systematic movements. The pattern of management of government power that is more inclusive and participatory, by involving various elements of society, has encouraged new awareness among ulama to then look back on the principles of their resistance to the state. Although still calling for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate,

rejecting democracy, encouraging the enactment of Sharia-based Regional Regulations, and calling for jihad, their discourse experienced several shifts. They construct this rejection with various current social issues, such as their inadequate economic access, limited network to government, poor education, and poor welfare conditions. In the context of the city of Solo, the involvement of oppositionist ulama in various community development programs such as the development consultation program to determine development priorities in each region has made them take responsibility for the environment around them. These oppositionist ulama then interacted and were involved in negotiations on determining regional development priorities. This process opens the possibility of oppositionists learning from the various patterns of thought and diversity that exist in society.

In addition, the de-radicalization program which was continuously developed by the government, both through state apparatus and civil society, greatly influenced the development of oppositionist ulama. Religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI work with the government to carry out various programs to counter radicalism in society, schools, religious organizations, and taklim assemblies. These activities look effective in reaching the people in the lowest domain. Likewise, de-radicalization through the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), which works with various communities, religious leaders, and educational institutions, has changed the pattern of development of opposition groups. In addition, law enforcement efforts by the police through Densus 88 also showed quite good results, although there are still many criticisms of the performance of Densus 88 since they are considered to have violated the human rights.

The condition then made the oppositionist ulama to be more realistic in seeing the problems of social life that continued to develop. On the one hand, they still adhere to their Islamic ideological commitment, but on the other hand, they have also made efforts to adapt to the latest social developments in society. This shift has encouraged opposition groups to become certain groups that seek to strengthen identity on the one hand, but on the other hand, they have adjusted in facing the pressure of the rapid dynamics of global social change.

In addition, the dynamics in Solo also influenced the growth of the Muslim middle-class significantly. The pattern of violence-based movements developed by oppositionists is currently experiencing a decline in support and sympathy from the society, especially the rapidly

growing Muslim middle-class in the city of Solo. The Muslim middle-class society has a logic that is different from what is expected by oppositionists. In some cases, many middle classes are affected by *tarbawi* and *salafi* ideologies, but the models of violence offered by opposition groups in achieving their goals get different judgments. The middle class of Muslims seems to prefer to live in harmony, be able to work, and be comfortable with family, enjoy holidays, go to tourist attractions, eat, and gather with family and many do other things. They choose to refuse to live in the shadow of the suspicions and prejudices of the security forces, fear, and uncertainty about the future.

Many of the middle-class work as professionals, educators, journalists, civilian servants, scholars, and entrepreneurs who have extensive networks, not limited to one or two communities. This broad association and access open up access for them to understand the diversity of society. The acceptance of diversity which in turn makes violent-based jihadist ideology increasingly loses its relevance. Jihadists who reject the existence of a democratic system are no longer seen by the Muslim middle-class as a group that fights for Islam, but on the contrary, they are seen as the main perpetrators of the politicization of religion. In the view of the middle class, Islam is politicized for their own sake.

Likewise, with the idioms of jihad they have spread, they are no longer heard by the public as an effort to fight for a better life for the society, but rather it is considered as an effort to use religion as their political medium. The Solo society understands that jihad is a sincere effort to encourage the creation of a better social, national, and state life. Jihad in this sense is not war, not bombing, not killing, but arranging life so that on the one hand in accordance with Islamic sharia, on the other hand, according to real-life needs. In the end, the idioms of the opposition who allowed violence, rejection of diversity, wanted a single ideology which had been called for through the establishment of the Caliphate state had reached its most critical point, compared to the previous period. This desire is slowly seen shifting into the implementation of Islamic law in the realm of self and family, which negotiates with various issues and societies in Solo. At this time, it is seen that those who believe in the struggle of the opposition are limited to certain societies, whereas the larger Muslim middle-class in quantity seems apathetic, pouting the movement of this model. Practically only a few wings of the opposition movement still maintain the ideology of the jihadists, for example, Tim Hisbah, JAK, JAD, and ADC. Many among the opposition ulama returned to

the mosque, organizing their communities and congregations through various religious and social activities.

Another important factor is the development of counter-radicalism narrative from moderate and inclusive ulama. Various communities included in the category of moderate ulama have contradicted the radical behavior of oppositionists. They carried out movements to build religious patterns that were inclusive and tolerant. Figures like Habib Syech bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf, Habib Naufal Alydrus, K.H. Rozak Safawi, K.H. Dian Nafi, K.H. Abdul Karim and many other ulama tried every opportunity to educate the public about the importance of building harmony, loving this country and nation, and avoiding behaviors that damage religion, such as terrorism and radicalism. In addition, various educational institutions managed by Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, LDII, and government-owned educational institutions consistently carry out activities that can encourage a sense of love for the country. Various educational institutions in Solo apparently networked and collaborated with various groups to voice peace, anti-violence, and anti-radicalism.

## CONCLUSION

The dynamics of ulama in Surakarta have a strong polarization. They are divided into two large groups; oppositionist ulama who reject nation-states and ulama who accept the nation-state. Both with varying degrees of rejection and acceptance. At least there are six variants that can be seen, namely ulama who are extremist, radical, exclusive, conservative, moderate, and inclusive. The variant of the ulama's thoughts still intersect and influence each other. The ulama's viewpoints are extreme, radical, and exclusive, or also called oppositionist ulama, have the same root of thought, namely based on the ideology of Islamism, especially the radical variants and jihadists. This ideology then undergoes translation in a very diverse context of space and time in Solo. Meanwhile, ulama who generally accept the reality of the nation-state are also divided into various variants, such as conservative, moderate to inclusive-progressive.

Basically, ulama have extreme, radical, and exclusive views that move dynamically to follow the existing social and political developments. The direction of their movement increasingly leaves Islamic conservatism in the direction of more post-Islamist patterns and is accepted in the wider community. Gradually the ulama who rejected the government system shifted along with the increasingly open political opportunity structure and the increasing number of Muslim middle classes. This is a sign that

the more open and democratic circles of those who reject the democratic system will be able to move in a more moderate direction, leaving behind the idea of changing the format of the nation-state towards the idea of Islamization from below through *da'wah*.

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# ULEMA AND ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM PUBLIC IN BANDUNG: **Islam, Politics of Identity, and Challenges of Horizontal Relations**

*Munirul Ikhwan*

In the past two decades, there have been concerns about the rise of Islamic conservatism and radicalism among the Indonesian people along with the ongoing democratization, direct elections, and decentralization of government. The resignation of the New Order government was welcomed by political competition which was full of the contestation of Islamic religious symbols. Religion (read: Islam) has become one of the focus of political commodities amid people who experience what is often referred to as 'increasing religious awareness'<sup>1</sup>. Groups such as Jamaah Tarbiyah, Salafi, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and Hizbut Tahriri Indonesia (HTI) competes to instill influence, especially among urban Muslims. Political parties with a structured agenda of Islamism such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) emerged and participated in political contestations. On the other hand, Islamism, or the issue of *shari'a* is the arena of negotiations between politicians and religious leaders on the regional political scene (Buehler 2008). In addition, many horizontal conflicts after the New Order were triggered by religious sentiments. Laskar Jihad, for example, is an Islamic militia group that responded to horizontal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Maluku with paramilitary actions. Since 2000, the series of bombings that have occurred have often been associated with the justification of jihad in Islam (Hasan 2006). So does Indonesian Muslims tend to undergo a transformation from moderate to hardline conservative ideologies? To what extent does this development correlate with the ulama's conception of the nation-state?

The transformation of the social landscape and religious politics in

the Reformation era is inseparable from religious figures who are sources and references to discourse and Islamic religious actions. Our attention is immediately focused on ulama as educated social classes who have received religious education in religious institutions and made religion their main discourse. However, in the era of democratization and fragmentation of religious authority (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996), ulama appear not to be the only main figures in the dissemination and articulation of religious discourse. On a certain level, they are often portrayed as past figures with a conservative perspective, hierarchical communication styles and are less interested in understanding the conditions of contemporary Muslim societies. The articulation of religious discourse, including religious relations with the state, is mostly contributed by religious political activists who have a strong base on campus and urban professionals, often referred to as Islamists (Roy 1994; Zaman 2002).<sup>1</sup>

This paper covers the perceptions of urban ulama about the nation-state which are concepts and systems of modern power that replace the world's great empire power, including the Islamic empire under the Ottoman Empire. The urban setting that is the focus of this study is Bandung, a metropolitan city located not far from the capital city of Jakarta. Bandung is long known as one of the central offices of government, business, education, creative youth, and national fashion trendsetter. Ulama in this study is not only limited to educated scholars who control Islamic canonical texts only but also include new figures who speak in the name of Islam, have a broad audience - worshipers who recognize their authority - even though they have no strong background professional religious education.

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1 Among the elements that are often considered essential in theories of modernity is the structural differentiation of social spaces in which religions are placed in private spaces, separate from politics, economics, and knowledge that inhabit public sphere (secularization). This religious privatization then affected the significance of religious beliefs, commitments, and institutions in social, political, and social life. Spanish sociologist, Jose Casanova (1994, 5), refutes this theory of modernity. Precisely the global trend in the late 20th century was "deprivatization of religion", namely the condition in which religions throughout the world refused to be placed in private and marginal positions as desired by theories of modernity and secularization. Following this global trend, the use of Islamic symbols in Indonesia has increased sharply in the Reformation era. This phenomenon is often associated with the success of the Islamic cultural movement since the 1970s which contributed to the increase of religious awareness which was later supported by changes in political direction in the 1990s (Liddle 1996; Hefner 2000).

Many ulama' studies in Bandung have discussed the *tajdid* movement (religious renewal) which helped color the contestation of Islamic discourse. Howard Federspiel highlighted the landscape of Bandung as the hometown of purist modernist organization, Islamic Unity (PERSIS), especially about its political contestation with the Sarekat Islam under the influence of HOS Cokroaminoto who did not want a polemic of religious understanding between traditionalist and modernist groups included in the Sarekat Islam. Some Persis figures such as Ahmad Hassan, Hadji Zamzam, and Moehammad Natsir were excluded from the Sarekat Islam (Federspiel 2001, 90). Another study by Rifki Rosyad (2006) highlighted the central role of Salman mosque in the Bandung Institute of Technology which was the concentration of the 'new' Islamic movement that wanted to respond to the dominance of power which marginalized the role of Muslims as majority citizens. In the last two decades, Bandung drew attention with the emergence of a popular and successful entrepreneur, Abdullah Gymnastiar. Aa Gym - as it is popularly called - builds its authority, as James B. Hoesterey (2008) observes, integrating aspects of Sufism with psychology and Western pop management theory to respond to new trends in the religious and economic desires of the urban middle class. The latest trend in Islamic studies in Bandung is the phenomenon of the emergence of millennial religious ulama such as Hanan Attaki and Evi Effendi who are very popular among young people because of their ability to narrate religion in language, imagination, and expectations of urban youth, especially those affiliated with urban subculture (Han culture) 2018.

However, the studies above do not give specific attention to the perceptions of religious or ulama leaders about the nation-state. It should be noted that in Indonesia religious ulama and religious leaders enjoyed greater social and political roles in the Reformation era after they were marginalized during the New Order (1966-1998). Ulama, religious leaders, and *dai* play an important role in shaping public discourse, especially regarding political and socio-religious life. Recent political and social events often involve religious ulama and symbols. This study aims to map and discuss ulama' perceptions of nation-states and their derivative concepts. By highlighting the views of ulama about the system of power and the system of government, issues of citizenship and tolerance, this study seeks to unravel the imagination and expectations of ulama regarding the position and role of Islam in the country. Why is the role of ulama so central in political and state life? Do ulama have an equal footing in

looking at the nation-state? If not, what factors make them different? What are their arguments for accepting, rejecting, or reserving the ideas of the nation-state? And how do they communicate their ideas to the public?

### THE LANDSCAPE OF AUTHORITY AND ISLAMIC DYNAMICS IN BANDUNG

Islamic dynamics in Bandung are inseparable from innovations in movements and discourses that give color to political, social, and religious life in the city. Bandung was the hometown of puritan reformist organization, Islamic Unity (PERSIS) on 12 September 1923 founded by Muslim merchants, Haji Zamzam, and Muhammad Yunus. Although at present PERSIS ulama are not much involved in debating major issues in national politics, PERSIS contributed important figures who were active in the debate and social-political movements before 1945 independence and the first years after independence. Soekarno, who later became Indonesia's first president, during his exile in Flores (1934-1941) corresponded with one of the prolific PERSIS figures, Ahmad Hassan, on Islamic issues.

Before 1926, the idea of reform had not become the main discourse of PERSIS's organization. The tendency of PERSIS reformism is often associated with Haji Zamzam who had studied in Mecca and the joining of Ahmad Hassan who emphasized the *scripturalist* orientation in Islamic renewal (*tajdid*) ideas. PERSIS following religious discussions contained in reformist magazines such as al-Manar in Cairo, al-Munir in Padang and religious debates between Jami'iyat al-Khair and al-Irshad - two Arab reformist organizations in Indonesia - concerning the stratification of non-Muslim-Arab, Arabic sayyid, and Arabic nonsayyid where al-Irshad rejects the superiority of other sayyid Arabs (Noer 1973, 84; Federspiel 2001, 26-27; Feener 2007, 84-86).

Inspired by Islamic political thought at that time - like the thought of Abul A'la Maududi and Hasan al-Banna - PERSIS carried on that basic principle of Islamic law must be the legal foundation in Indonesia. Unlike the Al-Ikhwani al-Muslimun movement, PERSIS did not move beyond the framework of Indonesian nationalism in the colonial period. And after the Indonesian proclamation of independence, PERSIS moved within the framework of the Indonesian nation-state.<sup>2</sup>

2 PERSIS' commitment to the Indonesian state did not seem to change until the Reform period where the idea of global caliphate surfaced; "Maintaining and enforcing Sharia in every country that exists today is far more important than uniting the voices of the people of the whole world in one country" (Abdurrahman 2008, 59).

PERSIS did not fight for its political ideas through direct political action, but through other political organizations (Federspiel 2001, 325–26). Masyumi was once an important political vehicle for PERSIS ulama. Masyumi's dissolution in the 1960s by the Soekarno government was also followed by the dimming of the political role of PERSIS figures. In later times, ulama and figures of PERSIS were more engaged in education and community with a strong base in West Java.

The New Order under Suharto, which effectively took control of the state after the publication of *Supersemar* (the Order of March Eleven) in 1966, built his government on two foundations, namely the military and technocrats. The New Order government built political stability by forcing Islamic parties to join a new party, the United Development Party (PPP). The New Order also intervened in the political activism of students who were the new middle class who voiced change at the end of the Old Order. In the late 1970s, the government banned student political activism with the Campus Life Normalization policy (NKK). This situation then urged many religious leaders to withdraw from politics and turn to social religious activities that contributed to the “Islamization” of society (Hefner 2000). Meanwhile, student activism also shifted to activism that was more oriented towards the formation of public opinion than dealing directly with the power structure (Rosyad 2006, 14).

In Bandung, the Salman mosque ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology) became the forerunner to the emergence of Islamic activism which fired up revivalism among young people. Young people from various big cities in Indonesia came to Salman mosque to attend the recitation which was delivered by Muhammad Imaduddin Abdulrahim, ITB electrical engineering lecturer, who received the support of Muhammad Natsir, one of the PERSIS figures, Masyumi, and the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII). Through various training and study programs, young Muslim groups and communities are formed. New political and Islamic discourse developed among the urban middle class as an expression of dissatisfaction with the system that did not accommodate their expectations. Rifki Rosyad (2006, 30) argues that the revivalist movement rooted in this campus is nothing but a continuation of renewal (*tajdid*) as it happened in Indonesia at the beginning of the 20th century.

The success of the Salman mosque accommodating these new Islamic has inspired other campus mosques. This evolving Islamic discourse is characterized by discourses of Islamic movements and puritans such as

the Muslim Brotherhood, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Salafi - in recent years. This Islamic discourse is certainly different from Islamic discourse which developed in religious institutions that emphasize more on the study of *fiqh*, *nahwu*, and *sharaf*, *aqidah*, *tasawuf* and interpretations and hadith (Bruinessen 2015). Therefore, this movement can be understood as 'friction' with mainstream religious trends which are relatively minimal in activism. The main figures of youth activism are often associated with the term "*new santri*" (the new Islamic scholars) (Machmudi 2008) which builds their authority not from elements of conventional authority, but from local Islamic movements such as Darul Islam and trans-national movements such as al- Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Salafi.

The establishment of the Daarut Tauhiid Islamic boarding school in 1990 not colored the urban Islamic discourse but also presented a new pattern of religious authority buildings. In contrast to Islamic boarding schools in general that compile a curriculum for mastering Islamic 'canonical' literature, Daarut Tauhiid focuses on moral studies and Islamic motivation and takes seriously the aspects of economics and entrepreneurship. This breakthrough is packaged with a value system concept management called 'Management of the Mind (MQ) which is broken down into four components: ma'rifatullah (know God), self-management, entrepreneurship (entrepreneurship), and leadership (leadership). This value becomes the philosophical basis and jargon of the Daarut Tauhiid Islamic Boarding School organization, "towards the generation of dhikr, thinkers, and endeavor experts".<sup>3</sup>

Aa Gym is not only the founder but also the central figure Daarut Tauhiid. If religious authorities in Indonesia are often associated with the background of the *pesantren* (or religious education institutions), *fiqh* mastery and competence in issuing fatwas, Aa Gym does not establish its authority based on the above aspects. He built his authority from the success of constructing *da'wah* techniques by combining religion, economics, and entrepreneurship. His success in maximizing new media and branding of motivational-economic-religious products gave rise to him as a popular figure who found his market amid the spirituality of the urban middle class. His popularity seems to "sink" the ulama's authority with an established religious background in Bandung. The Aa Gym phenomenon illustrates the new pattern of religious authority production that is built on certain practices in religious consumption, marketing politics of morality and media use (Hoesterey 2008).

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.daaruttauhiid.org/about/> accessed on December 22, 2018

New groups that built the stage and color the discourse contestation in public spheres in Bandung are Salafi groups. The Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII) under Muhammad Natsir is often referred to as the opening act and initial facilitator for the Salafi movement in Indonesia (Wahid 2014, 80). The Salafi movement grew with the success of the mobilization and dissemination of networks with the establishment of the Islamic and Arabic Sciences Institute (LIPIA), *pesantren* by alumni, book publishers, magazines, radio, television channels, and social media.<sup>4</sup> In Bandung, Salafi began to explore strategic places like the al-Ukhuwwah mosque which is managed by the Bandung city government. It is true that the Salafi group is not the main manager of this city hall mosque, but they have a regular schedule of activities every Thursday afternoon and Friday afternoon<sup>5</sup> which is managed by Ustadz Abu Haidar as-Sundawy who also has regular routines at Radio Roja. This routine activity at least gives color to the capital city with the presence of the male congregation of *jalabiyah* users and veiled female congregation.

Salafi groups have similarities with PERSIS in terms of religious purification and views on the Salafi generation as the best generation of Muslims. However, there are some fundamental differences between the two, if seen from the public debate (*mubāḥatsah*) both in 2007. PERSIS disagree with Salafi's view of the obligation to follow the Salaf *manhaj*. PERSIS see that there is no textual basis of both the Qur'an and the Sunnah that affirms that obligation (Wahid 2014, 137).

The religious authority also emerged among the street community in response to the dominant culture. They are young people who do not want to be forced to follow the pattern of life and the dominance of the traditions of parents. They chose their lives on the streets, formed motorcycle gangs and groups of young adventurers. The phenomenon of massive migration in urban areas has also contributed to the 'Islamization' influence among them. This development raises new authorities among young people or authorities who represent communication styles and explore their lives such as Hanan Attaki, Evie Effendi, and Inong (Han 2018). The question is, do they all have sufficient religious competence to speak Islam? The Evi Effendi case was controversial (2017) when he called the Prophet Muhammad 'heretical' before receiving the guidance of Allah in one of his assemblies. Many condemned the statement because

4 For studies on Salafi radio see Sunarwoto (2015).

5 Interview with a takmir of the al-Ukhuwwah Mosque in Bandung on October 11, 2018.



it contradicted the Prophet's theological concept (avoidance of sin).

Nonetheless, religious leaders in Bandung (NU and Muhammadiyah) positively viewed their existence as voicing religion in communities that were difficult to reach for ulama. To avoid lectures that are 'counter-productive' from the theological point of view, mainstream ulama view the community as having to relearn religion with ulama who know more.<sup>6</sup>

The emergence of the variant of religious authority above does not mean that mainstream religious authorities such as NU and Muhammadiyah did not play a role at all in the arena of religious contestation in Bandung. Ulama and institutions from both organizations play their role in the educational institutions and *taklim* assemblies they manage.


Even after the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in mid-2017, Islamic authority and discourse penetrated deeper in the arena of public contestation and campuses (see Suhadi 2017). However, the discourse they produced has not yet emerged as a hegemonic discourse in the context of Islam in Bandung, namely a discourse that is able to lead public opinion more effectively.

Regarding the views of the nation-state in general, ulama in Bandung can be mapped as follows. Ulama from Islamic minority groups - especially the Shia IJABI (Association of the Indonesian Ahlul Baitah) - have the most "progressive" views (3.33%). They not only received the total ideas of the Indonesian nation-state but also actively promoted anti-violence, pro-system, tolerance, and citizenship. According to Shia ulama, commitment to the country is associated with the doctrine of faith and the goal of a prosperity that religion appreciates. This view is based on the narrations in the Ahlul Bait tradition such as buubbu 'l-watthan mina' l-īmān (love for the country is a part of faith) and 'umiratti' l-buldān bi-ḥubbi 'l-autthān (the country is prospered with love to the country). In addition, the Medina Charter is understood as a model of relevant government in plural societies. Every citizen is positioned equally, and there is no compulsion to convert to Islam. Individuals are guaranteed the right to live according to the inter-group agreement in Medina. For Shia ulama, this shows that Islam provides space and a basis for democratic practices that are adapted to the challenges of the times. Therefore, democracy - where public decisions are obtained from agreements - is

6 One of the NU leaders, AAS, for example, expressed his opinion about the military, "I am glad they have access. It's just that the weakness is in terms of the capacity that must be possessed because it might be inconceivable [for them] that understanding Islam is complex." (Interview on October 9, 2018).

*syar'i* and binding.<sup>7</sup>

The next view is “inclusive” (6.67%) represented by Ahmadiyah and non-affiliative ulama. They are inclusive because they accept the concept of the Indonesian nation-state in general, but give more attention to issues of tolerance and citizenship advocacy that afflict many Muslim minorities. The position of the Ahmadiya ulama can be explained that the Ahmadiya is an organization that focuses on aspects of spirituality, and is not interested in being involved in practical political issues. Ahmadiya ulama accept any form of state because the most important thing for them is the guarantee of citizenship rights by the system in which the followers live.



The perception of mainstream ulama - Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah - about nation-states, in general, is “moderate” (36.67%), the highest percentage in the city of Bandung. They accept the idea of the Indonesian state with its ideology, constitution, and government system, but tend to be passive in responding to issues of intolerance and violence that afflict minority groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim. They accept other groups to get citizenship rights from the state, hold public positions according to the mechanism of the democratic system, but tend to be passive (not actively conducting advocacy) if groups other than them receive discriminatory treatment.

However, NU ulama tend to be more tolerant and inclusive than Muhammadiyah ulama. NU Ulama is more prepared to accept the

<sup>7</sup> Interview with one of the leaders of IJABI, MFR, in Bandung on October 15, 2018

existence of other groups with different religious and belief identities to get basic rights as citizens and coexist with them. Ulama of this group tends to accept Shia (in Indonesia) as part of Islam, although it is still difficult to accept Ahmadiya as a school in Islam because of the *nubuwwah* doctrine.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah ulama view Shia and Ahmadiyah as not part of Islam because of theological differences with Sunni Islam. The fatwa of the MUI regarding Ahmadiyah heterodoxy which excludes the group from Islam is an important reference for mainstream Islamic ulama in Bandung.

Both NU and Muhammadiyah ulama accept women holding public positions or leadership. However, they are different in terms of public leadership by non-Muslims and Muslim minorities. NU ulama tend not to face theological problems related to public leadership by other groups. They not only accept, but also do not question the nomination of this group. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah ulama generally view it as a necessity to elect leaders from their groups (Sunni Islam). However, they still accept the reality if they are non-Muslims or Muslim minorities who have been chosen as leaders because of Indonesia's democratic system. However, they will struggle to educate the public to prepare and select competent Muslim leaders.

A "conservative" view of the nation-state was represented by ulama from the Islamic Unity Organization (PERSIS) and Tarbiyah worshipers (10%). Conservatism in this context is a view that accepts the idea of the Indonesian nation-state and its political system, but with several types of reservations (non-intact receipts). PERSIS ulama, for example, considers that the Jakarta Charter which contains seven words (the Godhead with "the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents") is the ideal form of the state foundation. However, they accepted Pancasila with its current formulation. In this case, they have a concern about the strategy of translating the principles of Pancasila in the framework of Islamic law. PERSIS ulama refuse to equate national leadership with the concept of *waliyyu l-'amr* because the second includes the aspects of *ḥirāsāt al-dīn* (protection of the religion of Islam) and *siyāsāt al-dunyā* (social and political politics). According to them, the current national leadership does not carry out *ḥirāsāt al-dīn*. In addition, they also refuse to equate the current democracy (which focuses on direct election and

8 Ahmadiyah rejected the cessation of prophecy after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Nubuwwah continued and appeared to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who was believed to be al-Masih (the savior). Further study of the nubuwwah within Ahmadiyah, see Yohanan Friedmann (1989).

acclamation) with the concept of *syūrā*. For them, *syūrā* is the principle of exchanging ideas to find the right opinion (*tabāḍul al-ārā' li ma'rifati al-shawāb*), while the current democracy works at the quantity level so that the selection of leaders, representatives, and legislations neglects quality aspects.<sup>9</sup>

Conservatism also reflects the tendency to reject the equal rights of citizenship and politics towards outside groups, especially non-Muslims, and Muslim minorities. They rejected minority groups occupying public positions and having the same public role as Muslim groups. Regarding the issue of tolerance, conservative ulama tend to be more tolerant to non-Muslims than to Muslim minorities - Shia and Ahmadis - who they consider to be 'heretical' and cannot be part of Islam. In addition, they also reject women's leadership based on textual arguments from the Qur'an (Q. 4:34) and sunnah: there will never be happy people who entrust their affairs to women (*lan lafliḥa 'l-qaum wallau amrahum imra'ah*).

The categories of ulama above (progressive, inclusive, moderate, and conservative) are the characteristics of ulama who accept the concept of nation-state (acceptor). They are the majority group (56.67%). Nonetheless, Bandung ulama who belong to the range of rejectionist characteristics (exclusive and radical) are still relatively large, namely 23.33% - while the unidentified ones are 20%.

Ulama who had exclusive views (16.67%) generally have a literal mindset of religious understanding and historical thinking that Muslims contribute greatly to Indonesia's independence, and therefore Islam and Muslims should get a special position within the country. They are considered exclusive because they are passively anti-violence and pro-system, but tend to be active in intolerant and anti-citizenship discourse. A doctrinal and literal understanding of religious texts makes it difficult for them to accept new concepts and their consequences in outlooks towards the power system and civic relations. In other words, there is a theological barrier related to their acceptance of the concepts above. Ulama in this category come from various backgrounds, such as Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and Salafi.

While ulama in the "radical" category (6.67%) tend to be passive in terms of anti-violence, but their views tend to be anti-system, intolerant, and anti-citizenship. They tend to question the validity of the state system and the prevailing government, but avoid the use of violence in realizing a system that they consider legitimate and religious. This group

9 Interview with one of Persis' figures, MAR, in Bandung on October 11, 2018.

was represented by the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI) and Salafi ulama who were exposed to Islamic political movements. Salafi ulama in this category, for example, show sympathy for the figure and struggle of Kartosuwiryo - who has a negative image in the historical narrative of the country - as a warrior of the Islamic state and the Shari'a.

In addition to being explained due to the literal understanding of Islamic texts, exclusivity and radicalism in Bandung can also be explained due to the background and political affiliation.

These rejectionist groups, in general, are those who see the current system and government unable to represent their religious understanding and political aspirations. Their outlook of rejection seems to have been shaped by the current political context which gave rise to a dichotomy between the leaders of 'secular nationalists' who were perceived as 'anti-Islam' and 'Islamist' leaders. Rejectionist ulama tend to favor the current government opposition groups that are seen as voicing 'Islamic aspirations'. Exclusive ulama are very strict with the government and reject the legitimacy of the government with religious idioms.

It should be noted that the mapping above certainly cannot be considered a clear-cut characteristic for understanding Islamic organizations in Indonesia. The association of organizations with a progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, or radical character is based on the prominent quantity of ulama from certain CSO backgrounds. Deepening through qualitative research shows that the position of ulama of Indonesian Islamic organizations is in a certain stretch of the characters above. Minority Islamic ulama, for example, are in a stretch of character between progressive and inclusive. NU ulama are among inclusive and moderate characters. Muhammadiyah ulama are in the position of being moderate and conservative. PERSIS ulama are among conservative and exclusive positions. Meanwhile, new movement ulama - Tarbiyah and Salafi - are somewhere in between the conservatives and the radicals.

## **ULAMA AND HORIZONTAL ISSUES**

The survey conducted by the Center for Islamic and Community Studies (PPIM) of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in 2018 showed high intolerance among teachers. This survey shows that more than 55 percent of teachers have intolerant opinions (PPIM 2018). In the same year, Setara Institute (2018) released the results of a survey of 10 of the most tolerant cities and the 10 most intolerant cities. The 10 most

tolerant cities are dominated by cities with heterogeneous community backgrounds and have managed to regulate the coexistence of diverse societies such as Salatiga, Ambon, and Kupang. Meanwhile, cities in the most intolerant category are dominated by cities where conservatism and primordial identity issues have strengthened such as Jakarta, Padang, Tanjung Balai, and Banda Aceh.

In Bandung, perhaps other cities in Indonesia, ulama from Muslim minority groups (Shia and Ahmadiyah) are the most tolerant, while Sunni ulama with a literal pattern of religious understanding are the least tolerant. Sociologically, tolerance is the most favorable outlook for minorities who are not only under intense pressure from the majority of Indonesian Muslims, but are also neglected by government policies. However, we also do not rule out the possibility of theological arguments for tolerance from these minority groups (see discussion below).

NU ulama are generally more tolerant and inclusive than Muhammadiyah ulama, PERSIS, and Islamist groups. NU ulama tend to accept Shia as part of Islam. They believe in Shi'ism circulating in Bandung as a moderate Shiite - not *ghulāt* (extreme) - that is closer to the *Ahlussunnah*. For them, the Shiite issue has been sharpening in Indonesia because of the impact of political contestation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was welcomed by the Indonesian Muslim community. In fact, many students posted posters of Ayatollah Khomeini who were new idols for them.

[Shia in Indonesia] is still taqiyyah. I don't really know yet; He just appeared immediately got beaten up, especially after politics entered. Like the case of Kang Jalal. Now he can't go anywhere. Pity. Whereas before he often conducted discussions and seminars; became a resource everywhere in Bandung. When this issue entered politics, it was immediately attacked.

Now [he] can't go anywhere, even though his knowledge and rhetoric are excellent, because of politics. When [Kang Jalal] lectured he doesn't look like a Syiah. He is more inclined to Sufism.<sup>10</sup>

The NU ulama did see a theological difference regarding Ahmadiyah (nubuwwah). Nevertheless, they are more inclusive among ulama than other mainstream organizations. They do not agree with the actions of

10 Interview with one of the leaders of NU, CA, in Bandung on 10 October 2018.

most Islamic organizations that intimidate or isolate the Ahmadiyah group from the crowd, because according to them, this action will only make Ahmadiyah followers increasingly militant. NU ulama tend to take persuasive steps towards Ahmadiyah, i.e. opening communication and dialogue, not isolating, or intimidating them.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding violence conducted by a group of organizations based on *nahi munkar* (commanding the good and forbidding the evil), NU ulama tend to reject any physical actions outside the law. According to them, *nahi munkar* is indeed part of religious teachings, but its realization cannot be absolute. *Nahi munkar* is obligatory, but there are conditions that must be considered so that the sun's *nahi* does not cause other bad consequences as a result. Quoting Q. 2: 208, one of the NU leaders highlighted the command to enter peace (*silm*, not *Islam*) totally (*kaffah*) and linked it to the principle of *nahi munkar* which should be aimed at creating peace rather than conflict. The NU ulama based their understanding on the thinking of Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (m. 505/1111) in his book *Ihā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*.<sup>12</sup>

Muhammadiyah and PERSIS ulama firmly reject the bad faith that is carried out by means of violence. However, they tend to judge the events of persecution in the name of civil rights committed by certain organizations as a result of the non-functioning of the state apparatus. According to them, the state apparatus should stand at the front in carrying out military functions to avoid similar actions by parties outside the country.

It's sad. The intention is good, but the methods are debatable. The society that value the courage of making peace, prevent evil deeds. The apparatus must guard. We consider them as heroes! If there is mischief around us, and we do not act, it's a sin for us, right?<sup>13</sup>

Putting *aliran kepercayaan* (an official cover term for various, partly syncretic forms of mysticism in Indonesia) in the religious column on the ID card became a public conversation after the Constitutional Court (MK) granted the *aliran kepercayaan* believers claim in 2018. This Constitutional Court ruling made the *aliran kepercayaan* received juridical recognition in population administration. This decision certainly has implications for religions recognized by the Indonesian government.

11 Interview with one of the NU and MUI leaders, AAS, in Bandung on October 9, 2018.

12 Interview with one of the NU and MUI leaders, AAS, in Bandung on October 9, 2018.

13 Interview with one of the leaders of Muhammadiyah, TMU, in Bandung on October 12, 2018.

It should be noted that the conception of religion by ulama is different from the conception of religion in social studies of anthropology. Religion in the study of social science is associated with special relations between humans and other entities - both material and non-material - that is considered transcendent. However, according to ulama religion is not only a matter of trust but must have elements of prophethood and scripture. *Aliran kepercayaan* in the view of ulama is considered a “culture”, not a religion. In other words, religion in the definition of ulama refers to “trans-cultural religion” which is not bound by strict geographical and cultural space. State policies that officially recognize trans-cultural world religions encourage believers to call their beliefs a culture to avoid confrontation with Islamic groups and heretic labeling (Woodward 2011).

The NU ulama generally did not object to the above Constitutional Court decision at the level of administrative recognition of the population of believers. However, they want the religion column on the ID card to be vacated because *aliran kepercayaan* is not the same as religion. They encouraged the government (Ministry of Religion) to provide guidance for them because Islam was among the most affected by the recognition of the *aliran kepercayaan*.<sup>14</sup> Muhammadiyah scholars did not explicitly reject the inclusion of the belief flow on the ID card. They question whether *aliran kepercayaan* is in accordance with the first principle of Pancasila, Belief in the One and Only God. According to them, *aliran kepercayaan* is a culture because it is considered not to meet the criteria as a religion, and in this case, the state must be firm. Meanwhile, the PERSIS ulama were more explicit in rejecting the inclusion of *aliran kepercayaan* in the ID card religion column for the same reason that *aliran kepercayaan* is not the same as religion.

### PUBLIC ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM

Conservatism here is related to movements and views that define Islamic religious beliefs and practices in accordance with the text of the Qur'an and Sunnah or the religious practices of the first Muslim generation. The things above are the building of orthodoxy which is believed by conservatives- taking distance from the progressive mindset of new issues and the mindset of accommodating local culture. In Bandung, conservatism dictates the discourse of public Islam and appears to be a ‘true’ measure of Islamic discourse. Many factors that shape the dominance

14 Interview with one of the leaders of NU, CA, in Bandung on October 10, 2018.



of conservatism in Bandung include the memory of the past about the struggle to build an Islamic state, the triumph of Islamist discourse in *taklim* assemblies, and the role of the state (regional government) which gives space because of political negotiations and democratization.

The establishment of ANNAS (Anti-Shia National Alliance) in 2014 strengthened Islamic public conservatism in Bandung. ANNAS stood in response to the Syiah group they called bold enough to appear openly, and no longer hid identity by *taqiyya* (secretly). The ANNAS ulama see the existence of the Syiah as very 'dangerous' especially their propaganda in presenting the Syiah as tolerable schools of thought in Islam. According to them, the Syiah is a 'heretical' group and cannot be part of Islam. It should be noted that the founders of ANNAS are conservative Islamic figures who are members of the Islamic Ulama Forum (FUUI) such as Athian Ali Moh Dai, Amin Jamaluddin, Lutfi Bashori, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Daud Rasyid, Ihsan Setiadi Latief, and Adian Husaini.

The political position of FUUI can be said to be quite strong in Bandung when viewed from the presence of the Mayor of Bandung at that time, Dede Rosyada, and the Governor of West Java, Ahmad Heriyawan, in the "2nd Indonesian Ulama Council and Islamic Ummah" with the agenda "Formulating Strategic Steps to Address Misdirection and Humiliation by Shiites" in 2012. The ANNAS Declaration in 2014 was also attended by representatives from the West Java Regional Government. In some cases, ANNAS Bandung tried to strengthen its influence and conduct political negotiations with the Bandung City Government. The mayor of Bandung at the time, Ridwan Kamil (2013-2018), had been in the spotlight for giving permission to use the Persib stadium for the Asjura IJABI group event in 2015. ANNAS then 'pressed' the mayor not to give permission for similar events in the future. Arguments submitted, Shia are considered heretical and "intolerant" because they insult friends who are highly respected in Sunni Islamic theology.<sup>15</sup>

The existence of ANNAS can be understood as the arena of negotiations between conservative ulama and regional governments. ANNAS comes with the discourse of defending orthodoxy, namely the 'salvation of the faithful' agenda from Shiite propaganda and influence. This discourse has become so hegemonic that other Islamic groups that disagree with ANNAS are unable to speak out loudly or openly rival the discourse that was launched by ANNAS. Conservatism has succeeded in winning public opinion with heroic narratives, and those who try to advocate for

15 1For more information about ANNAS, see <http://www.annasindonesia.com>

minorities will easily be ‘questioned’ their Islamic commitments or even considered part of Shia.

To win this discourse, ANNAS took various steps to consolidate with ulama, leaders of the Islamic movement, Muslim activists, and mass organizations to give full attention to the efforts they called *jihad amar makruf nahi munkar*.<sup>16</sup>

In theory, the state greatly influences the views and outlooks of mass organizations. Protection of countries in minority groups will encourage social actors to be tolerant. On the contrary, state persecution of minority groups will increase intolerance among social actors (Menchik 2016, 23). However, in the current climate of democracy in Indonesia, the problem is more complicated. Populist democracy requires negotiations between officials who want public support and important elements in society. In the context of Bandung, conservative groups of ulama who won public discourse seemed to be freer to influence the state (government) in terms of policies towards minorities.

Since the establishment of ANNAS, the space for Shiite groups in Bandung has significantly reduced. Shia leaders no longer have the freedom they used to enjoy. They can no longer celebrate Ashura (one of the Shia holidays) as freely as they once were. They are forced by circumstances to withdraw from participation in public discussions, lecturing at taklim assemblies, conducting sermons and religious lectures. The government is unable to do anything, it is like as if being held hostage by Islamic conservatism groups.

“But the last two years [public lecture invitations] were not often, restricted. I do not know specifically, but one of them, there might be my background factor. In Bandung, on average, what is done is not dealing with parties who disagree, or *tabayun* (to check and verify news and information before accepting it as true) first, but rather trying to break the opportunity to convey information. In the past I also had sermons at mosques, the schedule had decreased for a long time. The management said some were visited and [asked] to be aware of certain names. Sometimes changing management means changing the choice of lecturers. There aren’t many teaching activities now either.”<sup>17</sup>

16 See <http://www.annasindonesia.com/profil/iftitah-dan-sejarah-aliansi-nasional-anti-syiah>, accessed on December 24, 2018.

17 Interview with a prominent Syiah IJABI, MFR, in Bandung on October 16, 2018.

The progressiveness of Muslim minority groups is perhaps not surprising when viewed from the fact that they are a group that is often aggrieved in terms of freedom to exercise trust and access to citizenship rights because of the pressure of the majority (Sunni Islam) elements. The progressiveness and inclusiveness of Muslim minorities can be understood as an effort to express their aspirations. It should be noted that democratization in the era of reform and globalization helped facilitate the emergence of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia. The religious symbols began to often be used as justifications for political and social struggles. The frequency of the presence of conservative groups on the social and political stage has increased and has colored the public opinion about what manifestations of Islam in social and political life in Indonesia. The persecution and expulsion of Shiite groups - in Sampang (2011, 2012) - and Ahmadiyah - in Bogor (2005), Cikeusik (2011) - by hardline Sunni groups and constrained reconciliation due to the lack of public support shows the strengthening of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia. This condition is exacerbated by the weak role of the state in carrying out its functions to protect all citizens of the nation. In this context, the progressiveness and inclusiveness of minority groups in Bandung can be a response to majority group sectarian authoritarianism and the hope of the state to carry out its functions.

Being progressive by accepting the total concept of the nation-state and its derivative concepts is the most rational choice for the existence of Muslim minority groups in Bandung, accommodating their aspirations to defend rights and reject the arbitrariness of the majority group. However, is this progressiveness more driven by causal or conceptual factors?

Responding to the current context of the global Islamic world and Indonesia, the Shia ulama IJABI (Association of the Ahlul Bait Indonesia Jamaah) affirmed their commitment to participate in the Islamic renaissance and defense of the oppressed (*mustadh'afin*). This commitment is translated by building a religious understanding that is inclusive, substantive and supports freedom of thought and tolerance. IJABI considers that the plurality of religion, ethnicity, and Indonesian culture is a historical reality that becomes a nation's wealth that needs to be preserved. In this context, IJABI sees Pancasila as having a central role as a *Vivendi* mode of national and state life. In the context of democracy in the Reformation Order where the plurality of ideas and politics becomes a necessity, Pancasila becomes the fiercest symbol of state authority, IJABI saw the need to 'restore' Pancasila as its function. IJABI works on

five pillars (1. rational and spiritual Islam, 2. non-sectarianism, prioritizes morality over *fiqh*, 3. pluralist Islam, 4. civil Islam, and 5. defense of oppressed groups) that reflect the civic of Islam, Islam Progressive civilians are adaptive to the idea of civic virtue. Commitment to *Indonesianism* paved the way for IJABI ulama to introduce the so-called 'Indonesian Shiite Muslims', namely Muslims adhering to Syiah teachings which manifested themselves in national values and Indonesian culture.<sup>18</sup>

Like the Syiah, the Ahmadiyah group expressed a total commitment to the idea of the Indonesian nation-state, without conditions. This commitment, among others, is based on the outlook of the Ahmadiyah who is not interested in moving in the political domain and therefore accepts any system of power. It is true that Ahmadiyah has a Khilafah leadership system. However, the Ahmadiyah missionary<sup>19</sup> emphasized that their leadership system was purely spiritual and had no territorial or administrative power orientation. The Ahmadiyah sees Pancasila as a collective agreement that is very relevant to the context of a pluralistic Indonesian society. The Ahmadiyah preacher realizes that Indonesia - although inhabited by most Muslims - stands on various layers of culture and beliefs, and in this case, Pancasila performs its function as a unifying diversity. The Ahmadiyah Governor sees pluralism as a reality that must be accepted if everyone is given freedom and protection in implementing their respective religion and beliefs.<sup>20</sup>

The Ahmadiyah preacher regretted the parties who considered the teachings of Ahmadiyah as not part of Islam, and therefore became the basis for them to carry out persecution and other actions that were not in accordance with the values of citizenship. The Ahmadi missionary emphasized that the Ahmadiyah adheres to the pillars of faith, the pillars

18 Interview with one of the leaders of IJABI, MFR, in Bandung on October 15, 2018.

19 It should be borne in mind that Ahmadiyah does not use the term 'ulama' to appoint figures of the Ahmadiyah religion who disseminate and teach Ahmadiyah teachings; however, the Ahmadiyah calls it the 'muballigh'. In the Ahmadiyah community that believes in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's 'mahdism' and 'messianism', the ulama has a negative connotation. Referring to the traditions of the hadith about the end times, ulama are described as humans who have deviated from the guidance of religion. They were even portrayed as allied with the evil forces dressed in dajjal. For this reason, the Ahmadiyah believes in the figure of al-Mahdi and al-Masih in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who appears to fight against the evil forces and uphold religion. If Ghulam Ahmad is called the Messiah, then the supreme leader of the Ahmadiyah who replaces him is called the "Caliph of the Messiah" (See the speech of Mirza Masroor Ahmad, the 5th Caliph of al-Masih, in the 2009 English Tadhkirah, v-vi).

20 Interview with one of the Ahmadiyah preachers, HRD, in Bandung on October 11, 2018.

of Islam, and the same qibla as believed by Sunni Muslims. Regarding the declaration of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet, the Ahmadiyah preacher argued that *khattam al-nabiyyin* which is often pinned to the Prophet Muhammad does not mean “the closing of the prophets”, but “the noblest prophet among the prophets”. The Ahmadiyah sees the formula *lā nabiyya ba’dah* (no prophet after Muhammad) in addition to the ulama (Sunni) who have no strong textual basis. Nevertheless, the Ahmadiyah did not regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet who brought a new treatise that replaced the Prophet Muhammad’s treatise. Mirza is no longer believed to be a ‘minor’ prophet who translates the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad in different times.

“So, the Ahmadiyah aqeedah and sharia are sometimes twisted, unlike what I believe and do; even one point does not shift from Islamic faith and sharia. We believe in the pillars of Islam and the same faith. Faith in God, angels, apostles, books, destiny, doomsday, etc. We also believe the Pillars of Islam, creed. There are no additions. Asyhadu an-lā ilāha ila Allāh ... “lā nabiyya ba’dah” is added by ulama. Shahada is Shahada, there is no additional mention of Mirza. Our Qur’an is not an interpretation. You can check what the first and last letter is.”<sup>21</sup>

Regarding the issue of the scriptures, the preacher of the Ahmadiyah asserted that Tadzkirah was not their holy book. They believe in the Qur’an as a holy book, also recognize the books of hadith in Sunni Islam as documentation of the Prophet’s hadith. For Ahmadiyah, Tadzkirah is a collection of revelations, dreams, and visions received by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who is still in line with the al-Qur’an corridor.<sup>22</sup>

The Ahmadiyah issue is relatively absent from the connection of issues of global or regional politics as well as the Syiah whose escalation is often associated with relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Ahmadiyah itself was warmly welcomed in Indonesia in the early 20th century before Haji Rasul (Abdul Karim Amrullah, 1879-1949) raised the polemic of Ahmadiyah orthodoxy (Ichwan 2001). In 1980, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa stipulating that Ahmadiyah was not part of Islam and its followers were considered apostates. In 1990, Ahmadiyah sources began to be absent from the Qur’an translation published by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion (Ichwan 2009). In 2005, the MUI issued a fatwa reaffirming the heresy of the Ahmadiyah sect (MUI 2011,

21 Interview with one of the Ahmadiyah preachers, HRD, in Bandung on October 11, 2018.

22 Interview with one of the Ahmadiyah preachers, HRD, in Bandung on October 11, 2018.

101–5). In the post-New Order era, the MUI fatwas became an important reference for many Indonesian people, including the fatwa concerning Ahmadiyah. The rejection of the Ahmadiyah became stronger with the issuance of the MUI fatwa.

As an organization that does not have strong political patrons in the country or abroad, Ahmadiyah does not seem to have a strong footing to defend rights through political channels. In Bandung, a city with Islamic conservatism that dominates public opinion, the Ahmadiyah congregation feels that they do not have much room to carry out their religious activities. The congregation that has great attention to spirituality responds to the pressure of the majority Islamic group with what they call *uswah hasanah* (good example). They respond to the pressure with clarification and social activities such as blood donations, eye donors and sending disaster relief. For them, this is “jihad”, jihad with words and abilities, not with swords.<sup>23</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The city of Bandung reflects one of the metropolitan cities where religious conservatism colors the Islamic public because conservative ulama play an active role in the arena of discourse contestation through various means and media. This writing is of course not to say that mainstream Islamic discourse (which is relatively more progressive) has fewer bearers. However, the discourse of mainstream ulama does not provide a dominant color and is unable to control Islamic discourse in the public domain. It is true that the majority of ulama in Bandung accept the Indonesian nation-state, the basic state of Pancasila and the democratic system, but quite a few ulama have proposed reservations related to the system of government and raised problems at the level of citizenship, and intra-religious tolerance. Theologically, this reservation and problems is based on literal interpretations of religious texts. This theological foundation underlies the idea of how Islam must play a role in the context of the nation-state which becomes an arena of open contestation where ulama become one of the important figures.

However, what is equally important is the factor of the political affiliation of conservative ulama in recent power contestations. The ulama's perception of the nation-state reflected in the above characters is much influenced by their position in the country: whether they are included

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23 Interview with one of the Ahmadiyah preachers, HRD, in Bandung on October 11, 2018.

in the system and structure of the state so that they enjoy the benefits of state policy, or they are outside the system so they take an opposition on the state (government). In other words, Islamic conservatism is a negotiating strategy for a few ulama in Bandung dealing with the state. The problem in the context of nation-states is the fact that conservatism dares to 'sacrifice' the values inherent in nation-state theories, such as equality of citizens' rights, tolerance, and secularization. Religion-based identity politics and Islamic orthodoxy are raised to eliminate the rights of citizens outside of their identity from their basic rights of citizenship.

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# **JAKARTA ULAMA AND THE CONCEPT OF NATION-STATE: Media, Politics, and the Strengthening of Conservatism in the Middle of Islam Moderation**

*Euis Nurlaelawati*

Jakarta is a big city that not only accommodates millions of residents but also becomes a place where the ulama reside and develop themselves through various religious activities. The Islamic community in Jakarta, as in other regions, respects and glorifies the spiritual figure of the ulama and places the ulama as the authority in all religious activities in Jakarta. According to Heuken, in its history, there were many religious activities held to continue pre-existing religious activities. In Pekojan, for example, there is the Al-Nawier Mosque which was founded by a person from Hadramaut surnamed Alaydrus, who held various religious activities that are still ongoing today (Heukeun 2000).

Just like the diverse residents living in Jakarta, ulama in Jakarta are also very heterogeneous. Various diverse attributes are attached to the ulama themselves. Attributes of religious organizations blend with the attributes of their involvement in the main activities both as preachers, boarding school management, lecturers, and others. The habib's presence in Jakarta adds to the heterogeneity of the clerical figure. The Jakarta society values the position of ulama from a variety of views, including from who their descendants come from.

Habibs are highly respected because they are considered descendants of the Prophet so that they have the highest authority of ulama (Hadi 2012). However, the Muslim society of Jakarta has other judgments related to this ulama. Although the habib are considered more authoritative, several factors can reduce the quality of their ulama. Their involvement in practical politics is one of the factors that can reduce the degree of ulama (Hadi 2012).

These attributes and characteristics of the ulama were later blended again with their attachment as preachers with a growing media. Thus, the category of ulama in this context is very complex which differs greatly from the typology of ulama who have clung to ulama in the past, such as independent and dependent ulama associated with state authority, as described by previous reviewers (Burhanudin 2007).<sup>1</sup> In the current context, though the category of independent and dependent ulama originating from their attachment to the state still exists and the mainstream category of ulama attached to religious organizations that have long-standing roots is still strong, namely NU, Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and others, other categories become relevant and developing, for example categories of new ulama, new movement ulama, and minority ulama.

These categories are more detailed when the ulama, who in this case are those who have the authority to broadcast Islamic teachings or who are considered by the society to have the expertise and authority to convey Islamic teachings, are associated with the media conveying Islamic teachings and their views related Islamic teachings. In this context, there are ulama who are not at all tied to the media, even though they use the media as a means of their religious activities and ulama who are bound by the media and media owners and audiences from the media who often present their religious directions and tendencies clearly. This category is very relevant to the condition of Jakarta which is considered home to media, both electronic, print and social, more than any other city in Indonesia. For this reason, there are categories of media-based ulama, such as groups of independent ulama and ulama who are contracted with the media.

Independent ulama, in this case, are those who carry out religious activities with old methods, without the help of media, both television and other media, such as social media. Ulama in this category are those who use old methods, knowledgeable, teach Islamic studies well, and understand religious issues specifically and deeply. They have sanad (a place to lean on) in their expertise and knowledge because they study with religious experts with an established education system through Islamic boarding schools or religious schools and colleges on an ongoing basis. The talaqqī process, meeting with teachers with “diplomas”, is a process that is not overlooked by the ulama of this group. Some have indeed started using media, but even so, this group uses it independently

1 In regards to this discussion, see Martin van Bruinessen (1990).

and chooses it freely, without any contractual ties with certain media, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.

The group of media ulama is a group of ulama who use the media intensively under their own management or media owners. Ulama in this category are ulama who have a unique background and religious ideas that is quite conservative. These artists and ulama who have just emerged due to previous fame such as celebrities, converts and the habaib with “Islamic” fashion dominate this group. The phenomenon of their presence in the media is very much related to the project dakwahtainment that was developed in Indonesia along with the strengthening of the Islamization discourse. According to Sofyan, even this was very much related to the liberalization of media ownership which had an impact on the weakening of control and management from the government. In fact, media owners tend to set the direction of their own media ideology and lead to the proliferation of religious da’wah programs and other programs that carry certain religious missions (Sofyan 2012). On a broader scale, this was allegedly very relevant to the idea of democratizing da’wah, where, according to Crollius, as quoted by Moazami, there was a dynamic and shift in the concept of religious propaganda. Moazami asserted that if preaching had only been imposed on religious experts whose religious expertise had been tested, in the 20th-century da’wah was the duty and obligation of every Muslim, which eventually paved the way for anyone to be involved in da’wah activities (Jouili and Moazami 2006). So, preachers such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, Yusuf Mansur, Jeffry Al-Buchori, and Maulana emerged, which among them were not fluent and qualified in their religious understanding. Hasan saw that they were more than able to manipulate symbols and their relevance with the rituals and to represent the mass society of today (Hasan 2012).

The emergence of ulama in the media is very much related to the Islamization project echoed by a group of Muslims who feel that the Islamic society of Indonesia is not strong and pure. Indonesian Islam is considered by this Muslim group as Islam which is not rooted in pure Islamic teachings. In the context of contemporary religion in Indonesia which they consider has deviated from the purity of aqeedah and sharia, this Muslim group intensively offers a solution to return to pure and sharia aqeedah, and does not hesitate to criticize and make claims of error to people or groups that are not in line with their teachings (Hasan 2007). Through a variety of ways and benefiting from the media, both print and electronic, they inflame the notion of Islamism which is considered urgent to be spread.

This might be related to the fact that Jakarta or Betawi in its history was a very religious area before to what we see today, where various government, business, and entertainment activities surrounded it. Compared to other regions of Java and Sunda where *pesantren* are widely established, Betawi is also known as a place that is strong with *Santris* (people in Javanese who practice a more orthodox version of Islam). Until the 1960s, Betawi had a unique tradition of marriage, because these people generally did not visit *pesantren* and did not live in dormitories to study religion. Hadi revealed as follows.

“Betawi ulama living in different places have excellent tradition of reciting the Holy Quran. The *santri* leave to recite the Qur’an and then returned home as soon as the recitation was finished. They are flexible to choose their teacher according to the convenient of each *santri*. This condition lasted until the 1960s. Usually, if they wanted to continue their education, they would go to the Middle East, especially in Makkah (Hadi 2012).“

Since the 1970s, to date, several *pesantren* appear to be standing along with the activities of lectures in various assemblies, Islamic boarding schools in Jakarta organizing religious studies such as the Islamic boarding schools in Java. However, the arrival of the *habib* and the celebrities who were facilitated by the media to hold lectures in the Muslim council whether they were broadcast by the media or not, revive and re-fertilize the tradition of religious studies as before. In addition, there is the tendency of the Jakarta people to choose Islamic boarding schools in Java or in the Middle East, even though the *pesantren* in Jakarta had begun to establish, such as At-Tahiriyyah, Ash-Shiddiqiyah, and others.

The pressure of Islamism felt by a group of Muslims in Indonesia and in Jakarta where various problems arise, ranging from political problems, Islamic law, and morality has implications for the state and nationality of Indonesia. This is especially evident in the discourse and understanding voiced by a group of ulama. For this reason, the Indonesian state with the concept of the nation-state and its derivative concepts accepts challenges in carrying out statehood and nationality.

The nation-state is an established concept in modern politics in the world today. This concept binds ‘nationality’ and ‘the state’ which are characterized by good understanding and application of several dimensions. These dimensions include systems of government, law, democratic systems,

citizenship rights, and others. Every citizen should be submissive and applies the concept of the nation-state. This has a close relation to the concept of differentiating private life and public life of Indonesian citizens, where private life cannot be used as a reference in carrying out the concept of the nation-state. This means that private life cannot be automatically transformed into public life, and the laws that apply in public life are not the same as the laws that apply in private life (Ali 2009).

The views and concepts of the nation-state according to ulama in Jakarta is a very interesting case to study and examine. As explained above, Jakarta is home to many ulama. The existence of ulama in Jakarta has become important to observe, especially related to the current political issues that have become the spotlight of many groups. The issue of the presidential nomination, the election of the head of the capital and its representatives, is an issue that is very relevant to the discussion regarding the concept of the nation-state. Although both issues are also relevant to the debates that have taken place among ulama in other cities, these two issues have a clearer influence on political conversations among Jakarta ulama, given the place and center of the debate in Jakarta. Moreover, the Ahok case, the Governor of Jakarta, who was re-nominated to become the Governor in the 2018 Period was phenomenal and horrendous. The views and utterances of the ulama related to these two issues to a certain extent reflect the views of the Jakarta ulama regarding the concept of the nation-state.

Although a glimpse into the views of the ulama can be a case study related to the perceptions of the ulama about the nation-state, in-depth studies need to be conducted to comprehensively understand their views on nation-states that cover many dimensions. Some important dimensions to be revealed and presented to them to obtain a good understanding of their views. In this study, four dimensions of the concept of nation-states were appointed and confronted by the ulama in Jakarta, namely, the system of government, anti-violence, tolerance, and citizenship.

This paper examines how ulama understand the concept of the nation-state and address emerging issues related to the practice of 'nationality' and 'the state'. This paper focuses on ulama in Jakarta where the complexity of political and religious problems arises. Based on the results of surveys and interviews, this paper reveals that there are three categories of perceptions and outlooks among Jakarta ulama on the concept of nation-states and their practices and factors that influence those perceptions and outlooks. This paper emphasizes that the outlook of acceptance of the concept of the nation-state is very dominant even

though some ulama provide conditions in their acceptance. Radical and extreme outlooks appear on a small scale and this outlook seems capable of being negotiated.

### **CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM AMID MODERATION AND RELIGIOUS PROGRESSIVISM**

Based on the survey with 70 statements that reflect the four dimensions of the nation-state concept by 30 ulama' respondents with the category of mainstream, new (entrepreneur), Salafi, and minority ulama, as well as the ulama' character as described earlier, this study found that the majority of Jakarta ulama, namely 24 respondents accepted the concept of a nation-state with a moderate, progressive and conservative outlook. The remaining four respondents had thoughts that tended not to accept the concept of nation-state well and were considered as radical and extreme, and two people who could not be identified who in a glance are considered under the conservative category. If presented in percentage, it would look like this; 83.81% accepted the concept of a nation-state with a distribution of 65% with a progressive outlook, 9.5% with a moderate outlook and 9.3% with a conservative outlook; 5.48% provide rejection with radical outlooks, and; 10.7% have a vague outlook, as mentioned above tends to fall into the conservative category. In terms of the conservatism of the ulama towards the concept of the nation-state, the survey data was reinforced by the number of ulama tendencies through interviews and observations of 14 scholars, of which six out of 14 had moderate and progressive views and six had conservative views and were quite radical. It is worth mentioning that the 30 ulama represent four categories of ulama in Indonesia, mainstream especially NU and Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS, Salafi, minority ulama especially Shia and Ahmadiyah, and the new ulama (entrepreneur ulama), including gender considerations, in which 5 ulama are female ulama. Based on respondents' perceptions and sources of this research, groupings related to their perceptions of nation-states are simplified into three categories, namely moderate, progressive, and conservative.

#### *1. Moderate and Progressive: Non-Discrimination and for the sake of Public Good*

As mentioned above, there were 24 respondents affirming their progressive and moderate thoughts regarding the concept of the nation-state. Judging from their religious categories, 24 of these ulama

have affiliations to the religious organization Nahdlatul Ulama and Ahmadiyah. Also included in this category are new ulama (especially those who are independent), but they also have affiliations of certain religious organizations, namely NU. Evidence of their moderation and progressiveness is also reinforced by the results of the interview, which was represented by 6 informants, affiliated to NU (2), Syiah (1), Ahmadiyah (1), and lecturers of UIN Jakarta and lecturers in *taklim* assemblies and social media (2) However, even though their progressive views are legible from all dimensions presented, in two dimensions their progressive and moderate views appear more clear and explicit, as will be explained below.

a. *Democracy and non-discrimination in the government system*

For these ulama, democracy and non-discrimination in the government are two keys that must be emphasized. Therefore, according to them, the system of government must not be discriminatory and rests on a force, such as the strength of religion, ethnicity, and gender and others. So, leadership in the government is the right of every individual who meets the requirements of leadership, both at the local and central level. Although some informants have very different understandings, the understanding held by the majority is a favorable understanding of the concept of nation-states in this leadership issue. In line with this, the leadership also, for these sources, is not one gender. For this moderate and progressive group, of which three are female ulama, women are equal to men and have equal rights and opportunities in leadership. There are no special conditions for women to lead, but the conditions that apply to women are the same conditions that apply to men. Such favorable outlooks and views are expressly expressed by two Ahmadi ulama. Indeed, in Ahmadiyah teachings, women have an equal position and even have to be well empowered: “women may be leaders. There is no distinction between the role of women from men and even women must be empowered well.”<sup>2</sup>

Because of this understanding, they also clearly state that minority groups in religion and belief have the same rights. Syiah followers, Ahmadis, and others have the same right to be leaders and officials in the government. Unlike some other informants, who fall into the conservative category as will be revealed below, who put religion as the first condition in leadership, this group measures the fulfillment of the requirements

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2 GY, Oktober, 2018.



for leadership not based on religion. This moderate and progressive group adheres strictly to the concept of nation-states that ignore factors of religion, ethnicity, and gender. The narrative of a resource person from NU related to this illustrates the understanding that emphasizes democracy and non-discrimination in the selection of leaders in terms of religion and sex as follows.

“For me, we just decide what the priority is. There are Muslim candidates and non-Muslim candidates, so we create criteria, for example, for the position of the governor; we should look at what is his/her vision, and we continue to observe his experience based on his/her track record. If we think that it meets the criteria, then it’s a ‘yes’ from me. I do not focus on his/her religion, but we focus on the criteria. We must be smart voters. If, for example, 70% of the criteria are fulfilled by either Muslim or non-Muslim candidates, we will still vote”.<sup>3</sup>

“... which is often forgotten leaders are selected not based on whether they are female or male but what is important is their capability to lead. But this gender issue sometimes becomes an affirmation for some reason. For example, why did America have more than 700 years of independence? Because gender issues are not a priority for Americans, but because race is more important. So, it is time that Indonesia should welcome a female president. If she finally fails, it is not because of gender, but because of her capabilities.”<sup>4</sup>

The strength of this progressive view among Jakarta ulama is related to the existence of progressive religious institutions and is even considered by some very liberal circles. In Jakarta, there are institutions where young NU gathers and hold the Holy Quran recitals.

One informant and three respondents were members of this Holy Quran recital group, who developed the concept of democracy, non-discrimination, tolerance and made it all the basis of Islamic thought. If we look at the themes and direction of discussion and the writings published on the website, we can see how these concepts are promoted and encouraged. In one of the writings, Abdalla, for example, emphasized that “the style of an ideal country is a country that is not” intrusive “, it

3 3AN, Jakarta, 2018.

4 AN, Jakarta, 2018.

does not interfere too far with its people's beliefs. Whatever beliefs are held by a citizen, the state's position must be 'agnostic', don't want to know'.

b. *Public good without the limits of Religion and Gender for the protection of the rights of minority citizens*

The progressiveness and moderate outlook of this group are also reflected in their views related to the protection of citizenship rights, both for the majority and minority, coupled with their significant arguments related to the right of establishment of places of worship and equal residence rights for minorities and majority. Progressive views related to this issue were rolled out by three of the 14 interview informants, strengthening their outlooks and other ulama who were categorized as moderate and progressive in responding to favorable prepositions in the survey. The views of the three ulama through this interview are very firm and clear and lead to an understanding that this citizenship is based on public good without religious boundaries. For this group, the rights of citizenship related to worship and residence are not limited by religion.

In terms of the right of establishment of places of worship for religious minorities, this group emphasized that the right of establishment does not need to be based on the permission of the majority and the fulfillment of the minimum number of users of houses of worship that will be established as stipulated in the Laws and Regulations. As it is known, based on Government Regulation No. 8/2006 that to establish a place of worship, a religious group must be able to get the approval of 60 other religious residents in the place of worship that will be established and must evidence that there will be 90 people who will use the place of worship, which according to many groups emphasizes partisanship with the majority group and makes it difficult to establish in areas that have fewer occupants (Mujiburrahman 2008).

For this group of progressive ulama, the provision deviates from the concept of the public good. For this reason, the three ulama considered that the establishment of places of worship must be based on the needs of the followers of religion and those needs will be measured by the need and urgency of the house of worship based on the availability of the closest house of worship and the substantial need for belief. A millennial ulama who graduated from the Krapyak Islamic Boarding School who is also a lecturer and familiar with social media in preaching among young mothers, for example, stated that if a house of worship for Christian

religious groups is needed to be established, since the existing houses of worship could not be reached easily and for security reasons and convenience a new Christian house of worship needs to be established and the government must allow it even though there are not many users of places of worship. For this reason, approval from residents who have other religions (Islam in this case) and limits on the number of Christian users can be ignored. In his sentence, he emphasizes the following.

“All citizens have the right to worship on Indonesian soil and have the right to live where they want. In terms of the construction of houses of worship, it is indeed not a provision of the number of users and community signatures that are needed to be considered but their needs. For example, if there are 10 Christians in one area, they still have the right to build a house of worship if their needs are urgent because for example other churches are located very far from the area where 10 Christians live and make it difficult for them to reach the church. To provide convenience for the implementation of their worship, the church must be built without and with the permission of the majority Muslim community, for example.”<sup>5</sup>

To strengthen his progressive outlook, he even compared the needs of Christian houses of worship to the needs of Muslim houses of worship. Clearly, he stressed, that, ‘this also applies to Muslims. And therefore, the establishment of mosques must also be considered, do not let mosques and *mushola* (prayer rooms) exist in a Muslim-majority area, but in fact, the mosque is not used well’.<sup>6</sup>

This progressive and moderate view is also reflected in the rights of citizens to their homes. For this group, every citizen has equal rights over all regions in Indonesia, regardless of their religion and ethnicity. BF, the female ulama who is also the caregiver of the Mahasina Islamic boarding school, in Jatiwaringin, Pondok Gede, and MS, both of whom are female clerics, for example, emphasized that there is nothing to prioritize regarding the rights of each region related to worship, activities, associations, and others. Thus, minority groups have voting rights to provide opinions, views, and complaints about something done by the majority group. For this group, the provision of the right to stay must be in line with the provision of the right to peace, security, and comfort. Regarding the outlook and views of BF, it is not surprising when we look at the vision of the establishment of the *pesantren*, which turns out to put

5 Interview with MR, Jakarta, October 2018.

6 Interview with MR, Jakarta, October 2018.

nationality as a vision that is upheld and guided. In his Islamic boarding school brochure, it was written, that Mahasina is a boarding school that upholds 'Integrated education, Ulama Cadres and Noble Character Leaders who are nationally-minded.

These three ulama seemed to understand the concept of citizenship as a concept derived from Islamic teachings and did not hesitate to accept it well. One resource person, for example, argued well and reflected on what was discussed by Al-Ghazali regarding the benefit of his monumental work, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm Al-Din*. Imam Al-Ghazali presents an interesting discussion about *maṣlahah*, which is associated with several daily actions of people in public places, which are the object of the *hisbah* (an Islamic doctrine which means "accountability"). For Al-Ghazali, for example, the behavior of using sidewalks to hold the merchandise, leaving remnants of blood and animal waste slaughtered for sale pollutes the streets or the act of chanting the call to prayer loudly that causes noise as an example of serious violations of *maṣlahah*. The message to be conveyed by Al-Ghazali seems to be that benefit is not only related to the protection of common interests, but also intersects with the protection of the weak or the problematic (Al-Ghazali, nd). They are also explained and understood by the above sources, which are in line with the idea of the common good that has developed since the emergence of the modern nation-state. Such progressive views have a positive impact on the protection of the rights of religious minorities in Jakarta, at least in the Ahmadiyya congregation in Cideng, where a foundation and place of worship for Ahmadiyah community was established in the 1980s and the Ahmadiyah congregation can carry out religious services and their Ahmadiyah activities, as acknowledged by two Ahmadiyah speakers.

## 2. *Conservatives: Conditional Acceptance, Discrimination and Subordination*

The second group of ulama faced with the concept of nation-state was a group of conservative scholars. They accept the concept of nation-states and derivatives with reservations and requirements. The next group is the group of ulama identified radically and extreme according to the survey results, and only radically in the interview notes. This group is represented by a small percentage of 30 respondents. As stated above, there were four respondents in the survey who identified conservatives and two considered as radical and exclusive which tended to reject some of the establishment dimensions of the nation-state concept. Their conservatism and exclusivism appear in the issue of citizenship rights

and the equal rights of citizens. They are identified as not receiving the same rights for all citizens in various fields and tend to be intolerant of groups with different religions and beliefs. This category of conservative ulama groups was also seen through interviews with 14 informants, six of whom expressed their conservative views on several issues that led to the dimensions of citizenship and human rights which all triggered the ulama's intolerance towards Muslim communities with different beliefs.

In addition, the ulama in this group showed their inconsistency with the ongoing power and government. They also showed a halfhearted outlook in giving rights to equality in the government system to non-Muslims and women.

Identified from the Salafi group (1), Muhammadiyah (1), Islamic Community Association (1), and new preachers who are active on Television media (3). The number of these groups is indeed smaller than the moderate and progressive group of ulama who fully and well accept the concept of the nation-state. However, these conservative and radical groups expressly and explicitly conveyed their views which they admitted often to members of the Koran with the help of the media who were able to transfer their religious knowledge.

a. *Conditional acceptance and discrimination in leadership and citizenship*

This conservative group can be seen from their perception of non-Muslim leadership. They cannot accept that perception and if they have to accept it, they will ask for certain conditions. This perspective was revealed from a resource person, a female ulama affiliated with Muhammadiyah. She affirmed that non-Muslim leadership cannot be accepted in Indonesia and leaders in Indonesia must have the same religion as most of the country. This view is also confirmed by a resource person who is active in the media. Below is the statement.

“The main requirement is Islam, and there is no comparison to be chosen between non-good Muslims and good non-Muslims. What you must look for is a Muslim and he must be good. If there is a non-Muslim who is good but there is a Muslim, even though he is not good, it remains a priority to choose a Muslim.”<sup>7</sup>

The outlook of refusal and reluctance to obey existing leaders and to non-Muslim leadership is accompanied by their intolerance towards

7 Interview with NH, Jakarta, October 2018.

Muslim groups with different beliefs that lead to deviations from Islamic orthodoxy. They, for example, consider that the Syiah and Ahmadiyah are misguided.<sup>8</sup> Although they disagree with the hostility shown by certain Muslim groups towards them, the groups of ulama has an understanding that the group they consider to be deviant is not entitled to freedom of worship. For them, the Syiah and Ahmadiyah ways of worship can disrupt the beliefs of orthodox Muslims. They consider that the Syiah and the Ahmadiyah are religious schools that reject Islam and their followers must be nurtured to return to pure and true teachings. Let's look, an example of the following resource person, a Betawi ulama who gives his evaluation.

“Syiah and Ahmadiyah are indeed teachings that are not accepted by Islam. It is deviating. Ways of worship and the right to worship needs attention. For this reason, it is the duty of Muslims to return them to the true and non-heretical teachings of Islam so they won't mislead others”<sup>9</sup>

b. *Women's rights and syariah issues: subordination in leadership and morality*

Conservatism on both issues is in line with their conservative views on women's leadership at national and local levels. One source said that he strongly agreed with the fatwa of the Riau MUI which forbade women's leadership in relation to the nomination of Megawati as the President who was carried by the PDI to become President and showed his desire to obtain the MUI fatwa Central.<sup>10</sup>

He views that the highest leader must be male and deplores the support of several ulama to nominate women as presidents. Indeed, he still mentors the leadership of women at lower levels such as the governor, regent, and others, but even then, an emphasis on capability requirements are highlighted. To support his view, he referred to the Qur'an which he said had clearly prohibited women's leadership. Relying on the verse which reads *Al-rijālu qawwamūna 'ala' n-nisāikan*, which means that 'men are stronger than women/men leaders for women', he analogous to the inability of leadership in the household scope and focuses on tasks that

8 For studies related to Shia and its development in Indonesia, see Zulkifli (2013).

9 Interview with MN, Jakarta, October 2018.

10 Regarding this fatwa, Ma'ruf Amin stressed that the Central MUI did not issue the same fatwa related to women's leadership. Nevertheless, Amin acknowledged that women's leadership was still debated and he passed on the matter to each Muslim.

must be taken by the leader. For him, as he said, ‘if, in a small household, women cannot be considered imam, especially at the state level.

Two other resource persons have the same understanding related to women’s leadership. However, these resource persons still provide the possibility for women to lead at all levels under strict conditions. They see that women can become leaders when women meet strict criteria, i.e. adequate education and knowledge and household conditions, but do not mention this condition for male leadership. If the criteria are not met, the leadership cannot be given to women, it should be given to the men.<sup>11</sup>

The views of some of these ulama on the status of women are in line with their views on how women are placed under men and as a source of destruction for the nation. They see that women are a source of disobedience and for that women must close their bodies properly. Hijab or even purdah is a way for women to close the doors of immorality. For this reason, this group of ulama felt frustrated with the information about the ban on the use of purdah in several universities including the Yogyakarta State Islamic University.

A keynote speaker on TvOne said that the issue of banning the purdah must be brought to the realm of law because it has tarnished justice and Islamic syariah. For him, it was strange and difficult to accept if students with purdah were in trouble and those who were dressed in mini-dresses were tolerated. That for him signifies the impartiality of educational institutions and the government in practicing syariah.<sup>12</sup>

This outlook of conservatism is not unusual in Jakarta and in line with the conservative outlook of the majority of ulama related to other syariah issues in Jakarta and other areas near Jakarta (Nurlaelawati, 2010; Nurlaelawati, 2015). The case of Alvin’s underage marriage supported by the ulama shows a tendency towards less acceptance of modernity, radical legal changes, including Islamic family law. For some ulama, Alvin is a model that must be emulated related to the avoidance of immorality and the application of Syariah. They assume that what Alvin did was far better than what other young men had done in immorality. Oki Setiana Dewi’s staff gave Alvin an appreciation and considered Alvin’s marriage to be a good example in the present era. Ustaz Arifin Ilham, Alvin’s father, even considered Alvin’s marriage as a breakthrough in the era of adultery and expected to be followed by other youths to avoid adultery.

The same appreciation was given by Ustadz Yusuf Mansur who

11 Interview with Hospital, October 2018, Jakarta; AR, 17 October 2018, Jakarta.

12 Interview with NS, Jakarta, 2018.

considered Alvin's marriage to be a marriage in accordance with Islamic law. Interestingly, this view was clearly expressed by the justice enforcers, the judges. Granting Alvin's marriage dispensation request, not only the avoidance of adultery that is feared by Alvin who can tarnish his father's ulama status, but also by the fact that Alvin's future wife is a convert who is feared to return to her original religion if his marriage is not immediately held (Angga 2018).

In family law issues, amid conservative outlooks in Indonesia, as mentioned above, progressive ideas have emerged among child protection activists. KUPI, the Women's Ulama Congress, which is fronted by Nyai Badriyah Fayumi, who is also the source of this research, brings fresh and progressive ideas to support legal conservation practices, and underage and polygamous marriages (Satori 2017). However, like supporting Badriyah, this effort has not been able to overcome grassroots and brings a common understanding among experts. Several factors, such as the economy and education of the community, as well as the outlooks and performance of activists, allegedly Badriyah, influenced strongly the conservative secrecy of the ulama and increased the idea of the progressive spread. For this reason, the dominant outlook and understanding in terms of Islamic law to date is a conservative understanding.<sup>13</sup>

#### **RADICALS: 'WRONG' CLAIMS FOR GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS, 'MISGUIDED' FOR MINORITY MUSLIM GROUPS, AND 'GUEST' FOR NON-MUSLIMS**

Two respondents identified each radical and extreme and the two interviewees presented views that led to the rejection of the government system, non-Muslim leadership, and discriminated against non-Muslims in citizenship rights. In relation to the first issue, the two ulama clearly stated that Indonesia's central government and leadership system was not the leadership that needed to be totally obeyed. For these two ulama, government policies are not in harmony with Islamic teachings and have harmed and discriminated against Islam. The tendency for the Chinese group, for them, was very clearly demonstrated by the leadership of the state and it was slowly able to shift the power of the majority. The Khilafah, for them, indeed needs to be rolled out to be applied in Indonesia.

Like conservative groups, the two ulama in this radical group also expressly did not accept non-Muslim leadership. For them, the position of leader, from the top level to the lowest level, should not be given to non-Muslims, in a country with a majority of Muslims like Indonesia. This

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13 Interview with BF, Jakarta, 2018.



assertion is driven by their understanding that the Qur'an, al-Maidah: 51, as understood by the majority of ulama in Indonesia prohibits Muslim communities from choosing leaders from among Muslims. This outlook was greatly influenced by the rise of the Ahok case which was sued for blasphemy against religion. Ahok's position as governor and proposing to become governor in the following period has reinforced the group's understanding and outlook about the non-Muslim leadership of Muslims. They emphasized that the main conditions of leadership were religion (Islam) and other conditions to follow afterwards. There is no, for them, a comparative parable between two Muslims behaving badly and non-Muslims behaving well to be juxtaposed with the voting community.

This understanding is a common understanding among Muslim communities. Nadirsyah Hosen (2016) looks at this outlook and tendency of understanding as an outlook based on the argument that there is no verse that allows Muslims to choose leaders from non-Muslims. According to Hosen, the majority of classical and modern ulama have the same view, and although Ibn Taymiyyah has a different view in which he asserts that religion is not a requirement for leadership but leader justice, this view does not take into consideration the majority of Indonesian ulama (Hosen 2017). For this reason, for Indonesian ulama, including the speakers in this study, the absolute religious requirements must be fulfilled first and thereafter, other conditions will be considered and tested. The narrative developed by a ulama below clearly leads to this assertiveness.

“Non-Muslim leadership cannot be in Indonesia, from the lowest level to the highest level. Leaders in Indonesia must be Muslim. Even in a region with a majority of non-Muslims, the leader must be Muslim. Ahok's leadership, for example, is not a leadership that is in accordance with Islamic law. Auliya ... was interpreted by the leader. So, we as Muslims must select leaders who are Muslim with other conditions, of course.”<sup>14</sup>

Their outlook towards Muslim groups with different ism is in line with their outlook towards non-Muslims, even though they are generally more tolerant of non-Muslims. Non-Muslims have the right to worship, and Muslims have an obligation to do da'wah well. For them, Muslims

14 Interview with ARF, Jakarta.

need not carry out acts of violence for *amar ma'ruf* and *nahi munkar*. It needs to be done with gentleness and policy so that they are interested and can enter Islam. The Meliana case, according to them, does not need to lead to punishment but indeed, he must be given an understanding that Muslims have the right to proclaim the call to prayer. However, for them, there needs to be dialogue that can lead to good solutions. They are indeed not selfless in suggesting the good way but have an agenda and hope to preach Islam in a wise way. For this reason, they generally view that attacking non-Muslim places of worship is not permitted, except in emergencies. In the narrative, one of them is stated below.

“Must conduct da’wah like non-Muslims, by fulfilling the economic needs of non-Muslims and others ... not by violence. It is okay to live side by side with non-Muslims and it becomes an opportunity for us to show how good Islam looks like.”<sup>15</sup>

This outlook is clearly rooted in a general view that Indonesia is a country that belongs to a community or Muslim and the existence of non-Muslims is a guest in Indonesia and Islamic law is a supreme law, and in the Muslim political domain must have the largest share and shares (Platzdasch 2009). A statement from a resource person from Jam’iyyah ATMI who questioned confirmed this about the establishment of a church in Lebak Bulus, which he said was no longer functioning. For him, the omission of the church in Lebak Bulus was an affirmation of the existence and partiality of the government towards Christian religious groups in Jakarta. Contrary to MR, the progressive ulama above, this ulama did not consider that many mosques were established and were still standing even though their functions were not optimal.

#### **THE JAKARTA POLITICAL AXIS: THE AHOK CASE AND THE SHIFT OF MAINSTREAM AND MUI RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN THE FIRE OF CONSERVATISM**

Although the tendency of the ulama is to accept the concept of the nation-state well and complete, the tendency to accept conditionally by ulama in the conservative category, especially from the results of interviews as discussed above, is interesting to study more carefully. In the book *Conservative Turn*, Bruinessen and other researchers assert that the Indonesian Muslim community returns to conservatism in several respects. According to Bruinessen, this outlook was initiated by the shift

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15 Interview with Hospital, October 14 2018, Jakarta.

of intellectuals to the realm of politics (Bruinessen 2013). Although the term ‘turn’ may not fully reflect what is desired in the book, what is revealed among ulama in Jakarta in this study is in line with what is described by Bruinessen and other writers in the book above, especially related to the political axis that fueled its strengthening conservatism among ulama as described above. Even though ideology and religious understanding are the reasons and axes that are explained are shown in their conservative outlooks, political circles indeed spur strengthening of conservatism. In fact, this political arena on several issues has changed the outlook of religious groups considered moderate, namely the Muhammadiyah and the Islamic Unity, which are moving towards a more conservative direction. Likewise, there is a very significant shift in MUI institutions related to religious views, which previously the MUI tended to provide support for government programs (Zulkifli 2013; Hamzah 2017). Related to the shift in outlook of the MUI, Zulkifli, for example said the following.

“Since the reformation era it shifted from being state-oriented to being umma-oriented even though the word umma is just a slogan without real evidence since it appears to be a radical wing of Islamic support for the general secretary and now vice chairman Din Syamsuddin. The MUI membership has included the exponents of Islamic radicals such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). “

The shift in the religious outlooks of the organization and the MUI institution gave strong legitimacy to the conservative notion of the Muslim community at large. As pointed out by many researchers, the MUI has an important role in the dynamics of Muslim religious life in Indonesia which affects the arguments on religious issues in Indonesia (Bruinessen 1990; Mudzhar 2003; Hamzah 2017).

As is known in general Muhammadiyah is a religious organization that is considered moderate. Ideologically Muhammadiyah has an advanced understanding and bases its religious understanding on the main sources, the Qur'an, and Hadith. To give legal status to one issue, Muhammadiyah will refer to the verses of the Qur'an and try to interpret them according to the path and method specified. By referring to the verses of the Qur'an and interpreting them openly, the Muhammadiyah is seen as a moderate

Islamic religious group and can answer questions of contemporary issues. Unlike NU, which tends to refer to the views of classical ulama in Jurisprudence, Muhammadiyah is very strict in referring to the Qur'an. However, along with the time and development of religious issues, Muhammadiyah allegedly tended to be conservative and rigid (Ka'bah 2000). Instead NU became an openly religious organization even though they often referred to *fiqh*. Apparently the study of law and other religious issues based on the very diverse *fiqh* (muqaranatt Al-madzhib) has helped NU to release rigidity in interpreting the verses of the Qur'an given the ulama as depicted in the books of *fiqh* have a variety of related views religious practices and have encourage them to choose and sort and to understand the flexibility of the Qur'an which was indeed understood differently by previous ulama (Bruinessen 1996; Ka'bah 1999).

The moderate outlook of Muhammadiyah is considered increasingly faded along with arguments of certain issues that arise in the heated situation of the political arena in the context of the election of leaders and officials in Indonesia. According to several studies, is due to the emergence of the Muhammadiyah variants associated with developing politics (Efendi 2014). The outlook of some speakers from Muhammadiyah in this study within certain limits shows a general shift in the outlook of the Muhammadiyah group. The issues that most clearly illustrate this are the issues of national leadership and the different kinds of beliefs in internal Islam. This outlook is evident in the political arena that blends with religious issues in Indonesia as in the latest case, the case of alleged blasphemy by Ahok, which gave rise to strong reactions from the community through actions that emphasized the view of a group of Muslims that Ahok committed blasphemy and had to legally resolve. And that involved some members of Muhammadiyah. In his writing on the shifting outlook of Muhammadiyah, Burhani stated that this outlook was influenced by the infiltration of radical and conservative ideas of transnational movements (Burhani 2013).

This kind of conservatism is also displayed by ulama in the Central MUI circle in Jakarta. Some studies have found that there is a shift in the religious outlooks of the MUI today. MUI is an institution under state control but is semi-autonomous. Its establishment is intended to help the government respond to religious issues and provide strong arguments and legal basis in providing input to the government. Influenced by its membership and leadership, the MUI was alleged to have accommodative views on state policies (Mudzhar 2003). Many fatwas issued by the

MUI support government policies and provide a legal basis not only from the main sources of Islamic law but also offer other reasons that are more relevant, sociological, historical, and political (Kaptein 2004; Mudzhar 2003). Along with the time and changes in leadership and political situation, the outlook of the MUI changed from its tendency to provide support to the government to its outlook which emphasized the correction of the government and even showed an outlook that was not in line with government policy. Later the outlook of the MUI often showed its populist and Islamist tendencies (Burhanuddin 2007; Ichwan 2013). Some fatwas related to the blasphemy of religion that was very ideological confirmed this outlook, such as a fatwa on the Ahok case. This fatwa gets very high attention and has a big impact on the community (Hamzah 2017; Hosen 2017).

The outlook of the MUI Center affected the growth of conservatism in Indonesia in general, and in Jakarta in particular, the center of political upheaval emerged. The outlook of the MUI in supporting the fulfillment of blasphemy actions by Ahok, for example, has been able to mobilize Muslim communities to take defensive actions against Islam which Ahok deems to have been tainted. Even this fatwa has led to the idea of the establishment of a very ideological forum, namely the National Defenders of Fatwa Movement (GNPF),<sup>16</sup> which subsequently influenced claims of the segmentation of Muslim communities to two large groups, Islamic defenders and *Penista Islam* defenders and on demonstrations and Islamic defense action.

The reflection of this group is also evident in the Jakarta ulama related to the concept of nation-states leadership issues, as described above. The Ahok case is a case that has become their land to show a conservative outlook and is a case that shows that this conservatism is very close to the political constellation. Three informants explicitly stated that they considered Ahok to have blasphemed Islam and there was no need for defense from the Muslim community.

They rely on this understanding and belief in the MUI Central fatwa and assess that Ahok has convincingly committed a criminal offense

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16 16 For detailed information related to the outlook of the MUI in this case, see “The Firm Outlook of the MUI: MUI is not Entering the Political Territory, Ahok is Entering the MUI Territory.” *Mimbar Ulama*, 737: 2017; <http://mui.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MU-373.pdf>.

and even accuses Ahok of dividing the nation. Their outlook towards the Ahok case is in line with their outlook towards the Meliana case in Medan. For the Meilana case, the three informants did not agree with his imprisonment if Meilana was proven to only question the increasingly loud voice of the mosque's speakers. However, they have an opinion that Meliana is indeed committing blasphemy by assuming that she has spread hatred of Muslim religious practices and therefore deserves to be imprisoned.

### **MEDIA AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICAL INTEREST: NEGOTIABLE CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM**

The conservatism shown by the Jakarta ulama who were the speakers and respondents appeared to be not wholehearted as their acceptance of certain issues as described above. Reservation shown by them on certain issues in the acceptance of the nation-state was evident and read in their rejection of certain issues. For this reason, it is interesting to note that conservatism that looks like an outlook can still be negotiated within certain limits. Acceptance by reservation on the issue of women's leadership, the fulfillment of citizenship rights of every non-Muslim and minority Muslim, is clearly concurrent with their rejection of the concept of nation-states, especially related to leadership rights without religious conditions and the system of government.

This conclusion was drawn from several statements of speakers who linked their statements and views on the issue of temporal politics and their flexibility in accepting policies. A resource person who is the representative of the leadership of a large organization, for example, clearly assesses that the leadership that took place was leadership that failed to accommodate Muslim interests and considered that the country's leaders were detrimental to Muslims and benefited non-Muslims and ethnic Chinese. He strongly believed that the Chinese would rule Indonesia and the PKI would rise again. However, he repeatedly mentioned that he still invited state leaders to religious activities organized by the organizations he led. He also said that he received various forms of material and moral assistance from the government.

“Democracy can be in accordance with Islam ... but this system does not come from Islamic teachings. The Khilafah system needs to be considered ... considering that Indonesia is heavily influenced by China which dominates

Indonesia. With the *Khilafah* system, Indonesia can carry out its teachings better. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had begun to emerge again and instead of the PKI which would rule Indonesia, Islam must become a ruler in Indonesia first. Yes, but I still rely on the government, the President, for some things. I just talked yesterday at an event organized by our institution ... He came, we invited, and he helped, which ... yes, of course, we accept it.<sup>17</sup>

This statement in a way illustrates that conservative outlooks and rejection of the nation-state concept on the issue of leadership and government systems are rooted in a temporal political situation motivated by power struggles. That is, in principle that he views that the ongoing system of government in Indonesia is an acceptable system and leadership that takes place is a leadership that is in accordance with Islamic teachings that they understand. However, the desire to seize power led him to correct the existing system of government and leadership, a negotiation to create the impression of an irregularity in the system of government that needed to be replaced. Another source, for example, offers that the *Khilafah* can be considered but with the central clarity of the Caliphate to improve the existing system of government and assert that the leader can be called *ulil amri* as confirmed in Islamic teachings if the leader is carrying out Islamic teachings properly and in accordance with the Al - Qur'an.

In addition to political interests, the role of the media in Jakarta is something that needs to be seen in relation to strengthening conservatism and radicalism and the possibility of its decline in Jakarta. As mentioned above, the media in Jakarta is something that is difficult to avoid. The insistence of Islamism carried by conservatives and radicals is triggered by the rampant and rapid information related to issues of morality and national problems. In interviews with three speakers, it appears that the media influences their viewpoint regarding nationality. For example, they say that information about terror events through the media in several countries and places that corner Islam makes them need to clarify that terrorism is not Islamic teaching and that Muslims cannot do it. For this reason, they later agreed to a conspiracy theory developed to defend Islam. For them, television, the internet, and other media are important for their *da'wah* and understanding that Islam is being cornered. These

17 Interview with AR, Jakarta, October 2018.

ulama often express radical views regarding the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Related to this, several studies reveal that the media play a good role in the transformation of Muslims into radicals and in the transfer of ideas of religious radicalism. Winarni, for example, mentions the following.

“Basically, Indonesia is a moderate Islamic country and radicalism is difficult to develop in this country, but that does not mean that Indonesia does not escape as a target for them, especially the younger generation. Whatever it is, the mass media has a moral and social responsibility towards the public, although, on the other hand, the reports do indeed benefit these movements as a form of free propaganda “(Winarni 2014).

This statement is similar to what was revealed by Fealy as follows.

“The importance of the internet as a tool for the transmission and dissemination of ideas is particularly strong among Indonesian Salafi groups. Apart from their distinctive social conservatism, they use the internet because the media offers an opportunity to create a deculturated Islamic identity by giving birth to sites “[www.salafi.net](http://www.salafi.net) (Fealy 2008).

## CONCLUSION

From the explanation above, we can conclude, first, the majority of ulama in Jakarta accept the concept of a nation-state fully and well. They accept derivative concepts from the concept of nation-states with acceptance which leads to the understanding that personal beliefs and private religious principles cannot be used as a basis for the life of a state and nation. The majority group is dominated by NU ulama who carry out *da'wah* activities or spread religious teachings independently and based on *pesantren* and minority ulama, such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah, who view citizenship rights and leadership rights as rights not based on supremacy of the majority over minorities, but on the public good without any limitation of religion and sex.

Secondly, some ulama indicated their acceptance of several derivatives of the nation-state concept under certain conditions. The outlook shown by Muhammadiyah, Salafi and Betawi ulama is based on the understanding that there has been a process of de-Islamization and marginalization of Muslim communities as the majority in Indonesia. The right to citizenship



and leadership are two issues that are directed by them as a means of restoring majority supremacy. They view that the fulfillment of minority rights is limited by majority rights, as illustrated in their understanding of the fulfillment of minority rights that require strict regulation.

Third, a radical outlook arises in the middle of the outlook of acceptance in the two levels above. This group with a radical outlook shows their resistance not only to non-Muslim leadership and equality of citizenship rights but also to the system of government which they think must be corrected by the Islamic system. For this group, the current system of government does not provide benefits for Muslims and the welfare of Indonesians and the Khilafah system need to be considered. Fourth, this conservative and radical outlook seems negotiable, considering the main factors that trigger it are political issues that are temporal in nature and the interests of groups/organizations that have not been well accommodated by the government. That is, at least conservatism can disappear if political factors no longer dominate. However, indeed this conservative thinking negotiation is not generally applicable because the conservatism of some other ulama who are not a group in this study may be difficult to negotiate because of very strong ideological factors.

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# ULEMA AND NEGOTIATION ON ATIONALITY IN MEDAN: Authority, Islamist Reservation, and Moderatism Paradox

*Mohammad Yunus*

On October 17, 2018, a young ulama with the initials Marjuki, in the city of Medan, wrote a status on his Facebook. He stated that he left the National Ulama Association (PUN) organization due to his business that could not be abandoned. Besides himself, he mentioned one more person from the group of young ulama who stated the same thing. PUN is an organization that accommodates young ustazah who want to devote their lives to the path of *da'wah*. Among young ulama, Ustaz Marjuki is known as a young *dai* who is smart and flexible. He was accepted by a diverse congregation, both from among officials and ordinary people. As he told himself, he has congregations from various backgrounds: some from the old and the young; some are from modern and traditional circles. In fact, some of them come from non-Muslims. According to him, non-Muslim congregations followed his recitation because they wanted to listen to his views on Islam that were not radical and extreme.<sup>1</sup>

The departure of Ustaz Marjuki from PUN was allegedly not solely due to his busy schedule. Because, according to other young people who were colleagues in the organization, each day his congregations lessen. In fact, after the North Sumatra gubernatorial election, the congregation decreased dramatically. His cousin-in-law, who is also a famous young *dai* in Medan, sees that the release of Ustaz Marjuki from PUN is because his political choices are not in line with other young *dai*. According to his brother-in-law, his colleagues chose the candidate of the governor who was both Muslims (Edy Rahmayadi and Musa Rajekshah partners),

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1 An interview with Ustaz Marjuki was conducted on October 11, 2018, at the home of Ustaz Marjuki, in Medan.

while he chose a candidate consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims (Djarot Saiful Hidayat and Sihar Sitorus pairs).<sup>2</sup> Many of his colleagues and worshipers regret his political choices. Because of this inconvenience, Ustaz M finally decided to leave PUN.

The Ustaz M case describes the ulama as people who have the authority to speak about Islam (Zaman 2002; Azmeh 2013) in a prescriptive manner and how they get their religious authority in Medan. This authority, on a practical level, is an important aspect to form a common good in public sphere (Zaman 2004).

Together with other authorities, such as political, economic, and social authorities, the ulama authorities dynamically contest and negotiate to find interpretations relevant to their context. This relevance is not only related to how to reinterpret the tradition of knowledge inherited from the past. Moreover, they are also required to find a network of patronisms that support the reinterpretation of several authorities present in the public sphere (Zaman 2004). A few challenges to reinterpretation and patronism are also relevant in the context of Medan. In this metropolitan city, ulama authority was formed through intense relations with decision makers of political, economic, and congregational policies that experienced dynamic fluctuations.

Over the past few years, the contestation of ulama like this in Indonesia has generally been a tendency to strengthen conservatism accompanied by the fading of liberal Islamic debates in the public sphere.

Bruinessen views, since 2005 what has happened is what is called the “conservative tendency” which dominates the representation of Indonesian Islam. MUI as an institution representing mainstream experts in Indonesia has issued a fatwa that secularism, pluralism, and Islamic liberalism are not in accordance with Islamic teachings (Bruinessen 2013). Furthermore, the presence of the transnational Islamic movement (read: Islamism) is considered an important factor in the changing face of Islam in Indonesia which shifts the main role of Muhammadiyah and NU in defining Indonesian Islam which is known to be accommodative and tolerant.

In a more specific context, namely the city of Medan, the capital of North Sumatra, Islamism is also seen as a symptom that is getting stronger among mainstream ulama. Islamism has at least provided an

2 Ustadz Ahmad Mustofa himself also made his choice to the candidates who were considered as Islamic candidates, namely Edy Rahmayadi and Musa Rajekshah. An interview with Ustaz Ahmad Mustofa was conducted on October 14, 2018, at the home of Ustaz Marjuki, in Medan.

opportunity for the emergence of conservatism laden with political content. Furthermore, Islamism provided practical political awareness for Medan ulama to engage in political moments. The election of mayors in 2010 was a contestation stage for ulama to involve themselves in practical politics and to appeal to the public to support the candidate pair they supported (Riza 2011). Thus, ulama have an important role in shaping political and national common sense in Medan.

The important role of ulama in the city of Medan on religious and political issues that influence the direction of the tendency of public Islam also shows, at the same time, that Islam in the city of Medan is present as a public religion. In the definition referred to by Jose Casanova (Casanova 1994), the religious traditions presented by ulama refused to be curbed in the privacy space. He is present in the public domain to attract the attention of Muslims so that eventually they can experience the dynamics of diverse interpretations.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between ulama and the state, especially about how they narrate the national paradigm. Furthermore, this paper attempts to show that the relationship between ulama and the state in the context of national narrative strategies in public sphere is not singular. They also experienced strict dynamics in forming their authority among the congregation. This dynamic often appears in the form of contestation between ulama to gain influence on the congregation so that in the end it creates a kind of ulama strategy. In the context of Medan Muslims, this paper attempts to explain that the way the ulama narrated their national views to the audience/congregation was part of their way of forming religious minorities. On the other hand, the national narrative is the topic of dynamic contestation which in turn creates fragmentation of ulama in the category of majority-minority ulama, mainstream ulama, and new generation ulama.

#### **ULAMA AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES**

Muhammad Qasim Zaman in the *Ulama in Contemporary Custodian Islam* (2002) argues that ignoring the study of scholars has an impact on failure to understand contemporary Islam. This confirms the importance of the study of ulama and their authority to obtain a dynamic picture of contemporary Islam. In Medan, the authority formed through the relations of ulama and its congregation is conditioned by the involvement of ulama on politics and their views on political issues both on a national scale and regional scale. Therefore, the election of the

governor of North Sumatra some time ago was an important moment, not only about North Sumatra's political direction but also the direction of Islam through the participation of its ulama. This was evident as stated by an ulama from Muhammadiyah, Prof. Ahmad Nur, as follows.

“The role of the ulama is enormous. I have researched the political articulation of *taklim* assemblies in the city of Medan. Ustadz who entered the *taklim* assemblies which had a huge influence on the community there. Taklim assemblies in Medan vary. Some are based on their place of residence or regions, or the similarity of the area of origin, or similarity of mass organizations and even ethnic similarities or similarity of clans. The recitation of the *taklim* assemblies is about religion. But when there were moments of regional elections, the assemblies became very potential. Thus, Ustadz with their political tendencies can also determine who should be elected.”<sup>3</sup>

In addition to the relationship between the ulama and politics on the one hand, and the relationship between the ulama and its congregation, on the other hand, ulama in Medan are also conditioned by several social organizations which become their primordial affiliation as ustaz. As a multi-ethnic city (which includes ethnic Malays, Mandailing, Batak Toba, Simalungun, Nias, Pakpak, Javanese, Acehnese, Minang, Arab, Tamil, and Chinese) and multi-religions (which includes Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism) and Confucius), Medan is quite dynamic in “producing” the diversity of these organizations - such as Al-Washliyah, Muhammadiyah, and NU. In addition to mass organizations, the background of the school is also a condition that creates its own religious authority - especially minority Islamic schools such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah.

Although in the end the role of the youth was greatly influenced by their expertise to preach in accordance with the character of the congregation, the background of the mass organizations and schools provided a communication network that enabled them to access affiliated congregations in their organizations or schools. For example, Ustadz Falah, a young Dai, who has a congregation of approximately 800 people, consisting of women and millennials, claims to have an Al-Washliyah

3 Interview with Prof. Ahmad Nur conducted on October 15, 2018, at Prof.'s house Ahmad Nur, in Medan.

background.<sup>4</sup> He has a background of Islamic teaching affiliated with these traditional organizations before he finally became widely known outside al-Washliyah. A similar thing also happened to Ustadz Ahmad Mustofa who had the same organization background.<sup>5</sup>

Compared to Ustaz Ahmad, Ms. Nurani has a different story. She came from the background of the Muhammadiyah organization. Starting from the Islamic teaching at the branch, the lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University of Medan, in the end, oversaw all the 127 Islamic teachings in North Sumatra. Even though she has a schedule for filling in Islamic teaching consisting of ulama under the Aisiyyah institution in North Sumatra, she still maintains the regular Islamic teaching at the branch, in Medan.<sup>6</sup>

If the emergence of dai in Medan is generally very conditioned by mass organizations, the religious teachers who come from Muslim minority backgrounds, are very dependent on the network of schools. Ustaz Candra, who oversees around 20,000 Shi'ite congregations in Medan, is a very authoritative ulama in the Shiite community, but he is relatively unknown outside the Syiah community. This also applies to Maulana Mundir who became the head of the Ahmadiyah Community in North Sumatra. As the preacher who for all the Ahmadiyah communities in North Sumatra with around 2500 members, MI was almost unknown outside his congregation as an influential preacher interpreter. In addition, every day, except in moments of da'wah, MI dress and behave as ordinary Muslims in Medan in general.

On the other hand, the authority of the ulama also has a very different pattern for the NU ulama. Furthermore, NU in Medan has a different pattern compared to other regions in Indonesia, especially in Java.

If the figure of the NU ulama in Java is reflected by the pesantren that it fosters (Bruinessen 2015), then the character of the NU ulama in Medan is confirmed through its organizational career within NU.

A figure who was previously active in the world of practical politics, for example, when he had political relations with ulama within the NU structure, he could have held an important position. The genius of a NU ulama in Medan does not have to be proven by Islamic boarding schools

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4 Interview with Ustadz Falah conducted on October 15, 2018, at the home of Ustadz Falah, in Medan.

5 An interview with Ustadz Ahmad Mustofa was conducted on October 14, 2018, at the home of Ustadz Ahmad Mustofa, in Medan.

6 Interview with Ustazah Nurani conducted on October 17, 2018, at the home of Ustazah Nurani, in Medan.



but can be proven by academic degrees and political careers.<sup>7</sup>

Ulama authorities in Medan are also established by religious organizations that have strong relations with the government: MUI and FKUB. Both institutions have an important role to play in this affirmation. The book published by the FKUB entitled *Buku Panduan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat* (The Guidebook for the Establishment of the House of Worship) is a public explanation of the purpose of the establishment of the institution. As an interfaith forum, FKUB has four missions that accommodate the noble principles of nationality-related to interfaith relations including:

1. Maintain pluralism;
2. Develop multiculturalism;
3. Explore the point of equality;
4. Uphold the ethics of harmony as religious observance (Harahap et al. 2016).

In relation to membership, the Medan FKUB consists of “religious leaders, namely community leaders of religious communities who lead religious organizations and those who do not lead religious organizations recognized and/or respected by local communities as role models” (Harahap et al. 2016, 67).

As stated by Ms. Lilik who is active in FKUB, this one institution serves to:

“Maintain harmony in religious communities, the program is to carry out various interfaith dialogues and community leaders. And one of the cores of this institution is giving recommendations on the establishment of places of worship, which come from the rules of the Minister of Religion and Minister of Home Affairs number nine and number eight.”<sup>8</sup>

As a forum for religious harmony, of course, FKUB is not only filled with ulama. It is also filled by other religious figures such as Christian, Catholic, Hindu, Confucian figures. However, for Islamic leaders, ulama who are eligible to participate in FKUB must go through the MUI’s recommendations. Because of this mechanism, the ulama who were accepted were ulama who represented the majority of the ulama

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Prof. Dr. Kartono conducted on October 15, 2018 at his home, in Medan.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Ms. Lilik conducted on October 16, 2018 at her home, in Medan.

who come from Al-Washliyah, Muhammadiyah, and NU. There is no room in the FKUB for ulama from Islamic minorities, such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah.

FKUB in Medan has given an understanding of the institutionalization of religious authority carried out by mainstream ulama. Through this mechanism, they normalize the religious knowledge they narrate as a measure of truth that Muslims can celebrate in public spheres. FKUB is an institution that is used by them to determine who are “true” ulama and who are the opposite ulama.

#### NATIONAL NARRATIVE ULAMA AND NEGOTIATION

From several narratives above, at least there is a relatively standard pattern in the presence of ulama and authorities in Medan. For the mainstream ulama category, they have strong relations with politics, while minority ulama are relatively present culturally in a limited religious space. The mainstream ulama is represented by a group of ulama who have a network of organizations such as MUI and FKUB, both from the generation of old ulama or from the younger generation, while the minority ulama are from Syiah and Ahmadiyah. Young ulama - who at a certain level represent the mainstream ulama - have a category as new ulama or can be referred to as entrepreneurial ulama because of this group's awareness of the importance of social media as a medium of self-actualization and *da'wah*. In addition, this group also targets the millennial generation and upper-middle-class mothers as the audience for their *da'wah*.

To see the views of ulama on national narratives as the subject of research, quantitatively, they can be characterized into seven characters as follows. 1. progressive ulama; 2. inclusive ulama; 3. moderate ulama; 4. conservative; 5. exclusive; 6. radical; 7. extreme. Of the 30 ulama surveyed with a variety of categories including mainstream ulama, minority ulama, new generation ulama, and entrepreneurial ulama, which included accepting national narratives and their derivatives including details as follows: two ulama (amounting to 6.67%) reflecting progressive categories. As for the inclusive category, there are six ulama (amounting to 20.0%), while for the moderate category there are ten people (amounting to 33.3%) and the conservative category there are three people (10.0%). Whereas for the category of ulama who reject the national narrative together with their derivatives, there are three people (10%) who belong to the exclusive category, one person (3.3%) who

belong to the radical category, one more person (3.3%) belongs to the category of extreme ulama. The rest, there are four ulama (amounting to 13.3%) that cannot be identified based on their outlook towards the national narrative.

Of course, the amount and percentage above require an adequate explanation. Although these numbers have been mentioned at the beginning of this book, attendance here is to present a more complex deepening and analysis. As a plural city but has a Muslim majority population, Medan is dominated by mainstream ulama who feel the need to show their identity amid various diverse religious identity (read: Islam). This political identity is also used as a response to the events of political identity that occur on a national scale, such as the events of 212 in Jakarta and the Congress of Muslims. This is as stated by Ms. Nuran, who is affiliated with the Aisyiyah Muhammadiyah organization as follows.

“For me, the tendency of Muslims in Medan is to increase religiously. Since the event 212, then the congress of Muslims, he wants to offer prayers or not, the important thing is that he chooses Muslims, this is called progress. Then there was the Subuh prayer movement in the congregation in Medan, and it was crowded. Before 212 and the Muslim Congress, it was rare to see the religious enthusiasm of Medan Muslims, but the current situation of Muslims in Medan is far more lively showing their religious enthusiasm.”<sup>9</sup>

The strengthening of identity politics by the mainstream ulama was also affirmed by other ulama such as Prof. Ahmad Nur who looked more at identity politics in Medan is still “a series of 212 moments and subsequently from what happened in Jakarta.”<sup>10</sup>

This tendency of Islamism to influence the views of ulama on national narratives. Of the ten ulama interviewed, six people wanted an Islamic nuance in the state system by supporting Muslim legislative or regional/national leaders and who were backed up by Islamic slogan parties. The aim is to slowly enter Muslim aspirations and Islamic values into the state system. Thus, it was agreed upon by the majority of mainstream

9 An interview with Ustazah Nurani was conducted on October 17, 2018, at the home of Ustazah Nurani, in Medan.

10 Interview with Prof. Ahmad Nur conducted on October 15, 2018, at Prof.'s house Ahmad Nur, in Medan.

ulama from both the older generation and the younger generation (new generation ulama).

If six people have Islamist tendencies, four other ulama interviewed did not support this trend. These mainstreams are, among others, represented by NU ulama and marginalized young ulama and minority ulama. They are a group of ulama who “lost” in their contestation with ulama who have political patrons and Islamist tendencies. These four ulama want to maintain the adaptative nature of Islamic politics that exists today, in the form of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, with the details that two of them (NU ulama and young ulama) call it the Nusantara Islamic politics, while the other two implicitly agree.

Of course, the fragmentation of the ulama’s views on the system of the nation-state is channeled through democratic means, a system that is now seen as the most realistic although not the best — in addition to the similarity of the outlook of those who agree to anti-violence actions. Most of the mainstream ulama at the same time also consider that democracy in Indonesia is a procedural democracy with the principle of one-man one vote. This is a common view for ulama who have political patrons in regions that have Islamist tendencies and have good structural positions in mass organizations.

#### **ISLAMIST RESERVATION AND PANCASILA ISLAMIZATION**

The tendency of mainstream ulama - except NU ulama - and some young ulama (such as Ustaz Ahmad Mustofa) in Medan who were surveyed and interviewed to support candidates and candidates for regional/national leaders who were Muslim aimed at smoothing the implementation of Islamic values. In a serious discussion with them, a tendency to make the spirit of Islamism the final goal of nationalism and the outlook of its approval of the system of government emerged in the discussion. They did not expressly want a change in the system of government with a system that they considered was in accordance with the political history of Islam in the early days (read: Khilafah). They realized that replacing the Pancasila system with Khilafah would violate Indonesia’s history. Therefore, Islamizing the Pancasila is a realistic choice rather than replacing it with another system — even though what is replaced is Khilafah.

One of their ways to carry out the Islamization of Pancasila is to take one form of outlook if at any time it is possible to restore the seven words in the first precept of Pancasila, “Belief in God, with the obligation to

carry out Islamic shari'a for its adherents". According to them, this does not reduce the plural and democratic nature that exists in the Pancasila system. His argument, as stated by Mrs. Nurani, "returns seven words specifically only for Muslims so that non-Muslims remain uninterrupted by the addition."<sup>11</sup> In such ways, they hope that even though the state's symbol and the systems are the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, Islamic values have been formally included. At the same time, non-Muslim citizens maintain their religious rights as a concession to the political compromise of the establishment of this nation-state.

The attempt to carry out the Islamization of Pancasila, for mainstream ulama in Medan, stems from the assumption that the first principle without seven words results in the escape of Islam as a religion embraced by most Indonesian citizens. Moreover, the first principle is to equate all religions in Indonesia. The logic is as said by Mrs. N, who became an important person in Al-Washliyah, in the following detail below.

"For example, like this: in delivering Citizenship lessons, explaining the material of "Belief in the one and only God", while in that class there are children who are not Muslim, then if he asks; what is meant by One? Does that mean the religions in Indonesia are the same? Because indeed it seems that there is the direction will lead to that the answer later. Another example, in the Citizenship there was a question, "On Friday, Abdullah went to ..." The answer is "the mosque". "On Sundays, Meri goes to ..." The answer is "the Church". Moreover, this type of question will apply to other religions. The next question will end with this question: "Those religions are ..." The correct answer according to the Citizenship lesson is "the same". Now that's kind of vague, don't you think?"<sup>12</sup>

In Ustazah Nurani's statement, it implies an objection to equating Islam as the majority religion with other religions in Indonesia. This objection applies to religious content as well as the existence of Islam itself in Indonesia compared to other religions.

When the majority of the ulama represented by mainstream ulama in Medan wanted to carry out Islamization of the Pancasila, at the

11 An interview with Ustazah Nurani was conducted on October 17, 2018, at the home of Ustazah Nurani, in Medan.

12 Interview with Ustazah Nurani conducted on October 16, 2018, at the home of Ustazah Nurani, in Medan.

same time that desire was also parallel with the desire to make Islamist reservations. What is meant by this reservation is to support Muslim legislative candidates to schedule Islamic regulations that are easier to implement. They do not care whether they are capable or not, what is important is that they are Muslims. Apart from the reason for *akhaffu 'l-dhararain*<sup>13</sup> (read: one of the two lightest damages) as stated by Ustadz Ahmad Mustofa, there are more linear reasons to justify it. This can be seen from the arguments presented by Ms. Nurani, as follows:

“First, because we are one of the Islamic organizations, certainly looking for Islamic aspirations with Islam. Regarding their individual abilities, we don’t have any information yet. Because indeed we are just looking for figures who are Islam in pairs with the religion of Islam. At least, we are looking for the best. We are at the Muslim Congress, including me and those who participated in winning Edy Rahmayadi,...”<sup>14</sup>

With such argumentation and justification, the victory of Edy Rahmayadi is considered as the victory of Islam in the city of Medan - a religion embraced by most of its citizens.

The victory of a particular political party, in the narrative of identity politics in Medan, has been transformed into a symbolic victory of Islam. This transformation marked the importance of the role of ulama in shaping Islamic and national narratives in the public sphere. There is a kind of Islamism that is loose and accommodating to the basic principles of nationalism, but at the same time they are consistently and collectively carrying out Islamization of Pancasila both as potential, as a form of interpretation of the derivatives of the concept, or as the application of praxis to their national concepts.

#### **CITIZENS OF MAINSTREAM MUSLIMS WHO ARE PARADOXES**

The victory of the governor election in North Sumatra from the candidate pair Edy Rahmayadi-Musa Rajekshah over the Djarot Saiful Hidayat-Sihar Sitorus candidate pair considered by the majority of ulama in Medan as the victory of Islam provided a strong understanding of the

13 This term is often found in fiqh discourse. It is used to refer to ways of taking legal priority to two or more cases which together contain damage to humans. In that case, one of the mildest cases was taken. See Jalaluddin al-Suyuthi (1983) for further details.

14 Interview with Ustadzah Nurani conducted on October 17, 2018, at the home of Ustadzah Nurani, in Medan

strengthening of identity politics in the context of citizenship. Ulama who function as prescriptive agents provide awareness about the importance of presenting religious symbols in the public sphere as a majority religious identity that wants to get a dominant space in socio-religious interactions. This politics of citizenship identity is conditioned by FKUB which is a forum to maintain harmony among religious people.

In the narrative built by mainstream scholars in Medan, FKUB is always called to declare the existence of religious harmony in Medan. Ustadz N of Al Washliyah expressly stated the following.

“Medan has FKUB institutions. In my opinion, this institution is very instrumental in creating this conducive atmosphere. So, indeed the situation between religious people in Medan is conducive. Interfaith friction may still be present, but not to protrude to the surface. Because our concept is clear, my religion is my business and your religion is your business.”<sup>15</sup>

This was also agreed by an Al-Washliyah activist who was a member of the FKUB, Ms. Lilik. However, efforts to maintain harmony are still dominated by the presence of mainstream ulama in Medan. For Ustazah Lilik, “because the multicultural city of Medan, FKUB institutions are trying to reconcile their people, not their religions. Recently FKUB also played a role in the smooth running of MTQ activities, in which the six religious communities worked together to succeed the event.”<sup>16</sup>

Formally, FKUB opens itself to every religious leader or religious group to become a member. However, the dynamics of Islam in Medan and the relations between religion and politics make the process of becoming a member more complicated. The religious harmony built by FKUB was a harmony which further emphasized the establishment of Muslim mainstream because the harmony was created to launch activities carried out by the majority Muslim represented by the ulama. As far as the explanation given by Ms. Lilik is related to the role of the FKUB in Medan, the narrative of citizenship tolerance is constructed in the establishment of the majority Muslim, although this is related to the traditions of non-Muslim living. Ms. Lilik narrated as follows.

15 Interview with Ustazah Nurani conducted on October 16, 2018, at the home of Ustazah Nurani, in Medan.

16 Interview with Lilik Ustadz conducted on October 16, 2018, at the house of Ustazah Lilik, in Medan.

“Together with leaders from other religions, we are obliged to deal with them together. So, once we are convinced with our figures, only then together we convince the congregation. For example, if someone is cooking a dog in a yard, figures from their religion will provide understanding so that they can understand and understand each other ... Especially in this village, the Islam is more dominant. Because usually religious activities that invite many people and need wide places, usually, are held in the Churches. Not held in homes. So, the socio-religious conditions in this village can still be well maintained.”<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, Ms. Lilik emphasized the following.

“Thank God, if in the city of Medan this harmony between religious groups is very well established. For example, when we would hold a maulidan event, they also help with a joint venture fund. What is amazing is that it was a personal initiative and not because it was requested ... Churches and mosques that are close together do not necessarily make the people tense and nervous. In fact, both congregations, help each other. For example, during the Eid al-Fitr prayers, the church congregation offered the mosque congregation to use the church field to park vehicles. So, FKUB indeed has a huge role.

“Someone once almost wanted to keep a dog in front of this house. But we had a meaningful dialogue and explained that most of the population here is Muslim. Finally, he was also willing to accept it. So, there has never been a quarrel ever since.”<sup>18</sup>

The narrative of the mainstream ulama tried to prove the existence of an effort to establish cooperation and harmony between religious groups. The explanation above is an attempt to build a narrative about the creation of the ideals of the FKUB. However, if examined more deeply, the ulama interviewed also mentioned the existence of interfaith tensions in the context of citizenship that could not be avoided - especially related

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17 Interview with Lilik Ustadz conducted on October 16, 2018, at the house of Ustazah Lilik, in Medan.

18 Interview with Lilik Ustadz conducted on October 16, 2018, at the house of Ustazah Lilik, in Medan.



to ways of life that were motivated by differences in religious perspectives. Ms. Narni narrates in details the following tensions.

“For example, non-Muslim people always do things that are sometimes offensive. Once a neighbor of mine who just moved in cooked pork. The aroma of the cooked pork spread around the neighborhood. It triggered Muslim kids around 12-15 years old to throw gravel while shouting “Pigs” since they smelled the aroma of the pig and are allergic to it. Then the neighbor became angry. He then threw them back with pork bones. Finally, the Head of the Environment (Kepling) heard about this issue. Although the issue came from both sides and provoked the emotions of Muslim children, thank God it was resolved. Therefore, I disagree with this condition.”<sup>19</sup>

Furthermore, Ms. Narni explained,

“I often tell people, if you want to sell a house, don’t sell it to Christians even though it’s offered at a high price. In fiqh, we have the concept of *syuf’attul jiwat* (read: compensation for purchases made by neighbors). This means that if you want to sell a house, offer first to the nearest neighbor who is a Muslim. Secondly, if there are already a lot of Christians in one environment, it means it’s a slum. That’s what I see.”<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, Ms. Nurani added other aspects besides aspects of religion, namely ethnic aspects. She experienced and observed it as a tension between Medan Muslims and Chinese.

“The case is like this, sometimes it happens to Muslim servants who work with non-Muslim Chinese people. Sometimes they like to say, “It’s okay, eat this pork”. ‘What is the consequence?’ ‘I am told to wash their used dishes’, she said. ‘Did you say that you are a Muslim when you worked there?’ Yes, ma’am, I did. ‘If not the father and grandfather who told me ‘Eat this!’ , sometimes it would be

19 Interview with Narni Ustadz conducted on October 16, 2018, at Ustazah Narni’s house, in Medan.

20 Interview with Narni Ustadz conducted on October 16, 2018, at Ustazah Narni’s house, in Medan.

the children. Now, this is disturbing.”<sup>21</sup>

In the case of ethnic Chinese tensions, which are generally Christians, religious tensions are more caused by economic and social inequality, while for religious tensions between Muslims and Christians is more a tension fueled by social problems - not solely because of religion. Therefore, religious tensions often overlap with ethnic tensions. These issues do not seem to get FKUB's attention as things that can hamper the harmony of religious people claimed to be the task of the institution.

As mentioned, in addition to focusing on permits to establish places of worship, the religious harmony built by FKUB is interreligious harmony. However, there is no adequate explanation of how to maintain harmony in an intra-religious context. Even when respondents were asked about the existence of a Muslim minority in Medan they responded diplomatically.

“Our presence in the FKUB is based on recommendations from the MUI. Of course, they have selected, and of course dialogue with mass organizations. These mass organizations are not Muslim minorities. So, the mass organizations that were consulted by the MUI were like Al-Washliyah, Muhammadiyah, and NU. No one in the Ukhwah Commission is from the Muslim minority, so they are not in the recommendation letter.”<sup>22</sup>

The explanation was also affirmed by other mainstream ulama. Ustadzah AI from Al-Washliyah who is an Al-Azhar Egypt alumni, and has a position in the MUI stated the following.

“What is certain, when the government and MUI have stated that there are indications of fraud, as citizens of this country we must obey the law. When the government and MUI decide that the organization is prohibited, then as good citizens we must avoid the organization. However, to join in worship with them, in ways that are already literal, for me there is no need to be hostile to each other. I once prayed at the Ahmadiyah mosque. I always do istighfar because there are so many different things. For example, my husband and I often traveled from one mosque to

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21 Interview with Ustadzah Nurani conducted on October 17, 2018, at the home of Ustadzah Nurani, in Medan.

22 An interview with Lilik was conducted on October 16, 2018, at the house of Ustadzah Lilik, in Medan.

another to perform tarawih prayers — just like when we were in Egypt. There is no qabliyah and ba'diyah prayer. It was Ignored and not given a chance at all. And the tarawih prayer was only less than half an hour. “<sup>23</sup>

On the other hand, the strengthening of identity politics built by majority ulama hid their concerns about the existence of Muslim minorities who have not been seen to be involved in forming the narrative of nationalism. Muslim minorities who naturally have their own patron of ulama do not seem to follow political rhythms and majority Islamic trends. Muslim minorities, as will be discussed later, show their outlook that is more accommodating to the national narrative without the reservation of Islamists. The outlook of the accommodative nationality of Muslim minorities ultimately gives an understanding of semi-autonomous discursive fragmentation in the map of ulama networks in Medan.

**EACH OF MOST MUSLIMS AND MUSLIM MINORITIES HAS THEIR OWN ISLAMIC AND NATIONAL RHYTHMS THAT HAVE DISCURSIVE ROUTES THAT ARE NOT STRICT.**

Explanation of Muslim minorities in Medan is an implication of the discussion of strengthening moderateism and conservatism. This section explains the perspective of minority ulama about their existence in Medan in the majority and moderate conservative Muslim siege. Of course, as already mentioned, what is meant by Muslim minorities here is Syiah represented by Ustadz Candra and Ahmadiyah represented by Ustaz Maulana Mundir. For Ustaz Candra, Medan is a secure area for the existence of minorities. He gave the following judgment.

“Medan is indeed plural. Medan, I can say, does not question this problem (read: the problem of minorities). So, we, I personally, have never been closed. We are open to each other. This is Shia, and this is not. Because when this foundation is established, we were very open, for example, we invited most institutions such as the MUI, the chancellor of IAIN, even mass organizations like HTI. We brought in Ayatollah Ramadhoni at that time and had a casual discussion. I think this local wisdom of the people of North Sumatra can indeed

<sup>23</sup> An interview with the AI Foundation was conducted on October 13, 2018, at the home of Ustazah AI, in Medan.

accept differences from a religious perspective. Even if there is friction, the emergence just happened in recent times, and the scale is not massive. In the past, Indonesia's liberal way of thinking was very strong, but now it has weakened and the radical way of thinking strengthened. And the friction symbolizes that radical movements in Indonesia are getting stronger. "<sup>24</sup>

The explanation briefly explained the chronology of the emergence of Syiah in Medan and the outlook of the mainstream ulama at that time was well received. The information also emphasizes the existence of nuances of Islamism which have been getting stronger lately. What is interesting about his statement is that there is a kind of local wisdom that tends to be indifferent to Muslim fragmentation. The local wisdom he meant was ethnic plurality which became the primordial condition of Medan. This wisdom, in turn, can develop and penetrate naturally into religious territory. The same impression was felt by Maulana Mundir as an important preacher in the Ahmadiyah Jama'at. He stated that there had never been any acts of persecution against the Ahmadiyah.

"Here in Medan, thank God, I have never experienced persecution. In Medan, the people are ignorant. If you don't bother me, I won't bother you. It had almost happened in Langkat, in the 90s, there was a warning that there was going to be an attack. But now everything has subsided. Previously, after the emergence of the 2005 MUI fatwa, FPI raided us. But suddenly left. Just like that ... It means, even though there are facts about the use of religious issues in the election of the governor, but radical movement in Medan does not apply. People here know where Ahmadiya mosques are. But they do no harm to the mosque ... "<sup>25</sup>

Maulana Mundir expresses local wisdom with the term indifferent. There is a kind of unconscious ignorance in the Medan Muslim community which confirms the statement of Ustadz Candra. As with the Syiah community, the Ahmadiyah Community in Medan expressly stated the existence of the community. They also freely carried out daily worship in public spheres. Even on Sundays Maulana Mundir routinely

24 Interview with Ustadz Candra conducted on October 12, 2018, at the home of Ustadz Candra, in Medan.

25 Interview with Maulana Mundir conducted on October 14, 2018, at the home of Maulana Mundir, in Medan.

held Islamic teachings at the Ahmadiyah Mosque. Each of the Syiah Muslims and Ahmadiyahs felt Islamism and identity politics in Medan strength thus after many years the Muslim majority did not bother the minority. Moreover, they felt that the strengthening of Islamism as a massive tendency - in the sense of being a tendency of ulama and common people - only occurred in political moments both national and local. In other words, identity politics shown by the tendency of the majority of Medan Muslims are volatile and “lazy”. Even though the MUI has considered “both” misguided, the fatwa does not provide an ethos for majority Muslims to respond in practical terms either in the form of statements or executive actions. The MUI fatwa seems to be seen only as a labeling status without having executive power.

If explored further, the ignorance of Islamism and identity politics in Medan does not just come from local wisdom. Moreover, it also has a relationship with the absence of minority awareness among common Muslims. In a few interviews conducted, both mainstream ulama and new generation ulama/entrepreneurs, when it comes to Islamic teachings, the topic of Muslim minorities was never asked by the congregation. In all Islamic teachings in Al-Washliyah, Muhammadiyah — including Aisyiyah—, PUN, and NU, there were no questions about the minority. Awareness of common Muslims who are the audience of ulama in Medan revolves around practical jurisprudence (read: fiqh worship) and national and local political issues. This fact certainly has an important influence in conditioning the emergence of a “comfort” minority in Medan. There is a relatively strong relationship between ignorance of Islamism and ignorance of the Muslim public about the “problematization” of minorities in the majority.

The existence of paradoxical Islamic conservatism on the one hand, and the convenience of Muslim minorities, on the other hand, provides an understanding that identity politics in the city of Medan looks very conducive. The tension of identity politics does not lead to the awareness of militants who demand their presence massively in all lines of the public sphere. In the dominance of Islamist mainstream, there is still room to allow Muslim minorities to express their identity. The conducive contestation seems to be proceeding towards forming a hybrid identity. There are multiple negotiations from the intersection of majority and minority Muslims: on the one hand, they remain firm with their fundamental identity, on the other hand, they cannot avoid paradigmatic debates about religious concepts and their relationship with nationality

which provides new inspiration for each to blend both according to their internal context. The attempt to present identity for Muslim minorities, in the context of Medan, in the words of Homi Bhaba, is an attempt to negotiate identity continuously in a dynamic public sphere to find more relevant transformations (Bhaba 2004, 3).

### **MARGINALIZED PROGRESSIVE ULAMA**

The dynamism of the ulama nationality in Medan is not only concerned with the contestation between majority/mainstream and minority Muslims but also related to the tendency of marginalized progressive ualmas. As mentioned in the quantitative data above, of the 30 ulama surveyed only two were declared as progressive ulama. The data illustrates that progressive trends in Medan remain, but do not have significant strength in shaping religious and national tendencies in their Muslim communities. In the interviews conducted, it appears that the marginalization of progressive ulama in the contestation of the formation of religious narratives is a result of the relationship between minority problems and religious political patronage problems. Ustaz Marjuki, in fact, is a young ulama who feels that he has been marginalized slowly because of differences in political choice and, thus, political patronage. Its progressive Islam is considered not to have the spirit of fighting for Islam in the form of narratives that are and built by mainstream ulama. In an interview, he even rejected the formalization of Islam as the long-term ideals of the reservative agenda of the majority of ulama. Related understood to the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, he even said that the acceptance of non-Muslims, "if possible, it should be as large and broad as possible, there should not be any restrictions. It means that the rights and obligations of citizens must be the same."<sup>26</sup>

In the Medan context which is dominated by national narratives that tend to be Islamists, progressive ulama tend to emerge from minorities. Minorities are not only portrayed in political patronage, but also in theological patronage. Maulana Mundir is an illustration of how theological patronage is the main cause of the marginalized ulama who has a progressive character. As a preacher who spreads Ahmadiyah understanding, he can only be accepted by the Ahmadiyah Jama'at congregation. His belief in the coming of Imam Al-Mahdi, which will bring world justice, does not conflict with the basic principles of

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<sup>26</sup> Interviews took place on 11 October 2018, at the home of Ustaz Marjuki, in Medan.

national narratives which include pro-system, democracy, tolerance, and citizenship.

Maulana Mundir believes that even though Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who is considered as Imam al-Mahdi, left the caliph who carried out his da'wah, it does not mean that there is a political leadership aimed at replacing the territorial state system. The leadership of the al-Mahdi in his view is spiritual and impractical. Maulana Mundir said the following statement.

“In the beginning, I once asked how the position of the Caliph in the Ahmadiyah was? Is it different or not from the concept of khilafat or NII's political mission? It was answered by Pak Mubalig at that time that the Caliph in the Ahmadiyya was only a spiritual teacher. So, no territorial area is needed. So, the obedience of Ahmadis to the Caliph is only limited to the obedience that is spiritual. And there will be no order from the Caliph to replace the system of government where there is an Ahmadiyya congregation. There will never be a command like that.”<sup>27</sup>

With the understanding of the leadership of the Ahmadiyah as spiritual leadership, the Ahmadiyah in the view of Maulana Mundir, will fully support Pancasila along with its derivative values.

The totality of Muslim minority alignments towards progressive national narratives is certainly not without reason. Because as a minority, they need support from the state to provide a secure space for citizenship — specially to carry out their religious rituals. Because they are different from the majority group, they really need the state to guarantee citizenship rights (Geri 2018) so that they can receive security as citizens.

From this starting point, minorities really need the presence of the state in providing safe conditions. This expectation of citizenship, in turn, makes minority communities assimilate and be accommodative towards national principles. Although this principle applies in general, the Medan context affirms its truth in the case of Muslim minorities (read: Ahmadiyah Muslims and Shiite Muslims). As a minority, most Muslims is a “threat” that can persecute them. Therefore, only countries that can or should be able to give equal citizenship rights when the majority are considered to fail in giving tolerance to them.

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27 The interview was conducted on October 14, 2018, at the home of Maulana Mundir, in Medan.

In the case of Medan, the assimilation and accommodation of Muslim minorities to the principle of nationality are very strong because the acceptance or rejection of the majority clerics in Medan about their existence is not based on nationalism. In the case of the Ahmadiyah ulama, outlooks towards them were based more on theological views and outlooks. The mainstream ulama gave an assessment of the theological views of the Ahmadiyah based on the MUI fatwa stating that the Ahmadiyah sect was heretical. The fatwa is also the basis for the evaluation of ulama who are members of the FKUB without ever re-tracking the data used by the MUI to determine the fatwa. This is inseparable from the fact that FKUB ulama are people recommended by the MUI to foster religious harmony.

The reluctance of mainstream ulama in general, and especially FKUB ulama, to track the required data is also the main reason they do not see the classification mentioned by MUI in the fatwa. In its fatwa, the MUI stated that the Ahmadiyah group which was deemed heretical was an Ahmadiyah who was in the Qadyan region, moreover, the MUI did not issue a fatwa about it.<sup>28</sup>

The negative theological stigma experienced by Ahmadiyah is the main factor that causes its view of progressive national narratives to find no good response from mainstream ulama. From this theological problem, the progression of minority ulama became invisible and became meaningless to the majority ulama. For the latter, theology is the most important principle so that theological differences are a fundamental cause for ignoring other aspects — including among them the progressive view of the nation-state concept.

The theological views that make marginalized minority ulama out of public religious participation depart from a closed conceptual view. The young Ulama with the initials AMT affirms this tendency that, “when we talk about the reality that Muslims are not only in *fikih* (jurisprudence) but also in the school of faith. Now try to find just one school that does not mislead the group outside of its own faith.”<sup>29</sup>

He thinks that theology is naturally isolated so that by affirming one of the existing theological schools, it will naturally blame the others to the extent of misleading them. This is not exactly the view of the theological imams of the Ash'ariah school. The founder of the Ash'ariah school of

28 See: <https://e-dokumen.kemenag.go.id/files/fmpbnNCJ1286170246.pdf>, accessed on December 2, 2018.

29 Interview with Ustaz Ahmad Mustofa at his residence in Medan, on October 14, 2018



Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d. 936 AD) and subsequent Ash'arian theologians such as Imam al-Juwaini (d. 1085 AD), and Imam al-Razi (w. 1210 AD), for example, even accepted all Islam (read: Ahl al-Qiblah) and did not forgive them - despite different schools and theological views (al-Subki 1964). The collective marginalization of the majority ulama towards minority ulama is, therefore, an attempt to appropriate the Ash'ariah theological concepts which they hold in accordance with their political and social conditions in Medan. This condition is manifested through their political patronage in the public sphere.

The same thing applies to minority ulama from Syiah. The pattern used to marginalize the Syiah minority is like the pattern used to marginalize the Ahmadiyah. Both use the MUI fatwa as a perspective starting point and normalize misdirection through FKUB by not providing space for expression and space for participation. This parallelization is also supported by a certain understanding of mainstream ulama against Syiah in Indonesia. One member of the MUI said that Aslamah stated, "The Syiah that we witness (in Indonesia) is a political Syiah. And these are the facts."<sup>30</sup>

"This political Syiah is a political vehicle whose interests are driven by many isms in it. There are liberals, even Jews. So, this political Syiah is the formation of groups which in their hearts have an effort to fulfill the religion of Islam. Because there are non-Muslims as well, even atheists also exist. So, Syiah as a political movement is to control an area or a country. And whoever disagrees, will be exterminated. This is very dangerous."<sup>31</sup>

The perception of Syiah as a dangerous political movement is certainly not in accordance with the assertion of Ustadz Candra, who is the leader of Shia scholars in Medan. He compared the views of the Syiah group with the Khilafah bearer group as follows.

"These Shia groups are groups that strongly support the government in such a way. Meanwhile, they are anti-government with the concept of Khilafah and we are not. For us, The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is incontestable, right? We are everywhere voicing loudly to reject Khilafah. I myself in many conversations

30 Interview with Ustadz Aslamah at his residence in Medan, on October 13, 2018

31 Interview with Ustadz Aslamah at his residence in Medan, on October 13, 2018

and always reject the Caliphate. So, for them, maybe we are their opponents - whether from an academic context or a religious movement. Therefore, their targets are the government, or state apparatus and groups that they consider are against them. "<sup>32</sup>

From these two contradictory arguments, it appears that there is a kind of discursive contestation between mainstream ulama and Syiah ulama as minority ulama. In the constellation of scholars in Medan, the Syiah were not given the opportunity to be involved in religious participation in the public sphere as they were also not given the opportunity to explain their views. The view was presented by the majority ulama in accordance with their narrative about Syiah without having to ask for confirmation and clarification to the Syiah community. Discrimination of minorities in the context of Medan is a systematic, institutionalized, and massive marginalization effort so that the Syiah is not only ideological opponents but also a problem in citizenship in Medan's public sphere. Institutionalization of discursive about Syiah is a political strategy to justify the argument.

However, on the other hand, the plural Medan primordial culture is a condition that makes discursive contestation not necessarily dominated by the narrative of the majority ulama. In the discursive attack of the majority ulama, Ustadz Candra stated that the Syiah still found a discursive space to disseminate the concept of Syiah - even it is only in an internal context. Meanwhile, in the public sphere, Syiah groups still enjoy the dynamics of normal citizenship as most Muslim rights. In other words, the parallelization of the majority of the ulama against minority ulama whose point of departure is theologically and politically responded by a plural primordial culture that still leaves discursive space and public sphere for minorities who become religious and social Islamic agencies. Furthermore, primordial culture in Medan has further provided a discursive space for the Syiah to provide narrative participation in nationalism and Indonesian nationalism.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the national narrative conceptualized by ulama in the city of Medan involves dynamic contestation. Ulama with a variety of categories has varied religious perceptions so that they ultimately

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32 Interview with Ustazah C at his residence in Medan, on October 12, 2018

influence their views on national narratives. Political patronage plays a very important role in shaping religious tendencies. Without a deeply rooted Islamic tradition, religious tendencies are strongly influenced by national and local political issues. As a result, there is a tendency for Islamism to strengthen in Medan as a result of the recent strengthening of Islamism in Indonesia. Islamic public sphere experienced a symbolic Islamic nuance. Religious assemblies are the arena of how identity political trends are elaborated and voiced.

The strengthening of Islamism influences the formation of national narratives among ulama. They conduct national negotiations to incorporate Islamic values more prominently and symbolically. Islamism even provided space for mainstream ulama to carry out Islamization of Pancasila to form a more Islamic Republic of Indonesia. Populist Islamism in Medan forms a discursive authority to include those who are considered true ulama and ulama who will threaten the integrity of The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) which in fact are minority ulama who are theologically different. On the other hand, minority ulama expressed their support for the Republic of Indonesia as the final form of nationality. The national narrative is a hallowed contestation space in shaping Islamic political narratives.

From another perspective, nationality is the stage of narrative contestation to gain religious authority. That is, how nationality is narrated by the ulama to influence the congregation in religious assemblies. Nationality becomes a struggle for narration and authority at the same time. The experience of ulama in Medan in narrating nationalism means that since the fall of the New Order, especially since 2005, there have been symptoms of strengthening conservative Islamism in Indonesia, this phenomenon undergoes a dynamic transformation. In the experience of Medan Muslims, the strong conservatism has found a paradoxical and relatively conducive presence that has slowly shifted towards a more moderate direction. Martin van Bruinessen even revised his thesis that Indonesia experienced an increasingly conservative tendency. The dynamics of Islam in the experience of ulama in Medan shows a more accommodating shift in Islamism even though it is accompanied by Islamic reservations. Of course, this accommodative shift is in turn very conditioned by democratic political space, increasing economics, and the success of ulama to understand and conduct the ways of Islam in a relevant and proportionate manner.

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# GURUTTA AND RELIGIOUS OTORITY CONTESTATION IN MAKASSAR

*Muhrisun Afandi*

Some studies underline that the narrative of Islamism has historically been strongly developed in the communities of Makassar and South Sulawesi in general. Makassar is known in history as one of the centers of the hardline Islamic movement in Indonesia since the Old Order with the emergence of the Darul Islam Kahar Mudzakkar (DI-TII) movement. DI / TII historical record reinforces the perception that Makassar is one of the cities in Indonesia that has strong roots in the tradition of Islamism.

People are very worried about the growth of Islamism since Makassar's geographical proximity with several regions is often indicated as centers of terrorism, such as Poso and Ambon. Some cases of religious radicalism that took place in Makassar itself show that the development of the tradition of Islamism in this region is not solely due to the influence of similar movements at the national level, but rather an expression of the dynamics of Islamism at the local level. Therefore, the suspicion that the tradition of hardline Islamism continues to resonate in this region is difficult to avoid, where the acceptance of Muslim communities in this region against the concept of the nation-state (NKRI) is not questioned. One of the important things that became the focus of the questions in this study was the mapping of perceptions and views of the ulama (*gurutta*) from various backgrounds of social, political, and religious affiliation in Makassar about the format of nation-states, along with the basic concepts that supported them. Furthermore, this study intends to map the position of the members in the context of the contestation of religious authorities in Makassar to further analyze the social resilience of the ulama in Makassar against the threat of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism that threatens the nation's future.

The strengthening of the Islamist movement in Indonesia itself, especially in recent years, is inseparable from the global geopolitical context, where the emergence of right-wing groups has become a global phenomenon that occurs in almost all countries. The phenomenon of Islamophobia, especially in Western countries, has indirectly opened opportunities for Islamist groups to exploit the religious sentiments of the Muslim community in Indonesia so that they support the ideology they are carrying out. By portraying themselves as fighters for the defense of Islam, Islamist groups in Indonesia easily gain sympathy from the public. Several studies have shown that the strong influence of the ideological Islamic movement does not only occur among ordinary people but allegedly has occurred among Islamic leaders who in turn will have a significant impact on the development of Indonesia's political conditions in the future.

As explained earlier, this paper is part of national research that aims to map the perceptions and views of ulama from various backgrounds of social, political, and religious affiliation about the format of nation-states, along with the basic concepts that support them. The diversity of sample locations in this study nationally (15 cities) is expected to map not only the perceptions and views of ulama regarding nation-states on a national scale but also illustrate the dynamics of locality in various regions in Indonesia. One of the questions that are the focus of this study relates to the extent to which the ulama's perceptions and views are in harmony with the idea of the relationship between religion and the state as formulated in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

As in other cities, research in Makassar was carried out with a combination of surveys and interviews. Group-based surveys were conducted involving 30 respondents consisting of Islamic ulama and religious leaders from various backgrounds, social affiliation, politics, and religious organizations in Makassar, such as the MUI, mainstream organizations (such as NU and Muhammadiyah), scholars based on pesantren, ulama affiliated with universities, ulama from minority groups (such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah), scholars from Salafi and Tarbawi groups, as well as scholars from other groups. In-depth interviews (in-depth interviews) are carried out to explore the results of the survey and explore further data related to things that have not been answered in the survey. Interviews were conducted between 13 to 23 October 2018 involving 12 key informants consisting of nine male ulama and three female ulama.

So far, the findings of previous studies related to the narrative of Islamism in Makassar, including the results of the BNPT study in

South Sulawesi, show that the culture of extremism and terrorism is not seriously developing in Makassar, where the Islamist movement in this region is believed to only grow to the level of militancy and radicalism. It is actually confirmed by the results of the quantitative survey of this study, of which all samples of Makassar ulama (30 people) who participated in this research survey<sup>1</sup> nearly 70 percent or 20 of them were in the progressive, inclusive and moderate spectrum, two ulama with conservative views, three people with exclusive views, and two people identified as having radical views, while the views of three other ulama were not identified. The survey results show that none of the ulama in Makassar who participated in this study were identified as having extreme views. However, the interview data shows slightly different results from the survey data, in which there are variations in findings related to the characteristics and views of more diverse ulama who were not identified in the survey results.

#### **NARRATIVES OF ISLAMISM: HISTORICAL RECORDS OR REAL THREATS IN MAKASSAR?**

Unlike the Islamic characteristic in Java, for example, the spread of Islam in Sulawesi is dominated by the legalistic character of Islam that does not accommodate the diversity of religious views (Ali 2011, 28). The Islamism movement in the context of South Sulawesi itself can be identified in several patterns. First, the pattern of the aristocratic elite who succeeded in Islamizing the kings of South Sulawesi, as was done by Sheikh Yusuf, in which efforts to Islamize the kingdom became a strategic step in spreading Islam more widely in the community. Second, the pattern of Kahar Muzakkar who carried out the movement of Islamism by means of rebellion against the government. Third, the pattern of the Islamic Syaria Enforcement Preparation Committee (KPPSI) that uses structural channels to implement Islamic law (Ali 2011).

Concerns about the strengthening of the Islamist movement in South Sulawesi itself have long been a concern of various groups, including the regional government. In 2002, for example, the Government of South Sulawesi Province held a poll on the implementation of Islamic Law in this region. The poll was conducted by a team formed by the provincial government, namely the Concept Study Team for the Implementation of

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<sup>1</sup> The characteristics of the ulama used in the survey are 7 (seven), among others: progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme. For more details, see the introduction in this book.



Islamic Law in South Sulawesi (PKPSI Sulsel) involving respondents from various groups, including 24 regents, 60 Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) members, 81 religious leaders, and 60 community leaders. The results of the poll at the time showed that most of the people (91.11%) agreed to the discourse on the application of Islamic Syariah in South Sulawesi, even though they differed in their opinion regarding the format and form of implementation of Islamic Syariah itself. The results of the polls showed that 59 percent of the people wanted the structural application of Islamic Syariah through legislation, 32 percent agreed to the implementation of Islamic Syariah culturally without having to go through the establishment of legislation, while the other nine percent did not provide firmness (Juhanis 2006; Mujiburrahman 2013).

However, the findings of studies related to Islamism in South Sulawesi tend to present positive results, in which it is believed that the Islamist movement that developed on a national scale in Indonesia did not have a significant impact on the formation of a similar movement in South Sulawesi. Some studies have even concluded that the pattern of movements that developed in South Sulawesi tended to be in the form of post-Islamism which was more inclined to an accommodative pattern of the government system. There is no indication of a problem related to the acceptance of Muslim communities in South Sulawesi towards the concept of nations (Karim 2011). The BNPT study itself does not show data that the actions of extremism or terrorism developed in Makassar. The Islamism movement in Makassar is believed to only develop to the level of militancy and radicalism (Hidayah 2013).

A high level of optimism regarding nationalism of Muslim communities in South Sulawesi, especially Makassar, was also shown by several scholars who participated in this study. As explained above, the survey results do not indicate an outlook of refusal of ulama to the concept of nation-states, in which 70% of ulama are in a progressive, inclusive, and moderate spectrum. In this case, many ulama even convey a priori outlook that this research will produce findings that are different from previous studies. Most of them were convinced that there was no problem regarding the acceptance of the Makassar clerics against the concept of the nation-state. Some of these a priori outlooks can be seen from the statements of several ulama from influential organizations in Makassar as follows.

“If the focus of this research is on ulama, then in Makassar this is the context of Gurutta. I am sure that none of the Gurutta in Makassar rejected the Pancasila. Therefore, they certainly have no problem if asked about their acceptance of the nation-state concept. “

“... Before this research was completed, I thought I could conclude what the Makassar ulama’s answer was about the nation-state. They certainly accept and don’t have problems. I guarantee it. “

However, some recent research shows data that is different from the previous one. The BNPT research related to radicalism in universities, for example, clearly shows that universities are alleged to be one of the most strategic new arenas for the development of the Islamism movement organized through halaqah activities, discussions, and other related student activities. The BNPT indicated that all state campuses in Java and Sulawesi were exposed to religious-based radicalism, although with varying degrees. This BNPT claim is supported by the results of the BIN survey of 20 universities in 15 provinces during 2017, which stated that 39 percent of students in the 20 universities rejected Pancasila and anti-democracy (Tempo, June 3, 2018: 43-4).

In the case of Makassar, further coverage of Tempo Magazine shows clearly that on the campuses of state universities in Makassar, such as UIN Alauddin, activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) no longer use hidden patterns of UKM activities to spread their teachings. HTI studies have been conducted with an open forum format with HTI speakers brought to campus. The discourse of rejecting Pancasila was delivered openly in forums facilitated by the campus. Although the campus management claimed not to know about the existence of the HTI forums, some students admitted that it was precisely their lecturers who introduced and invited them to join HTI studies on the campus of UIN Alauddin. These discussion forums diminished after the dissolution of HTI, where the spread of HTI teachings has now returned to its initial format through limited and clandestine methods (Tempo, 3 June 2018: 42-3).

The influence and relevance of the development of the Islamist movement in Makassar, and Indonesia in general, with global movements and organizations, have been alluded to by previous studies. The emergence of various organizations such as Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and the like is one proof

of the strong linkages between the movements of Islamism in Indonesia and similar movements that occur in parts of the world (Gunaratna 2002; Mujani 2007).

Some experts view that compared to other Muslim countries in the world, the emergence of the Islamist movement in Indonesia is arguably late (Elson 2010, 328). However, some other experts witnessed the delay in the emergence of the Islamist movement in Indonesian political circles showed more marginalization and strong pressure on this movement in the history of politics in Indonesia (Formichi 2010). The roots of the Islamism movement are clearly visible in Indonesian history from the era before independence to the present with different variations in scale and influence. The Islamism movement found its momentum post-Reformation, in which the democratic system had opened wide opportunities for the emergence of Islamic political power, as seen in the emergence of various Islamic parties only within a few months after the reform began.

The Islamic group which reiterated the Jakarta Charter and the formalization of Islamic Syariah had a stronger influence with the emergence of hardline groups, such as the Majelis Mujahidin, Hizb ut-Tahrir, KPPSI, and the like. Although the struggle of Islamic political power to include the Jakarta Charter in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution at the 2002 People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Session failed, the Islamic movement did not seem to recede.

#### **GRAY AREAS IN CATEGORIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MAKASSAR ULAMA**

Among the important things from the findings of this study, especially the qualitative data from the interview, is the fact that on the one hand, this study confirms some of the previous research findings regarding scholars and their perceptions of nation-states. However, on the other hand, the results of this study also refute some of the results of previous studies and theories that have generally developed about the characteristics of ulama, views, and political outlooks.

In general, research related to the characteristics of ulama tends to classify ulama in binary categories which simplistically tend to contrast one category of ulama with other categories. So is the case with the research that uses the category of ulama such as progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme ulama. The results of the interview show that efforts to categorize ulama in Makassar

in seven categories are difficult to do, and even tend to be trapped in labeling errors because the category of ulama described does not reflect the views of actual ulama.

Furthermore, this study shows that the ulama category should not be understood as a static character label like boxes that can clearly separate groups of ulama from one group to another. In reality, the ulama's views tend to be fluid, where ulama in one category in certain cases can have a view that is contrary to the views of other ulama in the same category. Ulama W (male), for example, in which the response to the survey variable of this study shows that he is in the category of progressive or inclusive ulama, there is no indication that he is radical or extreme. However, his view of jihad, for example, shows that he has a view that tends to be extreme.

“... that *rohmatan lil alamin* Islam (Islam is a religion of Blessing) is certain. But do not interpret it as an excuse that we are weak without resistance. The Prophet ordered us to fight too, don't forget that. The current condition is no longer appropriate if we only lecture *mauidhotul hasanah* (good message). It must be forced, Islamic law must be forced. If you are asked to be offered, no one will implement it. Must be forced, those who oppose must be fought ... “

The same thing was conveyed by ulama B (male), even though he was affiliated with mainstream Islamic organizations and had a fairly open view of the principle of tolerance among religious believers, but in other religious aspects, his perspective tended to be under the radical and even extreme spectrum. Regarding *jinayat* law, for example, he is inclined towards a strict stance on criminal law in force in Indonesia today.

“In the concept of the highest state of the essence and its weight is the law of God, whether it concerns civil or criminal. As the law of theft does not need to be interpreted again, cutting off one's hands means cutting one's hands. The effect of the snare is clearly going to be very high ... And it can enter our system through the first principle of Pancasila. The inheritance law must also be the same (it does not need to be interpreted again) it must be carried out according to the provisions in the Quran. “

**RECEIVING DEMOCRACY WITH HALF A HEART**

Rejection of democracy and the system of the nation-state itself cannot be seen solely from expressions and movements which blatantly blaspheme and reject democracy in the public sphere (Hilmy 2015, 441). The strength of the democratic system in Indonesia and the broad acceptance of the people of the nation-state system make the movement of individuals and groups who reject the democratic system very narrow. Even though the discourse related to alternative systems besides democracy, including the Khilafah system, is suspected to continue to be fought by certain groups, but until now the discourse of rejecting democracy campaign in this country is not popular enough.

Furthermore, some cases show that rejecting a democratic system can be interpreted as an attempt to commit suicide because it will bring individuals to the state's enemy status. The case of the dissolution of HTI, for example, is an example that the campaign blatantly rejects the democratic system is a counterproductive step for a movement in Indonesia. Therefore, many groups substantially have an anti-system platform, but in the public sphere they actively use democratic arguments, solely as tactics to gain sympathy and public support or as an attempt to circumvent accusations as enemies of the state (Hilmy 2015, 414).

In general, the views of Makassar ulama regarding democracy and nation-states do not indicate a rejection of the existing system. Most of them are even actively involved in efforts to uphold the democratic system in society. Ulama G (male), for example, where his involvement in the MUI activities seemed to really color his views, expressed the following statement.

“... What is more real is our national state. What we have to guard is the national state with all its diversity, so that there are two things that I underline, namely becoming good citizens and at the same time becoming good religious people. And we can synergize at the same time in the context of the national state that we have in Indonesia today ... Those who feel that they are not accommodated it's because of the euphoria of the past. They are trapped in the past's utopia, that we once had a Khilafah and then were sad because it was lost. But if we look at history, which is the most ideal from the post-Prophet Muhammad? Ottoman is not an Islamic state either, there is Safawi, and other small

countries. So, it's very utopian if dreams have one caliphate for Indonesia and the world. The system should be made so that there is synergy among systems. The system can be different but, in each country, it does not have to be contradicted by the variations. And I think the nation-state system in Indonesia today is the most realistic one."

Although survey data and interview results indicate that there are no ulama in Makassar from all categories that openly reject Pancasila, both as the basis of the state and the democratic government system, the results of the interviews indicate that there are indications of ambiguity in the understanding of several ulama regarding the democratic system. Although ulama clearly state that they accept a democratic system, for example they define democracy differently from what is understood in the constitution.

Ulama S (male), for example, despite his response to survey questions and interviews, confirms that he belongs to the pro-system category of ulama, but some of his statements show the opposite.

"There is no problem with democracy, (democracy) is Islamic, there is nothing that contradicts with the Islamic values ... but the democracy that we carry out in our (state) today is not a true democracy. This democracy has tyrannized Muslims. Unfortunately, there is no awareness of the people (of Islam) to fight, they are all are silent. Those who try to fight are actually hostile."

In line with ulama S, a similar statement was also raised by ulama H (male) who emphasized his rejection of the nation-state system and democracy, although his response to the survey did not indicate he was in the category of rejecting the system.

"So, if the Islamic state system is clear and standard. You cannot ask whether you agree or not. Just like sholat it must not be discussed because everything is clear. If you disagree with the system (the Islamic state system) it means you disagree with sholat, which means you are a polytheist ... The format of the country refers to what the Prophet exemplified. Our secularization has gone too far... The size and dosage of zakat may be discussed because of the different contexts, but there is no discussion that zakat is obligatory or not, because it is definite. "

This is even seen from the statement of the ulama from Islamic organizations which had been categorized as part of a support group of democracy, as stated by ulama R (male) who was also active in the MUI.

“In theory, the concept of Khilafah is valid, right? There is nothing wrong with it because the chapter and verse are in the Holy Koran. But for now, because of strong resistance, I am more inclined to the ideals of upholding Islamic Law. Upholding Islamic law is the same as Khilafah. We don't have to use the term Khilafah because there might be a large portion of rejection. “

The responses of several other ulama indicate a form of fragmentation in their acceptance of a democratic system, where they accept the system in certain aspects but they reject other aspects of the existing system. Others accept the system conditionally. Some of the ulama's responses even indicated that they were in fact substantially anti-system, but they accepted it solely because there was no possibility of refusing. The fact that democracy is the only system that is accepted makes the discourse offer another system, including Khilafah, it is illogical to be offered at the national level. The political system that developed in Indonesia today makes the discourse of rejecting democracy not getting much support from the public. In some cases, rejecting democracy can be interpreted as a suicide attempt that is counterproductive for campaigning.

In this case, the antisystem understanding of some ulama is more of a hidden agenda, where the possibility of resonance is determined by the presence or absence of the opportunity to articulate it in the future.

#### **SHIFT FROM NATIONAL TO LOCAL**

Interview data show that there are strong indications that counterterrorism campaigns and counters in Indonesia in recent years have had a significant impact on changes in the views of the people of Makassar, including ulama, regarding Islam and the nation-state. In general, regardless of the character of their political views and thoughts, the ulama in Makassar expressed their disappointment in the democratic regime which did not provide enough space for Muslims as the majority group in this country to freely articulate their various interests. However, the discourse of rejection of democracy and the system of government, as explained above, does not clearly emerge. The dissolution of HTI, for example, was referred to by several scholars as a justification that the Khilafah discourse had no prospects to be offered in this country.

However, this does not mean that the Khilafah discourse and changes in state form are completely perish. The discourse is still developing in Makassar with different formats and tones. The response of some ulama shows that they refrain from the discourse on Khilafah more because of their despair because discussions about changes in the shape of the state and its kind have reached a dead end. Ulama S (male), for example, states the following.

“... What is wrong with Khilafah? Is it against the rules of the Holy Koran if I speak about Khilafah. It is stated in the Holy Koran ... The problem is that people are already negatively affected by the words of Khilafah “

The difficulty of developing the discourse of formalizing the system of Islamic government at the national level makes pro-Khilafah ulama seem to take the momentum of strengthening the issue of regional autonomy as momentum to influence the political and governmental system at the local level through the implementation of Syariah regulations. It can be seen in the response of the Makassar ulama, where they rejected the idea of the Darul Islam which openly tried to uphold Islamic law through separation from the state by establishing an Islamic State. In this case, they are no longer interested in the discourse on the Khilafah system at the national level. However, some ulama who became informants in this study supported the Islamic Syariah Enforcement Preparation Committee (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi. Ulama S (male), for example, who openly supported the KPPSI and the application of Syariah Perda, but he refused to be associated with the Darul Islam movement and the like.

“... KPPSI is different from DI-TII. People misunderstood the KPPSI because his son Kahar Mudzakkar was part of it. We don't reject Pancasila or NKRI. We encourage the application of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. What is wrong with it? If Muslims want to implement Islamic law, why is it wrong? “

Therefore, it is understandable if the magnitude of support for the KPPSI raises increasingly strong concerns that the prospect of the emergence of the Islamism movement in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general, needs to be watched out (Mujiburrahman 2013). The success of KPPSI in promoting Islamism in Makassar itself can be seen from the success of the establishment of several Syariah Regional Regulations, such as the City Regulation No.2 / 2003 concerning Professional, Infaq, and



Sadaqah Zakat, Makassar City Regulation No. 5/2006 concerning Zakat and other related local regulations. It confirms that the strengthening of the Islamist movement in Makassar is truly obvious.

Data from the interviews show that the dream of making South Sulawesi as the Medina Veranda still resonated not only among ordinary people but also among ulama. However, the statements of some ulama suggest that they are aware that these ideals require collective work by involving various elements of society. Ulama H (male), for example, expressed his following suggestion.

“South Sulawesi is indeed the Medina’s porch, it is also recognized by the government. It is the vision of the general public here actually. But you really need to work hard to achieve it. The political situation sometimes does not support us to discuss it, especially during the current presidential election period. “

The leaders of KPPSI are also fully aware, in which they needed strong political support at both local and national levels in order to implement their political agenda. Therefore, pragmatic steps were taken by KPPSI leaders to obtain support. Aziz Kahar, for example, felt the need to emphasize that the KPPSI took a different path from his father, Kahar Muzakkar, who would not take the path of military force to implement Islamic Syariah in South Sulawesi (Mujiburrahman 2008).

These pragmatic steps were also taken by Islamist groups in almost all regions in Indonesia. As explained by Bush (2008) that the discourse on the implementation of Syariah in Indonesia itself is not always identical with Islamic parties or Islamist groups. Some studies underline that the reality of the strong discourse of Islamism among Indonesian Muslim communities has long been used as a political commodity to gain power. Caliphate discourse and the application of Islamic Shari’a are important issues used by political parties, including Islamic political parties, to fight for the voice of the Muslim community in Indonesia. Many politicians from the secular party carry the platform for implementing Islamic Sharia for various reasons. Some of them saw the discourse of Islamic Sharia implementation as strategic enough to attract supporters’ sympathies, while some of them discussed the implementation of Sharia-based regulations solely to divert people’s attention from several other issues, including corruption issues that involved them (Bush 2008, 187; Mujiburrahman 2013, 166).

## FROM FORMALIZATION TO SUBSTANCE

Some studies suggest that in the case of Indonesia Islamic radical groups tend not to choose the path of political parties to fight for their ideas and views, because of the perception that their involvement in political parties is the same as legitimizing the democratic system they are about (Hilmy 2010). In this case, they prefer social media channels, leaflets, halaqah, and other alternative approaches. For this reason, the radical group was not enthusiastic enough to participate in supporting the establishment of Syariah regulations and the like (Crouch 2009).

This pattern is not fully confirmed by the data of ulama perceptions in Makassar, where some ulama who are inclined towards anti-system views do not indicate their reluctance or refusal to fight through political parties and parliament. Some of them even viewed the struggle for ‘intra-parliamentary’ (Hilmy 2015) as the most strategic choice, as shown in the following excerpt from an interview with ulama S (male).

**Informant:** If people are still insistent on creating Khilafah or changing Pancasila and the Constitution, it means they are not smart. Just like HTI, who committed suicide and died, right? In the current political system, the social system that we see today is impossible to fight for the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia by replacing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD 45). Honestly, I want Islamic law to be applied in Indonesia. How about you, do you want Islamic law? But I will not join in a demonstration demand Pancasila to be replaced. It is not a clever move. But if there is a demonstration to replace the president, I will participate.

**Researcher :** But sorry in the contents of the survey yesterday, you said you agreed that Pancasila is the most appropriate ideology in Indonesia (questions No. 9 and 15).

**Informant :** Yes, because in my opinion Pancasila cannot be replaced at this time.

**Informant :** Pancasila is not the Holy Koran, so it can be replaced, right? But like I said earlier I don't see that replacing Pancasila is the smart idea for the moment.

**Researcher :** Then what do you think is the smart move to actualize the Islamic law?

**Informant :** Enter and control the House of Representatives (DPR) who makes the rules and regulations. The Pancasila can be translated to anything. If Soekarno can make Pancasila as part of communism, why can't Muslims make Pancasila as an Islamic law? “

However, despair over the failure of struggle through politics and parliament in the form of formalization of Islamic law made some groups choose alternative paths by avoiding friction with the political and state system. They believe that the Islamic state system will automatically be realized if the Muslim community has realized and agreed to want a system of Islamic national life. In this case, the persuasive way of 'Islamizing' in a manner that Muslim society is the most effective way to be taken, namely by influencing the thoughts and ideologies of each member of the community without having to rub against the political apparatus/state.

In this case, some ulama took other means in their efforts to discuss Islamic systems of government, namely by focusing more on the substantial aspects of the enforcement of Islamic law in society than the formalization of Islamic law through state instruments. Changes in Islamic character and lifestyle are more important in the framework of enforcing Islamic law than system changes.

"If Muslims live Islamically, are an enthusiast of Islam, want to fight for Islam, then automatically Islamic Syariah will be established in South Sulawesi. It's useless to insist on making a Syariah law if the community lives far from the values and teachings of Islam."

Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) is one of the organizations in Makassar that seems to have chosen this alternative route. Allegations that have hit this organization as part of the ISIS network have made this group to carefully carry out their missionary movements by avoiding friction with the political apparatus.

"Wahdah Islamiyah actually teaches a very narrow Wahabi view. They think those who are different from them are considered infidel. Then takfir emerged and flourished ... Wahdah [Islamiyah] was indicated as part of having a relationship with the terrorist network. Metro TV broadcasts, for example, clearly link Wahdah Islamiyah with terrorist networks ... We do *tabayun*, we give them the right to answer ... "

Although the WI did not seem to involve themselves in political discussions in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general, the political influence of this movement seemed very real, in which the militancy

of followers and sympathizers of WI was seen in almost all levels of society. WI chooses preaching and education in the society which indirectly become a forum for the regeneration of their movements in the community. Although this step of *da'wah* taken by WI cannot be automatically concluded as a form of 'democracy trap' (Fuller 1992), the indication towards that direction is quite strong.

Institutionally, WI does not have a program or policy related to efforts to formalize Islamic law in South Sulawesi. However, the involvement of WI figures and members in KPPSI indicates that the agenda towards the formalization of Islamic syariah is quite strong in this organization (Tajuddin 2013, 221). It does not rule out the possibility that in the end when the foundation of Islamism is strong, they can seize power easily because, in the current democratic context, state policy follows more the aspirations or desires of the majority of the public.

In this case, WI uses the opportunities opened by the democratic system to spread the ideology of Islamism that they are carrying out. The attempt to seize the influence of religious references in Makassar society is a serious step seen in the WI movement. The influence WI *da'wah* is widely spread through various media both print and online. WI *da'wah* cadres are also actively assigned to the field through forums at schools, campuses, and other forums (Tajuddin 2013). The influence of WI *da'wah* references is felt, especially among young age groups, as indicated by one of the following young ulama A (male).

"... The influence of the teachings of Wahdah [Islamiyah] and the like is very evident among teenagers especially. They usually look for information on the internet and the media that great ulama cannot provide. They would browse without any control and have no idea whether it is Wahdah media or not."

#### ***ANTAGONIST BRANDING BECOMES THE PROTAGONIST***

As explained above, there are indications that the difficulty of rejecting the strong connotation between the Islamist movement in Makassar and the terrorist network has made ulama supporters of radicalism feel the need to take a more productive alternative way to express their ideas in the public sphere. Some ulama expressed their objections to being labeled as a radical and exclusive group, although they openly expressed their discriminative outlook towards other groups, especially minority groups.

Some ulama openly denounce their discriminatory outlooks towards

minority groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim. However, they realize that labeling as a radical organization cannot be avoided, where it tends to harm their understanding and movements. Therefore, they realize the need to re-branding their understanding and organizational image to avoid a bad stigma. Ulama S (male) who is often categorized as part of radical groups is aware of this.

“We need to eliminate the notion of people that we are radical and discriminatory. What we are doing is a form of real *ijtihad* defending Islam from unaware attacks coming from several areas. We have been labeled as a bad person, as a troublemaker and other labels, but eventually, people understand, we explain that we are the ones who defend Islam with substantive action.”

On the other hand, the fear of labeling as a public or state enemy because it rejects the system encourages certain groups to construct their anti-system and violent campaigns with a more refined approach. The general patterns used include efforts to identify human rights with America, Israel, and other Western countries that are hostile to Islam, expose discrimination against Muslim minorities in various countries, or attempt to associate democracy with morality issues such as free sex, liquor, and drugs, etc. (Hilmy 2015, 414).

#### **SHIFTING THE ROLE AND ACCESS OF FEMALE ULAMA**

Unlike the results of this study in several other cities, in the Makassar context, the issue of gender equality in the context of social and political life did not appear as a significant issue to be discussed. The data from the survey and interviews have no indication of discriminatory outlooks among ulama regarding the role of women in the social and political realm. The discourse of the rejection of women's leadership is not a central issue. However, it becomes interesting to discuss because indications of rejection of the role of women appear in the context of their participation in religious life in the community, more specifically their role as leaders in religious activities in the community. The interview data illustrates the emergence of new, more rigid constraints on women's access and role as ulama or religious leaders in the Makassar community.

Of the three female informants in this study, all saw the issue of restricting access and the role of female ulama to be taken seriously. Although this issue has not yet reached a worrying level, there is the

potential for this issue to escalate, as stated by the ulama Z (female) as follows.

“It is increasingly difficult for women to lecture in mosques and public Islamic studies. Many mosques whose takmir are now dominated by XX people ... I am a regular speaker at a provincial mosque, I have been a woman in a mosque for years, there has never been a problem ... Now it has become a problem because I am a woman and the worshipers consist of men and women. I think there should be an effort so that the prohibition from women does not come into force, but we don't know what Makassar looks like in the future. “

The same thing was also conveyed by ulama D (female).

“... I have regular lectures in several mosques, recitation of actual mothers, but many of the gentlemen participated. I once lectured at a small mosque near my place, a routine of recitation of mothers. I was shocked when I was asked by the MC to go on stage and suddenly there was a takmir man who took the mic and told the committee to put a curtain behind me, because I had to lecture from behind the curtain. I said why should I use curtains? He said because there were men currently present and I was lecturing in an open place and not wearing a veil ... I was surprised that the mosque had been controlled by Wahdah now, the takmir. “

So far, there is not enough data that can explain the factors that led to the role of women as religious leaders in Makassar being more questionable than their roles in other fields, including their role in the political sphere. However, this condition implies that religious authority among the Makassar community is very important. Being a figure who has the authority and theological legitimacy can be more important than the position as a leader who only has political and territorial authority.

The term *gurutta* itself is not commonly given to female ulama in South Sulawesi, regardless of the capacity and competence of the female ulama. As far as the researchers have searched, there was only one female figure who was called as the *gurutta*, namely Sitti Aminah Adnan from the As'adiyah Pesantren. However, the status of *gurutta* was only recognized by her students, not by the wider community (Halim 2015, 235).

### **INTRA-RELIGIOUS AND INTERFAITH TOLERANCE**

In the Indonesian context, it is important to separate between values and principles of tolerance and liberal values (Menchik 2016). The fact that being a tolerant Muslim in Indonesia is not identical to the form of acceptance of liberal values. It has become a distinctive character for Muslims and Islamic organizations in Indonesia that the theological views they hold cannot determine their views and behavior regarding tolerance. They may be tolerant towards certain minority groups, but not with other groups, or they are tolerant in a certain context, but not in other contexts (Menchik 2016, 32).

Tolerance in this study is defined as limited in the context of religious tolerance, in which tolerance is defined simply as a form of outlooks and behavior in accepting differences in religion and belief in the context of social life. Tolerance itself emphasizes the form of acceptance of other beliefs, including differences in intra-religion understanding or between groups in a religious group (Woolf & Hulsizer 2002). Tolerance emphasizes the existence of a level (degree), in which a person arrives at a position to accept something that is fundamentally different from his belief or level in which someone understands and accepts that he is different from other parties without being trapped in evaluating and which attributes are better, his own beliefs or other people's beliefs (Walt 2014).

The tolerance outlook shown by most Makassar ulama is more inclined towards pragmatic tolerance, in which the outlook of accepting these differences is solely for the sake of maintaining stability (Menchik 2016, 130). In general, both survey data and interviews show a fairly high level of tolerance among Makassar ulama, both tolerance towards non-Islamic groups and Islamic groups who have different views. However, specifically regarding the existence of Syiah groups, there are generally negative views and outlooks among the Makassar ulama, regardless of the background of the religious organization and the characteristics of the thought of the ulama. Compared to other regions, there are indications that the rejection of Syiah groups in Makassar is stronger than in other regions. The existence of organizations that specifically reject the Syiah, such as the Laskar Pemburu Aliran Sesat (LPAS) or the Makassar Anti-Syiah National Alliance, shows that the rejection of this group is harder than the refusal of ulama to other minority groups such as the Ahmadiyah. The statement of ulama S (male) below describes the outlook mentioned.

“We only focus on Syiah because it is a massive international movement. It has already penetrated local colleges. Books and forums on Syiah are available, ... Some say Shia is like a frog, it always jumps, if it's not jumping it's because it's only observing the current situation. If they do not preach, it is only taqiyyah ... We strongly oppose Syiah because they consider friends to be infidels ... It is the opposite with Ahmadiyah, they do not open a Syiah-like front.”

Some ulama who belong to progressive and inclusive groups do not show their inclusive outlook when talking about Syiah, in which they are clearly discriminatory towards this group. However, data relating to this matter obtained from surveys and interviews is very limited so research is needed.

## CONCLUSION

In general, there is little difference in data regarding the perceptions and views of Makassar ulama regarding the format of nation-states between survey data and interview data for this study. The survey results show that none of the ulama in Makassar who participated in this study were identified as having anti-system views or rejecting the nation-state system. However, the interview data shows slightly different results, in which there are variations in findings regarding the characteristics and views of more diverse ulama who are not identified in the survey results.

The interview results indicate a form of fragmentation in the acceptance of ulama to the nation-state system, in which they accept the system in certain aspects, but they reject other aspects of the existing system, while others accept the conditional acceptance system. Some ulama even indicated in the interview that they were substantially anti-system, but they accepted the nation-state system and democracy simply because they did not see any possibility and opportunity to resist or fight. In other words, some ulama show an outlook of refraining from the discourse on different state systems, including the Caliphate, more due to their despair because they see that discussions about changes in the shape of the state and its kind have reached a dead end.

The difficulty of the development of the discourse on the formalization of the Islamic government system at the national level has made the pro-Khilafah ulama seem to take the momentum of strengthening the issue of regional autonomy by influencing the political and governmental systems at the local level through the implementation of Syariah regulations. The



dream of making South Sulawesi as the Serambi Madinah continued to resonate not only among ordinary people but also among ulama. Therefore, the magnitude of support for the KPPSI indirectly raises growing concern that the prospect of the emergence of the Islamist movement in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general, needs to be watched out for.

Discrimination issues arise among Makassar ulama not in non-Muslim minority groups, but in minority Islamic groups such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah. In this case, the data shows that discrimination against Syiah tends to be more violent when compared to the discrimination received by other minority Islamic groups. Related to gender issues, it is very interesting to discuss because indications of rejection of women's roles do not arise in the context of the role of women in the political sphere, as happened in other regions. Discrimination against women emerges in the context of their participation as religious leaders and figures. Restrictions began to be felt by several female ulama who participated in this study. The term Gurutta itself is not uncommon given to female ulama in Makassar.

The condition of the acceptance of ulama against the system of nation-states in Makassar further confirms that, the debate regarding the relationship between Islam (*din*) and the state (*daulah*) among the Muslim community in Indonesia is still unresolved. Dialectics related to the issue is constantly evolving and will never stop. The discourse that the Caliphate and Islamic Shariah are increasingly popular solutions along with the rise of criticism that the Western political system is seen as failing to offer prosperity in the socio-political order of Indonesia and the world in general.

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ULAMA IN MAINSTREAM  
ISLAMIC CITIES:  
Moderatism, Ethnonationalism, and  
Citizenship Problems



# ULAMA, NATION-STATE, AND ETHNONATIONALISM: The Banda Aceh Case

*Moch Nur Ichwan*

Nations are usually complex phenomena formed by factors of historical, cultural and language similarity. However, in the context of Indonesia, “nation” is an agreement that arises because of historical and political similarities (colonized), although it varies in ethnicity, culture, and language, to become the Indonesian nation. Then, the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) was born. Among the agreements is that Indonesia is not a secular state and not a religious state. However, the imagined community (Anderson 1983) or imagined this nation-state depends on the existing political, social, cultural, and economic dynamics. The process of being Indonesian also differs between one region and the other. Therefore, the dream of becoming the Indonesian nation was different between one region and another, even though Java tended to be hegemony. Aceh is kind of different. Aceh is not only a Muslim majority (98%), and has a long history of the Islamic sultanate, from at least the 12th century to the beginning of the 20th century, but also culturally and ideologically making Islam an identity so it is associated that Aceh is Islam. Even in the Dutch and Japanese colonial era, the Acehnese never felt religio-ideological.

Aceh's dream of becoming Indonesia is also different. The joining of Aceh to the republic was not without a reservation. There was a fatwa from the great ulama of Aceh in the early days of independence to combine Aceh with the Republic of Indonesia. There were preconditions given by the Acehnese ulama at that time. Daud Beureueh was permitted to apply Islamic law. So, Aceh's vision about the Indonesian nation is “Indonesia with Islamic law in Aceh”. Soekarno's agreement on the

requirements made the ulama and the people of Aceh donated jewelry and money to buy the first commercial aircraft, and it was said that gold was at the top of Monas (National Monument). When the preconditions for implementing Islamic law were denied in Jakarta, and even Aceh was later included in the territory of North Sumatra, the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion led by Daud Beureueh was inevitable. The rebellion took place for almost ten years, and in between there was a moment (1953-1962). However, the rebellion was not part of the agenda of releasing Aceh from Indonesia but making Indonesia an Islamic state. The movement was part of the Darul Islam / Indonesian Islamic Army (DI / TII) movement led by Sekarmaji Kartosuwiryo. Daud Beureueh turned Islamic consciousness into an Islamist movement. The second rebellion emerged during the New Order, namely the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) led by Hasan Tiro, which was triggered by economic injustice (1976-2005). Initially, the movement claimed to be a continuation of DI with the ideology of Islamism, but then shifted to ethnonationalism, in line with efforts to gain international support. Immediately after the fall of the New Order, a popular movement emerged demanding a referendum, following the success of East Timor separating from Indonesia.

After more than 50 years of independence, and after a long bloody conflict as above, the central government gave Aceh the privilege to implement Islamic law officially, legally, and constitutionally. This was the maximum effort that could provide Jakarta outside the independence option, as demanded by GAM, or a referendum, which was demanded by many civil society movements immediately after Soeharto's collapse. The entire history of the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta, which has more conflict than peace, is a long negotiation to become Indonesia by making Aceh as "Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam" which is locally translated as "Nanggroe Syari'ah" (Sharia State). In addition to the broad politicians and the people, the position of the ulama in the struggle and negotiations into "nanggroe syari'ah in the framework of the NKRI" cannot be denied. Therefore, after nearly 20 years of implementing sharia in Aceh, the people need to know the perception of ulama or religious leaders about the nation-state, because it also reflects the current and future dynamics of the nation-state of Indonesia.

This study aims to examine ulama in the urban communities of Banda Aceh, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province, and their perceptions of the concept of nation-states and their derivative issues. The derivative issues are: 1) anti-violence; 2) pro-system; 3) tolerance; and 4) pro-

citizenship (citizenship). These issues are used as dimensions to assess ulama's perceptions of the concept of nation-states. In this research, what is meant by ulama is Islamic religious leaders who are considered as scholars by their community, although by other communities it is not necessarily considered as ulama, especially those affiliated to - one or several organizations, majelis taklim, certain religious organizations or movements, who is domiciled in Banda Aceh, or whose center is in Banda Aceh. Therefore, ulama who are outside this category are not included in the scope of this study.<sup>1</sup> The nation-state is the concept of a sovereign modern state, which is distinguished from a global state (Khilafah), whose citizens are united by the factors that unite them as a nation, such as in the Indonesian context, historical similarities, and agreements form a country. The author argues that the perception of the ulama of Banda Aceh, and even Aceh in general, about the nation-state, is strongly influenced by government sharia politics in the concept of "nanggroe syari'ah in the framework of NKRI" which is a long crystallization of negotiations and canalization for the spirit of religious ethnonationalism of Acehnese ulama. In this context, the author also argues that ulama rejectionism towards the concept of the nation-state, at least until now, is more a phenomenon of decline from high to low, rather than vice versa. However, the concept of "nanggroe syari'ah in the framework of NKRI" will also treat ideal visions about the application of the Islamic political system, but in the context of the Republic of Indonesia, not in the context of an independent Aceh. This vision has also been, is being, and will continue to lead to the "*kaffah*" of the application of Shari'a in Aceh in the future.

Researches on ulama in Acehnese society have largely focused on the study of Islamic scholars, ulama movements, ulama organizations, or ulama in general, and did not assess their perceptions of certain issues (Amiruddin 2003, 2004; Saby 2005; Walidin et al 2006; Suyanta 2008; Nurdin 2019, 2017; Ichwan 2011; Nirzalin 2012; Hafifuddin 2014; Misbah 2016; Shadiqin 2017).<sup>2</sup> Most of the research was in the context of the role of ulama in the application of Islamic law and religious life in Aceh, not about how their perception of the nation-state. It can be excluded here the studies of separatist movements and Islamic radicalism

1 A generic definition that includes the notion of all clever Muslims, regardless of scientific discipline, such as natural and social sciences, as "ulama", is beyond the scope of this research.

2 Research on ulama before 2000 can be seen in, for example, Alfian (1976); Ismuha (1978, 1983); Hasjmy (1997).



in which there was the involvement of pre-Reformation ulama, such as Siegel (1969), van Dijk (1981), Chaidar (1999), Umar and Chaidar (2006), or specifically about ulama in post-Reformation separatism and Islamic radicalism, such as Bustamam-Ahmad and Amiruddin (2013), which certainly reflects the opposition of the movement and the ulama to the nations of the Republic of Indonesia, but they do not specifically look at the ulama's perception of the concept of the nation-state. The study focuses on and seeks to answer two questions: what are the perceptions of the Banda Aceh ulama about the nation-state and its derivative issues? Why do such perceptions arise?

This study uses the pragmatism research paradigm that combines quantitative and qualitative (Morgan 2013, 2014), although it is more emphasized in qualitative analysis to obtain a thorough explanation. Surveys were carried out in the city of Banda Aceh, both for ulama who lived in Banda Aceh, as well as representing organizations or movements whose center was in Banda Aceh and carried out many activities in Banda Aceh, such as provincial Ulama Consultative Assembly (MPU) or Banda Aceh MPU, or Banda FPI Aceh, it is possible for leaders or members to live around Banda Aceh. The transnational movement that we surveyed was Shia, Salafi-Wahhabi, and the Tarbiyah movement; national Islamic organizations include Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), FPI; or translocal, such as al-Washliyah and Perti; or local like MPU, Inshafuddin, HUDA, MPTT, and Tastaifi. This research is part of a national study of scholars and their perceptions of nation-states in 15 cities in 15 provinces in Indonesia. This is quantitative and qualitative research, and data is obtained by questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and observations. The survey with questionnaires was conducted from September 22 to October 4 2018.<sup>3</sup> The author conducted fieldwork on September 28 to October 9, 2018. The selection of informants was carried out by identifying ulama who were in Banda Aceh, or their main activities in Banda Aceh. There were 60 ulama who represented various organizations, institutions, movements, or Islamic groups. Of the 60 people, 30 ulama were taken randomly, although they are still considered representative. It is important that each group has its representatives, including minorities, and so as not to be dominated by certain groups. To develop a qualitative analysis, out of

3 This research was assisted by Marzi Afriko, and specifically for the distribution of questionnaires assisted by Murni Barus and Ichsan Maulana, but the writing of this article and its responsibility was entirely with the author. I thank them.

the 30 people that I interviewed, 10 people were thoroughly interviewed by considering the variety of questionnaire data and there was an additional interview with five experts that talked about Acehnese ulama. Furthermore, the author has experience as an Acehnese researcher for more than the past 10 years.

### **BANDA ACEH, SHARIA, AND ULAMA**

Banda Aceh is the capital of the province of Aceh which has important political, social, economic, cultural, and religious significance. Demographically, adherents of Islam are an absolute majority, not much different from most other cities/towns in Aceh, except in the border area with North Sumatra. Of the population of 356,983 (in 2016), 97.09% of them are Muslim, while the rest are Buddhists (1.13%), Protestants (0.70%), Catholics (0.19%), Hindus (0.02%), and others (0.85%). In addition to 93 mosques and 112 *meunasah* (*gampong* prayer rooms), Banda Aceh also has one Catholic church, *Hati Kudus* (the Sacred Heart); and two Protestant churches, namely the Western Indonesian Protestant Church (GPIB) and HKBP, and one Methodist church. In addition, there are also four Buddhist monasteries and one Hindu temple. Most *dayahs* are outside Banda Aceh. However, Islamic Universities are there, such as UIN (formerly IAIN) Ar-Raniry, and religious policies are mostly formulated and decided here, including about Islamic law.

In 2001, the government authorized Aceh province to implement Islamic law based on Law No. 18/2001 concerning the Privileges of Aceh, even though the process began in 1999. This law was then strengthened by Law No. 11/2006 concerning Aceh Governance. The first law privileged Aceh in the fields of education, custom, religion, and the role of the ulama. Among the four, privileges in the field of religion, which are interpreted as applying Islamic law, are the most important, because this is used to define the other three privileges.<sup>4</sup> Education, custom, and

4 However, the notion of shari'ah is not singular. In the Qanun it is said that the Shari'ah is Islamic teaching about all areas of life. Therefore, it is generally said that Aceh applies the "kaffah" shari'ah. At the community level, including in Banda Aceh, the definition of syari'ah is not the same. The *dayah* (*pesantren*) and FPI mostly understand it as the Shari'ah of Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah (*Aswaja*), and are more seen as "fiqh syafi'iyyah", although in the context of *Aswaja* it also includes theology (theology) and *tasawuf* - but they distinguish between shari'ah as jurisprudence and creed and Sufism. Meanwhile, in modernist and puritan circles, such as Muhammadiyah, DDII, Salafi, understand as a comprehensive way of life in all fields that includes *aqedah*, jurisprudence, economics, politics, and so on, even though the notion of legal rules is related to all that, non-madzhah. Although they also claimed to be Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, they did not use it as a group identity.

the role of ulama must be in line with and must not conflict with sharia. Whereas the second law further emphasizes that the application of sharia is the duty of governors, mayors, regents, and other officials under them. This means that sharia enforcement is the enforcement of national law in Aceh. In the context of our discussion, the two laws provide space for the role of ulama in various fields of life in Aceh.

With the inclusion of the ulama's role as part of Aceh's privilege, the central role of the ulama in the community was legitimized by law. Formally they have official institutions within the structure of the Aceh government, namely the Ulama Consultative Assembly (MPU), which not only exists at the provincial level but also at the district/city level. The provincial MPU office and the Banda Aceh MPU are in Banda Aceh. Although this institution is open to all ulama, in practice it is dominated by Islamic ulama. Besides them, there are campus-based ulama or Islamic organizations. This last number is less in the MPU. However, they played more roles in the legal drafting of Islamic law (Salim 2008, 160-1), an ability not possessed by Islamic ulama.

The legal drafting was carried out by the Islamic Sharia Office (DSI) whose province is in Banda Aceh. Whereas each district/city has its own DSI. Although the MPU was involved in discussing Islamic law, they were usually involved in the post drafting stage so that they could not determine the style of the qanun from the beginning. Thus, qanun Syariah in Aceh is very biased by campus clerics, while the MPU fatwas are very biased towards *dayah* ulama.

Banda Aceh is a place where ulama and Islamic institutions are located. Ulama are produced by, and usually, although not always, affiliated with, *dayah*, Islamic colleges, and Islamic organizations, and lately Islamic movements. Ulama in the city of Banda Aceh also has different characters from ulama in small towns and in *gampong*. They organize themselves like people who have similar professions, such as teachers who have teacher associations, doctors who have medical associations, and so on. In urban areas, ulama organize themselves in an organization. This is one form of the influence of urbanity on ulama.

The emergence of ulama organizations is a modern phenomenon and an urban phenomenon. During the Dutch colonial period, the All Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA) was established. This reflects the urban community of its time. This institution survived until Indonesia became independent, and then dispersed because of its leader, Tgk. Daud Beureueh, who founded the Darul Islam movement and rebelled

against the Republic of Indonesia (van Dijk 1981; Ibrahimy 1982). Then came the Ulama Consultative Assembly in Sukarno's time, and then changed during the Soeharto period to become the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). As soon as the privilege law was passed, an official ulama institution was formed under a government called the Ulama Consultative Assembly (MPU). This is just a change of name from the MUI, but with a new status as an official government agency.

During the New Order, Inshafuddin stood up, an institution that brought together dayah ulama affiliated to Perti (Union of Tarbiyah Islamiyah), who due to disagreement with Perti to turn into political parties, they formed this organization. It was also formed because it was established to stay away from politics, this institution was seen by supporters of the referendum as inadequate when a post-New Order shift occurred and the Military Operation Area (DOM) was revoked.<sup>5</sup> They did not want to be involved in politics, although the opportunity to expand political influence was enormous. Amid the demands of the referendum, a santri dayah organization called Rabitah Aceh Taliban (RTA) emerged, led by Tgk Bulqaini, which was used to mobilize the santri dayah to support the referendum. The RTA failed in influencing Inshafuddin, they approached several Acehnese charismatic ulama to create a new ulama institution, which was later named the Aceh Dayah Ulama Association (HUDA), led by Tgk Ibrahim Bardan, known as Abu Pantan. HUDA actively involved itself in the new political arena of Aceh, including supporting the existence of a referendum. However, when the referendum did not take place, and Jakarta gave the authority to implement Islamic law, the role of HUDA politics became weaker. This happened after HUDA failed to initiate the implementation of the Aceh People's Congress. HUDA still exists, even now, but its political role is no longer as large as the initial mass of its establishment. Now it shifts to socio-religious functions.

In 2009, another ulama organization emerged, named the Nanggroe Aceh Council of Ulama (MUNA), an ulama institution formed by the former Free Aceh Movement (GAM), with its spiritual leader Abuya Prof. Muhibbuddin Waly, son of the charismatic Sufi ulama, Abuya Muda Waly.

The emergence of MUNA, which approached the election for the gubernatorial election, made it irrevocable with the political motive of raising votes for the former GAM party, the Aceh Party (PA). However,

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5 Regarding the application of the Military Operation Area in Aceh, see Sukma (2004); Schultz (2006).

the ulama who joined MUNA was not dayah ulamas widely known in the community. This made MUNA less developed after the 2009 elections. They existed, but could not expand their influence widely. The ulama institutions are headquartered in Banda Aceh and have branches in the district/city, although not always in an even sense, except the MPU.

The above institutions represent several typologies of Acehnese ulama, namely dayah ulama, religious ulama, campus ulama, and government ulama. After the 2004 Tsunami, because Aceh was increasingly open to the outside world, there were also Islamist movements both nationally, such as FPI (Afriko 2010) and MMI, as well as transnational, such as the tarbiyah movement, HTI (although claiming to have entered Aceh long before), and Salafi. This can be categorized as the ulama or ulama of the Islamist movement. The characters, including graduates of the Middle East and those inspired by other transnational Islam, gradually took on roles in society. This effort was challenged by other ulama because it was considered a competitor in the diversity authority. Interestingly, FPI in Aceh consists mainly of Dayah affiliated figures and NU. This is possible because FPI is described as “*Aswaja* defender”.

Other types of ulama also emerged after that, in line with the rise of internet use and social media, namely “social ulama”, which targeted the millennial generation. They can also be called “millennial ulama”. On average they are young ulama who use communication and information media, not just television, but also YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, and Telegram. There are not many of them, but the trend is increasing, it is in line with the many young people who use social media in their lives. Salafi Ulama are among those who are familiar with using this media, even though the appearance is not very millennial, so they are not only categorized as *harakah* ulama, but also social ulama. They spread religious ideas through these types of media.


The institutionalization of ulama and the emergence of a typical type of urban ulama who is familiar with social media reflects the influence of urbanity on religion. The way Muslims practice their religion and the way ulama present and organize themselves cannot be affected by urban social space which is undergoing modernization and change. The institution, organization, and movement of the ulama claimed religious authority and contested to get recognition as one of, or perhaps the only, religious authority holder. Understanding and ideology differences are the only things that appear, but also the possibility of friction and tension between ulama groups or between one ulama and another.

## ULAMA AND PERCEPTION OF THE NATION-STATE

As mentioned in the introduction, what the ulama meant in this study was “Islamic religious leaders who were considered as ulama by their communities, although other communities were not necessarily considered as ulama, especially those affiliated to one or several Islamic ulama, *majelis taklim*, organizations or even a particular religious movement, which is domiciled in Banda Aceh, or which is the center of its activities in Banda Aceh. “To see the ideological tendencies of ulama, they are seen from the ulama’s perception of the concept of nation-states and derivative issues, namely (1) non-violence; (2) pro-system; (3) tolerant; (4) citizenship.

Ulama based on their ideological tendencies are as follows. First, progressives, namely ulama who are actively acting anti-violence, pro-system, tolerant, and pro-citizenship. Second, inclusive, namely ulama who are passively nonviolent and pro-system, and active in tolerance and citizenship. Third, moderates, namely ulama who are passively anti-violence, systemic, tolerant, and pro-citizenship. Fourth, conservatives, namely scholars who are passively nonviolent, systemic, and tolerant, but actively anti-citizenship. Fifth, exclusive, namely ulama who are passively nonviolent and pro-system, but actively intolerant and anti-citizenship. Sixth, radical, namely ulama who are passively anti-violence, but actively antisystem democracy, intolerance, and anti-citizenship. Seventh, extreme, namely ulama who are actively pro-violence, anti-democratic, intolerant, and anti-citizenship systems. Activeness is measured by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”, in addition to the activity praxis obtained through interviews and track records in the media.

Based on the survey we conducted on September 28-October 9, 2018 in the city of Banda Aceh the following data were obtained:



If you look at the table above, most of the ulama accept the concept of the nation-state (66.6%). If we thoroughly look at the details, from those who accept the concept of the nation-state, we can see that most of the Banda Aceh ulama have moderate tendencies, 33.3% (7 people). Under moderate ulama there are conservative ulama, whose position is between moderate and exclusive, followed by inclusive ulama with an amount of 10%. The amount of ulama who reject the concept of the nation-state is 23.3%, which consists of exclusive (13.3%) and radical (10%).

Who is not identified? There are 10% of ulama who are not identified with their ideology. This happens because of inconsistencies in the answer, or not included in the existing categories. However, it can usually be recognized in discourses developed daily. For example, in the first case, the ulama was nonviolent and tolerant, but antisystem and anti-citizenship. The antisystem and anti-citizenship outlook means he is has a radical character, but nonviolence and passive tolerance are categorized as moderate characters. In this case, he is between radical and moderate, which is closer to conservatism, and because of antisystem, it is not just conservative, but “a strong conservative “. The second case, he was violent, intolerant, and anti-citizenship, but pro-system. he is more precisely placed between exclusive and radical, or can be called “strong exclusivism”. As for the third case, he is nonviolent, pro-system, and pro-citizen, but intolerant-- all in a passive sense. The characteristics of anti-violence, pro-system, and passive pro-citizen are moderate traits, but intolerance is one of the exclusive characteristics. Therefore, he is among moderate and exclusive, namely conservatives, who fall into the category of receptionist. Therefore, 2 (6.66%) tends to be rejectionist and 1 (3.33%) tends to be a receptionist.

Therefore, if combined, the number of receptionists ulama is 66.6% plus 3.33%, which is 70%. While the rejectionist ulama are 23.3% plus 6.66%, which is 30%. The amount of 30% is considered high, not only when compared to our survey at the national level, but also objectively because the number of 5% rejectionists is already very high to reject the concept of the nation-state. The author will give his analysis below, based on the questionnaires we distributed and from the in-depth interviews, we conducted.

## **POLITICAL SYSTEM OF STATE**

There are three things that are important in the issue of this state system, namely the state ideology, the constitution and the democratic system, and The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

### 1. *State ideology of the Pancasila*

Related to the Pancasila state ideology there are two phenomena that appear to be contradictory. First, most ulama support the state's ideology, Pancasila. This can be seen from their response to several statements submitted to them. Most ulama (83%) accept that "*Pancasila is the most appropriate state ideology for Indonesia.*" The accepted ulama consist of 53% agree and 30% strongly agree. Only 3.3% disagree, and no one strongly disagrees. The remaining 10% is neutral. However, both the neutral position and the gray position, as stated by Jeremy Menchick (2016), cannot be interpreted as progressive, but rather conservative, or in this case considered as a conservative-exclusive study. It means that there are many reservations (requirements) are under consideration.

When the principles of Pancasila were broken down into details, most ulama also accept them as Islamic or in line with Islam. Most ulama (90%) accept the statement that "Pancasila principles are in accordance with the teachings of Islam" i.e. 56.66% agree and 33.33% strongly agree. There was no objection, but there were 10% who were neutral. It means there is also the potential for an objection from the 10% neutral. Well, when the statement was specified on the first principle, those who accept, reduced, but still, the majority was 76.6%. They do not agree if "the first principle of Pancasila obscures the Islamic faith." There are 56.6% disagree and 20% strongly disagree. As for those who consider the first principle obscuring the Islamic faith, or in accordance with that statement, there are 16.6%, consisting of 10% agreeing and 6.6% strongly agree. The rest, 6.6% is neutral. The amount of 16.5% is very high. That is, in the first statement no one refused that the Pancasila principles were in accordance with Islamic teachings, but apparently there were 16.5% who considered the first principle to obscure aqidah. Especially if the neutral is interpreted conservatively-exclusively, the number that considers the first principle to obscure can be up to 20%, which means one-fifth of the number of ulama in this study.

An explanation from a Salafi ulama who was interviewed might explain this phenomenon. He chose that Pancasila was the most appropriate state ideology. However, in the interview, it appeared that there were preconditions, i.e. that "God" in the first principle was meant to be Allah SWT.



“From the principle of Pancasila, if Belief in the one and only God, means that we must worship Allah SWT [as] the only God then this is right”

Then he broke down one by one the principles that are in accordance with Islam with the arguments of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In other words, he would accept Pancasila under many reservations, and if the reservations did not occur, he would refuse. Up to this point, it appears that support for the Pancasila as a state ideology is very high, 70%. However, it is not that simple, as shown below.

Second, they also open the possibility of replacing the state's ideology with Islamic ideology. This was evident when the following statement was put forward “There is no harm in Muslim leaders trying to find an alternative state ideology that is better than Pancasila.” Those who accept the statement are 50%; 40% agreed and 10% strongly agreed. Those who disagree with the statement are only 13.3%, and no one strongly disagrees. Those who stated neutral were very high, i.e. 36.6%, almost three times those who did not agree. If we interpret conservatively-exclusively, that this neutral tends to agree with this statement if their reservations are fulfilled. The statement is tricky. It can be seen from the two phrases, “no harm” and “better”. The first phrase shows a more passive outlook than, for example, the word “must”. There is also a condition if the alternative is “better”. It means that 50% of ulama accept this statement even though it is passive.

A Muhammadiyah figure said that this was related to Pancasila as follows.

“I think it's a movement in an era. If we look at the formulation of the Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter, the formulation is not the same. In the 2002 MPR sessions, there was an attempt to change that. So if the Indonesian people want to change the Pancasila democratically, so go ahead. “(Interview, Banda Aceh, 5 October 2018).

The above is directly proportional to the other statements about the return of the Seven Words in the Jakarta Charter, “Returning 7 (seven) words in the first principle of the Pancasila,” Believe in God, with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'a for adherents “, is important to reconsider the rights of the majority group so it becomes better. “Ulama who accept the idea of returning the Seven Words are very high, it is

about 69.9% of ulama, with 36.6% who agree and 33.3% who strongly agree. It means that the passive and active ones receive a balanced amount. Only 6.6% of ulama stated disagreement, and no one strongly disagreed. Like the previous statement, the number of neutral ulama is quite large, 23.3%, which if we interpret conservatively-exclusive, they tend to accept the return of the Seven Words if their reservations are fulfilled.

It means, that Acehese ulama mostly accepted the Pancasila as a state ideology and considered its principle is in line with Islamic values, or accepted Pancasila if it was in accordance with their Islamic perspective, but they mostly agreed with the return of the Seven Words in the Jakarta Charter in the formulation of the Pancasila and even open the possibility of other ideologies that they consider better, namely Islam. However, given that there is no demand for the replacement of ideology from Acehese ulama. Their views are passive and have potential, or latent, do not manifest (surfacing).

## 2. *Constitution and Political System*

Related to the 1945 Constitution (the amendment result) as “the highest constitution of Indonesia which must be upheld” most ulama (80%) accept it, with details 53.3% agree and 26.6% strongly agree. As for those who refused, only 3.3% said they did not agree, and no one strongly disagreed. Those who are neutral is quite high; it is 16.6%. Regarding the democracy adopted by Indonesia, most ulama consider it does not in conflict with the Islamic political system, but there is also a recognition that the Islamic political system is superior. It is reflected in the response to the two statements below.

When asked to respond the following the statement “*Indonesian democracy adheres to the sovereignty originating from the power of the people, therefore it is in conflict with the Islamic political system that affirms sovereignty originating from the power of God*”. Those who do not agree are 20%. According to the responders, democracy imposed in Indonesia is in line with the Islamic political system. Those who accept the statement were quite large, 24.2%, with following details: 16.6% agree, and 6.6% strongly agree. It means they think that Indonesian democracy is contrary to the Islamic political system. Ulama who are neutral is quite large, which is 30%. If the neutral ones are considered as conservative, then it means that those who think Indonesian democracy is contrary to the Islamic political system becomes even higher.

Why is that? Because when asked the question “The Islamic political system proved superior compared to the concept of democracy and other political concepts of human products” most ulama (63.3%) accepted this statement. 40% of ulama agreed and 23.3% of ulama strongly agreed. There were 16.6% ulama rejecting this statement. 13.3% ulama did not agree and 3.3% strongly disagree. Those who are neutral is quite large. It is 20 %. Moreover, if those who are considered neutral position are conservative-exclusive, then the number that considers the Islamic system is superior is far greater. However, the kind of Islamic political system is not very clear. Is it like Hizb ut-Tahrir, Salafi, Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), or Islamic empires, such as Saudi Arabia who reject Khilafah, or like Brunei, or federal constitutional monarchies, such as Malaysia, or republics, like Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan?

### 3. *Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)*

Most ulama (80%) received the statement that “the NKRI is a legitimate state structure because it is in harmony with the concept of dar as-salam (state of peace) or the concept of al-’ahdi wa asy-syahadah (state consensus and devotion).” Those who accept this, 46.6% agreed and 33.3% strongly agreed. Only 3.3% agreed, and no one strongly agreed. 16.6% are neutral and this is considered high. If it is interpreted conservatively-exclusively, then the potential of those who are neutral to reject is also quite high, of course, if the reservations are fulfilled.

80% of the conformity of the Republic of Indonesia with the concept of Islam is certainly very high. However, ulama who support efforts to separate themselves from NKRI (separatism) caused by development inequality are quite high, 26.66%. 16.66% who agree and 10% strongly agree. Of course if compared with the number of ulama who disagree with separatism, which is 56.66% and broken down into 46.66% disagree and 10% strongly disagree. The amount is considered smaller. However, the amount of 26.66% for tolerating separatism is very high in number. Moreover, the number of those who are neutral is also quite high, which is 16.66%. If interpreted conservatively-exclusively, they are likely to agree with separatism.

In Aceh, this condition is real, because Darul Islam and the GAM conflict has a very long historical background relationship with Jakarta and there were many casualties from civil society (Chaidar, Ahmad, and Dynamics 1998; Drexler 2008).<sup>6</sup> However, if we see the reality there is

6 About GAM and its conflict with the central government, see Schulze (2004, 2006).

no emergence of Acehese ulama who openly demanded separation from the Republic of Indonesia - even though there were several GAM groups, non-ulama, especially those living abroad - the potential was only latent, at least until now.

#### 4. Tolerance

The Setara Institute in the 2018 Tolerant City Index survey places Banda Aceh as the city with the lowest tolerance index after Tanjung Balai. However, when viewed from the perceptions of ulama, not coming from Muslim communities, most of the conclusions can be different. Most ulama (86.6%) accept that "People with different religion have the right to worship freely and openly, just like the Muslims", 53.3% ulama agree, and 33.3% ulama strongly agree. Those who refuse are only 6.6%, which are broken into 3.3% agree and 3.3% strongly disagree. Even those who choose neutral are small, 6.6%. Most of them also "accept people of other religions to live" in their environment (83.2%), which are broken down into 76.6% agree and 6.6% strongly agree. While those who refuse are only 3.3%, strongly disagree, and no one chose not to agree. There are 13.3% who are neutral.

In fact, when asked about the following statement "The interests of the majority group must be prioritized in every decision making," most ulama (76.6%) refused, which was broken down into 56.6% did not agree and strongly disagree 20%. It means that most ulama want discrimination in decision making. However, the decisions in Banda Aceh are, in fact, dominated by the majority, because most officials are from the majority. Not only minorities but public participation in decision making is also very low. There is a gap between what the ulama and decision makers desire to involve minorities. However, the number of ulama who agree on minority discrimination in decision making is quite high, which is 16.6%, i.e. 10% ulama agreed and 6.6% ulama strongly agree. Especially if the 6.6% neutral ulama are interpreted conservatively-exclusively. However, this discrimination is more due to the lack of public involvement in the decision-making process.

The outlook of the ulama above is in line with their outlook in the statement "The state must limit public facilities for non-Muslims so that they are not more powerful than Muslims." Although not as large as the number of ulama who reject minority discrimination in decision making, the number of ulama who reject the state restricts public facilities for non-Muslims are quite high, 43.3% chose to disagree, and no one chose

strongly disagree. Those who accept restrictions on public facilities are also quite high, which is 20%. 10% ulama agree and the other 10% strongly agree. However, the number of neutral ulama is quite high, i.e. 36.6%. This is almost double the number of ulama who accept restrictions. If we interpret this conservatively-exclusively, then the number that agrees with the limitation of minority rights is even greater.

However, regarding the houses of worship establishment, their outlook is different. They mostly agree that other religious groups should not establish houses of worship in a Muslim-majority environment. There are 60% ulama who agree (33.33% agree and 26.66% strongly agree). However, the number of ulama who rejected the statement, i.e. those who allowed non-Muslims to establish houses of worship in a majority Muslim area, was also quite high, 20% (16.66% disagreed and 3.33% strongly disagree). However, given that those who were neutral is also quite high (20%) the possibility of agreeing to the prohibition of the establishment of non-Muslim places of worship in a Muslim-majority environment can be even greater. This is in line with a few church closures (or precisely the church-built shophouses) in Banda Aceh (Makin 2016) and Langsa, and the burning of one church and the closure of several other churches in Singkil on the grounds that there was no permit to build houses of worship (Al-Fairusi 2016; Ansor et al. 2016; Ichwan 2017).

Related to the tolerance of Acehnese ulama towards other religions seemed very high, outside the issue of houses of worship. At the level of ulama in Banda Aceh, the location of this research was carried out, interreligious tolerance could be quite optimistic. However, it needs to be underlined that this could be among other things. First, tolerance among non-ulama, namely the Muslim community in general, can be different; second, the ulama being observed were living in the urbanity of Banda Aceh. Third, the minority of non-Muslims is very low in Banda Aceh, so it is not a threat. The same thing did not happen in border areas, such as Langsa, Aceh Tamiang, Subulussalam, and Singkil, except Aceh Tenggara with many churches and good interfaith relations.

##### *5. Citizenship: Leadership Issues*

Substantive democracy rejects discrimination based on religion and gender in leadership issues. A leader, if it is chosen through a democratic mechanism, must be respected, even though he/she is different in religion and gender. In relation to leadership, most ulama (80%) argued that the leader must be a Muslim (33.33% ulama agreed, and 46.66% strongly

agreed), while 10% each came from both ulama who disagree and are neutral. There are two references related to this, first, Aceh where they live in a Muslim majority and apply Islamic law; and secondly, DKI Jakarta, which even though most Muslims were led by the Christian governor, namely Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok). This is evident in the interview that the author did. For example, a leader of the MPU and NU does not mind if the non-Muslim leader leads in a majority non-Muslim area. However, if it is in a Muslim-majority area like Aceh, he said the following statement.

“It’s also not right. Because [leadership] is not only seen about the administration and financial management. Because there are religious things that they don’t understand. So this [non-Muslim leader] cannot be the majority of Muslims. He must be an Islamic leader. Because there are sensitive things. For us, the Holy Koran is something sensitive.”<sup>7</sup>

The last part about the Holy Koran refers to the Ahok case which was considered insulting to the Holy Book.

As for obedience to democratically elected non-Muslim leaders, ulama who accept the idea is only 23.33% (agree), compared to those who reject i.e. 30% (23.33% disagreed and those who strongly disagree 6.66%). Most ulama are neutral (46.66%). From this outlook, those who were neutral if interpreted conservatively-exclusively, then most tend to refuse to obey non-Muslim leaders, even if democratically elected.

As for female leaders, if she is elected democratically, most of the ulama (80%) would accept (66.66% agreed and 13.33% strongly agree). Those who refused only 3.33% strongly disagree. Those who were neutral is 16.66%.

This outlook is in line with their outlook towards the statement that the leader must be male because of the concept of *qawwamun* (*‘ala al-nisa’*) in the Holy Koran, in which ulama who disagreed were about 40%. It means that they think that leaders do not have to be men; even women can become one, if they are capable. Most of them refer to the historical fact that Aceh was once headed by four Sultanahs, and had several female heroes.

However, the ulama who accepted the statement that leaders must be male was also quite large 26.66% (agreed 6.66%, which strongly agreed 20%). Surprisingly, the neutral number is quite large, 16.66%. If interpreted conservatively-exclusively, there could be a shift towards rejection of, at least doubting, women’s leadership. Among the ulama

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7 Interview, 3 October 2018.

who rejected this, for example, was one of the leaders of HUDA, who was also a member of the FPI. He rejects women's leadership, if there are men, and he also rejects the idealization of sultana's leadership in the past. Sultanate leadership was an emergency leadership because otherwise the kingdom would be destroyed, and the kingdom at that time was indeed in a time of destruction.

“Women's leadership has terms and conditions, [that is] if there are no men. In Aceh, there was once a [sultanah]. But because he was the son of the king of Aceh. He was a symbol, so that the [kingdom] was not destroyed, whose control was Sheikh Abdur Rauf. [Sulatanah] just as a symbol. When Sultanah leads this moment of destruction, there was a lot of foreign debt.”<sup>8</sup>

Resistance to women's leadership does not appear to be released from the political division of the Aceh Regional Headquarters in 2017, where the incumbent is a woman, Illiza Sa'duddin Djamal. The issue of the illegitimacy of women as leaders has emerged from a charismatic ulama, the leader of Dayah Mudi Meusra, who is also the chairman of the Aceh Dayah Ulama Association (HUDA), Abu Mudi during a Tastaifi Islamic teaching on October 7, 2016.

Answering questions from the congregation about women's leadership, Abu Mudi said, “It is Haram (sinful) for a woman to nominate herself as a leader, and it is haram also choosing and appointing her.”<sup>9</sup> In addition, a reinterpretation of the leadership of the Sultanah arise and it happened because of a historical accident. The reason was to avoid chaos if they do not appoint them, while Aceh faces the enemy from the outside, the Portuguese (Angen 2016). Hanafiah (2016) did not directly deal with Abu Mudi's opinion, but he mentioned that the emergence of opinions about the illegitimate leadership of women is a setback (Hanafiah 2016). Indeed, the fact that the incumbent woman lost was not caused by the fatwa. However, given the fatwa was issued by an influential charismatic ulama, speculation that her defeat was caused by the woman leader's outrageous campaign was not far from the facts.

## 6. *Violence*

In general, most Acehnese ulama reject the use of violence for any

<sup>8</sup> Interview, 7 October 2018.

<sup>9</sup> Law of Women Nominating themselves as Leaders, “Nadpost, 8 October 2016; accessed from <http://nadpost.com>

reason, except in the context of Sharia punishment. Protecting the ummah from the deeds that are deemed heretical and from other religions does not make the use of violence permissible. The use of violence to give warnings to different groups of Muslims was rejected by most ulama (76.6%), with the following details: 23.3% did not agree, and 53.3% strongly disagreed. Those who agreed were only 6.6%, and no one strongly disagreed. The neutral number is 16.6%. The use of utterances of hatred towards other faiths as an effort to fortify Muslims from heresy “was rejected by 66.6% of ulama (46.6% disagreed and 20% strongly disagreed). Those who agreed with the use of hate speech were 6.6% and those who strongly agreed 3.3%. Those who were neutral is quite high, 23.3%.

Legal awareness and the constitutionalism of ulama are very large. Most of the ulama (86.6%) received the statement that attacks on religious groups that were deemed appropriate were against the law. “Of those who received this agreed 70% and strongly agreed 16.6%. Those who disagree are only 3.3%, and no one strongly disagrees. While the neutral is 10%. Most ulama (80%, 60% agree and 20% strongly agree) accept that *nahi munkar* (to prevent mischief) by violence committed by parties who are not the state apparatus, is not in accordance with applicable law. “As for those who disagree are 3.3% and no one strongly disagrees. While those who are neutral is 16.6%.

The amount who are neutral in the first to fourth cases above is quite high (16.6%, 23.3%, 10%, and 16%). If those who are neutral in both the first and second statements are interpreted conservatively-exclusively, the amount is not high. However, one violence and utterance of hatred in the public sphere was already high enough to damage the harmony of the religious community.

There have been several cases of violence against people who are considered heretical in Aceh. In 2012, Tgk Aiyub Syakuban, who allegedly taught a cult in Bireuen and two of his students, were stabbed by a sharp weapon and burned in his own house. Besides them, there were ten students who were injured by sharp weapon attack. It happened because of the fatwa of the Bireuen Ulama Consultative Assembly (MPU) which considered Tgk Aiyub's teachings to be misguided. Violence, intimidation, and eviction also occurred in Ujong Pancu (Aceh Besar), Lamteuba (Aceh Besar), Guhang (Southwest Aceh), Nisam (North Aceh) and Kuta Binjei Julok (East Aceh), and Sukadamai (Banda Aceh; Wardah 2013; Armia et al. 2015). There was also violence against the community



of Laduni (West Aceh), Mirza Alfath (North Aceh). According to KAYA (Acehnese Community for Freedom of Belief and Religion), all the violence was associated with the MPU Fatwa (No. 4/2007) regarding the Criteria for Heresy. Although it was disputed by the MPU, because the MPU did not tolerate violence,<sup>10</sup> but the masses used the heretical fatwa criteria to assess existing movements and act violence was evident. All these events were outside Banda Aceh, except those in Sukadamai. Gafatar appeared also in Banda Aceh, but they were different from other members of the “heretical” groups who experienced mass violence, they were processed legally through the courts.

The definition of violence can also be understood differently. One of the leaders of the Banda Aceh FPI, for example, considered violence as an act to carry out without following a procedure but they consider to be right. They are given three warnings, and a carbon copy is always given to the police. If the procedure is not passed then it is called violence, if it has been through procedures, then it is not considered a violent act.

“That [violence] covered in the media is true, because it covers the ending. But try to analyze it from the beginning. We have already visited the place, even the place has been written, but if we are ignored, we will go. Yes, violence means without procedure, and it’s a hit and run. But there is no denying that in some places these things exist. Because the procedure isn’t finished yet, they suddenly came down. We are not lying, right?”

Such understanding is only related to the group’s particular standards, not a general understanding of violence. It is related to the meaning of justified violence and unjustified violence. There is a long ethical debate, between those who reject violence in any form (idealistic), and who justify the ability of violence in certain matters, such as reprisal violence, fair war, and law enforcement (punishment) carried out by state apparatus, not by civil society. However, it is a general norm that the state has the authority to use coercive tools that are violent, not civil society. If civil society can use violence, what happens is the suppression of one element of society over another, or, if they are balanced, horizontal conflicts will occur between them.

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10 “Aceh Blasted Ulama who accuse intolerance,” Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion of Aceh Province, May 23, 2013; accessed from <http://aceh.kemenag.go.id>

### **RECEPTIONISM, REJECTIONISM, AND RELIGIOUS ETHNONATIONALISM**

Indeed, receptionist ulama are very high, at 66.6%, if added 3.33% of the unidentified portion it becomes 70%. A high number of receptionists raises questions, given that Aceh is an area that has always been turbulent in the past, colored by the Darul Islam and GAM rebellion, and human rights violations that have never been revealed. This fact raises the impression that the two movements did not have much influence on the ulama. This also raises the question, is it true that the de-extremization and de-separatism project of the New Order was successful? However, rejectionist ulama are also still quite high, 23.3%, if 6.66% is added, of the part that is not identified, then it becomes 30%. However, if only 5% of the rejectionists are considered high, then the amount of 30% is very high. Revolution in many countries is not carried out by majority groups, but by militant minorities. The problem is that the minority rejectionist is not militant. The author analyzes the rejectionist group, why this group is still quite high. The receptionist group is not unimportant to be discussed, but the question about it will be answered also by analyzing this rejectionist group.

The phenomenon of the high level of rejectionist ulama can be seen in two possibilities. The first possibility, it shows the increasing tendency of rejectionism among ulama, with the assumption that before the ulama could be significantly identified during the New Order period, and later it has strengthened lately. However, there is a second possibility, that is, the data reflects the decline of rejectionism among ulama, given that in the past two Darul Islam and GAM rebellions had occurred which the remnants of which could not be easily erased. This means that before the level of rejection was very high, and lately, it has diminished because of the political changes that took place in Aceh, such as the end of the GAM-Jakarta conflict and the official implementation of Islamic Shari'a which was top-down. If the first is correct, then this shows that sharia politics is ineffective, because it thickens religious ethnocentrism which is confronted with the concept of nation-states in a new pattern, no longer armed, but with an affirmation of independence and self-governance, which is done with the justification of legislation made by Jakarta. If the second possibility occurs, then it shows that the de-extremization and de-separatization of the New Order and the post-New Order government were successful. However, unfortunately, there is no previous research that measures the level of acceptance and rejection of the concept of this nation-state during conflict or/and immediately after the conflict so that

we cannot claim whether the rate of rejection has increased or declined. There is a survey conducted by the Insan Cita Madani Foundation (YICM), not about accepting the concept of the nation-state, but about community acceptance of the application of Islamic law (Devayan 2007). The survey conducted in collaboration with one of the local mass media was stopped because it was protested by several ulama because it was considered to be productive in the application of Islamic law.

History shows that receptionist tendencies and rejectionism are dynamic, sometimes rising and sometimes declining, highly dependent on the context. At the beginning of independence, the ulama's acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state was so great that a few Acehne ulama interpreted the joining of Aceh to the Republic of Indonesia, but in the hope of implementing Islamic law in the Indonesian context. When Sukarno promised that possibility, the ulama mobilized the people of Aceh to give huge donations of money and jewelry to buy the first civilian aircraft and, supposedly, gold for the peak of Monas. However, this acceptance-ism turned into rejectionism when Sukarno reneged on his promise not to approve the application of Islamic law. This led to the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion led by Daud Beureueh. DI was finally able to be conquered in 1962. However, rejectionism did not decrease, and it rose when another rebellion also emerged, namely the Free Aceh Movement led by Tgk Hasan Tiro in 1976. The rebellion was very long and took a huge toll, and only ended after the Helsinki MOU in 2005 (Aspinall, 2005; Morfit 2007), seven years after Suharto stepped down. However, before the conflict ended, there were two things that Jakarta had done to Aceh. First, the process of de-extracting and de-separating through soft and hard methods. The soft method is done by incorporating some of the receptionist ulama by accommodating them into the Indonesian Ulama Council, Golkar Ulama Work Unit (Satskar Ulama), and other efforts. The way of violence is carried out in an armed manner, as in the case of Teungku Bantaqiah (Ahsan 2017). Secondly, Jakarta had approved the adoption of Islamic law since 1999 and then officially adopted it in 2001. Meetings between Acehne religious leaders and the central government were carried out both in Aceh and in Jakarta (Miller 2009). This is seen as part of a security approach to win the hearts of the Acehne religious community and elite, in the face of GAM, which does not have an official Islamic law enforcement agenda (Kingsbury 2007; Ichwan 2007). Even at the beginning of the implementation, GAM criticized that the application of Islamic law was only a Jakarta strategy.

In the context of the dynamics of the perception of the above ulama, the process of de-extremization and de-separatization on the one hand and the application of Islamic law on the other hand according to the authors have succeeded in changing the perception of Acehese ulama towards the nation-state (NKRI), but not yet completed. It is considered quite successful for two reasons. First, there were no ulama who continued the struggle of Darul Islam to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Islamic State of Aceh, or the Islamic Kingdom of Aceh. The research shows that there are no ulama who are identified with extreme ideology, namely ulama who are actively pro - violent, anti-system, intolerant, and anti-citizenship. It has made the ideology of Islamism which rejects the total concept of the nation-state of Indonesia not to be the dominant and hegemonic ideology. Secondly, there were a few ulama who joined and supported GAM's struggle. It was later evident when ex-GAM established the local political party Partai Aceh (PA) and the ulama organization of the Nanggroe Aceh Ulama Council (MUNA) in 2009. Very few ulama joined the party. Dayah ulama even supported many other local parties, the Aceh Sovereign Party, even though the party would not be able to survive.

The absence of progressive ulama, in the context of Aceh that implements the Shari'ah, can be understood, because generally ulama - who are different from scholars - base their thoughts on the text and are critical thinkers especially when it comes to new ideas. In addition, progressive ulama could not be identified because of the way of thinking of mainstream Acehese ulama, namely the *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah* based on *dayah*, and/or Acehese universities which did not develop progressive Islamic ideas, and there was a stigma that progressive thinkers are deviant. There were cases of persecution of local religious leaders because of they were accused of deviating which can also haunt different possibilities of thinking. There were also those whose houses were destroyed, their pesantren burned and they were even killed. The progressiveness of thinking can be accused of being deviant or misguided. It makes the ideas of democratization and human rights which are usually carried out by progressive groups only supported by intellectuals and human rights activists and women, and very few ulama advocate them. It also causes contextual interpretations of sharia and nation-states that are difficult to develop among ulama.

## CONCLUSION

What must be underlined from this Banda Aceh case, and Aceh in general, is that efforts to de-extremism and de-separatisation are quite

successful, but are not or have not been fully completed, because the wounds of the conflict cannot be fully cured, while justice efforts against human rights violations are the period of the conflict only went in place, even though the institution that managed it was established. If GAM's ethnonationalism first demanded independence, then Aceh is now a "provincial sense of state", and if DI first demanded an Islamic state, Aceh is now a government based on sharia which is still part of the NKRI. The concept is not fully able to erase the sense of "nationality" of the Acehnese people and is also not able to completely erase their desire to implement the Islamic political system. However, the two desires were able to be cannalized with the concept of "nanggroe syari'ah in the framework of NKRI". It makes post-authoritarianism and post-conflict democratization in Aceh lead to the Sharization of bureaucracy (making the bureaucracy more shar'i) and bureaucratization of sharia (making sharia more bureaucratic) on the one hand and Sharization of society on the other. The vision of the Islamic political system remains in some Acehnese ulama. The project "nanggroe syariah in the framework of NKRI" is the translation of religious ethnonationalism in its "soft" form, not in its "hard" form like that of Daud Beureueh and Darul Islam. So, what happens is that there is canalization of Islamism in the context of religious ethnonationalism. With the concept, Islamist ideology does not direct itself to the formation of an Islamic state, but it forms an Islamic province, "nanggroe syari'ah in the framework of NKRI".

The concept of "nanggroe syari'ah in the framework of NKRI" is a "common ground" between Aceh and Jakarta, although after that there were negotiations between the two. The common ground, among others, is the reason the number of ulama who accept the concept of the nation-state (acceptor) to be very high. They do not want the current peace to return to a conflict state. Therefore, many of them advocate for acceptance of the nation-state in various forums and openly reject radicalism, extremism, and separatism. Thus, the high level of rejectionism of ulama is not in the form of active rejectionism as extreme ulama who are actively pro-violence, anti-system, intolerant, and anti-citizenship, and who openly call for opposition to the Pancasila ideology, constitution, and the Republic of Indonesia, but passive rejectionism. Their receptionist is more active. It has made the light of optimism for the acceptance of the nation-state still burning in Aceh. However, it all depends heavily on Aceh's internal social and political processes, including the presence of transnational Islamic groups that increasingly manifest themselves and

respond to them, on the one hand, and between Aceh and Jakarta on the other.

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# ULEMA AND NARRATION OF “POLITICAL DIFFERENCES”:

## Minority, Ethnicity, and Citizenship in Palangka Raya<sup>1</sup>

*Najib Kailani*

Since the incident of “blasphemy” which hit Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (read: Ahok) in 2016 came to light, the role of religious leaders or ulama increasingly pushed into the latest Indonesian political constellation. The fatwa of blasphemy against Ahok issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) regarding his remarks regarding the surah al-Maidah: 51 has prompted a demonstration claimed to involve thousands of people in the Monas monument demanding that Ahok be removed from the Jakarta governor position and be punished for blasphemy. The demonstration, which became known as the 212 movement, in turn, brought ulama into the latest political configuration in Indonesia. Ulama are not only seen as people who have the authority to issue religious fatwas but also become part of the practical political constellation.

After the Ahok incident, the term ulama echoed on the national stage with various intonations. The political case involving the leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) Rizieq Shihab gave birth to a discourse on ‘criminalizing ulama’, while the arena of presidential election contestation gave birth to the term ‘*ijtima* ulama’, which is said to be considered an important figure in the case of the fatwa on the blasphemy of Ahok, as a candidate for vice-presidential candidate accompanying the incumbent, President Joko Widodo, in the 2019 Election.

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1 The research was conducted from September-October 2018 in the city of Palangka Raya. All informants’ names in this study are disguised to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The author also thanks Supriadi and Muhammad Iqbal for helping the author in collecting data during conducting field research and providing input on Islamic developments in the city of Palangka Raya.

The series of events that show the significant role of the ulama in the political configuration of the homeland in recent years, makes us ask about their views on nation-state development. How do ulama view the right of citizens of different religions to become electorally elected leaders? What are their views on religious and cultural minorities? How do ulama view religious differences? And so forth.

The role of ulama in the nation-state is not a new issue that has surfaced in recent years. When referring to the initial debate on the establishment of the Indonesian nation-state, we can find the strong desires of Muslims (represented by most of the ulama) to propose Islamic visions as a form of the Indonesian state as reflected in the Jakarta Charter. Even before that, the form of an Islamic state had also become a serious discussion in national discourse (Hefner 1997, 2000). Although in its development, the seven words in the Jakarta Charter were abolished as a form of negotiation between various interests including nationalist groups and other religions in Indonesia, the demand to return seven words in the Jakarta Charter sprang up into the public sphere after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The regulations of the Post-Reform Islamic Shari'a (see Bush 2008, 174-191) and heretical fatwas against religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyya (Burhani 2014; Schäfer 2015, 2017; Mariani Noor 2017) made our questions about the perception of ulama towards the nation-state very significant.

Many ulama have reviewed and examined ulama in Indonesia by paying attention to various aspects including the network of ulama and Islamic educational institutions (Azra 2004; Dhofier 1999), their authority and diversity (Azra, Dijk and Kaptein 2010; Kaptein 2004; Kailani 2018; Hoesterey 2015) as well as the role of ulama in the political sphere and social religious fatwa (Horikoshi 1987; Hosen 2003, 2004; Hasyim 2015; Ichwan 2005, 2012, 2013; Mudzhar 1990, 2001; At 2018). Existing studies generally highlight ulama in the national landscape and not many studies that pay attention to the perceptions of ulama regarding nation-states especially ulama in the local domain (except Tayob 2010 and for the case of Palangka Raya Shah 2016).

Continuing the existing scholarship study, this paper will present a map of the ulama's perceptions of nation-states in the city of Palangka Raya that specifically pay attention to the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship. This paper is based on a survey of 30 ulama respondents and interviews with ten ulama. Surveys and interviews were conducted between August-October 2018. The research is part of a survey that we conducted in 15 other cities throughout Indonesia.

This paper reveals that the majority of ulama in Palangka Raya accept the idea of a nation-state especially in the dimensions of the system and nonviolence, but show reservations in the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship. Reservation referred in this paper is the acceptance that is not total or limited to the concept of nation-states - which in this study are put in four dimensions, namely system, nonviolence, tolerance, and citizenship. This paper argues that the reservation of most ulama in the dimension of tolerance and citizenship in Palangka Raya cannot be separated from the historical and creation of a non-holistic nation-state in Central Kalimantan, where the discourse of ethnicity is stronger than civic discourse.

In addition, the outlook of the majority of Palangka Raya ulama who reject the existence and expression of religious minorities, especially internal Islamic groups such as the Ahmadiyya and Shia, also represents a significant reservation in the issue of citizenship. Most scholars mentioned their agreement to recognize the existence of Kaharingan, but rejected the existence of Ahmadis and Shiites. Rejection of the Ahmadiyya and the Shia seems to be in line with the findings of Jeremy Menchik (2016) who said that the majority of NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS scholars accept religious differences, but reject internal religious differences. According to Menchik, this is related to the building of the nation-state of Indonesia which is not based on secularism but godly nationalism.

The concept of the plural nation-state refers to Benedict Anderson's idea of 'imagined community'. According to Anderson, it is called 'imagined community' because there is no experience of direct encounters among members of the nation-state even the members do not know each other. Even so, in each person's mind, they consider themselves as one community. This is mainly due to the mediation of print capitalism (Anderson 2006, 6, 44).

Anderson's idea, in turn, got a lot of criticism because it was "Eurocentric" and universal tendency. One of the main critics of the imagined community idea is Partha Chatterjee, a prominent post-colonial thinker in his book *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories* (1993). In the chapter entitled "Whose Imagined Community?", Chatterjee sharply questions Anderson's argument which states that the historical experience of nationalism in Western Europe, America, and Russia has provided "modular forms" that can be chosen by Asian and African elite. According to Chatterjee, if so, then Asians and Africans do not have their own "imagined community" because they are

inherited from the colonial experience. He argues that the imagination of the nationalists in Asia and Africa should be positioned not about “identity”, but about “difference” with the modular forms of nationalism that the modern West calls for. The politics of “difference” is extracted from the historical narrative of anticolonial nationalism (1993, 5-6).

Chatterjee’s view above seems to help us to analyze why the establishment of nation-states, especially in Palangka Raya, does not fully materialize. Historical experience and the strong narrative of ethnicity have given birth to “imagined community” which is ambiguous and ambivalent. In addition, the godly nationalism forms a “difference” from the experience of nationalism in the West.

This paper will first explore the ulama and shift of religious authority, then describe the typical ulama in the city of Palangka Raya and outline the findings of the survey results by highlighting issues related to the outlook of conservatism and exclusiveness of the ulama to the nation-state. In addition, this paper will also provide an analysis of survey findings emphasizing qualitative findings such as Islamic-Christian relations and the political rhetoric of recognized religious minorities.

#### **ULAMA: TRADITIONAL AND NEW RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES**

The term ulama generally refers to people who have deep knowledge of the Qur’an and Hadith (foundational texts) and classical Islamic traditions. They often have religious education backgrounds such as Al-Azhar or Islamic boarding schools that specialize in learning Islamic sciences. With all these backgrounds, they have the authority to issue religious fatwas (Feener 2007, 2014). In academic studies, these ulama are referred to as traditional religious authorities (Zaman 2009).

Scholars such as Eickelman (1994, 2003, 2004) and Turner (2007) state that traditional religious authorities face significant challenges especially after the emergence of mass education, printing technology, and digital. Both Eickelman and Turner argued that mass education and print and digital technology, in turn, facilitated ‘fragmentation of religious authority’ within Islam. Eickelman calls it ‘the objectivation of religion’ while Turner calls it ‘reflexive religious.’ Both terms refer to how most or common Muslims reflect and discuss their diversity through the ease of access to Islamic material without reference to traditional religious authority sources. Access to education and the development of information technology in Muslim countries, in turn, gave birth to the fragmentation of religious authority.

In addition to the development of media and mass education, in the Indonesian context, the challenges of traditional religious authority also occur because of changes in aspirations and religious political constellations. According to Feillard (2010, 156-176), the modernization of Islamic education in Indonesia, in turn, encouraged traditional *pesantren* *Kyai* to send their children to public universities in the hope that later after the study the children would become familiar with the general sciences in addition to the religious sciences they have obtained while in boarding schools.

Nevertheless, a short time in studying classical religious texts made the *Kyai* children lose the ability to master the yellow books well. In fact, many of them can no longer read the yellow book. On the contrary, 'abangan' circles experience excitement to study Islam. Even though they study on non-religious campuses, they are very active in following the models of Islamic studies based on the halaqah method by both the Salafi, Tarbawi, and Tahriri groups (see Hefner 2000; Hasan 2006; Kailani 2010; Nef 2012).

Feillard (2010, 156-176) argues that changes in the political constellation in the Reformation era encouraged traditional Muslim NU groups to establish political parties, the National Awakening Party (PKB). According to him, most of the *Kyai* children who had previously studied in secular campuses entered the political arena through PKB and were active in politics. Consequently, the recitation rooms and Islam which are generally filled by *Kyai* are replaced by new *Ustaz* who can package religious messages in more interesting ways that amaze urban Muslims. Feillard argues that the aspirations for modernity and changes in the political constellation in the Reformation era have contributed greatly to the dissemination of religious authority in the Indonesian public sphere, especially among traditional religious authorities.

Nevertheless, Muhammad Qasim Zaman said that traditional religious authority does not mean being replaced by new religious authorities. Zaman (2009, 206-236) demonstrates how traditional *ulama* can adapt to the changes that occur in rapidly changing societies by disseminating their lectures and views through the internet, television, and are active in leading national and international organizations.

Considering changes in the landscape of the authority of diversity as described above, the definition of *ulama* in this study refers to people who have a formal religious education background in the sense that they study and explore Islamic texts specifically, whether through educational institutions such as Islamic boarding schools, world-leading

Islamic universities, as well as those who study specifically through the strict tradition of assembly groups. In addition, the definition also includes a new religious authority which is generally characterized as having no strong religious education background. They usually obtain religious knowledge through available and easily accessible sources such as translated books, recitation, and listening and following recitations in current media such as television and the internet.

In academic studies, the new religious authority is also called a religious entrepreneur because of their ability to package religious messages through various mediums such as writing, training, and short videos and delivered through the current new media so as to reach a wider audience (Echaibi 2011; Hasan 2009; Kailani 2018; Nasr 2009, 182). In other words, religious entrepreneurs present Islam within the framework of *da'wahtainment*, namely a combination of religious advice and entertainment. Their ability to package the messages of diversity in the form of *da'wahtainment* can attract the interest of most people to listen and attend the lectures they deliver (Howell 2014; Rakhmani 2016).

Based on the variety of religious authorities mentioned above, the ulama respondents in this study were categorized into four criteria. First, mainstream ulama (mainstream ulama), i.e. ulama affiliated to the two largest organizations in Indonesia, especially NU and Muhammadiyah. Second, non-mainstream ulama, namely ulama affiliated to organizations outside NU and Muhammadiyah such as PERSIS, Al-Wasliyah, DDII, Syiah, and Ahmadiyah. Third, local ulama, namely ulama who have an influence on the local or affiliated with local ulama organizations, and the fourth new ulama, namely ulama who are not affiliated with the three variants above. They are characterized by being active in preaching Islam with attractive methods. The variant includes Salafi, Tarbawi, Tahriri and millennial.

#### **TYPICAL ULAMA IN PALANGKA RAYA**

The majority of ulama in Palangka Raya come from Banjar ethnic groups who migrated to Central Kalimantan. They generally learn Islamic knowledge from *taklim* assemblies initiated by prominent masters in Banjarmasin and from boarding schools such as Darussalam Martapura Islamic Boarding School, Al-Falah, and Darul Hijrah. Banjar ethnicity is often associated with Islam. The merging of Banjar and Islamic ethnicity is often associated with the role of the great Banjar ulama whose works are widely read by the archipelago including Malaysia, Brunei, and Thailand namely Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari (Mujiburrahman, Abidin,



and Rahmadi 2012). According to, Hawkins (2000), being “Banjar” is also synonymous with being a devout Muslim. In fact, according to him, if a Dayak enters Islam, he is a “Banjar.”

Aside from Banjar ethnic, most ulama in Palangka Raya also come from one of the Ngaju Dayak families, the Bakumpai Dayak (Chalmers 2007). The Bakumpai Dayak are known as the only Dayak clan who embraced Islam. Scholars think that their conversion to Islam is based on trade interactions with the Banjar people. In addition, there are opinions that say that Islamization in Bakumpai is related to the Abdussamad's figure, the grandson of Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari who came to the Bakumpai region regularly and taught the Naqsyabandiyah-Syadziliyah order (Nasrullah 2014).

In Palangka Raya, ulama are usually referred to as “tuan guru” (master teachers). Typical ulama in Palangka Raya can be classified into two tendencies, namely ‘traditional’ ulama and ‘modern’ ulama who actively convey religious messages through the *taklim* assembly. While “modern” ulama aside from studying Islamic sciences from the *pesantren* they also continued their studies in Islamic universities such as IAIN / UIN. The type of model of the last ulama usually conducts Islamic teaching not only in *majelis taklim*, but also in offices and is active in Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

In addition to the two ulama tendencies above, there are also new figures who fill the urban missionary landscape, especially in millennial circles. They are usually active in filling in Islamic teachings or seminars among university and school students. Unlike the previous two trends, most of these new figures learn Islam from the internet, especially social media through popular religious teachers such as Abdul Somad and Adi Hidayat. Before giving lectures or motivations to worshipers, they generally listened to lectures from popular religious teachers to explore material and inspiration.

## FINDINGS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ULAMA

The survey was conducted on 30 respondents who represented the category of ulama as described above, namely mainstream ulama, new ulama, local ulama, minority ulama, and millennial ulama. Five respondents were randomly drawn from the representation of NU / Muslimat / Fatayat, six respondents were from Muhammadiyah / Aisiyyah / Nasyiatul Aisiyyah, two respondents from the MUI, one respondent from the Grand Mosque Masjid or Islamic Center, two respondents representing Tuan Majelis Majelis Taklim, three respondents from the representation of minority ulama (Ahmadiyya and Shia), two respondents from new ulama, three respondents from academics, and six




respondents were taken from the representation of millennial ulama. In addition, seven respondents were female ulama and 23 were male ulama.

The survey aims to measure the scale of acceptance and rejection of ulama in Palangka Raya against nation-states. There are four dimensions measured in this survey, namely the dimensions of the system, nonviolence, tolerance, and citizenship. The scale of ulama acceptance of nation-states is grouped into four characteristics of ulama, namely; progressive, inclusive, moderate, and conservative. While the scale of rejection is grouped into three characteristics of ulama, namely; exclusive, extreme, and radical.<sup>2</sup>

The survey results show that there were six respondents or 20.00% of ulama in Palangka Raya are categorized as inclusive, fourteen respondents or 46.67% moderate, two respondents or 6.67% were conservative and three respondents or 10% were exclusive, and five respondents or 16.67% were not identified. In other words, 22 people from 30 respondents accepted nation-states or 73% of all respondents. However, their acceptability varies. In Palangka Raya there were no respondents who were included in the characteristics of progressive ulama, namely ulama who accepted total nation-state and actively promoted it.

The survey results revealed that most ulama in Palangka Raya belong to moderate characteristics (14 respondents). Although accepting nation-states in this study measured in four dimensions, moderate characteristics are below the progressive and inclusive level.

Table 1. Characteristics of Palangka Raya Ulama  
Bart Chart



2 A detailed description of the dimensions and characteristics of ulama can be seen in the Introduction to this book.

Nevertheless, the survey results also show that 6.67% of respondents are categorized as conservative. Conservative characteristics reveal a rejection of the dimensions of citizenship which is the final limit of acceptance of the nation-state and 10% of respondents display rejection of the nation-state. The survey results also demonstrated that 30% or nine people out of 30 respondents showed rejection of the dimensions of citizenship and 20% or six people out of 30 respondents refused tolerance. Although the numbers are small, this is very important to be explored because respondents who are included in conservative characteristics generally have a rejection of the dimensions of citizenship which includes issues of Human Rights (HAM) and democracy. While respondents who are categorized as exclusive, are characterized by the rejection of the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship.

The following description will present some survey results related to issues of tolerance and citizenship. As described at the beginning of the writing that most ulama did not question the differences in religion and the existence of local religions such as Kaharingan, but firmly rejected the existence of Ahmadis and Shiites. As many as 20% or six respondents stated strongly agree and 46.7% or 14 respondents agreed that the Shia group should not openly conduct worship and *da'wah* activities because it is considered as heresy.

Most ulama also expressed their agreement to the statement that the existence of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia was part of an effort to weaken and divide Muslims which is in line with the answers of most of the Palangka Raya ulama above. As many as 26.7% of respondents stated strongly agree and 30% agreed. Only 20% said they disagreed and 3.3% said they strongly disagreed.

In contrast to the case of religious minorities in internal Islam, the majority of ulama agreed to express statements that the state needed to recognize and fulfill the rights of indigenous peoples and their religious beliefs, including local religions. A total of 46.7% of the ulama respondents agreed and 23.3% expressed their strong agreement with the statement. Only 10% of the ulama respondents said they disagreed and 3.3% of respondents stated they did not agree.

In addition, most ulama also do not have problems with religious differences. The majority of ulama agree and strongly agree to the following statement: "All citizens have the right to freedom of opinion, including non-Muslim groups." A total of 46.7% or 14 respondents agreed and 43.3% or 13 respondents strongly agreed. In other words,

only 2 out of 30 respondents who disagree and one stated they were neutral.

The findings above are in line with Jeremy Menchik's research which conducted a survey of a thousand religious' leaders in the NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS circles. According to Menchik, the majority of NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS leaders showed a tolerant outlook towards other religions but presented a high intolerant outlook towards heterodox Muslim groups, especially Ahmadiyah (Menchik 2016, 20). Menchik argued that the secular-liberal political theories that had been referred to in academic studies to review the issue of relations between religion and state and tolerance must be reviewed because according to him religious figures in Indonesia had different ideas about politics from liberal political theories. secular (Menchik 2016, 12). According to Menchik, the character of Indonesian nationalism which is not secular and religious but "godly nationalism" requires understanding that is also not considered secular-liberal towards the model of tolerance that is prominent among NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS leaders.

Although the survey results say that the majority of ulama in Palangka Raya accept religious differences, there are several issues regarding interfaith relations, especially Islam and Christianity in Palangka Raya. This issue surfaced especially in the issue of non-Muslim leaders. The complexity of the relationship between Islam and Christianity in Central Kalimantan is also inseparable from the union of religious and ethnic identities. The following description will present qualitative findings regarding ethnic and religious relations in Palangka Raya and minority issues.

#### **"FEELING THREATENED": ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY IN THE SHADOW OF ETHNICITY AND RELIGION**

Interfaith relations, especially Islam and Christianity in Palangka Raya are generally present in harmonious narratives. Symbolically, the religious leaders, especially the ulama that I met, told me that a harmonious interfaith relationship in the city of Palangka Raya is represented through adjoining masjid and church buildings such as the Evangelical Nasaret Kalimantan church which is adjacent to the Al-Azhar Masjid on Jalan Galaksi and the Evangelist Efrata Kalimantan church with the Nurul Iman Masjid on Jalan Sangga Buana. The religious buildings that have flanks, according to them, show the harmony of Islamic and Christian relations in the city of Palangka Raya.

Ibu Solehah, a teacher from the Muhammadiyah women's organization, Aisyiyah, said that the harmonious relationship between Islam and Christianity is not only symbolic but also practical. In 2015, the Prophet Muhammad's Mawlid and Christmas holiday took place sequentially on December 23 and 24, Thursday and Friday. This event certainly has special meaning when churches and masjid stand side by side. In the city of Palangka Raya, church congregations and masjids arrange Christmas celebrations and Friday prayer services so as not to collide.<sup>3</sup>

Nonetheless, not all the ulama I interviewed agreed with the illustration of the building of worship houses standing side by side as a symbol of interreligious harmony. One of the ulama from the MUI, Kiai Syukri said:

"In my opinion, do not continue to build places of worship which is lined up side by side and claim that this is a symbol of harmony among religious people, in my opinion, it is wrong. Harmony does not need to be presented by building places of worship standing side by side. Religion cannot be united. The most important thing is that people are in harmony and have mutual respect."<sup>4</sup>

The statement of Kyai Syukri is not exaggerating. My in-depth discussion with several informants revealed that the harmonious narrative of Islamic-Christian relationship represented through the building of houses of worship seemed to be rhetorical.

From conversations with several informants, I found stories of cases of conflict over the construction of houses of worship and high sentiments about the issue of Christianization. Kyai Syukri for example strongly believes that Christianization is real. Kyai Syukri said that he had heard the discourse that Palangka Raya would be ordained as a city of a thousand churches. In addition, he also told me the story of his journey to the rural area of Borneo and found that many churches were built without his congregation. In addition, he also explained that many people who converted to Islam are only doing it for the purpose of marriage. Kyai Syukri told:

"I believe it was an act of Christianization because I myself joined their helicopter when they were preaching.

3 Interview, 20 October 2018.

4 Interview, 20 October 2018.

Coincidentally my role at that time was as an agricultural extension lecturer, they did not know that I was also a member of a prominent Islamic organization ... The most significant movement was one of which was the movement of marrying Muslim women so that the Muslimah had become an apostate “<sup>5</sup>

Another discourse that surfaced regarding the relationship between Islam and Christianity was a matter of local political leadership.

When I asked the issue of non-Muslim leaders to the ulama informants, I found a similar response. Although they generally state that democratically elected non-Muslim leaders through elections must be accepted, most of them say that non-Muslim leaders have the potential to prioritize the interests of their religious groups rather than the interests of Muslims.

In contrast to the general discourse of rejection of non-Muslim leaders elsewhere, the narrative of disagreement with non-Muslim leaders in Palangka Raya is not directly related to national political events such as the case of DKI Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or better known as Ahok, but comes from Palangka Raya local experience.

Ustazah Solehah said that when regional heads were led by non-Muslims, most important positions in the government were filled by non-Muslims. According to him, the situation made the aspirations and interests of Muslims marginalized. The same thing was also conveyed by Kyai Syukri. He mentioned that non-Muslim leadership tends to marginalize the aspirations of Muslims. He added that the obligation of ulama to always convey to Muslims to choose Muslim leaders for the benefit of Muslims. Nevertheless, Kyai Syukri firmly stated that non-Muslim leaders elected in the election must be accepted and respected.

The feeling that the interests of Muslims are marginalized or borrowing the term *Mujiburrahman* as “feeling threatened” (*Mujiburrahman* 2006) seems to overwhelm the narrative of the ulama I met. The discourse on Christianization and the concern of marginalizing the interests of Muslim groups whose majority in Palangka Raya felt strong in every conversation. Most of the ulama I interviewed mentioned the feeling of “injustice” experienced by Muslims when led by non-Muslim governors. This experience of two periods led by non-Muslim governors was the trigger for the debate on the pros and cons of the ulama regarding non-

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5 Interview, 20 October 2018.

Muslim leaders.

The tension between the relationship between Islam and Christianity in Palangka Raya does have long historical roots starting in the late 1960s. Mujiburrahman (2017) states that the tension of Islam and Christianity in South and Central Kalimantan stems from state policies regarding the regulation of religious broadcasting to those who already have a religion. According to Mujiburrahman, in April 1969 a meeting was held to discuss a working paper on the regulation of the spread of religion in Kalimantan. A pastor of the Evangelical Christian Church (GKE), E. Saloh, objected to the rules limiting the spread of religion only to adherents of a religion that was not recognized by the state. According to him, the missionary's goal is everything to do with humanity. Saloh is the leader of the Synod of the Evangelical Christian Church (1962-1968) which is the largest church in South and Central Kalimantan. Responding to Saloh's statement above, Rafii Hamdi, one of the participants from the Muslim group interrupted and asked the chairman of the congregation to stop Saloh because he could trigger controversy. According to Mujiburrahman (2017), after the meeting, several Muslim reformist organizations such as PII, HMI, and IMM issued statements protesting against Saloh.

Islamic and Christian narratives in Palangka Raya are also related to the issue of ethnicity. Ethnicity is an important issue that echoes strongly among the ulama I met in Palangka Raya. The events of the ethnic conflict in Sampit between Dayak and Madura in 2001 triggered by a quarrel at a karaoke between the people of the two ethnic groups in the 2000s led to an escalation of violent conflict which resulted in many lives being lost in the event. This conflict has made almost all ethnic Madurese leave the province of Central Kalimantan (Bertrand 2004, 81). This conflict by some Muslims in Palangka Raya is considered to have implications for reducing the voice of Muslims in the political sphere. Ustaz Ashri, an ulama from the Bakakai Dayak ethnic group and active in urban Islamic religious organizations, PKS said:

“There used to be a Sampit case which resulted in the ethnic Madurese being generally exodus Muslims. This certainly has implications for the reduction of Muslim voters. Because it was the end of the war for Muslim tribes, there were also many Dayaks involved. From this point, the issue of regionalism began to emerge, like the Sons of the Soil and those who are not, or immigrants and natives. The issue

is always used as “bargaining” tool, for example, “choose the Sons of the Soil!” In the elections, these kinds of acts always appear. So, ethnicity and religion always appear (he is a Banjar, Javanese, etc.). Some elites consciously take advantage of this issue ... “because you are migrants, remember the Sampit case!” This is how people verbally abuse. The event was used to persecute people or mass organizations that were not approved by the community.”<sup>6</sup>

The discourse of ethnicity in Palangka Raya seems complex and fluid. In certain contexts, as explained by Ustadz Ashri above, ethnicity overcomes religion. The events of the Dayak and Madura conflict in the 2000s overcame religious discourse. All Dayak tribes, whether Christian, Muslim or Hindu-Kaharingan, feel like a unit vis-a-vis the ethnic Madurese who are predominantly Muslim. Meanwhile, in the case of regional leadership, most ulama from the Bakumpai Dayak emphasized Islamic identity rather than ethnicity.

The complexity of ethnic and religious discourse in Central Kalimantan society, referring to Bertrand (2004), cannot be separated from the New Order policy which prioritized ‘national models’ in its state-building in which ethnicity and religion were excluded from discourse nationalism.

It has significant implications for the strengthening of most political narratives that appear in the form of ethnicity and religion. Tolerance and a view of citizenship rights are closely related to the ‘majority’ narrative. ‘For Muslims who make up 67% of Palangka Raya’s population,’ majority ‘narratives are represented in religious narratives, but for Dayaks who are the largest ethnic in Palangka Raya,’ the majority ‘more prominent in ethnicity discourse.

In the context of Central Kalimantan, especially Palangka Raya, Dayaks as the majority ask the central government to provide access to resources including power. Sampit’s conflict became the entrance for Dayak residents to negotiate the discourse of ethnicity which had been experiencing marginalization in the New Order’s developmental narrative (Bertrand 2004, 6). In addition, ethnicity is also intertwined with religion. Religious policies that marginalized local religion, including Dayak beliefs, made most of the Dayak ethnic groups in Palangka Raya embrace Christianity.

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6 Interview, October 27, 2018

The demand for access to resources and power in the post-New Order era was marked by the strengthening of identity politics. Dayak people demand to have a local male leader. However, the regional male discourse, in turn, was coupled with Christians, especially Protestants. Tuan Guru Muhammad from MUI and NU explained the following:

“We cannot deny that identity politics still exists. The identity politics was strongly felt in the era of Teras Narang’s leadership, previously Asmawi Gani, a Muslim. After the Reformation, there was a demand for Dayak people to choose native people. This is when tribal discourse strengthens. Then once the gubernatorial election of the local male discourse was not directed at Islam, it was leaning on Christianity. I see that even Dayak identity must be Christian, possibly Protestant because it is part of the Christian majority.”<sup>7</sup>

In addition to the explanation above, historically Central Kalimantan also recently joined as part of the Indonesian nation in the late 1950s. Referring to Klinken (2006, 2007), the merging of Central Kalimantan with NKRI appears more like a “state-building” instead of a “nation-building”. As a “state-building” the combination with the Republic of Indonesia was a solution to the country’s problems to overcome the vulnerability of remote areas of the archipelago after war and revolution. While “state-building” has been formed, “nation-building” is still separate, ambiguous, and ambivalent. Dayak people still prioritize ethnic identity rather than citizenship (civic).

#### **‘POLITICS OF RECOGNITION’ AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES RHETORIC**

In addition to the issue of Islam-Christian relations which presents the complexity and conduciveness of ethnic and religious discourse in Palangka Raya, the ulama whom I met also demonstrated a distinctive perception of religious minorities. The majority of ulama in Palangka Raya support the existence of local religions, especially Kaharingan, to express their beliefs and agree to the recognition of them, but refuse to recognize religious minorities in internal Islam, especially Ahmadiyah and Shia.

Neng Ana, a millennial religious teacher who actively provides Islamic motivation in the student environment, said that the state must recognize Kaharingan - which is a local religion in Central Kalimantan -, but not

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7 Interview, 22 October 2018



Shia and Ahmadiyah. Neng Ana said:

“For Kaharingan, its existence has been recognized and accepted by the community. If they are Ahmadiyah or Shia claim to be Muslim but have already left the true ways. They should not be given space so that they (Ahmadiyah and Shia) do not spread their teachings in Indonesia. It is very damaging. I once got information that the way of Shia worship was different. Moreover, they made a holy city, even though the holy city that Muslims believed is only Makkah and Madinah, while they made their own holy city.”<sup>8</sup>

Similar with Neng Ana, another millennial ulama, Ustadz Sahid who actively filled the Taklim assemblies around the city of Palangka Raya, also stated that although the Shia and Ahmadiyya have the closeness to Islamic teachings, many things differ from the Islam adhered to by most Indonesian Muslims (read: Sunni).

He said “the Shia were indeed included in Islam, but he claimed that there was the End of Time prophet other than the Prophet Muhammad, namely Ali. So, after we read books about Shia, the direction was deemed heretical. “Nevertheless, Ustadz Sahid firmly stated his disapproval of the persecution of both Shiite and Ahmadiyya groups if they were carrying out their religious activities on condition that they were not carried out in public spaces.”<sup>9</sup>

Mainstream ulama such as MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah have different intonations regarding the existence of Ahmadis and Shiites in Indonesia. One of the leaders of the MUI in Palangka Raya, Kyai Syukri, explicitly stated that the Ahmadiyya and Shia were heretical and should not exist in Indonesian Islam. When I asked the question: “Doesn’t the state guarantee all its citizens to express their beliefs?”, Kiai Syukri said:

“... The idea is good, that the first principle” Belief in the one and only God” comes from the verse *Qulhuwallahu Ahad*. It means that this country is very Islamic. However, the government did not maintain it properly, so various kinds of polemics such as azan, ulama certification, and others including the Shia and Ahmadiyya emerged. The group should not be here.”<sup>10</sup>

8 Interview, 21 October 2018.

9 Interview, 21 October 2018.

10 Interviews, October 20, 2018.

Unlike Kyai Syukri, Ustaz Muhaimin from Muhammadiyah said that Ahmadiyah and Shia should not be “excluded” from Islam. Ustadz Muhaimin believed that the Shia and Ahmadiyya believed in the same god, Allah. However, there are differences in the way of worship or derivation or views about prophethood. By not excluding the Ahmadiyya and the Shia, according to Ustadz Muhaimin, the path of *da’wah* will be easy to convey to them.<sup>11</sup> Similar rhetoric was delivered by Kyai Muhammad from NU who stated that if it is from the Qur’an, the procedure of worship and prophets are the same, then Shia and Ahmadiyah does not need to be accused of being heretical. In addition, Kyai Muhammad also stated that their rights to expression must be protected by the constitution.

Rejection of the Ahmadiyya and Shia as described by the ulama above exposes more theological arguments than citizenship issues.

In general, it can be said that the rejection of the existence of Ahmadis and Shiites in Indonesia is related to the MUI’s heretical fatwa against Ahmadiyah in 2005. According to Burhani (2014), hatred towards Ahmadiyah cannot be separated from the efforts of the majority of Muslim (read Sunni) to safeguard Islamic orthodoxy. Burhani argues that Ahmadiyya misdirection has put them in the liminal position i.e. of not being Muslim on one side but not non-Muslims on the other. This unclear position makes them vulnerable to persecution by conservatives.

In contrast to Burhani, Schäfer (2015, 2017) argues that the rejection of Ahmadiyya and Shia cannot be read solely in theological arguments, but must also be an effort to renegotiate the boundaries of Indonesian state secularism regarding recognized religion. In contrast to the experience in the West, according to Schäfer, most Muslim countries experienced colonialism which when formed into a nation-state was generally led by a regime that did not provide space for religious articulation and expression resulting in resistance or negotiation by religious or ulama circles.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has revealed that the acceptance of ulama in Central Kalimantan, especially Palangka Raya, towards the nation-state which in this study is put in four dimensions, namely, system, nonviolence, tolerance, and citizenship is not comprehensive but there is a reservation. This limited reservation or acceptance is mainly on the issue of interfaith relations, especially Islam-Christian and religious minorities. Despite accepting the validity of electorally elected non-Muslim leaders, most of

<sup>11</sup> Interview, 25 October 2018.

them stated that non-Muslim leadership tended to override the aspirations and interests of Muslims. The same is true of religious minorities. The majority of ulama acknowledge the existence of local religions including Kaharingan, but generally, reject — with a variety of arguments — the existence of Ahmadis and Shiites.

In addition, religious discourse is also closely related to ethnicity. The relationship between ethnicity and religion is often parallel, but sometimes one overcomes the other. Although the fact is not so, Islam is generally identified with the Banjar ethnic. Meanwhile, plural Protestant Christians are associated with Dayak ethnicity. However, this association is not always consistent. Sampit conflict proves how ethnic identity (in this case the Dayak) overcomes religious identity (in this case Islam). However, on the issue of regional leadership, the issue of religion seemed to overcome ethnicity. In this context, most Bakumpai Dayaks prioritize religious issues rather than ethnicity.

The paradox and ambivalence of nation-states in Palangka Raya are also inseparable from the historicity of the formation of the Central Kalimantan province in the late 1950s, which in terms of Klinken (2006) is stronger state-building than nation-building. “Country-building” is more administrative and ambivalent. Despite being part of the NKRI, the discourse of ethnicity is stronger than civic discourse.

Nevertheless, the Palangka Raya case also shows, borrowing Partha Chatterjee’s term, ‘politics of difference’ with the narrative of the central government regarding nation-states. Different historical experiences regarding the ‘nation’ show different modular forms. As a result, the relationship between religion and ethnicity in Palangka Raya is crucial and complex, but conducive.

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# REVIEWING THE DECLINE OF CUSTOM AND THE INCREASE OF SYARA': Construction of Nationality Identity and Politics of Padang City Ulama

*Roma Ulinnuha*

This paper is part of a national research on the views of the ulama of the city of Padang regarding the concept of the nation-state, which includes aspects of democracy, tolerance, nonviolence, and human rights.<sup>1</sup> Kota Padang is widely known as a city with a strong Islamic identity. Islamic nuances appear to be strengthened with the stickiness of the customary *Adat menurun, Syara' mendaki* (Custom declines, Syara' increases), in addition to *Adat bersendi Syariat* (Custom depends on Syariat), and *Syariat bersendikan Kitabullah* (Syariat depends on Syariat). Both describe concrete forms of cultural and religious considerations, special markers of the people of Padang.

As a collective construction, a kind of national politics, the concept of the derivation of the nation-state in the form of democracy, tolerance, and citizenship is interpreted by various ulama. This research shows a novelty in the form of ulama outlooks towards the nation-state, while some previous studies revolved around how ulama took part and were active in society in terms of education and modernity and the significance of Islamic education institutions. The significance of the role of ulama in religious societies has been examined by Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2002, 78), including religious education which shows the active involvement of scholars in modern life.

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1 The description of Ulama in the context of this research rests on but can surpass the definition of Ulama as someone with a reference to having knowledge of Islamic religion, originating from the singular form of the Arabic word "Alim", such as the definition of Djohan Effendi (2008, xxi). Ulama in this research are concerned with religious authority which is not only obtained from Islamic boarding school education for mastering Islamic knowledge but also intertwined with attribution to Ulama by certain religious groups.



Other writings related to the aspect of education in Indonesia in the context of the synergy of civil society and democratic countries were mentioned by Robert W. Hefner (2001, 509-510) as a vital aspect of socio-religion in Indonesia. Both aspects of the role of religious leaders, order, and citizenship in democracy in Indonesia, can be used as part of the initial reading to discuss the outlook of ulama to the concept of the nation-state. Meanwhile, critical research is needed when reading the involvement of the state and civil society in matters of citizens 'rights and obligations, can be traced through the record of the ideals of citizens' equality that are far removed from the fire (Cholil 2008, x). The role and the old context in this research, are more about Islamic figures, such as the thoughts of Syed Rizwan Zamir (2014, 163), in which he emphasizes the side of social and political activity, which brings the echo of Islamists to the context of the nation-state common sense.

This paper describes the aspects of reservation, negotiation, and contestation of the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang. Set in urban socio-religious settings, the focus of the issue of this paper covers the following questions. Does the intellectual reservation, negotiation, and contestation that contains the meeting point as well as the separation point of view of the ulama on issues of democracy, tolerance, non-violence, and citizenship, provide a solid foundation for the future of Indonesia? How is the fragmentation of the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang with the background of socio-religious organizations as well as various socio-cultural dimensions, including the fragmentation of the identity of ulama, ulama institutions, and ulama characters? The issue was presented as one of the important elements to explain the ulama's identity politics in the national political clause.

The argument of this paper is, in the discourse of the nation-state, no matter how strong the penetration of the antithesis claims acceptance of the system of government, tolerance, nonviolence and citizenship, while ulama in Padang and the severity of differences in addressing contemporary cases such as immunization and female president in the Islamic view, the national political behavior of the Ulama Padang is quite solidly maintained with the *ḍarūrī* principle and hybridization of indigenous Islamic *cum*. The modality is coupled with the moderation of Islamic education and the wealth of treasures of knowledge of moderation of nation and state originating from local ulama leaders, especially Minang Muslim scholars, and Indonesian Muslim scholars in general. Efforts to strengthen and tend to violence, radicalism, and extremism are marginal

with the massive rejection of the concept by the Minang community.

This brief article first mapped the fragmentation of ulama based on religious-social organizations in the city of Padang through a series of preliminary surveys of 30 Padang City Ulama and follow-up interviews with 12 Ulama, representing mainstream ulama, new Islamic ulama, minority ulama and young ulama in October 2018. At the beginning of the writing, the results of observations and interviews with the ulama were then discussed in the aspect of reservation. The second part explains the plurality of ulama outlooks so that it raises the aspect of contestation, while the next section discusses intellectual negotiations. In some parts of the writing, while quotations from verbatim interviews are included as justifications for aspects of reservation, contestation, and negotiation.

#### **ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND AND OUTLOOK TENDENCY IN NATION-STATES**

The outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang cannot be considered singular in the acceptance of the concept of the nation-state. The Islamic organization and community background of the ulama can relate and determine the plurality of outlooks to democracy and leadership. While the ulama of the city of Padang are characterized by a modernist predominance with several religious organizations such as the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI). PERTI, which was born from the roots of the Ahlus Sunnah Waljamaah Ulama in 1930, is the estuary of various Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and other mass organizations in West Sumatra cities in general. The Padang Ulama Council (MUI) of the city of Padang, which is part of the elite of its organization affiliated to PERTI, is a mainstream religious organization and has a strong influence on public issues regarding Islamic, social, and local politics. In addition to the MUI, scholars of new religious movements such as Salafi and Tarbiyah play a strong role, especially the latter in the context of regional politics. In the constellation of Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah organizations, quite dominant, in addition to the Tarbiyah movement, in the socio-political landscape of the city of Padang, while the Ahmadiyya Jamaat, representation of minority religious groups was able to consolidate their organizations with a long historical trajectory in Padang since the early decades of the 20th century. The research of new ulama with the use of mass media and print, although their existence appears only on local TVs such as TVRI and NET, show that the influence of new ulama from outside the city of Padang is quite

obvious, such as Ustaz Abdul Somad and Arifin Ilham, as well as other Ustaz who are invited in various cities in Indonesia. Some informants said that the fact that the new ulama came to be invited to lectures by various parties but that the impact of their role model figure did not show any significant impact.

The new ulama have used information technology-based social media and electronic media in Islamic expressions and da'wah. This research context does not emphasize the use of pamphlets and studies on social media but focuses more on the temporary outlook of ulama on nationality and the role of these ulama in Islamic religious education assemblies such as Islamic teachings, *zikir* (praying) assemblies and *taklim* assemblies.

In the context of the city of Padang, the tendency of the percentage of ulama with progressive, inclusive, moderate, and conservative (receptionist) characteristics from the results of the national survey are follows. Quantitative data taken from a survey of thirty ulama in the city of Padang showed that there were no progressive characteristics of ulama, seven were inclusive, eight were moderate, two were conservative, six were exclusive, and five were not identified, while the radical and extreme characteristics were one person. The typology of Padang ulama with receptionist characteristics amounted to seventeen people, there were no identified five people. There are eight ulama who tend to be exclusive, radical, and extreme so that they are included in the characteristics of the rejectionist. The quantitative data will then be discussed to show various interesting levels of response to be observed about how ulama see the concept of nation-states in Padang.

Survey data about the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang as preliminary data to map their outlooks towards the concept of the nation-state, is enough to help explain the ulama's views deeply about various issues related to the dimensions of the system, tolerance, non-violence, and citizenship. Through fieldwork in the form of observations and in-depth interviews with twelve target informants, a number of informants were chosen to represent four spectra of ulama, namely mainstream, Salafi, minority, and new ulama.

The aspect of acceptance of Padang ulama on the state system which contains outlooks towards the concept of NKRI based on Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity), can be said to be a final acceptance. This general picture, as in the outlook of ulama in other cities, can be considered as a basic modality to support the continuity of the Indonesian national and state foundation. These

outlooks include the tendency to tolerate the existence of non-Muslims and minorities who seek to live peacefully and non-violence side by side, although there are still several inter-religious and inter-ethnic nuances of conflict. As part of the rights and obligations of citizens to support a safe and peaceful life (Dixon 2009, 68), the modality is very important. To really understand, we need an in-depth observation of how the complex process of modality is formed.

There are criticisms of Padang city ulama on the principle of nation-state. Intellectual presentation of reservation,<sup>2</sup> in this section, is observed from the relationship between democracy and Islam, female leaders, and cases of halal immunization. These three aspects are analyzed in the derivative aspects of the nation-states above. In addition, the relationship between democracy and Islam, women's leaders, and cases of halal immunization, is an important point with enough data in the context of the city of Padang, which can show clearly the reservation made from the ulama in accepting the concept of the derivation of the nation-state.

Quantitative data shows that the tendency of Padang ulama in respect of citizenship values is quite high, namely 60% of 30 respondents. This dimension of the ulama shows the general outlook of the ulama to the issue of conformity between democracy and Islam which then sustains acceptance of the democratic system, and actively encourages the system to be understood and agreed upon later implemented in the life of the nation and state. The explanation below shows that the acceptance of these ulama does not just happen, but is mixed by various conditions and considerations.

When asked about the suitability between Islam and democracy, the Padang city ulama presented a variety of answers included in their reservation. As the informant said in the background of Islamic boarding school and Islamic education, democracy is seen as a concept that recognizes that people's voices are God's voice. In the clause of democracy, it was agreed that the most votes were the winners of the system and the right to hold the government. Ulama who are active in a few *taklim* and Dzikir assemblies, submit the following reservation. If democracy operates by denying the value of truth and allowing wrong practices, especially supported by the unclear what system governs it, then the suitability of democracy with Islam is difficult to accept.

2 Reservation, in the context of this research, is in the form of conditional acceptance, namely a position of view accepting on issues such as democracy, tolerance, non-violence, and citizenship, but there are certain terms and conditions for such acceptance.

On the other hand, these ulama accepted the form of the state of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution as an indisputable pillar of the nation-state, but in the derivative concept of nation-states especially democracy, the ulama's outlook seemed difficult to accept without being accompanied by strong commitment and integrity from political figures. The argument is the voice of the people is a mandate that must be accounted for through processes and methods that are right in the eyes of Islam.

Other reservations can be found in the statement of ulama who are known to often provide training in educational institutions as well as to fill in various media events, such as Padang<sup>3</sup> local television and ijma '(consensus) of ulama.

"Sometimes democracy is not in line with Islam if the policymakers of secular people are not guided by the Qur'an and hadith and ijma 'ulama. Especially in the current regime/government, democracy is according to their taste or their group. In my opinion, if democracy is guided by Islamic teachings, I would agree, even though the name of Indonesian democracy is important, but the essence and substance should come first, which is guided by Islamic teachings. Therefore, let us choose the true leader in favor of Islam, and the people around the leader who are pro with Islam, not hypocrites. "

Furthermore, we will discuss the ulama's outlook towards democracy and Islam, the modernist background ulama in Padang and who participate in masjid activities and *taklim* assemblies, hints at differences in terms and concepts behind democracy and its consequences in the election of leaders, as a record of not meeting the suitability of democracy with Islam.

"I think democracy is indeed very different from what we adhere to in Islam. Islam is a system of deliberation and when people are invited, they are supposed to think and state their ideas and opinions. We know that democracy is based on most votes in terms of election of leaders. For example, the chosen leader is someone who does not understand religion, so that is the leader who must obey. Of course, Islam does not want anything like that. How

3 Interview with BS on Friday, October 12, 2018, in East Padang.

the leader must be should be according to my criteria, “the believer must lead the believer”. Therefore, democracy is different in the deliberation system.”

After aspects of democracy and Islam, another form of the reservation is the issue of women’s leadership. A survey of 30 Padang city ulama shows that there are 18 ulama who agreed on concepts of citizenship, while the rest disagreed. This dimension of citizenship contains the principle of acceptance of citizens as fellow human beings and the acceptance of the basic principles of the rights and obligations of citizens in politics, such as the right of women to occupy strategic positions in the legislature and executive. Ulama who are quite active in several majelis taklim argue that women’s participation can be accepted, both in the context of government and other organizations, but need to be added with skills and competencies.<sup>4</sup>

“I agree that the leader is a woman, if the female leader is authoritative, capable, capable, willing to lead respected, and respected by her people. In Indonesia, it was also led by a female president but ... in leading Indonesia ... and the country was destroyed and damaged at that time. Many of the country’s assets are sold, chaos everywhere. If the woman is competent in leading there is no harm in leading women to become ministers, governors, judges, and others.”

Furthermore, the ulama with a broad collection of Islamic literature based their views on aspects of the terms of acceptance of female leaders by emphasizing the contextual understanding of hadith.

“There is a hadith of al-Bukhari, al-Turmudzi, and an-Nasa’i from Abu Bakrah about women and leadership. There will be no success of a people (people) who surrender (to lead) their affairs to women. The Hadith should not be understood textually but must be understood contextually because the nature of the hadith is temporal. When the hadith was delivered by the Prophet, there was a Persian king who was appointed Queen, Buwaran bint Syairawih bin Kisra Barwaiz. However, because the Queen is not authoritative, she was not respected by the people. The community at that time lacked the trust in women until

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4 The second interview with BS on Monday, October 15, 2018.

the Persian empire was destroyed. It is the reason that the prophet's words were released."

The reservation outlook towards women's leadership, then conveyed by female ulama with a background of mainstream Islamic organizations that agreed on women's leadership with modalities of skills, abilities, and electability.<sup>5</sup>

"It's not a problem and there is nothing wrong if we choose a female leader as long as she meets the criteria. If a country is not an Islamic state and a democratic country, of course, the rights of all countries are the same and it does not have to be a man to lead, if the woman is capable, it is not a problem and indeed the community needs a capable leader. Sri Mulyani's ability is to become a finance minister is a great example. The economy improved and when the rupiah increased, she was considered capable of handling it and she was also recognized by other countries such as America. If she wants to become president, it is legitimate and has the right to be elected due to the democratic country."

The aspect of accepting the female leader clause by the Ulama of Padang, like the previous aspect, illustrates the large requirements proposed to accept women's leadership still exist. In the era of information openness and freedom of expression, the conditions proposed for the acceptance of the derivative concept of the nation-state mark part of the outlook of religious authorities towards the nation-state, where the reservative views are then distributed to the consumption of knowledge of worshipers, assemblies taklim, and sermon. At a certain point, the Islamic community of the city of Padang, will recall the forms of knowledge received from the Ustadz and influence the way of determining outlooks on aspects of democracy, Islam, and women's leaders. This configuration of knowledge will later intersect with a series of antithetic ideas, where interagency contestation can be observed.

The next form of the reservation is observed in the issue of immunization. This immunization program is one indicator of the outlook of the ulama in responding to the policies of the elected government. The response of the ulama who agreed on an immunization program was a characteristic of the ulama with a pro-government character. The pro-

5 Interview with MB, the leader of the mainstream women's organization on Sunday, October 14, 2018.

government character is included as part of a pro-system outlook that respects the principles of the nation-state based on Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the framework of NKRI which is united in diversity. The content of the outlook includes the acceptance of regulations issued by the government including policies regarding immunization for health and benefit. The survey results show that 93.33% of the total 30 ulama of Padang city agreed on this pro-system clause. The pro-system dimension score is quite high, which found 9 out of 30 respondents, showing a score above 70%. Especially in the case of immunization, Padang ulama developed a more careful outlook regarding the issue of the immunization agreement.

While ulama accept immunization policies as part of efforts to improve preventive health degrees. The acceptance is received if it is in an emergency. The statement is seen as the narrative of young ulama who use the media a lot in their religious preaching.<sup>6</sup>

“Whatever the immunization is called, whether it is Rubella or others, we are guided by fiqh and ushul fiqh and maqasid sharia. The beginning of the rubella vaccine was stated by ulama as illegitimate because it contained pig and human pancreas elements. Then the MUI fatwa came out because there was no other drug/vaccine found, so the question is: are children already sick? Are the lives of our children under threat? If not, the logic of thinking is that the child is not necessarily sick and the lives of the nation’s children are not being threatened (*maqasid sharia; hifdlhu ‘l-nafs*, guarding the soul). This is not an emergency, while the forbidden is injected into the body of the nation’s children. This is not an emergency, this is coercion. There is a possibility of an opportunity for the government to pressure the MUI. Ministry of Religion under the orders of the government. This virus is a project and already bought by the government. Indonesia is often under pressure from foreign parties. Regarding the issue of pain and the future, only Allah knows. If you are sick, then seek treatment. If the illness is life-threatening and there are no other drugs, then the rukhsah / relief is only valid in the case of emergency, those which are considered haram is allowed. “

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6 Interview with BS on Monday, October 15, 2018.



The outlook of acceptance with the following halal conditions on immunization was also conveyed by mainstream ulama from Nahdlatul ulama.<sup>7</sup> The statement are follows.

“On the one hand, as a preventive measure, I agree. But indeed, because substances that are inserted into the body will become part of the blood and flesh of humans, then halal items are necessary because it will affect the body. Referring to the West Sumatra MUI fatwa, there are immunizations that are not recommended before the halal status can be ascertained.”

The outlook of affirmation on the issue of immunization was delivered by the Indonesian Ulama Council in the city of Padang that “immunizations that already have MUI fatwas is clear and there are no problems anymore.” Amid the issue of halal vaccines, while modernist ulama agree on immunization under emergency conditions and benefits elements fulfilled.

“If the immunization is in accordance with the fatwa of the ulama council. but contains materials from pigs (which is haram), it is permissible for emergency purpose only. The question is whether Indonesia is in an emergency? Are our children in an emergency? If we are in a state of emergency, then go ahead and proceed. Vaccines for children are indeed important so they can become children who grow up with a strong immune system and prevent them from dangerous diseases in the future. If indeed it is for the benefit of the children, and the benefit of the people. I don't think that's a problem.”

The explanation above which emphasizes the fact that the form of reservative outlooks is reflected in the conditional views on the issues of democracy and Islam, women's leadership, and immunization policies by the government, can also be linked to the general description of ulama as part of Minang people who are not easily influenced by new issues. People of Minang, however far from the principle of obligation as Muslims in matters of worship, for example, but if they brought up the realm of Islamic teaching values such as deliberation, male leaders, and issues of halal vaccines, their religious sense will emerge and strengthen.

The reservation element is supported by a fatwa delivered by the MUI as well as through the distribution of Islamic values in religious events such as *majelis taklim* and Holy Koran recitations.

The way of thinking of the Minang people who are not easily influenced by new issues and the conservative distribution of Islamic knowledge by the ulama, is two justification points about the difficulty of external penetration into the Muslim knowledge of the city of Padang. Negotiations and reservations in this paper illustrate the acceptance of the Muslim community and Padang ulama towards the country's ideology which is quite high, but its acceptance tends to be low when dealing with new issues such as democracy and Islam, women's leaders, and immunization. The hallmark of the ulama and Muslim community of the city of Padang and its reservation is one that distinguishes the ulama in other cities in Indonesia.

#### CONTESTATION OF PADANG CITY ULAMA IN THE MIDDLE OF BALANCE AXIS

The outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang in looking at the idealism of leaders, democracy, Islam Nusantara (the Islam Archipelago), and religious minorities, can be used as a marker of contested identity construction to obtain socio-cultural recognition, the fulfillment of community group aspirations, and accessibility of power. This section of the paper reviews the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang to the issue of leaders, democracy, Islam Nusantara, and minorities, and shows the existence of an axis of balance that sustains the outlook of ulama to the nation-state.

The first form of outlooks concerning the position of ulama in assessing themselves and the objectives of Islamic activism. With Islamist characteristics that are quite strong, the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang shows the basic and typical signal that all groups want to be leaders in Padang. This fact then leads all interested parties to express their response as identity politics. The ulama's outlook towards leadership, democracy, Nusantara Islam, and to religious minorities, besides being rooted in the theological dimension, also touched on social issues while still using Islam as its main content to push them into the contestation field. The Padang Ulama, for the provision of leadership contestation, requires a set of internalization patterns to understand and assess the social world (Pierre Bourdieu 1977, 1992). The statement was conveyed by ulama in the city of Padang, who had meet the socio-political domain of religion since the New Order government began around the 1980s.

The outlook of the Padang city ulama to various cases, thus, led to the construction and expression of massive Islamic identity. Identity becomes important with the aim of obtaining access, affirming roles, and taking part in power and authority. Strong religious authority and enough influence will strengthen the bargaining position with high probability in the matter of leadership.

It is interesting to look at why the outlook of the ulama agreed on the concept of the nation-state but was very critical of derivative concepts such as democracy. This situation shows the indication that the ulama who portrayed the concept of the nation-state was suspected of being responsible for the deterioration of the Muslims. While the concept of democracy is an important pillar of the nation-state, ulama with the principle of tracing to the glory of Islam in the early period, convey the following aspects of contestation.<sup>8</sup>

“It is true that democracy is not in line with Islam. There is no democracy in Islam. And democracy, as known together, comes from the infidels, not from Islam. Wallāhu a‘lam.”

The part of internalization built from the statement above shows that outlooks towards democracy are used as values that are understood and used to justify bargaining positions as Muslims by expressing a firm identity to systems outside of Islam. The outlook towards democracy, which is believed to be temporary by the Padang city ulama with secondary education and Islamic boarding schools, was then used to assess the position of other Muslim groups who believe in the alignment of democracy with Islam. A series of patterns carried out through the process of internalization then became a marker or special feature of Islamic groups that opposed democracy. Contestation on the issue of democracy involves terms, as seen in the belief that democracy is not from Islam, but from the infidels. The binary opposition of Islam, which is used as a differentiator of democracy, then influences the perspective of action, and socio-religious activism more broadly.<sup>9</sup>

Contestation outlooks towards subsequent democracy, conveyed by ulama in the city of Padang with a strict view on Islamic Shari’a said as follows.<sup>10</sup>

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9 Ibid

10 Interview with N, affiliated with MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), on Wednesday, October 17, 2018

“Bismillahiraahmaanirrahiim. The views and reviews of democracy that exist in Indonesia from an Islamic point of view are basically all laws and provisions in the life of the nation and state are absolutely regulated by Allah SWT through the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. But when living in a democracy then making a law then setting it later becomes a guideline that if the established law is under the Qur’an there is certainly no problem. It means it refers to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. But when the law is made and established outside the Qur’an, this is where the difference of opinion begins. Because this is indeed the real problem. This is included in the realm of monotheism and this includes the fundamental problems in life and life above this world. When a person rules to the law other than the law of Allah then this is purely in the syariat as haram. But when the law was made later based on the arguments that exist according to the Qur’an and the, of course, there is no problem. Because, the Prophet himself taught the sunnah that the affairs of your world *syūrā bainakum, bermusyawarahlah* (Do deliberate). So, basically there nothing wrong with democracy. Only the problem is arising when the person carrying it out in it makes the law not based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It was what some ulama think. “

The form of contestation in a democracy is quite diverse, starting from the first on the differentiation of the term of democracy originating from the binary opposition of Islam-infidel as observed by the informant’s narrative above so that the whole process of democracy refers to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The internalization pattern that is used as an important understanding in looking at themselves and other groups, is quite strict with a legal statement that does not refer to God’s law, so the law is unlawful. This temporary picture of the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang is an attempt by Islamists to see Islam, not only as religious teaching but also extending to a wider system of life. The Islamist adage which is evident in the view that democracy in binary opposition of Islam-infidels and normative claims of God’s law, strengthens the Islamist epistemology with a reference to the textual superiority of Islam and transcendent ideas, which are sharply confronted with institutional

construction and man-made ideology. The totality of religion and strengthening of the Islamic concept is important markers.

The method of conveying aspects of contestation in the country is mostly carried out through the path of da'wah in taklim assemblies, recitations, and other religious studies such as training and workshop for dai and religious consultation.

In this way, the new ulama can slowly shift the authority of the clergy who only emphasize the normative issues of religion. The concept of the nation-state thus, because it is linked as part of globalization and modernity while the Islamic scholars, while it needs to be addressed with strong criticism.

In addition to the critically addressed democracy, the portrait of the case of the establishment of the Krematorium in the city of Padang can be used as an example of a form of conflictual contestation, where exclusivity is the main idea. The conflict originated from the establishment of crematoriums by Chinese ethnic groups. Intensive communication triggered a rejection of the establishment of a crematorium which was thought to leave residues, smoke, and odors, even though the location was near the center of Islamic studies. From the informant's narrative, the crematorium is actually a new technology without residue. The case of the refusal of the crematorium to present meeting rooms of various interests and struggles to make it happen in the public and religious spheres, at the same time became a characteristic marker while the ulama of the city of Padang tend to be exclusive. The case of rejecting the establishment of the crematorium ended with mediation by the MUI, the city government, and the FKUB. However, the refusal itself at the insistence of the Islamists is a manifestation of contestation in the tolerance clause and is quite successful in disrupting the position of the nation-state which implies the plurality of religion, ethnicity, and class. At this point, awareness of Islamist penetration can emerge at any time when religious conservatism is faced with citizenship issues. The exclusive Islamist penetration was recorded in survey data which showed many exclusive characters ulama in the city. From several respondents from the Padang city ulama and then willing to be interviewed, half of the 11 had exclusive tendencies. Exclusivity gives a special characteristic with an active outlook of intolerance and does not agree on citizenship clauses.

The next point of contestation on the concept of the nation-state is the reluctance to be tolerant of the Nusantara Islamic discourse. The discursive outlook of some of the ulama of the city of Padang responded

to the construction of the Islamic Archipelago carried by the Nahdlatul Ulama. The response of the Islamists manifested itself in the discourse of self-identification by Islamists as observed in the rejection of Nusantara Islam by members of the West Sumatra MUI. Padang's MUI affirmed its position by conveying the statement that the Islamic Archipelago caused debate and interpretation was not necessary among Muslims.

“Concerning Islam in the archipelago. Which when added to the word “on” is safe, but when the word “on” is missing, there is a concern. Is that concern because there is indeed something that provides motivation, say from our friends Middle East alumni who often understand this problem textually. So that's the point for me, so if you don't go too far, it's not taken in a more directional direction to the left. If it is still like a way of understanding that we live diverse, that Islam is present in a society that has been cultured too, that Islam accepts culture if it does not conflict with the aqeedah there is no problem. That is in terms of what I feel from the conversation from the spirit of the ulama assembly. Then from the real community, I used to be when Islam in the archipelago became a discourse for example wanting to write about this. But when I met with the community, especially the people who were religious, understanding religious practice was good, but their knowledge was limited. I call this the term people whose diversity of enthusiasm is higher than their knowledge. People from our friends who are in the head of service, for example, or general intellectuals, for example, we must admit that their enthusiasm is higher than their knowledge. He is very much affected by this discourse.”<sup>11</sup>

The statement of rejection of the Nusantara Islam while the West Sumatra ulama showed a passive outlook towards citizenship tolerance. The temporary outlook of the Padang city ulama to the Nusantara Islam emerged from the offer of the archipelago Islamic epistemology that was built and believed to be a support for the nationality and Islam of Indonesia. The concept of Nusantara Islam by the Nahdlatul Ulama is intended as an Islamic discourse to make Islam in Indonesia more down to earth. The Islamic concept of the archipelago can be summarized

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11 Interview with DS, figure of MUI in Padang, on Thursday, October 11, 2018.

as the crystallization of values that all citizens need to follow with the foundation of social change without breaking the attachment to the historical element. In the process, the cultural reality is absorbed in the character of Nusantara Islam. The response from the Nahdlatul Ulama to the Islamists has been conveyed.

In the 33rd NU Pre-Congress Conference in Makassar, ulama affirmed a temporary misunderstanding of Islam groups that disagreed with Nusantara Islam because of the labeling aspect of Islam. Nusantara Islam is empirical and distinctive as a result of interaction, contextualization, indigenization, translation, vernacularization of universal Islam with social, cultural, and literary realities in Indonesia. Islam thus manifests itself in the realization of daily life, with human nature, in addition to the divine.

The understanding of the archipelago's Islam also emphasizes the contextual dimensions of the scriptures by considering local customs ('urf) for the benefit of the worldly religion. Nusantara Islam emphasizes the principles of historical experience, dominant religious orientation, rooted Islamic indigenization, respect and determination for tradition, construction of Islamic groups with inclusive and dialogical Islamic discourses, and enlightening roles of Indonesian organizations and thinkers.<sup>12</sup>

While the outlook of those who reject the concept of Nusantara Islam as the premise supporting the nation-state, in the body of the MUI in West Sumatra, there is also an internal contestation process. In the MUI Padang, the term of Nusantara Islam was rejected in relation to religious feeling, for example when the chanting of the holy verses of the Qur'an was practiced with Javanese, Malay, or Sumatran styles. While the ulama of the city of Padang are characterized by this inclusiveness, emphasizing disagreement on the psychological acceptability of the region or religious feeling. This ulama continued that the actual meeting of Islam with culture was understandable without labeling. The proof is, while the Minang community is still carrying out the practice of reciting the tahlil three days after the mourning, with emphasis on aspects of social cohesion. Moreover, regarding the negotiation of Minang values, between Islam and local culture, can be found in the discussion of this section later. At that point, religious and cultural negotiations contributed to the

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12 The 33<sup>rd</sup> NU Pre-Muktamar discussion data in Makassar, April 2015, the full news can be accessed at <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/59035/apa-yang-atas-islam-nusantara>, accessed November 17, 2018.

foundation of Indonesianness and Islam is needed in the construction of the nation-state.

The variants of the outlook of the MUI in the city of Padang besides being inclusive can also be observed from the outlook of the character of exclusive ulama, in which the reason for the rejection of Islam Nusantara by the MUI was based on a few concerns. Moral panic becomes strong with fear of the entry of Liberalism. Meanwhile, on the other hand, according to the informant, it was Padang ulama who were more aware of the Islamic community in the area. This ulama, with several activities in Islamic education institutions in city masjid, agreed more on the concept of Islam in Indonesia. An additional note for the rejection of the Nusantara Islam is that Nusantara does not need to be labeled Islam. Islam remains with the term Islam itself.

The temporary refusal of ulama on the concept of the Nusantara Islam, as conveyed by members of the West Sumatra MUI interviewed, shows the existence of Islamic identity politics, namely the exclusivity of religious meaning. Likewise, while ulama outside the MUI, Nusantara Islam is considered quite difficult to accept in West Sumatra. The size is no longer *terma*, but the ultimate truth comes from God. The epistemological foundation of the archipelago's Islam, addressed by the active-intolerant ulama and active in not agreeing to this clause of citizenship, needs to be assessed by the rules of God's truth. This outlook is quite radical in the idea because it is rather difficult to explain how the superiority of the religious text is derived together with the solidity of the transcendent ideas into a form of outlook that can be interpreted between sacred and worldly forms (profane) at the sociological level.

"Let alone the Islam of the archipelago, the Islam brought by the Prophet himself is very difficult in Indonesia. The most difficult place to entry was West Sumatra. Before our country was led by King Adityawarman with a state of non-Muslim religion. When ulama from the Middle East brought the Qur'an. The Qur'an itself is difficult to be accepted in West Sumatra. Today it turns out that the character of West Sumatra people is when it is *haq* true, whose measure of truth is only Allah, so the West Sumatran people are the most persistent in holding on to defend the religion of Allah. So when today there is a new story, regardless of whether we speak right and wrong, the Qur'an is difficult to enter into West Sumatra. Moreover, this new story that carries the book, so many of its books cannot be ascertained according to the rules of Allah. Well, this is the latest new problem. The development continues



if it is in accordance with Allah just like as if the people of West Sumatra would receive exactly the Koran in the past. It is difficult to enter. But if it's *haq*, it's hard to take off. The Islam of the Archipelago is *al-bāthil*, while the *haq* is difficult to accept".<sup>13</sup>

The contestation of the concept of nation-state reflected in the issues of leadership, democracy, and Nusantara Islam is quite evident in the context of the outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang. The next axis of balance will be explained to explain the strength of Islamists with the contestation, there is a temporary belief of the ulama in the MUI that the concept of Islam is quite strong to be used together in a social context. Historically, Islam was difficult to enter in Padang's customs, but it is strong enough to be used as a foundation when it is included in the socio-religious cognition that marks a plural and dynamic social construction.

The strengthening of Islamist solidity, according to the informant who considers Padang as a radical city and is more of an accent in the idea, but with a soft and flexible expression. With other articulations, there is an appropriation process when there is a distance between ideality and reality, such as Taufik Abdullah (1966, 1) described as an effort to reconcile behavior and value standards. In certain stages, of course, this position will collide in the conflict of authority and power and aspects of the surrounding environment.

#### **FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS ON PADANG CITY ULAMA AT NATION-STATE**

The character of some of the Padang city ulama who are moderate in character can be seen from the results of the survey, showing the negative aspects of strengthening passivity. This can be seen from the view of democracy. As one of the activists of a nationally understood Islamic women's organization, as the main jargon, the informant said that the democratic system is a choice of the consequences of the nation-state which is constructed, as the antithesis of a religion-based state. The representation of the female representation informant emerged a process that was mentioned (De Fina 2006, 355) as a constant construction of negotiations, which was seen through outlooks towards the form of democratic choice. Although informants distinguish between democracy and Islam, and therefore, both are two things that are not right to compare, the statement shows a passive outlook in accepting democracy as a mere choice, and at the same time, negates the construct of religion as the basis of the state. The further consequence is that as citizens, the

<sup>13</sup> Excerpt of interview with N, on Wednesday, October 17, 2018.

outlook of submission as a form of respect for the system prevailing in the democratic system of government becomes apparent.

Negotiating outlooks can then be seen from how the formalization of Islamic law is seen by temporary ulama of the city of Padang. It can be observed that there are two important principles, namely Muslims as the majority and Minang people are becoming Muslims, as two main things in the negotiating arena. As understood, the Muslim aspect is the dominant discourse in the context of Islamic religiosity in the city of Padang.

Nearly half of the informants of the Padang city ulama repeated the statement that Muslims need to take an important role after the Reformation. One way in which Islam can obtain rights as a majority and then determine its aspirations and political interests more extensively is through executive control and parliament with the important agenda of making Islamic law manifest in a formal context. While the ulama in the city of Padang stressed that, ulama in Padang certainly understood the interests of the Islamic community in the educational, social, and religious realms. The core formalization of Islamic law in West Sumatra is to further connect the unfinished role of the state in the form of sharia regulations. Various regional regulations, including the Governor's Regulations and so on, can be a forum for how aspirations while Islam is voiced. According to the informant, the realization of the formalization of Islamic law is not in the form of *qishas* extremes and so on, but rather regulates religious discourse in the public sphere that touches socio-cultural aspirations and interests such as managing school clothes according to Islamic principles, responding to anxious communities in the presence of musical band, mediation of socio-religious issues, and eradication of immorality. Several studies show that non-Muslim cities in Padang can understand the implementation of Islamic law, but need further studies on how negotiating processes are agreed and implemented (Ancient 2016, 29).

Furthermore, the discussion focuses on the negotiation space between citizens with *Muslimimness* as a characteristic of *Islamicism* in the city of Padang and an obligation to respect citizenship reasoning or between citizens facing (vis a vis) the state. This can be observed from the aspect of the figure and the context of the space. The position of clerical activism, as a figure with aspects of space in Islamic religious activities, shows that the distribution of Islamic knowledge is conveyed through various religious activities so that it becomes one of the characteristics of the Padang city community that is close and closely related to Islamic identity. At a certain stage, the figure shifts himself to another "space"

and leads to partiality to certain Islamic ideas, from “Islamic teaching” to public religious political issues which he believes are strategic for the benefit of Muslims. This condition resembles the concept of “tolerance”, as described by Alfred Stepan (2011), where there is a space in which religion and state are recognized to rise so high that the concept of the nation-state is grounded in its distinctive form in accordance with the aspirational and Islamic nature of the city Padang.

In addition, culturally, the meeting between Muslimism and the reasoning of citizenship was negotiated again with what was referred to as a form of appropriation of state-religious tensions. In the Minang Muslim community, in which the role of Mamak as the control of religious values, becoming Minang is to be Muslim, oral culture and the value of Islamicism are valuable aspects of harmonious outlooks, including the concept of nation-states.

The praxis of negotiation can take the form of induction of knowledge processes in Islamic institutions, both formal such as schools and madrasas, as well as informally in *pengajian* and *majelis taklim*, as aspects of supporting state-religious negotiations which are sustained and disbursed with the principles of locality-customs. Mamak’s role towards individuals, for example, as also observed in oral culture and Islamic values, reminds us of the dialectic between adjustment, intersubjective interaction, and internalization so that the individual is synonymous with social institutions (Berger & Luckman 1990, 83). The functionality of social values is to strengthen Islamic / “Muslimness” and respect for the country.

Cum customary religious management, in the midst of the Minang proverb “*Adat menurun, Syara’ mendaki*”, or Muslimness in the context of the city of Padang, becomes an important marker of why aspects of violence become marginal, while forms of respect for the government system, tolerance, and democracy is understood more discursively by the people of Minang, the city of Padang. The temporary outlook of ulama active in the anti-violence clause against perpetrators of immorality and religious minorities is a strong thing that can be observed as an outcome of negotiations on indigenous cum clauses, with an emphasis on cultural and social reproduction in the education system (Haralambos 1982, 215-216). The outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang especially benefited from the belief that education is the main thing sought for Muslims. While several ulama interviewed mentioned the figure of Buya Hamka and Jamaluddin Al-Afghani with their main inspiration for intellectuality

and emphasis on the significance of education. In the context of social system support in the construction of national politics, this point contains similarities to those suspected of being *Godly Nationalism*, especially in the informal description through social norms and education (Menchik 2014, 600).

While the ulama of the city of Padang, normatively acted the same, namely not agreeing on acts of immorality. When it was related to who would do the persecution of the perpetrators of the disobedience, most of the Padang city ulama referred to the security forces. Strengthening the outlook of the Padang city ulama on the dimension of nonviolence manifested itself in active involvement in reminding disobedience but carried out in non-violent ways. The values of justice and humanity, as reflected in the basic state of Pancasila, are observed to be at an implementative stage with strengthening the practice of education as an instrument, such as citizenship education in schools (Mudzakkir 2018, 111). Such as the narrative of a modernist ulama informant who was active in the masjid and the activism of urban proselytizing, that the need to carry out religious orders and reminded that actions that were not in accordance with religious teachings were carried out by actively supporting the path of non-violence or anti-execution.<sup>14</sup>

“In accordance with *man ra minkum munkaran fal yugayyirhu bi yadihi*, if we see something wrong (misdeed) we should prevent it just like the authorities for example the police, the civil service and others prevent misdeed. So if there is a participant in Padang in West Sumatra participating in this, the *mamakak* (the mothers) of the adat leaders to protect their tribe, their children will prevent it from taking place. So if we understand that *bi yadihi* is who has power, uses the power to prevent *munkar*, not to protect *munkar*. Then *fa bi lisānihi* convey, report it. Report if the public sees someone doing something wrong, report it to the authorities. If the authorities do not pay attention to the report then certainly do not take anarchic action and still give a warning. And suppose the next is *fa bi qalbihi* with that heart how to hate that deed and pray so that then those people get guidance from Allah SWT. So the name *kemungkaran* must be prevented; of course in this legal

14 Data on interviews with HK, modernist Ulama on Monday, October 15, 2018.

entity, we submit it to the authorities. We certainly don't want persecution and all kinds of things."

Likewise, there were disagreements with the Ahmadiyya and Shia, and it was still carried out by non-violent means.<sup>15</sup>

"I do not agree, let alone set fire to something, the prophet and friend of the Prophet never did that. There was no burning and use of violence."

"And the state guarantees, because the rights to religious freedom are protected by their rights. That is normal if Shia or Ahmadi are protected. But I have already said that he screwed up in *ushul*, in harmony, it was broken in *ushul*. Please just like them, but not in the name of Islam, that's the problem. If he is still a Shia school, he said, Islam, Ahmadiyah, he said Islam, this will still get resistance in Indonesia at any time. Finally, it will be boring. Mending them to be their own religion. But if they remain in the Shia school of Islam, Ahmadiyah Islam. So change the prophet Muhammad's prophet. So there is no prophet Mirzam Ghulam Ahmad, there is no Shiite. Like LDII, what it says has changed, we can accept it. "

"We never set fire on things. In each regency in West Sumatra, I see Ahmadiyah. But it is very small, nothing is burned. That shows people in Minangkabau don't like radicals, extremist actions. But if we do a demonstration, it's normal, we go down the road. We don't start up a fight and set fire on things. Because in our view, it's like as if we are demonstrating a masjid and we know that a masjid is not wrong. The character of the Minang people doesn't like to burn stuff."

The outlook of the ulama of the city of Padang, as reflected in the case of controlling the chaos and the existence of religious minorities, are some negotiating forms of the concept of nation-states in addition to strengthening the power of political Islam in local parliaments and executives. Although the formalization of Islam seems obvious, the social practices that emerge are the minimum practices of controlling civil

15 Interviews with BS, new Ulama on Friday, October 12, 2018.

liberties and outlooks towards non-violence in the midst of disagreement with minorities. Several informants were confirmed, emphasizing the aspect of control, in addition to traditional elders, in the form of religious institutions, such as MUI in the city of Padang, and other organizations affiliated to PERTI outside the city of Padang, as social-religious alignment institutions, not vice versa as sources of controversy. In the observations conducted, it was highly indicated, that ulama with pesantren backgrounds had sufficient modalities needed to play an active and comprehensive role in negotiating processes between religious regions on the one hand and public areas on the other.

Briefly, no matter how strong the penetration of Islamist groups with the radicalism of ideas about religious-based state images, disagreement on issues of women's leadership and the outlooks of giddy democracy, the fact is that ulama are inclusive, very active in terms of tolerance and alignment with citizens' rights. The ulama is capable of acting as a negotiator that reduces the tendency of excessive active exclusivity of some Islamic groups.

## CONCLUSION

Padang Ulama are closely attached on Islamic religiosity, as illustrated since the arrival of Islam and its meeting with Minang customs, until the struggle of Tuanku Imam Bonjol and the initiation of PRRI / Permesta, were historical aspects of the closeness of Islam and the Minang community. Religiosity is intertwined with the political Islam in various levels and interests. This research generally confirms the acceptance of the ulama of the city of Padang in the concepts of the nation-state, with an accommodative outlook between religion and the state associated with the element of the locality. The adat proverb '*adat menurun, syara' mendaki*', which is held by the Minang ulama, as a point of harmony between Muslimism and civic reasoning, is observed to be quite effective and efficient for Islamic moderation in the city of Padang.

The issue of identity politics, as reflected in the dimensions of reservation, contestation, and negotiation on the concept of nation-states in this paper, reinforces the argument that Indonesian- Islam remains in the accepted level and constructed in the minds of citizens. During the construction of the Islamic-Indonesian identity, it is certainly inseparable from the variants of political interests with the foundation of jargon and religious symbols, such as the formalization of Islamic law and a firm outlook towards issues of government programs such as immunization.

The historical context proves that the issue of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and the Pancasila which are diverse in diversity as an important platform for the nation-state, as observed in observations and interviews of the leaders of the city of Padang, have long been understood and interpreted in the Minang community in the midst of exclusivity, conservative, and a radical view among some ulama on the concept of nation-state, in which the definition of radical character here refers to an active outlook in the context of the dimension of intolerance and does not fully agree on the citizenship clause.

Thus, the struggle within the body of the ulama institution is a picture of identity politics that occurs in the socio-political space (read: Islamic politics) that relates to aspirations, interests, and partiality to intellectual religiosity - the enforcement of Islamic law. Supported by Islamic boarding schools and moderation, the central role of supporting the nation-state clause is that Padang ulama are characterized by being inclusive and moderate who carry out their functional structure as a balancing flow between tensions between religious and state issues, including outlooks towards religious minorities. This vision, in Menchik's statement, is to balance individual rights, religious groups, diversity of beliefs, and obedience to God (Menchik, 2014: 621). It is the main and fundamental portion as the brightest color which is believed to be part of the Indonesian-Islamic discourse.

Identity politics were observed quite clearly in the ulama hall of the city of Padang, which was characterized by moderation as a dominant marker of the character of Padang ulama. In its praxis, such inclusive and moderate authority can grow together with the exclusive. There are confrontational outlooks and contestation ideas as separate points, but there is also a negotiating outlook as a meeting point that is reflected in several local and national religious political issues. In this sociological-anthropological level, the concept of the nation-state becomes a discursive fragment, in which the inclusive one encourages the outlook of ulama to moderate Indonesian-Islam for the future of Indonesia, and coincides with the aspirations and voices of interests echoed by Islamist-pacifist authorities and its strong exclusive patterns.

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# ULEMA AND NATION-STATE IN BANJAR LAND:<sup>1</sup>

## Between Reservation and Resilience

*Ahmad Rafiq*

Since the establishment of the Banjar sultanate in South Kalimantan in the 16th century AD, the Banjar concept has always been identified with Islam. At least, there are three main theses about Banjar and Banjar ethnicity. First, Banjar is Malay by referring to the closeness of language, clothing, and a few rituals that can also be found in several areas in the mainland of Malay, namely Sumatra today. Secondly, Banjar is an ethnic transformation from the Dayak who have previously inhabited the Kalimantan region, including South Kalimantan. One opinion states that Dayak is a protomelayu in Kalimantan (Radam 2001; see Tsing 1993). The last thesis, Banjar is a political entity, which was constructed at the time of the founding of the Banjar Sultanate, to unite the various factions that played a role in winning the civil war which succeeded in raising Prince Samudera as the first Sultan and with the title Sultan Suriansyah. (See Daud 1997; Hawkins 2000; Ideham et al. 2005; Rafiq 2014; Mujiburrahman et al. 2011; Syahriansyah 2016). Islam has since been used as an ethnic and political marker of the Banjar sultanate as a form of transformation from the form of the Daha State kingdom and previous kingdoms.

As a support for the transformation process, the Islamization process of the Banjar sultanate always involved religious leaders or ulama who

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<sup>1</sup> The term Banjar in this paper is used as the equivalent of the word Banjarmasin with a broader understanding, including physical space, political designation, as well as ethnic groups, according to the context of the sentence. This term is more commonly used by residents in Banjarmasin to refer to their space, self-identity, and history, compared to the word Banjarmasin which is more often interpreted as limited to the physical space of the provincial capital of South Kalimantan.

accompanied the Sultan. The existence of Ulama in the main circle of sultanate power became a pattern that continued to exist relatively and dynamically throughout the history of the Banjar sultanate. In the first phase of the transformation, Sultan Suriansyah was accompanied by Khatib Dayan who in history was written as a Demak royal envoy to guide the Sultan's sultanate and the Sultanate of Banjar. In the 18th century, the Banjar Sultanate had advisors to Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari (m.1812). He was a great ulama of ulama and his descendants coloring the dominant history of Islam in Banjar today. Even so, until the collapse of the Banjar sultanate (ca. 1905), it was difficult to find written records, both in the works of Syekh Al-Banjari and his descendants, which reviewed in depth the Islamic political views of the sultanate or government in general or in the *siyasaḥ fiqh* in Islamic scholarship.

The absence of this discourse is also illustrated by a few studies of ulama in Banjarmasin. Most of these studies are still dominated by historical and biographical studies, some of which are even hagiographic, such as manaqib. Studies such as this can be found in the research of Rahmadi et al (2007) about Manakib of the works of the Banjar Ulama. The writing that is almost the same is also done by Bayani Dahlan (2009) about the Banjar Ulama and his works. Rahmadi and Husaini Abbas (2012) again wrote about the intellectual genealogy of ulama in Banjar using a historical approach. In addition to the collection of biographies, there are also other models in the form of personal biographical works of ulama in the Banjar land. Bayani Dahlan et al (2007) also wrote a biography of H.M. Asywadie Syukur, Saifuddin (2013) specifically discussed a female ulama, grandchildren from Sheikh al-Banjari who gave birth to the monumental work of the Malay Purukunan which was read massively up to now around Southeast Asia. Previously Abu Daudi had also written a single biography of Sheikh Muhamamd Arsyad al-Banjari. Biographical works with a wider range and number of ulama discussed prepared and written by A. Makkie et al (2010 and 2010) from the Team of the Indonesian Ulama Council of South Kalimantan Province consisting of two editions. The data are compiled from written records and oral history which are presented in the form of spatial spaces based on districts in the Province of South Kalimantan. In 2018, in collaboration with UIN Antasari Banjarmasin, the book published by the MUI was revised by adding several new names, including surviving ulama, and presented in the order of the century since before the 19th century to the present.

he 2010, 2011 and 2018 editions of the biography of the ulama published by the South Kalimantan MUI were given an introduction by Mujiburrahman. This introduction can be grouped in a separate pattern of studies by ulama in South Kalimantan which emphasize the diachronic side of terminology and the role of the ulama in South Kalimantan. In contrast to previous studies which focus more on chronology and historical explanation, Mujiburrahman shows in this section that titles such as Tuan Guru, Guru, Mualim, and later Ustaz mark social religious positions, even politics, as well as the locality of the ulama who is subject to the term. Although an initial analysis of the social and political role of ulama in the course of history in South Kalimantan has been presented, this paper does not specifically touch the nation-state issue in the view of the ulama, but has succeeded in providing an initial perspective to understand the views of ulama in Banjarmasin about the next nation-state.

Some studies at UIN Antasari, Banjarmasin, began to enter the issue of the views of ulama in South Kalimantan on policies or social phenomena around them. Saifuddin et al. (2014) report the results of persuasive research on ulama in the city of Banjarmasin and women's reproductive rights. Mahsunah Hanafi et al. (2015) conducted a study with the same approach and subject about insurance issues. The more phenomenological study conducted by Ahmad Sagir et al. (2011) about business theology of ulama. These three studies generally present the normative views of the ulama studied, except for the research of Saifuddin et al. which goes further in the explanatory aspect, even though it has not been supported by further analysis. Nahed Nuwairah (2007) conducted a study that was closer to the issue of nation-states about the political views of ulama in South Kalimantan. This research focuses on the normative view of the person concerned about the rights and obligations of citizens and the historical description of the character's figure, which can be used as a starting point for an explanation of the historical views of the character in further research.

Previous studies have not found specifically presenting religious experience or historical experience of ulama in Banjarmasin or South Kalimantan province related to the construction of nation-states in Indonesia. This is regrettable because the historical embryo of the nation-state in Indonesia cannot be separated from the 1936 NU Congress in Banjarmasin. The congress included a fatwa that Indonesia was Darulssalam, even though it was in the Dutch colony at that time. The


fatwa had consequences that every Muslim had an obligation to defend Indonesia as a country that has not been independent at that time. The fatwa was read by Hadratusy Sheikh K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, founder of the Nahdlatul Ulama, at that time. It was this fatwa which later became one of the basic resolutions of an open jihad resistance against the Dutch colonial in 1945. Even so, together with the DI TII rebellion in Aceh, West Java, and Makassar, Ibnu Hajar in South Kalimantan also carried out the same movement locally. Contrary to the 1936 NU Congress fatwa which affirmed the spirit of nationalism, Ibn Hajar's rebellion, triggered by disappointment over the absence of accommodation for some former freedom fighters for administrative reasons, did not specifically criticize the form of nation-states chosen by Indonesia, even using the Darul Islam label. According to van Dijk (1983), Ibn Hajar's DI / TII rebellion was relatively ideological and the movement from the same rebellion in West Java.

The centrality of the role of ulama in Banjar and the historical experience of nation-states in Banjarmasin in particular, and South Kalimantan in general, influenced the position of ulama in Banjarmasin on the concept and practice of nation-states which became the main theme of this paper. By combining the methods of surveying and interviewing several Islamic religious leaders in Banjarmasin who were identified as ulama in an open understanding as mentioned in the introduction to this book, this paper would like to show a general map and in-depth analysis of the position of ulama in Banjarmasin on the conception of nation-states. The historical dynamics in South Kalimantan generally show that in addition to the acceptance and support of the nation-state in the form of the NKRI, the Banjar land has also experienced a rebellion which was stopped. At the same time, the Banjar land that is synonymous with Islam has always opened the space for dynamic relations between religion and nationality, coupled with the dynamics of political practice in Indonesia which continues to develop dynamically from time to time. The dynamics are also present along with the development of knowledge and sources of knowledge for ulama and society in general, for example, the development of printing technology into digital.

The dynamics above certainly influence the outlook and acceptance of ulama in Banjarmasin to the concept of the nation-state. The outlook and acceptance are mapped quantitatively and qualitatively on the scale of acceptance and rejection based on the dimensions of the nation-state and in the form of diagrams (see tables 1 and 2). From the explanation of

the diagram, the focus of this paper is to look at the space for reservation and resilience of ulama in Banjarmasin on the concept of nation-states. Presentation and analysis of the two spaces to show the dynamics and contestation that continues among the scholars studied.

**BANJAR ULAMA AND NATION-STATE IN FIGURES**  
**Bart Chart**





Characteristic chart of acceptance of nation-state  
among Banjarmasin ulama

Following the selection pattern of respondents on a national scale, 30 respondents at the Banjarmasin local level were selected based on the distribution pattern of affiliated mainstream ulama from large organizations, namely NU and Muhammadiyah, MUI, and each one from Muslim minorities, namely Ahmadiyah and Shia , as well as several new religious authorities active in LDK and social media based, as well as new social movements that use networks. In practice, a few respondents also have cross-identities, especially those affiliated with mainstream organizations. For example, a young ustaz initiator of the diversity movement through social media is also affiliated with the Nahdhalul Ulama organization. Meanwhile, an ustazah who was chosen based on her affiliation to the NU women's organization (Muslimat) was also active in preaching on social media and television and was better known as the ustazah on her regular program on local TV broadcasts in Banjarmasin. Other than that, a freelance ulama who does not want to identify himself/herself with certain religious organizations or movements, completes all his/her primary and secondary education in a *pesantren* with the tradition of Nahdliyin that is so strong that he/she

paved the way for education in the Middle East and returns to Banjarmasin as an Islamic studies teacher in masjids and *majelis taklim*. Other ulama were Muhammadiyah leaders in the city of Banjarmasin, but also became important people in the MUI of Banjarmasin City. Meanwhile, ustaz from internal Muslim minority groups who became respondents did not have an identity crossing based on affiliation, except the affiliation from their organizations and groups, such as Shia and Ahmadiyya.

The existence and absence of cross-identity of respondents in this study, in a sense, explained the distribution of the characteristics of the ulama above. Among the main issues that place several informants in the middle position, which are conservative or right wings, who are exclusive, radical, or extreme, are their perceptions of the position of the minority of internal Muslims, namely Shia and Ahmadiyya in the nation-state. In the question items about the great concept of nation-state or concepts especially in the practice of nation-states in Indonesia, such as Pancasila, Democracy, Human Rights, and others, almost all respondents agreed. This position can be seen in the table of the results of the recapitulation of the pro-system and nonviolence dimensions which show a high percentage of positivity. The situation is different from the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship which show a significantly negative number. These last two dimensions are measured by questions including women's leadership, non-Muslim leadership, and the existence and rights of Muslim minority citizenship, such as Shia and Ahmadiyya. The crossing of identity and affiliation of religious institutions among respondents in this study only occurred among people affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah religious mainstream groups, to other groups, or vice versa, but not with minority ulama.





The relatively small difference between the views that say ‘agree’ and ‘no’ on the dimensions of tolerance and balance of ‘agree’ and ‘no’ numbers on the dimensions of citizenship, while the ‘agree’ number on the pro-system and non-violent dimensions is very significant, indicating a reservation of state revenues nation among the Banjar ulama who were respondents to this study. On a quantitative scale, this situation places a number of respondents into a rejectionist position, as much as 30% (9 out of 30 respondents), which are spread into three exclusive rooms (four people), radical (three people) and extreme (two people) ) At the same time, the significant acceptance of the existing system and the rejection of violence indicates that the rejection cannot be fully interpreted as a rejection of the nation-state. For example, questions about leaders must be answered positively. At the same time, state restrictions on non-Muslim facility services were responded negatively. A thorough interview was conducted and succeeded in confirming the variance in rejection in which the views of an ulama or religious figure in Banjarmasin on the nation-state were influenced by many factors, especially those that were contextual and temporary, and not entirely based on conceptual or ideological rejection. This description will be deepened in the sub-topic “reservation spaces” and “action agenda and resilience space”.

Reservation, which places a few respondents in an exclusive, radical, and extreme position, dwells on questions about the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship. For example, the question of whether leaders must be Muslim men, and restrictions on Shi’ite public spaces answered positively by some respondents. On the contrary, the acquisition of public positions for Ahmadiyah followers, religious freedom for Shiites,



and the ability of female leaders were answered negatively by the same group of respondents. Meanwhile, questions about the suitability of Pancasila, democracy, the governance of the results of democracy with Islam, were answered positively also by the same group of respondents. A small part of this group of respondents further gave a positive response to the possibility of returning seven words from the Jakarta Charter into the Pancasila, or an attempt to find a system that is better than the current nation-state system. These slices mark the existence of reservation spaces in acceptance of the nation-state among ulama in Banjarmasin.

### **RESERVATION SPACES**

The significance and variability of the level of intolerance, both in the context of internal Muslim relations and externally with non-Muslims or gender-based as derivative concepts of nation-states, can be explained in the patterns of reservation of individual ulama in Banjarmasin. Reservations occur because acceptance of the concept of nation-state has been agreed upon by almost all respondents and informants. However, there is a reluctance to fully accept the concepts of derivatives, especially in the issue of tolerance. Even so, this reluctance cannot be fully interpreted as a rejection of the nation-state. This reluctance is the space for reservation and at the same time creates a heterodoxy variant of the nation-state idea. The reservation spaces at least can be seen in five circumstances.

1. The strong conception of proportional justice as a double-edged knife, namely the issue of majority-minority relations and the paradox of human rights, for some informants. Proportional justice is an understanding of justice based on a proportion of numbers to determine the rights and obligations of citizens. Justice is proportional like a double-edged knife to the conception of citizenship in the nation-state. On the one hand, proportional justice provides balanced rights to each community group in a democracy according to its numerical number. At the same time, proportional justice eliminates the human rights inherent in individual citizens because of their humanitarian entity, not in relation to other human beings based on numbers. The paradox in proportional justice is in understanding the obligation rights based on the assumption of the majority and minority, while democracy in the nation-state respects everyone as a single entity that has the same rights and obligations as other individuals, regardless of their numerical affiliation to the majority or minority. This paradox

can be seen in the views of several informants in Banjarmasin who limit the appointment of non-Muslim leaders at varying levels. Some informants seem to agree, even in separate places, stated that conceptually non-Muslim leaders were not a barrier for someone to become a leader in Indonesia. This is because it is possible by the constitution, except for the position of president. Even so, they are of the view that in Muslim-majority regions leaders should also be Muslim, as in most non-Muslim regions, non-Muslim leaders are also preferred.

This reservation space in proportional justice still varies in a few informants. There are at least three variations that appear. First, the variant of the informant who explicitly stated that the population with the majority religion was a limitation to determine which leaders should come from the majority religious group. So, in the Muslim majority, leaders must be Muslims as a form of justice. Second, the proportion of the majority and minority is not to determine boundaries, but it must be a priority. If there is a regional head election with prospective Muslims and non-Muslims, then the candidate from the majority group that embraces religion must be prioritized to be chosen as a form of religious commitment. Third, the proportion can be defeated if leaders of different religions with the majority group can do justice to all residents in the region. However, justice requires empathy, and religious differences make it difficult for the leader to empathize with the population in the region he leads. For informants in this third variant, religion is significantly believed to affect people's lives, so policy and leadership must be able to touch the entire life of the people they lead. The difference in religious leaders with most people led will be an obstacle in the leadership process. Therefore, leaders from most religious groups should take precedence over leadership effectiveness.

2. The second reservation space occurs because of the distance between the ulama's conceptual understanding of the nation-state as an umbrella concept and their perceptions of current political practices, both at the local, national, and global levels. Conceptually, there is hardly a statement that explicitly, even implicitly, rejects the concept of the Indonesian nation-state. By referring to several classical sources, several informants expressed the validity of the choice of state form adopted by Indonesia today. An informant stressed the

conception of the nation-state as a form of *darul-'ahd*, or the state resulting from a collective agreement. Therefore, the government is considered conceptually valid. In the national context in Indonesia, this research data excavation took place during the preaching of one Islamic organization in Indonesia which was considered anti against the concept of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, and rejected the concept of nation-state and nationalism in general, and instead carried the concept of transnational Islamic leadership unity. This phenomenon has led to the revocation of the legitimacy of the organization in Indonesia because it is considered contrary to Pancasila and NKRI. Because of this, all informants seemed to take distance from the phenomenon by asserting their acceptance of the concept of nation-states, democratic systems, and even Pancasila, along with their derivative concepts.

At the same time, the acceptance of the concept of Indonesia as a nation-state, for a few informants, is precisely accompanied by rejection of some praxis of derivative concepts, such as the concept of *ulil amri*. In contrast to the acceptance of the concept of nation-state which they relate to the conceptual explanation of *fiqh siyasah* with *darul 'ahd*, the question about *ulil amri* actually connects them with ongoing political practices so that the following statement appears, "this government election results in Indonesia can be called *ulil amri*, but there are many *ulil amri* conditions, the current government cannot yet be called *ulil amri*". On the one hand, they accept the government resulting from the direct democratic process in the form of elections as *ulil amri*, but the conceptual acceptance is disguised by the rejection of the existing government, which is a perception of ongoing political practices.

There are two basic interconnected things that appear in this form of reservation. First, group affiliation and political moment when the interview took place. Group affiliation is marked by the organization from which the informant originated, when this article was outlined, implicitly it was not in the ruling government group. This group affiliation was also strengthened by the informant's referral at the time the interview took place to the social media group which was the official group of an organization, to show the lack of fulfillment of the conditions as *ulil amri* from the current government in power. Regardless of the accuracy of the information referred to in the social media group, this is sufficient to show that outlooks towards

the derivative concept of the concept of nation-states are individual perceptions formed by the organizational affiliation facilitated by social media groups. The general outlook of the affiliated organizations and groups can be simply linked to the political moment that was taking place at the time this article was written, approaching the election, especially the 2019 presidential election. The same informants gave concrete examples of the lack of fulfillment of the current government regulations with the initial determination case. Ramadan and Islamic holidays from the Government. Because the government does not qualify as *ulil amri*, there is no obligation on Muslims in Indonesia to comply with government decisions and therefore take a different outlook.

The distance between conceptual acceptance and perceptions of existing political practices influences the acceptance of the nation-state dynamically. On the one hand, changes in political practice can also influence the acceptance of the concept of the derivation of the nation-state according to the different levels of importance of each. On the other hand, this also explains that the relationship between understanding and acceptance of religious leaders, in this case, Islam, towards the concept of the state, is not entirely a conceptual problem, but is also constructed by political issues and interests that take place around it. In contrast to the first reservation room which is based on proportional justice, the second reservation space is very likely to change according to changes in one's affiliation and political position practically. Meanwhile, in proportional justice change cannot occur quickly, because it deals with the issue of identity.

3. Unlike the second reservation pattern which shows deep conceptual understanding, but does not necessarily relate to their perceptions of existing political practices, some informants do not show a deep understanding of the concept of nation-state in Islamic discourse. A few informants expressly stated the disclaimer at the beginning of the interview that he was not an expert in the theme discussed, Islamic politics. This limited knowledge can be related to the previous description of trend issues in Islamic teaching, both in pesantren and majelis taklim in Banjarmasin, which do not touch much on the fiqh issue of siyasah in Islam, except when there are questions from the audience in the recitation. This was also confirmed by the lack of works by local ulama, to say that there were none, who discussed the

issue of *siyasah* or politics in Islam. Historically, even though the work of the great ulama of the Banjar land was a *fiqh* work, such as the Book of Sabilal Muhtadin, but the theme of political jurisprudence was also not the main theme discussed.

In addition to the reasons for the absence of the *Siyasah fiqh* discourse among Banjar ulama in general, some ulama or religious leaders who became informants in this study were also not of Islamic education background. An informant who leads a national scale organization at the local level, for example, has been active in the organization since middle school. Meanwhile, his formal education, up to doctoral level, was not taken at an Islamic educational institution. He obtained his religion knowledge entirely from the activities of the organization and the Islamic teachings he participated in. This case occurred in several informants with diverse organizational affiliations.

The two conditions above are reasons for the limited knowledge of several local informants or religious leaders in Banjarmasin on key terms in the concept of the derivation of nation-states such as the concepts of *ahlu 'l-halli wa' l-qaqdi*, *ulil amri*, *dzimmī*, and *al-walā' wa 'l-barā'*. In the context of the constitutional system, an informant simply stated that the system of *ahlu 'l-halli wa' l-'aqdi* cannot be applied in Indonesia only by referring to the general statement that *ahlu 'l-halli wa' l-'aqdi* is a collection of ulama in the sense religious expert. There is no in-depth elaboration of the concept, except the statement that "it is the institution of the ulama". However, with this statement, the informant concerned did not expressly reject or accept the democratic system adopted so that it tends to be passive towards the current system. On that basis, the acceptance of the concept of the nation-state was entirely due to the reason for accepting the agreement of the founding fathers, but Islamic institutions could not be embedded in Islamic concepts.

In the context of *Ulil Amri*, an informant firmly stated that the government in Indonesia is not merely an Islamic religion because Indonesia is not an Islamic State. Even so, this government is still considered legitimate because Indonesia is indeed not based on Islam. The logic that is built is not based on conceptual explanation of the term *ulil amri* as a political term in Islam, but solely uses the general understanding of *ulil amri* as a term of Islam which only applies to Islamic countries and is not appropriate to current political and government practices without rejecting the existing government system.

Another example which also shows the absence of understanding of fiqh term is the concept of *al-walā' wa 'l-barā'* which is understood as guardian and kindness. This understanding naturally shows the absence of informants' knowledge of some basic concepts in Islamic jurisprudence / Islamic state law. It is different from the viewpoint of Islamist circles, which makes the concept of *al-walā' wa 'l-barā'* as the legitimate basis of religious-based citizen segmentation between Muslims and non-Muslims. With this view, one of the informants actually accepted the concept of *al-walā' wa 'l-barā'* to show it as the goal of the state. The simplicity of the answers and the absence of such understanding further confirms the low level of urgency in understanding the basic concepts of constitutionality in Islam for some ulama.

In the above context, the outlooks and knowledge of some ulama are entirely based on their perceptions of existing political practices using common sense, with limited understanding of fiqh terms related to politics as derivatives of the concept of nation-states. As the second reservation space, the third pattern of the reservation is also very likely to change according to changes in the interests and situation of the community concerned, because the conceptual discourse about the nation-state and the concept of derivation in Islam are almost completely absent.

4. The fourth reservation space is formed because of the distance between conceptual references and contemporary Islamic literature references, including digital media. (e.g. human rights and non-Muslim conspiracies against Muslims, and female leaders). In the second reservation space, it has been revealed that conceptual understanding of the nation-state according to some informants is sometimes within their perception of existing political practices. This perception of practical politics was formed among others by Islamic literature references. An informant eloquently explained the concept of statehood in Islam by referring to classical Islamic literature. In fact, in the living room where the interviewee was interviewed, neatly arranged many primary books of Islamic studies, especially in the study of hadith and fiqh in a large cupboard four shelves that were about two meters wide. When interview questions are directed at contextualizing Islamic state concepts with contemporary issues, such as human rights issues and non-Muslim leaders, the informant no longer refers to the primary books, but to a

small line of Indonesian translation books which is arranged in a row just behind the seat where the informant is sitting. Most of the books are books by Islamic leaders from the Middle East, such as Al-Albani, Al-Nabhani, and A'id Al-Qarni. Without specifically referring to a particular book, the informant only referred to the issue such as human rights as an issue formed by the West to dominate Muslims. For him, Islam itself has its own concept of human rights without the need to study with the West.

The second group literature above is placed as a daily reading that can be referred directly. The structure of the placement of these two types of literature also allows easier access to the second literature. When asked where the second group's literature came from, the informant referred to recommendations from several friends and personal searches in bookstores. Book recommendations often come from social media groups, such as the WhatsApp group that he follows. Its importance is to update information based on the latest literature.

5. The last reservation space is the theological position of Islamists on the concept of leadership in Islam. This phenomenon occurs in two cases from individuals with different group affiliations. The first case occurred in the position of a Salafi cleric in terms of choosing non-Muslim leaders and obedience to *ulil amri*. In the issue of obedience to *ulil amri*, the informant explicitly stated the obligation of absolute obedience as ordered by the hadith. The ulama concerned based his opinion on the hadith which ordered complete obedience to the leader even though he was an Ethiopian servant. This Ethiopian servant was interpreted more broadly to include non-Muslims when he became a leader he was subject to the law to be obeyed as *ulil amri*. At the same time, they limit the ability to appoint non-Muslim leaders, only when there are no other choices that are Muslim. A Muslim must choose Muslim leaders even with lower qualifications than would-be non-Muslim leaders.

Another case is the leadership of women in the view of a religious teacher of the Tarbiyah group. He stated full acceptance of the concept of the nation-state as a collective agreement, and the equal rights of all citizens to be appointed as leaders, including women. Even so, he cannot accept the leadership of women because of the "threat" of the hadith about destruction when a nation is led by women. "It is not allowed, and I am afraid that it will be a path of destruction for the nation since it is stated in the hadith" he stressed.

In the reservation spaces above, it appears that the acceptance of the nation-state concept is a case that is almost complete in all segments of the scholars studied. However, reservations mostly occur in derivative concepts, especially those relating to citizenship and human rights when faced with followers of other religions. This affects intolerant outlooks or known as “lazy tolerance” by being passive, especially on the rights of non-Muslim citizenship. Even so, the existence of a reservation in accepting the concept of nation-state among several ulama in Banjarmasin does not necessarily include an ideological position that rejects the rejectionist as reflected in the survey. Conversely, from a few interviews found a reservation variant that is more temporary and contextual based on social, economic, and political phenomena during the interview. Thus, the position is actually very likely to change dynamically according to the growing social, economic, and political discourse.

For this reason, the reservation spaces among ulama in Banjarmasin also encourage the birth of resilience spaces. A larger reservation space occurs in groups that have “segmented” traditions and identities, while resilience develops along with maintenance of several traditions that are transmitted and transformed from generation to generation in Banjar Muslims.

#### **AGENDA FOR ACTION AND SPACE RESILIENCE**

During the strong reservation space in some of the ulama in Banjarmasin who were observed, ulama and Muslim religious leaders in general still play a central role in the Banjar community. In the context of the Banjar community which is always positively identified with Islam, the role of Islamic leaders is always placed in a significant position (See Mujiburrahman, 2018; Rahmadi, 2012). The history of Banjar since the first stand in the form of a sultanate has always recorded the presence of ulama as a central figure, some of which have even become part of the power, such as Mufti or Sultan’s religious adviser. The presence of these ulama also significantly influenced the historical, social and political direction of the Banjar community to date (Helius Syamsudin; Rahmadi 2012; Syahriansyah 2016). The centrality of the role of ulama in Banjarmasin currently varies from involvement in mainstream Islamic organizations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI, Islamic teaching caregivers routinely open or mejalis taklim to be institutionalized in the form of pesantren. The reach of the ulama in these roles to the



community varied from thousands of people who routinely gathered to study Islam to a great ulama, such as the Islamic teaching of Tuan Guru Muhamad Zaini Abdul Ghani or Guru Sekumpul in Martapura, during his lifetime or Tuan Guru Zuhdiannor in Banjarmasin City who is currently active. There were also ulama who took care of Islamic teaching with the number of congregations of tens to hundreds but took place in many places. One of the informants in this paper, for example, cared for 45 Qur'an recitals or regular taklim assemblies in a month, both weekly, biweekly, or monthly.

At the time of this research, the main public spaces of the ulama in Banjarmasin were dominated by majelis taklim or Qur'an recitals, whether they took place in masjids, prayer rooms, houses, or special places that functioned as taklim assemblies on a regular basis, such as in markets or shops. Some ulama also use television and radio, as well as social media to reach out to their congregation. Of course, there are differences between the first public spaces such as Qur'an recitals with direct interaction, when compared to virtual public spaces such as on social media or television and radio. At first, there was a direct meeting between ulama and his audience directly and periodically. At that time a confirmation process can occur and reconfirm various issues in the form of questions from the audience and answers from the ulama. Even though there is not always a direct meeting, but, in the second part, the abandoned digital footprint allows a virtual "meeting" repetition by playing back or even spreading it on other occasions. This allows a second way to reach a wider audience relatively, but with limited confirmation and reconfiguration of the issues that arise. This difference affects the understanding and acceptance of ulama and the community to the concept of the nation-state in Banjarmasin.

If the concept of the nation-state is understood as a political concept, in those spaces, there is not much to say about Islamic politics or fiqh siyasah. As illustrated by the works of Banjar ulama who are dominated by works in the fields of Aqidah and Tasawuf (Rahmadi 2007, 2012; Makkie 2011; Syaifudin 2013), the fiqh discourse of siyasah or politics in Islam is not touched much. Even in Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari's monumental work, the *Sabial Muhtadin* Book, which is a book of fiqh, the fiqh siyasah discourse is not widely reviewed. Equivalent to money with the dominant Islamic discourse in the works of ulama in Banjar, the umbrella themes discussed in the Islamic teachings also revolve around the issue of aqidah, tasawuf, and daily amaliyah. None of the informants

asked for an explanation made the theme that encountered *fiqh siyasah* as the theme of their Qur'an recitals. These themes may appear sporadically in the process of question and answer that accompanies the Qur'an recitals that take place, especially at the direct meeting of the ustaz / ustazah with the audience in a taklim or Qur'an recitals. Questions that arise from the congregation are often based on certain events or events in the community that they witness and experience directly, or are triggered by virtual information media, such as television, radio, and social media.

In the above conditions, political issues, including the concept of nation-states with their dimensions, often become a blind spot in the centrality of the role of ulama in Banjarmasin. This issue is more elaborated in new media, especially digital media, such as social media. The discussion of political issues, including the nation-state and its derivatives in this new space affects the mass understanding and acceptance of the nation-state both positively and negatively. The mass referred here includes the ulama who were the subjects of this research and their audience. Some groups that fill this empty space are affiliated into groups of Islamic thought that contradict the concept of the nation-state and its derivative dimensions. This is what affects the construction of the reservation spaces above.

In the context above, the acceptance and reservation of nation-states and their derivative dimensions in Banjarmasin can be seen in the interrelationships between three things at once: the centrality of ulama, the blind spot of *siyasah fiqh* discourse in the ulama's public space, and the presence of new media. An important question that must be asked is, why is the strong reservation of the nation-state in Banjarmasin not to lead to stronger resistance? There are two theses that can be submitted based on the findings of this field research. First, the memory of Banjar's history which became an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and secondly, the strengthening of media literacy among some ulama to encourage strengthening resilience to the rejection of the concept of the nation-state or its derivative concept.

In the first thesis, an informant was the leader of a large Islamic organization in Banjarmasin City who was also the oldest Islamic party politician in Indonesia. Personally, he also sympathized with national Muslim leaders who led mass Islamic organizations which often displayed the media as violent groups. With this identity loss, the informant said his emotional ties both personal and communal as the Banjar people to the Republic of Indonesia with the story of breaking Hinduan on the side

of the Martapura river in the center of Banjarmasin which was the place for KH Hasyim Asy'ari to deliver the results of the NTS Bahtsul Masa'il Congress in Banjarmasin in 1936 stating that Indonesia was Darussalam. This statement later became the basis of the political outlooks of the NU people then to receive, defend and defend the NKRI, including in Banjarmasin. This historical memory is a forming factor of resilience to ideas that reject the nation-state.

In this case, memory or local historical memory can be distinguished from global historical memory. At first, among some ulama in Banjarmasin, local historical memory emotionally bound people concerned with existing political realities. As a result, this memory can be a forming factor of resilience to views that are contrary to the reality and ideals left behind by these historical memories. By binding that memory to the ulama's decision in the past that specifically referred to the political reality at the time, namely the struggle for Indonesian independence, the ulama concerned managed to build legitimacy not only in politics but also religious acceptance of the concept of the nation-state adopted by Indonesia. This can be easily awakened because of the gradual interconnection of memories from one generation to another which is bound by various accompanying rituals (Leger 2000). In this context, the organizational ties and political affiliations of the informants concerned and organizational and political activities that accompany them are rituals that bind these memories continuously.

The situation is different when compared to the memory leap of a group of other Muslims in Indonesia who reject the concept of the nation-state. Referring to the results of the study by Noorhaidi Hasan et al. about the Islamic literature of the Melineal generation (Hasan 2018), opponents of the concept of the nation-state in Indonesia jumped their memories out of local space and time. Their historical memories are built based on the triumph of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic caliphate which for centuries ruled the world, especially the Middle East and Europe. There is no tiered memory network built on local and actual historical experience. Therefore, their memories of the past encourage a puritanical outlook towards the historical reality they face today. This puritan outlook is not always in the sense of a reference to the early generation of Islam in a rigid manner, but the purification of historical reality based on the ideals of the past is believed. The same pattern can be compared with the existence of other Muslim groups in Islam in referring to the past (Afsarudin 2007; compare with Zaman 2002).

The importance of the capitalization of historical memories about the past as a form of resilience is also well understood by some ulama in Banjarmasin. On that basis, the second structured resilience movement was born, the media literacy movement. There are two patterns of this movement. First, the use of television and local radio broadcast media, and secondly the use of social media. The first movement was structured with the cooperation of local or national broadcasters, both television and radio, with state Islamic higher education institutions in Banjarmasin. For example, on a regular basis, every week there are lecturers assigned to fill in the “Majelis Sore” event on a Local TV. The program was broadcast live with various themes, ranging from teen issues, how to address social media, family education, and others. One ulama who routinely carries out the “Majelis Sore” program with the theme of family consultation became an informant in this study. Ustazah, who is also a female wing activist of the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia for the region in South Kalimantan, expressed full awareness of media war, and inserted messages of nationality, tolerance, and respect for citizenship through the event, even though the main theme was family consultations. The ustazah planned to develop several cadres at home with a friendly and open approach to Islam. Together with her students on campus, she was also active in producing short films that inserted messages of tolerance and peace. This positive content is uploaded on social media like YouTube. A respondent of this study with moderate vision also actively promoted the “Come Mengaji” movement on social media. This movement even received special airtime at a regional television broadcasting institution in Banjarmasin. This movement did not specifically touch on national issues, but this movement was deliberately campaigned to fill positive content on social media and television, as a contradiction of negative content that was also scattered on social media.

Outside the structured media literacy movement, social media such as Youtube and Facebook are also tools for expressing the strong influence of local ulama in Banjarmasin. This power can be capitalized as a source of positive media content to build resilience to resistance to the nation-state. For example, by typing the keyword “Teacher Zuhdi” (nickname Tuan Guru K.H. Zuhdiannor), a charismatic local scholar in Banjarmasin, we will find hundreds of lecture posts, either in the form of chunks or complete lectures. The Zuhdi Islamic teaching does not touch much on political issues, it even seems to avoid it. In general, Guru Zuhdi’s Islamic teaching uses the popular Sufism approach. These teachings

elaborate more on moral and ethical matters using local terminology and everyday cases. If it is tucked into the theme of law or fiqh, it will also be seen in the same perspective, not merely a legal case. Guru Zuhdi is still the main magnet of Islamic teaching in Banjarmasin today, both directly at the location of the teaching and on social media. Thousands of audiences always attended his lectures. Meanwhile, on YouTube, the average lecture has been watched by tens of thousands of people, whose reach has exceeded the city of Banjarmasin. His routine recitation also not only attracted parents but also managed to attract young people. In the city of Banjarmasin, the phenomenon of Guru Zuhdi is one of the main construction factors of the resilience of anti-nation-state ideas and their distribution. Meanwhile, several other informants also explicitly stated the importance of national issues in their Islamic teachings, even though they were delivered sporadically according to the circumstances or questions when the recitation took place.

## CONCLUSION

Positive identification of Banjar and Islam always places ulama in the central position of social, cultural, religious, and even political construction in Banjarmasin, including in accepting or rejecting the concept of the nation-state. The construction is not entirely based on the ideals of the knowledge of the ulama who were the subjects of this study. This is because the knowledge of the ulama themselves is also constructed by various things outside themselves. This construction process gave birth to heterodoxy acceptance of the nation-state among ulama in Banjarmasin in the form of reservation spaces. In addition to the Islamic literature and traditional Islamic education that varied in each individual ulama studied, group affiliation and access to new media also influenced the dynamics of their acceptance of the nation-state concept reflected in their relative view of the derivative dimensions of nation-states. This dynamic was also reinforced by the moment of the political season when this research was conducted, in which the conception of knowledge was often disguised by perceptions of political practices that had been or were ongoing.

Thus, the relatively high negative position on the dimension of tolerance and citizenship among ulama in Banjarmasin cannot necessarily be understood as an ideological rejection of the nation-state. This position only marks the reservation spaces in the acceptance of nation-states which, at the same time, are marked by a high percentage of positive informants

on the dimensions of nonviolence and pro-system. Heterodoxy from the reservation room does not explicitly deny orthodoxy acceptance of the nation-state which — on the contrary — encourages the emergence of spaces of resilience, both in the form of knowledge and actions that create rival narratives.

In the end, the Islamic identity inherent in Banjar ethnicity will always place the ulama in a central position to continue to contest the issues of the nation-state. Resilience will strengthen when it is consolidated in the owners' alliance with the same views and outlooks. The existence of charismatic ulama who do not have direct contact with political discourse and the topic of nation-states can also be capitalized for strengthening positive national discourse, not in terms of practical politics. Conversely, reservations can also be strengthened if the various constructive factors are not managed positively.

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# MEASURING THE NATIONALITY AKIDAH OF INDONESIAN MUSLIMS: Fragmentation, Negotiation, and Reservation Views Surabaya Ulama against the Nation-State<sup>1</sup>

*Ibnu Burdah*

The imagination of the nation-state among Indonesian Muslims is not single, static, and final, but their views are fragmented into non-simple variants, in the process of formation and negotiations that have not been completed and are influenced by many factors, even the views, both acceptance, and rejection, always accompanied by various reservations. This study of the views of Surabaya ulama on the concept of the Indonesian nation-state shows a complex fragmentation and very diverse negotiations and reservations on certain parts of the nation-state concept along with its derivative principles.

In contrary with the previous writings on the relationship of Islamic authority and understanding of Indonesian nationality which emphasizes the study of institutions (Ichwan 2005; Scott 2012), movements and groups (Rinaldo 2008), international agencies (Stambach 2011), or national structures (Nordholt 2001), this paper attempts to describe the “occurrence” of nationalism through individual agencies or figures at the local level even though the individuals are also in certain groups. Individual ulama as stated by Nico. J.G. Kaptein (2004), is one form of Islamic authority in addition to other forms in the form of text, groups or organizations, and institutions. The results of this study indicate that the individuals in each group also showed a variety of views that were quite varied.

This research is basically qualitative in nature by using the interview method. However, quantitative research with survey techniques was

<sup>1</sup> The researcher would to thank Cak Chafid Wahyudi, Dr. Mahbub Ghozali, and Gus Kamto who have helped and accompanied the author to carry out the field research in Surabaya.

also carried out with the aim of obtaining a general picture of the views of Surabaya ulama on the concept of the Indonesian nation-state and its derivatives. The survey using the proportional stratified random sampling method was conducted on thirty Surabaya ulama from various backgrounds, namely from mainstream, consisting of ulama affiliated or with backgrounds from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), from Islamists, from minorities, especially Ahmadis and Shiites, and “millennial” ulama. Based on the results of this research, 11 respondents were interviewed by considering the representation of the spectrum of their outlooks towards the nation-state and its derivative principles, religious group background, and age group and gender.

#### **ACCEPTANCE ACCOMPANIED BY NEGOTIATIONS AND RESERVATIONS**

This paper intends to show that the acceptance of ulama with various group backgrounds in Surabaya towards the concept of the Indonesian nation-state and its derivatives is very strong even though almost all also have records (reservations) that are diverse and some attempt to bargain in certain matters. Of the 30 survey respondents, 25 of them were deemed to have adequate “acceptance” outlooks, with the details that 3 people (9.68%) were progressive in terms of accepting all the nation-state principles and all of their derivatives accompanied by fighting and promoting activities, 11 people (35.48 %) declared inclusive, 9 people (29.03%) moderate, 2 people (6.45%) conservative, and only 2 people who were declared “rejection” with the details of 1 person being exclusive and 1 person being extreme, and no one “called” radical. Progressive, inclusive, moderate, and conservative in accepting the nation-state are gradations which are sequentially from the highest level to the lower level, while the remaining four are declared unidentified. So, most of the outlooks of Surabaya ulama can be categorized as inclusive or moderate.

These figures, once again, show the high acceptance of Surabaya ulama against the nation-state and its derivative principles despite a variety of reservations and negotiations. Without counting unidentified categories of ulama (4 people), more than 90% of scholars in Surabaya accepted the basic concept of the Indonesian nation-state which included acceptance of the basic state Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the Republic of Indonesia despite its acceptance of ideological acceptance accept based on principle, but also realistic acceptance of acceptance because of circumstances or reality. It also shows a very high number in their

acceptance of the principle of nonviolence, namely rejecting the validity of the use of means of violence in achieving goals. However, this figure and the deepening conducted also shows that there is a problem regarding the acceptance of the nation-state, mainly related to the discourse of returning seven words in the first principle of the Pancasila. Problems also arise regarding the acceptance of the principle of tolerance and citizenship which emphasizes equality and justice of rights and obligations for every citizen including minority groups. The negotiations and notes are most often given by the Surabaya ulama generally concern these two things. Partial tolerance and acceptance of half-hearted principles of citizenship, which are sometimes inconsistent, ambiguous, and even paradoxes are important notes in the view of Surabaya ulama against the nation-state even though there are many other records.

Researchers at a certain level also associate this research with several other derivatives of the nation-state principle, namely the principles of democracy, human rights (HAM), and the legitimacy of the elected government through the electoral process. And on that issue too, some notes also appeared including the belief in conspiracy theories. According to Burdah (2010), the perception of some Indonesian Muslims in many ways is often influenced by the view of conspiracy. The acceptance of Surabaya ulama against the concept of the nation-state and its derivative principles is however high. Only two people out of 30 respondents were then categorized as conservatives who had very low income, and one person who could then be categorized as extreme who had an inhospitable view of the nation-state system and viewed the means of violence as being used on certain occasions to achieve goals and they actively promoted their ideas. However, even this number certainly cannot be ignored because of their social position as ulama who have followers and influence in society.

The high number of receipts seems to be easily understood by observing Islamic history and nationalism that is "united" in Surabaya. Jihad Resolution October 22 and the Surabaya War November 10 is a historical monument that shows the strong sentiment of nationalism among Muslims, especially among ulama and *santri*. Surabaya is also one of the nodes of transportation both land, sea, and air for the surrounding areas in the country. The cosmopolitan character of this city has appeared since long before Independence Day. This is an equally important explanation regarding the strong acceptance of the city community towards the principles contained in the nation-state concept. However, several incidents of terrorism in the name of religion that have befallen

the city of Surabaya in recent times have also raised several questions related to the possibility of penetration of antisystem radical groups in the provincial city which is the basis of the “NU”. This research, in addition to trying to see the diversity of acceptance of the nation-state, also seeks to find the possibility of sparking radical views among religious leaders.

### THE VIEW OF THE NU ULAMA

Based on the results of the survey and through in-depth interviews, the authors made prudent preliminary conclusions that NU ulama, in general, had very high acceptance of the concept of nation-state along with its derivative principles accompanied by resilience to the threat of “Islamism” despite NU ulama in this matter also have a diversity of degrees of acceptance and also submit a variety of diverse records. The most prominent notes are on issues of citizenship and tolerance. As for the issue of acceptance of the basic system or building of the nation-state and the principle of non-violence, the views of NU ulama can be said to be “almost” complete. Acceptance of the nation-state system based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is almost maximal even though there is still one figure found that confirms the discourse of returning the seven words in the first precept of Pancasila. The author calls the mainstream the acceptance of NU ulama against the nation-state as “ideological acceptance”. However, their views on equality for Muslim minority groups are still a problem. Tolerance against minorities outside Islam is strong, but it does not apply to a certain level for minority groups in Islam, especially Shia and Ahmadiyya. One other thing, there is little record of equality for women. In short, the acceptance of NU ulama in Surabaya against the principle of the nation-state is not singular but is divided into variations which are actually very diverse and complex.

Here are some examples of the views of NU ulama. Kiai MZ, for example, mentions the pillars of the nation-state of Indonesia, especially the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the NKRI is final and has been “syumul” which should no longer be negotiated. According to him, Pancasila is values that have been extracted from various national views. However, with an interesting explanation, the ulama who is also a doctor gave notes. Negotiations in terms of this principle are unacceptable, but negotiation is still possible even at the level of the Pancasila values in the process of developing political and economic systems, and the ongoing and ongoing law. Primordial aspirations including religion, ethnicity, and local views, for him, may still be even important given space but must

be through democratic procedures and efforts to adjust to the nation's public rationality. The following is an interview between the researcher and him:

"If I think that Pancasila is final, it is one form or one view that is extracted from the view of life, various kinds of thoughts, various kinds of philosophies from the Indonesian nation, the first to fifth principles have already been used as a basis of the state and way of life that is, a view of life that can be used as a basis, a guideline, to develop this country and nation ... if the Pancasila is final, only experimentation from the life of this state, in the political system, and so on, aspirations are still possible religion-based primordial aspirations, or certain local life-based views, etc., are still possible to negotiate but with two conditions which still following the democratic procedure, and must also be part of the Pancasila."<sup>2</sup>

A similar statement was also conveyed by other NU figures who were also very active in MUI and politics:

"In my opinion, the basis of Pancasila is already ...final ... it's final, because of what? Because keeping the NKRI if the Pancasila is changed, the NKRI can be damaged, because of what? ... so there is a need to maintain the unity of Indonesia. I don't think it should be returned (the first 7 words of the Pancasila: researcher), there will be a dispute again later, it's peaceful like this. Those who worship Islam, go ahead and those who are not, be my guest and do what you must do. So that alone has safeguarded the integrity of Indonesia, so whether any religion is returned to the seven words, there might be a dispute later, our country can be divided".<sup>3</sup>

Returning to Kyai MZ, it should be noted that despite having views on the possibilities of Islamic groups to fight for the formalization of Islam in today's democratic Indonesia, the Kyai who seemed very relaxed were not at all interested in the agenda of formalization of Islam. He was critical of the agenda:

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2 Interview with Kiai MZ Friday October 12, 2018.

3 Interview with Prof. I on Friday 12 October 2018

“To the extent that Muslim people can convince the public about universal values so that universal values can be accepted, it doesn’t matter. But the problem is that in terms of what is put forward are formal primordial symbols and identity, in my opinion, it is counterproductive for the Islamic struggle”

As with most of the other NU ulama in Surabaya, the results of a survey of these figures show a moderate and inclusive view, even according to the interview results, this figure can be categorized as progressive. This figure known as the “urban” Qur’an recitation community has confirmed the agreement on the nation-state system, the principle of equality in citizenship, tolerance for diversity, anti-use of means of violence to achieve goals, and pro-human rights and democracy despite the last, he submitted a critical note and was quite sharp. Democracy in his opinion is both a tool and a substance. Besides Muslims need to believe that the road that emphasizes the people’s voice is “Islamic”, the practice of democracy in this country with all the excitement of “ritual” and its products must also deliver this nation to the goal of living together namely “prosperity”. If not, then this democracy according to him can backfire. The following are excerpts of interviews with him;

“Yes, this democracy has become our choice, but indeed as we talked about at the beginning ... In my opinion, democracy in this country is still moving in the formal territory, not in the substantive region. Even in the formal area, there are still many shortcomings that must be addressed, and substantially the people’s voice is not yet qualified, meaning that it has not led to how the voices will then manifest or end in prosperity and benefit. If the rule of law and other products of democracy do not immediately lead to increased welfare, it will backfire.”<sup>4</sup>

However, the commitment expressed by this ulama to the overall principles of the Indonesian nation-state and its derivatives is very strong, including in crucial issues which are polemic among ulama and the general public such as minority issues, tolerance, and others. This is reflected in the respondent’s confirmation or approval, and his consistency in answering tricky issues in the survey, as follows; women have the right to occupy strategic positions in the executive and legislative institutions, an

4 Interview with Kyai MZ Friday 12 October 2018.

Ahmadiyya has the right to occupy public positions if competent, attacks on religious groups that are considered heretical are acts against the law, Islamic foundations and Christians have equal rights to establish schools, government leaders who are elected through democratic processes must adhere even those from non-Muslim backgrounds. This figure also affirms several items that are contrary to some principles or derivatives of nation-state principles such as the following; Currently there needs to be an independent team to formulate a state constitution that is more in line with Islamic law, Ahmadiyah is a deviant group so that it is not allowed to speak in the name of Islam, Shia groups should not openly conduct worship and da'wah activities because of heresy. Since there are efforts to weaken and divide Muslims, Shia should not be given the opportunity to hold gatherings in the Indonesian Muslim community. The state does not need to help Christian education institutions because it will strengthen Christianization, some human rights principles are harmful to the purity of Islamic faith, and so on.

To this figure, the author only notes about his disapproval of avoiding misguided allegations to the Shiites for the common good in the life of the nation and state. The author calls this figure's view of citizenship as "secularistic" citizenship that separates the size of theology and pluralistic reality which is like the opinion of Rasyid Ghonnusi as al-Muwathanah which is more related to Ardh than religious identity (1993). This respondent distinguishes between citizenship and theological reality. For him, the MUI's decision on Shiite heresy was a theological decision that did not need to be regrettable and could serve as a guideline for Indonesian Muslims. However, the MUI, through its fatwa products, is indeed trying to show that it is a "servant of the people, different from the nature of its birth which is called the servant of the regime (Ichwan 2005) although he does not support the decisions of the MUI or other MUI decisions for example 11 crucial decision at the 7th MUI National Conference (Rumadi 2011). However, as an Indonesian citizen, the Shia group according to him still have the same rights and obligations as others.

More or less the same survey results and interviews were also put forward by Ning F, a public nickname for one of the Fatayat leaders of the Surabaya PCNU, and a Islamic preacher on television as well as a caregiver of Islamic boarding schools, as well as carers of terrorists children from "Surabaya", and Kiai Y, an Islamic boarding school caregiver who is active in social media and the business world as well as teaching and preaching.



Both can be categorized as ulama with a moderate and progressive view of the nation-state. There are small notes from Kiai Y that relate to her neutral views on issues related to the Ahmadiyya group, while Ning F has notes relating to her neutral views on several issues regarding the Ahmadiyya, Shia, and Christian groups. Kiai Y even provides interesting Islamic justifications for almost all the nation-state building principles and their derivative principles. It is reflected in her statements regarding the NKRI and the choice of the Indonesian people to walk the path of democracy, not as an Islamic state or caliphate, as follows:

“NKRI has been Islamic, we cannot find anything in Pancasila which is not in accordance with the Qur’an and hadith, we certainly will not find ... and this is also what I usually emphasize to the santri; I’m in a pesantren facing santri, students on campus too. When discussing the verses about the hadith related to the history of the Prophet, I tell about the history of the Khulafaurrasyidin that explained the system from the outset, and that the elections in Islam were different, starting from the Prophet that the Companions and inhabitants of Medina agreed that the Prophet was the leader, continued with the election Abu Bakr, who was a result of the acclamation from a direct vote, and then from Abu Bakr to Sayyidina Umar, it was a will, from Sayyidina Umar to Sayyidina Uthman, even the team, from Sayyida Uthman to Sayyida Ali, again, and even from Muawiyah to his children even continued until the Khilafah, which he said was the Khilafah Islamiyah instead of the form of the kingdom. So I always emphasize to them whatever the system, whatever the form of election of the leader, which is actually obligatory to form a leader, just like in the hadith if there are only two of you, choose one who becomes the leader on the trip and if there are three, have a musyawarah (forum) to decide who should be the leader.”<sup>5</sup>

Kiai MZ also gives the argument and justification of Islam for the principles of democracy as follows:

“Therefore, in the context of democracy, the ulama is also tasked with how to improve the quality of people’s thinking in channeling those aspirations in order to channel their aspirations intelligently by

5 Interview with Kiai Y on Thursday 11 October 2018.

considering the value which is also the voice of God. That's what I think."<sup>6</sup>

The author gives a small note about the view of citizenship F as the theoretical citizenship or *al-muwāṭṭhanah al-fikriyyah* namely acceptance of the principle of full citizenship equality for all citizens including Shiites, Ahmadiyya, and religious people outside Islam and women, but the implementation of that principle when faced with cases of being limited. On the one hand, this figure agreed to the item "all Indonesian citizens have the right to freedom of association, including Shiite groups" and the item "all citizens have the right to freedom of opinion is no exception non-Muslims", but on the other hand, his answers are neutral to a number of questions regarding equality of rights for Shia and Ahmadiyya groups in Indonesian society. She also agreed that the leader must be a man for theological reasons even though she was known as a female activist in one of the religious organizations known as "progressive" supplying national female figures (Rinaldo, 2008). The author calls this limited emancipation. The educational background and family of the strong *pesantren* seem to influence this "great-granddaughter" Syekh Nawawi al-Bantani. However, as a woman who succeeded in being a carer for terrorist children, she also strongly believed in the role of women's agency in transmitting national "values" to the next generation, as described by Rinaldo (2008, 1781). The following is Ning F's statement describing her "thoughts" of terrorist children who have been poisoned by radical thoughts by the family:

"It turned out that when it was the 14th right, I gave the PC Surabaya a concern statement, I uploaded a photo of a bomb, then the child asked Is that a bomb Ustazah ? I immediately asked how do you it's a bomb? Yeah, because when I grow up I'm going to be a suicide bomber, ...This is so straightforward ... meaning that I am increasingly convinced what Densus 88 said about how their mind is brainwashed, this means *kulo ngaten*"<sup>7</sup>

Her experience of caring for terrorist children not only provides new awareness about the dangers of radicalism and extremism but also awakens her awareness to do something even greater in the framework of deradicalization. This figure then strongly believes that the best way of deradicalization is through family education and literacy movements.

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6 Interview with Ning F Tuesday 16 October 2018

7 Interview with Ning F Tuesday 16 October 2018

With its strategic position in the community, in addition to efforts to eradicate through education and dialogue, she designed literacy activities on a broader scale called Go-book which means simple but comfortable houses in Javanese (huts), books in English (book), or Love in Arabic (hubbuk). This strategy that relies on the enthusiasm and local wisdom remind the author with the story of Sumanto al-Qurtubi about grassroots efforts in peacemaking in one area in Indonesia (Qurtuby 2012/2013, 135). The problem faced by Surabaya was clearly as severe as the city because it did not experience such a violent civil conflict, but the church bombings and acts of terrorism involving children really gave a new awareness to this character. Likewise, Kiai Y, who confirmed and even legitimized all the principles of the nation-state with interesting Islamic arguments, also chose to be neutral when facing questions related to the Ahmadiyah group.

The three ulama, two men and one woman above, seem to reflect the mainstream's view among NUs who have very high acceptance of the nation-state principle and all its derivatives despite a number of notes on citizenship and tolerance along with the outlook of neglect to negotiate at the level of implementation in development of Indonesia's political, social and economic system. However, the researcher also found a millennial ulama who had an NU background and was recorded as an administrator in the NU autonomous body but had a view that seemed to be different from the figures mentioned above and other NU figures who were survey respondents. I mentioned his name as L, who had expressed his irregularities about the possibility of returning the seven words in the first principle of Pancasila to the researcher in the following interview passage:

“Researcher: Now there is an effort to encourage the Islamic NKRI to return or return the seven words in the first principle of Pancasila as they once were. L: If indeed we have strong arguments that can be accepted by many people, it is very positive, but if you don't have a strong argument that can be accepted by many people, it will be a blunder ... Let the young people love Islam, love the history of this country in order to make changes. This country exists because of Islam. If we can't make people love one another how can we make a difference?”

**RESEARCHER: BUT IS THE IDEA NOT HARMFUL TO THE NKRI?**

Respondents: No, as long as we have been able to change people's mindset first that Islam is universal, with the spirit of Islam, so we can be free to let people love it first and so we can change them, and the fill their minds with the Syariat, but if we don't do those steps it is impossible"<sup>8</sup>

Based on the record of this figure, the authors see a striking difference between this figure and other NU figures surveyed or interviewed, namely on religious education backgrounds, reading sources, and activities. This figure, according to a record written by the respondent and other sources of information, did not have a pesantren education background and was not intensive in the struggle for NU discourse. Her activities were focused on business activities even though she was listed as the management of one of the NU autonomous bodies. Background factors without Islamic boarding schools and lack of religious reading and the NU discourse seemed to help explain the outlook of this NU millennial female figure. This is the opposite to Kiai MZ who is an alumnus of the Surabaya al-Najiyah pesantren (graduated in 1987), and Darul Ulum, Rejoso, Jombang (graduated in 1990), Kiai Y is also an alumnus of the al-Khozini Buduran Islamic boarding school in Sidoarjo and Ning F is also alumni from Tambak Beras Jombang Islamic boarding school. If all three are very familiar and fluent with the turast books and Islamic discourse, especially with the thoughts of NU figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid, this female figure is not so familiar with it. In addition to questioning the basic building of the nation-state, this view of citizenship can be called "limited citizenship or partial citizenship, namely accepting the principle of citizenship equality for some citizens rather than entirely. Let us look again at her views on citizenship by quoting her interview as follows:

"Researcher: ... one of the prominent issues lately is related to the expulsion of Shia people in Sampang. How do you see the problem as a female figure? Respondents: yes, so it was a coincidence that one of the refugees was also a friend and we had the chance to discuss. She conveyed, (this is based on experience, too), conveying her complaints during the evacuation, yes there were shortcomings in terms of health, facilities, like that. I also told her too. I said that becoming a refugee has certain limitations, ... Then I also said why don't you try to go back to the previous location

but with the same identity as the residents? So, I think the conclusion is that they are convinced with their own identity as a Shia. I mean, if we are Muslims, then we are just Muslims, they returned home as a Muslim, and forget all kinds of identities... Apparently, she wants people to generally see her as a Shia, and she wanted to be like that. Surely there will be pros and cons regarding her identity. There is friction from people around. So, the point is, how do you want to improve the facility? How is it supposed to look like? The problem is that she withdrew from the surrounding community, that's a temporary view. We are humanist ... but we must admit that the problem is on their own, which indeed they wanted to be different from the surroundings. If they want to be different, there will certainly be a risk too. "Researcher: So, the problem comes from their Shi'a belief, right? L: Yes. "

#### **THE VIEWS OF MUHAMMADIYAH ULAMA**

Among Muhammadiyah ulama in Surabaya, acceptance of the building of the nation-state along with its derivative principles is also high, and the acceptance is also accompanied by diversity and records especially regarding tolerance and citizenship, and to a certain degree on human rights. The acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state system which covers the basic state of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the Republic of Indonesia, is high among the ulama organizations that carry Islam Berkemajuan (the Developed Islamic) concept even though there are also figures who give the possibility of negotiating the first changes in Pancasila and tolerating the use of means of violence in achieving goals in certain contexts. Although acceptance is high, reservations and negotiations on the principle of derivation are also quite strong, especially related to the principle of citizenship and tolerance. Partial acceptance towards the principle of equality of all citizens and partially tolerant, limited acceptance of the principle of tolerance, is felt at this point especially towards Muslim minority groups namely Shia and Ahmadiyya as well as religious groups outside Islam. What is interesting here is the high acceptance of equality for women even though there are also female Muhammadiyah ulama who require state leaders to be male because they

are in accordance with the concept of *al-rijālu qawwāmuna alā ‘l-nisā’*. According to the results of this research survey, most Muhammadiyah ulama who were respondents to this study could be categorized as moderate ulama, and some were conservative. Nevertheless, it was also found that one figure who according to the survey results was categorized as extremist in his views, although the latter was said to be in accordance to the researcher, this was not entirely the case. In essence, the views of the Muhammadiyah Surabaya ulama on nation-states and their derivatives are not single but are fragmented into several variants which are not simple.

MS, Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Muhammadiyah East Java Regional Board, for example, can be categorized as an example of Muhammadiyah ulama who are in a moderate approaching progressive spectrum. He not only deftly stated and helped promote the idea that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and NKRI were final for the Muhammadiyah people by citing the official decisions of the Muhammadiyah organization, but he also proposed the establishment of a national-level ideology university whose task was only one which was the planting of state ideology Pancasila. The author calls this acceptance of ulama on the basic principle of the nation-state an ideological acceptance. Here are some MS statements to the researcher:

“In Muhammadiyah everything is clear, so Muhammadiyah has stated that the Pancasila is a legitimate state philosophy and that it is one of the personalities in the Muhammadiyah ... So, the Muhammadiyah is encouraging, and working with the entire community to improve this nation and country. From the beginning, Muhammadiyah’s personality has been established since 61. At that time, by Faqih Utsman, the head of the Muhammadiyah central leadership and continued by Pak Yusuf Anis, the head of PP Muhammadiyah at the 35th congress in Jogja, a few matters concerning the personality of Muhammadiyah were established. And yesterday at the 47th Muhammadiyah Congress in Makassar, the issue was set again. So, Muhammadiyah believes that the Pancasila is final, and may not be dismantled again. Because it has been proven that so far it has become a tool to regulate the life of a good nation and to give appreciation to all elements of society ... Muhammadiyah is one of the organizations with

many figures who oversee the birth of the Pancasila. So, the term is *darul ahdi wa as syahadah*. This Pancasila country is a state that has been legally final, which is not negotiable.”<sup>10</sup>

MS, who often refers to and knows well the thoughts of Muhammadiyah figures such as Buya Syafi'i Maarif, Munir Mul Khan, M. Amin Abdullah, and Malik Fajar, also confirms or approves crucial items and has the potential to contain polemic if submitted to Muslims in general, for example, the following items: non-Muslims have the right to worship freely and openly the same as Muslims, women have the right to occupy strategic positions in executive and legislative institutions, all citizens have the right to freedom of opinion, including non-Muslim groups, I accept a follower of Ahmadiyya occupying public positions if he/she is competent, attacks on religious groups that are considered heretical are illegal, etc.

On the other hand, the respondents also negated or disagreed with crucial statement items that contradicted the principles of the nation-state and their derivatives as follows: currently an independent team needs to be formed to form a state constitution that is more in accordance with Islamic law, Ahmadiyah is a deviant group who speak in the name of Islam, the state must limit public facilities for non-Muslims so that they are not more powerful than Muslims, the return of seven words in the principles of Pancasila “Believe in one God, with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its followers” is important to reconsider to accommodate the rights for the majority group to be better, and the leader must be Muslim because according to the concept of *auliya* ‘(loyal friend, leader) in the Qur'an, interfaith dialogue can weaken faith, and human solidarity should focus on Muslims only, and other items. This shows the strength of this figure's affirmation of the principles of the nation-state including some of the contents of the derivative principles such as tolerance and equality between all citizens.

However, it should also be noted that this figure also criticized the principles of citizenship, human rights, and democracy as a part or derivative of the nation-state principle. He affirmed or gave approval to the statements in the following survey items: Shia groups were not allowed to open worship and *da'wah* activities because of heresy, the utterances of hatred towards other religious people could be understood as an attempt to fortify Muslims from heresy, Shia should not be given a chance to hold

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Ustadz MS on Thursday 11 October 2018.

associations in the midst of the Indonesian Muslim community, some human rights principles are harmful to the purity of Islamic faith, the outlook of some Muslims who reject groups deemed heretical by MUI is understandable, and so on. The Dai and at the same time a doctor in the field of HR from Universitas Airlangga (Unair) graduated or disapproved of the statements in the items as follows: all Indonesian citizens have the right to freedom of association including Shiites, Islamic foundations and Christians have the same rights to establish schools, government leaders who elected through democratic processes must be adhered to even from non-Muslim backgrounds, the Islamic political system proves superior to the concept of democracy or other political systems of human products, and so on. From this note, there appears to be a strong acceptance of the principle of equality in general, but in its translation, in more detail, it appears that the “faucet” of equality has become more specifically limited to Shia and Ahmadiyya groups, and to a certain degree for non-Muslims. The researcher calls it a partial acceptance of the principle of equality with citizens, partial tolerance, and realistic acceptance of democracy.

However, after conducting in-depth interviews, this figure at least principally expressed the view that the equality of all citizens, human rights, and democracy in principle, in fact, does not conflict with Islamic teachings even the contrary is in line with actual Islamic values. The agreement treats Shia and Ahmadiyya groups differently, especially to preach and gather, according to the researchers’ clarification of this figure, based on the MUI’s decision on the deviations of the teachings of the two groups which must also be adhered to:

“Maybe if with Shia and Ahmadiyya all this time it seems that Muhammadiyah has never cooperated, because I see that in the regulations in the MUI that Ahmadiyah and Shia are still considered as prohibited organizations. Now, this is a rule that Muhammadiyah must also follow.”<sup>11</sup>

This figure also considers it important to put democracy in the context of prioritizing the interests of the majority, in the case that Indonesia is a Muslim so that his views on the development of Islamic and Christian religious education must be placed in this context.

However, not all Muhammadiyah leaders or figures in Surabaya have a strong commitment to national principles and their derivatives as MS above. The researcher found a *dai* and Muhammadiyah activist, one of



the branch managers in the city of Surabaya, let's call her N, who was very difficult to categorize as a moderate figure especially progressive in her various views on the nation-state. These women leaders who often refer to information from the *Whatsapp* group and Amien Rais national figures in general lack confirmation of Indonesia's national and state principles including tolerance, non-violence, and civic equality including other principles such as democracy and human rights.

Reference to patron figures seems to be important enough to read the fragmentation of views among Muhammadiyah followers. The figure mentioned even sometimes seems to be trying to bargain for the Indonesian national system. As a small example, women who are very active in disseminating their ideas through Qur'anic recitations and other activities agree to the statements in the following survey items that are contrary to the principles of the nation-state or its derivatives; currently there needs to be an independent team to formulate a state constitution that is more in line with Islamic law, the existence of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia is part of an effort to weaken and divide Muslims, government policies need to be adhered to only if they are in harmony with the aspirations of Muslims, utterances of hatred towards other religious people can be understood as an attempt to fortify Muslims from heresy, Shia should not be given the opportunity to hold gatherings in the Indonesian Muslim community, the state must limit public facilities to non-Muslims so that they are not stronger than Muslims, leaders must be Muslim because they are in accordance with the concept *auliyā* in the Qur'an, persecution of religious groups deemed deviant can be justified so that error does not spread, leaders must be men because of the concept of *qawwāmū 'alā 'l-nisā'* in the Qur'an, and so on. The fact is that some outlooks are very critical of some of the country's foundations, equality of citizenship, and the principle of tolerance is confirmed in interviews with researchers. What surprised her as a woman is that leaders must be a male for religious reasons. Once again, the existence of the thesis that Islamic women's organizations are important incubators and supporters of women's national leaders is questionable. Next, among her statements about the discourse of returning seven words in the first principle of the Pancasila, although she seemed doubtful about citizenship. This is her statement as follows:

"If it were like that (returning the seven words in the first precept of the Pancasila) it would have been better, sir, if

that was the case ... if it was deemed to be safer... now the situation is not good, sir, for example, the government now according to me is similar to the era of Pak Soekarno who almost became a communist country. As Pak Amien Rais said, it is truly alarming. Mr. Amien Rais once said that this is already critical, this is already a concern, this is almost ... it's like if you get on a boat, it's shaky, sir. Muhammadiyah people are consistent. This is different with the people of NU who are shaky, sir, to the point in which they do not use this (pointing to the forehead), instead of "let's join forces", they support the government. I am horrified, sir, in support of this latent danger government, for example, Rifka, who is a Communist Party (PKI) child, according to her there are 15-20 million plus children plus grandchildren of PKI followers Sir inside the House of Representatives (DPR).<sup>12</sup>

"Actually, the Shi'a ideology is a little deviant, Sir, from Islam, which has been understood by most Indonesians, most of them are NU and Muhammadiyah. Well, it seems like it's deviant, we need to make it clear, but it's better that it's not necessary."<sup>13</sup>

He also stated the rejection or disapproval of the statements in the items which constitute the embodiment of the nation-state principle or its derivatives as follows; the principles of Pancasila in accordance with Islamic teachings, the elected government is in the same position as *ulil amri* in the Qur'an, the action of *nahi munkar* (preventing breaking God's command) by violence committed by non-state apparatus, not in accordance with applicable law, attacks on groups religion which is deemed heretical is against the law, I accept an Ahmadiyya occupying a public position if he/she is competent, all Indonesian citizens have the right to freedom of association including the Shia group, all legal products including those related to the interests of Muslims must not conflict with the 1945 Constitution, etc. The ulama does not only negotiate the basic building of the state and citizenship but also tolerates the violence carried out by Muslims against certain groups.

However, it is noteworthy here that the character's negative emphasis on these basic building aspects of statehood seems to center on his

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13 Interview with Nahazah on Monday 15 October 2018.

extraordinary disappointment with the current government and the failure of the “NU” authority as the largest organization in stemming “liberalization” and hedonism. According to him, this contradicts the aspirations of Muhammadiyah members and Muslims in general. This accusation is similar to that carried out by Muslim Brotherhood activists in Egypt to delegitimize Azhar with the accusation of failing to stem liberalism (Scott 2012). At a certain level, the prominent “sharp criticism” of Nusantara Islam reminds sharp critics of Najib Burhani (2012) about NU-style moderate Islam even though of course the respondents are not sophisticated in their speakers as the Muhammadiyah ulama or “ideologist”. Below is his statement:

“That is Aqil Siroj, who created and sparked the Nusantara Islam, that Islam must be according to the archipelago rather than the archipelago according to Islam. I was surprised by the recitation, sung like a Javanese song, it was not melodious at all, if the recitation of the Koran is usually not like that, if the contents are taken it doesn’t make sense, sir. This is contrary to Allah, the sunnah of the Prophet who is truly Islam is Islam that comes from Allah from the al-Qr’an. Many have deviated from the Kiyai themselves, and are supported by their fellow Muslim friends or families. LGBT was almost legalized. One of the examples of LGBT is lesbian, sir. In America it has already been legalized, the marriage of a man with a man, a woman with a woman. It is written in the Koran, Surat Hud, and other surah mentioned the Prophet Luth who overturned the land. This is written in Surat Hud verse 85. This is just like what happened in Palu. In one of the villages near BTN, there were activities such as prostitution, adultery, gambling, etc. I saw this in the TV show “Hitam Putih” the village was ripped apart like it was blended in a blender.”<sup>14</sup>

Although it was very hard in his view on several matters, in fact, on another occasion this very active Ustadz gave affirmations and approvals to the principal matters in the Indonesian nation and state in the following items; Pancasila is the most appropriate state ideology for Indonesia, the principle of democracy in accordance with the principle of Shura (consultative) in the Qur’an, I accept other religious people

14 Interviews with Nahazah N on Monday October 15 2018.

living in my environment, rules made by the elected government bind all citizens including Muslims, other religious communities have the right to implement freely and openly as Muslims, the basic values of human rights in accordance with *maqāshid al-syarī'ah* (Sharia objectives). From the agreement on these items this figure confirms and agrees to some important principles in Indonesian nationality and their derivatives. The author further mentions the acceptance of this figure towards the principles of the nation-state that are narrow and realistic acceptance. The author must say, the views of these figures are indeed confusing in almost all things both related to the national system, the principle of nonviolence, citizenship, and tolerance so that it is difficult to categorize this female figure. The final conclusions of the survey which show this character as extreme view cannot actually be fully accepted because she accepted a portion of the national system, some principles of tolerance and equality of citizenship, and other principles as reflected in her choices above and also interviewed regarding her doubts about the additional discourse seven words on the first precepts and human aspects related to Shia. The following are some of her later statements as opposed to her choice and the above statement:

“I mean we are a pluralistic layer, Pak comes from various walks of life, from various religions, so the first principle I think is like” Belief in the one and only God” has fulfilled the requirements of Islam.”<sup>15</sup>

“It’s a dilemma, on the other hand, it’s humane, Sir, on the other hand, their views (Shi’a) sometimes can be misleading, sometimes they are rather disorganized, Sir. Once, from the Shi’ite side, I have heard - they plan to take control. This is a real dilemma, it’s difficult for me.”<sup>16</sup>

### THE VIEWS OF ISLAMIC ULAMA

Probably beyond the expectations of some researchers, acceptance of the concept of nation-state among Islamic ulama in general, is also quite strong, although it certainly cannot be equated with acceptance among NU and Muhammadiyah. The difference lies in the very high rejection of the discourse of returning the seven words of the first principle of Pancasila in the two largest mass organizations in the country, while

15 Interviews with Ustazah N on Monday, October 15, 2018.

16 Interviews with Ustazah N on Monday, 15 October, 2018.

in Islamists the acceptance of the discourse is quite strong. From a few respondents, they generally accepted the nation-state system, especially Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and NKRI, although with several critical notes to the principle and some derivative principles, especially democracy and human rights, even though the issue of equality of citizenship was particularly noted and also stood out in this group. The issue of radicalism and intolerance is not an urgent matter for this nation according to some Islamic ulama who were respondents to this study. However, the issues that are more urgent according to them are the division of Muslims and Western domination in the lives of all Muslims in the world, including in Indonesia. The call for Muslim unity and resistance to Western domination became an issue that had high appeal.

Beyond the assumption of some public who described it as pro-HTI and critical of the nation-state system (Pancasila and UUD 1945), a Professor D for example, argued that Pancasila was not only the basis of the Indonesian state that must be accepted but also considered it as an important finding for the course of history of this nation:

“Now I think the nation-state is a response to the founding father- for me - when I formulated the Pancasila, in my opinion, it was an extraordinary innovation, extraordinary creativity and I appreciated the discovery of the Pancasila as a platform for our shared life in a pluralistic environment.”<sup>17</sup>

This statement was also supported by a survey that he did not support the efforts of Muslim leaders to seek a better ideology than the Pancasila and at other times he also mentioned the principles of the Pancasila in accordance with Islamic teachings. Some reservations and negotiations put forward by figures who are very intense in building the academic climate among students are related to many things including the praxis of democracy that is too procedural and not accompanied by wisdom as an individual who “deviates” from the principles of Pancasila:

“Yes, so if democracy is in perspective ... so I believe with the formulation of the Pancasila, we must use popularism, if democracy is considered as popularism it must be led by wisdom. The interpretation can be found in the explanation. But the last neocolonialism forces through repeated amendments are far from wisdom, we are far from a democratic system led by wisdom through a mechanism that we call the MPR system. “

17 Interview with Prof. DR on Wednesday 10 October 2018.

He also conveyed very sharp criticism related to the amendments to the 1945 Constitution which he said had alienated this nation from the foundations of its first life. The source of the problem, according to him, is neocolonialism, which he calls the real *Khilafah* in a world that should be opposed. The strength of international agencies with its various forms in influencing the imagination of the nation-state which, according to him, should be opposed. Maybe what he meant was the same as Stambach (2011, 111-112) meant that modernization in any field should not mean “secularization”. The following is a statement by Prof. D related to the rejection:

“So I think that the current homework if we still use the Indonesian nation-state platform is still considered relevant, maybe in 20 years’ time. We must go back to the 1945 Constitution. In my opinion, the platform is no longer in the 1945 Constitution, but it is the 2002 Constitution which is very different from the 1945 Constitution. I think the nation-state is defined as a reconstitution. So, if the name remains Indonesian but the constitution changes, everything changes, and a nation are declared independent from an independent political entity if it has its own constitution which is formulated independently. On the contrary, the formulation is not independent, if it is the formulation of many foreign consultants, and I think we are what we are today, we are too liberal, maybe even very liberal in a very pro-market economy so that the role of government seems to be smaller.”<sup>18</sup>

Democracy and human rights are the main targets of critics of figures who, according to this phenomenal researcher, although he is also critical in matters of citizenship, especially concerning the Shia and Ahmadiyya groups. He stated that he strongly agreed that the inclusion of human rights in article 28 of the 1945 Constitution as a result of the amendment was contrary to the national character. He also stated strongly agree that some human rights principles are harmful to the purity of Islamic faith. And the great force that forces the amendment to include human rights once again according to him is the great Western power he calls neocolonialism. He also stated strongly disagree with the statement “the principle of democracy in accordance with the concept of Shura (consultative) in the Qur’an. However, regarding the principle of nonviolence of this character so far the author fully agrees without any notes or reservations.

18 Interview with Prof DR on Wednesday 10 October 2018

There were not many other figures from the “puritan” group with followers, but were known to be very aggressive in condemning the practices of Islamic Indonesians, namely H. He supported the efforts of Muslim leaders to seek alternative ideologies that were better than the Pancasila even though at other times he called the principles in Pancasila are in accordance with Islamic teachings. He also agreed that Pancasila was the right ideology for the Indonesian people, although at other times he also called the Islamic political system to be superior to democracy and other systems. He also affirmed that the government which does not fight for the formalization of Islamic law is a *thāghūt* government and is not obliged to obey the government that does not fight for the interests of Muslims even though at other times he disagrees if government policies are only adhered to when supporting the interests of Muslims. This “half-hearted” and paradoxical nuance is very clear in the results of surveys of several Islamic ulama. As for tolerance and citizenship, the problem that arises, in general, is greater than that of ulama from the mainstream groups above, especially for minorities and non-Muslims.

A slightly different variant is Ustaz M. The view of Ustaz M, one of the leaders of the Luqmanul Hakim Islamic College under the Hidayatullah Community Organization, reflects a high acceptance of the nation-state principle along with its derivative principles, although also with several reservations. Hidayatullah as a “new Islamic organization” in the country is not easily grouped into certain groups. The members of this group are quite complex and the direction inside also appears to be diverse, one of which is its strong tendency to Salafi purists in the Din Wahid category (Sunarwoto, 2016) despite the differences (Burdah 2018). The presence of the Ustadz figure in Hidayatullah also proves that there is diversity, he is a complex figure when viewed in terms of educational background, organizational progress, and activities. He studied at the Nahdlatul Wathan boarding school in Kediri, Lombok, then continued his studies at STAI Luqmaul Hakim Surabaya, then UNITOMO, and finally UIN Sunan Ampel. He also engages in many organizations ranging from Nahdlatul Wathan, Youth Organization, OP3NH (at Pondok), KAMMI, Askois, MUI, Hidayatullah Community Organizations, and many others. He took part not only as a teacher and lecturer while at the same time serving at STAI Hidayatullah, but also boarding schools, dai, and family consultants. This complex character’s background may also reflect the diversity that exists in Hidayatullah’s institution.

Regarding his views on nationality can be stated as follows. The strong

acceptance of the main principles of the nation-state is reflected in its agreement with the statement: Pancasila is the most appropriate state ideology, the principles in Pancasila according to Islamic teachings, and the 1945 Constitution is the highest constitution that must be upheld. However, one thing that reflects the high acceptance is the agreement in the survey of the possibility of returning the seven words in the first principle of the Pancasila. However, after conducting interviews and asking for thorough confirmation, the respondents apparently indirectly corrected their choices by stating:

“I personally tend to take more of the existing views, as soon as I learn from various dialectics and so on. The group that says or wants to return the seven words is a small group, not many. For me, it is best to follow the ulama that Pancasila is sufficient, in the end, is just a matter of strengthening. Why? Because the five principles have represented the Islamic values, whether about monotheism, morality, worship, all of them already exist in those points, it may only be reinforced with these points accompanied by relevant theories so that it is not necessary to change them.”<sup>19</sup>

In the principles of the nation-state derivation, especially citizenship, this figure also shows little reservations, especially about his outlook towards Shia and Ahmadiyah. An outlook that can be called partial acceptance towards some of the nation-state principles. His work in the MUI institution and the great expectations of this figure for the MUI could provide an explanation of his outlook about the two Muslim minorities.

Both in surveys and interviews, this figure is consistent in his views on the two groups, although in principle he recognizes the equality of the rights and obligations of all citizens:

“... if we talk about these two groups in sharia studies, the MUI fatwa is such a deviation. For example, Shia with such understanding and Ahmadiyah. Well, we follow it. The fatwa of the MUI is because it is banned, which I call the government has the impression of not being supportive. Some questions asked I answered neutrally. Because there really is such a thing, being a PR is the term. Uncertainty can be seen, for example, whether the MUI makes it considered as a prohibited group when there should be education or whatever. But on the other

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19 Interview with Ustaz M on Saturday, October 13, 2018



hand, it was left so that it became the realm of conflict until now. What does it mean? If talking about the group was a Shia, then the Ahmadiyya in our Law has a recognized religion, right? Now Islam is clear, the standard, the creed, then the Prophet, and also the Quranic Hadith guidelines, but these two groups are somewhat different, the ulama's fatwa deviates and we follow its opinion."<sup>20</sup>

Although his hopes were very high for MUI as an umbrella that united Muslims, this figure also realized the weakness of MUI's roots in the Indonesian Muslim community. This institution was, however, less popular than other Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. According to Ichwan, the MUI must compete with the two more deeply rooted institutions to stabilize their authority (Ichwan 2005, 50). According to the figure, the MUI could be expected to become a unifying forum for Indonesian Muslims.

As for the principles of tolerance and democracy, this figure also has acceptance with reservations and negotiations. The author calls it a more realistic acceptance of the principles of the nation-state, especially systems and democracy. This is like the type of gradual struggle process and acceptance of democratization in the style of the Tarbiyah congregation called Yom Mahmudi as Islamizing Indonesia through the community first (Machmudi 2008, 106-7). Here is the statement of this ulama:

"Researcher; but democracy places power on the people, not on God, does it conflict with Islam? Sovereignty in the hands of the people is not in the hands of God.

Ustaz M: on the one hand there is indeed idealism in that direction, it relates to God in that we agree. But when we talk about facts, reality, and where we are, we must adjust ourselves and what I understand from Hidayatullah is that there is no kind of effort to change, it does not exist, but if there is someone who is able to fight for it then we have to support. But there is no special attempt from Hidayatullah himself."<sup>21</sup>

### **The Views of Minority Ulama Groups**

Among minority ulama, especially the Ahmadiyya and Shia groups,

20 Interview with Ustaz M on Saturday, October 13, 2018.

21 Interview with Ustaz M on Saturday, October 13, 2018.

the strong acceptance of the concept of the nation-state and its derivatives is accompanied by rejection and suspicion of the agendas disguised as “Islam”. In this circle, acceptance of the concept of nation-state along with its derivative principles is very high, especially in the issue of equality of citizenship and tolerance even though it is also with various notes mainly related to democracy, human rights, and equality issues for women. This strong attention to the issue of citizenship and tolerance is certainly understandable because the last thing is related to their direct experience as a minority, especially the Ahmadiyya where East Java is the first province that bans “Ahmadiyah” and areas where the Shia also experienced persecution.

In general, the acceptance of Pancasila as the basis of the state and the pillars of Indonesian statehood is very high and this acceptance as far as the researcher excavates is ideological not because of realistic acceptance. An example is the statement of Ustaz I, one of the Shia leaders from Sampang who later “lived” in Surabaya, against the principles of the nation-state even when mentioned by the author with a problem with dual loyalty:

“Pancasila is final, why do we have to fight to change the Pancasila ... In my opinion, we live in Indonesia, why should we be loyal to other countries? We must defend the country, what constitutes our country’s constitution is what interests us, in my opinion, say one example, Iran wants to attack Indonesia for whatever reason I will defend Indonesia because this is my homeland. Because religious teachings teach defending the nation and state, not other countries. That is the teachings of religion, and if there are people who understand like that according to me, I still ask first the teachings of Shia.”<sup>22</sup>

Based on the survey, figures in the Shia community who are in their 40s confirmed the principles of the nation-state as follows with a very agreeable (maximum) choice:

Based on the survey, figures in the Shia community who are in their 40s confirmed the principles of the nation-state as follows with a very agreeable (maximum) choice: Pancasila is the most appropriate state ideology for Indonesia, and the principles of Pancasila are in accordance with Islamic teachings, and is in line with the following items; The 1945 Constitution (the amendment) is the highest constitution of Indonesia which must

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22 Interview with Ustaz I on Friday October 12, 2018.

be upheld, the Islamic and Christian Foundation has the same right to establish schools, elected government leaders through democratic processes must be adhered to even from non-Muslim backgrounds, all citizens have the right to freedom arguing that there is no exception for non-Muslim groups, I accept an Ahmadiyya occupying a strategic position if they are competent, etc. The emphasis on equality of citizens' rights also seems very strong, especially regarding minority rights even though there are notes in the women's leadership issue. This respondent strongly disagrees with the following statements: Violent actions are needed to warn different groups of views with Muslims, Shi'a groups should not openly conduct worship and da'wah activities because of heresy, the utterance of hatred towards other religions can be understood as efforts to fortify Muslims from heresy, and so on. It is just that in the issue of women's leadership the respondent expressed his agreement that the leader must be a male as is the concept of *qawwāmun 'alā 'l-nisā'* in the Qur'an. Although, on the other hand, he expressed his agreement with the role of women in strategic institutions (outside the highest leader) both executive and legislative.

Ustaz AN, the Ahmadiyya preacher in Surabaya, also showed his belief in the basic state of Pancasila. According to him, Pancasila is sufficient and in accordance with Islamic teachings:

"But in essence, according to Ahmadiyya, Pancasila is sufficient for this archipelago because first, it is concise and flexible. Compact, flexible, and already in line with Islamic teachings. If we think that Pancasila is appropriate, and we do not hesitate in our articles of association, it states that in the constitution of the Ahmadiyya the principle is Pancasila. We do not have a special discussion to include it as a single principle does not drain energy, just written there all agree, there has never been such a complicated discussion. Because indeed we consider that Pancasila is appropriate, in harmony with the ideals and upholding as living a nation and a homeland in our archipelago."<sup>23</sup>

The Riau-born Senior Mubalig who obtained an assignment in Surabaya can be categorized as progressive according to the survey results because his confirmation is almost full of all the principles of the nation-state and its derivative principles. These respondents' answers certainly had made the researcher strange because the Surabaya

23 Interview with Mubalig AN on Wednesday 10 October 2018.

government was the earliest local government to issue a governor's regulation on "Ahmadiyah ban", but the consistency of respondents' answers and repeated affirmations made the researcher must interpret this "strange" outlook. They seemed to be very accustomed to getting different treatments so the pressure of the governor's regulation did not make him appear "very disappointed". In the context of his agreement with the nation-state system, he even expressed maximum agreement by choosing to strongly agree with the following item statements; Pancasila is the most appropriate state ideology for Indonesia, the principles of Pancasila in accordance with Islamic teachings, and the amended 1945 Constitution constitutes the highest constitution of Indonesia which must be upheld. He also stated strongly disagree with the return of seven words in the first principle of Pancasila namely "Belief in one God, with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'a for his followers". Likewise, on issues of justice and equality of citizenship, the preacher also provides a very high appropriation of equality for non-Muslim groups, Muslim minority groups, and women. In contrast to the Shia figures above, he strongly agreed that women occupy a strategic position even as leaders of the nation, as well as non-Muslim leadership, elected through elections. He even expressed readiness and feeling of pleasure when the writer asked about the possibility of a neighbor establishing a church next to his mosque. The following is an interview with Ustaz AN:

"Researcher: For example, this mosque continues to have Christian friends who want to establish a church beside it and happen to have been taken care of by the government and obtained permission, do you object or not? Ustaz AN: oh no problem, I don't mind at all. It's nice because Nadrotuna, our motto is love for all, there is no hatred for anyone. So whatever religion he/she is and even he/she does not have a religion, we still must love him/her. If he/she wants to build a mosque, we must love him/her, let alone if he/she is a terrorist, or even if he/she is a hardline Muslim, we still always love him/her. There is no discrimination in love. That includes love for all humans, this is a part of love for the creatures of Allah SWT, the understanding of love is we can love more than ourselves. "

AN stated that Ahmadiyya had long been a part of this nation and together the nation was built it. He mentioned that several Ahmadiyah people who were

important figures in the history of the nation's struggle as one of the reasons for the strong acceptance of Ahmadiyya towards the Indonesian nation-state:

“Ahmadiyya entered Indonesia since before Indonesia's independence ... because the Ahmadiyya had been established since 1889, still in the 19th century, entering Indonesia in the 1920s so that it had a long process of history in the process until 1945 independence, even in the era charging this independence. Well, before independence to realize Ahmadiyya's involvement in the field of humanity included in obtaining the rights of independence. The life of the nation and homeland is a part that must be encouraged in the Ahmadiyya congregation starting from the caliph. Now in Indonesia in the 20s, entered the second caliph, Isa Basyirudin Mahmud Ahmad. So, the Ahmadiyya struggle in the Indonesian independence period, Alhamdulillah, there were many names such as W.R Supratman from Ahmadiyah, then there was Pak Muhidin, Mohammad Mr. Muhiddin, they entered the preparatory team for the 1945 proclamation independence ceremony. Including the chief executive of the Ahmadiyya Jama'at in Indonesia at that time, Mr. Muhidin ... Then some other fighters emerged from Tasikmalaya, from Garut, but I did not know their names, there were heroes, so, we Ahmadis, every August 17th in Jakarta they were invited to enter the family hero. In Surabaya, Major Bambang Giono was buried in the Surabaya Heroes Cemetery, he was one of the Ahmadiyya youths who died in defending the independence of Indonesia in 1947 ... Mr. WR Supratman also came from Surabaya, East Java, he also joined Ahmadiyya despite his family is from Cianjur, he is native to Central Java Purworejo.”<sup>24</sup>

Respondents repeatedly confirmed to the researcher that Ahmadiyah is a religious congregation so that there is no agenda involved in practical politics. Ahmadiyah is considered obedient to the existing government. So, the term khalifah in Ahmadiyah according to him is a spiritual leader, not at all a political leader despite the “cosmic” narrative of the Ahmadiyya struggle which was conveyed by words which according to the author were very politically impressive. The researcher also received a message to convey

24 Interview with Mubalig AN on Wednesday 10 October 2018.

the Ahmadiyya's strong arguments about their basic beliefs which were polemic in the Islamic world, but the author cannot convey them here.

## CONCLUSION

The ulama's view of the nation-state of Indonesia is not singular, static, and fixed, but quite diverse including those who are in the same group or organization and are still in a dynamic process accompanied by various negotiations and reservations although generally there is a very strong acceptance of the "main" principle of the nation-state. The fact of this research shows that the main acceptance of the principle of the nation-state that is namely the acceptance of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the Republic of Indonesia, is very strong among Surabaya ulama from various groups both accepting ideological and realistic. The researcher did not find a single respondent who openly or implicitly wanted to change the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the state. The researcher only found two people who agreed to the discourse of returning seven words in the first principle of Pancasila. The majority of Surabaya ulama who were respondents also refused to use violent means to achieve their goals. The principle of non-violence as part of the concept of the nation-state is generally agreed upon, but again there are views that appear to be inconsistent in this matter especially in relation to outlooks towards minority groups that are considered heretical. So, despite the diversity, the reception of Surabaya ulama against the nation-state principle is generally very high.

However, there is tremendous diversity in their views on the principles of their derivation, especially about tolerance and citizenship. Almost all the ulama in Surabaya gave certain notes about the derivative principles especially when the principle was related to various issues or cases that occurred in the city of Surabaya or the homeland in general. The author has not been able to find a neat pattern for this diversity because there are many variations, almost as many as the respondents themselves. At a certain level, some of the Surabaya ulama also noted their acceptance of the principles of democracy and human rights. At this point, there seems to be a kind of partial acceptance of these principles, that acceptance sometimes seems paradoxical and ambivalent, sometimes it seems inconsistent, and sometimes it is accompanied by excessive suspicion. In essence, there is tremendous diversity in accepting these derivative principles. The terms that the author shares in this article are partial acceptance of the principle of citizenship, partial tolerance, paradoxical citizenship, realistic acceptance,

and ideological acceptance, all of which are only initial goals to give a “label” in more detail about the outlook of the ulama to the nation-state.

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ULAMA IN THE MINORITY  
MUSLIM CITIES:  
Progression, Tolerance, and  
Shadows of Islamism





# ULAMA, FRAGMENTATION OF AUTHORITY, AND IMAGINATION ON THE STATE: Case Study of Pontianak City

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Ulama as a religious elite and society have played an important role in socio-political changes in Indonesia. They even became one of the main figures in the formation of the Republic of Indonesia. The idea of Islamic nationalism built by scholars could be traced long before independence (Laffan 2002). After Indonesia's independence in 1945, they remained important actors in social change (agent of social change). Researchers such as Clifford Geertz (1960) and Hiroko Horikoshi (1987) show that during the New Order the ulama played a role in translating modernization ideas into rural Muslim societies on the island of Java. However, the relationship between ulama and the state does not always go hand in hand. In the historical record, there are ulama who are oppositions and sometimes must clash with the state. In the colonial period, we knew Hajj Rasul, Ahmad Hasan, Zainal Mustafa, and Isa Anshary who were widely known to be critical of the colonial government (Subhan SD 2000). In the period after independence, ulama who were members of the Darul Islam (DI) or Indonesian Islamic State (NII) movements such as Ajengan Masduki and Abdullah Sungkar were known to be very critical of the Indonesian state.

This paper discusses the perceptions and views of ulama on the nation-state and the problems associated with it such as democracy, religious tolerance, and citizenship. This chapter aims to see how ulama develop their perceptions and views; what are the factors that shape and influence it. The study of the perceptions and views of ulama about nationalism is important to help us understand their role amid the major changes in the fields of politics, culture, and technology. Ulama such as Dale Eickelman,

James Piscatori, and Jon Anderson, note that the advancement of education, communication technology, and transportation has resulted in the fragmentation of religious and political authority (see Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, 131-35; Eickelman and Anderson 2003 [1999], 1-18). According to that, the traditional Islamic authority commonly referred to as ulama has the challenge of fragmentation. Inevitably, this kind of view is rooted in a secularization thesis that believes the collapse of the public role of religion. However, as noted by Jose Casanova (1994), since the late 1970s religion has increasingly shown its public role. Regarding the ulama, Muhammad Qasim Zaman thinks that in the midst of these changes the ulama continued to answer the challenges that came with it. They can “strengthen influence, expand the audience, contribute to public discourse, and even determine these discourses” (Zaman 2002, 2).

This paper examines Muslim politics as “competition and contestation both for the interpretation of symbols and the control of institutions, formal and informal, which give birth to and support them” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, 5). From the perspective of Muslim politics, the perspective of Muslims, and especially ulama, is strongly influenced by Islamic teachings. They make Islam as one of the important terms of reference in seeing and understanding reality. Differences in perspective are born from differences in understanding of Islam. Therefore, in this chapter, I argue that differences in the perceptions and views of ulama against the nation-state are born out of differences in their interpretations of Islam that compete. As will be shown later, the nation-state is well received by almost all ulama in Pontianak. However, their acceptance is not always the same. There is a variety of reasons behind this acceptance, in which Islam is the main reference. Borrowing the term from Benedict Anderson (1983), ulama “dreamt” that this nation-state was made from the reference of Islam. In the competition and contestation of Islamic interpretations, they imagine the format or system of nation-states that are ideal and in accordance with Islam. To explore the insights of the ulama’s nationality, this chapter also discusses how they view the issue of citizenship, human rights, intolerance, and violence. It will be seen later that their views are not singular and are determined by the context and relationships that surround them.

#### **ULAMA AND AUTHORITY FRAGMENTATION**

Pontianak in the 18th century was a kingdom founded by Sultan Syarif Abdurrahman Alkadri (m. 1808). This founding sultan is known as a

religious figure. However, compared with other kingdoms, it is different, in West Kalimantan, Pontianak Sultanate, according to Zulkifli Abdillah (2010: 242) from IAIN Pontianak, did not have a special position for mufti or qadi. This, for one reason, was because the Sultan himself was a religious leader so there was no need for special positions for qadi or mufti. Apart from that, religious leaders or ulama occupy social strata that are highly respected and have a big influence on people's lives. They are the highest authority and respected in Islamic affairs, even though they do not have political power (Hasanudin 2014, 90). This royal version of Islamic model lasted even until after independence.

In the period after independence, when the kingdom no longer held the highest political power in society, the ulama continued to play an important role in religious and political life. The state accommodates some ulama and gives them religious trust. The history of the establishment of Muhammadiyah in 1912 and NU in 1926, as well as other religious organizations, showed that during the independence period the ulama played a large role in building and forming Indonesia, a new nation-state. During the New Order period (1967-1999), ulama strongly colored the political journey. The establishment of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in 1975 at the initiative of President Suharto showed that the ulama needed by the state to succeed the development agenda being carried out by the country. Muhammadiyah entered Pontianak in 1932 (Hasanudin 2014, 191), while NU in the 1950s.<sup>1</sup> These two largest Islamic organizations helped color the Pontianak Islamic model until the end of the New Order. The end of the New Order was marked by the emergence of new Muslim groups such as HTI, FPI, MTA, Salafi, Tarbiyah (PKS), and new Ustaz. In Pontianak, as in other cities in Indonesia, these new figures also helped change the religious landscape of the community. Royal Islamic models or sultanates no longer dominate Pontianak's Muslim community. Symbolically, the presence of these new groups can be seen clearly in the Mujahidin mosque, Pontianak. Almost all Islamic groups participated in enlivening Islamic activities such as Quran recitals in this mosque. There is Halaqah recitation from these various groups.

In the post-independence period, the Pontianak sultanate no longer had political power. The Sultanate only holds symbolic-cultural power. However, after the New Order, especially since ascending the throne, the

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1 Personal communication with Ahmad Fauzi Muliji, Pontianak, October 19, 2018.

Sultan seemed to be building political authority by establishing relations between various parties inside and outside the government. No less important, the Sultan established relations with Islamists and Islamists. There is one important note about the relationship of the Pontianak sultanate in the present with the new group, for example, FPI.

The relationship between the two was closely intertwined so that the FPI was often invited to events held by the current Sultanate.<sup>2</sup> In September 2018, Ustadz Abdul Shomad (widely known as UAS) also received an invitation and a warm welcome from the Sultan of Pontianak. In Pontianak, UAS gave a *tausiyah* at the event of the founder of the Pontianak sultanate's haul.<sup>3</sup> This implies to the Sultan's close relationship with the national-scale religious figures who became new figures in Muslim public life.

An important note is the proximity of the current Sultan of Pontianak to FPI, which can be seen from the support of FPI activities and the involvement of FPI in religious events in the Sultanate of Pontianak. The Sultan also gave support to the FPI Bela Ulama Action in protest at the refusal of the visit of a central FPI leader, Ustaz Shobri Lubis, to Pontianak.<sup>4</sup> It seems that the Bela Ulama Action in Pontianak mimics the pattern of Bela Islam Action driven by the FPI and other Islamist groups in Jakarta, namely by using Islamic sentiment to protest the actions of the then West Kalimantan Governor Cornelius, who is a Christian. The trigger was the rejection of a group of people against the arrival of Ustaz Shobri Lubis to Pontianak. The BBC's online site calls the Bela Ulama Action mimics the politics of anti-SARA (Ethnic, Ism, Race, Religion) that occurred during the Jakarta regional elections (Pilkada) 2017. The Sultan's closeness to the FPI may be possible through the Habib or Syarif network. The founder of the Pontianak Sultanate was a Syarif, who was believed to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. This allows closeness with FPI figures who are of Habib or Yemeni Hadramaut backgrounds.

Apart from that, FPI is one of the groups that are currently dominant in the life of Pontianak city. The fragmentation of religious and political authorities above affected the changes that occurred in the outlooks and

2 Syamsul Kurniawan, personal communication, Yogyakarta, December 11, 2018.

3 <http://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2018/09/10/sultan-pontianak-sambut-uas-di-airport-supadio-pontianak>, accessed December 21, 2018.

4 See <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39992156>, access December 12, 2018).

views of Muslims and ulama in Pontianak against the nation-state. It will be seen later that despite accepting the nation-state well, ulama are critical of certain aspects of the acceptance.

## THE ACCEPTANCE OF NATION-STATE

### 1. *Pancasila and NKRI*

Islam as the majority religion strongly changes the perception and views of these issues. Islam is an important frame of reference for measuring and assessing the position of nation-states. The acceptance of scholars in Pontianak against nation-states was born from and influenced by their understanding and interpretation of Islam. An important note from the field is the strong recognition that Indonesia is not an Islamic state. This recognition is an important premise for them to answer the question of how Islam should be placed in this nation-state. With the premise of not an Islamic state, religion (Islam) is not placed as a whole reference to the values of nation and state, but only one value reference. This premise is certainly not easily proven thoroughly in reality, especially when faced with the premise of Islam as a frame of reference. Islam is often too dominant in matters that should not be part of the religious territory. In this writing, we will see how negotiations occur between Islam and nationality.

In general, this survey shows that acceptance of the nation-state by Muslim leaders in Pontianak is without a doubt. Quantitative data shows that out of the 30 questionnaires distributed, 21 progressive respondents, 5 moderates, 2 conservatives, 1 extreme, and 1 unidentified. None is included in the radical category. Data on interviews with 10 respondents reinforced this quantitative conclusion. Almost all respondents accepted the form of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The only one who desire another form is HTI which desires the realization of the Caliphate system. For most Pontianak ulama, the Pancasila which became the basis of the NKRI was the result of an agreement by the Chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Pontianak PW which is called the point of agreement of the founding fathers. They agree that it contained Islamic values.<sup>5</sup> Referring to K.H. Ma'ruf Amin from NU, the head of the West Kalimantan MUI called Pancasila the Mitsaq (agreement). Not just the result of an agreement, the principle of the Pancasila itself are believed and deemed born of Islamic teachings. The Imam of the FPI Pontianak area emphasized that the Pancasila was the essence of some Islamic

<sup>5</sup> Interview, Pontianak October 12 2018.

teachings. Similar beliefs and views were conveyed by other speakers from Pontianak's NU Muslimat.<sup>6</sup>

HTI Ulama are the only parties who reject Pancasila as a state ideology because for them Islam and the Caliphate are ideologies that should be applied in this Muslim-majority country. However, they did not reject the fact that the principle in Pancasila did not conflict with Islam. An Ustadz from HTI Pontianak believes that Pancasila is not an ideology but normative values. As normative values, Pancasila does not have special rules and is open to interpretation. He stated that as long as the Pancasila was interpreted as not contradicting to Islam, there was no problem.<sup>7</sup> HTI is certainly not the only party who wants a Khilafah system. The Imam of the FPI region stated that the Caliphate was an absolute necessity that would occur someday. Salafi also has the concept of Khilafah, namely the *khilāfah 'alā manhaj al-nubuwwah* (Khilafah - according to the prophetic method). The FPI, as emphasized by the regional Imam, sees the Khilafah as not applicable now. While the Salafis argue that the Khilafah does not have to be realized in the form of government.

The adherence of Muslims to the government is based on the command of the Qur'an to obey *ulil amri* (or *waliyul amr*), which coincides with obedient orders to Allah and the Messenger (see Surah al-Nisa [4]: 59). Among Muslims, there are differences about who is really *ulil amri* who must be obeyed. It is undeniable that this debate has also been taking place in Indonesia for a long time, and inevitably influences the perceptions of Muslims or ulama on leadership and government. In Indonesian history, the total acceptance of the leader as *ulil amri* was once given by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to President Sukarno called *waliyyu 'l-amr al-dharūrī i l-syaukah* (see, for example, Naim 1960, 97). Until now there are still frequent differences regarding whether the Indonesian government can be called *ulil amri*. For activists from Islamic movements such as MMI and Salafi jihadists, for example, the Indonesian government is not *ulil amri*.

Most of the speakers in the questionnaire, namely as many as 25 respondents, agreed that the Indonesian government which is the result of democracy could be called *ulil amri*. As many as three other respondents stated neutral and only two refused. This quantitative data shows the high recognition of the government resulting from democracy. This is also reflected in the results of interviews with a leader of an Islamic boarding

6 Interview, Pontianak, 12 October 2018.

7 Interview, Pontianak October 18 2018.

school in West Kalimantan. He stated that a legitimate government is *ulil amri* because it is a product that results from religious values. The same thing expressed by the regional Imam. He said that “anyone who holds the power of our state, we must still submit, and obey as a citizen.”

The Chairperson of the West Kalimantan MUI did not give a clear answer about whether the current government was *ulul amri* or not. In the questionnaire, he chose to be neutral, which was also seen in interviews with the author. He also did not give a clear answer about whether non-Muslims should lead. Instead, he referred to the political experience of West Kalimantan, which for two periods was led by a non-Muslim governor, Cornelius. In such circumstances, the most important thing, according to him, is that Muslims are overseeing the regulations made by the government thus they do not hinder the interests of Muslims, especially to implement their religious teachings. As stated in Islamic teachings, obedience to *ulil amri* is not primarily based on existing legal norms but on religious boundaries, i.e. obedience while not in the category of disobedience in the view of religion. In other words, obedience to *ulil amri* is not total obedience, but obedience based on religion.

## 2. Democracy

One of the complicated debates among Muslims in looking at the nation-state is about democracy, whether it is in accordance with Islam or not. Some Muslim ulama such as Hasan al-Banna (m. 1949) from Egypt view democracy as incompatible with Islam, and it is a Western product. Others like Rashed al-Ghannoushi (born 1941) from Tunisia argue that Islam and democracy are not contradictory. In fact, he said that Islam is basically democratic. Hasan Turabi from Sudan initiated Islamic sharia. This difference cannot be separated from the root of the problem of sovereignty. In a democracy, sovereignty is in the hands of the people or citizens (popular sovereignty). This principle is contrary to the Islamic principle that sovereignty is in God’s hands (divine sovereignty). These two types of authority, in Islam, have become fierce debates among supporters and opponents of democracy. The logic behind this binary opposition authority, as stated by King Bahlul, is the opposition between “government by the people” and “government by the ulama class” (government by a class of clergy; Bahlul 2006, 3).

In this survey, acceptance of democracy in general also showed a positive outlook, in the sense that they accepted democracy as a political system in Indonesia. For most of them, democracy is in accordance with Islamic



teachings, especially the teachings about *syūrā*. In the language of the NU Pontianak Muslimat Chair, *Syura* is a concept of Islam that overlaps democracy.<sup>8</sup> In other words, there is a match between democracy and Islam (*syūrā*). We can see that the ulama's acceptance of democracy as a political system is always constructed in the Islamic framework. Democracy is understood and interpreted through Islamic teachings. It should be noted that the position of Islam, for them, is above democracy. Referring to the chairman of the West Kalimantan MUI, Islam must not be confronted with democracy. Islam must be part of democracy, not vice versa.<sup>9</sup>

The fact that democracy does not originate from Islam does not prevent Muslims from following this political system. The Pontianak FPI regional priest stated that democracy is indeed not an Islamic concept, but while it does not conflict with Islamic teachings, Muslims must follow it. There are also those who give a critical record of the running of democracy that is not good, which has not been able to produce ideal leaders and justice for the people.<sup>10</sup> The only one who rejects democracy as a political system is the HTI Ustaz who views it as not part of Islam. "So, yes, it does not have a real place of democracy in Islam," said Ustaz HTI Pontianak. He further stated that democracy is not just a matter of *Syūrā*. According to him, democracy has two principles. The first is sovereignty in the hands of the people, while the second is power in the hands of the people. In his view, power in the hands of the people does not cause problems, because he relates to people's rights to choose leaders. Meanwhile, sovereignty in the hands of the people creates a problem because it is related to lawmaking. The democratic system that gives birth to laws made by the people through a system of representation becomes problematic because it will make the law change according to the interests that made it. He confirmed it with the following statement.

"What I understand is that there is no concept ... sovereignty in the hands of the people. But sovereignty is in the hands of the Lawmaker, '*ya asy-Syari*', namely Allah or the law of *Syarak* or the *Kitabullah* or the Sunnah of the Prophet. That is if we want to make a law, not make it, in the sense of compiling the law, referring to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah. "<sup>11</sup>

8 Interview, Pontianak, 12 October 2018.

9 Interview, Pontianak, 15 October 2018.

10 Interview with Dr. H. Syarif, Pontianak, 11 October 2018.

11 Interview, Pontianak, 12 October 2018.

Ustaz HTI does not explain how to compile the law by referring to the book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Apart from his rejection of democracy as a political system, Ustadz HTI did not totally reject the elements of democracy. If we look at it in history, Hizbu at-Tahrir (HT) can live and develop in a democratic country. This proves that there are political conditions that allow HT to be part of the democratization process.

To further understand the differences in views of ulama regarding the position of democracy and Islam, we may refer to Asef Bayat. According to him, the question is not whether Islam is appropriate or not in accordance with Islam, but the question is “in what conditions do Muslims make Islam and democracy appropriate or not?” The answer to this question lies in social agents in countries that adhere to a democratic system like Indonesia. They struggle to make Islam in harmony with democracy (Bayat 2007, 4). In short, the question of whether the suitability of democracy and Islam in its essence, said Bayat, is a matter of “political struggle” (Bayat 2007, 6). We can see that, although the ulama in Pontianak agreed, generally they provide a critical record of democracy. In other words, they want to say that democracy can be applied only if it is in accordance with Islam. To a certain extent, although HTI rejected democracy, they accepted another part of democracy as shown in the opinion of Ustaz WI above.

### **ISLAMIC SHARI’A**

The discourse on the formalization of Islamic Sharia strengthened in the post-Reformation period. At the same time, in parliament, there was a demand for the return of seven words from the Jakarta Charter, namely “with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari’at for its followers” (see Nur Ichwan 2003, 23-24). The demands of the formal application of Islamic Shari’a were partly realized in the form of Sharia Regional Regulations that were implemented in several regions in Indonesia. Pontianak is not one of those areas. This does not mean that Islamic sharia is not a concern of the public or Muslim figures in this region. The strong desire to make Islam as a guide to everyday life can be seen in the presence of Islamic symbols in a stronger public sphere.

Of the thirty religious leaders who filled out the questionnaire, there were 15 people who did not approve (TS) or strongly disagree (STS) that seven words were returned in the Jakarta Charter. Twelve others agreed or strongly agreed, and the other three were neutral. Interestingly, some who

agreed, when the writer interviewed directly, they showed inconsistent outlooks. In interviews, they emphasized the acceptance of the principles of Pancasila as their present form, not their form in the Jakarta Charter. Their agreement to seven words in the Jakarta Charter does not mean they want to restore the Jakarta Charter itself or formalize Islamic law. What they want is a real implementation of Shari'a. Muslims must carry out the teachings of Islam seriously and the state must not obstruct the implementation. This desire was clearly reflected, for example, in some of my interviews with one of the informants who in the questionnaire approved the Jakarta Charter. He said that an agreement on the Jakarta Charter had been reached, and Pancasila in its present form as a state philosophy should not be changed again.<sup>12</sup>

Other sources emphasized that the abolition of the seven words was a form of the greatness of the Muslim leaders for the unity and unity of the Indonesian nation. Furthermore, the Chairperson of the West Kalimantan MUI stated the following.

“In my opinion, there is really no need for formalities. Because, for me, the important thing is the implementation ... What is the meaning of formal? If the application is also contrary to the truth ... It does not have to be formal”.<sup>13</sup>

We can clearly see that the survey data and interviews that appear to be inconsistent are basically based on a substantial understanding and application of real Islamic sharia rather than the desire to support the formalization of Islamic law. This is as seen in the statement of the Chairperson of the West Kalimantan MUI that the actual application of sharia in life is better than just a formality without manifesting it in reality in the community.

### **CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, MINORITIES, AND VIOLENCE**

The concept of citizenship in Islam is different from the concept of citizenship in the nation-state adopted in the West. The great concept that underlies the idea of citizenship in Islam is the ummah concept which is characterized by Islamic religious ties and applies across territorial, racial, and tribal boundaries. The Ummah is a community of believers (Islam), and therefore makes the people of other religions as second-class citizens. As a statement, in fiqh, the concept of citizenship is usually

<sup>12</sup> Interview, Pontianak, 18 October 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Wawancara, Pontianak 15 Oktober 2018.

under the concept of *dār al-Islām* which refers to Muslim society, and *dār al-ḥarb* refers to non-Muslim societies. Non-Muslims who live in Muslim communities and are subject to their laws are called *dhimmī*, while those who resist are called *Harbi* (see Salam, 1997: 125- 147; Kamali, 2009: 121-153). As stated above, the ulama in Pontianak did not view Indonesia as an Islamic state. They did not use the term *dār al-Islām* to refer to Indonesia.

Therefore, some of the respondents I interviewed did not understand citizenship from the *dhimmī* and non-*dhimmī* conceptual spectacles. Nevertheless, they did not “collide” the concept of an Islamic state with the NKRI.

The acceptance of human rights among Pontianak scholars is quite high. From the quantitative data, most of the 23 respondents (15 agreed, 8 strongly agree), viewed human rights as being compatible with the principles of *maqāshid al-syarī'ah* in Islam. Those who disagree only four, and who strongly disagree with only two people. While the neutral is only one respondent. The number of those who did not object to Human Rights included in the Amendment Constitution which was 18 respondents. They view human rights are in accordance and do not conflict with the national character. Only six stated otherwise, while six stated neutrally. High acceptance is also given to the rights of indigenous peoples and their local beliefs. 21 respondents (17 agreed, 4 strongly agreed) stated that they recognized the rights of indigenous peoples. Only 6 (4 disagree and 2 strongly disagree) who do not recognize, and 3 declared neutral. From this data, it can be concluded that although the acceptance of human rights is high, there is also resistance. This is clearly reflected in how the ulama responded to various cases of violence which caused problems of citizenship rights. They do not fully accept, and even in certain cases tend to support the loss of citizenship rights.

In terms of rights as citizens, women's leadership does not seem to be too problematic for ulama in Pontianak. Women have the right to occupy positions in executive and legislative positions. A total of 18 respondents agreed and even strongly agreed (5 agreed, 13 strongly agreed) if women occupied the political position. Only five people expressed disagreement (2 disagreed, 3 strongly disagreed), and the remaining two declared neutral. This data shows that the acceptance of ulama for women's political leadership is quite high. The problem is why is this acceptance so high? One respondent explained that the necessity of men to become leaders is only valid in the *Khilafah* or *Imamah* political system. Because

Indonesia, he said, is not an Islamic state, then the requirement is not valid. Another respondent said that what was not permissible for her was to lead prayers. In state affairs, he classified the leadership of women in the hadith which said that Muslims knew more about religious affairs than the Prophet (antum a'lamu bi-umūri dunyākum). Rejection of women's leadership was not total. There are sides that are allowed for women to lead. Other respondents, for example, argue that women may occupy political positions while not at the level of the president. In line with this, Ustadz HTI explained that according to Shari'a women should not be rulers, but may become leaders. This distinction between rulers and leaders is inseparable from the distinction he made between sovereignty in the hands of the people and power in the hands of the people as explained above. Leading is included in the category "power in the hands of the people" which includes the right of the people to choose a leader (administrative). Therefore, women can be chosen to hold administrative positions. However, said Ustadz HTI, women may not participate in making or determining laws such as qādhī or judge.

The anti-violence outlook of ulama in Pontianak is also very high. This can be seen from their answers to the statement about the need for acts of violence against groups who differ in views with Muslims as a warning. A total of 17 respondents stated strongly disagree and ten did not agree. There is only one respondent who strongly agreed. The remaining two took a neutral stance. It means that almost 75% of respondents reject the use of violence. In fact, from the results of interviews, the authors with respondents who stated strongly agree to the acts of violence also expressed disagreement with the use of violence. Judging from the interview data, this high non-violence outlook is not without a reservation. Among the respondents, there were those who stated that a strong outlook towards Muslim groups that were deemed deviating from the true teachings of Islam could be taken firmly after persuasive actions were taken. The same thing applies to acts of violence against immorality or social violations. The FPI imam emphasized that in combating the immorality of the FPI, they first coordinated with local authorities and gave a warning. If it doesn't work, only coercive action will be put in place. The acts of violence carried out by civilian groups can be read as a result of not upholding rules and laws by the state.

#### 1. *Against Muslim Minorities*

The outlook of the clergy towards the minority seems ambiguous.

A strong outlook is shown against minorities who are deemed not in accordance with “true Islam” or declared heretical. The same thing does not happen to minorities who are considered to be within the limits of “true Islam”. “The truth” here can be interpreted as Sunni Islam which is mainstream Islam in Indonesia. So, the minority Salafi or Jama’at Tabligh, for example, is not declared heretical and is included in Sunni Islam. Since its establishment, the MUI has played an important role in giving birth to fatwas about these Muslim minority groups. These fatwas have a big influence on the community as seen in various cases, ranging from violence against the Ahmadiyya congregation, Lia Eden, to Gafatar. In this survey, the approval of the heretical fatwa issued by the MUI was very high, i.e. thirteen agreed and seven strongly agreed. There are two people who stated strongly disagree and five people disagree. While the remaining two chose to be neutral. It means that over 50% (i.e. 57%) of thirty respondents support MUI’s heretical fatwas.

By comparing fatwas about Shia and Ahmadiyya, we can see the ambiguity of the MUI towards both. Meanwhile, on the one hand, the Ahmadiyya is expressly deviant, but on the other hand, the MUI has not declared heresy to Shia. The MUI, through a fatwa issued in 1984, only warned of differences between Shia and Sunnis and the dangers of Shia if they entered Indonesia. This fatwa about Shia seems to have an influence on the outlook of religious leaders or ulama outside the MUI. Minority groups that have only recently emerged like Gafatar have been misled by the MUI. The ambiguity of MUI towards the Muslim minority can be seen in the distinction between teaching or doctrine and citizenship rights. Let’s look at quantitative data. Of the thirty who filled out the questionnaire, only seven ulama said they disagreed if the Shia should not be considered heretical. In other words, they agreed that Shia was a cult. Twenty others agreed that the Shia should not be considered heretical, or in other words, they did not agree if the Shia were misled. Shia is not a cult. The remaining three people stated neutrally. From this data, it appears that ulama in Pontianak are generally tolerant of Shia. This outlook of not declaring heresy against the Shia can be interpreted, firstly, because of the influence of the MUI which has not or has not declared heresy against Shia. Over the past decade, movements that have campaigned for heretical Shia have sprung up like the movement incorporated in the Anti-Shiite National Alliance (ANNAS).<sup>14</sup> However,

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14 <http://www.annasindonesia.com/profil/visi-dan-misi-aliansi-nasional-anti-syiah>.

secondly, the two largest Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, have so far resisted the insistence that the MUI issue a heretical fatwa of Shia.<sup>15</sup> These two reasons have at least an effect on the level of rejection of the Shia which is not as strong as the rejection of the Ahmadiyya.

The ulama's outlook towards the Shia is different from their outlook towards the Ahmadiyya. Of the thirty people who filled out the questionnaire, only five people expressed disagreement or disagreement with the ban on Ahmadiyah speaking in the name of Islam. Twenty other respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the ban. The remaining three people declared neutral. Of the 22 who agreed, not all consider the existence of Ahmadiyah as part of an effort to weaken and divide Muslims from within. Some of them took a neutral stance. Eleven of them did not approve of Ahmadiyya occupying public office despite having skills. Seven of the 22 people agreed that Ahmadiyah members who are competent to hold public positions. Four declared neutral.

The data shows that the rejection of the Ahmadiyya Muslim minority is very high. The fatwa of the MUI regarding the heresy of Ahmadiyah seems to have a strong influence on the rejection (Fatwa of the MUI Number: 11 / MUNAS VII / MUI / 15/2005). Most of them are indeed members of the MUI. The EAM staff from the Contact Council of Taklim (BKMT) who are also members of Pontianak's Fatayat NU said the following.

"There is an MUI fatwa regarding Ahmadiyah, I forgot what year. Because they recognized Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad. The fatwa of the MUI explained that they were among the heretics. Because it is not in accordance with the Qur'an and hadith, there is a recognition of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad. That is clearly deviant."<sup>16</sup>

In addition to Ahmadi and Shiites, in West Kalimantan, especially in Mempawah district, one of the minorities who received a heretical fatwa was the Nusantara Fajar Movement or abbreviated as Gafatar. The West Kalimantan MUI expressly stated that Gafatar was a cult and was misleading, and therefore quit Islam.<sup>17</sup> This incident forced Gafatar

15 <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/538851/muhammadiyah-dan-nu-tolak-mui-fatwakan-sesat-syiah>, accessed November 15 2018.

16 Interview, Pontianak, October 18, 2018.

17 <http://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2016/01/25/mui-kalbar-k-issued-fatwa-gafatar-flow-sesat>, accessed on November 15, 2018.

members to lose their homes and live in exile.

There are some of them who sort out theological issues and citizenship issues. In terms of theology, they did not tolerate Ahmadiyya at all. This theological outlook raises an ambiguous outlook regarding citizenship rights and resolution of the Ahmadiyya case. On the one hand, they acknowledge that the government must provide protection to the Ahmadiyya community. However, on the other hand, they could not see the resolution of the violence against the Ahmadiyya community in addition to realizing the residents that Ahmadiyah teachings were contrary to the teachings of Islam and the government had to limit their movement so as not to spread the teachings.

The main basis of their outlook towards Ahmadiyah is the fatwa of the MUI mentioned above.

## 2. *Against Non-Muslim Minorities*

In countries with a majority Muslim population such as Indonesia, the interests of the majority are often a complicated problem. There is a strong tendency to make the majority as first-class citizens, while the minority as second-class citizens. Quantitative data from this study indicate that there are tensions between those who support and those who reject the provision of most Muslims in political decision making. A total of 11 respondents (10 disagreed, 1 strongly disagreed) refused the privilege, while 10 agreed. The remaining 9 respondents stated neutrally. This high number of neutral respondents implies that majority-minority is a serious problem in political life in Pontianak. At least, this implies the threat to the erosion of minority rights. This threat depends on various cases and triggers. Of course, this is not typical of Pontianak, because similar things can be found in other places.

The problem of the majority-minority, in turn, has an impact on the issue of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. The views of ulama in Pontianak on the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims appear in their agreement to equal access to the state budget. 26 respondents agreed (19 agreed, 7 strongly agreed). Only one respondent stated disagreement, and the remaining three were neutral. This illustrates how ulama in Pontianak uphold the equality of citizens without seeing religious differences. This was also reinforced by the outlook of most of those who agreed to state assistance to Christian institutions. 23 respondents disagreed (15 disagreed, 8 strongly disagree) if the government did not aid Christian institutions (only) for fear of being used for Christianization. Only one



respondent said he strongly agreed the government did not aid Christian institutions. The remaining four respondents stated neutrally. They also respond positively to the provision of public facilities for non-Muslims. A total of 24 respondents expressed disagreement (20 disagreed, 4 strongly disagreed) if the state restricted public facilities to non-Muslims. Only three respondents agreed (2 agreed, 1 strongly agreed). While the remaining 3 are neutral.

Even though it has a Muslim majority (more than 59.7% of the total population of 5,406,553),<sup>18</sup> West Kalimantan, including Pontianak, is also characterized by a large non-Muslim population. Living side by side in harmony between Muslims and non-Muslims has been planted for a long time. This awareness of religious diversity seems to be reflected strongly in the positive views of the ulama in Pontianak about living side by side with non-Muslims. From the quantitative data collected, a total of thirty respondents said they accepted other religious people to live in their neighborhood. This acceptance is quite high, thirteen states strongly agree and seventeen others agree. This shows a high level of tolerance among religious people in Pontianak. In terms of freedom of worship, this survey shows that as many as twenty-three respondents in Pontianak admitted strongly agree and five agreed to the freedom of non-Muslims to carry out their worship. Only two respondents expressed disagreement and strongly disagreed. In interviews, this high tolerance is also clearly illustrated. The principle of the *wacuum dīnukum waliya dīn* (your religion is your business, and my religion is my business) (Surah al-Kafirun [109]: 6), as stated by one of the respondents, underlies this tolerance. The same respondent attributed the fact that Indonesia is not an Islamic state, and therefore non-Muslims have the same rights.

The growing awareness of the need to maintain harmony among followers of religion spread among the people of Pontianak. This is inseparable from the experience of ethnic conflict that has occurred in various regions in West Kalimantan after the New Order (van Klinken 2007, chapter 4). They are aware of the potential for conflicts that arise from ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. On a national scale, the government has sought to resolve this problem by, among other things, establishing the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB) in several cities in Indonesia, including Pontianak. However, as shown by Suhadi's research (2016, 61), FKUB in Pontianak is not always effective. In fact, said Suhadi, FKUB is often one of the obstacles to obtaining a building permit

to establish non-Muslim places of worship. This tendency is not typical of Pontianak, because other regions are also facing the same problem. In this survey, as many as six respondents expressed disagreement with the establishment of non-Muslim worship in a Muslim-majority environment. Four other people stated strongly disagree. While as many as nine respondents agreed and four respondents said they strongly agreed. Some of the remaining seven respondents were neutral. Seeing the high number of respondents who are neutral, the tendency and potential for intolerance can be said to be increasingly vulnerable. This depends on the factors that trigger tolerance and intolerance.

Vulnerability to intolerance towards non-Muslims can also be read from changes in diversity that occur on a national and local scale. This is seen in the results of surveys from several institutions such as LIPI and Setara Institute which show an increase in intolerance.<sup>19</sup> In 2017, I interviewed several Islamic students in Pontianak. One of the interesting things from the interview was the change in outlook towards non-Muslims. One of the people I interviewed told me that during his childhood in his village, Muslims, including himself, used to say Merry Christmas or Happy Chinese New Year to their non-Muslim ethnic Chinese neighbors. However, later the habit of greeting is no longer common. Generally, Muslims avoid saying Merry Christmas or Happy Chinese New Year.

It is undeniable that this change was a result of the stream of Islamization which was recently carried out by new figures in Islamic da'wah such as Salafi, Ustadh Abdul Shomad, and Felix Siaw. In this case, their Islamic teaching through social media such as Youtube is very influential in changing outlooks towards non-Muslims. In one of his teachings, a Salafi ulama, NA, who also filled out the research questionnaire, for example, explained at length about the illegitimacy of greeting during Christmas (and during Chinese New Year).<sup>20</sup> Ustaz AZA, a NA colleague, also emphasized that Muslims should not say Happy New Year and eat New Year's Eve celebration food.<sup>21</sup>

19 see for example, [https://m.merdeka.com/politik/lipi-temukan-fakta-intolerance-naik-di-indonesia.html?utm\\_source=GoogleAMP&utm\\_medium=Other&utm\\_campaign=Mdk-AMP-Others&utm\\_content=Article-6](https://m.merdeka.com/politik/lipi-temukan-fakta-intolerance-naik-di-indonesia.html?utm_source=GoogleAMP&utm_medium=Other&utm_campaign=Mdk-AMP-Others&utm_content=Article-6), accessed December 12, 2018; <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1118802/setara-insti-tut-intolerance-to-belief-increase>, accessed December 12, 2018.

20 See the recording at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXraoRSKodw>, accessed December 4, 2018.

21 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWED42rITkk>, accessed December 12, 2018.

## CONCLUSION

Broadly speaking, this chapter has shown the positive outlook of Pontianak ulama to the nation-state. Pancasila and democracy are well received. However, we can see the various outlooks and views of the ulama that show the post-Reformation situation, namely the monolithic view of nationalism undergoing change. The presence of freedom of opinion and expression has allowed voices to be critical of nationalism. In general, they accepted Pancasila and democracy, but with a critical note. However, they also see that all of this has not been able to bring significant impact to the citizens. The inclusion of new figures in Islamic da'wah in Pontianak clearly changed the monolithic view of nationalism and Islam. The fragmentation of political and religious authorities changed the monolithic view.

Pontianak, and West Kalimantan in general, is known as an area with a high number of minority religious followers. History records that the diversity of religions and tribes is one of its strengths. This diversity explains how the perceptions of Pontianak ulama build perceptions and views about the nation-state. The fact that religious diversity is an important consideration for them to choose the form of the Pancasila nation-state and NKRI rather than, for example, an Islamic state. Their views on non-Muslim minorities are also classified as progressive, in the sense that they are non-violent, pro-system, tolerant, and respect citizenship rights. However, it also appears that there are vulnerabilities in the relationship between most Muslims and non-Muslim minorities. Religious tolerance began to erode on certain aspects, for example from the habit of greeting non-Muslims on holidays. The lack of tolerance of some Pontianak ulama against the Muslim minority which is seen as deviating from the true version of Islam seems to be influenced by the general discourse that has developed throughout Indonesia.

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# MUSLIM IDENTITY AND NEGOTIATION LOCAL AUTHORITY

## In the Middle of Strengthening the Political Culture of Ajeg Bali

*Suhadi*

Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir, one of the pioneers of the 212 movements, enthusiastically confirmed in a short video, "... and they are Sahabat Subuh (Subuh Friends). Joining this group means that you are joining the process of the rise of a strong Islamic civilization ... Together with Fellow Friends, let's rise! With Sahabat Subuh, we will not be ordinary friends. Allahu Akbar (Allah is the Greatest!)"

If you only listen to the sound of the short video, you might imagine that the video was recorded from a mosque or a Quran recital community in Padang, Jakarta, Makassar, or other areas where the number of Muslims is dominant. However, if we watch the video, we will recognize, maybe even surprised, that the video was broadcasted from Denpasar, Bali. The video is equipped with a round logo with a black background that inscribed "*Sahabat Subuh Bali*" which was designed in a simple, but cool way. The logo was also pinned on the vest worn by the Ustaz guards. In the video, of the six youths with the words *Sahabat Subuh Bali* shot by the camera, there were two people who held up their index fingers upwards, a symbolic expression that was widely used by Islamic movement activists who took quite challenging positions against the ruling regime in Indonesia lately and has connotations of support for the global Islamic political movement.

The video was precisely broadcasted from the Baitul Makmur mosque, Denpasar. Many Muslim ulama and leaders, young and old, men and women, interviewed by researchers, boasted of the existence of the mosque. A leader of the Sahabat Subuh Bali movement whom the researcher interviewed mentioned that every morning at least 1,000

people attended the congregational prayer. In certain events, the Subuh (dawn) congregation could reach around 1,800 people.<sup>1</sup>

One Ustadz proudly said that there were Malaysians coming to Bali for a short visit, with the main goal of wanting to feel the Subuh prayer in congregation at the Baitul Makmur mosque. He said, even though Muslims in Bali are minorities, the congregation of the morning prayers in the most mosques in Indonesia is in Denpasar.<sup>2</sup>

The facts above show the complexity of the development of Islam in Bali today. The growth of the Subuh movement in congregation marked that Bali did not escape the influence of the trend of *pietization* (piety; Mahmood 2001) that occurred in Indonesia in general. Even so, capitalizing on such videos, especially the symbol part of the index finger upwards in the video, then putting suspicion on the development of Islam in Bali is an excessive outlook. What happened, as this research shows, is the insistence on Muslims to continue to negotiate their citizenship aspirations.

In its local history in Bali, Hinduism, and Islam live side by side peacefully. However, after the 1998 Reformation, there were developments in the strengthening of the Balinese Ajeg idea which was getting stronger every day. This research is not a study of interfaith relations, but seeks to place the relationship between Islam and Hinduism as a context in examining how the outlooks of Muslim ulama or leaders in Bali understand and respond to the strengthening of religious identity both among Hindus and Muslims? Then, in what conditions does the strengthening of religious identity make Muslim ulama or leaders put forward progressive or extreme outlooks? Furthermore, what would the outlook be like if it was tested in the framework of the concept of nation-states, such as being pro or not on the existing state system, nonviolence, tolerance, and outlooks towards the concept of citizenship outlook?

This study uses two methods at once, quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview). In implementing quantitative methods, researchers conducted group based surveys with respondents totaling 30 scholars or Muslim figures from four categories, namely: (a) Mainstream Ulama, namely NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI; (b) Ulama from new Islamic movements, such as Tarbawi and Tahriri; (3) Ulama from minority groups within Islam, in this case Ahmadiyah; and (4) new Ulama or Muslim figures who are mostly young under the age of 40, such

1 YS Interview 10/27/2019

2 Interview with TW 7/10/2019.

as activists from Sahabat Subuh, school administrators in the Integrated Islamic network, and others. Of the 30 respondents, only eight were born in Bali. This seems to indicate that most ulama or Islamic leaders in Bali are immigrants. Whereas interviews were conducted with 10 people from all four categories. Most informants were interviewed once, others were interviewed twice.

### **SHORT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND**

Dutch colonial political policies in the past also influenced the construction of cultural politics in Bali in the postcolonial era. The traumatic experience of the Netherlands in Sumatra and Java with various Islamic and nationalist movements encouraged the Dutch to create their unique imagination about Bali. The uniqueness is built on the foundation of Bali as a Hindu island and a pillar of nobleness of Balinese culture. Bali is a Hindu island surrounded by Islamic islands around it. By placing Bali as a Hindu area, the Dutch colonial government was passing on the concept of Bali as an opposition to Islam. In the early 1920s, the colonial government established a policy of two legal systems in Bali. To effectively control its power, the Dutch uniformed local administration into two forms. The rich variety of cultures and traditions are regulated in the administration of customary law which came to be known as the administration of “traditional villages” whose power was handed over to Balinese people. Before uniformizing into this traditional village, traditional communities in Bali have very diverse traditions. While outside customary administration was administered by the colonial administration to control Balinese natives (Picard 1997, 186). After Indonesia’s independence, the colonial administration transformed into a “desa dinas” (official village).

If we compare religious demographics in a rather long term, developments, or changes in religious demographics, especially between Hinduism and Islam, we can see that there is a shift. However, demographic data published by the 1972 Bali Statistical Census Office showed interesting figures. It was mentioned at that time the percentage of Hindus was 92.93%, while data on the number of Muslims was vacated or unwritten. Probably at that time, the number of Muslims could be insignificant. Conversely, in its development more than 25 years later, the 2000 Population Census showed the percentage of the number of Hindus was 87.44% and Muslims became 10.29%. Ten years later, in 2010, the data showed that the percentage of Hindu population fell back



to 83.46% and the population of Islam rose to 13.37%.<sup>3</sup> These figures illustrate the decline in the percentage of Hindus, and vice versa, the percentage of Muslims in Bali is slowly increasing.

Does that mean that many Hindus convert to Muslims? Apparently not. The migration factor is the dominant cause. Other research on religious demographics in cities with high in-migration such as in Jayapura and in Denpasar shows that changes in religious demographics are caused more by factors of migration or the arrival of people entering the city (Suhadi et al. 2010, 15). The phenomenon of the development of Islam in Bali is an urban phenomenon. As confirmed by several informants of this study, the conversion of Hindus to Islam is very little, mainly due to the migration of Muslims from East Java, Lombok, Sulawesi, and others to Bali. Indeed, there are Hindus who convert to Islam, mostly because of marital factors, but the numbers are very small.<sup>4</sup>

The distribution of the number of Muslims in Denpasar reached 28.65%. Whereas in Buleleng, the northern coastal region of Bali, there is 9.21% and in Karangasem Regency, east Bali region, amounting to 4.09% (Population Census 2010). In Buleleng, the number of Muslims is relatively large, because many Islamic villages have a long history since the 17th century in that place (cf. Ardhana 1985, 17-18). The distribution indicates, once again, the large number of Muslims, in Denpasar, is an urban phenomenon.

#### **CITIZENSHIP: ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION**

This section outlines quantitative research findings, surveys of 30 respondents of Muslim ulama or leaders, which aim to examine patterns of acceptance and rejection of the concept of nation-states. As a quantitative study, of course, this section speaks in outline, lacks detail.

So, its function is more as a general map of the perceptions and attitudes of ulama or Muslim figures which are divided into three things. First, a general description of how much acceptance or rejection of the concept of state matter. Second, how are the distribution of the attitude of the ulama and their percentages when viewed from the six determined characters: progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme. Third, how detailed findings of the outlook of ulama to the concept of nation-states are divided into four categories: system,

3 Bali Statistics Census Office 1972; Population Census 2000; 2010 Population Census.

4 FHA interview, 10-13/2018; HDY, 10/14/2018; MM, 10/15/2018.

nonviolence, tolerance, and citizenship. The first and second sections are presented very briefly using a percentage unit. While the third part is described at length using a unit number of respondents.

The general picture shows acceptance of the nation-state concept among ulama and Muslim leaders in Bali, which is quite high, namely 66.7%. Meanwhile, those who refused were 16.7%. The acceptance figure in Bali is slightly lower than the average income at the national level of 71.6%. From its characteristic aspect, this survey shows progressive Muslim ulama or leaders in 3.3%, inclusive 26.7%, moderate 30%, conservative 6.7%, exclusive 6.7%, radical 6.7%, and extreme 3.3%. A more detailed explanation of the survey findings is presented in this section. While the context and dynamics of the views of ulama or Muslim leaders in greater depth will be delivered next after this sub-chapter.

This research examines the concept of nation-states through four dimensions referred to as the dimensions of the system, nonviolence, tolerance, and citizenship. The theoretical explanation of these dimensions can be seen in the introduction to this book. Surveys in Bali show two interesting patterns. First, there is an equally high acceptance among Muslim ulama or figures on the concept of nation-states in the dimensions of the system (83%) and nonviolence (83%). Second, there is a lower acceptance, even though it is still quite high in scores, on the concept of nation-states in the dimensions of tolerance (77%) and citizenship (67%). If we look at other calculations, one third (33%) of respondents can be called having a problem in the dimensions of citizenship and almost a quarter (23%) have problems in the dimension of tolerance.

Regarding the pro-system, the acceptance of Muslim ulama and leaders in Bali who were respondents to this study on the statement “Pancasila is the most appropriate ideology of the country for Indonesia” is very high. Of the 30 respondents, 25 respondents expressed their agreement (14 respondents strongly agreed, 11 respondents agreed) and those who did not agree with only one person. There were four respondents who chose neutral positions. Although the acceptance of the Pancasila was very high, the desire to return the seven words in the Jakarta Charter was still quite high. Responding to the statement that “Returning 7 (seven) words in the first principle of Pancasila is important to be reconsidered to accommodate the rights of the majority group better”, there were still nine respondents (3 respondents strongly agreed, 6 respondents agreed) who mentioned their agreement. Although those who refused

more were 13 respondents (7 respondents disagree, and 6 respondents strongly disagree), those who were neutral (did not mention the choice to approve or disagree) were quite large, as many as 6 respondents (6 neutral respondents). This means that those who firmly reject the attempt to return the seven words in the first precept of Pancasila are less than half of the respondents.

Similar questions as comparisons were made in this survey, namely “There is no harm in Muslim leaders trying to find alternative state ideologies that are better than Pancasila”. Those who firmly refused were indeed bigger, as many as 16 respondents (8 respondents disagree, 8 respondents strongly disagree), but there were still those who agreed to the statement, namely five people (5 respondents agreed), and those who took neutral positions were quite large, namely nine people (9 neutral respondents). The question about the next pro-system, for example, “the government that does not fight for the formalization of Islamic law is *thaghut*”. Although there were 18 respondents who expressed their disapproval (10 respondents strongly disagreed, and 8 respondents disagreed), there were still six respondents who agreed (6 respondents agreed) to the statement. It means that, even though the acceptance of Pancasila is indeed high, we can see there are Muslim ulama or figures who still have the vision about the formalization of Islamic law.

Regarding nonviolence, there is an interesting pattern. In general, respondents have a firm basic attitude about nonviolence, but there are problems in certain cases. The basic attitude of nonviolence was even confirmed when responding to difficult questions such as “acts of violence are needed to give warnings to groups who differed in their views from Muslims”. Responding to the question there were only two respondents who agreed (2 respondents agreed). A total of 23 people did not agree with the action (17 respondents agreed, and 6 respondents strongly disagree). In terms of verbal violence such as “hate speech”, there were also only three respondents who agreed (3 respondents agreed), while as many as 21 respondents expressed their disapproval (15 respondents did not agree, and 6 respondents strongly disagreed). Up to this point, once again, it can be stated conclusively that the ulama or Muslim figures who were respondents of this study had a high anti-violence attitude.

However, there are problems regarding the attitude of support for violence in certain cases, although there are also differences in attitudes between one case and another. That is, some respondents make reservations for certain cases only and not for others. Responding to the statement,

“the act of mischief through violence committed by non-state apparatus is not in accordance with applicable law”, very many respondents can expressly agree. There were only three respondents who expressed their disapproval (1 respondent did not agree, and 2 respondents strongly disagreed). However, if it concerns a controversial issue, for example, the issue of the group is deviant or misguided, the story can be different. Responding to the statement “persecution of religious groups deemed deviant can be justified so that error does not spread”, there were ten people expressing their consent to violence (8 respondents agreed, and 2 respondents strongly agreed). At this point, we can draw the conclusion that the attitude of the agreement to nonviolence is not substantial, but contextual.

Regarding tolerance, quantitative research instruments in this study discuss the dimensions of tolerance in three indicators: external tolerance (non-Muslim), internal tolerance (Shia, Ahmadiyya), and social tolerance. We find the pattern of attitudes of respondents who are less consistent. On the one hand, they have very high tolerance in terms of social tolerance and external tolerance. On the other hand, their internal tolerance is low. In terms of external tolerance, for example, responding to the question “other religious people have the right to worship freely and openly, as Muslims”, they (29 people) expressed their consent (14 respondents strongly agreed, and 15 respondents agreed) and only one respondent said no agree (1 respondent does not agree). Similarly, responding to the statement of social tolerance about their attitude to “continue to provide assistance to victims of natural disasters, although I know that not all victims are Muslim”, 29 respondents also mentioned their agreement (14 respondents strongly agreed, and 15 respondents agreed) and only one person chose neutral (1 neutral respondent).

In contrast to very high social and external tolerance, internal tolerance, both concerning the tolerance of clerics or Muslim figures towards Shiites and Ahmadis, is low. Regarding matters of worship, the question offered was related to the issue of worship for Shia followers with the question “Shia groups should not openly conduct worship and da’wah activities because of heresy”. The result, as many as 19 respondents (5 respondents strongly agreed, and 14 respondents agreed) stated their agreement and only six people did not agree (5 respondents did not agree, and 1 respondent strongly disagreed). In the field of non-worship, the question of tolerance towards Ahmadiyah relates to public office as such “I accept an Ahmadiyah follower to hold a public position if he/she is competent”.

There are only three people who accept (1 respondent strongly agrees, and 2 respondents agree), while 19 people cannot accept (16 respondents disagree, and 3 respondents strongly disagree) and the number who states do not behave eight people (8 respondents neutral). Up to this point the pattern of tolerance and intolerance from the respondents of the study, as mentioned earlier, is quite clear.

In general, in addition to tolerance, attitudes in the dimensions of citizenship are the lowest attitude compared to the other three dimensions. What are the more detailed descriptions? Responding to more general questions, especially Muslims being a minority in Bali, there were only two people who expressed disagreement (2 respondents disagree) to the statement, “all Indonesian citizens have the right to freedom of opinion, including non-Muslim groups”. What does it mean? For the outlook of citizenship such as the recognition of the basic right of freedom of opinion, his rejection among Balinese ulama is very low. Likewise, for the concept of religious freedom, it turns out that the income is also high. There were only four respondents who showed disagreement (4 respondents disagree) to the statement that “one’s religious choice, including the choice to convert, is part of human rights”.

The situation is different when it is associated with the right to organize for local religious or religious groups. There were 15 people who gave consent (2 respondents strongly agreed, and 13 respondents agreed) that “the *aliran kepercayaan* (an official cover term for various, partly syncretic forms of mysticism in Indonesia) group organization should not be allowed to develop in Indonesia”. This was confirmed in a similar question, “Indonesia is not ready yet to recognize the rights of new religious groups such as Lia Eden’s group”. Responding to this question, there were 19 people who gave consent (14 respondents strongly agreed, and 10 respondents agreed) and there were only four people who did not approve (4 respondents disagree) the statement.

The findings of the reservation of citizenship rights above are interesting to compare with two other issues. On the one hand, if we look at the issue of civil rights, such as expression rights or the right to associate for Muslim minority groups (such as the Shia and Ahmadiyya) shows a very alarming outlook. There were only seven respondents who agreed to freedom of association for Shiites in Indonesia. The situation was even worse when it came to Ahmadiyya where there were only two people who agreed to freedom of speech in the name of Islam for Ahmadis. On the other hand, the opposite condition occurs when it comes to women’s

issues. The acceptance of women to “occupy strategic positions in the executive and legislative institutions” is very high. There were only three respondents who refused.

From this quantitative study, we can see patterns that can be concluded and can be recorded. First, even though the majority of ulama or Muslim figures of 66.7% accepted the concept of the nation-state, the acceptance was still slightly lower than the national level acceptance which reached 71.6%. Secondly, the character of ulama or Muslim leaders in Bali is the most moderate (30%), then followed by those who were inclusive (26.7%). Those who are conservative, exclusive, and radical had the same amount, respectively 6.7%. Then, both those who are progressive on the one hand and extreme on the other hand were less, only 3.3%. Third, the acceptance of the pro-system and non-violence dimensions is equally high, 83% respectively. Interestingly, although not severe, the acceptance of the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship is rather low. In other words, about one third (33%) of respondents rejected the dimension of citizenship and almost a quarter (23%) rejected the dimension of tolerance. Fourth, if viewed into detailed data, respondents’ acceptance of the basic concepts of four dimensions is at a high level, such as acceptance of Pancasila as a state ideology, choice of non-violent actions, freedom of religion, freedom of worship, freedom of worship, humanitarian action without distinction religion, and so on. An interesting pattern is seen in which even rejection occurs that goes beyond the dimension category when it comes to specific cases. The most prominent specific cases are related to internal relations between mainstream groups and minority groups within Islam (such as Shia and Ahmadiyya) and new religious groups such as the Lia Eden movement. Rejection of them not only in terms of dimensions of tolerance and citizenship, but also dimensions of nonviolence. It means that the methods of violence are affirmed when it comes to the group. It is interesting to note in the closing section that in Bali the acceptance of equality for women by respondents is at a high rate.

### **MUSLIM IDENTITY, TRAVEL, AND RESPONSE**

The low acceptance of minority groups in Islam such as Shia and Ahmadiyya and new religious groups such as the Lia Eden movement, as the findings of the survey above, are not only typical of Bali. The tendency of the ulama or Muslim leaders in Bali on this issue follows the mainstream that is developing at the national level. Although the attitude of refusal of Muslim clerics or leaders to the Shiite and Ahmadiyah groups

is high, it even affirms the use of violence against them, but, there are no significant problems especially mainstream Muslim violence against minorities in Islam in the practice of daily life in Bali. The Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia published by CRCS UGM from 2008 to 2012 shows that there are verbal abuse and persecution of groups that are deemed heretical by mainstream groups in various regions in Indonesia, sometimes even falling victim. Among the major events that occurred were persecution and expulsion of more than two hundred fifty Shi'ites in a village in Sampang Madura by mainstream Muslim groups at the end of 2011 (Bagir et al. 2012, 29). Until now they have not been able to return to their hometowns and are still refugees in Sidoarjo, East Java.

A strong attitude towards minority groups in Islam was confirmed in interviews with several, not many, research informants. The strongest view states that these groups are not only “misguided”, but also “dangerous”.

“Shia, Ahmadiyya, LDII have different goals with us. They are dangerous. In countries with large Shiites, such as Syria, Iraq, etc., they must fight with the Ahlus-Sunnah. Except for Syiah Zaidiyah, we can still accept it. Other than that, not. So, our goal must be the same. Because they stated “other than my group, the other groups were wrong”. If you pray at the LDII mosque, the floor will be mopped after you have prayed. The Shia likes provoking between Islam and the government ... Such a person is also a Jama'ah Tabligh, and misguided ... Gafatar is like a group that does takfiri too. It is dangerous if left unchecked.”<sup>5</sup>

As in the excerpt from the interview above, besides Shia and Ahmadiyah, an informant also included LDII, Tablighi Jamaah, and Gafatar in a heretical group.

The perspective he expressed was very clear, the argument against them using the logic of the threat of conflict if such groups continued to grow. What is reality like? Gafatar is not in Bali, while followers of Shia, Ahmadiyya, LDII, and Jamaah Tabligh are also very small in Bali. In Bali Ahmadiyah followers numbered only about 200 people, most of whom were around 90 in Denpasar. While the Shia group is dominated by the Bukhara community which has long been in Bali. Other Shi'a groups have relatively little development.<sup>6</sup> In the Balinese context, there

<sup>5</sup> Interview with FHA, October 28, 2018

<sup>6</sup> Interview with FHA, October 28, 2018; MNF October 13, 2018.

is a wide gap between the attitude of hatred towards the group that is considered heretical and the socio-religious relations in daily life that are quite peaceful.

While the high tendency towards acceptance of the Pancasila idea as a state ideology, the choice of non-violence, freedom of religion, freedom of worship, and freedom of association in the Balinese context must be read specifically in relation to the existence of Muslims in Bali as a minority. This tendency must be seen in relation to their survival strategy amid the dominant culture and rise of Hindu identity politics. It means that the idealism of such an outlook is a situation that they expect to occur not only for those who are Muslim, but moreover the outlook of Hindus.

The rise of Balinese Hindu identity politics, marked by the strengthening of *Ajeng Bali* in the public sphere, encouraged social and political consolidation of Muslims. That helped spur Muslims to redefine their social identity in Bali. The survey above shows that there is a high acceptance of the dimensions of pro-system and nonviolence, but acceptance of the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship is rather low. In relation to identity politics, how is the explanation for such a phenomenon? It seems that the rather low acceptance of tolerance and citizenship which generally concerns many aspects of daily life shows the reaction of Muslims to the strengthening of Bali's Hindu identity politics. This contestation is part of the challenge of pluralism to find a multicultural citizenship model (Hefner 2001, 3; Kymlicka 1995). We will discuss this concept and its consequences for the future of citizenship in Bali at the end of this paper.

The strengthening of the *Ajeng Bali* movement which pushed into the political realm and local cultural policy demanded Balinese Muslims to negotiate with the situation. The cultural policy is very clear in favor of the dominant culture that exists. One of the markers is the Governor of Bali which issued Governor Regulation Number 79 of 2018 concerning "The Day of Use of Balinese Customary Clothing". In the Governor Regulation on Thursday and certain days (Purnama, Tilem, and Bali provincial anniversary) all employees in government institutions, teachers, education staff, and students are required to wear traditional Balinese attire. Among the objectives of the traditional Balinese dress code policy is to "recognize the aesthetic, ethical, moral and spiritual values contained in Balinese culture" (Article 3 c). In the Governor Regulation, the provisions concerning the elements of Balinese traditional dress identity for men and women are also mentioned. For example, for men,



they must use “destar /udeng (headgear)” and for woman, they must have their hair open with a “neat hairdo” (Article 4).

Some Balinese Muslims view traditional clothing in the Governor’s Regulation as nothing but a form of traditional Hindu clothing. The policy was made aimed at maintaining the religion, culture, and language of Bali amid the onslaught of globalization through the flow of tourism and at the same time also became a fortress against the influx of Muslim migrants who were increasingly prominent in Bali.<sup>7</sup> The Governor’s Regulation of Balinese traditional dress opens space for respect for minorities of non-Balinese Hindus but is quite blurred and less assertive. Article 8 The Governor’s Regulation contains rules on exemptions intended for workers who are exempted from traditional Balinese dress obligations for “religious reasons”. For the indigenous people of the archipelago other than Bali, they are also given the right to choose whether to wear traditional Balinese attire or traditional dress of their respective regions. Amid increasingly obvious tensions between indigenous Balinese and immigrants, this last provision is certain to be seldom chosen.

Almost all the research informants talked about the existence of the Governor of Bali’s traditional dress regulations, because even if they did not directly deal with them, at least their children were obliged to wear them. Although aware of the Governor’s Regulation as part of cultural politics that favored the dominant Hindu culture, Muslims did not reject it but tried to negotiate. This form of negotiation takes the form of acceptance of traditional Balinese dress policies but negotiates their forms. At the time this research was conducted, the Governor’s Regulation had just been issued by the government and was being discussed among educational practitioners in Islamic educational institutions. What they almost agree to and practice is those male students will follow the provisions of the Governor’s Regulation, while for women they will use kebaya (top) and Kamen (bottom), but still use headscarves (headgear). When asked, why did men not use cap or kopyah which might be closer to the Islamic tradition, but using udeng as a head cover? An informant explained what he considered the principle in Islam that “clothing is not worship”, so there was no provision for form. Their main concern, especially for women, is to cover their genitals or use headscarves.<sup>8</sup> Up to this point, it is important to emphasize that Muslim tolerance for

<sup>7</sup> MNF Interview, 13 October 2018.

<sup>8</sup> LW Interview, 15 October 2018; HNY, October 14, 2018.

Balinese traditional clothing is part of their survival strategy amid the dominant culture and rise of *Ajeg* identity politics Bali.

Balinese Muslims live not only in the dominant culture of Hindus but also in the socio-cultural space which is dominated by tourism with all its consequences. Bali is ranked first in Indonesia as a domestic and international tourist destination. The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) of Bali Province noted there were no less than 8.7 million domestic tourists and 5.6 million foreign tourists throughout 2017 (BPS Bali Province 2018). Tourism in Bali has become an industry followed by massive commodification of religion and culture for the benefit of tourism. The Indonesian government markets culture and identifies cultural objects to attract the attention of tourists, and at some level modifies the performing arts that are rooted in religious and ethnic rituals to suit tourist tastes. For a long time, tourism in Bali formed and directed the social order of society (Home 2005, 131). Although Muslims in Bali are sometimes critical of the social order, they generally try to negotiate and often compromise with the situation.

Being a touristic area, Bali is a very open area. The efforts of the government and the people of Bali to provide the best service to tourists require respect for freedom for tourists. Perhaps many view that in the world of tourism, guests and visitors come for a while so that they will not affect the local community much. However, contemporary studies in tourism studies show that when tourism has become an industry, what was initially understood as an insistence from outside society in turn later becomes an integral part of the relevant community order (Home 2005, 131). In this regard, it is undeniable that Balinese Muslims experience moral panics in the face of the modern social life system that promotes freedom and liberalism because Bali is a world tourist destination.

Regarding this matter, we can place MUI's disapproval of the Grand Final of Mister and Miss *Gaya Dewata* in Denpasar led by the *Gaya Dewata* Foundation on October 10, 2018. An interviewee from Muhammadiyah explained that basically Muslims support Bali as the center of tourist destinations, but cannot accept if it exceeds the limit, such as making Bali an open place for LGBT parties. For this reason, the MUI urged the police to cancel or dissolve the activity. The informant also considered that Hindus were too permissive, while Muslims could not be too permissive.<sup>9</sup> The Muslims do not want to deal and protested directly with the organizers of the activities of the Grand Final of Mister

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9 MS Interview, 13 October 2018.

and Miss Gaya Dewata. If they did, it can invite serious tension. The Indonesian Ulama Council used procedural methods to exert pressure on the police and finally the police met the demands of the MUI. In this case, in the perspective of Muslims, the state is present to carry out its functions properly.

Muslims in Bali, more precisely certain groups, have offered Sharia as one of the tourist identities in Bali. The offer received many strong responses from various groups of Balinese people. Although it finally failed, the experiment was interesting. Sharia tourism discourse in Bali initially cannot be separated from the interests of the state, in this case, the Central Ministry of Tourism (Kemenpar) in Jakarta. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the idea of sharia tourism also developed among some Muslims in Bali along with the growing passion for piety. Muslims feel it is important to serve other Muslim tourists with halal tourism services.

Bakormubin, a coordinating body of national preachers who have branches in Bali, also has ideas about sharia tourism in Bali.<sup>10</sup>

At the national level, the idea of Sharia tourism appeared after a Halal Expo and Halal Global Forum was held in 2013. In 2013 the Ministry of Tourism (Kemenpar) also determined 13 provinces to be prepared as sharia tourist destinations, one of which is Bali (Kemenpar, 2015: 20 ). It seems that the Ministry of Religion has collaborated with the Islamic Economics Society (MES) to implement this idea. In Bali, Kemenpar then cooperates with MES Bali. Before the idea was truly implemented in a detailed program, protests arose. Protests against the idea of sharia tourism were addressed to the Chair of the Bali MES, Dr. Dadang Suherman. After getting a lot of criticism and protests, including a demonstration that was held on the road, the Chair of the MES revoked the plan to establish a sharia tourism village in Bali. Interestingly, among the critical arguments for the idea of sharia tourism is that sharia tourism is contrary to Balinese tourism based on Hinduism.<sup>11</sup>

If efforts to catapult Islamic identity in the world of tourism fail, this is not the case with Islamic identity in the world of education. In relation to the concept of the nation-state, Islamic education, especially in the Integrated Islamic School Network (JSIT), is often alleged to reject the Indonesian nation-state system, at least partially derived values. Therefore, it is important to look at developments in the field. In Bali, although there are many public and private public schools, Muslims

<sup>10</sup> Interview with MS, October 13, 2018.

<sup>11</sup> [www.republika.co.id](http://www.republika.co.id).

feel it is important to build Islamic schools in the form of madrasas and Islamic schools, including schools in the Integrated Islamic Network (IT) which are generally driven by activists of the Tarbawi movement. In Bali, there are two schools in the IT network, namely Mutiara and Al-Banna. Two other schools have not formally become part of the IT network, but refer to the IT curriculum, namely Paradise and Mushroom Nature.

Those who are engaged in the field of education emphasize that Islam has a different moral system and provides unique answers for Muslim children and adolescents in the Balinese context. An elementary school education manager who is part of the network of Integrated Islamic Primary Schools (SDIT) says the current generation faces “moral degradation and moral chaos”. Such feelings, according to Noorhaidi Hasan (20012: 86), are a form of moral panic typical of urban society as the influence of modernization and globalization.<sup>12</sup>

Two managers and teachers at Mutiara and MI Terpadu Alam Jamur Elementary Schools were very aware of the criticism of many people, including researchers, media, and agencies within the government, that the JSIT Network taught intolerance, radicalism, and anti-Pancasila attitudes. They denied this by stating that Pancasila was something that could not be rejected. In the elementary schools, they managed, Pancasila was not only recited but also interpreted in simple language that could be understood by children, including at the elementary level. For example, the application of the 1st principle of Pancasila concerning Godliness is by encouraging children to pray before eating, eating with their right hand, not eating while running, etc. While the implementation of values from the second principle, which is Humanity, encourages students to not mock friends of different religions, the importance of maintaining honesty, etc.<sup>13</sup>

According to them, there is indeed sensitivity from the teacher to the students regarding the importance of carrying out Islamic Shari’a, but the meaning of Islamic Shari’a is that prayer should not be defeated by just playing around, the obligation to consume halal food, etc. To ensure that Indonesianness is taught and becomes an integral part of IT schools, one of the informants exemplifies how Pramuka (Scout Movement) is one of the extra-advanced activities in IT schools. According to him, the Ministry of Education has also recognized the contribution of the Scout Movement from IT schools. They also even dominated the proposals in

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12 HDY Interview, October 14, 2018; LW, October 15, 2018.

13 Interview with HDY, October 14, 2018; LW, October 15, 2018

the national Scout Movement, such as ideas that were then used as a guide for veiled students in wearing neck straps.

For veiled female students, the neckline is worn outside the neck, so that the red and white stage is seen from the outside. 14 When we look at the contents of the HDY and LW questionnaires, we find a consistency that they both agree on Pancasila as the most appropriate ideology for Indonesia and do not approve the return of the seven words in the first principle of Pancasila.

## CONCLUSION

The rise and strengthening of local identity is a common phenomenon in many regions in Indonesia as a response to the post-Reformation decentralization policy of 1998, including in Bali. The strengthening of local identity and Ajeg Bali intrigued I Gde Parimatha asking critical questions about non-Hindu places (read: Muslims) in public spheres in Bali.

“Based on the response, it looks like the thickening of identity politics, in which traditional villages are placed as Hindu fortresses, and the discourse of Ajeg Bali began to be popularized. In this context, the question arises, where are the public spheres for non-Hindus? What happened to non-Hindu communities during this territorialization process? “(Parimatha et al. 2012, 14).

The “thickening” of the identity seems to be at a reasonable stage at first. Ajeg Bali in the late 1990s until the early 2000s reflected more on the encouragement of strengthening indigenous identity and not much related to the direct response to Islam. In the villages, the Muslim community is still considered as *nyama selam* (Muslim brother/sister) (Parimatha et al. 2012, 81). Until the later developments, Ajeg Bali’s discourse began to shift, especially after the Bali Bombing I incident in October 2002. Ajeg Bali turned to the “Ajeg Bali movement” which contained elements of the spirit of resistance to Islam after the Bali Bombing (Wijaya 2009, 46; Miharja 2013, 64). At this stage, Muslims are no longer seen as *nyama selam*, but rather as *jelema/nak selam* (Muslims). These changes in mention of names indicate a shift in culture and social relations that occur in Bali. When we are called *nyama selam*, the relationship between Hindus and Islam is a relationship of brotherhood. Meanwhile, when referred to as *jelema/nak selam*, you are considered someone else (Parimatha et

al. 2012, 81). The interviews in this study confirmed the findings of I Gde Parimartha, although the conditions were also very dynamic and not stagnant between one community and another.

Muslims in Bali who are generally religious and make Islamic identity important to live side by side with Hindus who are no less religious and create the Hindu identity as an important element in their cultural, social, and political life. For this reason, both need to build a dialogue on how to develop a mutual understanding which should include how to build mutual security and comfortable communication.

The expression of Harvey Cox (1965) “pluralism and tolerance are biological children of secularism” feels increasingly obsolete, including for conversations about citizenship in Bali where religiosity is strong. The expression that comes from the experience of European history that gave birth to the political concept that nationalism and tolerance were produced by secular-liberal ideology, now in many places began to be abandoned. Through his research on the contribution of Islamic organizations to democracy in Indonesia which examines the movements of the three largest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, namely NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, Jeremy Menchik (2016) proposes a thesis on “tolerance without liberalism” and basing nationalism self to godly nationalism. According to him, the paradigm derived from European experience that can no longer be an absolute benchmark for developments in non-Western countries.

The paradigm usually places two extreme positions. On the one hand, tolerance can only be realized if the community experiences a secularization transformation. On the other hand, if the religious identity strengthens, there will be a clash of civilization. In reality, such is not the case; for example, NU has a high tolerance commitment without having to be secular. For them, Islam’s commitment to democracy is a result of long experiences of interaction between groups among Muslims, the interaction between Muslims in relation to other religions, especially Christians, Islamic political idea, and the influence of modernization of the state system (Menchik 2016, 4).

When looking at Bali in a smaller micro space, we can find contradictory positions of Muslim democratic practices. On the one hand, Balinese ulama show high acceptance of the principle of the nation-state system but do not want to accept liberalism which is characterized by the idea of equality of citizens, for example not giving space to LGBT in public spheres. Menchik’s analysis is not entirely new. Previously,

Robert W. Hefner (2001, 4) emphasized the importance of sociology and anthropology about pluralism and democracy in Southeast Asia to not only talk about measuring developments in the field with a list of their suitability with the principles of liberalism.

But the question is, should the development of godly nationalism be a concern? In a country in which religious identity flourishes and Godliness is firmly in one of its national pillars, Pancasila, tolerance without liberalism and godly nationalism is an inevitable stream. The problem is in the Balinese context, is Bali still open to multiethnic and multi-religious openness? It cannot be denied that the process of narrowing the space for openness began to occur, but it was part of the dynamic challenges of local pluralism because of deliberative democracy and multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Hefner 2001). Challenges at the local level according to Jaques Bertrand (2004, 4) become part of local grievances that are not to be condemned but are broken down by placing them in the context of relations between citizens and local government policies. In the Bali context, the Governor's Regulation on the obligation to wear Balinese traditional clothing, on the one hand, can encourage inculturation of Muslim culture in Bali, but on the other hand, if similar policies continue to develop it can trigger consolidation and resistance from Muslims.

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# THE ULEMA'S PERSPECTIVE OF KUPANG ABOUT NATION-STATE: A Disturbed Identity and Tolerance Politics

*Ro'fah*

The discussion about the acceptance of Indonesian Muslim ulama and leaders towards the nation-state is a long discussion that has always colored Indonesia's history. Shortly after the independence, the desire of some Indonesian Muslims to establish an Islamic state began to emerge, among the most obvious of which was the accusation of DI TII chaired by Kartosuwiryo. In the future, movements or debates and ideas about the shape of the ideal state, Pancasila, and other issues such as democracy, human rights, and minority positions often color the dynamics of Indonesian national life and become part of relations between Muslims and the state. Has the Indonesian government been considered in accordance with the concept of Islam? What is the ideal form of state and government according to Muslim and Indonesian Muslim leaders? Are democracy, tolerance, and citizenship a concept accepted by Indonesian Muslims? These questions are the core questions that are answered in this book.

This paper tries to see how the perceptions and attitudes of the Kupang city ulama to the questions above. Based on the results of the questionnaire on 35 ulama and in-depth interviews with eleven ulamas in the city of Kupang, this paper argues that the majority of Kupang ulama indicated acceptance of the nation-state. However, it is interesting to note that the acceptance was colored by negotiations and reservations in various aspects that could be drawn from the political context and religious dynamics at both local and national levels, the most important of which was the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.

**MUSLIM DYNAMICS IN THE CITY OF KUPANG**

Before directly addressing the discussion on the perceptions of Muslim clerics in the city of Kupang regarding the nation-state, the author needs to describe how the dynamics of Muslims in the city of Kupang because the study of Islam in this region is very limited. Holger Warnk in his introduction to the Special Edition of *Islam and the Malay World* 2007 stated that the study of Islam in Eastern Indonesia is still very limited. From the short existing studies, the focus is more on the Jihadi movement studies after the Ambon violence, and several anthropological-ethnographic studies of the Bima kingdom on Sumbawa as well as the studies of Henri Chambert-Loir (1982, 1994, 2004) and Rodeimer (2006, 2008, and 2009) the focus is on the Alor area. In the past ten years, the description of this Warnk may not be appropriate but specifically related to the context of East Nusa Tenggara and the city of Kupang in particular, this analysis is still appropriate. The dissertation written by Stella Aleida Hutagalung (2015) can be considered the only comprehensive study of Islam in the city of Kupang.

The Eastern Region of Indonesia is indeed known as an area with a Muslim population being a minority. Some informants in this study mention that even though they are a minority, Islam is the “oldest” religion in East Nusa Tenggara that entered the region since the 15th century. This was earlier than the presence of Catholic missionaries who had just arrived in Timor region in 1642 through Flores and it was only around the 17th century that around 2500 East Timorese people converted to Catholicism (Fox 1997, Hueken 2008 as referenced by Hutagalung 2015). Referring to Hadergal (2012), Hutagalung said that Islam is in the East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) region through the Solor island, the northern part of Timor which is the center of the Cendana timber trade and is a center of interaction between Java, Ternate, Sulawesi, and Muslim preachers from Bengal, India (2015, 43) . This time prediction is slightly different in the analysis of Ardhana (2000) which states that Islam entered the NTT region through Ternate (Maluku) and Gowa (Sulawesi) around the 17th century. Referring to Ricklefs, Ardhana noted that the defeat, experienced by the Portuguese Gowa kingdom at the beginning of the 17th century led them to flee to Sumbawa, and then spread to the East through economically connected coastal areas such as Ende, Putta, Solor, Pantar and Alor (Ardhana 2005, 74-75). Until now, these areas are believed to be the enclave of Muslims in NTT, especially the three districts, namely Flores, Alor, and Ende.

While in Kupang city the area known as the Muslim enclave is in four villages, namely Bonopoi, Solor, Airmata, and Oesepa. Hutagalung presented interesting explanations regarding the differences in the origin of the entry of Islam in the four districts which further shaped the character and Islamic identity of each of these enclaves. Muslims in the village of Solor, for example, come from the island of Solor, which is a descendant of Atulaga Nama, another name for Sultan Syarif Syahar, a preacher and warrior from Ternate who led the community to fight the Dutch and Portuguese in the Kupang and coastal regions of Timor (Hutagalung 2015, 73). From the resistance, Atulaga was given a living area which is now known as the Solor area in the city of Kupang. Until now, Solor Muslims say they are descendants of Atulaga Nama.

In contrast to Solor which is quite homogeneous, Muslims in the Bonopoi and Airmata villages come from diverse groups; some are runaways from Java who lost the Diponegoro war and some are descendants of the king Adipate Bahren, Raja Bangka who was exiled by the Dutch in Kupang. Another group in the Muslim population in Airmata is the Hadhrami group, one of which is Abubakar Algadrie, a royal descendant of Pontianak who is said to have married an Endean noble daughter, and in 1839 was assigned to Kupang. The last Muslim bag in Kupang is the Oesepa area. Compared to Muslims in three other villages, the Muslim groups in Oesepa are the newest and they are dominated by Bugis traders who eventually settled in this area in the 1970s (Hutagalung 2015, 13-15).

According to the 2015 Kupang city BPS data, the Muslim population in Kupang city reached 47,324,000; this figure places Muslims in third place after Christians who reached 241,250,000 people and Catholics that amounts to 78,000. Although in quantity the Kupang Muslims rank third, Islamic organizations appear quite complete in Kupang both mainstream organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah as well as groups of minority organizations such as the Shia (IJABI) and Ahmadiyah. Hutagalung said that Kupang Muslims in Solor, Bonipoi Mata Air and Oesepa are traditional Muslims affiliated to Aswaja even though since 1970 modernist Islam represented by Muhammadiyah has been present and has been quite successful in spreading their da'wah of its reformation especially in the Solor area (Hutagalung 2015, 198). Meanwhile, there are two Islamic non-mainstream groups organizations, namely Jamaah Tabligh (JT) and Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which expanded their da'wah to the city since 2002. By looking at the history

and development of Islam in Kupang, it can be clearly seen the existence of religious contestations that took place in Kupang between traditional groups that maintained their traditions with modernist groups which also had a significant influence. The above contestation was further enlivened by the presence of transnational missionary movements, both cultural and political, such as HTI and JI. It is only important to note that the penetration of the new da'wah movement in Kupang is not as hard as that in other regions in Indonesia given the strict response and safeguards of non-Muslim groups who reject the presence of Islamic movements that are considered violent or radical as described below.

### **CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM RELATIONS: MARRIAGE AND KINSHIP**

The relationship between Muslims and Christians as a majority is one of the most important factors in the dynamics of Kupang Muslims. As explained earlier, tolerance and peaceful relations are quite entrenched and become part of the culture of Kupang, or NTT more broadly. Almost all informants conveyed the value of tolerance arising in various cultural practices such as the construction of houses of worship and celebrations of holidays which involved not only the followers of the religion concerned but also those of other religions. Traditions in celebrating holidays, for example, the process of celebrating or carrying out rituals, will be safeguarded by followers of other religions, to ensure that the community can carry out worship in peace. Another important aspect, especially for Muslims, is the availability of halal food for Muslims at social events, from the cooking process and all cooking utensils used. This cultural tolerance has well-established for a long time and, according to an informant, is based on the principle of “understanding” and respect for others.

One explanation behind this “cultural” tolerance is that interfaith marriages are common between Muslims and Christians. As Hutagalung explained in his dissertation, interfaith marriages mostly occur in Muslim communities in the four areas mentioned above. Marriage between Muslims and Christians was also found in this study. Two respondents, each representing NU and Muhammadiyah, married women from non-Muslim families who later converted to marriage. This study does not explore the ulama's perceptions of interfaith marriage. Referring to Hutagalung's study, there are differences of opinion among Muslim leaders in Kupang about this interfaith marriage. Some understand that interfaith marriages are not fully tolerated in Islam and are therefore regarded as adultery practices. While others consider the marriage

between Muslim men and women who are expert in the Book of Scripture acceptable in Islam (Hutagalung 2015, 64). It seems that this understanding has not prevented interfaith marriages to date. What is certain is the culture of interfaith marriage that confirms the acceptance and tolerance of Muslim-Christians in the Kupang community. In other words, the tolerance that is built is more due to the element of kinship, and not merely ideological reasons. From Hutagalung's strongest study in this study, interfaith marriages do not separate existing kinship relations, although conversion must occur in married couples, both conversion to Islam and Christianity. Social relations and kinship continue to be established and become a medium for the practice of tolerance.

### **KUPANG MUSLIM WOUNDS: 1998 BLOODY EVENTS**

November 30, 1998, is a traumatic dark history for the majority of Kupang Muslims. The framework of cultural tolerance between Muslims and non-Muslims that has been built up so far has been torn apart by the burning of masjids, schools, shops, and buildings owned by Kupang Muslims. The tragic event began with a movement of mourning and solidarity over the burning of the church in Ketapang, East Jakarta. The mourning movement was initiated by Christian student and youth organizations, such as GMKI, PMKRI, and NTT Catholic Youth. It is not known exactly what caused the mourning movement to become an act of violence against Muslims. Several sources said that the investigation had never been carried out thoroughly. The target of acts of violence is Muslim villages in the Solor Bonipoi and Oesapa regions. According to Sihbudi and Nurhasim, as referred to by Hutagalung (2016), this violence left two people dead, fifteen mosques burned and dozens of houses and kiosks burned or damaged. The data, according to the same author, is just an estimation, there are some reports which say that the victims reached four people and dozens more were lost during this incident (Hutagalung 2015).

The 1998 incident was mentioned by almost all the informants at the time of this research. Some informants also became witnesses or were directly involved in the riots. Information obtained in interviews related to several aspects of the riots reinforced Hutagalung's analysis. First, most of the informants said that the attackers were not local people because most residents in the area attacked did not know who the identities of the attackers were. One of Kupang's research assistants who at that time saw directly and was involved in securing the masjid in the Airmata area as follows.

“We don’t know the people who pelted this mosque with stones. We are wondering who they are even though, ma’am, people in Kupang are different from the subdistrict, we still know. We understand, if this is the family of A, this is family B. But at the time of this incident, we did not know these people at all.”

The above conditions encourage citizens to interpret that the “rioters” were deliberately brought in from outside, some explicitly refer to East Timor and Dili. The informants also considered the riots to be the result of external provocations, one of the names suspected of being the mastermind behind the riots was Theo S., “the General of the Kafir” as the informants called him. The TNI General, who in 1998 was a member of the House of Representatives (DPR) from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), was considered to have spread hatred towards Islam in his speeches. The *Abadi Tabloid* owned by the Bulan Bintang Party, for example in the 24-30 December 1998 edition, stated that there was a connection between the circulation of the General’s lecture cassette tapes in Kupang and the riots that occurred on the 30th (Aritonang 2004, 537).

Secondly, the Kupang riots were also inseparable from the national political atmosphere at that time, especially the series of violence in the name of ethnicity and religion which flourished after the fall of the New Order regime. However, unlike Ambon, the Kupang riots did not increase to a wider scale. In several studies, this condition was caused by the strength of the mechanism and culture of tolerance rooted in the community as well as the steps taken by the government and local religious leaders (Sihbudi and Nurhasim 2001, 45-54, Robinson 2002, 148, as cited by Hutagalung, 2016). One of the informants, Abah JFR, who at the time of the incident was the chairman of the East Nusa Tenggara MUI confirmed the following.

“When my Muslim friends from Surabaya offered help to come to Kupang, I confirmed to reject them. I want to localize the problem and not counterattack. We only carry out defenses, although in some cases we were also forced to take up arms because of being attacked. When I saw the Ambon case after the case in Kupang, I was very grateful for my decision at that time. If I received energy assistance from Muslims from outside Kupang, Kupang would be like Ambon.”<sup>1</sup>

1 Private interview with the JFR staff conducted on Monday, October 22, 2018, at the informant’s private residence located in the Airmata area. The interview took place from 18.30 - 20.30 WIT

Another factor referred to by some informants as the trigger for the Kupang riots was the existence of social jealousy towards Muslim migrants who were mostly from Bugis, West Sumatra, and Java. These migrants hold control of various important sectors in Kupang's economy, especially meeting basic needs.

The 1998 riots left deep wounds in the minds of Kupang Muslims so that whenever Christian-Islamic tension escalated, the community linked them to the 1998 tragedy. In February 2011 for example hot rumors circulated among Kupang Muslims that there would be attacks by Christian residents in response to the arson church that took place in Temanggung, Central Java. The burning was carried out because a case of religious humiliation was committed by a Christian adherent by the Temanggung District court with a five-year prison sentence (Hutagalung 2016, 56). These rumors circulated quite widely and some Muslims had fled to Makassar and other areas, but fortunately, the rumors were not proven and calls for the government and Muslim and Christian leaders to intensify restraint.

Another case that caused a considerable escalation of Muslim-Christian tensions in Kupang was the construction of the Nur Musafir Mosque in Batuplat. According to M Iqbal Ahnaf et al (2015) research, the dispute over the construction of the Musafir Mosque which took more than ten years could occur due to the influence of local politics, namely the ownership of the Head of Regional Election (Pilkada). This case originated from a permit request filed by Muslims in Batuplat village in 2002 to perform tarawih prayers in one of the homes of Muslim residents. The tarawih prayer activity was continued with the establishment of the mosque which was carried out in May 2003 at the knowledge of the Head District and other local officials. Two days after the laying of the first stone, the Head District received a complaint letter from residents who refused to build the masjid because it was considered to violate the rules considering the location was too close to non-Muslim residents. Citizens' rejection was also carried out because it was alleged that there was a signature forgery from residents to obtain a permit. This dispute continued for a long time because it became a political commodity in the two periods of the elections, and the new masjid could continue its development in 2016.

From the three cases of Islam-Christian riots and tensions in Kupang, there is a national political influence that is often the context for local unrest, although local politics can also be a trigger. The 1998 case and 2011 rumors were clearly triggered by conflict in other regions, while in the 1998 case, the perpetrators were also indicated not as Kupang's



occupation. In the case of the construction of the Batuplat Masjid, local politics dominated more, because the elected candidates and mayors made this issue the key to votes. The phenomenon of the influence of local and national politics is also seen in the ulama's perception of the nation-state. Reservations and negotiations showed by the ulama, as will be explained in other parts of this chapter, must be a response to national politics (read: Jokowi's government) and local politics.

### **LACK OF PENETRATION OF ISLAMISM?**

The rise of the issue of radicalism and terrorism that took place on a national scale was quite influential and colored the dynamics of Muslim-Christian relations in Kupang. As mentioned earlier, the Kupang Christian community as the majority is sensitive enough to address the rampant issues of radicalism and Islamism that occur at the national level. Among the efforts, they have stopped the entry of Islamic organizations that are considered harsh such as HTI and FPI, as well as the presence of Muslim figures who are considered intolerant. One of the organizations in the Kupang community that was quite hard in responding to the issue of radicalization and Islamism was the Meo Brigade. The researcher did not get adequate information about this group, but from Facebook owned by this group<sup>2</sup> and some news in the newspaper media, it was seen that the organization's outlook in rejecting the existence of HTI and its concept of Khilafah is firm. The last case is the refusal of Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian House of Representatives, Fahri Hamzah, who was scheduled to visit Kupang on October 18, 2018. In a statement signed on October 15, Fahri is considered a figure who often issued provocative and intolerant statements that threaten the integrity of the nation and he is also an HTI and FPI supporter. HTI and FPI are considered as a radical and intolerant mass organization.<sup>3</sup> The Meo Brigade also confronted members of the Tablighi Jamaat in 2016 at Eltari Airport and refused their presence because they were suspected as FPI.

The existence of the Meo Brigade in rejecting Islamic radicalism in Kupang be an effort to maintain the national narrative in the local area. How far the influence of this group in limiting the penetration of Islamism and radicalism in Kupang needs to be explored further, but what is important is to see how the steps of the Meo Brigade influence

2 (<https://www.facebook.com/Brigade-Meo-Timor-158353137965194/>)

3 (<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1136375/rencana-kedatangan-fahri-hamzah-di-kupang-rejected-mass-organization-local/full&view=ok>).

Islamic-Christian relations in Kupang. The author found no information about the Muslim reaction to the Meo brigade's harsh attitude, but one young ulama, FM, made the following statement.

“There are no ulamas who can enter Kupang! Especially if it has been socialized long ago. (Is there an official ban, mas?). No, but, my friends, if my friends post the arrival of Ustadz on social media and then got negative responses from the community, it means they have given up.”<sup>4</sup>

The statement above, even though the informant intended as an example of the inferiority complex possessed by Kupang Muslims, indicates the potential for tension in the dynamics of the relationship between Islam and Christianity which will increase if it is not handled properly.

#### KUPANG ULAMA RESPONSE TO NATIONAL ISSUES

As the results of quantitative research results, the majority of Kupang Muslims, to be exact 70 percent of respondents, showed a moderate attitude towards the nation-state and all its derivative dimensions. However, in in-depth interviews with selected informants, there were more complex dynamics related to the above perceptions which showed that the acceptance of scholars to the nation-state was also colored by negotiations and reservations on several aspects. Below are some important themes drawn from the interview.

##### 1. *NKRI and Pancasila Price of Death*

Quantitative data shows that of 30 respondents, all (100 percent) agreed and strongly agreed with the statement that NKRI is a legitimate state form because it is in harmony with the concept of *dār al-salām* or the concept of *dār al-dahd wa al-syahādah* in Islam. These results were confirmed in interviews which showed that Kupang ulamas from all groups considered the discussion about NKRI is final. The concept of a unitary state is the right formula for Indonesia, at least for now, for various reasons both normative and pragmatic.

Mr. JML, an informant from NU, for example, stressed that the NKRI and democracy are culturally appropriate forms of the state and, more importantly, have been agreed upon by the people of Indonesia.

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4 FM interview conducted on Wednesday October 24, 2018 at the Airmata Mosque at 3:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. Eastern Indonesia Time.

“Every country, every society can formulate the shape of the country, there is culture in it, so people say that in Iran, right according to Iranians, then Syria, Sudan, Turkey has the concept, because the concept was born from that community so at that NU formulated that this country [Indonesia] is not a Khilafah state or a Daulah Islāmiyyah state.”<sup>5</sup>

The agreement, according to the NU figure, is an important point in Muslim acceptance of the Republic of Indonesia, although the informant also reinforced the above argument with normative reasons that the Qur'an never explicitly spoke about the concept of the state or the shape of the ideal state. It is wrong, according to the ulama, to interpret the Surah al-Maidah: 44, 45 and 47 as a threat to the enactment of Allah's law [Islamic state], because according to him, the context of the verse falls very specifically, which is about the enforcement of stoning, and not about the state.

The acceptance of the NKRI was also very firmly stated by ulamas from minority groups namely the Shia and the Ahmadiyah. AS, an informant from IJABI (Association of Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia) stated that the Shia group was one of the groups that made a significant contribution to the founding of the Indonesian state and therefore it was impossible for them to reject the NKRI.

“Talking about the government. On behalf of Shia in Indonesia, NKRI, Pancasila, UUD 45, Unity in Diversity cannot be negotiated for us anymore. I said [referring to the context of the dialogue conducted by respondents with BIN] I guarantee it. Why? Because Islam that came into Indonesia for the first time was Shia. Not the others and the one who built this archipelago was Shia. The Islam of the archipelago is Shia. How we will damage the clothes we have made. ... Therefore the 1945 Constitution guarantees the rights of Shiites as well.”<sup>6</sup>

From the statement above it can be seen that the Shi'a group wants to assert its identity as a “son of the nation” who has the same role and rights as part of Indonesia. This outlook might be drawn from their position which is often considered heretical and rejected by the majority of Indonesian Muslims.

The absolute acceptance of the NKRI was also stated by respondents from the Ahmadiyya congregation, NZ, who stressed that one of the teachings of the Ahmadiyya was loyalty to a legitimate government.

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6 Personal interview on Tuesday, October 23, 2018 at the IJABI secretariat, 13.00-15.00 Eastern Indonesia Time.

“It is said [by] our leaders, wherever you are, you must be loyal to the government wherever you are. It is not negotiable and we must pay attention. And we have never disturbed the stability of the government or in any case let alone change the existing law, it is final, it comes from our government.”<sup>7</sup>

The apolitical outlook is part of the doctrine of the Ahmadiyya. As a member of the organization, the respondents further stated that the Ahmadiyya was forbidden to engage in practical politics because it was feared that it would become an obstacle to the Da’wah mission carried out by the movement.

The outlook of acceptance was also shown by the SHRN informant from the Prosperous Justice Party (PPP). Instead of offering alternative interpretations and questioning the nation-state, the ulama of the new Islamic movement showed the same outlook as the mainstream ulamas. The informant indicated the concern felt by the PKS with the voice that emerged that the party was considered not fully in agreement with the Republic of Indonesia and the Pancasila.

“In my opinion, in the PKS, everyone agrees. Well, this is what we don’t understand, I’m sorry, is this part of the strategy to weaken the party, I don’t know about the issues that PKS is said to be less nationalist, I wonder which part of Pancasila is lacking, because it’s final and we do not understand which part of Pancasila is contrary to Islam.”<sup>8</sup>

From the various narratives above, the acceptance of the concept of the NKRI, both the mainstream ulama, the new Islamic ulama, and the ulama from the minority group, appeared to be in the same position. However, the explanation behind this outlook might be distinguished. For mainstream ulama, acceptance of the NKRI is a form of support or legitimacy of government narratives which also has implications for affirming their authority in holding Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia. As for new ulamas, such as PKS and minorities, the attitude of acceptance of the NKRI can be seen as an effort to ensure that the public [and the government] accept their existence, or as reflected in the exposure of Ahmadis and Shiites, acceptance of the NKRI can also be read as a hope of “guarantee” State protection. NKRI with the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila is a legal basis that guarantees the existence of Shia and

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8 Interview with SHRN on Wednesday October 24, 2018, at 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. at the SHRN’s private residence.

Ahmadiyah groups as legitimate citizens.

## 2. *Imagined Islamic State*

Although almost all respondents showed strong outlooks towards NKRI and, in part to Pancasila, respondents were quite different in their positions when the discussion was directed at the importance of an Islamic State or the Caliphate and Shari'ah formalization in Indonesia. From the presentation of several respondents, it appears that there is an aspiration to have an Islamic state or to assert the establishment of Islamic Sharia as a solution to the complexity of problems in Indonesia. In other words, the phenomenon of an Islamic state is a goal that is written or imagined, referring to Anderson's term, an Islamic state is an Imagined Community (1983). Regarding the concept of Khilafah, for example, some respondents stated that the idea of establishing the Caliphate as initiated by some groups such as HTI was "stupid" and "utopian", while other respondents stated that Khilafah was an unrealistic concept in the life of a pluralistic country. The management of the Hidayatullah boarding school, for example, said the following statement.

"NKRI cannot be negotiated (laugh). That was the agreement of the preceding ulamas, this was the agreement of the ulamas. Researcher: seeing a lot of problems popping up, is there no other solution, the format of the NKRI was reconstructed, reformulated again, and there is a tendency for the caliphate state, what do you think? But indeed it seems like the journey is still long because our society still does not understand, what is Khilafah (laughing) ".

The answer from the board of the Hidayatullah boarding school above shows that there is a perception that the Caliphate or Islamic state is an "ideal" condition for Muslims who at one point needed to be reached. However, this condition is still considered a long-term goal because the knowledge of Indonesian Muslims is still inadequate, and more importantly, is politically impossible due to the strong narrative of the Indonesian Republic of Indonesia or because Indonesian Muslims do not have the power and agreement to establish an Islamic state.

Similar responses were given by informants in the issue of Sharia formalization. Many respondents (from NU, Muhammadiyah, PKS, and Syiah) stated that the formalization of Sharia in Indonesia was not important because the constitution and Pancasila already contained values that were in

harmony with Islam. However, two ulamas stated that the formalization of sharia in Indonesia needs to be done as a solution to the high level of legal violations such as corruption. Sharia, in the perspective of the MUI ulama, for example, can provide a deterrent effect which in the long run helps create wealth.<sup>9</sup> This condition can be read from various angles. The first was the emergence of fragmentation among mainstream ulamas as Islam strengthened as a symbol and identity politics. NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI ulamas are no longer fully regarded as entities that have perspective homogeneity. Secondly, still triggered by the strengthening of Islam as a political identity which has implications for strengthening conservatism, reservations and negotiations emerged regarding the concept of the NKRI and its derivatives which were previously considered established. NKRI is not debated, but the formalization of Sharia is also believed to be a solution and the Khilafah is considered a more ideal, more Islamic form, and therefore needs to be aspired.

As repeatedly mentioned above, the explanation that can be given for reservation, which is shown by mainstream ulamas and new generation ulama is the opening of a public sphere in post-Reformation Indonesia which opens a space for contestation which in turn strengthens religion as a political commodity. The research was conducted in the political year it was difficult for respondents to give up this research from a practical political context. They have difficulty answering questions normatively or conceptually (as expected from this study). Most informants answered in a practical political framework, i.e. outlook and perceptions of the current government. More explicitly, the response to the formalization of sharia and the Islamic state is a form of dissatisfaction with the government which is considered unable to solve various important problems of the country such as corruption. Reference to the conditions of national or local politics is also carried out by most respondents in looking at other issues, specifically related to the importance or absence of Muslim leaders.

### 3. *Muslim leaders (Citizenship Issues)*

Responding to questions about whether they desire Muslim leaders or non-Muslim leaders for both Indonesia and Kupang, we found a spectrum of quite interesting answers. Quantitative data shows when answering questions about the necessity of Muslim leaders since it is in accordance with the concept of *auliya'* in the Qur'an, 13 (thirteen) of 30 people agreed, 5 (five) respondents strongly agreed, 3 (three) respondents

9 Interviews on October 22, 2018

disagreed, and the rest were neutral. If drawn at the percentage, the approval number in this statement is quite high. That is, the majority of Kupang ulamas consider the image of the ideal leader to be Muslim. However, the percentage and outlook above are not easily illustrated in the interview. Although the consistency of outlook (to desire Muslim leaders) can be found in the narratives of the informants, the majority provide indirect answers using various arguments, one of the most prominent being the dominance of the majority. SHRN from PKS, for example, said the following statement.

“In Indonesia, it will not be much different from the conditions in Rome, which means that roughly Roman society would not want to have a leader who is a Muslim, the same as in Indonesia, do you want to be led by a Christian, ... what we hope for is the one who can become a protector, because in Islam I understand that the leader is not just a leader of a cabinet or a country, but that leader has many functions, functions in a state, function in security, functions in protection, including protection for one's faith. In my opinion, so we cannot blame the people if Indonesia wants to have Muslim leaders. It's the same as in Italy, for example, I'm sure they also don't want Muslim leaders because they understand that the figure, they need must be the same as them.”<sup>10</sup>

Although the informant does not directly state that the leader (in Islam) functions as a religious leader, he is the guardian of the faith and hence when most citizens are Muslim, the leader must be Muslim. This view seems to be in line with the PKS perspective regarding the issue of non-Muslim leaders, at least in some political events in the country.<sup>11</sup>

10 Interview with SHRN on Wednesday, October 24, 2018, at 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. at the SHRN's private residence.

11 Referring to the PKS support case for the nomination of FX Rudi Hadi (non-Muslim) in the 2010 Solo Pilkada, PKS President Sohibil Iman responded to a statement from the Surakarta Regional Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) Sharia Council in January 2010 stating that Muslim communities may elect leaders non-Islam. According to Sohibil, the statement conveyed by the sharia council must be seen thoroughly. One of them, seeing the conditions that occur in a region. When the sharia council delivered the statement ahead of the Solo 2010 elections, judged by the PKS, Solo citizens were mostly non-Muslims (<https://www.liputan6.com/pilkada/read/2877980/polemik-dukung-pks-for-leader-non-Muslim>). The PKS Syariah Sharia Board issued a letter which essentially allowed the appointment of non-Muslims as leaders because the leaders of a region were not religious leaders. Only in other parts of the appeal letter mentioned that at the level of *wilayatul 'aah* (absolute leader) such as the president or caliph and strategic positions relating to the welfare of the people such as military leaders, then - referring to the Ulama Ijma - must be Muslim (Council Syariah PKS Solo, 2010).

The points regarding the majority were also raised by WGS, a Muhammadiyah ulama and MUI administrator of NTT province who was running for members of the Provincial DPRD from the PPP faction.

“Ideally, this nation is predominantly Muslim, let’s give them the opportunity to live as Muslims, and vice versa for minorities. Today is upside down, the minority feels heeded, but when they are the majority they don’t care about the minority. In Manado, a Kiai was expelled. I follow the developments on television every day, we seem to be trapped in the interests of pragmatism, the interests of the political elite.”<sup>12</sup>

The statements of the PKS and PPP informants above highlight what is often believed to be one of the spirits of democracy, namely the power of the majority rule.<sup>13</sup> The statement of the two informants above also shows that they are referring to the national political context of Muslim and non-Muslim issues since the DKI Election and ahead of the 2019 Election. The WGS statement confirms one of the sentiments often raised by Islamic parties that Muslims as a majority are experiencing discrimination and therefore lose politically compared to other minority groups. This is what Ustadz WGS calls the interests of the Indonesian political elite. That is, there are efforts from current politicians or state leaders to marginalize Muslim groups.

However, this perception is different, although it remains consistent with the principle of the power of the majority when discussions are taken at the local level in Kupang or NTT. All informants mentioned the position of Muslims in Kupang as a minority and therefore having a regional head, governor and Muslim mayor was not a realistic option. Most informants considered the ideal leader to be fought for was those who were able to accommodate Muslim interests, or in the language of informants from Ijabi and PKS, “being fair” towards all groups. In other words, having Muslim representatives as the top leaders (read: governor) is not realistic at this time, but Muslim representation, according to

12 Personal interviews at WGS October 21, 2018, 19-21: 00 WIT (Eastern Indonesia Time) located at the private residence of Mr. WGS.

13 In US history, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and some of the names considered by the founding father as names known to socialize the ex Majoritis Partis principle “literally means the majority party or” the rule of rules “. This principle was initiated by Jefferson at the time of the drafting of the Constitution and Bill of Right in the early 19th century and later developed into the concept of democracy. One of the earliest writings of this theory that is still accessible is John Gilbert Heinberg (1932, 452-469).



them, must appear on the government map. This conclusion is conveyed by WGS as follows.

“Because they can fight for the desires or aspirations of Muslims. But politics cannot accommodate this, ma’am. Political conditions cannot accommodate them. There must be a leader, if he is a representative, it might be like Ahok. In this province, two forces compete, Catholics, Protestants, fight each other, Islam is in the middle (laugh).”<sup>14</sup>

In this case, the Indonesian Ulama Council, especially at the NTT provincial level, became an important base for Muslim political struggle. There are two things that seem to be Kupang Muslim’s strategies to ensure their representation in the local political map. First is support and alliances with candidates for governors or mayors who are considered to represent or can accommodate Muslim voices, even though they are not Muslims. Second is the pragmatism of Kupang Muslims. In some cases, it appears that Muslim leaders in Kupang do not feel the need to wear the clothes of one Islamic organization consistently. Membership in NU or Muhammadiyah, for example, is not considered to be fixed but can change when political conditions, or other considerations, require the change. This can be seen, for example, in the case of the head of the NTN PWNU, who is also the deputy chairman of the MUI, who in his career had also been a member of an Assembly in the NTT Muhammadiyah Regional Management. In another perspective, it can also be said that for some Kupang ulamas, political vehicles do not need to be restricted to one Islamic organization because Muslim representation is more important, regardless of the organization’s background.

Therefore, the MUI is quite central as a representation of Muslim communities both culturally and structurally. The centrality of the MUI’s position seems to encourage Muslim groups to maintain the solidity of this institution even though differences of opinion occur within it. The latest case for the election of governors can illustrate this phenomenon. The elected Governor of NTT, Viktor Laiskodat, in his campaign had a speech which stated that several Muslim parties such as PKS, PAN, and Gerindra were intolerant and radical parties. This statement certainly triggered strong reactions from Muslim groups, both from the accused party and other groups.

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14 Interview with WGS October 21, 2018, 19-21: 00 WIT (East Indonesia Time) located at Mr. WGS’s private residence

Laskodat's speech was even considered as a hate speech and it was reported by the authorities on charges of violation of the ITE Law.<sup>15</sup> Interestingly, several informants said that the NTT MUI chairman was one of Viktor Laskodat's successful teams at that time, although according to the chairman's confession, the support was carried out in his personal capacity as a member of a particular party. Of course, the majority of Kupang Muslims regret the decision of the MUI chairman, but the development of escalating tensions in the MUI body to a higher level was not apparent.

#### *4. Tolerance and acceptance of minorities*

##### *a. External Tolerance (towards non-Muslims)*

Quantitative data shows that 26 out of 30 Kupang informants were in a pro-tolerance position. More detailed data regarding tolerance shows a slightly more dynamic view. Questions in questionnaires related to tolerance focused on several aspects including freedom of worship for followers of religion (question no. 1), establishment of houses of worship of other religions (question no. 7), accepting non-Muslims as neighbors (question no. 13) and the last question relates to whether religious freedom is the same as secularization (question no. 20). For questions about freedom of worship and acceptance of non-Muslims as neighbors, the response is very positive. In question number one, seven informants agreed, and 22 strongly agree; only one informant did not agree. While for question number 13, twenty (20) informants agreed and strongly agreed to accept non-Muslims as neighbors. Questions about the freedom of non-Muslims to establish places of worship in Muslim areas and freedom of response are balanced between those who agree and those who disagree, each chosen by ten (10) informants. While seven informants only approved the issue of secularization while the remaining 13 stated that religious freedom is not secularization.

The high level of tolerance among Kupang ulama is certainly not surprising considering that, as explained above, Kupang and NTT are more widely known as tolerant areas because of the high harmony between Christians as the majority and Muslims as a minority. As explained at the top of this paper, kinship reinforced by interfaith marriages is one of the keys to cultural tolerance, especially between Muslims and Christians. Kinship as a key to Muslim tolerance and harmony in Christian areas

15 (<https://news.detik.com/berita/3592352/pemuda-muslim-ntt-lorkan-viktor-laiskodat-ke-bareskri>)

is also a character in other cities in Eastern Indonesia such as Manado, Ambon, and others.<sup>16</sup> Another reason for high tolerance in Kupang is the efforts of religious leaders both Muslim and non-Muslim in maintaining calm, especially when tension arose between followers of these two religions as occurred in the 1998 riots (see page 6).

However, emphasizing the question raised above, how strong can cultural tolerance be maintained amid the strengthening of conservatism and identity politics that are increasingly prevalent in Indonesia? At least this social condition affects the change in expression of tolerance between Muslims and Christians and the potential for conflict that needs attention. Some informants explicitly stated that tolerance requires a two-way effort; a principle of understanding. The informant described that the Muslim expect Christians as the majority to be able to respect Muslim traditions in the process of daily interactions such as halal food, alcohol, and Christmas celebrations that are increasingly changing.

“Yes, the actual tolerance that is meant is that each of them keeps limits, there is no tolerance that goes too far, you and your party friends continue to eat there [Christmas parties] or perform worship rituals as an official part of the event.”<sup>17</sup>

Regarding changes in the expressions of acceptance and appreciation for other groups, some informants said this had changed with changes in time and religious understanding of Kupang Muslims.

In the context of the Christmas celebration, for example, SHM and MF, both young activist ulamas in two Islamic organizations, expressly stated that they no longer wished Christmas to Christian families and relatives, and no longer visited on Christmas day. In MF's words, this change occurs because the community in general no longer celebrates religious holidays as before, but this change is also due to normative reasons, namely the widening of views that forbid Muslims to greet during Christmas.<sup>18</sup> According to him, this change in attitude and according to SHM has been understood by the Christian community so that their expectations regarding the Christmas greeting have also changed.

<sup>16</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Interview with SHM on Tuesday, October 21, 2018 at the Kupang Ministry of Religion Office

<sup>18</sup> FM interview conducted on Wednesday, October 24, 2018, at the Airmata Masjid at 15.00 - 17.30 WIT (Eastern Indonesia Time). The fatwa on the prohibition of attending Christmas was issued by the MUI for the first time in 1980 as part of the suspicion of Muslim on the issue of Christianization. See Mujiburrahman, 2001.

More substantially, the rise of conservatism among Muslims in Indonesia and the strengthening of religious identity influenced the dynamics of Muslim-Christian relations in Kupang. Mujiburrahman said that in the history of Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia it was dominated with suspicion of Christianization efforts that had emerged since the New Order era (Mujiburrahman, 2006). If applied in the Kupang context, this phenomenon of suspicion emerges or strengthens in the current period. Besides the issue of the Christmas celebration above, two informants also mentioned their suspicion of interfaith marriages as part of the Christianization effort. WGS informants, for example, stated that the high number of pregnancies outside of marriage experienced by Muslim adolescents was an attempt at Christianization, moreover - in his view, the culture of Kupang tolerated the practice of relations outside of marriage, and children born from these relationships were considered children of God.<sup>19</sup>

Some informants also stated that in its current development, policies and practices emerged which were considered to violate the boundaries of tolerance that had been agreed on culturally. For example, Mr. JML in his interview described the official Christmas celebrations held by the local government, in some cases no longer separating halal food for Muslims. The celebration is even tinted with toasting and drinking wine together.<sup>20</sup> Another case referred to as a violation of tolerance is the effort of Governor Victor Laiscodat to make Kupang a tourist destination which in practice is carried out by exploring regional specialties such as culinary pork and discourse on legalizing local liquor.<sup>21</sup> Some informants stressed that after the policy socialization, the increase in the pork business was quite visible. The issue of pork also led to the case of Prima Gaida Journalita, a Kupang Muslim who on Thursday, May 11, 2017, was reported by the chairman of the Meo Brigade Community Organization, Rev. Ady Wiliam Frith Ndiy S.TH, MT and dozens of other residents for posting on Facebook using vulgar language and considered spreading hate speech. Below one of the posts made on May 10, 2017.

“Want to talk about tolerance? NTT Tolerance? ... if there is still pork on the dining table, it is not tolerant ... the food cooked by non-Muslims and served for Muslims is also not

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19 Interview, 21 October 2018.

20 Interviews, October 21, 2018.

21 See one of the news: <http://kupang.tribunnews.com/2018/11/28/members-legalization-remix>? Page = 2

tolerance ... after eating pork and dog meat and continue to greet and kiss the baby, it is also not tolerant.”<sup>22</sup>

Geida's case shows that local policies regarding tourism are considered to “hurt” Kupang Muslims and as a form of violation of Muslim-Christian boundaries and tolerance that have been established for hundreds of years.

*b. Internal Tolerance (Muslim Minorities)*

Different responses are shown to minority groups in Islam such as Shia, Ahmadiyya, and local religion. More specifically, quantitative, and qualitative data shows tolerance to minority Muslim groups seems lower. Quantitative data, for example, shows that 21 out of 30 respondents agreed to the community's rejection of groups that were considered heretical by the MUI; four others agreed strongly. Likewise, 20 respondents agreed (10 strongly agreed and 10 agreed) with the statement that the existence of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia is part of an effort to weaken and divide Muslims. Then related to Shia, 12 (out of 30) respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed with the statement, “In the life of nation and state, we need to avoid misguided allegations against Shiite groups”.

The low acceptance of Shia, Ahmadiyya, and local religions is reflected in the interviews, although not explicitly. Some informants, for example, clearly acknowledges the existence of Ahmadiyya and Shia worshippers in Kupang, while other informants stated that the existence of these two groups was not visible because they deliberately hid their identities. However, a general view states that Ahmadis and Shiites are heretical Muslim groups who must be “straightened out” or invited to rejoin the majority of Islam through Da'wah movements and activities, not by violent approaches. Informants from the PKS said that the problem with these two minority groups lay only in their recognition as Muslims, “if neither Ahmadiyya nor Shi'a claim to be Muslim, the problem will disappear.” The opinions above affirm the national phenomenon as seen in the quantitative data, namely tolerance of Muslim minorities is lower than tolerance for non-Muslims. In the context of Kupang, this phenomenon is stronger given the tolerance for Christianity that is entrenched and becomes part of the daily lives of Kupang Muslims.

22 See <http://beritahubulat.blogspot.com/2017/05/hina-warga-ntt-di-fb-prima-gaida.html> and, <http://www.nttsatu.com/prima-dipolisikan-karena-insulting-people-not-tolerant/> and <https://sinodegmit.or.id/pasca-penanguhan-penah-anan-prima-journalita-met-ms-gmit>

## CONCLUSION

Qualitative and quantitative data shows the acceptance of Kupang ulamas against nation-states with several derivative concepts. However, reservation and contestation also dominate the acceptance as seen in the emergence of *imagined Islamic state* and the application of sharia which is considered as a solution to the “problem” of the nation. This reservation needs to be understood with the framework of Islamic-Christian relations which is the main character in the dynamics of Muslims in Kupang. The existence of a shadow about an Islamic state, although very limited, can be referred to the position of Muslims as a minority and seeing Islamic leaders and countries as entry points to become politically stronger. This phenomenon is also influenced by the strengthening of identity politics at the national level.

Regarding the issue of tolerance, Kupang has a strong cultural tolerance between Muslims and Christians which is bound by kinship as a result of interfaith marriage and is built on the principle of “understanding”. The dynamics of local politics and the strengthening of identity seem to be able to tear the building of cultural tolerance that has the potential to become “embers in the chaff”.

In other words, the government needs to start questioning whether this tolerance can survive in the rush of Islamism and whether identity politics can strengthen in the present conditions.

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# DEFENDING THE UNITARY STATE OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (NKRI): Ambon Ulama's Perception and View of the Nation-State

*Nina Mariani Noor*

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution which affirms the plurality of ethnic groups and religions is the result of an Indonesian founding father's agreement after certainly passing many contestations and debates. In its journey, this agreement was held firmly by the state and legitimized by mainstream ulamas. Along with the journey of the Indonesian people, there were efforts and challenges from several Muslim groups to form an Islamic state such as DI TII in West Java in 1949 under the leadership of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewiryo and DI TII in Aceh under the leadership of David Beureuh. In the reform era, alternative political-religious discourses emerged that legitimized the global system of integrity in the form of the Caliphate championed by Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, or the idea of a state with Islamic law with several sharia regulations in several regencies and provinces. The current shift in religious authority has made fragmentation and the spectrum of ulama's views on the nation-state also very diverse. In general, it can be said that mainstream ulamas support the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution, but ulamas from the new authorities tend to experience wider and more diverse fragmentation.

This paper discusses the views and attitudes of Ambonese ulamas regarding the nation-state and what are their variations in outlooks towards national issues. Before discussing the views of Ambonese ulamas about nation-states, the first part of this paper discusses the characteristics and composition of Ambonese ulamas and the Ambon context surrounding the ulamas. The discussion of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) as



an institution of ulamas in Ambon is described in the following section. The views of the Ambonese ulama regarding the nation-state are divided into two parts, namely the ulama's view of democracy and the life of the nation and state, then the next section concerning citizenship. The last section will highlight the views and outlooks of young or millennial ulamas and the closing section.

#### MUSLIM COMPOSITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF AMBONESE ULAMAS

Ambon has a composition of a Muslim population of approximately half of the total population, namely 205,502 people per 2017 from the total population of Ambon 390,032 people (Pemeluk Agama, t.t.). Islam developed in Maluku, especially Ambon in the 15th century with the establishment of the Kingdom of Leihitu.

As part of the Indonesian nation, Ambon Muslims strongly supported the formation of the Indonesian State because of the historical experience of the colonial era which was very discriminatory to them. Religious polarization has occurred since the Portuguese colonization when conflict occurred between the Portuguese and residents which resulted in the separation of residential locations. During the Dutch colonization, this segregation became increasingly visible when the Dutch privileged Christians compared to Muslims. Muslim-Christian polarization is said to have been created by the Dutch. So, when the Dutch suffered defeat and Japan came, Muslims welcomed with a great enthusiasm with the spirit of nationalism to build a new country called Indonesia, while the Christian community felt more comfortable with the Netherlands (Kadir 2013).

In conjunction with Christians, Ambon Muslims have quite a dark experience, especially when the Christian-Muslim brotherhood relationship was torn apart by a bloody conflict that claimed the lives of thousands of people died in 1999-2002. It raised awareness for Ambonese people to continue to foster harmony and brotherhood, restored what had been torn apart in the past by preserving local cultural values such as *pela gandong*, *salam sarani*. The results are amazing, now Ambon is considered a laboratory of Muslim-Christian harmony in Indonesia and even the world.

The majority of Ambonese Muslims practically *'ubūdiyyah* are closer to NU culture. They practiced *tahlilan*, *maulid*, and others, but in terms of Islamic organizations, Ambon Muslims are spread in a variety of Islamic organizations. Religious mass organizations in Ambon are Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, Salafi, LDII, Tarbawi and

from the minority groups there are Shia and Ahmadiyah. As with the diversity of Muslims in Ambon, each group has influential ulama. The meaning of ulama in this paper is Ambon's ulama who are the subject of the research and affiliated with various religious mass organizations in Ambon, namely MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama including Fatayat and Muslimat, Muhammadiyah including Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, LDII, Salafi, PERSIS, PKS, and IKADI. In addition to the ulama who are affiliated with certain mass organizations, there are also some ulama who are not affiliated with the mass organization but have Islamic boarding schools or *taklim* assemblies or have Islamic background organizations such as HMI, PII, PMII.

Whereas the new ulama or millennial ulama found in Ambon included young men who were able to mobilize young workers and the community of other young people who were thirsty to study religion and determined to be better people. They have a community that organizes studies and preaching by means of young people. They call this movement "Hijrah Ok Main". Qur'an recitation is usually done in many cafes spread in Ambon city with the movement "Da'wah Goes to Café". The study material is more focused on discussing the daily issues faced by young people, such as love affairs and lifestyle. The material presented by Ustadz also uses the language and theme of young people, for example, the title of the theme is "I know what I want" which discusses about the nature of life as a human being, or "Dilan Secretly Proposes" which discusses love and marriage. This community is under the guidance of Ustadz Arsal Tuasikal and Ustadz Hatta who are also administrators of the Al Fatah Masjid, a masjid that is the center of Muslim activities in Ambon, located in downtown Ambon.

In addition to conducting studies at Cafés, this community also conducts da'wah by doing rihlah/sightseeing together while understanding nature. They also use social media such as Instagram,<sup>1</sup> Twitter, Facebook,<sup>2</sup> and YouTube<sup>3</sup> to spread their da'wah and attract more members to join.<sup>4</sup>

Another young ulama who became an informant in this study was a Habib who had a foundation that specifically educated prospective religious teachers. The foundation founded by Habib is still relatively new and is in downtown Ambon. This institution only accommodates

1 <https://www.instagram.com/hijrahokmain/>

2 <https://www.facebook.com/hijrah.okmain.1>

3 Chanel Youtube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9kn1PzffxKL1MMI AHZw0-g>

4 Interview with FRF on October 18, 2018.

students who want to seriously study religion and later become ulamas in the future. Santri came from various regions in Maluku. The foundation was founded because of concerns from the Habib about the very limited Islamic religious education in Ambon. Many families cannot educate their children with religious knowledge while in Ambon there are not many Islamic boarding schools or institutions that focus on religious education for Muslims. Some students from this institution were sent to institutions outside the region and even abroad to study religion in depth, namely, five people went to Yemen Hadramaut and six people went to the Al Fakhriah Foundation, Tangerang which is managed by Habib Jindan, and to Kiai Masbuchin in Tasikmalaya. These institutions are part of the network owned by the Habib.<sup>5</sup>

Minority ulamas in Ambon are from the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia and from Shia. The number of followers of this congregation is very small and even its existence has not been heard by the Ambonese community. Their activities are still very limited and far from publications so that many Ambonese ulamas and Muslims do not know that there are also Ahmadiyah followers in Ambon. The Ahmadiyya Ulama (commonly called mubalig) who are based in Ambon oversees the Maluku region, namely the Ahmadiyya in West Seram, Namlea Buru Island, and the Aru Islands.<sup>6</sup>

Regarding Shi'ites, the numbers are not clear even though they are present. There is a pesantren in Hila whose religious practices tend to be Shiite. They held Ten Muharam celebrations. The Ten Muharam celebration has started to invite people from outside the pesantren. The masjid is always filled with parents, and only a few of the young people, but tahlilan activities for the deceased are also held and every Friday night a prayer meeting is held together with the Santri. On Wednesday night a joint tawasul is held. (Tubaka & Masawoy t.t.).

The ulamas are not limited to male ulamas, but there are also female ulamas. Of the thirty ulamas who were respondents, there were nine female ulamas from various religious organizations, namely Fatayat NU, Aisyiyah, members of the Prosperous Justice Party, DPRD, IAIN Ambon lecturers and NGO activists.

From quantitative data, the characteristics of Ambonese ulamas' outlooks towards the nation-state were identified in six spectrums. Of the 30 respondents, 4 people (13.33%) were categorized as progressive, 9 people (30%) as inclusive, 10 people as moderate (33.3%), 1 person as

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Habib RA on October 17, 2018

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Ustadz R

conservative (3.33%), 2 people as exclusive (6.66%), 1 person as extreme and 3 people (10%) were not identified.

Four ulamas who were categorized as progressives were from NU, IAIN Ambon, and Ahmadiyah lecturers. Nine ulama categorized as inclusive came from Fatayat NU, Muhammadiyah, LDII, and Shia. Moderate ulamas come from MUI, NU, FKUB, Muhammadiyah, PKS, and lecturers. One conservative ulama from Salafi, two exclusive people from NU and Aisyiyah, and one extreme person are activists of Islamic study activities. The distribution of the data above shows that ulamas from large religious mass organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah did not have the same attitude with each other. Educational background and their interaction experiences with others determine how they behave, whether they accept or not. Looking at the outlooks and views of ulamas regarding the nation-state from an age range, the facts in Ambon show that the older generation of ulamas is more acceptable compared to the ulamas of the new or millennial generation.

#### **AMBON INDONESIAN ULAMA COUNCIL**

When talking about ulama or ulama institutions in Indonesia, we cannot ignore the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in this discussion. MUI in Ambon is also an organ of the central MUI. Like the MUI at the central level, the ulama who were included in the Ambon MUI membership were the mainstream ulamas such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and IKADI, and rarely were minority ulamas. As Ichwan stated that the MUI, after the collapse of the New Order, tried to bring Indonesian Muslims closer to orthodoxy (Ichwan 2005), the Ambon MUI also did the same. Ichwan further stated that the fatwa and tausiyah issued by the MUI were usually a manifestation of how the fatwa or tausiyah authority was negotiated and the position of the MUI as an 'ulama' institution redefined (Ichwan 2005). Fatwa or tausiyah issued by the Ambon MUI is usually in accordance with a fatwa from the central MUI, for example regarding rubella vaccination which is not halal due to its ingredients. The Ambon MUI has not dared to issue a fatwa on whether or not vaccination can be carried out and asked the government, in this case, the Ambon health office to postpone it until the status is clear. As soon as the central MUI stated that the rubella vaccination could be applied even though the ingredients of the vaccine were made from haram (illegitimate) items, in a case of emergency, the law could be used, so the Ambon MUI issued a statement that vaccination is permissible. Once

again, the MUI here serves as the giver of legitimacy for the government regarding matters that cover the Muslim community at large.

However, the fatwa issued by the MUI Ambon regarding vaccination was not the unanimous vote of all ulamas. Some ulamas who take care of Islamic boarding schools with a significant number of students take steps not to comply with the fatwa of the MUI regarding this controversial vaccination. For them, the authority to give vaccination permits to children is the parents of these children, not caregivers of Islamic boarding schools. Therefore, they refused to give permission and let the parents of the Santri decide. Because these Santri live in their boarding school and their parents are far away, of course, many Santri were not vaccinated. The ulamas took safe steps in addressing the halal controversy of vaccination.<sup>7</sup>

The attitude of these ulamas shows that after the reform era, the ideological orientation of the MUI became more exclusive, namely protecting the interests of Muslims rather than the overall national interest. However, despite this puritan orientation, MUI has tried to be moderate. Its moderation is shown by, among other things, its rejection of radicalism and terrorism, its acceptance of modernity, and the nation-state of Indonesia based on Pancasila and modern democracy, and not on Islam (Ichwan 2013, 63).

The argument from Ichwan is in line with the following situation. Ambon MUI also tends to become more conservative, the ulamas are increasingly exclusive, while progressive ulamas have begun to be marginalized and have not received much support from other ulamas within the MUI itself. An example is when the Chairman of the Ambon MUI passed away in early 2018, the position of the chairperson can be replaced directly by the Deputy Chairperson of the MUI, a very progressive ulama, but it turned out he was not replaced because there were several MUI officials who objected. The statements and outlooks of MUI members on certain issues are also sometimes inconsistent.

The MUI itself also received criticism from several ulamas who were interviewed in this study, especially ulamas from new authorities or millennial ulamas. They consider that not all members of the MUI meet the criteria as ulamas. Their religious knowledge is still considered superficial. In addition, the MUI is now no more an institution that becomes a tool for the government, especially when it relates to

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7 Interview with Ustadz of Pondok A and Ustadz of Podok I, 15 and 16 October 2018.

government policies concerning Muslims, for example in the case of rubella vaccination which has invited many pros and cons some time ago.

### DEMOCRACY AND NATION-STATE EXISTENCE

The concept and form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Pancasila as the basis were accepted by almost all the ulamas who were respondents in this study, namely 29 people. They stated that the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution were in harmony with Islamic teachings. According to them, the selection of the form of the Indonesian state is now a joint agreement of the Indonesian people. The ulamas added that the founding fathers had considered many things when choosing a democracy not an Islamic state even though most of the Indonesia's population was Muslim. One ulama added that with the shape of the country as it is today, the task of being Muslim and Indonesian citizens, according to them, is to fill the spaces created in this democratic state system.

Furthermore, the ulamas linked the democratic state system to the interests of Muslims who had not been disturbed. They see that democracy in Indonesia does not prevent Muslims from worshiping and practicing Islamic teachings, nor does it call on *syirik* (to worship other than Allah) even the state encourages Muslims to practice their religious teachings. They even asserted that the state had also provided many means to support Muslims to perfect their worship such as religious courts and marriage laws. So, there is no room to reject democracy as a reason for not being in accordance with Islamic teachings.<sup>8</sup> The following statement emerged from one of the ulamas who manages a large Islamic boarding school in Ambon. *"Indonesian democracy and Pancasila are good, there are no problems with them. When did Pancasila invite us to be syirik? It never happened. Our religion is good, it is actually encouraged and supported by the government and is also extraordinary..."*<sup>9</sup>

An ulama and a lecturer at IAIN Ambon, who is known to be very progressive, AW, emphasized that Indonesia's democratic system is *ijtihad* carried out by the founders of the nation. He further referred to the Prophet's hadith which reads "*antum a'lamu bi umūri dunyākum*", it is humans themselves who know more about world affairs. Regarding the understanding of returning directly to the Qur'an and the hadith which are now being voiced, Abidin Wakano emphasized that *ijtihad*

8 Interviews with several ulamas in the period 16-20 October 2018

9 Interview with Ustaz AR, 15 October 2018

was the way to understand the Qur'an and Hadith.<sup>10</sup> Ulama from minority groups, namely Ahmadiyah and Shia, also strongly supported the principle of democracy and Pancasila. A Shia ulama expressed the following statement.

“Democracy is in line with Islamic teachings. Because if you talk about the rules that apply, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, do not deviate from the rules of religion even in line with Islam because they are manifestations of religious teachings. If all power is in God's hands and everything is governed by God's law, what is the function of humans then? Humans as implementers of that rule. Concerning democracy and so on, it is a state agreement. We have agreed to live in a country with these kinds of rules.”<sup>11</sup>

While the Ahmadiyya ulama who was interviewed that democracy could be accepted, within the limits of mutual respect. Religion should take care of private matters; the state and democracy are used to deal with matters of public nature. The democracy that is believed by Ahmadiyah is more on secularization, namely the separation of religion as a private matter for everyone.<sup>12</sup>

From interviews and questionnaires about the acceptance of Ambonese ulama about the shape of a democratic state, almost all ulamas accepted the democratic system, and only one refused. However, when asked about the suitability of democratic principles with the concept of shura in Islam, there were three scholars who stated that the principle of democracy was not in accordance with the concept of shura in Islam. Variations in the form of acceptance of ulamas towards the system of democratic countries are indeed diverse, there are those who fully accept all the consequences, but there are also those who make it as a form of negotiation. As long as they can still carry out their duties and obligations as ulamas. There is also acceptance of the form of the state from the ulama just because it is part of the reality, as citizens they do not have the power to change the condition so they inevitably accept it even though it may not be wholehearted, but for the sake of the larger people, they chose to accept the existing system. For example, a respondent stated that the system is already there, which is a democratic state, what he can do as a citizen is just to accept it.

<sup>10</sup> Interviews with AW, October 15, 2018

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Ustadz JB, October 15, 2018

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Ustadz R, October 17, 2018

The ulama was previously under surveillance by BNPT (the National Agency for the Management of Terrorism) because there were indications of supporting the ISIS movement (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham), but now these ulamas support the NKRI state system and try to take part in this country through its efforts to manage Islamic boarding schools that provide education free for children in need. The *pesantren* that they manage even gain support from the government in the form of the appointment of several of their teachers as civil servants who work in the *pesantren*.

Regarding the idea of formalizing sharia in Indonesia, most Ambonese scholars, as many as 21 people, expressed disagreement. They do not assume that formalization is important and more importantly, sharia itself is implemented in Indonesia. Formalization is just a cover, and what is important is the substance. What is interesting is that there are seven people who support the formalization of Islamic sharia so that the government does not support the formalization of sharia as a government of *thaghut*. The rest of the ulamas (2 respondents) chose to be neutral on this matter. They did not show support or resistance to the formalization of sharia.

As for the concept of the Caliph in Islam, along with their support for Pancasila democracy, the ulamas also disagreed with the form of the Caliphate government. Even though there are 17 or more people who think that the Islamic political system is superior to a democratic system or other human-made systems. This shows that the ulamas accepted the Pancasila democratic system that existed in Indonesia as a reality that must be accepted, but in their idealism, they might still desire an Islamic political system.

Ahmadiyah as a religious organization in the form of Khilafat affirms that the form of the caliphate used by the Ahmadiyya is a spiritual caliphate across national borders, not a form of political government with the regional authority. Therefore, Ahmadiyah followers are required to be good citizens who obey the rules of a legitimate government in their country of residence so that they do not dispute any form of government that is legitimate in a country. Whereas the Shi'a ulamas who were interviewed emphasized that the concept of Khilafah which was now being offered was still unclear to this day, even the figure who was to be made a caliph was not clear. This ulama considers the offer of the system of the Caliphate (in this case referring to HTI) is too political which is considered a threat to the integrity of the nation so that it is only natural



if eventually it will be disbanded by the government.<sup>13</sup>

Furthermore, the last ulama who was previously mentioned suggested to the government, in this case, the Ministry of Religion, to prevent the spread of the Caliphate by conducting strict screening and maximizing the religious instructors to prevent the development of ideas that threatened the NKRI. The role of religious educators is very important because they are the voice of the country. In addition, the role of religious organizations in Indonesia such as NU and Muhammadiyah is also very important in fortifying the community from such attacks. In the context of Maluku, Khilafah groups were very difficult to penetrate and gained support in rural areas that still maintain their local traditions, but they gained sympathizers in urban circles who have more acceptable traditions.

#### CITIZENSHIP: ANTI-VIOLENCE, TOLERANCE AND CITIZENSHIP

With Ambon's historical background having experienced conflict with violence between Muslims and Christians in 1999-2002, almost all Ambonese ulamas who were interviewed in this study had a strong objection to violence, except for one ulama who in this study was categorized as extreme. In relation to *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, the ulamas considered that this could be done by advising, educating the people, rather than committing violence to people who were considered *munkar* (to conduct bad deeds). They also agreed the action of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* with force can be carried out by state apparatuses who indeed had authority over it.

“Actually, to prevent using our own hand is not our right, but the government's, it's called power”. “If we talk about positive law, then we have no rights, we cannot take action alone by using destructive actions. Because we are bound by positive law. (Ustaz JB)

However, there are also ulamas who do not expressly reject acts of violence in their ambitions because according to them there must be certain situations and reasons that make groups like the FPI to conduct sweeping.

However, these ulamas also do not support acts of violence in the context of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. The concern of Ambonese ulamas regarding *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* with an emphasis on education is because they consider that Ambon Muslims still need to improve the

13 Interview with Ustadz JB, October 17, 2018

quality of human resources and their moral character.

The interpretation of jihad by these ulamas also did not associate the jihad discourse with weapons or war. Jihad for them is to do something that is really needed by Muslims, for example by providing education for children in need by building Islamic boarding schools. Jihad is also interpreted as an effort to uphold justice for all. From the interviews we conducted, there was one ulama who argued that it was not time to carry out physical jihad at this time, but according to him in the future, it could lead to physical jihad too, if the ulama began to be terrorized. He gave an example of the rejection of the arrival of Habib in Southeast Kalimantan who was expelled at the airport. This can lead to small jihad and create terrorism.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, an Ustaz who managed several Islamic boarding schools in Maluku including Ambon stated that by providing free religious and public education to orphans and underprivileged children was a form of jihad. He termed jihad *tarbawi*, educational jihad. This is in line with the opinion of a female activist from Fatayat NU who stated that jihad is an effort to instill values of justice, values of love, solidarity, and values of peace among Muslims. In other languages but with the same essence, a teacher of a children's boarding school asserts that jihad is an attempt to change a Muslim for the better, of course through education both formal and informal. The Shia ulama interviewed stated that he agreed more if in the current context jihad was not interpreted by lifting the sword. Jihad must be positioned in a positive sense, for example, if someone adequately understands jihad and is wealthy, his wealth should be used as a means for jihad.

In the context of Maluku, there are still many children in rural areas who have intelligence, but cannot go to school because of the lack of costs, so people who have excessive money can provide scholarships to these children. It is part of the greatest jihad. There are still various other fields that Muslims can use as jihad in a positive sense rather than lifting swords. He further emphasized that the Indonesian state is not a state of *ḥarb* (*dār 'l-ḥarb*) or a state of war so that the issues of Jihad in the meaning of violence must be eliminated.

Jihad must be interpreted positively such as education and health. An example is to go to certain areas that really need health. That is the true meaning of jihad because it can save the lives of the people. According to Ahmadiyya, jihad means using a pen to spread writings that are beneficial for the betterment of life.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Ustaz AL, October 17, 2018

The discourse of jihad with violence did not emerge from the results of research on 29 of these ulamas except one who interpreted jihad by conducting war. The ulama who stated that jihad should not be violent exemplified the existence of Laskar Jihad, which once existed in Ambon during the conflict, the Ambonese ulama stated that Laskar Jihad does not exist anymore, there was only Laskar Ahlus Sunah Wal Jamaah from the Salafi group. They have a foundation that is engaged in education, namely the Abu Bakar As-Shidiq Foundation which manages educational institutions ranging from early childhood education to Islamic schools.

Al-Manshuroh Kindergarten (TK) is seen as the best kindergarten in Ambon today. Whereas from the ulamas who are categorized as Jihadists in this study understand that jihad is to declare the unbelievers to be infidels, who do not implement Islamic Shari'a are Thagut, and their blood is halal to be shed. For them, the truest religion is Islam which is in accordance with the Qur'an in Surat al-Maidah. Other religions are man-made so that their teachings are not in line with Islam so that their blood is halal to be shed. According to them, Thagut is a person who obstructs the Islamic law, their blood is also halal to be shed.<sup>15</sup> As for the use of violence against groups that are different from Muslims, Ambonese ulamas generally disagree, but there are two people who strongly agree.

Muslim-Christian polarization has occurred since the colonial era when the Portuguese came to power in Maluku. The polarization continued, but in its journey, there were efforts from both parties to restore the brotherhood through the spirit of *pela-gandong* which became the local wisdom and in the post-conflict period it proved to be a means to foster peace. In the past, even though the Ambonese people had been polarized, they were still left to blend in Muslim-majority and Christian-majority regions.

The conflict that broke out in the span of 1999-2002 made the polarization even more apparent with the more segregated Muslim and Christian settlements. Now we rarely find Muslims living in Christian villages and vice versa. Their opportunities to interact with one another are in public such as markets, offices, and schools. (Kadir 2013). The segregation of settlements must be taken seriously because it has shown an outlook to avoid direct contact with other religions. (Iwamony & Relmasira 2017).

Religious life in the context of nation and state has become common for the Ambonese people because of the diversity of ethnicities and

15 Interview with Lilik Ustadz, October 16, 2018.

religions that exist. Regarding leadership in the government, almost all Ambonese ulamas in this study did not mind having non-Muslim leaders. The composition of the Ambonese population between Muslims and Christians is almost balanced, and there is an agreement from the Malino II Agreement which one of the contents is an agreement to regulate the composition of regional leaders as a reason for their attitude. The ulamas gave an example if the Maluku governor was a Muslim, his representative was Christian or vice versa. This also applies to the mayor and his deputy.

As for non-Muslim leaders, of the 30 ulama respondents, there were 15 people who stated that the leader must be Muslim because it was in accordance with the *auliya* concept in the Qur'an. On the contrary, the remaining 15 ulama said they disagreed if leaders had to be Muslim, they would accept whomever the people elected. The concept of *ulil amri* according to the ulamas is government leaders, namely leaders who take care of world affairs. So, there is no problem if they are non-Muslims as long as they are competent and are the people's choice. There was one ulama who stated that the requirement if the leader is Christian, he should come from a Christian group that is not fanatical. This opinion arose because of the ulama's experience. A regional head who was a Christian only prioritized the interests of Christian citizens.

Regarding women's leadership in government, there are two different opinions from the results of the questionnaire. More than half of the ulamas stated that women could become leaders, while 10 stated that leaders must be men because of the concept of *al-rijālu qawwāmūna 'alā' l-nisā'* in Islam. The rest, five ulamas chose to be neutral in terms of women's leadership. For ulama who supported women's leadership, it does not matter if women become government leaders if indeed, they are the result of people's choice and have the competence of a leader. An ulama from Muhammadiyah cited the doctrine: "*wa' l-mu'mināna wa 'l-mu'minattu, yasyuddu ba' dhuhum ...*" it emphasizes that women may become leaders. He also mentioned that now the level of intelligence of women is higher than that of men. So, there is no harm in women being leaders because women are also caliphs or servants of Allah who must also be given a role.<sup>16</sup>

Regarding the agreement to share the composition of regional leaders between Muslims and Christians, there are ulamas who say they do not agree with this agreement. According to him, even if the leader composition is Muslim and Muslim, this can work, but so far

16 Interview with AL Hajj on October 17, 2018

no one has dared to try to do it. Whereas the young ulama said that it was no longer necessary to look at religious backgrounds in choosing government leaders, but rather pay attention to their capacities and abilities. He believes that if Muslims have qualified human resources, in the future they can become leaders with a Muslim-Muslim composition or vice versa if the qualified leaders are Christians so Christian-Christian compositions can also occur. Therefore, he emphasized on increasing the capacity of human resources for Muslims. Scholars from the Ahmadiyya and Shia do not question the government's leadership held by non-Muslims or women. The concept of *al-rijālu qawwāmūna 'alā' l-nisā'* does not apply in institutions or government but applies in terms of leadership in religion and the household. They emphasize that in matters of religion and household, men are the leaders, for example, if there is a man in the house then he becomes the imam and must lead the prayer.<sup>17</sup>

When we talk about tolerance, Ambon is a good sample of the success of the Muslim-Christian relationship dialogue. In 2018, Ambon was ranked fifth as a tolerant city in the Setara Institute version (Institute, n.d.). National-scale religious activities held in Ambon received full support from the community and ulamas such as the MTQ activities in 2013, the Church Choir Festival (usually abbreviated as PESPARAWI) in 2015, and the Church Choir Party (PESPARANI) in October 2018. It involved and united Muslims and Christians in organizing and implementing these activities. When the MTQ activities took place, Christians sincerely opened the doors of their homes to the contingents who would stay overnight. Likewise, when Pesparawi and Pesparani took place, Muslims participated in the success of the event (Iwamony & Relmasira 2017).

The Islamic-Christian dialogue initiative usually comes from religious leaders and from the grass root level (Iwamony & Relmasira 2017). There are some ulamas who are actively involved in interfaith dialogue, both through FKUB as official organizations under the Ministry of Religion and other organizations. When this research was conducted, there was a big celebration of the first Pesparani in Ambon. MUI congratulated on the success of organizing the Pesparani through a billboard message, and all Ambonese were also happy to welcome the implementation. Tolerance between Muslims and Christians in Ambon is an example for other regions in the country. Since the end of the conflict in Ambon, many attempts have been made by various parties to re-establish Muslim-

17 Ustadz Interviews from Shia and Ahmadiyya, 15 and 17 October 2018.

Christian harmony and treat the wounds of conflict, which of course are traumatized the people of Ambon. Religious leaders in Ambon took many roles in these efforts. Among them was Abidin Wakano who is a Muslim and Rev. Jacky Manuputty who is a Christian (both are founders of the Interfaith Institute, LAIM Maluku) who made a movement called the Provocateur of Peace ('Dian Interfidei', t.t.). The Provocator of Peace Movement is a community-based dialogue movement that involves many communities in Ambon. The networks that joined the Provocator Peace Movement included: Jurnal Lintas Iman, Gerakan Perempuan Peduli, Hiphop Lintas Iman, Blogger Lintas Iman, Ambon Bergerak, Sanggar Tari Lintas Iman, Photographer Lintas Iman (Cross Faith Journalists, Caring Women Movement, Cross Faith Hip-hop, Cross Faith Bloggers, Ambon Moves, Cross Faith Dance Studio, Cross Faith Photographer), and dozens of other groups of young people. With the many efforts made by this movement, the collective awareness of the Ambonese community to jointly create peace has intensified.

However, if examined further about tolerance in the present, there is a lot of effort that is needed to take care of the tolerance in Ambon so it can be passed to the next generation. The ulamas told the researcher that they were involved in interfaith dialogue, especially dialogue with the Christians, but this dialogue was still limited to public spheres that allowed them to meet and interact. The segregation of dwellings that continues to this day. It shows that the Christian-Muslim relationship still requires a lot of effort to be better so that when there is friction it does not easily trigger greater violence. Subconsciously, Muslims and Christians are still suspicious of each other, for example, they do not have the courage to do activities at night in their environment. There are ulamas who are concerned that the current conducive situation will suffer a setback when Islamism begins to increase in Ambon.

Furthermore, the tolerance that they perceive is still limited to non-Muslims, while tolerance for intra-Islam itself is still a problem, especially for Ahmadis and Shiites. For most of these scholars, the Ahmadiyya and Shia are clearly heretical, and there is no need for tolerance for them. This outlook is in line with the fatwa of the MUI which expresses the heresy of the Ahmadiyya twice its fatwa. There are 19 ulamas who argue that Ahmadis are a deviant group so they cannot speak in the name of Islam. As for the Shia group, there are only 11 ulamas who consider Shia as a heretical group, there are 6 people who are neutral and 14 people who perceive the Shia are not a heretical group. This indicates that Ambonese

ulamas can accept the existence of Shiite groups more.

This attitude of tolerance resonates with the attitudes and views of the ulama regarding citizenship rights for Ahmadiyah and Shiite followers. The ulama can still be tolerant towards Shia compared to Ahmadiyah followers. They are also able to accept the existence of *aliran kepercayaan* followers more. According to the researcher, this situation happens because of the heretical fatwa about Shia and Ahmadiyya which influenced the ulama's opinion about the two groups. In addition, they also consider that Ahmadiyya does not exist in Ambon. They might consider Shia, but it is not visible.

As for the attitudes of Ambonese ulamas regarding the rights of citizenship, especially for the Ahmadiyya and Shia groups, of the 30 ulamas involved in this study, 25 ulamas were pro-citizenship and five were non-citizenship. Progressive ulamas have no problem if Ahmadiyah followers become leaders in the government. As explained earlier that in terms of tolerance, almost all ulamas can be tolerant of different beliefs, for example with Shia and Ahmadiyya as well as *aliran kepercayaan*. However, when it comes to their attitudes regarding the rights of minority groups as citizens, there are concerns from the ulama that if Ahmadiyah is given the same opportunities as other Muslim citizens, then they will spread deviant ideas. Some of these ulama view that Ahmadiyya is indeed there to divide Muslims, therefore they (Ahmadi) must be wary of and should be limited in their freedom to express their beliefs and be inhibited from becoming government leaders. The fatwa of the MUI on Ahmadiyah is again a reference for the ulama in determining their attitude. They also showed the same attitude to the Shia group even though it was not as strong as the Ahmadiyya group.

### THE YOUNG WHO IS WORTH LOOKING FOR

The process of moderation and affirmation of tolerance in Ambon can be said to be quite successful in involving many stakeholders from all parties in Ambon. Many dialogue movements have been carried out, one of which has already been mentioned above, namely the Provocator of Peace Movement which was initiated by pastor Jacky Manuputty and Abidin Wakano. This movement involves many young people. Films about former Muslim and Christian child soldiers aired by the BBC show an increase in the peace process, dialogue and cooperation between Muslims and Christians.

From the overall findings in this study, the ulama in Ambon were

predominantly receptionist ulamas. Based on the data, from 30 respondents there were only 3 people who could be categorized as rejectionists, namely two people are exclusive, and one person is an extremist. What is interesting is that the millennial ulamas are mostly on a lower spectrum of levels of perception of the nation-state than the older generation of ulamas. Of the six-millennial generation ulamas, only one was progressive, three were moderate, one was extreme and one was not identified, but there was an exclusive tendency. Moreover, one extreme person from the young group is still 24 years old. He had not yet become a well-known religious teacher, but he had a Qur'an recitation community who had a congregation of 20 people. They routinely conduct studies in an undisclosed location by presenting Ustadz from Java. When we did this research, they were "lying down" or hiding from public supervision because just one of their leaders was arrested by Densus 88. The teachings that were disseminated were the Khilafah government (they supported the ISIS-style caliphate) as an ideal government system so they rejected the democratic system Pancasila, sees a government that is not a Caliphate as a *thāghūt*, and its blood is halal to be shed. Some time ago, this group also dared to conduct public services, such as at the Islamic Center in Waehong. Most of their followers are young people who are looking for an identity, they come from diverse Islamic organization backgrounds. This shows that this group gained sympathy and support from the Ambonese community even though the support was very small. This situation shows that young people in Ambon who are interested in following their studies and aspiring to an Islamic state like ISIS still exist. They were also not detected by the progressive ulamas, and they thought that there were no Laskar Jihad or movements that fought for Khilafah in Ambon. This is certainly a warning for the life of the nation and state in Ambon and in Indonesia.

## CONCLUSION

Historical background has proven that since the beginning of the formation of the Indonesian state, Muslims in Ambon along with the ulama became the part of Indonesia and firmly maintained Indonesia as a nation-state. The experience of a period of colonialism which placed the position of Muslims as second citizens after Christians contributed to shaping the spirit of Ambon's nationalism. The results of this study reinforce that ulama in Ambon play a major role in maintaining the nation-state with all its dynamics and challenges.



The level of acceptance of the concept of a democratic and tolerant nation-state among Ambonese ulamas emphasizes that the increasing symptoms of Islamism that occur in almost all parts of Indonesia and are considered worrying about the existence of the Indonesian state as a nation are not so influential in Ambon. Indeed, Islamic understanding is increasing and some ulamas have become a little more conservative, but in the Ambon context, there is another more important matter that is of concern to these ulamas, namely increasing the quality of Muslims in Ambon in order to live side by side and collaborate with Christian brothers. It can be said that improving the quality of Muslims by providing better education is a way to maintain the continuity of the life of the nation and state.

The tendency of millennial ulamas who have a lower level of moderation than the older generation of ulama, besides being influenced by the way and sources of learning of their religion is more fluid also because of the discontinuation of memory in history. The present period in which the number of Muslims has begun to surpass the number of Christians in Ambon fosters self-confidence among ulamas, especially young ulamas. This affects their attitudes and perceptions about the relationship between Muslims and Christians. They did experience conflict in the past, but due to their young age when the conflict happened, it did not leave a memory for them so the need to foster better relations with Christians to live side by side in peace is not in their consideration.

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# LITERATURE AND ATTITUDE OF AUTHORITY In Muslim Minority Communities in the city of Manado

*Eva Latipah*

Massa Bela Islam 212 commemorates two years of action by carrying out a grand reunion at the National Monument (Monas), Jakarta, on Sunday 2 December 2018. The movement initiated by Rizieq Shihab and a number of these figures named his movement as the National Defender of Fatwa (GNPF) Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI).<sup>1</sup> The ulama became an important element in each of the voluminous religious actions and became the trigger for similar actions in various regions in Indonesia. In this joint action, the new figures took advantage of the emotions of Muslims by ultimately claiming to be religious authorities.<sup>2</sup>

In the *khazanah* of Indonesian Islam, ulama occupies a very important position. Ulama has authority not only in the religious field but also in the social field (Zulkifli 2013) and politics (Varol, 2016).

Through an the establishment of pesantren and the mastery of the yellow book, the ulama acts as a translator of authoritative Islamic doctrines and at the same time serves as a bridge to the process of transmitting long religious values; or borrowing the term Clifford Geertz (1959-1960, 228-249) as a cultural broker between a large tradition and a small tradition in Islam. It is through the role of ulama that Islam is then practiced within the framework of a diverse Indonesian Muslim social culture system (Jajat Burhanuddin and Ahmad Baedowi 2003).

The existence of the ulamas greatly influences the socio-religious behavior of the community (Zulkifli 2013). Because of the dogma that is claimed to be true, da'wah (in Islam) tends to be a stimulant for the emergence of

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1 Tempo.com, December 16, 2018.

2 Tempo.com, December 3, 2018.

intolerant behavior. Conflicts in the name of religion in the country raise questions about the contribution of ulamas to build a civilization that is strong and polite for a pluralistic society such as Indonesia. Aside from being a scientific reference, ulamas also play a role as an adhesive for unity between differences (Rubiyannah & Darajat 2017).

The authority of ulamas lies in their knowledge, morality, and their role in teaching or spreading Islam (Sirelkhatim 2015). An ulama, who at the same time, could be a trader like Al-Ghazali, a tapestry trader. Ulama are groups that do not have monthly salary even though the main source of their livelihood can come from their activities as preachers. Moreover, the religion of Islam was spread not only by the ulamas but also by ordinary people with limited religious knowledge, for example, someone who just carries out several ways of worshipping or reading the verses of the Qur'an. Islam is also spread by ordinary fathers and mothers, who only teach Islam to their children.

The standard of an ulama is not only assessed by the mastery of his/her in-depth religious knowledge but also his/her application of Islamic values in the practice of everyday life (Machasin 2011). Ulamas are religious specialists who know about the scientific tradition of beliefs and legal orders (Otappilakol 2007). However, ulamas are certainly those who deepen their knowledge about Islamic teachings, even if that person is just a soldier or a merchant. By teaching Islam, ulamas basically play a role as a group that participates in forming a value system, institutional system, and community behavior. That understanding arose mainly because of the nature of Islam itself which was not only focused on the ritual affair but also on the social and political affair. An ulama does not only lead people to go to the masjids, but also to form an ummah (Rahardjo 1996).

The ulama criteria grew more flexible and diverse over the years. It cannot be denied that in order to explore Islamic knowledge, one must master Arabic well. Currently, one can only study Islam by reading a lot of religious books in Indonesian which are very numerous. By reading a lot of the books coupled with the skill of lecturing, someone will gradually be called an Ustaz or Kiai in the community. In addition, there are also organizations that act on behalf of scholars such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), but if the administrators pay attention, it is not uncommon to find people who traditionally cannot be regarded as ulama. There are also people who prefer to call themselves Muslim scholars, who in fact act like ulama (Mujiburrahman 2008).

The position and role of ulamas in the present experience a shift over time and the development of socio-culture in society, especially in terms of the concept of ulama, scientific quality, and character (Zaman 2002). The community's assessment of the quality of ancient ulamas is very different from the present. The perspective of the status of ulamas in society today is equated with religious teachers or religious leaders. Whereas the ulama in the real sense are those who master *al-'ulūm al-dīniyyah*, namely the sciences that use Arabic as a tool, such as interpreters, *nahwu*, mastering Sufism (Islamic morality; Muhtarom 2005). This will affect his views on many things, both religious issues and the rules of life of citizenship and nationality, how an ulama responds to the issue of non-Muslim leadership, his views on the constitutional foundation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, about democracy, and issues of women.

This research will explore more deeply the views and attitudes of citizenship in the Muslim minority region of Manado. This will be seen based on four components, namely anti-tolerance, pro-system, tolerance, and pro-citizenship. It is interesting to read the characteristics of ulamas in the city known as 'one thousand churches'.

#### **PROFILING OF MANADO ULAMA**

Based on the results of the survey, Manado ulama as respondents to this survey have the identity as shown in Table 1.

Table 1  
Identity of Manado Ulama as Respondents

VARIABLE	CATEGORY													
AGE	20 – 40						41- 65							
	12 people						18 people							
GENDER	Male						Female							
	4 people						24 people							
BACKGROUND	Pesantren						Not fromPesantren							
	6						24							
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	High School			Bachelor Degree			Masters Degree				Doctorate Degree			
	4 people			9 people			10 people				7 people			
RELIGION ORGANIZATION	NU	Muh	PPM	Kem	ABI	JII	SIAM	WS	Par	RMNH	BKPRMI	Syl	MUI	LPTQ
	10	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1

**Information:**  
**NU:** NAHDATUL AMALAMA; **Muh:** MUHAMMADIYAH; **PPM:** YOUTH CARE FOR MOSQUES; **KEM.:** MOSQUE; **ABI:** AHLUL BAIT INDONESIA; **JII:** INDONESIAN ISLAMIC JEMAAT; **SIAM:** ASSALAM ISLAMIC STUDIES; **WS:** WAHDAH NORTH SULAWESI; **PAR.:** PARMUSI; **RMNH:** TEENAGER NURUL HUDA MOSQUE; **BKPRMI:** INDONESIAN YOUTH MOSQUE YOUTH COMMUNICATION AGENCY; **Syl.:** SYARIKAT ISLAM; **MUI:** NORTH SULAWESI INDONESIAN ULAMA COUNCIL.

Based on the results of the survey, the Manado ulamas accepted the concept of citizenship. Ulama who accept citizenship can be categorized into four characteristics: moderate, inclusive, progressive, and conservative ulamas. There are also ulamas who act exclusively as an indication of rejecting citizenship. There are also those who do not accept and do not reject citizenship (categorized as not identified). There are no Manado ulamas who show extreme and radical attitudes towards citizenship. It can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2.  
Characteristics of Manado Ulama on Citizenship

No.	Category	Citizenship Outlook	Percentage (%)
1	Moderate	Accepted	36, 67
2	Inclusive	Accepted	26, 67
3	Progressive	Accepted	13, 33
4	Conservative	Accepted	10
5	Exclusive	Accepted	3, 33
6	Radical	Rejected	-
7	Extreme		-
8	Unidentified	-	10

Based on Table 2, Manado ulamas who accept citizenship principles are as much as 90% (27 people), and the rest (10%/ 3 people) were unidentified. Ulama who accept citizenship are more compared to ulama who refuse or who are not clear about the principle of citizenship. The acceptance of ulamas to the principle of citizenship is shown in several dimensions which include anti-violence, pro-system, tolerance, and procrastination. Furthermore, the acceptance is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3.  
Acceptance of Ulama Based on the Dimension of Citizenship

No.	Dimension	Percentage (%)
1	Anti-violence	100
2	Pro-system	96
3	Tolerance	90
4	Pro citizenship	83

Based on table 3, 30 (out of 30 people / 100%) ulamas stated anti-violence; 29 people (out of 30 people / 96%) ulamas stated pro-system; 27 people (out of 30 people / 90%) ulamas stated tolerance, and 24 people (out of 30 people / 83%) stated that they were pro-citizenship. It means that all Manado ulamas stated anti-violence, while on the dimensions of the system, tolerance, and pro-citizenship, the Manado ulama showed a variety of attitudes, which were 29, 27, and 24 ulamas respectively.

#### NEW FACE OF RELIGION IN MANADO

In quantity, the number of Muslims in Manado has increased. The most recent data obtained by the researcher shows that the number of Muslims in Manado is 37.78%; while Christians are 54.31%, the rest are Catholics (6.91%), Hindus (0.43%), Buddhists (0.42%), and Confucians (0.15%).<sup>3</sup>

This increase is due to the large number immigrants from various regions, especially Java and Sumatra. Manado has more appeal after the enactment of its status as a special economic zone<sup>4</sup> and Bitung is included in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and for the last 10 years, it has been the center of economic activity in eastern Indonesia, the door to

<sup>3</sup> BPS North Sulawesi, 2018.

<sup>4</sup> Regions with certain limitations that have regional geo-economic and geostrategic advantages and special facilities and incentives as investment attractiveness (<http://kek.go.id/>)



globalization and the main gate of the Asia-Pacific. The consequence of increasing the number of Muslims is the increasingly hectic religious activities, Islamic study communities, zikr assemblies, and expressions of Islam in the public sphere, increasing religious symbols such as the use of Muslim clothing, and sharia-based consumer consumption choices are also increasing rapidly. Leadership is certainly needed in moving this community, new figures appear to decorate da'wah stages, especially the new generation of ulamas.

The new figures that appear are divided into two typologies. First, those who have an Islamic scientific base because studied in Islamic boarding schools<sup>5</sup>, especially in Alkhairat<sup>6</sup> Palu. There are also graduates from Mecca and Medina, but these figures are mostly old and their da'wah activities are very limited.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, these young figures, do not have in-depth Islamic knowledge,<sup>8</sup> and generally come from natural science major.<sup>9</sup>

They gained their understanding of Islam from the lectures of Dai on television and YouTube; from Yusuf Mansur, Arifin Ilham, Felix Siauw, and Aa Gym.<sup>10</sup> These young Ustadz have a place among the Manado millennials because they use rhetoric that is easily understood by the typical approach of young people, they mobilize through social media, and they have gained many followers. These young figures become new authorities among Manado Muslims.

Now, these ulamas have a base of congregations whose majority come from young people. They also coordinate ta'lim assemblies in almost all masjids in Manado, and weekly to monthly programs are created to strengthen inter-congregational solidarity, Islamic studies intensified, national movement (distributing rice meal boxes for Friday

5 Quantitative data shows that there are 6 (out of 30) scholars who attended Diniyyah Islamic Boarding School / Islamic Education in Manado. The rest (24 people) did not take up Islamic boarding school education.

6 Islam gained its place in Manado, mostly through Alkhairaat (abna'ul al-khairaat). This is because in the view of the Manado Muslim community, Alkhairaat is part of NU. Even though this is not the case. NU and Alkhairaat are only partners in guarding and preserving the values and traditions of Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah (hereinafter referred to as Sunni). Alkhairaat and NU, both are two different things both institutionally and organizationally.

7 Quantitative data show that the age of scholars in Manado ranges from 24 to 69 years. Elderly scholars have an educational background graduating from Mecca and Medina.

8 In line with the quantitative findings of this study, where 24 (out of 30) stated that they did not receive Islamic Boarding School / Madrasah Education.

9 This data is not obtained quantitatively, but from interviews with each selected cleric in Manado.

10 Results of interviews with Manado Millennial scholars on October 1-10 2018.

congregation), conducting Subuh prayer together, Monday-Thursday Sunnah breakfasting activities from one masjid to another. This activity was supported by many parties from businessmen, government officials to police security forces. In addition, to accommodate young people, an Islamic study community was formed with populist themes. In early 2018 they succeeded in bringing hundreds of millennial young people from various districts in North Sulawesi, Gorontalo and Palu by presenting the Ustadz of “a million viewer”, Hannan Attaki. After Hannan Attaki was successfully brought in, then Felix Siauwa was invited, but this activity was canceled because several mass organizations boycotted the activity and Felix Siauwa also did not attend. The young ulama decreased the popularity of the elderly ulamas who were more likely to be political.<sup>11</sup>

Ulama in Manado have different characteristics from ulama on Java.<sup>12</sup> Ulama in Java are generally born and large with Islamic boarding schools; while in Manado, this is not the case. Many ulamas in Manado were born and raised not because of the Islamic boarding schools they built, but they were once a santri.

Although ulama in Manado are mostly not based on the pesantren Islamic education<sup>13</sup>, their existence in the eyes of the ummah is relatively the same as the ulama in other regions.

### DA'WAH IN THE CITY OF 'THOUSAND CHURCHES'

The city of Manado is located on the tip of the island of Sulawesi and is the largest city in the North Sulawesi hemisphere as well as the provincial capital. Geographically, Manado City is located between 1 ° 25'88 “-1 ° 39'50” LU and 124 ° 47'00 “-124 ° 56” 00 “East Longitude, while the administrative limit is as follows:

- Northern region boundary : Minahasa Regency
- Eastern boundary : Minahasa Regency
- The southern boundary : Minahasa Regency
- West boundary : Sulawesi Sea

Manado is a unique city. It is different from many cities in other parts of Indonesia, Manado has forests and beaches that surround urban areas. Its location is at the outermost point of the northern part of the country.

11 Interview with one of the Manado ulamas (Sunday, October 7, 2018), 15: 55-21: 00.

12 One obvious difference is in the term of ulamas. In Manado, the common name is Ustadz, there is also the term Kiai, but it is rarely called and it only appeared just recently.

13

Manado has the potential not only to be the gateway to Indonesia's territory from the north side but also to become a tourist, business, trade, and meeting area between people of various ethnic backgrounds and beliefs. When you travel to this city, the first thing that caught your eyes is the number of churches that can be found almost on every main road and corners of the city. However, other religions can live quietly and peacefully in this city. In fact, a few hours to the west of Manado, on the shore of Lake Tondano, there is a village in which most of the population is Muslim. The village is known as the "Kampung Jawa" (Javanese village). From generation to generation, the population has been inhabiting this area.

The city of Manado is the largest urban area in North Sulawesi Province, even in eastern Indonesia in the northern hemisphere with a population of 395,515.<sup>14</sup> Its population growth is quite rapid, which is an average of 3.04% per year with a natural growth rate (birth factor) of approximately 1,50% per year. Another factor that causes accelerated population growth is urbanization (migration).

In addition, the tendency of circular migration is also quite high, with an estimated 40,000 people domiciled outside the city carrying out daily activities in the city of Manado.

The composition of the population of the city of Manado is quite heterogeneous both in ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. Most of the population comes from the Minahasa ethnic group, then Sangihe Talaud, Chinese, Arab, Bugis-Makassarese, and a small part of Mongondow ethnicity. In addition, there are also immigrants from Javanese, Batak, Padang, Betawi and so on. Religion is Protestant, Islamic, Christian Catholic, Adventist, Pentecostal, Buddhist, Hindu, and Confucian. The composition of the population of the city of Manado based on the religion adhered to, according to existing data, shows that most of the city population is Protestant Christian, then the followers of Islam, then Catholic Christians, followed by Hindus and Buddhists. The population of the city of Manado based on North Sulawesi Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) data in 2010 was 445,467 people. Based on this number 57% were Protestant Christians, 31% were Muslims, followed by Catholics 8%, Hindus 2.5%, and Buddhists 1.5%.

After the Trans Sulawesi road opened (in the early 1980s) and the transmigration community began to develop (in the 1970s), more and more migrants from South Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and Javanese who were Muslims entered the North Sulawesi region. They came with many kinds

<sup>14</sup> Data from the Central Sulawesi Provincial Statistics Agency in 2018.

of purposes. In almost all regions in North Sulawesi, there are residents who are Muslim. They work in the government, the world of education, and in small trade centers, markets, or street vendors.

Based on the same data at the North Sulawesi Provincial Statistics Agency, 60% of houses of worship in Manado city are Protestant Christian churches, 26% masjids, 11% Catholic churches, 2.5% Buddhist temples and 0.5% Puras. In the historical record of religious life, Manado was once dominated by Christians who then dominated all areas of life both institutionally and social activities. They felt and assumed that Christianity was the original religion of the people in this area. Christians or the Church in general still think that this city is a Christian area. Church members do not face significant challenges and tend to dominate in coexistence because their large numbers make the community appear homogeneous both ethnically and religiously.

Such conditions certainly influence the lives of Muslim communities in the city, including religious life activities. Indeed, there is nothing that leads to the major conflict as in other regions, but interfaith or interethnic interactions and frictions (which usually happens to different religions) can occur at any time which can lead to conflict. This condition is exacerbated by the fact that the groups of “evangelical” or “fundamentalist” in Minahasa are increasingly developing, as well as the Pentecostal group who are known for being isolated to the society. At the same time, Islam developed, as did Hinduism, Buddhism, and the present-day Confucianism (although the three last religions are not yet significant). Everything is part of the dynamics of change and the development of plurality in society. They are citizens of North Sulawesi.

Various kinds of discriminatory treatment experienced by non-Muslims nowadays, especially in the Java region, say for example the case of the closure of the HKBP and Yasmin churches, greatly influences the views of Christians towards the Muslim community. More local cases that deal directly with interreligious relations (Islam and Christianity) began to occur, religious sentiments began to become an issue, most recently the case of not issuing a permit to use the Sparta Tikala field to become the place for Eid al-Fitr prayers in 2013, then the construction of the city Texas Masjid was disputed, thus there was a mass action both that supported and refused the construction of the masjid. These events made the city vulnerable to interfaith conflict (Sapriallah, 2016).

Seeing the many problems mentioned above, the ulama in Manado city faced challenges in carrying out their da’wah activities, especially in

areas in which Muslims are a minority. In order not to cause social unrest, ulamas are required to seek new formulations in developing da'wah that is compatible with the socio-religious conditions in which the da'wah is carried out.

In the early days, the development of Islam in North Sulawesi had tremendous challenges both from the government and the community. This is because Christianity is so entrenched. There are fears that there will be massive Islamization movements in North Sulawesi by ulamas such as those that occur in Java or Sumatra. In several districts in North Sulawesi, for example, Bolaang Mongondow, in which most of the population is Muslim, religious activities (da'wah) are very advanced, but still in the local sphere. What is interesting is the spreading of the population of the Javanese village of Tondano in various regencies and cities throughout North Sulawesi, because the Javanese community of Tondano is indeed recognized as capable in mastering the knowledge of Islam. This is due to the role of Kiai Modjo and K.H. Ahmad Rifai who was in exile and was able to preach Islam in Minahasa. The success cannot be separated from the strategy of preaching with social adaptation strategies through local wisdom media (Rahman Mantu 2015).

The biggest transmigration of the students and descendants of Kiai Modjo and Kiai Rifai is to the city of Manado, sponsored by Besari Maspekeh The first Imam of the Mahawu Masjid,<sup>15</sup> Ichwan and Kosio, then in Dumoga, Bolmong, Josonegoro, Rekso-negoro and Kaliyoso in Gorontalo. The descendants of Kiai Modjo and their followers have a good knowledge of the religion so they become a reference for Muslim communities in various regions in North Sulawesi and because of this, the da'wah movement in North Sulawesi, especially in the city of Manado began to develop. Apart from the children of Kiai Modjo's descendants, there were also migrants from several regions in Kalimantan, Makassar, and Java who took part in broadcasting the religion of Islam. They established religious education institutions such as Islamic boarding schools and Qur'an Recitation Parks in several places in the city of Manado as institutions to produce inclusive-minded ulamas. From these institutions, the generation of preachers in the city of Manado was born. Tf a young dai<sup>16</sup> said there was a challenge in preaching in a multicultural society. As much as possible, the themes of the lectures were

15 Mahawu is one of the villages in Tuminting sub-district, Manado. Mahawu village is the most populated area of Muslims, making it the largest center for Islamic da'wah in Manado.

16 Interview with Tf conducted on 7 October 2018 at 17: 34-21: 15

delivered not to offend other religions. This area is the meeting point of various religions, tribes, and cross cultures. Therefore, invitations to coexist harmoniously continued every occasion of the lecture. The use of the Quranic verses and traditions that contain the meaning of peace is something that must be recited.

#### **VIEWS OF NON-MUSLIM LEADERSHIP**

A bigger and more prominent challenge in recent years has been the involvement of religion in practical politics (Ihsan Ali Fauzi et al. 2018), especially during the election of regional heads and the President. The politicization of religion for short-term practical political needs has long been in place (M. Iqbal Ahnaf 2014) including at the local level. In the DKI regional election in 2016-2017 which was followed by regional elections in 2018, the trend seemed to be strengthening. There is one thing that is increasing, namely the view of having to choose Muslim leaders in Muslim-majority areas. In other words, the election process has transformed the attitude of ulamas and Muslims in general about leadership in Muslim minority areas.

The demographic and socio-political context certainly influences a person's attitude in responding to issues related to political choice, but this influence is not significant in the general view of ulama in Manado. In the context of leadership in Manado, which is predominantly Christian, non-Muslim leadership is not the main choice; as stated by one of the following young ulama.

“If I choose a leader, (if he is available) I would choose a Muslim who is just and good. Except if we are in a place in which there are more non-Muslims, our hope for choosing Muslim leaders will not be realized.”<sup>17</sup>

This information shows that there is a half-hearted attitude, although in Muslim minority areas, choosing fellow Muslim leaders is seen as a responsibility for the interests of Muslims. This means that the attitude of choosing leaders based on religious factors is very strong. The hope of the presence of Muslim leaders was also vigorously voiced on the grounds that Muslims were freed from the threat of discrimination, as stated by one of the following ulamas.

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17 Interview with RTI on October 2, 2018 between 9:00 and 10:10.

“It is not possible for non-Muslims to lead Muslims. The term is a wolf leading a cage of chickens. They will be eaten one by one. On the contrary, how about a cage of wolves led by a chicken.”<sup>18</sup>

This attitude shows an excessive fear of non-Muslim leadership which is considered dangerous and threatens Muslims in their activities as citizens. Non-pro-democracy attitudes are also shown by other ulamas. According to him, religion is the main requirement in choosing a leader. The religion of a leader is a representation of the religion of the community that he leads because it will have an impact on policy. Below is his statement.

“How can he provide programs that are predominantly Muslim, while he himself is a non-Muslim. We must look at his figure. It is our concern that there has never been a country that was led by a minority. In theory, it might be possible, but in practice, it is difficult for minority leaders to be able to do justice to most of the society.”<sup>19</sup>

From the findings above, it seems very clear that the support from ulama in Manado for the leadership of non-Muslims is not strong enough, although local politics also influence the arguments of these ulamas. The thing that stands out from the findings is the strong influence of religion and belief in shaping their ideological insight and attitude. That some ulamas accept non-Muslim leadership with many records which essentially accommodate Islamic interests, but paradoxically, on the other hand, these ulamas argue that if Muslims lead it is obvious that the minority interests are not a priority. Ulamas who refuse are also influenced by religious motives. There seems to be a connection between personal affairs and political-ideological affairs.

#### **LOCAL POLITICS AND PSEUDO-DEMOCRACY**

The views of ulamas in Manado as a whole show a pro-attitude towards democracy. One informant, for example, said that substantially democracy does not conflict with Islamic values, even the principles in the democratic system have long been practiced in Islam, and it is reflected in the following statement.

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18 Interview with Ustaz FS on October 5, 2018 at 16: 05-17: 30

19 Interview with Ustaz Jn on 4 October 2018 at 10: 00-12:10

“I have no problem with democracy, the term democracy is the same as returning to the people, the term is that the state and religion are equal, so the understanding of God’s power and people’s power does not clash. Especially if we talk about the nation and state. Someone who defends the country is considered a martyr in Islam. Even one of my instincts is to love our nation as we love father and mother. Regarding the democracy discussed, the system in Indonesia has no problem, the most important thing is how the life of the nation and the community is in accordance with what we hope for.”<sup>20</sup>

Another reason for accepting the concept of democracy in Islam according to him is that democracy has led to several forms and means, which until now are considered the only system that guarantees safety for the people. Even so, according to him the democratic system also has its shortcomings. However, according to him, the democratic system must be used as a means of realizing justice and prosperity, although other informants said that there were several events in Manado which were considered to hurt the principles of democracy and justice. The informant claimed that his empirical experience as a minority in the middle of the Christian majority experienced a treatment which he considered an undemocratic act.

For example, Ustadz FS informed that when Muslims wanted to organize events in public spheres, they often stumble on obstacles and they even had a hard to acquire a license. IPRA (the Asslam Teen Youth Association), which he has developed, also often received reports about ROHIS (a student Islamic Spiritual Organization) activities that are limited or it is limited by the school, including lack of facility support, and Islamic religious studies organized by combining students from several classes so that it is not optimal. Unlike the case with Christians when they want to hold an event, licensing, according to this informant, can be obtained very easily. Likewise, when Muslim groups voice their rights and freedoms, they are often labeled radical, such as voicing anti-Ahok attitudes. Besides that, groups of community organizations that are close to Christianity such as Brigade Manguni, where the action is sometimes like FPI, do not want to be categorized as a radical group.

A piece of information was obtained from a religious figure that in the middle of 2014 there was a case of threats from a Christian to a

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20 Interviews with RTI on 2 October 2018 at 9:00 a.m. to 10:10 p.m.



muezzin (azan attendant) at dawn prayers so as not to raise the call to prayer with loudspeakers.<sup>21</sup> Still in the same year, Muslims in Manado suddenly were not given permission by the Manado city government to use public facilities, namely the Sparta Tikala football field to carry out Eid al-Fitr prayers, even though every year on the soccer field Muslims are used to performing Eid al-Fitr prayers which are part of the PHBI agenda (Commemoration of Islamic Holidays). This issue received mixed responses from the community and religious leaders.<sup>22</sup>

These are not the only cases, but there are also assumptions from some Islamic figures that the harmony of the life of religious people who are actively being socialized and built by the government as a process of 'covert Christianization' although this is difficult to prove. The attitude of some Islamic leaders (actually) can be "interpreted" as an expression of disappointment with the political direction and the government in the city of Manado. It is an undeniable fact that for the past few decades Muslims have never occupied the number one or at least occupying strategic posts in the region so that there is an assumption that Muslims are deliberately marginalized in political-government matters.

In addition, the recruitment of employees in government agencies originating from the Muslim community is very limited so that this adds to the feeling of disappointment and marginalization among Muslims.

Substantially the ulamas gave a positive response and fully accepted the values and principles of democracy, but according to them at the local level, such as Manado, the ideal democracy was not yet fully materialized. Political institutions in Manado have also not accommodated the political interests of Muslims. It has been proven that the political behavior of Muslims is no different from other groups. If the government is closed to the interests of the people, this can provoke the unconstitutional behavior of Muslims and vice versa. So, power-sharing will make Muslims take responsibility in the government. In some of the previous periods the Manado regional secretary and city secretary were handed over to Muslims, but the distribution of power at the SKPD level did not accommodate many Muslims. The ulamas' criticism of this matter was very strong even though it was not voiced openly. The results of the political process then determine the village head, sub-district head, regent, governor, performance permit, commodity monopoly, approval

21 Interview with a masjid administrator in Dendengan Sub-District on October 5, 2018 at 6:12 p.m.

22 Interview with North Sulawesi GP Ansor Chairman Benni Rhamdani, October 6, 2018.

of candidates and so on. Problems that should only be technical problems can be a political problem. Local politics influences the attitudes and democratic behavior of Manado ulamas.

*a. Arguments for Pancasila Ideology*

Ulama in Manado generally recognizes and accept Pancasila unanimously without conditions as a symbol of the adhesive of a pluralistic nation. For them, Pancasila is a pillar of unity in diversity, and a basic principle that unites a diverse Indonesian nation. Ulama in this typology accepts and support the Pancasila unanimously because they view that in the basis and philosophy of this country there lies the essence of Islamic values. Ulama who support this view mostly come from religious organizations based on strong nationalism such as NU and Muhammadiyah. K.H. AR from NU, for example, argues that “Pancasila is the ideology of all the people of Indonesia and democracy has been very appropriately applied in Indonesia; “I do not agree with the Islamic state because it is not in accordance with the Indonesian context,” he emphasized. In Manado, the researcher did not find comments from a certain group of ulamas who usually tend not to support the Pancasila as an ideology and firmly stated that Islamic law was the solution.

The interesting thing in this connection, as seen above, is that the arguments for nationalism that are used as the basis of support for Pancasila are not merely monopolized by ulama on the social basis of nationalist organizations. There are also ulamas from the conservative layer, who use national / diversity arguments to support the Pancasila. Ustaz My, for example, said the following statement.

“Of course, the state system that we want is to return to deliberation or not necessarily by voting with the most votes. But according to the constitutional agreement that we carry out, we must obey the rules that we have agreed to. We obey because indeed this is the result of an agreement; And when we impose the establishment of the Caliphate, impose a system of Islam, it is feared that there will be more devastating damages that can occur to our own nation.”<sup>23</sup>

This statement shows Ustaz My to be pro on the Indonesian nation-state system with his opinion that it is not easy to try to replace the Pancasila ideology with the Khilafah system, due to the fact that Indonesian society

23 Interview with Ustaz My on October 3, 2018 at 8:00 a.m. to 9:10 p.m.

comes from a variety of social, political and cultural backgrounds. He has the view that if forced, the application of the Caliphate and Islamic Shari'a can cause chaos. Still, in the same context, TB, a young religionist who also use diversity arguments to reject the enactment or application of the Shari'a and the enforcement of the Caliphate. According to him, Pancasila is the ideology of all the people of Indonesia and democracy has been very appropriately applied in Indonesia. For him, Pancasila is not to be negotiated (final), while Khilafah is not necessary because it does not fit into the historical, cultural, and political context of Indonesia. TB rejects the Khilafah system because it is considered irrelevant at this time. Ustaz Yq, from the Ahmadiyya, who is in line with TB, minority group also strongly disapproves of the idea of making syariat as the official law of the state. According to him, such an idea is not needed because the state has sufficiently facilitated the application of the essence of Sharia values in the life of the nation and state.

The fact of diversity is used not only to support Pancasila but also to reject other ideologies other than Pancasila. Mrs. BC, for example, expressed the following statement.

“Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world can become an Islamic state, but if we look at it from our constitution (Pancasila and UUD), it turns out that it is more appropriate in our current conditions because our society has many ethnic groups and religion.”

Mrs. BC, as mentioned above, uses diversity arguments to support Pancasila and reject the adoption of ideology and other legal systems such as the Shari'a and the Caliphate. According to her, Pancasila is an ideology for all the people of Indonesia, while democracy has been very appropriately applied in Indonesia.

Ulama in Manado in general also agreed not to contradict the Pancasila with Islam. They have a strong view that Indonesia is simply a Pancasila state, but it is not a problem if Islamic values are still used as a basis or guide for practicing every principle of the Pancasila.

According to Doctor TP, in North Sulawesi, the value of the Pancasila manifests itself in the lives of the people. Below is his statement.

“I have specific knowledge of experience about North Sulawesi. If there is a case where we do not have the same view, for example, about the Pancasila. Pancasila here is more

concerned with plurality so sometimes we do not follow the central government. For example, mass prayer, there was a fatwa from the MUI for mass prayer which was avoided by religious leaders, but we chose to the mass prayer because of the reasons that we were asked to respect and maintain interfaith relations. And for the implementation of the Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution, it is going well".<sup>24</sup>

This informant gave an example of annual religious nuances such as the Mawlid Nabi, Isra Mi'raj, 1 Muharram which always involved non-Muslims in their implementation. Whether they are invited guests or those who participate directly participated in the event. This has become a common thing found in this city. When in other regions arguing about whether to say Merry Christmas, some religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam in the city are busy making billboards in large sizes to congratulate Christians on Christmas and New Year's, the billboards are unmitigatedly displayed in large churches in the city of Manado.

When Muslims celebrate Eid al-Fitr, the same thing is done by non-Muslims, church institutions, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist youth organizations, as well as congratulating and celebrating at Muslims' homes. This condition is maintained until now. Adapting da'wah materials to the conditions of multiple regions and establishing communication with other religions politely through da'wah carried out by the Da'i is an accurate strategy to maintain tolerance values in the frame of *Torang Samua Basudara*.

### **WOMEN'S RIGHTS ISSUES**

The involvement of women in activities in the public sphere raises a variety of responses including from ulamas. Many ulamas still think that the main task of women is to take care of the household and men should become leaders. As for other ulamas, they stated that there is nothing wrong with women working and being leaders because women also have a stake in supporting the family economy and in the present, we see that as a common phenomenon.

At the practical level, the concept of citizenship as mentioned above is manifested in the response of the ulamas to the women's movement. Many ulamas in Manado support on the existence and role of women in

24 Interview with the TP Doctor on October 7, 2018 at 17: 30- 21:10

the public sphere. Ustadz AR, one of the NU figures made the following statement.

“Yes, everyone has the same rights. In the Qur’an, Allah also determines, the most important thing is taqwa, what distinguishes men from women is their gender but both men and women each have their own rights and obligations.”<sup>25</sup>

According to him the limitation of women’s rights to conduct activities in public spaces by using the arguments in the text of the Qur’an is wrong. Below is his statement.

“Ustadz nowadays need to be taught. When an Ustadz read a verse and then explains the verse but he does not know its characteristics. *Ar rijalu qowwamuna an alan nisa* ‘explains about the household and the problem of living. After earning money, in the end, who is it for? For orphans, the structure of thinking is clear in that direction. So, don’t cut it. It is like giving people half of their money, but in the end, it will be useless but if we give half of a verse to someone, it will be useful”.

Reinterpretation of the text of the Qur’an must be done according to Ustadz AR. God has given the same potential to men and women so that what distinguishes them is the opportunity to develop that potential. Women have the right to hold an office job, it is permissible as long as they are capable and have knowledge of those fields, because in the Qur’an it has been expressly stated that humans are created from the same source, the position of men and women is equal in the eyes of Allah SWT and the difference can only be seen on the level of piety.

RA, the chairman of Muhammadiyah Manado also revealed the same thing with AR from NU. Women’s leadership in the public sphere need not be questioned because it is clear from the normative-theological point of view, and below is his respond based on the history of Rasul Muhammad SAW responding to women’s leadership.

“Based on history, Ummu Hindun led the war and the Prophet agreed, then I also read some references in Muhammadiyah, judging by his professionalism, expertise, abilities. If then he has it all, why not? There is no need to insist on *rijalu qowammuna alan nisa* ‘, that the man

must be a leader, but then the Prophet silenced and said yes because when he led, the enemy forces were defeated at that time. And in the next war, the Prophet allowed it“.<sup>26</sup>

This information shows that the ulamas in Manado were not patriarchal. The participation of women in the public sphere, according to them, is a choice for women themselves, with their abilities, physical and spiritual. Basically, the ulama in Manado did not prohibit women from doing activities in the public sphere, becoming doctors, company leaders, chancellors, even at the IAIN Manado the chancellor was a woman, the staff up to the level of deans in the faculties are all women. Many legislative candidates are women including those who are elected regents and mayors. This phenomenon does not become a problem for ulama in Manado as long as the women have integrity, the ability to lead, have the character to build and provision of good religious knowledge. They even encourage women to move and solve their problems well and dare to be open when discrimination occurs such as acts of violence both in the domestic sphere and in the public sphere. Ulama in Manado provide an understanding of the involvement of women in the public sphere with the community by raising women's themes in their lectures.

## CONCLUSION

In general, ulama in Manado have national insights that are quite strong and support citizenship issues. All of this is confirmed by their arguments and attitudes towards non-Muslim leadership, women's issues, democracy, and the Pancasila constitutional foundation and the 1945 Constitution. These attitudes and views are the results of the understanding of the local religious elites on the complexity of the diversity of Manado society. It's just that the national political situation in the last ten years has influenced the attitude of the ulama so that the response to one problem will be related to their political choices. On the other hand, what needs to be addressed is the invasion of transnational groups into mainstream Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and the growth of Islamism among the Manado youth.

With the percentage of Muslims who are less than forty percent of the population, the challenge comes from internal Muslims themselves, especially related to the involvement of ulama in politics. If the ulamas go too far in political Islam, the consequence is the possibility of clashes

with the Minahasa indigenous militia groups. The result of peace and tolerance that was achieved can be at stake.

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- Ustaz Muyassir, October 4, 2018.
- Taufik Pasiaq, October 7, 2018.
- Ahmad Rajafi, October 2, 2018.
- Rizal Arsyad, October 6, 2018.

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# POLITICS, ULAMA AND NARRATIVES ON NATIONHOOD:

The post-1998 democracy provided the stage for new actors from various educational, professional and ideological backgrounds to concentrate on re-examining the position of Islam in the state and society of Indonesia. These new actors offered new religious discourses and habitus, and pushed issues on public interest as well as Islamic interpretations into public discourses. They opened up debates on the relationship between religion and the state, which at one point was considered ‘final’, with a variety of alternatives made popular in public spaces, such as schools, campuses, mosques, majelis taklims, radios, televisions, internet and social media. However, this does not mean that the old religious actors have totally withdrawn themselves from the public stage. The development in the public sphere shows a contestation of authority between religious actors who are fighting for public influence. Meanwhile, the state is closely monitoring the discourses that develop among these actors (called “ulama”) as it needs to take them into consideration for the formulation of policies and determination of political direction.



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