

Vol. 3 | No. 2 | Year 2020

# VOICE OF SENAYAN:

THE VIEWPOINTS OF PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE  
ON THE STATE'S ROLE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION



CONVEY Indonesia  
PPIM UIN Jakarta - UNDP Indonesia



# **VOICE OF SENAYAN:**

The Viewpoints of People's Representative  
on The State's Role in Religious Education



**CONVEY REPORT**

Voice of Senayan: The View points of People's Representative on the State's Role in Religious Education

Vol. 3 No. 2 of 2020

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**ISSN:**

977-272-38070-0-6

**Publisher:**

PPIM UIN Jakarta

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## Acknowledgement

This Convey Report was aimed at providing a description of the viewpoints of the members of the People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) on the country's role in religious education, particularly at state schools. This report is a part of the PPIM survey under the title "The Viewpoints of DPR RI on Nationality, Education, and Religion in Indonesia". This report specifically discusses the education issue, in regard to the importance of schools' position in maintaining unity in diversity, especially in the increase of intolerant behavior and perspective toward other believers or religious understanding within the surrounding environment of school.

The authors would like to give the highest appreciation to the senior researchers of PPIM, such as Prof. Jamhari Makruf, Ismatu Ropi, Didin Syafruddin, and Fuad Jabali, for the support in preparing the report and also preparing the survey instruments. We also would like to thank Hendro Praseyto, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Philips Vermonte, and Titi Anggraini for their valuable inputs on report writing or the preparation of survey instruments. We also gratefully acknowledge the PPIM's researchers, specifically for M. Zaki Mubarak, Idris Thaha, Saiful Umam, Muhammad Takdir, Ikhwan Luthfi, and Yufi Adriani for their viewpoints and inputs on the initial draft of this report. Moreover, we would also like to express our appreciation to the members of DPR RI, who took their time to participate in this survey and the enumerators who patiently assisted us in data collection. Special thanks also goes to Dani and Utami Sandyarani of UNDP Jakarta, for their constructive criticism and suggestion to the design of the study. Without the assistance from the aforementioned parties, this report may not be completed. However, the authors bear full responsibility for any shortcomings and errors in this report.

## Glossary:

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (DPR RI)	Peoples's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI)	Indonesian Institute of Science
Pusat Pengkajian Islam, Demokrasi dan Perdamaian (Puspidep)	The Center of the Study of Islam, Democracy and Peace. An Indonesian institution focusing on the sector of social, religion and humanity.
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	Indonesian National Party. A nasionalist party founded by Ir. Soekarno.
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi)	An islamic party founded by Mohammad Natsir, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, Wahid Hasjim.
Nahdatul Ulama (NU)	An islamic party founded by Hasjim Asy'ari and Abdul Wahab Hasbullah.
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	Communist Party of Indonesia. This party was founded by Henk Sneevliet.

## Executive Summary

### BACKGROUND

In formulating the policies, laws, and regulations of Indonesia, political parties play a strategic role. Political parties serve as the main actors in obtaining the people's political aspirations, including the issue of religion and religious education (Mujani & Liddle, 2018; Muhtadi & Mietzner, 2019; LIPI, 2018, 2019). Through their representatives elected as people's representatives in the House of Representatives of Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), political parties, both gaining more or less votes, still play the major roles in determining public policies through their functions as a check and balance regulatory body for the government.

In regards to the religious life, legislative members play an important role. They are expected to be able to give a better policies guideline to the occurrence of exclusive, closed, anti-citizenship, anti-state and pro-violence religious behavior in society in the recent times (PPIM, 2016, 2017, 2018; Puspidep, 2017, 2018). Study results of PPIM (2018) showed that, in a case of people's attitude/opinion, 58.5 percent of Indonesian students had a seemingly radical view on religion, and the remaining 51.1 percent had an intolerant view on religion (internally). 34.3 percent of student and university students had an intolerant religious understanding (externally). It also occurred to Indonesian religious teachers.

In pursuance of the duties of DPR RI, which is to maintain the unified nation, they are expected to play a major role in preserving the existing diversity through educations. However, to a certain extent, the number of information regarding the attitude and perspectives of DPR RI's members on state's role in religious education had never been adequate. A study of legislative members is more focused on the political aspects of legislative institution, for example, the interaction between the president or executives and legislative institution within a framework of multi-party presidential system (Hanan, 2014). Some researchers attempted to observe other issues such as legislative members' performance and the public trust on them (INSIS, 2013; FORMAPPI, 2018; Indonesian Survey Circle, 2018; and Poltracking, 2017). However, there were only a few research which systematically observed individual views of DPR RI members on some primary issues rising in national politics and Indonesian public policy, particularly the ones associated with religious education.

## RESEARCH FOCUS

In order to seize the views of the DPR RI's members on the religious education policy, this study was conducted based on two things. Firstly, this study observed the views of some scholars or researchers in the fields of comparative religion to grasp an adequate understanding of the patterns of religious education in various communities. Secondly, due to the fact that the close correlation between religion and states is not merely in religious education but also in the formulation of religious education policy, the present study also used some results of previous studies about the relationship between religion and state as the underlying basis to better shed light on the views of DPR RI members on the religious education policies.

## CONCEPTS

### **The Variant of Religious Education Models**

According to the objectives of education and learning contents given by the teachers, religious education can be categorized into three models, namely (1) religious education, (2) education about religions, and (3) education from religions (Schreiner, 2005). Religious education is a model of education that teaches the values of a particular religion to the students. It is called as confessional religious education. This model aims to teach the students to be a devout individual and to adhere to their own dogmas. The education about or from religion does not emphasize religious devotion but promote religious diversity (including the religion outside the one believed by the students) or teach them to take some lesson from each religion taught as universal values. This religious education model is also known as non-confessional religious education.

### **The State and Religious Education Policies**

Considering the broad relationship spectrum between religion and the state, as well as the variants of religious education models, religious education might be classified into four different categories, namely '*laicite*', 'neutral-religion', 'accommodationist', and 'interventionist' as shown in Table 1. These four policy directions have different points of views as to what extent is the engagement of the state in religious education, particularly in public schools.



**Table 1.**  
**State's Role on Religious Education**

<i>Laicite</i>	<b>Neutral-Religion</b>	<b>Accommodationist</b>	<b>Interventionist</b>
Religion is considered a private matter. The State should not be involved in religion.	Supports neutrality in religion.	The state considers religion an important thing, yet it does not only acknowledge the major religion.	Religion and politics cannot be separated
Actively eliminates religion from public schools.	Opens or closes the space for the entire religious groups.	The State facilitates more than one recognized religion.	Religious education is closely related to the interest of maintaining the role of the major religions in the State.
Decrease the portion or remove the religious education in the public schools.	Religious education is performed for the sake of universal values of humanity.	Religious education is established only by the religious groups recognized by the State.	Provides privileges to the major religions in order to maintain the domination of those religion in several fields.


## RESEARCH METHOD

This executive summary is written according to the completed survey on the 575 members of DPR RI serving for the period of 2019-2024. The data were collected from a face to face interview with the respondents. Data collection was conducted from 21 October until 17 December 2019 by our trained enumerators. The response rate was 68.1%. Thus, it can be said that this study had successfully interviewed 380 members of DPR RI. To ensure the quality of our data, this study executed spot check mechanism to 100% of the collected data. 10 out of the data were incomplete, so, there were 370 (64,6%) data to be analyzed.

Several reviews on the responses had been conducted by observing the proportion difference on some variables, including gender and age of the members (both wholly and per political party). This test was implemented to check as to what extent the rate of 'non-response' affected the analysis results. It was concluded that the 'non-response' was spread randomly. Therefore, it could be said that, statistically, the bias of 'non-response' was relatively small.

## PRIMARY FINDINGS

A number of primary findings obtained from the completed survey will be discussed here. Firstly, there were a few members of the DPR RI who were concerned about the issues associated with the concept of citizenship, the access of particular groups to insert their dogmas to the curriculum of religious education and the concept of religious diversity in religious education. The followings are the data related to the point of views of the DPR RI's members on the existence of issues in religious education:



**Figure 1.**  
**Point of views on the presence of .religious education issue**

Out of the total of 370 respondents, 47 percent of them found that some problems were rising in Indonesian religious education. Only 19.46% of respondents stated that the lack of nationalism insight in religious education is a serious problem. The percentage of respondents viewing that 'the awareness about the urgency of diversity in Indonesia was lacking' was even smaller (only 12.16 percent of total 370 respondents). The increment of intolerant/exclusive point of view and behavior in schools would definitely be bad news for DRP RI as an institution whose functions are to maintain the diversity of Indonesian people and also for the other societies in this world. Secondly, the results of our completed survey portrayed that the point of views given by the members of DPR RI was relatively varied.

The majority of the respondents tended to be accommodationists when it came to the policy on the basic format of religious education, including religious teaching, the praying activities performed in a group, and the availability of religious teachers. However, a more diverse point of view can be found in the respondents evaluating other aspects of religious education. Many respondents showed the tendency of being interventionist to the policies (made by the country or Indonesian schools) of religious books procurement and the training for religious teachers. Meanwhile, in the cases related to the enrichment

of religious education, a large number of respondents showed a tendency of being impartial in determining the role of the state in providing religious education.

In several cases, the variation of the point of view provides a small space for the society to obtain political support for attempts in constructing a more inclusive culture and to respect the believers of a different religion in public schools. However, during the increment of intolerant attitude and opinion in Indonesian schools, the huge proportion of respondents possessing the interventionism principles in such crucial cases, such as the training for religious teachers and the procurement of religious books, should be separately noted. Within the domination of accommodationist attitude to the policies associated with the religious education form, the huge number of interventionism attitude cases would allow the country to manage the religious life of the societies or students in the school, and it would not provide bigger space for the attempts of creating a more inclusive culture in public school and the willingness to respect the diverse religions among the students.

**Table 2.**  
**Classification of Political Party**

<b>Components of Religious Education</b>	<b>Point of View</b>
Procurement of religious books	Interventionist
Training for religious teachers	Interventionist
Religious education form	Accommodationist
Praying activities in the school	Accommodationist
Availability of religious teachers	Accommodationist
Talks on religion	Neutral
Ideal teachers	Neutral
Additional time allocation for religious education	Neutral
Additional classrooms for religious education	Neutral
Displaying religious symbol in the school	Neutral

Components of Religious Education	Point of View
Celebration of religious holiday in the school	Neutral
Religious extracurricular activities	Neutral

Thirdly, the results of this complete survey also discovered that political parties had a huge impact on how the members of the DPR RI view the role of the state in religious education. In certain senses, the difference of political party affiliation revealed the difference of respondent’s review in the direction of religious education policy. In other words, respondents from particular parties had a bigger tendency to be interventionist or neutral compared to the respondents from the other parties. The classification of the political party based on the classification of political and religious diversity that could be obtained from the data. The political identity of parties (respectively or individually) was acquired from the platform on the party’s website or the statements from the political figures. Meanwhile, the level of religious diversity was based on how many members of the DPR RI acted heterogeneous while following a religion. The following table shows the classification of the political party according to political identity and religious diversity.

**Table 3.**  
**Classification of Political Party**

Category of Party I (Political Identity)		Category of Party II (Religious Diversity)	
Type of Party	Party	Type of Party	Party
Modernist Islam	PAN, PKS, PPP	Slightly Diverse	DEMOKRAT, GERINDRA, PAN, PKB
Traditionalist Islam	PKB	Diverse	GOLKAR, NASDEM
Nationalist	PDIP, NASDEM	Completely Diverse	PDIP
Nationalist-Religious	DEMOKRAT, GERINDRA, GOLKAR	Non-diverse	PKS, PPP

In the case of religious books supplied in Indonesian schools, the result of analysis on logistic regression suggested that the respondents from Modernist Islamic Party (PAN, PKS, and PPP) had a bigger tendency to be interventionist rather than being neutral when it comes to the supplying of religious books in the school. The respondents from these parties were different compared to the respondents from PDI Perjuangan. This fact was also discovered in a case of the training for religious teachers, except for the respondents from PPP. The findings can be seen in table 4.

**Table 4.**  
**Classification of Political Party and Interventionist Tendency**

	Religious Book Supplies		Training for Religious Teachers	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Modernist Islam	5.7*** (0.54)	3.08** (0.55)	4.88*** (0.56)	4.50*** (0.59)
Traditionalist Islam	0.71 0.45	0.35** 0.49	1.30 0.47	0.84 0.54
AIC	784.87	784.87	739.73	739.73

	Religious Book Supplies		Training for Religious Teachers	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Heterogeneous	1.88 (0.47)	2.21* (0.46)	1.97 (0.46)	1.62 (0.51)
Non-Heterogeneous	8.80*** (0.73)	5.78*** (0.74)	0.83* (0.73)	1.11** (0.76)
AIC	790.32	790.32	742.59	742.59

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05\*\*\*p<0.01. Coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio

In the first table, the 'Nationalist' party is considered to be the 'reference group' in analyzing the multinomial logistic regression, while the 'reference group' on the second table is the "Non-heterogeneous" party. The regression was conducted by controlling the impact of the parties and the impact of several political social factors such as commission membership, gender, religion, origin, and regional diversity.

Furthermore, in regards to the characteristics of a political party, in which these characters affected the difference of the respondents' point of view, this research discovered that the

political identity of Indonesian parties was closely associated with the views of the DPR RI's members on the state's role on religious education.

**Table 5.**  
**Classification of Political Party and Neutral Tendency**

	<b>Ideal Religious Teacher</b>		<b>Additional Time Allocation</b>	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Islam Traditionalist	7.05*** (0.58)	1.43 (0.51)	0.97 (0.46)	0.50 (0.51)
Nationalist	8.89*** (0.52)	1.91 (0.44)	2.33* (0.43)	0.67 (0.49)
AIC	743.80	743.80	742.76	742.76

	<b>Ideal Religious Teacher</b>		<b>Additional Time Allocation</b>	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Heterogeneous	5.36*** (0.59)	3.01*** (0.50)	1.71 (0.48)	0.85 (0.53)
Completely Heterogeneous	6.36*** (0.64)	2.15*** (0.57)	3.41* (0.58)	1.35 (0.66)
AIC	759.44	759.44	748.05	748.05

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05\*\*\*p<0.01. Coefficient shows the Relative Risk Ratio

In the first table, 'Nationalist' party becomes the reference group in analyzing multinomial logistic regression, while in the second table "Non-heterogeneous" party is the one serving as a reference group. The regression was conducted by controlling the impact of the parties and the impact of several political social factors such as commission membership, gender, religion, origin, and regional diversity.

Table 5 revealed that respondents from Nationalist parties had a bigger tendency to be neutral in viewing religious education policy when compared to respondents from Modernist Islamic parties, particularly in the case of additional allocation time for religious education. On the contrary, respondents from Modernist Islamic parties had a bigger tendency than the respondents from Nationalist parties to be interventionist in the case of religious education, specifically insupplying religious books and trainings for religious subject teachers. As for the society and particular elements of the civil society having an interest in developing the

values of nationality and diversity in the religious education performed in Indonesian public schools, this study provided a clearer depiction of a political map of DPR RI based on the position of the political parties and the basis used in viewing the state's role in religious education.

Finally, this completed review results concluded that during the increment of intolerant behavior or point of view in the school, the principle and position of DPR RI as the highest institution having a major role in making the policy of religious education, remain unclear to deal with the religious problems. In addition to the small proportion of DPR RI members who considered the problems associated with the increase in nationalism insight development, understanding on the religious diversity, and the access for the particular groups to insert their dogmas in the education curriculum as major problems to be given special attention, several DPR RI members also tended to be an interventionist when determining state's role and position in religious education.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

The results of this completed survey indicate that the proportion DPR RI members who paid a lot of attention to the issues of nationality and diversity in religious education (according to legislative members) were relatively small, especially the ones who served in the commission that was supposed to conduct a discussion about nationality issues with different group. The discussion was particularly associated with the major role of the DPR RI in nurturing diversity and maintaining national unity and integrity. The political party also bore a huge responsibility to prepare their cadres, specifically for those who will serve in the commission dealing with education and religious problems. These things were compulsory so that the members of DPR RI understand the intricacy of religious education problems and the way to deal with the existing problems, particularly the problems associated with nationality. Without the active role from legislative institutions to keep an eye on government's policy and the arising impacts, it will be hard to cope with the problems resulted from the increment of religious intolerance, to create a culture of tolerance in schools and to respect the believers of other religions.

Moreover, a close relationship between the political identity of Indonesian parties and the interventionist's point of view indicated that the attempt for respecting diversity requires a bigger democratic control from the elements of civil society so they could vocalize their aspiration toward the policies of religious education. At the central level, the DPR RI and political party are required to open the larger participation space for

civil societies in the discussion of National Education Acts revision proposed by some groups. The right to control democracy should be given not only to the representative of majority groups, but also to those who are marginalized or discriminated against due to religious problems, so the rights of minority groups can be maintained.

Democratic space should be opened not only at the national level but also at the local level and at school level. The formulation of school regulation and policy associated with the implementation of religious education should provide a huge space for society's representative, particularly student's guardian, in order to maintain and ensure that every student, regardless of their religions, obtains a good educational service and treatment from their schools. These matters will be so important if we want to create a school culture which is 'diversity-friendly' and respectful to the difference of the students and the surrounding environment of the school.



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## Background

Political parties, which are considered to be one of the main pillars of democracy, have a strategic role not only in determining the dynamics of the political system within a society, but also in formulating the public policy. A political party is the main actor in aggregating political interests and aspirations of citizens. After winning the general election, political parties possess a crucial role in stipulating the form and direction of policy through their representatives in the executive institution due to the fact that they have the authority to formulate and implement the policies.

However, the major role of political parties does not belong only to those who win the general election. The parties who failed in the general election and do not serve in the government institution still play a major role in establishing public policies. Through their people, who are elected as the representative in the House of Representatives of Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), political parties possess a major role in determining public policy by providing the check and balance functions for the government. Legislative members also play a huge role in formulating laws, including the ones related to religion and religious education (Mujani & Liddle, 2018; Muhtadi & Mietzner, 2019; LIPI, 2018, 2019).

In regards to religious life, the role of legislative members is quite decisive and they are expected to be the determinant of policy direction in the middle of exclusive, close, anti-citizenship, anti-state, and even pro-violence religious behavior experienced by Indonesian society recently. (PPIM, 2016, 2017, 2018; Puspidep, 2017, 2018). Study results of PPIM (2018) suggest that, in the level of attitude/opinion, about 58.5 percent of Indonesian students have a somewhat radical view on religion, and 51.1percent of them had an intolerant view on religion. 34.3 percent of students and university students show that their religious understanding tend to be externally intolerant. As for the religious teachers, other results of PPIM's survey (PPIM, 2019) suggest that, in accordance with implicit measures, 63.07 percent of Indonesian teachers have an intolerant religious point of view on the believers of other religions. More explicit measures used for measuring the level of religious intolerance did not reveal an innermost difference using the implicit measurement tools. The explicit measurement tool suggested that almost 57 percent of teachers have an intolerant point of view on the believers of other religions.

In pursuance of the duties of DPR RI, which is to maintain the unified nation, they are expected to play a major role in preserving the existing diversity through educations. But to a certain extent, the number of information regarding the attitude and perspectives of DPR RI's members on religious education has never been adequate. So far, the study of legislative members is more focused on the political aspects of the legislative institution, for example, the interaction between the president or executives and legislative institutions within a framework of the multi-party presidential system (Hanan, 2014). Some researchers attempted to observe other issues such as legislative members' performance and the public trust on them (INSIS, 2013; FORMAPPI, 2018; Indonesian Survey Circle, 2018; and Poltracking, 2017). However, there only were a few research which systematically observed the individual views of DPR RI members on some primary issues rising in national politics and Indonesian public policy, particularly the ones associated with religious education.

The aim of this study was to fulfill emptiness. It is a part of bigger research intended to discover the point of view of the DPR RI's members (at the central level) on religion, nationality, and religious education. This research included a) perception of the DPR RI's members on religion, democracy, and nationality; b) their attitude and point of view on the nationality issues within religious education; and c) their attitude and point of view on religious education policy, especially the one applied in public school.

This research is a part of the activities of a program entitled Counter Violent Extremism, CONVEY. This research intended to increase the opportunity and effort in providing some survey results which are deemed necessary for the making of policy and advocacy to counter violent extremism. The results of this research is expected to be used as an input for the formulation of some policies which may be implemented in order to counter violent extremism in Indonesia, in the form of laws provisions, RPJMN (Short-Term National Development Plan) or other relevant products of the policy. The result of this research could also be a valuable input for the attempts to improve the role of the DPR RI's members to establish a better public policy associated with religion, nationality, and religious education issues in Indonesia.

In a larger context, this survey (concerning the point of view of the DPR RI's members on nationality and public policy issues) is expected to provide the necessary academic contribution for the political study on public policy in Indonesia, especially the public policy made by the legislative institution. Due to the lack of neat and systematic report regarding the policies chosen by every member of the DPR RI during the votings conducted in DPR RI, researchers and Indonesian society find it difficult to understand how the members of the DPR RI act and perceive the major issues in Indonesia. Thus,

this survey is completely important and required for those who need to understand and clarify the opinion of the members of the DPR RI agree on the major issues raised to be the public interest, and what cases affecting the act and the perception of DPR RI members toward the issues.

However, due to the lack of space in this report, we ought to limit the discussion; it will merely include the point of view of the DPR RI's members on the religious education problems and policy. This report was generally aimed to observe the point of view of legislative members on the efforts which possibly and necessarily be done to build the defense of nationality and to prevent violent extremism through religious education. In the context of social-politics and a compound society like Indonesia, religious education is supposed to be discrimination-free and violence-free. Furthermore, religious education is also expected to contribute in the attempts of strengthening the values of toleration, harmony, the sense of understanding between each other, and collaboration between religious communities or believers of other religions.

### **Research Focus and Analytical Framework**

This section will discuss two issues related to the focus of this report and the analytical framework used to clarify the main subject matter. As aforementioned, this report is focused on the point of view of DPR RI's members on religious education in Indonesia. More specifically, this report will answer the following questions:

1. In pursuance of the symptom of intolerant religious behavior/point of view in the surrounding environment of Indonesian schools, to what extent do the DPR RI perceive the corresponding problems with regard to the increase in nationality insights and understanding in diversity as relevant to religious education?
2. Within the current push and pull relationship of religion and the state, how does DPR RI perceive the orientation of religious education policy in the future? To what extent does the political party affiliation affect the difference of point of view among the members of the DPR RI on religious education policy? What causes the difference among the political parties?

This section will explain how this study committed to finding the most objective depiction of the point of view of DPR RI's members. As described further, this research combined the perspective on political science in regard with the correlation between religion and country, and the perspective on a comparative study of education policy regarding the models of

religious education policy, in order to prepare the proper methodological tools to capture the point of view of the DPR RI's members on religious education policy. Moreover, this section will also discuss the analytical framework to be used for clarifying the variant of point of view of the DPR RI's members on those problems.

## a. Research Focus

To grasp the point of view of the DPR RI's members on religious education policy, we conducted this research is based on two things. Firstly, this study used the experts' point of view on comparative religious education to obtain a proper understanding of religious education patterns in different societies.

Secondly, this research also used the results of previous research on the relationship between religion and the country as one of the basis in portraying the perspective of DPR RI members on religious education policy. Hence, a more detailed explanation regarding the two bases was required so we could provide a better understanding of the main points of this research. The following paragraphs will concisely discuss the relationship between religion and country in the politics of religious education, as well as the answer as to what extent does the relation between religion and country may provide better information on the patterns of religious education policy.


### 1. Relationship Spectrum Between Religion and The State

The politics of religious education policy might be clarified through the framework of the relationship between religion and the state. Educational institutions, particularly public schools, are considered to be the public space under the control of the state. Therefore, the form of religious education performed in public school will be affected by the policy maker's attitude and point of view, including the attitudes and the views of legislative institutions, members on the relationship between religion and the state. Those who are expecting the big role of religion in a state tend to provide a huge space for religious education in the school. On the contrary, those who are expecting that minimal role of religion in a state tend to restrict religious education in public school or manage religious education in many ways so that the role of religion in politics could be more controllable. Perspective differences would not merely affect the choices of religious education policy but also the way religious education policy will be provided to the students.

In some countries, the significant role of education in establishing future generations have developed Indonesian schools to be the strategic area for various parties to

express their interest (Skeie, 2006, p. 19; Kuru, 2007, p. 569; Schreiner, 2005, p. 8). The source of this contradiction was not merely from the different religious points of view, but also from different attitudes or point of views associated with the relationship between religion and the state. However, it is important to understand that the contradiction cannot be simply figured out as the dispute between those who facilitate religious education and the ones who restrict such education. Being similar to the variance of point of view on the relationship between religion and the state, one's attitude/point of view on religious education had a large spectrum as well, even larger than that of the two huge tendencies (facilitating versus restricting).

The variance of attitude or point of view on the relationship between religion and the state might be presented systematically in a linear continuum of the relationship between religion and the state as demonstrated by (figure 1). It can be seen that the right side presents the position of a party providing the space to the religion in the state, and the left side exemplifies the position of the party restricting the role of religion in the state. Thus, theoretically, there are two extreme positions that are diametrically contradictive. The extremely left position indicates the antipathy or their rejection of religion in a country ('antireligion'). On the contrary, the extreme right position is occupied by the parties combining the religion and the state ('the state religion'). This last position might be found in religion-based countries such as Saudi Arabia or Iran in the Islam world or Vatican in the Catholic world. Reversely, antipathy toward religion can be found in communist countries such as China, Cuba, and North Korea (Kuru, 2007, p. 570).



**Figure 1.**  
**Relationship between religion and country**

Right between the two extreme parties, there is a position so-called 'religion-neutral', meaning that this kind of country is assigned neither to restrict the religion within a public area nor to facilitate the role of religion. However, the country provides the space or latitude for its citizen to express their religious attitudes and point of view in the public area, including in public schools, as long as it does not violate the prevailing regulations in the country (Kuru, 2007).

In addition to those three positions, a linear continuum of the relationship between religion and state includes the other two positions. The first would be the position between 'anti-religion' and 'religion-neutral'. In spite of the fact that the countries perching on this position are not fully rejecting any kind of religion, they tend to restrict the role of religion in a country. In this research, it was called '*laicite*' (Kuru, 2007). It is different from the 'religion-neutral'. *Laicite* possesses a more negative attitude to the role of religion in a state or public sector. In many cases, supporters of *laicite* will actively restrict the role of religion in public areas such as public schools.

The second position, located amid the position of 'neutral-religion' and 'country by religion', is a position illustrating the tendency of being 'friendly to religion'. Instead of not deeming the religion as an ideological foundation of the state, this position provides an acknowledgment and a relatively huge space for the role of religion in a state. This realization of political attitude and point of view can be seen in several European countries such as Denmark, England, and Greece, which acknowledge the major religion established in their societies (Kuru, 2007).

By paying attention to the various positions, this study provides a larger and more open discussion of various points of view in regard to the religious education in public school. Being different from other researches which classify the different point of view on religious education into two huge classes, namely religious and secular, this research perception does not rule out the possibility for the other kinds of attitude/point of view between those two perceptions. Moreover, this research perception was also open to the possibility that the patterns of the discussion on religious education may differ from one case to another.

## 2. Variant of Religious Education Models

In accordance with the objective of education and the learning contents given by the teachers, religious education can be distinguished into three models, namely (1) religious education, (2) education about religion, and (3) education from religion (Schreiner, 2005). Religious education is a model for education teaching the values of religion to the students. Thus, they will take the religious course based on their beliefs. In many works of literature on the comparison of religious education, this model is also called confessional religious education. This model aims to teach the students or citizens to be devout individuals and to adhere to their beliefs. In this model, all religious teachers are required to have a proper understanding of their



respective religion. Similarly, the teacher will also provide education based on their belief.

Unlike the model of religious education, education about or from religion does not emphasize the religious devotion within every student but promote the religious diversity (including the religion outside the one believed by the students) or teach the students to take some lesson from each religion being taught. In the literature on religious education studies, this religious education model is also known as non-confessional religious education.

Due to its non-confessional nature, this model of education does not require the similarity of religions between the teachers, students and religious lessons itself. A Moslem teacher may teach the subject of Christian or Catholic religion or the other way around. Similarly, Moslem students may learn Islam from a Christian teacher or vice versa. This is possible because the purpose of religious education is not to internalize certain religious values within students but to provide an understanding of various religions. Instead of teaching the religious values and studies in accordance with each student's religion, non-confessional model will emphasize the universal values embraced by various religions.

### 3. The State and Religious Education Policy

The debate about religious education might be influenced by various factors, including political dynamics or competition between ideological groups in a country (Kuru, 2009). Therefore, due to the largeness of domestic political influence, the focus of the conflict among the strongholds or groups associated with the religious education in public schools between the countries might be different. In the United States, for example, the dispute would be the competition between supporters of passive secularism, expecting that the state would be neutral toward religious education, and some conservative religious groups expecting that the state would take a greater role in implementing religious education in public schools. In contrast to the United States, the conflict in Turkey would be the competition between *laicite* supporters who actively abolish religion from the public sphere, and 'religion-neutral' supporters expecting the state to be more neutral so as to open the space for religious expression performed by citizens in public spaces, including in public schools (Kuru, 2009).

Within a country, different response might also be performed across the issues. A particular group may be accommodative about the role of religion in one aspect while acting as opposition when perceiving the other religious issues in another

aspect. Therefore, a broader and detailed perception would be required when a nation has to overcome an outstanding issue in religious education. A person or a policymaker should also behave appropriately toward those kinds of issues. Moreover, due to the imperative effect of internal political dynamics, researchers would also be required to look further at the appropriateness of the methodological tools used to discover one's view on religious education policy with the variety of religious and political views in that country.

The flexibility or contextualization of the methodological instruments, as mentioned above, is completely required to analyze the policy of religious education in a certain country experiencing a lot of movements that might be related to the relationship of religion and a country as Indonesia. As documented by numerous researchers, the political dynamics that occurred in the early days of the state formation lead Indonesia to be a country that is 'religion-friendly' in many ways. Although Indonesia has never been considered a religious country, it cannot be considered a secular country as well. Several conditions of the constitution and other regulations applied in Indonesia, as well as the state agencies possessed by Indonesia, do acknowledge religion, and this country provides a greater space for religion to be inserted in the state's life. In regard to Indonesian education, this country provides religious education in public schools. Moreover, Indonesia is actively engaged in facilitating religious schools through a particular ministry, namely the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Ropi,2017).

With regard to the variance of the relationship spectrum between religion and country, this study (concerning the politics of religious education policy in Indonesia) was focused on four political choices, namely '*laicite*', 'religion-neutral', 'accommodationist', and 'religious country'. The models of religious education policy as discussed in the previous section would be reclassified according to the four political positions.

In the present study, we notice further on the different position in the education model of confessional religious education. The way religion taught to Indonesian students would depend on a religious point of view believed by the teachers. More fundamentally, it would depend on the policies set forth by the country or the government. In regard to the politics of the relationship between religion and the state, the confessional religious education might theoretically be distinguished into two great models such as interventionist and accommodationist.

The first education model or interventionist is established based on the awareness that religion and politics are considered as integral. Within the framework of the relationship between the state and religion as mentioned above, this kind of perception would be suitable for those expecting the maximum role of religion, and it can be seen in religious countries. In an interventionist country, religious education is closely associated with the interests of maintaining the role of religion played in the state level. According to the point of view of the political parties in an interventionist country, this policy choice is completely reasonable because, to them, the government or the ruling regime shall spread the religious values that support their power. By its nature, the applicable religious education model would be called an interventionist model.

The interventionist model of religious education can be found not merely in religious countries but also in non-religious countries. In the latest case, the desire to achieve or maintain political dominance stimulated a particular religious group to use the state policy as a powerful instrument. Consequently, in regard to religious education, the applicable model of religious education would adopt the form or model of interventionist religious education, in which privileges will be provided to the majority religious group to gain or maintain political dominance in the country.

Differing from the education interventionist model, a country might choose another kind of policy that would pay more tribute to the religious diversity in society. So, the objective of religious education provided to the students would remain the same: to provide an understanding of certain religious values to the students. The state does not provide privileges to one particular group or religion. On the contrary, the schools or the state would give an equal space to provide or receive religious education for all religious groups in accordance with the values of the believed religion. The primary role of the state or the religious education would be to facilitate, not to intervene, or impose a doctrine of certain religious views on the students. This education model is often known as an accommodationist model of religious education policy. From the perspective of the relationship between religion and the state, this accommodationist religious education model shows an 'accommodative' or 'religion-friendly' political attitude or perception.

Unlike the confessional religious education model, the learning model about or from religion is mostly consistent with a view that emphasizes the neutral role of the state in religious affairs. Given that the state does not prioritize one particular religion, the most reasonable way out would be to teach universal religious

values that might be adopted from every religion in the school or community. As mentioned earlier, the learning model about or from religion does not emphasize the necessity to internalize the religious values of a particular religion in students. On the contrary, religious education has the goal of promoting various religions so students can take a lesson from universal values acquired from each religion, or, at least, students have a better understanding of the diversity of existing religions.

Eventually, the discussions on religious education might not be impeccable without taking into account the position of those who reject religious education or the matters related to religion in public schools. In 'religion-neutral' countries, religion is perceived as a private affair in which the state should not interfere in it. Therefore, they reject religious education in public schools. Neither the government nor the state should provide religious education; it should be performed by family or community. This view is in line with the *laicite* perspective on the relationship between religion and the state. In this research, we considered this kind of perspective as disinclination towards the role of the state in religious education. In this case, this disinclination might be manifested in the form of a desire to reduce the portion of religious education or to abolish such education in public schools.

In some cases, those who strive for the neutrality of the state might also agree to reduce or abolish religious education in schools due to the fact that the procurement of religious education services for particular religious groups might be viewed as the state's tendency to support these religious groups. However, being different from the *laicite*, which actively wishes to abolish religion from public schools or public areas in general, religion-neutral attitudes or perspectives still allow students or teachers to express their religion. As mentioned previously, the religion-neutral position does not completely reject the subjects associated with religion in the school environment. Advocates of this political position are still deemed at a certain level and still able to accept certain religious expressions in the school environment.

## **b. Analytical Framework**

To explain the variance of attitudes of the members of the DPR RI in formulating religious education policies, two things will be discussed in this report. In the first part, this report will clarify the variation of DPRI RI's members point of view on significant issues arising in religious education and its policy in accordance with the political party affiliation and Socio-demographic conditions of the respective members of the DPR RI. The socio-

demographic conditions include religion, gender, regional origin, social environment of residence, particularly related to religious and ethnic diversity, and the age of each respondent member.

Then, in further analysis, this report would observe the factors clarifying the differences in the point of view of the DPR RI members regarding the role of religion in religious education policies. It will be useful when we want to comprehend the variance of DPR RI member's points of view on religious education policies and understand the relation between the view and the system of the Indonesian party. For this purpose, our research has specifically observed two things, namely the political identity of the party and the socio-religious composition of the party in Indonesia. Through this study, we wanted to examine as to which of the two things might better clarify the map of the point of view of DPR RI's members on religious education policy.

It is clear that religion has a great influence on the establishment of the Indonesian party system. As indicated by a number of groups, the party system in Indonesia was initially established through the 1955 election, in which religious parties played a significant role. The four largest parties at that time, namely PNI (Indonesian National Party), Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), NU (Nahdatul Ulama) and PKI, (Communist Party of Indonesia) represented the largest group in the ideology and socio-economic system of the Indonesians, by which two of them representing the two largest religious social groups. If PNI and PKI represented nationalist (and *priyayi*) and communist (and lower-class) groups, Masyumi and NU represented modernist and traditionalist Muslim groups. The destruction of PKI by the New Order regime did not necessarily destroy the party system. As denoted by Dwight King (2003), the 1999 Election, which was the first election after the collapse of the New Order regime, showed that the classification of political parties and voters was in line with the party system classification of the 1955 Election, with an exception of the absence of PKI in the 1999 Election.

In some cases, the Indonesian party system has changed due to the implementation of the 'Open List' system in the election of members of the DPR RI. Some shreds of evidence indicated that this system had a great influence on the decrease of political party's role in aggregating voters due to the fact that the current competition in legislative elections engages not only the competition between political parties but also the competition between candidates within a political party. Furthermore, the emergence and disappearance of new parties along with the rise of money politics in elections abolish the existing party system. The relations between voters and political parties become more fluid and the ideological influence is now diminished (Ufen, 2008). Muhtadi (2019) also found out that party identification among voters continued to decline since the reform era.

However, in spite of the shifting that occurred in the Indonesian party system, the influence of religion on the classification of Indonesian political parties is relatively huge. The study of Fossati, Aspinall, Muhtadi, and Warburton (2020) suggested that there are no other issue playing a significant role in distinguishing the ideological position of political parties except for the religious issue. Whereas, how it occurred, or how religion affects the establishment of identity or ideology of the party has not been proportionally discussed. This report intended to fulfill the vacancy by observing two mechanisms on how religious impact on the party system affects the map of point of view on religious education policy. Firstly, this report reviewed how the party identity affects the map of the perspective of DPR RI's members on religious education school. Secondly, as an alternative explanation, this study observed as to what extent does the social composition of religious cleavage clarifies the point of view of the DPR RI's members on religious education policy.

Both mechanisms observed the influence of political party affiliation on one's view toward religious education. However, the perceptions of these mechanisms on how the classification of the party should be performed were somewhat different. The first mechanism, whose concern was on the Indonesian party's perception about the influence of religion/the state on their political point of view, clarified that those who put religion above the nation as the major factor in establishing party's identity were actually having a commitment to the nation. Conversely, those who considered the nation as the main factor to form the party's identity were actually having a kind of commitment to the religion. However, the difference more likely refers to what extent the party puts religion or nation as priority in establishing its identity.

Being in line with that assumption, this study classified Indonesian parties based on the way they perceive religion and the nation as the factors to establish the party's identity. In accordance with the social history, policies line of the party as composed in the article of association (AD/ART), as well as the survey conducted to the elites of the party, this report classified parties into four groups, namely, Nationalist, Religious-Nationalist, Traditionalist Islam, and Modernist Islam. The first group included parties prioritizing the nation over religion in establishing the party's identity, while the last two groups included the parties prioritizing religion over the nation in establishing the parties' identity.

In regard to the religious parties, this report distinguished them into Traditionalist Islam and Modernist Islam in accordance with the difference in a religious point of view possessed by the religious groups within those parties. The 'Traditionalist Islam' parties comprised Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) which was established by a group

called NU having the traditionalist point of view. Otherwise, the 'Modernist Islam' included Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN). The major groups establishing these parties came from Modernist Islamic groups, in which their religious point of view tends to be more puritan than that of the traditionalist Islam.

Given that Masyumi's constituent as Modernist Islam had a greater impact on the party's formation, PPP was classified into this category, especially when NU confirmed that they left PPP after the party's establishment. Indeed, the current leaders of this party were mostly from NU. However, as seen from the results of a survey conducted by Fossati, Aspinall, Muhtadi, and Warburton (2020), PPP had a somewhat conservative point of view, even as conservative as PKS's or PAN's. This statement indicated that the religious point of view of Modernist Islam completely affected PPP. Meanwhile, PKS and PAN might be classified into Modernist Islam, given that the character of religious perspective primarily formed these parties. While the establishment of PAN was driven by Muhammadiyah leaders, the formation of PKS was assisted by those who were most active in 'dakwah' movement performed on campus, in which that kind of movement was, ideologically, closely associated with Muslim Brotherhood.

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI Perjuangan) and Partai NasDem were classified into the group of Nationalist party. Those parties explicitly declared that nation should be deemed as the primary subject in the formation of their political point of view. Slightly different from the Nationalist groups, Religious-Nationalist groups tried to insert religious thought within their nationalist perspective. Three Indonesian parties namely Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), Partai Demokrat, and Partai Golkar were classified into a Nationalist-Religious group. Gerindra and Demokrat explicitly revealed the Nationalist-Religious tendencies in their article of association. Golkar showed the ideological tendency, not merely in the structure but also in their activities or political attitude. They tried to accommodate the interest of religious groups. A survey conducted by Fossati, Aspinall, Muhtadi, and Warburton (2020) suggested that, when it comes to the relationship between religion and country, Gerindra, Demokrat, and Golkar tend to have a similar conservative political perspective compared to a political point of view of the elites of PDI Perjuangan and NasDem.

The model of party's classification was different from the model by political identity; this model is in accordance with religious cleavage whose concern was more on the composition of religion within the elite parties. In Indonesia, this religious cleavage can simply be defined in accordance with the proportion of party elites, or the non-muslim DPR RI's members in the context of this study. Although this study had only acquired

the response rate of 64.6 percent (an explanation about the non-response rate will be clarified in the next section), the non-response rate was quite random so the collected data could be deemed adequate for representing the whole members of the DPR RI. In regard to the religion, the religious composition depicted by this survey result illustrated the actual religious composition in each party, except Partai Demokrat.

As seen in table 1 below, there was no significant difference found between the religious composition of the parties in the DPR RI and the religious composition suggested by this survey result, except for Partai Demokrat. For example, the survey conducted by PPIM indicates that the non-Muslim proportion in PDI Perjuangan is 48.68 percent, while the actual proportion in the DPR RI is 44.53 percent. The result of this survey did not indicate a meaningful difference between non-Muslim proportion of PAN elites working in the DPR RI (4.54 percent) and the non-Muslim proportion of the DPR RI's members from PAN who were successfully interviewed by the enumerator of PPIM (5.88percent).

**Table 1.**  
**Non-muslim Proportion of Party Elites**

No.	Name of Party	Non-Muslim Proportion (DPR RI)	Non-Muslim Proportion (Survey of PPIM)	Category of Party
1.	PDI Perjuangan	44.53	48.68	Completely Heterogeneous
2.	NasDem	20.34	20.51	Heterogeneous
3.	Golkar	12.94	15.91	Heterogeneous
4.	Gerindra	7.69	6.38	Slightly Heterogeneous
5.	Demokrat	12.96	6.25	Slightly Heterogeneous
6.	PAN	4.54	5.88	Slightly Heterogeneous
7.	PKB	5.17	3.85	Slightly Heterogeneous
8.	PKS	0	0	Homogeneous
9.	PPP	0	0	Homogeneous

Source: The Survey of PPIM



According to the variation in the non-muslim proportion of the DPR RI's members in each party, the parties were classified into four categories. The first category was 'Completely Heterogeneous'. It was referred to a party which had an immense number of non-Muslim party elites (>40 percent). As shown in the table above, only one party was classified into this category, i.e. PDI Perjuangan. The second category was a party with a high number of non-Muslim party elites (>15 percent yet <40 percent). NasDem and Golkar were included in this category. It might be called as 'Heterogeneous' parties. The third category was the party with a small number of non-muslim elites (>3 percent yet <15 percent). This group might be categorized into 'Slightly Heterogeneous' and it included four parties, namely Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKB. Lastly, there was the fourth category occupied by the parties with zero non-Muslim party elites. They were PKS and PPP. In this report, both parties were categorized as 'Homogeneous' parties. This study observed how the difference of this party type affects the point of view of DPRRI's members in religious education policy.

## Research Method

This report is in accordance with the completed survey or census conducted to the members of the DPR RI serving for the period of 2019-2024, with the number of the respondent of 575 people. The data were collected through a face to face interview with the respondents. Data collection was performed by our trained enumerators on the period of 21 October – 17 December 2019 with the response rate of 68.1%. In other words, this study succeeded in interviewing 380 members of the DPR RI. To ensure the data quality, this study performed a spot check mechanism to 100% of the collected data. There were 10 incomplete data. So, there were 370 (64.6%) data to be analyzed.

Methodologically speaking, this research might be classified as an elite survey. We chose political elites as the interviewee because they had the independent socio-demographic characteristic which was different from the socio-demographic characteristic of the Indonesian community in general. For the elite survey, the experts confirmed that the response rate of 64.6% is acceptable. However, to ensure that our collected data have a certain quality and that our data could be considered reliable, we performed conservation to know whether the non-response in this survey was random. Hence, we conducted several observations by inspecting the difference of proportion or mean on several variables. Firstly, we used some variables such as gender and the age of members

of the DPR RI in order to check the influence of the non-response rate on the result of the analysis. Secondly, we observed the difference in proportion and/or the mean on the variable of the political party.

In regard with gender and the age, the analysis result suggested that at the significance level of 5%, there was no significant distinction on the proportion (in the context of gender) between the interviewed legislative members (370 people) and total members of the DPR RI serving for the period of 2019 - 2024 (575 people). In the context of age, the analysis result suggested that there was no significant distinction between the average age of the interviewed legislative members and total legislative members. Thus, it could be concluded that the non-response was spread randomly (based on gender and age variable).

Similar results would also be acquired if the observation was implemented to every party. It was discovered in each of the parties that there was no significant distinction regarding the proportion of gender and the average age between the responding legislative members and the total legislative members. It might be concluded that the non-response was also spread randomly in every party (based on the gender and age variables). Based on the aforementioned condition, it could be concluded that the non-response of this research was spread randomly. Therefore, we might be statistically argued that the non-response bias was relatively small.

## **Research Subject Overview**

As specified in the previous section, this survey encompassed 370 people of 575 DPR RI members. Demographically speaking, in accordance with the statistical analysis clarified above, there was no significant distinction between the socio-demographic conditions of the respondents interviewed in this survey and the socio-demographic condition of the whole DPR RI's members. In pursuance of the proportion of female legislative members in the DPR RI (2019-2024), amounting of 20.5 percent or 118 of 575 people, the proportion of female respondents interviewed in this survey was 21 percent. There were 78 females out of 370 people of legislative members who were successfully interviewed. The proportion of non-Muslim respondents was in line with the proportion of non-muslim politicians in DPR RI's. As shown in table 2, 61 (16.49 percent) of the interviewed DPR RI members were non-Muslim. These numbers also reflected the proportion of non-Muslim legislative members in the DPR RI, and it was 17.03 percent (98 of 575 people).

**Table 2.**  
**Respondents Composition by the Religion/Belief**

No.	Religion	Total	Percentage
1.	Islam	309	83.51
2.	Protestant	28	7,57
3.	Catholic	19	5.14
4.	Hinduism	9	2.42
5.	Buddhism	4	1.08
6.	Other Religions/ Beliefs	1	0.27
Total		370	100

Source: Survey of PPIM

At the party level, respondents who were successfully interviewed in this survey came from every party in the DPR RI, except Partai Golkar, since the number of interviewed Golkar politicians (working in DPR RI) was only 5,41 percent.

The proportion of respondents (according to the party) who were successfully interviewed by our team was about 60.2 percent to 89.7 (table 3). The greatest proportion came from Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), in which this survey has succeeded to interview 52 people from the total 58 PKB politicians working for DPR RI (89.7 percent).

**Table 3.**  
**Respondents Composition by Political Party Affiliation**

No.	Party's Name	Total Representatives in the DPR RI	Total Respondent	Respondent Proportion
1.	Partai Amanat Nasional(PAN)	44	34	77.3
2.	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI Perjuangan)	128	77	60.2
3.	Partai Demokrat	54	35	64.8

No.	Party's Name	Total Representatives in the DPR RI	Total Respondent	Respondent Proportion
4.	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)	78	47	60.3
5.	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	85	46	54.1
6.	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	50	33	66.0
7.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	58	52	89.7
8.	Partai NasDem	59	39	66.1
9.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	19	17	89.5
Total		575	380	66.09

Source: Survey of PPIM

This survey was also conducted to every commission in DPR RI. As shown in table 4, the proportion of the volunteered interviewable DPR RI's members in every commission was approximately 52.94 percent to 78.43 percent. The commission having the fewest respondent was the Commission I working for the issues of defense, foreigners, communication, Informatics, and intelligent affairs. Meanwhile, the one with the largest proportion of respondents was Commission IX working for the issues of health and employment affairs. In pursuant to the focus of this research, i.e religious education, there were two associated commissions, namely the Commission VIII and the Commission X. The Commission VIII serves in the issue of religion, social, disaster, and women's empowerment and child protection affairs. Meanwhile, Commission X serves in education, sports, and historical affairs. We had successfully interviewed 75.47 and 67.31 percent of members of Commission VIII dan X.

**Table 4.**  
**Composition of Respondents by Membership in the Commission**

No.	Name of the Commission	Total Members	Total Respondents	Respondents Proportion
1.	Commission I	51	27	52.94
2.	Commission II	50	33	66

No.	Name of the Commission	Total Members	Total Respondents	Respondents Proportion
3.	Commission III	53	29	54.72
4.	Commission IV	54	40	74.07
5.	Commission V	52	32	61.54
6.	Commission VI	54	32	59.26
7.	Commission VII	51	33	64.71
8.	Commission VIII	53	40	75.47
9.	Commission IX	51	40	78.43
10.	Commission X	52	35	67.31
11.	Commission XI	51	29	56.86

**Source: Survey of PPIM**

In regard to the socio-demographic composition, it is shown in table 5 that in accordance with the racial background, the largest ethnic group was Javanese. Nearly 32.43 percent of respondents confirmed that they originally come from this ethnicity. According to the majority ethnics in the DPR RI, this survey suggested that there were four largest ethnic groups dominating 63.25 percent of seats in the DPR RI in total. Besides Javanese, there were Sundanese (12.43 percent), Malays (6.49 percent), Batak (5.95 percent), and Bugis (5.95 percent). Furthermore, based on the origin of the constituency, approximately 54.05 percent of respondents originated from Java, including Banten, Special Capital Region of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta), West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. The remaining, or 45.95 percent, originated from various regions or island outside Java

**Table 5.**  
**Composition of Respondents by Ethnic Background**

No.	Name of Ethnic	Total Respondents	Respondent's Proportion
1.	Acehnese People	9	2.43
2.	Ambonese People	6	1.62
3.	Arab People	2	0.54
4.	Balinese People	9	2.43
5.	Banjar People	7	1.89

No.	Name of Ethnics	Total Respondents	Respondent's Proportion
6.	Batak People	22	5.95
7	Betawis	11	2.97
8.	Bugis People	22	5.95
9.	Dayak People	7	1.89
10	Javanese	120	32.43
11.	Madurese People	6	1.62
12.	Malays	24	6.49
13.	Minangnese	15	4.05
14.	Papuan People	7	1.89
15.	Sasak People	3	0.81
16.	Sundanese	46	12.43
17.	Chinese Indonesian	6	1.62
18	Others	48	12.97
TOTAL		370	100

Source: Survey of PPIM

In accordance with the age, this survey results suggested that the majority of the DPR RI's members were 41 to 60 years old. As shown in table 6, the proportion of respondents who were classified into this age category was 66.22 percent of total respondents. A couple of young adults, aged less than 41 years old, served as members of the DPR RI. This survey results suggested that the proportion of respondents who were under 41 years old was just 17.83 percent. These numbers were just slightly greater than the proportion of those who were 61 years or older, reaching of 15.95 percent.

**Table 6.**  
**Composition of Respondents by Age**

No.	Age Classification	Total Respondents	Proportion of Respondents
1.	<= 30 Years Old	18	4.86
2.	31 – 35 Years Old	16	4.32

No.	Age Classification	Total Respondents	Proportion of Respondents
3.	36 – 40 Years Old	32	8.65
4.	41 – 45 Years Old	49	13.24
5.	46 – 50 Years Old	70	18.92
6.	51 – 55 Years Old	72	19.46
7.	56 – 60 Years Old	54	14.59
8.	61 – 65 Years Old	30	8.11
9.	>= 66 Years Old	29	7.84
TOTAL		370	100

**Source: Survey of PPIM**

### **Viewpoints of DPR RI's Members on Significant Issues in Religious Education**


This section discussed the point of view of the DPR RI's members on the crucial issues arising in religious education in public schools. This report was specifically focused on the major problems in regard to the relationship among religions in Indonesia. This survey observed as to what extent do the respondents agree or disagree with the following statements:

1. Material for religious education discourages the enhancement in nationalism insights;
2. Several particular religious groups may not insert their religious perspective into the curriculum of religious education;
3. Religious education does not provide a proper understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia; and

Furthermore, this survey also questioned the perspective of DPR RI's members on the existence of major problems in Indonesian religious education. Aside from delving general point of view of the DPR RI's members on the problems arising in religious education, this question was also asked in order to comprehend whether the problems related to the enhancement of nationalism insights, religious view of minority groups, and the understanding of religious diversity obtained special attention from the members of the DPR RI.

The Figures below represented the variations on point of view of the DPR RI members on the major problems in religious education. In regard to the development of nationalism

insights in religious education, approximately 30.08 percent of respondents of this survey strongly agreed or agreed, that the current religious education did not fully encourage the enhancement of nationalism insights. Meanwhile, around 31.62 percent of respondents declared that they strongly agreed, or agreed, that some particular religious groups not imply their religious perspectives in the religious education curriculum. The proportion of respondents who strongly agreed and agreed that the problems within religious education slightly decreased, when acquiring a question whether the religious education currently gives a proper understanding about religious diversity in Indonesia, just around 20.54 percent of respondents stated that they strongly agree or agree that all the time, religious education does not fully provide a proper understanding about religious diversity in Indonesia.




**Figure 2.**  
**The View on Major Problems in Religious Education**  
 Source: Survey of PPIM

However, when the respondents were questioned about the existence of significant problems in Indonesia’s religious education, there were only several of the respondents stating that serious problems were happening in Indonesian religious education and considering them as part of the problems in religious education. Out of the 370 interviewed DPR RI members, only 173 of them, or 46.75 percent, declared that serious problems were arising in religious education (see the bottom right of Figure 2). Out of the total of 370 respondents, only some of them stated that the nationalism insight was lacking, that a certain group were facing difficulty in inserting their religious perspectives in the religious education curriculum, and that there was a shortage of understanding about religious diversity as the major problem within Indonesian religious education.




In relation with the lack of enhancement of nationalism insights within the Indonesian religious education, this survey results suggested that, out of the total of 370 respondents, 19.46 percent of them confirming that the lack of religious education in promoting the enhancement of students' nationalism insights should be deemed as a serious problem.



**Figure 3.**  
**Nationalism Insight Enhancement in Religious Education**  
Source: Survey of PPIM

Meanwhile, associated with the difficulties of the particular groups in introducing their religious or beliefs views to religious education, the result of analysis above also suggested that from a total of 370 respondents, only approximately 15.9 percent of respondents perceiving that it was a serious problem. Eventually, it is also important to note that, from a total of 370 respondents, only 12.16 percent of them perceiving that the lack of a better understanding of religious diversity which should be taught by Indonesian schools should be deemed as a serious problem rising in religious education.



**Figure 4.**  
**Religious Diversity in Indonesia within Religious Education**  
Source: Survey of PPIM

Although a number of groups had revealed the intolerant religious attitudes or views in the school environment, there were only several DPR RI members perceiving the problem

of the lack of nationalism insights enhancement, the difficulty faced by certain groups in promoting their religious or beliefs views, and the lack of understanding on religious diversity in Indonesia as the major problems in religious education. The proportions of respondents perceiving that reduction of religious education would promote the enhancement of nationalism insights (19.5 percent), that particular groups were facing difficulty in introducing their religious or beliefs views to the religious education curriculum (15.9 percent), and that religious education did not actually provide an understanding about religious diversity (12.16 percent) there were much less than the proportion of the respondents perceiving that there were no serious problems in religious education (41.62 to 44.86 percent depends on the problems).

In order to grasp the views of the DPRRI members on the problems corresponding with the significance of nationalism insights, the access of a certain group to promote their religious views in the religious education curriculum, and the understanding about religious diversity in Indonesia, the following table presented the result of (logistic) regression analysis for the things which possibly affected the views of the DPR RI members on the problems. To simplify the discussion, the variants of DPR RI member's views on nationalism insights, the access of a certain group in promoting their religious teaching in curriculum and the understanding of religious diversity were simplified into two groups, namely (1) acknowledging and perceiving them as a serious problem; and (2) other attitudes or views. The result of regression analysis is shown in table 7.

**Table 7.**  
**Factors Affecting Views of the DPR RI members on Significant Problems in Religious Education**

	<b>Nationalism Insights</b>	<b>Access of Certain Groups</b>	<b>Religious Diversity</b>
Commission	0.94 (0.33)	1.14 (0.45)	0.60 (0.24)
Demokrat	1.53 (1.24)	3.57 (4.18)	1.93 (2.45)
Gerindra	2.06 (1.54)	4.64 (5.18)	2.52 (2.94)
Golkar	1.20 (0.93)	4.48 (5.06)	3.89 (4.39)
NasDem	1.16 (0.94)	3.90 (4.49)	3.99 (4.66)
PAN	0.97 (0.86)	1.92 (2.43)	1.98 (2.52)

	<b>Nationalism Insights</b>	<b>Access of Certain Groups</b>	<b>Religious Diversity</b>
PDI Perjuangan	4.25* (3.00)	9.26* (10.03)	7.90# (8.66)
PKB	2.93 (2.07)	5.31 (5.81)	4.27 (4.71)
PKS	-	-	-
PPP	0.48 (0.59)	6.19 (7.52)	4.56 (5.89)
Religion	0.56 (0.23)	0.58 (0.25)	0.98 (0.49)
Java	1.62 (0.53)	1.60 (0.53)	1.21 (0.45)
Highly Diverse Religion	0.14* (0.11)	0.13* (0.10)	0.26 (0.25)
Highly Diverse Ethnic	3.95# (2.96)	4.95* (3.83)	4.75 (4.53)
N	370	370	370
Log Likelihood	-161.36	-148.88	-123.79
AIC	364.72	339.76	289.58

\*\*\*p<0.001; \*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.5; #p<0.1; Coefficient revealed odds ratio

PKS became the *reference group*. Regression analysis was conducted by controlling the influence of age and gender.

Source: Processed from the result of PPIM's survey

The result suggested that the political party was one of the factors that could differentiate the attitude of the members of the DPR RI toward the pending religious education. according to the regression analysis on the entire models mentioned above, it was suggested that respondents from PDI Perjuangan had a bigger tendency (3.25 times to 9.26 times bigger) than that of the respondents of PKS to perceive that the lack of nationalism insights in religious education, the unfavorable access for a certain group, and the lack of the understanding on religious diversity in Indonesia, were the serious problems of religious education. In the first model (Nationalism Insight) and the second model (The Access for a Certain Group), the influence of PDI Perjuangan was statistically significant with the significance level below 0.05, but in the last model, the influence of PDI Perjuangan statistically significant with the significance level below 0.1.


Besides the factor of 'political party', the background of diverse experience also affected the respondent's perception of the important problems in religious education. However,

as suggested by the result of regression analysis, there were several things that should be noted in regard to the influence of 'diversity experience'. The first thing was, it was only the extremely socially heterogeneous environment that could affect respondents' views. Meanwhile, those who lived in the homogeneous and slightly homogeneous area did not reveal the meaningful difference in their assessment regarding the problems of 'nationalism insights', 'the access for particular groups to promote their religious views within the curriculum' and 'the understanding of religious diversity' in Indonesian education.'The second thing was, that the respondent's views were differed by ethnic diversity and religion differently. The respondents who live in an ethnically heterogeneous area tended to be more sensitive toward the problems occurring in religious education, particularly the ones associated with the significance of religious insights and the difficulty faced by certain groups. In the case of nationalism insight, those who lived in a very heterogeneous area had a bigger tendency, almost 3 times greater compared to those who lived in the ethnically homogeneous area, to declare that religious education does not completely provide the religious insights and perceive that this kind of case should be deemed as a serious problem, although the significance level was only  $p < 0.1$ . While in a case of an opportunity to introduce a certain religious view in the religious education curriculum, the respondents who lived in an ethnically very heterogeneous area possessed the tendency almost 4 times greater –and statistically significant to  $p < .05$ —compared to those who lived in an ethnically homogeneous area.

However, in contrast with the ethnic diversity, religious diversity led someone to be insensitive toward the lack of nationalism insights within religious education and the difficulty faced by certain groups to promote their religious views in the religious education curriculum. In the latter case, those who lived in a religiously heterogeneous area had a surprisingly smaller tendency (around 87 percent smaller) than that of the ones who lived in the religiously homogeneous area in comprehending the difficulties of the particular groups in promoting their religious views within religious education curriculum.

Furthermore, the result of the regression analysis also suggested that there was no significant distinction between respondents who served in the commissions dealing with the religious and education issues (Commission VIII and Commission XI) and the respondents from the other commissions. This statement can be viewed through the following cross-tabulations. Similar with the respondents from those commissions, respondents who worked in the commissions dealing with the religious and education issues, namely Commission VIII and Commission X, also had a relatively low level of concern to the issues associated with the nationalism insights, the difficulty faced by

certain groups to promote their religious or beliefs views in education curriculum, and an understanding of religious diversity in Indonesia as previously mentioned.



**Figure 5.**  
**Crucial Problems in Religious Education by Commission**  
Source: Survey of PPIM

## Religion, Politics and the DPR RI members view on the State's Role in Religious Education

This section discusses the views of the DPR RI members on the role of the state in religious education. In the first sub-section, the views of DPR RI members will be elaborated. Meanwhile, in the next sub-section, this report will specifically discuss the views of Muslim politicians in the DPR RI.


### a. The Views of DPR RI Members on the State's Role in Religious Education

To capture the views of DPR RI members on religious education policies, this research used some specific questions related to the implementation of religious education in schools. The implementation covers increasing the duration of religious learning, adding classrooms for religious learning, installing religious symbols, praying together in schools, religious lectures at schools, supplying religious

books, providing religious teachers, training religious teachers and the ideal religious teachers. Each question might comprise four answers which illustrated the diversity of their political attitudes the implementation of religious education in public schools.

As previously mentioned, this research distinguished one's orientation in religious education policy into several categories, namely averse, neutral, accommodationist, and interventionist. We attempted to observe these categories in several issues associated with religious education such as the presence of teachers, classrooms, group prayer activities, and the promotion of religious attributes or symbols in public schools. Due to the differences between the views, particularly the lack of the respondents who put themselves in the 'averse' category (except for a particular question), this report merged the 'averse' and 'neutral' categories into a 'neutral' category so that the result would be easily comprehended.


For each category of the question, the result of this survey indicated that the perceptions of DPR RI members relatively varied. For general questions in regard to religious education, most of the DPR RI members tended to be accommodative, emphasizing that the state should provide the appropriate religious education for each student in accordance with their respective religions or beliefs. Very small numbers of the DPR RI members tended to be interventionist, prioritizing the majority religious group's interest in terms of religious education. Very small numbers of members behaved 'neutrally' toward religious education in public schools. A similar tendency was also found in the cases related to praying activities in schools and the procurement of religious teachers. As shown in Figure 6, the accommodationist tendency dominated the attitudes of our respondents toward religious education, praying activities in schools, and the procurement of religious teachers.



**Figure 6.**  
**Accommodationist Tendency in Religious Education**  
 Source: Survey of PPIM

However, the majority of respondents also showed the interventionist attitude toward the establishment of worship houses in public schools, training for religious teachers and procurement of religious books. In the other words, a large number of DPR RI members agreed that the state or school had sufficiently paid attention to the majority. In the context of Indonesia, the interventionist attitude toward the establishment of worship houses was understandable considering that the ritual procedures among religions are completely different. While Indonesian people required the Muslim students to perform praying during the day (Zuhr and Asr prayer) due to the fact that Islam is deemed to be the major religion believed by most of the population, the other religions do not require the same.

Otherwise, being an interventionist toward the cases of procurement of religious books and the training for religious teachers means an agreement on the fact that religion should completely or generally manage student's life. As shown in the following figure, approximately 42.16 percent and 55.13 percent of respondents confirmed that they supported the procurement of religious textbooks and the training of religious teachers as an effort to manifest religion as the way of life for Indonesian students. The sizeable interventionist tendency might affect the religious culture in schools, given that the religions contain a variety of interpretations that might distinguish them from one another. An interventionist tendency might result in the prioritization of one particular religious understanding above another.




**Figure 7.**

**Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education**

Source: Survey of PPIM

However, it was interesting to know that, toward the other religious education policies, this survey discovered that the proportion of the DPR RI members striving for neutrality was completely huge or even the largest. The neutral attitude here meant that the respondents agreed with the opinion that the state or government should provide the right for students or citizens to express their religion without facilitating it, except for some general things that could be applied to all citizens regardless of their religion or

belief. As shown in Figure 8, this neutral attitude was to the idea of increasing the duration of religious learning, the addition of classrooms for religious learning, the installment of religious symbols in schools, religious holidays, religious extracurricular activities, and religious lectures. In pursuant to the tendency toward the latest case (religious lectures in schools), around 38.92 percent indicated a neutral tendency and almost one-third of respondents (32.97 percent) confirmed that religious teachers should not merely teach appropriate religious content conforming with the religion believed by the students, but also the content of the interfaith dialogue between different religions. In accordance with the theoretical framework described before, it indicated a tendency to be 'neutral' in describing the ideal religious teacher.



**Figure 8.**  
**Neutral Tendency in Religious Education Source: Survey of PPIM**

To demonstrate the variations of the views of the DPR RI members on religious education policy, Table 8 shows various factors that affected the likelihood of the members of the DPR RI to be interventionist in religious education. In the provision of religious textbooks, the results suggested that political party affiliation affected the respondents' views. Compared to the respondents from PDI Perjuangan, respondents from PAN, PKS, and PPP had a greater tendency to be interventionist than neutral. Compared to the respondents from PDI Perjuangan, respondents from PKS and PPP were nearly nine times more likely to be interventionist than neutral on providing religious textbooks. Besides, respondents from PKS and PPP were nearly three times and a half more likely than the respondents from PDIP to be accommodationist than neutral on providing religious textbooks.



**Table 8.**  
**Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education**

	Religious Textbooks		Training for Religious Teachers	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Komisi	0.89 (0.38)	0.82 (0.38)	2.01 (0.44)	1.87 (0.48)
Demokrat	1.14 (0.64)	1.94 (0.60)	1.41 (0.65)	2.59 (0.69)
Gerindra	2.03 (0.54)	0.91 (0.58)	2.07 (0.58)	1.44 (0.66)
Golkar	1.80 (0.55)	2.04 (0.54)	2.00 (0.56)	1.64 (0.63)
NasDem	2.03 (0.60)	2.57 (0.59)	0.85 (0.56)	1.14 (0.62)
PAN	5.00** (0.73)	3.06 (0.75)	6.15*** (0.84)	3.60 (0.92)
PDI Perjuangan	-	-	-	-
PKB	0.90 (0.50)	0.48 (0.53)	1.20 (0.51)	0.89 (0.59)
PKS & PPP#	8.69*** (0.73)	5.88** (0.74)	3.46* (0.73)	6.50** (0.76)
Religion	4.52*** (0.47)	2.19* (0.38)	1.48 (0.45)	0.95 (0.50)
Gender	1.68 (0.36)	2.03* (0.38)	0.28*** (0.46)	0.45* (0.50)
Java	0.44** (0.33)	0.64 (0.34)	0.50*** (0.34)	0.61 (0.38)
Diverse Religion	2.31* (0.44)	3.74*** (0.48)	0.62 (0.49)	1.18 (0.54)
Highly Diverse Religion	9.30** (0.91)	3.97 (0.91)	1.22 (0.86)	0.20 (1.01)
Diverse Ethnic	0.29** (0.60)	0.16*** (0.62)	0.82 (0.62)	0.56 (0.66)
Highly Diverse Ethnic	0.23 (0.91)	0.35 (0.88)	0.28 (0.90)	0.90 (0.93)
Constant	0.43 (0.74)	0.55 (0.73)	7.63** (0.80)	2.86 (0.87)
AIC	791.01	791.01	747.17	747.17

\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1; Coefficients show Relative Risk Ratio; PDI Perjuangan is set as a reference group; The model includes age categories as a control variable.

# The analysis combines respondents from PKS and PPP into one group to allow statistical estimation of the effect of the affiliation with the two parties on the interventionist tendency in religious education. In the

“Religious Textbooks” Model, no respondent from PPP showed a neutral preference in the provision of religious textbooks. Similarly, no respondent from PKS showed a neutral preference on the provision of training for religious teachers (The Training for Religious Teachers Model). As a result, the estimated coefficients for the two parties were highly inflated as the confidence intervals for the coefficients were zero. To solve this problem, we combine respondents from PKS and PPP into one group. Source: Processed from Survey of PPIM

In this Table, PDI Perjuangan became a reference group. In addition to the variables above, regression analysis was performed by controlling age and gender influence.

In the case of religious teacher training, the results of regression analysis suggested that respondents from PAN and PKS had a greater tendency to be interventionist than being neutral. As shown in the table 8, the respondents from PAN had a tendency more than six times greater than respondents from PDI Perjuangan to be interventionist rather than being neutral in religious teacher’s training. Meanwhile, as compared to the respondents from the PDI Perjuangan, respondents from PKS and PPP were more than three times more likely to be interventionist than being neutral in the case of religious teacher’s training. In addition to political parties, interventionist members of the DPR RI in providing religious textbooks and training for religious teachers were also established by other factors such as regional origins and social conditions. Regression results suggested that as compared to non-Muslim respondents, Muslim respondents have more than four and a half times greater tendency to be interventionist than being neutral in supplying religious textbooks. Meanwhile, as compared to the respondents from outside Java, respondents from Java had a little tendency to be interventionist rather than neutral in the supply of religious textbooks. As compared to those who lived in an area with homogeneous ethnical backgrounds, respondents with heterogeneous ethnical backgrounds also had a little tendency to be interventionist than being neutral in the procurement of worship houses.

Contrary to ethnic diversity, it turns out that religion diversity in residential areas increased the tendency to be interventionist rather than being neutral. The result of regression analysis suggested that those who live in religiously heterogeneous environments had a greater tendency up to 1.25 times than those who live in religiously homogeneous environments to be interventionist rather than being neutral in providing the religious textbooks. Religion positively affected the increase in interventionist tendencies along with the increase of diversity in a religious environment. Respondents who lived in religiously heterogeneous environments had a tendency more than nine times greater compared to those living in religiously homogeneous environments to be interventionist rather than being neutral in the procurement of religious textbooks.

The fluence of diversity in a residential environment, both religiously and ethnically, did not affect the respondent's views on a policy of religious teacher's training.

Table 9 indicates a neutral tendency amid the members of the DPR RI. From several jurisdictions in which the neutral tendency obtained considerable support, the views on the ideal religious teachers and the additional duration of religious learning depicted the idea as to what extent do the political parties affect the respondent's neutral tendency in religious education policy.

The affiliation of the political party became one of the significant factors clarifying the attitude of the DPR RI members toward the idea of ideal religious teachers. As compared to the respondents from PKS, respondents from Demokrat, Gerindra, Golkar, NasDem, PDI Perjuangan, and PKB had a greater neutral tendency than being interventionists. The greatest tendency could be found in the respondents from NasDem and PDI Perjuangan. As compared to respondents from PKS, the respondents from NasDem had a greater tendency to be neutral (almost 12 times greater) than being interventionists in determining the ideal religious teachers. Having a slightly fewer neutral tendency than that of respondents from NasDem, the percentage of the neutral tendency of the respondents from PDI Perjuangan was nine times greater than that of respondents from PKS in determining the ideal religious teachers.

In the case of additional duration for religious learning, the respondents from PDI Perjuangan were the only ones who behaved differently from PKS. As compared to the latest respondent group, respondents from PDI Perjuangan had a greater neutral tendency (more than three times greater) than being interventionist in dealing with the suggestion to increase the duration of religious teaching.

**Table 9.**  
**Neutral Tendency in Religious Education**

	<b>Ideal Religious Teacher</b>		<b>Additional Duration</b>	
	Neutral	Accomodationist	Neutral	Accomodationist
Komisi	1.10 (0.41)	0.94 (0.36)	1.53 (0.36)	0.97 (0.39)
Demokrat	3.83* (0.80)	2.01 (0.63)	2.59 (0.69)	0.94 (0.76)
Gerindra	7.06** (0.80)	4.53** (0.63)	1.64 (0.63)	1.21 (0.65)
Golkar	4.71** (0.79)	4.14** (0.62)	1.34 (0.64)	0.81 (0.67)

	Ideal Religious Teacher		Additional Duration	
	Neutral	Accomodationist	Neutral	Accomodationist
NasDem	11.85*** (0.82)	3.58* (0.70)	1.80 (0.65)	0.46 (0.71)
PAN	0.62 (1.00)	2.12 (0.60)	1.40 (0.71)	1.68 (0.70)
PKB	8.20*** (0.74)	2.36 (0.61)	0.99 (0.59)	0.52 (0.63)
PKS	-	-	-	-
PPP	2.54 (0.94)	2.11 (0.75)	0.80 (0.75)	0.47 (0.82)
Religion	0.38* (0.53)	1.63 (0.54)	0.13*** (0.78)	0.34 (0.85)
Heterogeneous Religion	1.40 (0.53)	0.62 (0.45)	2.63** (0.40)	2.10* (0.45)
Very Heterogeneous Religion	0.35 (1.03)	0.51 (0.93)	3.43 (0.85)	2.81 (1.00)
Heterogeneous Ethnic	0.35 (0.68)	0.47 (0.61)	0.96 (0.47)	2.18 (0.57)
Very Heterogeneous Ethnic	0.53 (1.06)	0.96 (0.96)	0.97 (0.77)	0.92 (0.95)
Constant	1.49 (1.07)	2.01 (0.95)	1.428 (1.04)	1.45 (1.17)
AIC	756.79	756.79	756.84	756.84

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Coefficient Indicated Relative Risk Ratio

PDI Perjuangan becomes a reference group. In addition to the variables above, regression analysis was performed by controlling age and gender influence.

Source: Processed from the survey of PPIM


## b. Muslim Politicians' View in the DPR RI on Role of the State in Religious Education

309 people out of the 370 members of the DPR RI who participated in this survey declared that they were Muslim. This section is made specifically for a discussion on the group of Muslim respondents in regard to their views on religious education. It is important to note that Islam has many kinds of religious traditions. In Indonesia, there are two types of religious traditions having the greatest influence, namely NU and Muhammadiyah. Numerous other Islamic religious traditions out of those religious traditions also existed

amid the society, including Nahdlatul Waton, al-Washliyah, al-Khairat, and Tarbiyyah. However, not a few of Indonesian Muslims do not feel close to any Islamic organization.

In the DPR RI, particularly those participating in this survey, NU and Muhammadiyah were the two religious traditions mostly adhered to and practiced. Approximately 46.49 percent of respondents acknowledged that they were close to the religious tradition promoted by NU, while around 14.32 percent of respondents claimed that they were close to Muhammadiyah traditions. The remaining 4.86 percent acknowledged that they were close to other religious traditions outside NU and Muhammadiyah, while the 34.32 percent of the Muslim respondents said that they were not familiar with any Islamic traditions. Due to some considerations, or mainly due to the lack of total respondents who were close to religious traditions outside Muhammadiyah and NU, thus, this report was only focused on the observation of the respondents who were close to Muhammadiyah and NU, as well as any religious organizations.

With regard to the aforesaid limitation, the Figure 9 shows the distribution of Muslim politicians in accordance with religious traditions. Firstly, PAN is a political party that was selected mostly by those acknowledging the religious tradition of Muhammadiyah. Around 41.51 percent of respondents who claimed to be close to Muhammadiyah were affiliated with PAN. PKS (20.75 percent) was selected as the second choice of a political party for the respondents who were close to Muhammadiyah traditions. Aside from the two parties, a number of respondents claiming to be close to Muhammadiyah tradition were affiliated with Gerindra and Golkar. Around 13.21 percent and 11.32 percent of respondents who are close to religious tradition Muhammadiyah perceived Gerindra and Golkar as their political house parties.




**Figure 9**  
**Distribution of Muslim Politicians in the DPR RI**  
Source: Survey of PPIM

Contrary to the respondents confirming to be close to Muhammadiyah, those who acknowledged that they were close to NU were mostly affiliated with PKB and PDI Perjuangan. Around 29,1 percent of respondents who were close to NU was affiliated with the PKB, and meanwhile around 15,7 percent was affiliated with PDI Perjuangan. In addition to the two aforementioned parties, NasDem and Golkar were considered as the best-chosen political parties by the respondents who were familiar with NU, in which approximately 11.63 percent of respondents (close to the tradition of NU) considered NasDem and Golkar as the political house parties.


Meanwhile, those confirming that they were not close to any Islamic traditions stated that they were affiliated with Gerindra, Demokrat, and Golkar. Around 25.76 percent of respondents (clarifying that they were not familiar with any Islamic religious tradition) were affiliated with Gerindra, while approximately 22.73 percent clarified that they were affiliated with Demokrat. Golkar and PDI Perjuangan subsequently will be the second choice after Gerindra and Demokrat. While 13.64 percent of the respondents (acknowledging that they were not close to any Islamic traditions) confirmed that they were affiliated with Golkar, around 12.12 percent of the respondents (who were not close to any Islamic traditions) clarified that they were affiliated with PDI Perjuangan.

The political affiliation of Muslim politicians is shown in the following figure. The number of respondents who were familiar with Muhammadiyah tradition was concentrated in the Modernist Islamic party. Meanwhile, those who were close to NU religious tradition were spread throughout many types of parties, with the greatest proportion acquired by Traditionalist Islamic parties and Nationalist Parties. Meanwhile, respondents who are close to other Islamic traditions were concentrated in Nationalist-Religious parties. Lastly, respondents who were unfamiliar with any Islamic traditions mostly chose to be affiliated with Modernist Islamic parties.





**Figure 10.**  
**Distribution of Muslim Politicians based on Parties' Political Identity**  
 Source: Survey of PPIM


We have successfully seen the difference between the tendencies of religious traditions (particularly between Muhammadiyah and NU) according to the distribution of Muslim politicians in the DPR RI and the diversity of political parties. As shown in the following figure, the proportion of Muslim politicians who were close to the NU tradition decreased along with the reduction of the diversity of the party (in the aspect of social-religion). Otherwise, the actual proportion of Muslim politicians who were close to Muhammadiyah decreased along with the increment of diversity of a party (in the aspect of social-religion).



**Figure 11.**  
**Distribution of Muslim Politicians based on Parties Diversity**  
Source: Survey of PPIM


The difference between respondents who were close to Muhammadiyah and those who were close to NU could be seen in several issues associated with religious education. The following figures suggest that the proportion of the respondents who were acknowledged to be close to NU looked slightly greater than the proportion of the respondents who claimed to be close to the Muhammadiyah in the case of acknowledgment for the issues related to nationalism insights, the right of minorities to promote their values in religious education, and the issues of religious diversity in religious education. However, given that the distinction was relatively small, a further statistical test to observe the significance of the difference was still required.





**Figure 12.**  
**Muslim Politicians' Views on the Major Problems in Religious Education**  
 Source: Survey of PPIM

In regard to the religious education policies, the results of this survey suggested that, in several cases, respondents who were close to the NU tradition showed a less interventionist tendency (meaning that they were being more neutral) than those who were close to the Muhammadiyah tradition. It can be seen in the case of worship houses establishment and the procurement of religious textbooks in schools. Regarding the establishment of worship houses, approximately 58.49 percent of the respondents who were acknowledged to be close to the Muhammadiyah tradition, showed an interventionist tendency. On the contrary, 'only' 44.77 percent of respondents who were acknowledged to be close to the NU tradition showed an interventionist tendency toward a similar issue. Both groups of Muslim politicians also showed a different interventionist tendency toward the procurement of religious books. Around 50.94 percent of the respondents who were close to the Muhammadiyah tradition clarified that they chose to be interventionist when it comes to the procurement of religious textbooks. However, there was 'only' 41.28 percent of the respondents from the NU group who expresses the same tendency (interventionist tendencies).




**Figure 13.**  
**Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education amid Muslim Politicians**  
 Source: Survey of PPIM

In addition, the respondents from the Muhammadiyah and NU religious traditions shows a relatively different tendency in the cases of the increment of religious learning



duration and the description of the ideal religious teachers. In both cases, the proportion of respondents from the Muhammadiyah group who revealed a 'neutral' tendency was significantly smaller than the proportion of respondents from NU who revealed the same tendency.



**Figure 14.**  
**Neutral Tendency on Religious Education amid Muslim Politicians**  
**Source: Survey of PPIM**

## Political Parties and Religious Education Policies

The results of some regression analysis discussed in the previous sections suggested that political party affiliation was associated with the views of DPR RI members on the policy of religious education. The respondents who came from the parties such as PKS and PPP showed a greater interventionist tendency while those who came from the parties such as PDI Perjuangan and NasDem showed a greater neutral tendency. What explicates these distinctions? To answer this question, this section will observe the effect of differences between the parties on the variations in the views of members of the DPR RI. The answer to this question should be useful to explain the differences in the views of DPR RI members on the direction for religious education policy, but also to explain the things that fundamentally underlie the inter-party differences associated with their position in religious education policy.

As previously mentioned, to observe deeply the differences between the political parties and their influence on the views of the DPR RI members on religious education policy, this report would review the political identity and party diversity in the context of religion. Political identity referred to the extent of the religion or nation is considered as the basis or the foremost reference for political parties in establishing their identity. In this study, religious diversity was referred to as the level of diversity in the context of religion believed by party

members or the political elites. In this report, the level of diversity would be judged by the number of non-Muslim members (as per party) working in DPR RI. Therefore, the parties in the DPR RI might be classified as follows:

**Table 10.**  
**Parties Classification in the DPR RI**

<b>Category of Party I (Political Identity)</b>		<b>Category of Party II (Religion Diversity)</b>	
<b>Type of Party</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Type of Party</b>	<b>Party</b>
Modernist Islam	PAN,PKS,PPP	Slightly Heterogeneous	DEMOKRAT, GERINDRA, PAN, PKB
Traditionalist Islam	PKB	Heterogeneous	GOLKAR, NasDem
Nationalist	PDI Perjuangan, NasDem	Completely Heterogeneous	PDIPerjuangan
Nationalist-Religious	DEMOKRAT, GERINDRA, GOLKAR	Not Heterogeneous	PKS, PPP

Although both classification systems were related, they had significant differences as well. The second classification ignored the differences among the Islamic religious traditions by merging PAN and PKB in one type of party. Meanwhile, the first classification ignored religious diversity within the parties. In regard to the religious compositions, PAN was slightly more heterogeneous when compared to PKS and PPP which were not extremely heterogeneous. PDI Perjuangan and NasDem had a level of religious diversity which completely different from that of PAN. However, the question as to which one of these two classification models can better explicate the differences among parties in viewing religious policies was considered an empirical issue requiring further observation. Hence, this report analyzes the effect of both classification models on the variation of DPR RI member’s views on religious education.

Table 11 and Table 12 would respectively provide the results of multinomial regression analysis on the influence of the party’s political identity and religious diversity in regard to the interventionist tendencies in education policy. Both factors - political party identity and religious diversity, indicated the variance of the views of the DPR RI members appropriately. Table 11 suggested that respondents from Modernist Islamic parties had a greater tendency (than that of the respondents from Nationalist parties) to be an interventionist rather than being neutral toward the religious education policy. Meanwhile, table 12 suggested that

respondents from non-heterogeneous parties had a greater tendency (when compared to the respondents from extremely heterogeneous parties) to be neutral rather than being interventionist toward religious education policies.

However, the AIC number in each model stated in table 11 was smaller at all times than that of table 12. This result suggested that the model which used the party's political identity as an independent variable (table 11) had a better ability to clarify the variations in the data. In other words, the political identity of the party could indicate the difference of the DPR RI member's perception of religious education policy in a better way rather than indicating the religious diversity of the Indonesian party.

**Table 11.**  
**Party's Political Identity and Interventionist Tendency on Religious Education Policy**

	Supply of Religious Book		Religious Teacher's Training	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Modernist Islam	5.37*** (0.54)	3.08** (0.55)	4.88*** (0.56)	4.50*** (0.59)
Traditionalist Islam	0.71 (0.45)	0.35** (0.49)	1.30 (0.47)	0.84 (0.54)
Nationalist	-	-	-	-
Nationalist-Religious	1.36 (0.38)	1.12 (0.37)	1.99* (0.38)	1.70 (0.42)
AIC	784.87	784.87	739.73	739.73

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Coefficient suggested Relative Risk Ratio

In this table, the Nationalist Party became a reference group. Besides controlling the aforementioned variables, regression analysis was performed by controlling the influence of commission membership, regional origin, age, gender, and socio-environmental conditions of a resident.

Source: Processed from Survey of PPIM

**Table 12.**  
**Party's Diversity and Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education Policy**

	Supply of Religious Textbooks		Training for Religious Teacher	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Slightly Heterogeneous	1.56 (0.42)	1.22 (0.38)	2.07 (0.42)	1.43 (0.48)
Heterogeneous	1.88 (0.47)	2.21* (0.46)	1.97 (0.46)	1.62 (0.51)

	Supply of Religious Textbooks		Training for Religious Teacher	
	Interventionist	Accommodationist	Interventionist	Accommodationist
Completely Heterogeneous	-	-	-	-
Non-heterogeneous	8.80*** (0.73)	5.78***( 0.74)	0.83* (0.73)	1.11** (0.76)
AIC	790.32	790.32	742.59	742.59

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. The Coefficient showed Relative Risk Ratio

The 'Extremely Heterogeneous' party in this table served as the reference group. Besides controlling the variables above, a regression analysis was performed by controlling the effect of commission membership, regional origin, age, gender, and socio-environmental conditions of the resident.

Source: Processed from Survey of PPIM

Being different from table 11 and table 12, the two tables below suggested the results of multinomial regression of the influence of the party's political identity and religious diversity on the tendency of the DPR RI members in selecting religious education policies. Each model, whether it was using the party's political identity or religious diversity, might explain the difference between the views of the DRP RI members in establishing religious education policies. In the case of an ideal religious teacher, Table 13 suggested that respondents from the Nationalist, Traditionalist Islamic parties, and Nationalist-Religious parties possess a greater tendency to be neutral rather than being interventionist as compared to the respondents from the Modernist Islamic party. However, in a case of the additional duration of religious teaching, it was only the respondents from the Nationalist party who had a greater tendency to have a 'neutral' point of view rather than an interventionist as compared to the respondents from the Modernist Islamic.

As compared with the two models in table 13, both models in table 14 might also explicate the influence of religious diversity on the tendency variation of the DPR RI members' in establishing the religious education policies. As compared to respondents from non-heterogeneous parties, respondents from parties that were slightly heterogeneous, heterogeneous, and extremely heterogeneous in the context of religion had a greater neutral tendency than interventionist tendency. In the case of the addition of learning duration, the second model in Table 14 might also clarify the data in an appropriate way. This model suggested that the respondents from the 'extremely heterogeneous parties' is the only one who had a greater tendency to strive for neutrality in establishing education policies.

However, when we take a deeper look, it would be discovered that each model in Table 14 had a greater AIC value than the AIC value in each model in Table 13. By taking into account that both models had the same total independent variables in the analysis, the value distinction

indicated that the two models in Table 13 had a relatively more developed ability in denoting the variations in the data.

**Table 13.**  
**Political Party's Identity and Neutral Tendency in Religious Education Policies**

	Ideal Teachers		Addition of Teaching Duration	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Modernist Islam	-	-	-	-
Traditionalist Islam	7.05*** (0.58)	1.43 (0.51)	0.97 (0.46)	0.50 (0.51)
	Ideal Teachers		Addition of Teaching Duration	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Nationalist-Religious	4.42*** (0.49)	2.10** (0.37)	1.69 (0.39)	0.94 (0.41)
AIC	743.80	743.80	742.76	742.76

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Coefficient showed Relative Risk Ratio

The 'Modernist Islam' party in this table served as the reference group. Besides controlling the variables above, regression analysis was performed by controlling the influence of commissions membership, regional origins, age, gender, and social conditions.

Source: Processed from the Survey of PPIM

**Table 14.**  
**Party's Diversity and Interventionist Tendency in Religious Education Policies**

	Ideal Teachers		Learning Duration Increased	
	Neutral	Accommodationist	Neutral	Accommodationist
Slightly Heterogeneous	3.12** (0.52)	1.99 (0.42)	1.56 (0.43)	1.26 (0.46)
Heterogeneous	5.36*** (0.59)	3.01** (0.50)	1.71 (0.48)	0.85 (0.53)
Extremely Heterogeneous	6.36*** (0.64)	2.15 (0.57)	3.41** (0.58)	1.35 (0.66)
Non Heterogeneous	-	-	-	-
AIC	759.44	759.44	748.05	748.05

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Coefficient suggested Relative Risk Ratio

In this table, the 'Non-Heterogeneous' party served as the reference group. Besides controlling the variables above, a regression analysis was carried out by controlling the influence of commission membership, regional origin, age, gender, and social conditions.

Source: Processed from the Survey of PPIM

## Conclusion

Some important things have been discussed in the previous sections. Firstly, the result of this survey indicated that most of DPR RI members do not pay big attention to the issues of nationalism insights, access for certain groups to promote their religious views to the religious education curriculum, and the understanding of religious diversity in religious education. Only 19.46 percent of 370 the respondents interviewed in this survey viewed the lack of nationalism insights in religious education as a serious problem. The proportion of respondents who considered the lack of proper understanding of diversity in Indonesia as a serious problem was even less. It was only 12.16 percent of the total of 370 respondents. In regard to the increment of intolerant (or exclusive) views and behavior toward religion in the school environment, it must be bad news for the DPR RI as a state's high-level institution whose function is to maintain the diversity of this country..

Secondly, the result of this survey also shows the diversity of DPR RI member's perceptions about the role of a state in religious education. Most of the respondents of this survey reveal that they have accommodationist tendency toward the policy of the basic religious education form, including religious teaching, praying activity, and the procurement of religious teachers. However, quite a lot of respondents show an interventionist tendency toward the state or school policies on the establishment of worship facilitation, religious textbooks procurement, and training for religious teachers. Meanwhile, in the cases related to the enrichment of religious education, many respondents reveal neutral tendencies in determining the role of a country in education.

In several cases, the varied point of view provides insignificant space for some people to obtain political support for establishing an inclusive culture and appreciating other religions believers in schools. Whereas, amid the increment of intolerant behavior or opinion in the school environment, the proportion of respondents possessing interventionist views on crucial cases such as training for religious teachers and the supply of proper religious textbooks is relatively huge that it should acquire special attention. In the midst of an accommodative perspective that dominates the policies of religious education form, the level of interventionist tendency is relatively huge which allows the state to control the religious activities of the citizens, or the students, in

schools. This kind of situation reduces the opportunity of creating a school culture which is more inclusive and respectful to the religious diversity among students.

Thirdly, this research also discovers that political parties have a huge impact on how a member of the DPR RI views the role of the state in religious education. The diversity of political party affiliation indicates the difference between the respondent's views on the direction of religious education policies. In other words, respondents from certain parties have a greater interventionist or neutral tendency than the respondents from the other parties. For example, the result of our logistic regression analysis shows that respondents from PAN, PKS, and PPP have a greater interventionist tendency than being neutral in providing the religious textbooks in schools. A similar situation can also be discovered in a case of training for religious teachers (except for respondents from PPP).

As for the characteristics of political parties affecting the difference between the views of respondents, this study discovers that the political identity of Indonesian parties has a fairly close relationship with the views of DPR RI members on the state's role in religious education. Respondents from the Nationalist parties have a greater neutral tendency in perceiving religious education policy (particularly in the case of learning duration increment) than the respondents from Modernist Islamic parties. Conversely, the respondents from Modernist Islamic parties have a greater interventionist tendency in perceiving religious education, especially in the case of providing the religious books and training the religious teachers, compared to respondents from Nationalist parties. For the public and particularly the elements of civil society who keep an eye on nationalism and diversity issues in religious education arising in public schools, the result of this study provides a clear picture of the political map of DPR RI in regard with the position of political parties and the underlying factors to perceive the state's role in religious education.

As the closing statement, the results of this survey show that during the increment of intolerant attitudes/views in the school environment, DPR RI which serves as a high state institution that plays a significant role in establishing the direction of religious education policy shows an unclear attitude or position in addressing the issue. Furthermore, the proportion of the DPR RI members who consider the cases of national insights, understanding of religious diversity, and the access for certain groups to introduce their religious views to the education curriculum as an important issue which requires special attention is relatively small. Several DPR RI members show an interventionist tendency while determining the role or position of the state in religious education.

Those cases indicate the importance of the efforts of the DPR RI in increasing the understanding of its members about the fundamental issues in religious education, particularly associated

with the DPR RI's significant role in maintaining diversity and national unity. Political parties also have a great responsibility to prepare their cadres serving in the DPR RI, particularly those who will be in the commissions dealing with education and religion affairs, so that they could properly grasp the intricacies of religious education issues, and address some problems, especially the problem of nationalism, diversity and the increment of religious intolerance. Without an active role of legislative institutions to keep an eye on the direction of government policies and resulted in impacts, it would be difficult for the state to deal with the problems due to the increment of religious intolerance, as well as to embody a school culture that seems to be more tolerant and respectful to another religion.

Furthermore, due to the great challenges faced by the DPR RI in handling its weaknesses, legislative members and political parties, should grant a broader democratic control to the various elements of civil society so that they could express their aspirations and interests about the establishment of some regulations related to religious education in public schools. At the central level, the DPR RI and its political parties should provide wider participation spaces for civil society in the process of discussing the revision of the National Education Laws that would be proposed by several groups. The right to control democracy should not be given merely to the representatives of the major groups, but also to those who have been religiously marginalized or discriminated so that the rights of minority groups in religious education could be maintained.

Democratic control space should not be provided merely at the national level, but also at the local and school sectors. In the case of formulation of schools' regulations/policies in regard with religious education, the larger space should be provided for people's representatives, particularly students guardian, in order to maintain and guarantee that each student, regardless their religion whatsoever, acquire religious education service and proper treatment in their school. These things are required when we want to embody a school equipped with a 'diversity-friendly' culture and respect for the differences among the students in the school environment.



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**Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta** is an autonomous research agency under Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. PPIM UIN Jakarta was established in 1994 and continuously conducting research, advocacy, and publication of life matters and religious education issues in Indonesia. Together with UNDP Indonesia, PPIM UIN Jakarta since 2017 performed a program called Countering Violent Extremism for Youth (CONVEY) Indonesia. A program that is aimed to promote peace in Indonesia by observing the potency of religious education and discovering the issues of tolerance, diversity, and violence amid youth generation. Furthermore, PPIM UIN Jakarta has successfully published a Journal under the name of **Studia Islamika**. It is an international journal covering Islamic studies in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.







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