



# GEN Z:

## UNCERTAINTY IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

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# **GEN Z:**

## **UNCERTAINTY IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY**

**Gen Z:  
Anxiety in Religious Identity**

Translated from original book titled  
*"Gen Z: Kegagalan Identitas Keagamaan"*,  
published by PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2018.

ISBN 978-623-94591-8-5

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# FOREWORD

This book is a result of PPIM 2017 National Survey on the Attitude Toward Diversity among School/College Students and Teachers/Lecturers at Schools and Universities in Indonesia, which is part of a series of CONVEY Programs, a collaboration between PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP Indonesia. The many discussions herein primarily focus on school/college students and were made possible thanks to the close cooperation of some great people and institutions. We would like to take the opportunity to convey our indebtedness to everyone who has provided meaningful contributions for the survey execution and completion.

First of all, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to Ms. Sachiko and Mr. Syamsul Tarigan from UNDP, who have remained warmly close to us throughout the entire CONVEY activities. Our gratitude also goes direct to Prof. Dr. Phil., Kamaruddin Amin, MA., Hamid Muhammad M.Sc., Ph.D. Prof. Intan Ahmad, Ph.D., Prof. Dr. Jamhari Makruf, Ph.D and Amich Alhumami MA, M.Ed, Ph.D., who were all present as speakers during the launching of the survey. To all of the senior researchers at PPIM who have refined the research concepts, instruments and reports, we also express our gratitude, especially to Saiful Umam, Ph.D., Ismatu Ropi, Ph.D., Didin Syafruddin, Ph.D., Din Wahid, Ph.D., Jajang Jahroni, Ph.D., Dadi Darmadi, Ph.D., and Ali Munhanif, Ph.D. We also thank everyone at PPIM for their support to the survey activities.

Our immense gratitude should be expressed to the 34 provincial field coordinators and enumerators who have shown tremendous dedication in collecting survey data and in performing spot-checks throughout Indonesia for the sake of data quality assurance. We would also like to thank our partners in the 6 cities during the survey-results dissemination—starting from Medan to Palembang, Yogyakarta, Makassar, Surabaya and finally Banjarmasin. In addition, our thanks should go to Ananda Findez and Bang Ali for their cooperation in turning the survey instrument into a Computerized Assisted Program (CAT); to Mr. Oryz and Mr. Iwin who have created the infographics; and to Ms. Dita and Mr. Abda who painstakingly monitored the entire activities. Last but not least, we thank all the school/college students and teachers/lecturers as our survey respondents.

Above all, as the team of authors of this book we are fully responsible for every mistake and flaw this book may contain. We hope the book will prove itself to be useful.

The Author Team

# 1 Gen Z: An Uncertainty Generation

Being young is probably the best time to freely express ourselves: our work, our language, and all forms of our creativity. Almost everyone agrees that the youth have their own style that may be hard to understand by older people or even by their own seniors. Of all the freedom of expressions that the youth have, some kind of connection can be seen from any current trend affecting themselves, which is typically started by one young influencer who dares to initiate something, which then gets copied by other young people.

For example, we can see many young people today build their own businesses simply by “copying” the business models of other youths. The general problem is that most of them are uncertain about the paths they want to take in life. *Galau* is the word. This peculiar Indonesian word does not translate easily into foreign languages. Such English words as “uncertainty, confused, restless, hesitant, doubtful, and inconsistent” need to be lumped up together to be its closest synonym.

But why do many young people tend to be easily uncertain? According to the Markplus Insight survey titled Youth Monitoring 2015 to 6,798 respondents in 18 cities in Indonesia (Okii Witjaksono, 2016), many young people are uncertain because of the uncertain nature of self-defined targets or desires they wish to achieve; most youths create their own definitions of success, typically based on their perception of others. Suffice it to say here that youthful discontent stems from their own ever-shifting standards.



However, some of them are also attracted by the idea of being different lest they are perceived as being part of the herd. This type of youth tends to have their own standard on what is good for them. It is actually fine for the young to have targets to achieve. It is undeniable that many young people tend to copy other young people's ideas.

So, are you one of those young people uncertain with life's goals? If that's the case, you need to do these simple things: first, know your future goals; then, fight the tendency to "follow" others because this would give you indecision. Develop a firm principle or standard of your own as it will help to make you a better and more stable person. In this way, you will become a youth who can avoid uncertainty.

This book is titled "Gen Z: Uncertainty in Religious Identity." Here comes a little explanation of the title. Generation Z is the generation born between 1995 and 2000. Their age range is in the 20s. When this book was being written, they would at most be at college-level, perhaps doing an undergraduate program. They are also known as the gadget generation. Colloquially, they are also referred to as the "kids nowadays" (youth of today). In the discipline of psychology, Generation Z are entering their adolescent stage of late teenage years.

Several scholars and psychologists who study teenager psychology have different opinions about what constitutes the boundaries of late teenage years. Papalia and Olds (1996) state that late teenage is between the ages of 17 and 19-20. Adam and Gullota (2000) agree that teenage is anywhere between 11-20. Hurlock divides it into two phases: early teenage (13-16/17 years old) and late teenage (16/17-18 years old). Sri Rumini and Siti Sundari classify teenage years into three phases: early teenage (12-15 years old), mid-teenage (15-18 years old), and late teenage (18-21 years old) whilst Prof. Dr. Sarlito W. S. defines teenagers as those aged between 11-24 years old.

### **Characteristics of Late Teenagers**

What are the characteristics of late teenagers? As every

developmental stage has different characteristics, teenagers have different characteristics compared to children and adults. Allport (Sarrito, 2006), in his study on the psychology of teenagers, provides his opinions on the teenage period by dividing it into the following characterizations:

1. Extension of the self

In this characteristic, teenagers exhibit an ability to turn other people or things as part of themselves. If during childhood they showed a strong tendency to be selfish, they will be less so in this period. It is followed up by acts of empathy that they show others.

2. Self-objectification

During the teenage period, some teenagers start to assess themselves (self-insight) and act calmly despite being subjects of other people's teasing and criticism (sense of humor).

3. Unifying philosophy of life

Lastly, the teenage period is signified by an understanding of how they should act. They also have a principle or philosophy embedded within. They also show a quality of not being easily swayed by other people's opinions.

### **Development of Morality and Religion in Teenagers**

During teenage years, a person will achieve post-conventional morality, i.e. a level in which he or she will defend certain principles. A teenager can be said to already have different opinions and values within himself or herself. He or she will not easily accept stiff or absolute ideas that they might have previously taken for granted. What makes teenagers unique in terms of morality is that they begin to question whether or not the ideas presented on them are true. They also start considering alternatives to such ideas.

Most late-teenagers are stabilizing and firming, meaning that they want to live courageously, to have understanding of who they are and of their paths in life, and to become aware of the goals they want to

achieve, which is often accompanied with somewhat firm principles and directions. They are becoming increasingly critical and in this respect they start to participate actively in extracurricular activities in their community. They have started educating themselves according to the influence they received. In this case, significant development may occur in their perspective on life. This is the period where they will struggle to determine what kind of adults they will become.

Traits that are exhibited during teenage years include the following:

1. Acting positively in determining an existing value system.
2. Acting with calmness and balance in their lives.
3. Becoming aware of their activeness and critical thinking. This is also exhibited during puberty (early teenagers) but they have difficulties to actually implement it.
4. Beginning to have clear and firm plans for life.
5. Becoming increasingly appreciative to history, tradition, religion, culture, ethics, aesthetics, and economy.
6. Not merely relying on sexual desire in choosing their life's partner, as they will base their decision on careful consideration in many aspects.
7. Beginning to take or determine their principles based on the values that they believe in.

The fifth trait above shows that during late teenage years, a person will start to appreciate history and tradition, including religion. With regard to religious activities, it is true that Generation Z are highly motivated to carry out Islamic activities. They are willing to learn Islam outside of formal education. Data from 2017 PPIM survey reveal that 89.40% of school/college students have learned about Islam since they were little. Eighty-one percent of them learn about Islam outside of their formal education at school or college while the rest (9.79%) only learn about Islam at school. When asked about how religious they feel about themselves, 47.71% of them believe that they are quite religious;

32.84% are convinced they are religious or very religious while 18.45% feel less religious and not religious.

Why are they called anxious people? PPIM Survey on School and College Students' Attitude toward Diversity in Indonesia, which was held from 1 – 15 October 2017, reveals that anxious tendency. On the one hand, intolerant and radical opinions among Gen Z members, as survey samples, are quite prevalent. On the other, they are less likely to commit intolerant and radical actions.

### **Level of Intolerance and Radicalism among School and College Students**

The PPIM survey shows an increase in the prevalence of radical and intolerant opinions among school/college students. The research shows that most of them have opinions that are considered intolerant/very intolerant and radical/very radical. However, in terms of action, most of them tend to be tolerant and moderate (Figure 1). Although they tend to act with moderation and tolerance, their tendency to believe in radical and intolerant ideas is quite a concern because it can potentially drive them to commit radical actions.

The religious tolerance concept employed in this research refers to the definition by Sullivan et al. (1982), i.e. the willingness to allow others or other groups to express their different ideas/interests. This research employs 2 concepts of tolerance, namely internal tolerance and external tolerance. Internal tolerance refers to a Muslim's tolerance toward fellow Muslims of different groups; for instance tolerance of a Muslim affiliated with Muhammadiyah toward another Muslim affiliated with Shia.

Meanwhile, external tolerance refers to tolerance to fellows of different faiths, such as of a Muslim to a Christian, or to a Buddhist and so on. The radicalism concept in this research refers, firstly, to that of Hafez (2015), who argues that radicalization refers to the adoption of an extremist group's perspective in order to influence a sort of social

or political change; and to the definition by O’Ashour (2009), who argues that radical people may utilize means to undermine democracy in order to achieve their political goals. This research limits radicalism to support for creating an Islamic State.




Figure 1. Proportion of school/college students by categories of internal tolerance, external tolerance, and radical opinion

Based on their statements, school/college students tend to have radical opinion. In total, students with radical and very radical opinion account for more than half of the total respondents, namely 58.5%, while those with moderate opinion only amount to 20.1%.

In terms of intolerant opinion, the data show a similar tendency. However, the percentage of intolerant opinion is different from that of tolerant opinion toward fellow Muslims and intolerant opinion toward non-Muslims. School and college students are more likely to be intolerant/very intolerant toward fellow Muslims from different groups (51.1%) than toward other faiths (34.3%). The same is also true in the level of tolerance: they are more likely to be tolerant toward people of other faiths (51.9%) than to fellow Muslims from other groups (31.1%).




Figure 2. Proportion of school/college students by categories of internal tolerance, external tolerance, and radical action

The data reveal that school/college students tend to be intolerant toward fellow Muslims than toward other believers. This internal intolerance opinion is caused by their dislike to Ahmadiyya and Shia. As many as 86.55% of them agree that the government should prohibit the existence of minority heresies that deviate from Islamic teachings. Ninety-nine % of them disagree with the idea that the government should protect Shia and Ahmadiyya followers.

As for their external intolerance opinion, most of it stems from hatred toward the Jews. Of the school/college students, 53.74% of them agree that the Jews are enemies of Islam, and 52.99% agree that they abhor Muslims. One of the triggers behind this intolerant idea can be traced to Islamic Studies textbooks that often depict the Jewish people as being unscrupulous.<sup>1</sup> The conflict between Palestinians and Israelites has also contributed to the intolerant opinion against the Jews, of which the students (55.08%) subscribe to the notion that the Muslims are victims in the conflict.

<sup>1</sup> Depiction of the Jews as unscrupulous people and enemies of Islam can be found in Islamic Studies textbook for 7<sup>th</sup>-Grader on page 197 and for 8<sup>th</sup>-Grader on page 8-9. Further explanation on this can be seen in PPIM UIN Jakarta research report, "Diseminasi Paham Eksklusif dalam Pendidikan Islam: Telaah Kebijakan dan Politik Produksi Bahan Ajar PAI (2016)."




Figure 3. Opinions on Shia, Ahmadiyya, Jews, and Christians

However, the hatred toward the Jewish does not really apply to the Christian, to whom these school/college students tend to be tolerant. Some 76.22% of them believe that Christians do not hate Muslims and they do not mind if people of other faiths seek help to Islamic institutions (70.36%). This confirms the notion that the tolerance of Generation Z Muslims, who adopt the majority religion, is only limited toward official religions recognized by the state – Christianity being one of them – but not toward other religions the state does not recognize, including Judaism.

Where do they learn about Islam? Apparently the “kids nowadays” learn about Islam from the virtual world. 54.37% school/college students do it from the internet, either from the social media, blogs or websites. Technological improvement has displaced where people can learn, especially in a society where technology has become ubiquitous. There was a time when people learned about religion from clerics in *pesantren*; now we have Mr. Google.

This change in how people learn causes website contents and religious information in social media to become the main sources of Islamic teachings for the young generation. YouTube has become a popular platform for school/college students to access Islamic teachings in addition to the knowledge they receive in school. The need for contents about religious teachings and daily practices can be fulfilled from YouTube and the many links shared on social media. Various tips, guidelines, and daily prayers are the preferred contents for Generation Z in learning about Islam.

The result of 2017 PPIM survey shows that the internet plays a significant role in the increase of radicalism and intolerance among Generation Z. School/college students without access to the internet tend to be more moderate than those with such access. The problem is that those with internet access are in the majority, i.e. 84.94%; only 15.06% school/college students have no internet access.

The types of websites and clerics that they use as references will highly influence their level of radicalism and intolerance. Even though the school/college students reported that the website they accessed most often to learn about religion was *nuonline.com*--which represents moderate Islam, they also accessed websites that represent radical Islam, such as: *eramuslim.com*, *hidayatullah.com*, *voa-islam.com*, and *arrahmah.com*. The latter websites often present news that contains radical ideas (PSBPS, 2017).

As for the most popular clerics, they are respectively: Mamah Dedeh, Yusuf Mansur, and Abdullah Gymnastiar. Then, popular



clerics on the internet are Zakir Naik, Hanan Attaki, Arifin Ilham, and Khalid Basalamah. The popularity of Zakir Naik and Khalid Basalamah is a significant concern because both of their teaching often contains radical ideas. It is unfortunate that clerics from mainstream, moderate Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah are not among the most popular clerics for school/college students. Moderate clerics such as Quraish Syihab, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Mustafa Bisri, Haedar Nasir and Nazaruddin Umar are not among the most popular clerics for school/college students.

*Perception on Islamism and government performance*

Although school/college students are dissatisfied with the government, they show strong acceptance to the national philosophies-Pancasila, NKRI (The Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia) and democracy. Over half of them (52.29%) stated that today's economic condition is bad and really bad, especially in terms of economic gaps, 43.46% believing the economic condition is quite bad. In terms of law enforcement, 69.80% stated that it ranges from less fair to so unfair.

Their negative assessment on the government's performance does not hinder their acceptance of NKRI and democracy. A majority of them still believe that NKRI and democracy are the best for Indonesia. As many as 90.16% school/college students agree that contributing to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is in line with Islamic values. Moreover, 85% agree that democracy is the best governmental system; 91.93% disagree with the idea that Indonesia, a state based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, is heretic and *thaghut* (an object of worship other than Allah).




Figure 4. Evaluation to government's performance and acceptance to NKRI and democracy

This data show that the loyalty of school/college students to NKRI and democracy is unquestionable. This condition allows us to be optimistic that the future of NKRI and stability of democracy will remain firm despite their disappointment to the government's performance in economy and law enforcement. However, economic improvement and law enforcement must continue to be the government's concern;

this structural problem must not be allowed to drive the Generation Z to be radical, or we would repeat the cases of failed states in the Middle East.

Thus, the optimism above is not without any problem. Despite their strong acceptance to NKRI, Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and democracy, they also show a strong aspiration for the implementation of Islamic sharia. 91.23% school/college students agree that Islamic sharia needs to be implemented in the state system, and 61.92% are under the impression of Caliphate being a governmental system that is recognized under Islamic teaching.

### *Gender*

If we disaggregate the demography based on gender, both female and male students tend to have radical opinions on religion, respectively 60.4% of females and 56.2% of males. Of those with moderate opinions, 18.2% of them are females and 22.4% are males.

Despite their mostly radical opinions on religion, they tend to act with moderation. The data show 75.6% of female students and 72.7% of male students have moderate-tolerance actions. Those exhibiting radical actions only stand at 6.1% for females and 8% for males.

On the level of intolerance, the majority of Muslim students are tolerant to other believers. The data show that 53.4% of females and 53.4% males are tolerant. However, if we look at the percentage of intolerance, it is still a quite large proportion, with 36.5% of males and 32.4% female being intolerant. They tend to be intolerant toward fellow Muslims from different groups. The data also show that the males tend to be more intolerant (53.7%) than the females (48.9%).

### *Socioeconomic Status*

There is no significant correlation between economic status and radical opinion. It means that students with lower-income parents are not necessarily more radical than those of higher income, and

vice versa. For example, the proportion of radical-opinion among the students whose parents have monthly income < (below) Rp 1 million is 59.1% whereas those with income between Rp 1 - 2.5 million is 63.2%, those with income between Rp 5 - 7.5 million being 63.4%.

However, when it comes to action, there is a significant correlation between socioeconomic status and radical action. Students whose parents have lower income tend to be more radical than those with higher income. The percentage of students exhibiting radical action is highest among those whose parents have monthly income < Rp 1 million (10.3%), followed by Rp 1 - 2.5 million (6.3%), Rp 2.5 - 5 million (6.2%), Rp 5 - 7.5 million (8%), and the lowest among those with income > (above) Rp 7.5 million (4%).

However, with regard to intolerant opinions toward non-Muslim, students with a low socioeconomic status tend to be more tolerant, i.e. 50% among those whose parents have income < Rp 1 million, followed by 53.3% of those with income between Rp 1 - 2.5 million, 48.9% for those with income between Rp 2.5 - 5 million, and 44% for those with income > Rp 7.5 million. These data show consistency in the level of intolerance, namely those whose parents have monthly income above Rp 7.5 million are the most intolerant (around 52%), while the others below that percentage is ranged between 31.8% and 37.1%.

In terms of tolerance-action to other believers, it is distributed quite evenly across all income levels. On average, 50% of each income group exhibits tolerance toward other believers. Next, 63.3% students whose parents have income below Rp 1 million show tolerance to other believers, followed by 69.4% with income of Rp 1 - 7.5 million.

This study finds that socioeconomic status does not have significant correlation with radical opinion – except for radical action – nor with their intolerant opinion and action. For example, students of a higher socioeconomic status can have a higher level of intolerance while those of the lowest socioeconomic status (below Rp 1 million income) can be more tolerant. As such, the factors driving a person to become

intolerant and radical are complex: socioeconomic status is not the main factor of radicalism. This can be explained by the plurality-factor in the society. For a plural society such as Indonesia, which is characterized by its many social cleavages, some of the expressions are ethnic conflicts and political competitions—these are some main factors that drive radicalism and intolerance.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, many studies have argued that poverty is the main driver behind radicalism. Radicalism and conflict are driven by poor economic development.<sup>3</sup> There is also a strong correlation amongst socioeconomic condition, the growth of young population, and radicalism behavior of the youth. The Arab Spring phenomenon can be interpreted in that context.

The worsening socioeconomic condition in most countries in the Middle-East has driven the young generation to find alternative solutions by overthrowing the regimes they deem to have failed the people. This bad condition has caused people anxious that they have no future. This then drove them to be radical, and the type of radicalism that the young generation in Muslim countries know best is religious radicalism.<sup>4</sup> These structural factors are what seem to be happening in Indonesia. That is why economic factors do not significantly drive radical and intolerant opinions and actions among Generation Z.

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- 2 See Rizal Panggabean and Benjamin Smith (2011). "Explaining Anti-Chinese Riots in Late 20th Century Indonesia." *World Development*, Vol.99, No.2, pp. 231-242, 2011; James A. Piazza (2006) "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:1, 159-177; James Anderson and Ian Shuttleworth (1998). "Sectarian Demography, Territoriality and Political Development in Northern Ireland." *Political Geography*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 187-208, 1998.
  - 3 Paul Stevenson (1977). "Frustration, Structural Blame, and Leftwing Radicalism." *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, Vol.2, No.4 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 355-372; George A. Lundberg (1927). "The Demographic and Economic Basis of Political Radicalism and Conservatism." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 32, No.5 (Mar., 192), pp. 719-732; Helen Ware (2005). "Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No.4, *Special Issue on the Demography of Conflict and Violence* (Jul., 2005), pp. 435-454.
  - 4 Graham E. Fuller (2004) "The Youth Crisis in Middle Eastern Society", Michigan: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. pp.9-11.

### *Pesantren Background*

Students who have experienced *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) education tend to be more radical in terms of opinion and action. On the level of opinion, 66.6% of those with *pesantren* background harbor radical religious understanding. As for those without *pesantren* background, only 56.4% of them harbor such opinion. On the level of action, 10.5% of those with *pesantren* background are more likely to exhibit radical behavior, while only 6.1% of those without *pesantren* background exhibit such behavior.

The data show consistency in the level of moderate opinion and action. In terms of diversity-attitude, students with no *pesantren* background tend to be more moderate (21.2%) than those with *pesantren* background (15.9%). The same also holds true in terms of action: 75.6% students with no *pesantren* background exhibit moderate behavior while 68.9% with *pesantren* background exhibit moderate behavior. It can be concluded that those with *pesantren* background are more likely to be radical, either in attitude or behavior.

These findings clarify the notion that people who receive deeper and correct religious education will be more moderate. *Pesantren* as an established religious educational institution in Indonesia definitely plays an important role in molding a moderate Islamic understanding. However, with the increase in transnational relations that brought radical ideologies, the peculiar type of *pesantren* that radicalizes students need to be further analyzed, such as *pesantren* owned by Jamaah Islamiyah and Salafi group that continue to grow in several parts of Indonesia. Although only few extremists and radical figures have graduated from this type of *pesantren*. As such, it can be said that while *pesantren* has the potential to produce moderate Muslims, it can also produce radicals; it all depends on the type of the *pesantren*.<sup>5</sup> We

5 Several studies that discuss this topic are: Ali Maksum (2015), "Model Pendidikan Toleransi di Pesantren Modern dan Salaf", *Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam*, Volume 03, No. 1, May 2015, pp. 82-108; Thohir Yuli Kusmanto, Moh. Fauzi and M. Mukhsin Jamil (2015), "Dialektika Radikalisme dan Anti Radikalisme di Pesantren" *Walisongo*, Volume 23, Nomor 1, Mei 2015; Ayub Mursalim and Ibnu Katsir (2010)

do believe that this calls for further attention.

Table 1. RADOP (Radical Opinion), RADAC (Radical Action),  
TEOP (Tolerant External Opinion) and  
TEAC (Tolerant External Action) & *Pesantren*

<b>PESANTREN BACKGROUND</b>				
		<b>Radical (%)</b>	<b>Neutral (%)</b>	<b>Moderate (%)</b>
RADOP				
<b>School/College Students</b> <b>p=0.000</b>	<i>Pesantren</i>	66.6	17.4	15.9
	<i>Non-Pesantren</i>	56.4	22.4	21.2
RADAC				
<b>School/College Students</b> <b>p=0.015</b>	<i>Pesantren</i>	10.5	20.5	68.9
	<i>Non-Pesantren</i>	6.1	18.3	75.6

Unlike radicalism, when it comes to intolerance, school/college students who were educated in *pesantren* tend to be more tolerant. In terms of external tolerant-opinion, 64.4% of students with *pesantren* background are tolerant while those without are only 48.8%. The same holds true in the level of intolerance: 37.3% of those with no *pesantren* background are more intolerant than those with *pesantren* background (22.8%).

In terms of external tolerant action, school/college students with and without *pesantren* background tend to be very tolerant, i.e. above 60% on average. However, if we look at their internal tolerant-action, they tend to classify as intolerant. Those with *pesantren* background are more likely to be intolerant (38.2%) than those without (33.1%).

## Conclusions

Gen Z is an anxious generation. If we correlate it with the result of the survey (School and College Student's Attitude toward Diversity in Indonesia), this generation has a pretty high prevalence of its members harboring radical and intolerant opinions. However, their internal intolerant-action and radical-action are less prevalent. They

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"Pola Pendidikan Keagamaan Pesantren dan Radikalisme: Studi Kasus Pesantren-Pesantren di Provinsi Jambi", *Kontekstualika*, Vol. 25, No.2, 2010.

agree with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, yet they want Islamic sharia to be implemented in Indonesia. Moreover, they are under the impression that Caliphate is a governmental system recognized by Islamic teachings. They agree that Islamic Studies influence them to act intolerantly toward fellow Muslims from groups that are deemed to be deviant. However, they also agree that Islamic Studies must teach about other religions, other groups, and Indonesia's diversity.





## 2 Intolerance and Radicalism

This chapter seeks to identify the roots of radicalism that may drive radical opinions and actions, especially in the name of religion. It will also explain about violence and intolerance in Indonesia.

### **The Roots of Radicalism**

Many scholars have attempted to discover the driving factors behind the emergence of violence and radicalism from many perspectives. Studies on the roots of radicalism continue to grow and have become an interesting topic to be discussed. New approaches and perspectives have emerged to compete with, and complement, each other, which shows that studies on religious violence especially in relation to Islam will continue to grow. Scholars seem to agree that the emergence of radicalism and violence cannot be explained by a single variable; they agree that it is a complex phenomenon requiring a multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach. For example, the socioeconomic deprivation approach, which used to be a mainstream approach in the study of social movement, or approaches that focus exclusively on ideological aspects, have nowadays been considered outdated or insufficient.

Recent development on the studies of violence and extremism has pointed at the need to look at various macro and micro elements that drive a person or a group to join an extremist group and be involved in some acts of violence. Under a recently-growing framework and policy

referred to as countering violent extremism (CVE), which is also known in other literatures as preventing violent extremism (PVE), the process and dynamics behind radicalization are seen to involve two major elements called the “push and pull factors.” The push factors include among others the structural, emotional and psychological conditions that drive an individual or a group to commit violence. Meanwhile, the pull factors refer to organizations or groups that actively recruit people to join their cause and the existence of various narratives or messages that invite people to join extremism. The interaction between those two factors has caused an individual or a group to be more vulnerable to the influence of violence and extremism.<sup>6</sup>

In an overview published by The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, several structural conditions were mentioned as the driving factors behind a person or a group to be influenced by radicalism, among others: (a) lack of socioeconomic opportunity; (b) marginalization and discrimination; (c) poor governance which is characterized by, among others, severe human rights violation and weak rule of law; (d) long-lasting unresolved conflict; (e) radicalization process within jails.<sup>7</sup>

Emotional and psychological factors also contribute to that direction. Some scholars, such as Jerrold Post and John Horgan, have analyzed the psychological condition that stimulates an individual to commit violence. According to these scholars, the desire for revenge to respond to humiliation and the experience of being treated unjustly are psychological factors that stimulate some people to commit violence and terrorism.

### 1. Social and Economic Factors

Some scholars consider poverty among certain individuals or

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<sup>6</sup> Georgia Holmer, *Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective*, USIP Special Reports No. 336, September 2013, pp. 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> UN General Assembly Seventieth session, The UNGCST, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General*, 24 December 2015, pp. 7-8.

groups as a very significant, even the main, variable that contributes to extremism and violence. Condition of poverty in addition to low education and high level of unemployment will quickly translate to social frustration that will drive them to be aggressive.<sup>8</sup> One of the explanations for the significant growth of violent groups in some parts of Africa and Arab concerns really bad economic condition in which most citizens live in increasingly chronic poverty. This leads the young to feel frustrated and hopeless, which makes them vulnerable to the seduction of local militia groups. In other countries, including Indonesia, which is also afflicted by radicalism, the notion that poverty and economic difficulties are driving people to be radical has led to several policy recommendations for economic empowerment. This applies for pre-emptive, de-radicalization and reintegration measures.

Indeed, some scholars have pointed out that most acts of violence and terrorism are occurring in countries that are relatively poor or under-developed. However, they also made a point, as affirmed by Moghadam, that poverty does not directly influence acts of violence. Various factors are involved in economic poverty in some states that cause them to fall in a perpetual state of violence. He argued that the factors are, among others, as follows:

Firstly, most of the poor states are failed states with weak territorial sovereignty. In the two poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan and Sudan, the government's helplessness is characterized by the continuous growth of armed militias that almost seem to have absolute power over the territory they have. They control almost everything from economic sources to trade routes, security, law, administration and so on. These failed states are a haven for gangsters and violent militias.

Secondly, the perpetual civil wars and conflicts in those poor states have also provided an entrance for violent group to the region. In a society divided by religious and ethnic civil wars, the emergence of

<sup>8</sup> Assaf Moghadam, *The Roots of Terrorism*, (University Nevada Reno, Chelsea House Publishers, 2005), p. 67

these extremists, wherever they came from, will usually be welcomed wholeheartedly by any party who can take advantage of their existence. The same holds true for other parties that feel threatened, as they will invite other violent groups to join their cause. In that kind of condition, some number of violent groups, including vigilantes, local militias and global jihadist-terrorist movement will find a comfortable place to expand their influence. This situation reminds us of what happened in Indonesia, i.e. the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Maluku and Poso several years ago, which ultimately led to the involvement of radical groups, including some jihadist factions.

Thirdly, as the poverty becomes increasingly severe, pro-violence group will find it easier to exploit the dissatisfaction and rage of some parts of the society who believe that they have been treated unjustly. People in the state of dissatisfaction and rage will have an impression that the ruler has mistreated them. These people will become potential recruits for radical groups.<sup>9</sup>

Ted Robert Gurr, an expert in social movement, provided a similar explanation that poverty does not have direct influence.<sup>10</sup> Inequality or sudden change in socio-economic condition can become a catalyst for the growth of radicalism and violence. He argued that violent groups would often justify their actions in the name of marginalization and injustice (either socially or economically) instead of their poor living condition.

Furthermore, the reason why individuals and groups are willing to be involved in acts of violence is, among others, the dissemination of general perception that their suffering, whether in terms of economy, social and politics, are caused by an unfair governmental policy. They also believe that their lack of opportunity to escape their suffering is caused by the government who has abandoned them. On the contrary, other groups (that are deemed as rival) will be labeled as the privileged

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>10</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, "Economic Factors" in Louis Richardson (editor), *The Roots of Terrorism*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2006), p. 87.

ones under the government's unfair policy.<sup>11</sup> Thus, it is not surprising if the violent groups that motivate themselves with a shared feeling of injustice will then blame the government that they deem as the main source of problem.

According to Gurr, a sudden change in socioeconomic condition can also be a significant catalyst for the growth of seeds of violence. A sudden change can cause riot and instability in the society--not to mention that economic modernization often bring negative effects, such as increasing the socioeconomic gap between ethnic groups within a country.<sup>12</sup> A small portion of the country find themselves rich and prosperous, yet the rest are not progressing, still remaining in the depth of poverty. This will lead to social jealousy and the notion that they have been abandoned. Another effect of economic modernization is urbanization. As newcomers in a city, these people are uprooted from their traditional values and become confused with the very different values and norms they face in the city. This feeling of being marginalized will eventually lead to disappointment and hatred to anything modern. The above phenomenon, where individuals put under bad environment might be attracted to violence, is in line with the findings of an Egyptian Sociologist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who argued about the social motives and backgrounds of the young people who were involved in jihadist movements to launch acts of violence and terror in Egypt during the early 1970s.

Based on the above explanation, it can be seen that economic factors can have significant impact to a number of people and can lead them to the path of violence if they are exposed to a condition of socioeconomic deprivation, especially as a result of modernization and sudden changes. The deprivation approach provided by Gurr and a few other scholars can answer the criticism of other scholars who found that some terrorists actually come from well-educated middle-class background with income relatively higher than that of

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

most people.<sup>13</sup> The jihadists who wage terror in Europe were generally found to have the latter characteristics, i.e. well-educated and well-off.

## 2. Government Performance

In one of its statements, The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy provides a major note that violent extremism tends to flourish in countries characterized by poor governance, democratic deficit and growing culture of impunity toward violation conducted by state and its apparatus. Repressive actions and policies in those poorly-governed countries will face opposition from its political enemies that, according to UN's overview, correlates with an increase in the opportunity for its society to become violent.<sup>14</sup> This can be explained by the fact that repressive actions for the sake of state security will lead to restrictions of freedom of expression, lacks of access to power, and eventually marginalization and alienation of some people. When every normal avenue for people to struggle has been removed, violence becomes an attractive alternative. The points made by UNGCTS are in line with the findings by other scholars.

In one of his analyses, Krueger argues that instead of poverty and low-level of education, a lack of civil and political freedom shows more direct correlation with violence and terrorism.<sup>15</sup> The same conclusion is also made by two Islamic radicalism scholars, Mohammed Hafez and Wiktorowicz. Both of them argue that the more a country provides access to power and policy-making for the people, the less likely it would be for them to oppose the government through violent means.<sup>16</sup> It also means that the more a country restricts access to power, the more likely it will be for its enemies to oppose it through violent means. Violence will become a preferred option if formal channels

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13 Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economic and the Roots of Terrorism*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 3.

14 UN General Assembly Seventieth session, p. 7.

15 Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes...*, p. 104.

16 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement", in Quintan Wiktorowicz (editor), *Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 66.

for peaceful and constitutional means, which is the foundation of a democratic political system, have been restricted.

Authoritarian countries do not only restrict political access but also recklessly repress their people. This will lead to resistance by means of violence. In one of his studies on the violent conflict in Algeria, Muhammad Hafez pointed out that discrimination and suffering as a result of the state's brutal repression against the Islamist group of GIA (*Groupe Islamique Army*) became the driving factors behind its brutal retaliation. The combination of injustice sentiment, repressive policies, restriction of negotiation process, and the existence of radical ideologies ultimately leads to anti-systemic repertoires among the Islamists that have resulted in bloodsheds.<sup>17</sup>

On the contrary, the opportunity for political participation, albeit limited, such as can be seen in several semi-authoritarian countries in the Arab region, may prevent or at least minimize the violence of Islamist groups. Through an open-access legitimate system of participation, Islamist groups that previously oppose the government began to act positively toward the government. On this point, Jillian Schwedler writes that access to political participation for Islamist groups in Jordan during early 1990s and in Yemen succeeded in integrating the radical Islamist group into the system and ultimately complying with democracy.<sup>18</sup> Since 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt has also officially accepted the government's invitation to participate in democracy and parliament. MB integration into the system brought positive externality as is signified by the decline in pro-violence Islamist groups.

### 3. Psychological Factors

Several psychologists such as John Horgan, Jerold M. Post, and Marc Sageman have produced major and influential works in the study

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<sup>17</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria" In *Victorowicz, Islamic...*, p. 37-38

<sup>18</sup> Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006)



of terrorism based on their discipline. An impulsive, thrill-seeking behavior or desire for revenge as well as retaliation to humiliation, according to some psychologists, are significant conditions that can lead a person to become radical.<sup>19</sup> However, Jerold Post in “the psychological dynamics of terrorism,” recognizes the limitation of psychological approach. He argues that in order to understand the very complex phenomena of terrorism and radicalism, psychological approach needs to work with other disciplines, such as politics, economy, history, culture, and religion. Considering the context behind those various disciplines are important since terrorism is a product of a certain place in a certain time with a certain context.<sup>20</sup> John Horgan agrees with Jerold Post by reasoning that explanation on terrorism from the perspective of individual psychology is insufficient.<sup>21</sup> Jerold Post also underlines that terrorists are psychologically normal; they are not under depression, not emotionally-disturbed, and they are neither fanatic nor extreme.<sup>22</sup> However, a psychological analysis on the level of group, organization and society may contribute to a better understanding than the analysis on the level of individual.

One major document resulting from a meeting of scholars incorporated in Club Madrid has concluded psychological factors or conditions that can drive violence and terrorism. Some of the points made in the document are as follows:

1. There are various kinds of individual motives: to show off power to the powerless, to take revenge, and also to gain recognition on one's existence
2. The leaders play a very significant role in identifying external enemies; these leaders will invite the marginalized and the

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19 Shannon N. Green and Keith Protcor, *Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism*, (Washington, CSIS, 2016), p. 14

20 Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism”, in, Louis Richardson (editor), *The Roots of Terrorism*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2006), p. 17

21 John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2005), pp. 65-66

22 Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from The IRA to Al Qaeda*, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 8.

frustrated, saying something like unless they join they will continue to be isolated and treated unfairly.

3. Religious fundamentalist leaders may also use their authority to interpret the holy book to justify their acts of violent extremism.
4. The martyrdom (*syahid*) culture contributes to the act of terror through suicide attacks.
5. Many Muslim diaspora and migrants are suffering from an existential crisis and alienation due to living in a foreign place. Extreme ideologies might turn them into radicals and facilitate them to find the path of terrorism.<sup>23</sup>

The above explanations were also updated by an influential work of Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. By profiling 172 global jihadists who were involved in terrorism since the 1990s to early 2000s, several data were obtained, including: on average, they were 26 years old when they start getting involved. About 115 of them (70%) joined and were involved in terrorism movements in other countries (not their places of birth) while 14 (8%) were second-generation immigrants in Britain, France and US. Sageman denied the common assumptions that potential recruits for terrorism are people who are socially and religiously alienated and that they are under difficulties or distress. Through his observation, he found that the process of involvement in terrorist movements is generally made through three channels:

Firstly, social affiliation with those movements through friendship, kinship and patron-client relationship; secondly, progressive intensification of beliefs and teachings which leads to acceptance of Salafi-jihadist ideology; thirdly, formal acceptance of jihadist movements through meetings with global Salafi network. This patron-client factor is most visible in the jihadist group in the Southeast Asia. Most of them are related, either directly or indirectly, with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'ashir who are positioned as the mentors or

<sup>23</sup> Alex P. Schmid, *The Routledge Handbooks of Terrorism Research*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2011), p. 272.

teachers. Sageman affirmed that these social bonds are very important elements of the radicalization process.<sup>24</sup>

A profiling made by another scholar, Edwin Bakker, in the following years complemented Sageman's conclusion. Based on his profiling of jihadists in European countries (2001-2009), Bakker explained that social affiliation factor created through friendship and kinship does play an important role in leading a person to join a jihadist movement, as affirmed previously by Sageman. However, Bakker also found that a few old assumptions on economic, employment and educational conditions were still relevant.<sup>25</sup>

He found that most jihadists in Europe were socially and economically among the lower class (52 people) and middle class (36 people), out of the total 93 jihadists. In terms of employment, most of them were unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, and 30% out of the 126 jihadists were unemployed when they were caught. Their educational levels were mostly (50 people) of secondary education, followed by 22 people who graduated from college and university, out of a total 71 jihadists. The data that Bakker found shows that social, economic and educational conditions among them vary highly. No fixed pattern can be found for a longer run. Bakker also noted that almost all of the terrorists in Europe were not native Europeans; they were immigrants, mostly of the second or third generation. Only a very few of them were native Europeans.

#### 4. *Radical Religious Understanding*

Involvement in a radical community and participation in violence

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24 Edwin Bakker, "Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001-2009), in Rik Coolsaet, *Jihadi Terrorism...*, p.133. Friendship, kinship and discipleship factors that facilitate involvement in extremist movement were also argued by Carrie Rosefsky Wickham in the case of jihadist group in Egypt, in her book, *Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, (Seattle, University Washington Press, 2002)

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 138-142. Unlike Sageman's studies that are mostly about old jihadist where most of them either have direct or indirect experience in Bosnian, Afghanistan and Czechian war as well as originating from various countries (including Southeast Asian countries), the data used by Bakker for his profiling are collected from recent jihadists who were active in Europe.

is mostly a manifestation of thoughts and beliefs that grow within an individual or group. These thoughts or beliefs do not only give meaning to one's behavior but also provide mechanisms for complex decision-making. Ideologies define what can be considered good and bad, justified and unjustified, morally correct or morally wrong, friends and foes, and so on. As argued by Ian Adams, ideologies work as maps and signs that provide overviews of an ideal society and how to achieve it.<sup>26</sup> As such, ideologies that contain intolerant values and that lead to violence will direct a person into doing things that express those values. In order to understand the dimension behind the series of acts of intolerance, violence and religious terrorism, such as the one carried out by the so-called Islamist-Jihadist group in Indonesia, it is important to unveil the religious thoughts or doctrines that live within those extremist groups. In religiously-motivated acts of terror, such as the one often carried out by supporters of radical movements like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the actors will always justify their action by using theological reasoning.

The increasing growth of Islamist-jihadist ideology in some segments of Muslim youth can be traced to the idea and philosophy of several classical and contemporary Islamic scholars. Some of the scholars that are often used as references by those radical groups are, among others, Ibnu Taimiyyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, Hasan Al-Banna, Abul a'la al Maududi, Sayyid Quthb, Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiry. In Indonesia, the philosophies and decrees made by Abu Bakar Ba'ashir and Aman Abdurrahman are the most popular one among jihadists.

Sayyid Quthb and Abdullah Azzam are two most prominent Islamic scholars and activists for contemporary jihadist movements. Several radical Islamist groups were born in Egypt between 1970s and 1980s, such as Al-Jihad Islam, Takfir wal Hijra, and some Muslim Brotherhood (MB) affiliates. A lot of them adopted the radical

<sup>26</sup> Ian Adam, *Political Ideology Today*, 9-edition, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010)

philosophy of Quthb, one of which is about the concept of modern infidelity, which he claimed to apply to Muslim rulers who do not implement sharia, and the idea of a need to transform this “pagan” society into an Islamic society. Quthb’s concept of modern infidelity is deemed radical since it also attacks Muslim rulers and Muslim communities whose compliance are more toward man-made norms, regulations and systems instead of the sharia of Allah.<sup>27</sup>

Quthb’s idea was further radicalized by his follower, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982), who stated that the Muslim community made a huge mistake by ignoring the call for jihad, either jihad against the heretic or hypocrite Muslim rulers who ignore the rule of Allah. He reminded the Muslim community that their holy duty on this earth is to enforce Islamic sharia throughout the world. He believed that Islam can only be powerful through wars, hence every Muslim must go to war.<sup>28</sup>

In his mind, the true power of Islam had not fully emerged. The Muslim society after the downfall of Caliphate in 1924 was in a similar condition as that when Islamic world was conquered by the Mongols. Despite becoming a Muslim in the following years, the Mongolian rulers were still deemed deviant by Ibnu Taimiyyah because they did not apply the principles and rules of Islam.<sup>29</sup> According to Ibnu Taimiyyah, those who comply with Mongolian deviant rulers are no different than apostates. In Faraj’s mind, today’s Muslim rulers have renounced Islam. They are no different than the Mongolian rulers who claimed themselves Muslims but refused the rule of Islam. Thus they are Muslims in name only. Even if they claim that they pray and fast, they are still guilty of apostasy.<sup>30</sup> Those apostate rulers, by referring to

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27 Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam*, (London, Saqi, 2005), pp. 46-47. See also the work of Sayyid Quthb, *Milestone*, (translated by Ma’ alim fi at Thorieq), (Beirut and Damascus, IIFSO. 1938 H or 1978), especially in chapter 2,4, and 5,

28 Translated to English by Johannes J.G. Jansen in his book, *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*, (New York, Macmillan, 1986), p. 165

29 *Ibid.*, p. 167.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 169.

Ibnu Taimiyyah, should be imposed by heavier punishment than the one imposed for the heretics, i.e. must be killed.<sup>31</sup>

The current radical Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shahab, Boko Haram, Jabhat Nusra, and their networks, are often referred to as jihadist groups. In general, this terminology refers mainly to those who adopt or who are part of one of the extreme schools of Salafi. The term Salafi itself originates from the phrase *al salaf al salih*, which refers to the early generation of Muslims (circa the life of Prophet Muhammad and his friends) who are deemed to reflect a pious behavior and the true teaching of Islam. The life of *al salaf al shalih* generation is the ideal role model of piety that needs to be referred to by all Muslims who live after them. The Salafist strictly believe that only Al-Quran and hadith can be the references for Muslims' behavior and thought. In understanding religion, the Salafists are mostly characterized by their rather literal and puritan approach.<sup>32</sup>

Salafists' theology-religious perspective mostly relies on the teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ibnu Taimiyyah, and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. Despite having the same reference, Salafy still continues to grow in some variants. Wictorowicz explained that there are currently three major schools of Salafi, namely: (1) the purist Salafi, who avoid political involvement (apolitical); (2) the political Salafi, otherwise known as *salafy haraki*, who have political or power orientation; and (3) the jihadist Salafi. The differences among the three exist. Whereas the purists emphasize missionary activities that are non-violence, such as purifying and educating, the political Salafi

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31 In comparison to jihadists in the following year, Quthb could exercise more self-restraint in using the label deviant. Calvert argues that Quthb can clearly divide the definition of deviant and heretic. Those who can be deemed as deviants are those who intentionally do not have faith in God, while heretics are those who believe in God yet they refuse to implement God's authority in ruling all aspects of life. John Calvert, *Sayyid Quthb the Origins of Radical Islam*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 220.

32 Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadis-Salafis or Revolutionaries?" in Roel Meijer (editor), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, (London, c Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2009), p. 249.

focus on the application of Salafi doctrines through involvement in political arenas. They are under the impression that political involvement is necessary to enforce the rule of Allah. Meanwhile, the Jihadist Salafi believe that the only way to defend Islam in our current condition is through violence – no compromises shall be made with the establishment.<sup>33</sup>

According to Brachman, behind the doctrine adopted by the Jihadist Salafi are five main concepts, namely: (1) *tauhid*, (2) *aqidah*, (3) *takfir*, (4) *al wala wal-bara*, and (5) jihad.<sup>34</sup> For the global jihadist movement, *aqidah* or virtue is the most important element in ascertaining and identifying the difference between right and wrong according to Allah. They will always stress the importance of pure *aqidah* that is void of heresy and hypocrisy. In their mind, there are only a few groups of people who truly exercise pure Islamic *aqidah* while the others have deviated – they have condoned heresies, hypocrisies and destruction.

The concept of *tauhid*, or belief in one and only God, refers to the oneness of and total submission to Allah. A perfect *tauhid* must comprise three dimensions: *tauhid rububiyah asma' wal sifat dan uluhiyah*, which means total (*kaffah*) compliance to Islamic sharia and avoidance of all kinds of prohibition. For them, *tauhid* is not only witnessing and recognizing Allah as the Creator of the universe and the Most Powerful, but also absolute compliance to the way of life according to the rules of Allah. A *tauhid* that is only partially and imperfectly understood and applied shall lead people to heresies. A heretic is a person who believes in an authority other than Allah with regard to laws and other rules of life.<sup>35</sup>

The concept of *takfir*, or the action/practice of declaring that a

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. 208

<sup>34</sup> Jarret M. Brachman, *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practices*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2009), pp. 41-51. In addition to referring Ba'asyir and Aman Abdurrahman, explanation on the five global jihadist-salafi doctrines rely on Brachman's idea.

<sup>35</sup> Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Kesempurnaan Tauhid: Diterapkannya Syariat Islam Secara Kaffah" in Irfan Suryahardy Awwas, *Dakwah dan Jihad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir*, (Jogjakarta, Wihdah Press, 2003), p. 42 & 50.

fellow Muslim is guilty of apostasy, is the most crucial one for Salafi followers and is even responsible for many of their internal disputes. Most of Salafi followers have stopped or are reluctant to declare fellow Muslims an apostate only because of some violations, as long as they have recognized the oneness of Allah and Muhammad as Allah's prophet. But for the jihadists, the word 'apostate' will come out of their mouth easily to those who claim to be Muslims yet do not comply with the sharia or even refuse it altogether. For most Salafi, heresy and deviation are seen more as individuals sin that are related to their relationship with God, but Jihadists believe that the punishment for the deviant must be made clear and public. As such, the jihadists are often labeled as the *takfiri* because of their many allegations of apostasy to fellow Muslims who they deemed to deviate from the *aqidah*.

The concept of *al-wala al-bara*, or loving and hating for the sake of Allah, is deemed as the most important doctrine among the jihadists. Through the framework of *al-wala wal-bara*, they can define the ones they must comply to and the ones they must avoid or fight, the ones that are like them and the ones who are not, the ones that can be allies in jihad and the ones that must become the targets of jihad. *Al wala* refers not simply to those who claim to be Muslims and have performed *syahadat*, but to those who also comply with that principle in their *aqidah* and behavior. On the contrary, *al bara* refers to anyone who has deviated from Islamic teachings, either those who are clearly deviant and those who claim to be a Muslim.

The concept of jihad has different meanings among the Salafists, including how to practice it. To the jihadists, the concept is always evolving and developing from time to time. The definitions provided by Quthb, al-Faraj, Azzam and al-Zawahiry have significant influence in the interpretation and practices of jihad among modern Jihadist Salafi. Quthb and Faraj radicalized the concept of jihad to not only about offense and defense but also about restoring God's sovereignty that



has been taken away.<sup>36</sup> In that context, jihad will also mean removing the system along with its rulers who obstruct the implementation of all laws and rules of Allah for all aspects of life – to respect an infidel society with a true Islamic society. In the hand of Al-Faraj, an extreme jihad was manifested in bloody violence to resist the secular “pharaoh” ruler of Egypt, including the murder of President Anwar Sadat in 1981.

Next, Abdullah Azzam who based his jihad in Afghanistan by “modifying” the understanding of jihad, to not only target anti-Islam power within the country (near enemies), but also all of the enemies who occupy Muslim countries (far enemies).<sup>37</sup> Abdullah Azzam also made a statement that jihad against enemies of Islam in Muslim countries is an obligation for every Muslim.<sup>38</sup>

The following discussion shall explain about previous studies on intolerance and radicalism in Indonesia and other countries.

Firstly, a survey on the Attitude of Oslo Youth to Extremism was conducted by Centre for Welfare and Labour Research, Norway in 2016, involving 8,500 youth aged 16-19 years old throughout Oslo. The respondents were students of secondary schools in Oslo and 70% of them were 16-19 years old when they participated in the study. However, those who were not enrolled in school were also included in the survey.

The survey found that the attitudes usually found in extremist environment were having limited support among the youth in general. The majority of respondents (66%) were against the use of violence as a means to obtain political influence on major issues or to create political changes in Norway or Europe. Most of them (59%) condemned those who went to Syria to fight the war. Among respondents who were not against the use of violence, 10% responded by saying “I don’t know” and around 25% stated that it the use of violence is something they can

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<sup>36</sup> Peter Mandaville, *Global...*, p. 252.

<sup>37</sup> Thomas Hegghammer, “Abdallah Azzam: The Imam of Jihad” in Gilles Kepel dan jean Pierre Milleli (editors), *al Qaeda In Its Own Words*, (Cambridge-Massachusetts, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 98-99.

<sup>38</sup> Peter Mandaville, *Global...*, p. 252.

support “a little bit.” The study also found that:

- About 3% believed that the use of violence “to some extent” may be justified to obtain political change in Norway/Europe.
- About 6% supported “to some extent” the choice of youth to go to Syria to fight a war.
- 24% totally agreed that a war between the West and Islam is undergoing.
- 10% totally agreed that Islam in general threatens the culture and values of Norway.
- 8% totally agreed that the West in general threatens the culture and values of Islam.

Yet none of the above aspects indicate that the youth were supporting extremism or that they identified themselves as anti-extremist or anti-Islam. It might still be relevant, nonetheless, because they did talk about “the nearby environment” from the attitude and position of youth in general, that the dispute between extremist groups could still be further analyzed. The study also found that very few youth were combining the extreme positions. The study attempted to group those who had gone as “Syrian fighters” by truly defending the use of illegitimate political violence in Norway/Europe. The analysis indicated that this group was only 0.2 percent of the respondents who answered relevant questions. This is approximately the same number as those who supported the use of violence as they believed that the West and Islam were threatening each other and were in the state of war. This is a significant finding; it appears that extremism will become more difficult when the whole “package” of extreme perspective is made at the same time.

The survey also indicated three determining factors. First of all, extremist behavior must be understood under the framework of concepts such as marginalization and exclusion. Many youth tend to support the most extreme perspective: having bad relation with other

youth, having weak educational foundation, having a more negative perspective about their future and are more involved in violence and crime.

However, the study provided limited support to the perspective that socioeconomic background of the family is a determining factor. Young people from lower socioeconomic condition, who might also live in the poorest region of Oslo, are found to have greater tendency to support extremism to some extent according to the survey. But other factors that are related to socioeconomic factors also appear to explain these relations, including religion and having the status of immigrant. These characteristics do not apply to those in the right-wing extremist who criticize Islam.

Secondly, the analysis showed that religion and immigrant status play a role in developing the attitudes toward extremism. The Muslim and immigrant youth were those who gave the most support to extremists in some regions, while non-religious and Christian youth with no immigrant status tend to really avoid those kinds of perspectives. Among youths with immigrant status, the support for political violence is highest among boys who have been insulted due to their religion and/or immigrant status.

Thirdly, attitudes toward extremism in many cases are hand in hand with social involvement among the youth, and in many other cases are combined with a lack of faith toward social institutions.

Gender is also influential in some, but not all, regions. Compared to girls, boys tend to give more support to violent extremism in Norway/Europe, Syria fighters, and right wing extremists who criticize Islam. Girls are more positive toward those who go to Syria for humanitarian aids. The responses of boys and girls are a bit similar on the relationship between Islam and the West, as well as questions on the superiority above law during conflicts.

This study mainly concludes that attitude toward extremism is very complex. Various variables such as political processes, media,

personal bio, exclusion, social commitment, fear to the unknown, feeling insulted, discrimination and religion, all of them interrelate and influence each other.

The second survey on intolerance in Western Europe was conducted by RAND Europe. The study aimed to find empirical evidence on the perception to intolerance in Western Europe. By analyzing the European dataset, empirical literature studies and assessment to trends in some selected states, they aimed to find out: whether intolerance had increased toward certain groups; what kinds of groups or population were impacted; as well as the clear patterns with regard to trends in the political, social, economy and cultural spheres.

Next is the Survey on Countering Violent Extremism, which was conducted online on 12-29 August 2016 by a global consultant National Research Group (NRG). The survey involved 8,000 people aged 18-75 in many countries, including US, Britain, France, India, China, Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia. However, in countries with younger demographics, the oldest age was adjusted to maximum 55 years in Egypt/Indonesia, and 65 years in Turkey.

### **Violence and Intolerance in Indonesia**

The excuse made by most jihadists, to not over-generalize, is manifested in a frame of religious-mindedness. The confession from one member of the Bali Bombing trio who got executed, Imam Samudera, shows a similar pattern. The feeling of dissatisfaction and anger, framed under the logic of religion, resulted in the call to violence. These factors were also captured by Zachary Abuza who studied the motives of Islamist groups in using violence in Indonesia. He mentioned these four major factors, namely: (1) among the JI, their *motivation* was to implement Islamic sharia holistically by overthrowing the secular rule and replacing it with the Southeast Asia caliphate; (2) *purification* of Islamic teaching, including from Western and secular values, to create a foundation that would facilitate the creation of Islamic state; (3) a

*perception* that Islam was currently under attack by anti-Islam powers, especially the US and its allies – the Christians; (4) there was a global *conspiracy* to weaken the power of Islam, which was evidenced by the global support to anti-Islam power such as by the separatists in Maluku and East Timor.<sup>39</sup>

The confession of Ali Imron--perpetrator of bombing attack in Legian Bali, 2002, clearly shows how those unstable emotions, from dissatisfaction toward the government, a call for jihad, rage, and revenge, were all combined into one by a series of religious motives that resulted in brutal violence. To him, any place including Bali was a place for jihad. All non-Muslims and Western citizens were enemies that were okay to victimize. Ideologies clearly play an important role in constructing such and idea of jihad; the following analyzes his reasoning:

*Firstly*, there was dissatisfaction toward the existing government due to a lack of leader appointed using Islamic standard or means, such as a Caliph. This led to flourishing infidelity and the obligation to become subject of non-Islam leadership. *Secondly*, Islamic sharia was and is not fully implemented. *Thirdly*, a hope for *jihad fi sabilillah* emerged, for which a great crusade would occur for the Muslim community to fight against the heretics after Bali bombing. *Fourthly*, the bombing was part of jihad obligation as taught by religion. *Fifthly*, revenge was necessary against all the cruelty and oppression by heretics against the Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Czech, Somalia and other countries. The bombing was also a form of revenge toward Christians who crusaded against Muslims in Poso and Ambon.<sup>40</sup>

A firm jihadist doctrine can be seen from the writing of cleric Aman Abdurrahman, a radical figure with strong influence in the

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<sup>39</sup> Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, (London and New York, Routledge, 2007), p. 84-91. He mentioned that other Islamist groups, such as the Islamic party PKS, shared the same values or feelings with the violent militia groups but they decide to take a different path, i.e. non-violence, to obtain their Islamist goals.

<sup>40</sup> Ali Imron, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom*, (Jakarta, Republika, 2007)

current Indonesian jihad movement. Aman called upon his followers to support ISIS and, together with Ba'ashir, to pledge loyalty to Caliph Abu Bakar al Baghdadi. Aman's jihad is based on the idea that Indonesia is not in line with Islam. In fact, he is not reluctant to declare the state and the government of Indonesia as a heretic state and a *thaghut* government – hence the fight against them. The allegation of heresy also applies to the Muslim community in this country who consciously believe and participate in the democratic system, giving their votes, singing the national anthem, and recognizing the national philosophy of Pancasila.<sup>41</sup> This jihadist figure called NKRI a heretic state because:

1. Its rule of law is not the rule of Allah
2. It consults *thaghut* on the matter of dispute. The *thaghut* in this case refers to international institutions (such as the UN and International Court) whose law does not refer to Islam.
3. The state and government (Indonesia) pledges their loyalty to heretics, such as to the US and European countries, and assists them in combating the jihadists.
4. It provides or transfers the right and authority to create laws and regulations to other than Allah.
5. It provides the right to exercise heresy, deviation to and apostasy from Islam under the excuse of freedom of religion, and human rights.
6. It puts heretics and Muslim on the same pedestal.
7. It runs a democratic system.
8. It is based on Pancasila.<sup>42</sup>

Jihad on alleged heresies is not only targeted at non-Muslims who occupy Islamic countries but also to whoever fellow Muslims that they

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<sup>41</sup> See, Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman, *Seri Materi...*, p. 79.

<sup>42</sup> Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman, "Masihkah Kalian Ragu...! Dalil-Dalil Yang membuktikan Kafirnya NKRI dan Syiriknya Pancasila", pp. 114-121, 4<sup>th</sup> Annexure in Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Buku I, *Tadzkiroh: Nasehat dan Peringatan kepada Allah*, downloaded from [www.anshratuttauhid.com](http://www.anshratuttauhid.com).

deem as deviant, such as the Shia and Ahmadiyya. With the rise of radical groups in Indonesia after the Reform, it is unsurprising that Shia and Ahmadiyya have continuously become targets of persecution and attacks by several radical groups who are motivated by extreme ideologies. In their mind, jihad means waging wars against external enemies (non-Muslims) and internal enemies (deviant Islamic groups). The latter groups are considered more dangerous for Islam because of their somewhat subtle deviation.

With the rise of intolerant religious identity, the role and existence of the state become significant. Indeed, in a number of cases in Muslim countries, as argued by Grim and Finke, regulations that provide authority for the state to intervene in religious matters are always part of the problem of intolerance.<sup>43</sup> Regulations or policies about religion in general will provide advantages to the majority religion and harm to the minority group. Most of the state's policies will be more influenced by pressures from dominant religious groups. "Unclear" government regulations on Shia and Ahmadiyya have provided opportunities for intolerance and persecution, not to mention the government's lack of conviction in dealing with the pressures from radical groups. To prevent intolerance from escalating, the government must not only provide stronger protection for freedom of religion but also stricter punishment for perpetrators of religion-based violence or persecution.

It is imperative that, in the context of building a diverse nation and country, collective awareness be strengthened toward the dangerous attitude and action of those radical-intolerant groups. Many national values are pitted against the values of those groups. For example, compliance to law and constitution, nationalism, commitment to and participation in democracy, all that are considered by most citizens as a civic culture that needs to be continuously developed, are considered as expressions of heresy by the radical groups. This sort of

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<sup>43</sup> Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011), especially the discussion in chapter 2.

extreme perspective ultimately leads them to use violence against the government and its apparatus that they call *thaghut*.

It is indeed ironic that all kinds of intolerance, persecution, violence, and terrorism – including suicide bombing – are considered by these extremists as expressions of worship that will gain them honor and tickets to heaven.<sup>44</sup> They have not considered the fact that their reckless acts of violence, that they justify by using religion, have actually harmed the great and virtuous message that Islam actually wishes to teach to the world – to create peace and salvation for humankind.

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<sup>44</sup> Dimensions of violence that are understood as part of ritual or worship, which live on in various traditions of religion and faith, were discussed at length in Hans G. Kippenberg, *Violence as Worship: Religious Wars in the Age of Globalization*, (California, Stanford university Press, 2011).





### 3

## Islamism, Intolerance, and Radicalism

Identity binds a group due to similarities in race, ethnicity, culture and religion. When individuals realize that they share several things in common with others, what makes them unique will eventually disappear and be replaced by a common identity that will be maintained collectively. Through social relations, the collective identity creates a perception on “us” (self) and “them” (others). This kind of perspective can lead to positive things if we can coexist peacefully with each other but can also lead to negative things if there is a sentiment of superiority among the self-compared to the others. The latter is often responsible for exclusivity and hatred to others.

When a collective identity is applied in a political sphere based on religion, there will be a political identity that leads to what Bassam Tibi referred to as religionized politics – politics carried out under the framework of religion. Among the Muslim communities, religionized politics occurs when Islamism ideology is used as a foundation to gain power. Islamism is not the expression of Muslim’s faith or piety, but an act of using Islam to legitimize political movements. Islamism is anti-Semitic (Jews), anti-Christians, and anti-Western. In general, those who adopt Islamism are against liberal democracy, secularism and capitalism, because they came from the West.

When the national philosophies were being formulated prior to the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, an Islamic alliance managed to force the nationalist group to accept the first principle of Pancasila,

which reads, “Faith in God with the obligation to implement Islamic sharia for Muslims.” The formulation was titled “Jakarta Charter” by Muhammad Yamin on 22 June 1945. However, on 18 August 1945, just one day after the independence, the first principle was amended into “Faith in One and Only God.<sup>45</sup>” It was thought as a compromise to accommodate aspiration of non-Muslim citizens.

In the early days of Indonesia as an independent nation, some people used Islamism to gain both parliamentary and non-parliament power. The parliamentary was used by M. Natsir using Masyumi Party; the non-parliamentary was used by Kartosuwiryo with his DI/TII movement aimed to build an Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). Islamism-based political movement went down during the New Order due to the policy of the authoritarian regime.

After the 1998 Reform, political identity and conservatism in religion was back on the rise, providing opportunities for political Islam to penetrate this nation. The Islamists exhibited their religious rise through Islamic institutionalization. The emergence of multiple Islam-based parties, sharia local regulations, religious groups, and the demand to return to Jakarta Charter, were some of the post-Reform phenomena. Tarbiyah Movement, which first emerged through *halaqah* (small community gatherings) and student organizations (KAMMI), eventually evolved into Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In addition, organizations that wished to build an Islamic caliphate such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which originally could only carry out their activities in universities under the guise of Islamic studies, could then make their activities public and voice opinions with confidence in various means, including by organizing congresses on caliphate.<sup>46</sup>

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45 *Pancasila, Sukarno, Piagam Jakarta, dan Debat Dasar Negara*, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/16/06/02/o83mzy385-pancasila-sukarno-piagam-jakarta-dan-debat-dasar-negara>, accessed on 3 November 2017.

46 *Penyebaran Gerakan Khilafah di Kampus Menguat Pascareformasi*, 22 May 2016, [http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita\\_indonesia/2016/05/160510\\_indonesia\\_lapsus\\_radikalisme\\_anakmuda\\_kampus](http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/05/160510_indonesia_lapsus_radikalisme_anakmuda_kampus), accessed on 25 October 2017. See also: HTI Memakai Kampus dan GBK untuk Mempropagandakan Khilafah, 12 May 2017, <https://tirto.id/hti-memakai-kampus-dan-gbk-untuk-mempropagandakan-khilafah-coxM>, accessed on 25 October 2017.

Islamist groups have infiltrated many educational institutions, governmental agencies, mosques, and Islamic organizations, including Muhammadiyah And Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).<sup>47</sup> Political identity gets stronger as a regime change is paving the way for intergroup conflicts within the society. Such examples can be seen in the sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Poso, which ultimately led to the formation of religious militias that condone acts of vigilante, such as Laskar Jihad.<sup>48</sup>

Political violence also emerged in the era of Reform, as signified by a series of suicide bombings at home--from the Atrium Senen bombing in 1998 up to Kampung Melayu bombing in 2017.<sup>49</sup> The serial terrorism attacks indicate that violence is preferred by the Islamists as a shortcut to gaining power.

It appears that the Reform and post-Reform eras have yet to be able to unite the nationalists and Islamists. The gubernatorial election in Jakarta 2017 even rejuvenated political identity by championing the idea of rejecting non-Muslim leaders. Religion as such became a sensitive thing. The occurrences of 411 and 212 Movements in late 2016 demanded the then-governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok, be imprisoned due to allegation of blasphemy against Islam. Those actions show that religious issue can be an effective fuel to mobilize people and that Jakarta Election is not only the concern of Jakartans but has also become a national concern. Participants of 212 Action did not only come from Jakarta but also other areas in Java and outside of Java Island, such as Ciamis (West Java), Solo (Central Java) and Bukittinggi (West Sumatera).<sup>50</sup> The presence of religious and public

47 Rendy Adiwilaga, *Gerakan Islam Politik dan Proyek Historis Penegakan Islamisme di Indonesia*, Jurnal Wacana Politik, Vol. 2 No. 1, March 2017:5.

48 "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon", Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.132, 26 January 2012, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-vigilantism-terrorism-cirebon>, accessed on 4 November 2017.

49 Rentetan Bom Bunuh Diri di Indonesia, 25 Mei 2017, <https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/rentetan-bom-bunuh-diri-di-indonesia>, accessed on 25 Oktober 2017. See also: Rangkaian Teror Bom di Indonesia selama 15 Tahun, 14 January 2016, <https://media.iyaa.com/article/2016/01/rangkaian-teror-bom-di-indonesia-selama-15-tahun-3433485.html>, accessed on 25 October 2017.

50 See <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/aksi-damai-212-berjalan-kaki-ciamis-bandung/3618625.html>, <https://www.gosumbar.com/berita/baca/2016/11/29/hari-ini-ratusan-peserta-aksi-bela-islam-212-asal-bukittinggi-dan-agam-bertolak>

figures such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, Rizieq Shihab, and Bachtiar Nasir, managed to attract participants.<sup>51</sup> National Movement of MUI Decree Guardian (*Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI/GNPFMUI*) and Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam/FPI*) have played a main role of religious authority, superseding mainstream Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Islamism-based movements also showed their solidarity in those actions where Islamic elements from various schools were united. "Transnational Islam, as represented by Hizbut Tahrir, and the Tarbiyah movement, which was represented by PKS, came together in 411 or 212 Actions and took a prayer together."<sup>52</sup>

The Jakarta election did show that democracy could go well in Indonesia, but it also showed that ruptures caused by Tribal, Religious and Racial political identities were on the rise. In addition, Jakarta Elections in 2016 and 2017 also showed the intensity of radicalism and terrorism movement which led to the bombing attack on Jalan Thamrin in January 2016. A series of terrorist attacks ensued in the same year, targeting security apparatus by means of officers stabbing, police office arson, and so on, all leading to the bombing of Kampung Melayu in 2017. It was in such a social setting that the national survey on diversity attitude was carried out by Center of Islamic and Community Studies (PPIM) of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta.

## Research Methods

This paper is based on research using a quantitative method applied to a national survey on the attitude toward diversity among school and college students. The survey was conducted by PPIM from 1

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ke-ibukota-jakarta, <https://www.jpnn.com/news/kemenhub-siapkan-300-bus-untuk-pulangkan-massa-aksi-212>, and <http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2016/12/03/rombongan-peserta-aksi-212-asal-jateng-mulai-kembali-ke-daerahnya-sejak-dini-hari-tadi>, accessed on 5 November 2017.

51 Reuni aksi 212 dan orang-orang dalam pusarannya, di mana mereka sekarang?, 1 December 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-42191751>, accessed on 5 December 2017.

52 Rendy Adiwilaga, *Gerakan Islam Politik dan Proyek Historis Penegakan Islamisme di Indonesia*, Jurnal Wacana Politik, Vol. 2 No. 1, March 2017:7.

September to 7 October 2017 in 34 provinces in Indonesia whereby one district and one city per each province was opted through a random selection process.

The target population of the survey was students and teachers of high school (SMA) level as well as college students and lecturers (university level). Some of the schools and universities are governed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), some by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC). School selection used a proportional sampling method; hence districts or cities with more schools would generate more samples. The total sample included 2,181 people, consisting of 1,522 school students and 337 college students, 264 teachers, and 58 lecturers teaching Islamic Studies subject.

The survey emphasized on matters of religious tolerance in Indonesia, such as those surrounding *khilafiyah* in Islamic communities, their perspective on Ahmadiyya and Shia, and their perspectives on freedom of expression and on others. The research also sought to find out their perception on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, Islamic sharia, Islamic State, jihad, and whether or not Islam could go hand in hand with democracy. To enrich the quantitative data, literature reviews were conducted involving various sources, including books, journals, on-line sources, and scientific publications related to Islamism.

### **Literature Review**

According to Bassam Tibi, contemporary Islamism is different from Islamic religious belief. Based on his research in 20 Islamic countries for more than three decades, Tibi in his book *Islamism and Islam*, depicts Islamism as a political ideology according to a new version of Islamic law. He discusses the vision of Islamism on the: state order; centrality of anti-Judaism in Islamism ideology; idea that Islamism cannot go hand in hand with democracy; interpretation of jihadism as terrorism; transformation of sharia law from tradition into legal

regulation, and; confusion of Islamists on the concepts of authenticity and cultural purity. He then applied a theory by Hannad Arend to identify Islamism as a totalitarian ideology.<sup>53</sup>

Bassam Tibi introduced an “institutional” concept of Islamism as a process that he claimed to have developed after the Arab Spring. In his other book, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe*, Tibi argues that both jihadist and institutional Islamists have the same goal, namely to create an Islamic state, but they do have different methodological means. Jihadism commits on the idea of a revolution in Islamic world (through violence), whereas institutional Islamism prefers using political institutions as the avenue to achieve their goals. He referred to the Arab Spring events in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt when he asked whether or not non-violence was enough to support the shift toward original democracy. By specifically analyzing the downfall of Mursi in Egypt, Tibi inquired into what lessons we can learn from that regime; and he argued that this event would not change the overall trend of development from jihadism to institutional Islamism.<sup>54</sup>

Political, social and cultural struggles are currently rampant in the Middle East whereby the Islamists believe, according to Tarek Osman, that Islam must become the region’s main identity. In his book *Islamism: What It Means for the Middle East and the World*, Osman depicts that those against the Islamists--namely the nationalists, secularists, monarchies, military organizations, and so on--are seeing Islamism as a serious threat to national security, historical identity, and cohesive society. He explains why political Islam has tried to win elections and how Islamists in various nations have acted after gaining power. Osman divides the alliances that have taken shape among the Islamist factions, and discusses major issues such as the compatibility between Islamism and modernity, and the experience of the region in 20<sup>th</sup>

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53 Tibi, Bassam. “Islamism and Islam”, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012.

54 Tibi, Bassam “Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism”, New York: Routledge, 2014.

century, as well as its impacts to social contracts and on minorities. Besides sharing his views on the meaning of Salafism, he also discusses its evolution and relationship with jihadists in the Middle East.<sup>55</sup>

Internal complexity and dynamics of Islamism are discussed by Andrea Mura in his book *The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political Thoughts*, which tests the roles played by tradition, modernity, and trans-modernity as the main “symbolic scenarios” of Islamist discourses. The book initiates a dialogue from among the discourses by three most prominent figures in Sunni Islam, namely Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb, and Osama bin Laden. Andrea Mura provides a unique contribution to rethinking the nature of citizenship, antagonism, space and demarcations that are currently required through the perspective of discourse theory, post-colonial theory, political philosophy, and comparative politics.<sup>56</sup>

Research that correlates citizenship and Islam has been conducted to young Muslims in Sandžak, Bosnia, who view themselves more as Muslim rather than as Bosnian. *“The Sandžak youth are almost totally impregnated with Islamism...They mostly trust no one but members of their families: they have no trust in politicians, in religious dignitaries, in their neighbors of the same ethnic origin and religion, in their peers.”*<sup>57</sup> Respondents are almost totally and socially isolated, and most of them do not trust anyone – not even their neighbors, peers, government or religious authorities – other than their family members.

Jihadist ideology has inspired a number of various radical groups and is decentralized to wage wars on the enemies of Islam as well as to restore the holy caliphate that unites Muslims throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Springer, Regens and Edger in their book *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* explain about what the

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55 Tarek Osman, “Islamism: What It Means for the Middle East and the World”, Yale University Press, 2016.

56 Andrea Mura, “The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political Thought”, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015.

57 Vladimir Ilić, “How Susceptible Are The Youth To Islamic Extremism opinion Poll Conducted Among The Sandžak Youth”, Helsinki Committee For Human Rights in Serbia Helsinki Files No.35, Wwww.Helsinki.Org.Rs, Belgrade, May 2016.



jihadists want and how these radical philosophers have deviated from Islamic teachings to convince their followers to commit terrorism as a religious obligation. This book provides explanation on philosophical foundations, strategic visions, organizational dynamics, and modern jihadist tactics by paying attention to its main driver: Al-Qaeda.<sup>58</sup>

Meanwhile, Quintan Wiktorowicz, in an article titled “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam” explains four main processes that can increase the likelihood of someone joining a radical Islamic group. The first is cognitive opening, a process where a person accepts the possibility of new ideas and worldviews. The second is religious seeking, a process where someone tries to find meaning through religious idioms. The third is frame alignment, a process where public appearances advertised by a radical group seem to “make sense” to the seekers and grab their interest. The fourth is socialization, a process where someone learns in religious activities that facilitate indoctrination, identity construction, and value transformation. The first three processes are the important first steps for the fourth process (socialization). In other words, if individuals are not open to new ideas, not exposed to messages of a movement, or they reject the message after initial exposure, they will not participate in activities required to truly penetrate the radical ideologies that will convince them to join.<sup>59</sup>

Many Islamists adopted the idea of an Egyptian Islamist, Sayyid al-Quthb (1906-1966) who desired the enforcement of Islamic Sharia and, consequently, the removal of Western influence in the Muslim world, among his followers who govern the countries in Muslim world. Quthb’s ideas have proven to be effective in resisting the rulers in the Middle East, but according to Bob de Graaf, the ideas do not apply for the formation of a new Caliphate because Quthb firmly believes that

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58 Springer, Devin R., James L. Regens, and David N. Edger. “Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad”, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

59 Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun And Radical Islam*, <http://instct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wiktorowicz.Joining-the-Cause.pdf>, accessed on 6 November 2017.

no Muslim can ever govern other Muslims.<sup>60</sup>

While many have referred to the Islamism radicalization of Sayyid Quthb, the Saudis developed their own school of jihadi through the work of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab titled *Ten Things that Nullify One's Islam*. The book explains ten things that cause someone automatic apostasy from Islam, namely 1) Polytheism (putting other creatures on the same pedestal as Allah in worship); 2) setting an intermediary between oneself and Allah (for example, praying through a cleric); 3) questioning the idea that non-Muslim is a heretic; 4) complying to non-Islamic laws and deeming them as more superior than the rule of God; 5) hating anyone who has been declared as lawful by the Prophet; 6) ridiculing Islam or Prophet Muhammad; 7) using or supporting the use of sorcery; 8) supporting or defending the heretics in oppressing the Muslims; 9) believing in the idea that some people can stop the application of Islamic teaching; and 10) turning completely away from Islam and not learning its precepts or acting upon them. The first three points are the most important for the jihadists. First, a Muslim will be deemed an apostate if he or she puts other creatures on the same pedestal as Allah – included in this case are rulers who employ non-Islamic laws. Secondly, a Muslim who complies to the law “other than the law of Allah” and believes it to be superior to the law of Allah is a heretic. A heretic ruler will not only apply non-Islamic laws but also be convinced that they have employed better laws than the Islamic one. Thirdly, supporting or assisting the heretics in oppressing a Muslim will immediately make a person an apostate. This is what has made Al-Qaeda believe that regimes in Muslim world are *thaghut*.<sup>61</sup>

In Indonesia, the orientation of Islamists to enforce Islamic sharia prior to and in the early days of Reform, during the era of decentralization, has shifted to hoodlumism and control over economic

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60 de Graaff, Bob. “How to Keep our Youth away from IS: The Need for Narrative Analysis and Strategy.” *Journal of Strategic Security* 8, no. 5 (2015): pp. 48-52.

61 Quintan Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of Radical Islam, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28:2, 75-97, 20 Aug 2006, pp. 81-82.

resources. By looking at a case study in Solo, Nur Kafid depicted the patron-client relationship between radical Islamic groups and local political elites. One party provided security assurance while the other provided access to economic resources. He argued that the shift in orientation was due to several factors: the first was a high rate of social inequality and the roughness of sociopolitical relations; the second was tough competition in business and employment market; and the third was the lack of law enforcement on the part of governmental agencies.<sup>62</sup>

However, recent research conducted by Alvira Research Center and Mata Air Foundation in 2017 showed a striking difference in tendency. The 1,200 respondents of their research were Civil Servant (PNS), professionals in private sector and Indonesian state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It was found that 29.6% or 355 professional respondents agreed that Islamic state had to be sought for the sake of total implementation of Islam and 19.6% agreed to commit jihad for the sake of establishing an Islamic state. According to the research, the respondents obtained religious information from gatherings in the mosque in their workplace as well as from the internet.<sup>63</sup>

## **A Never-Ending Battle between Islamism and Nationalism**

### *1. Perspective on Secular Government vs. Theocratic Government*

#### **a. Support to Indonesian Government based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution**

The main assumption of Islamism concerns Theocratic Government (*Hakimiyyat Allah*).<sup>64</sup> This assumption believes that the law of Allah is the most superior in governing the world and that democracy is incompatible with Islam. The Islamists also believe that Islam is an

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<sup>62</sup> Kafid, Nur. "Dari Islamisme ke Premanisme: Pergeseran Orientasi Gerakan Kelompok Islam Radikal di Era Desentralisasi Demokrasi", *MASYARAKAT: Jurnal Sosiologi* Vol. 21 No.1: 57-79, January 2016.

<sup>63</sup> "Potensi Radikalisme di Kalangan Profesional Indonesia", Laporan Penelitian, Alvira Research Center dan Mata Air Foundation, October 2017.

<sup>64</sup> Bassam Tibi, "Islam and Islamism", p. 137.

integration of religion and state (*Al Islam Din wa Daulah*). On that point, 80.74% of school/college students as well as 91.93% of teachers/lecturers showed positive attitude to the existence of the Indonesian Government. They did not agree with the notion that the Government being based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution was *thaghut* and heretic. In this case, they agreed with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which place “people’s sovereignty” as the core of democratic teaching.

**Do you agree that the Indonesian Government, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, is *thaghut* and heretic?**




Figure 5: Opinion on whether Indonesian government is *thaghut* and heretic

In terms of attitude, those among school/college students who agreed with the notion that “Indonesian Government based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution is *thaghut* and a heresy” consisted of 47.8% very radical students, 14.2% radical students, 8.1% very moderate students and 5.9% moderate students. In terms of action, this was agreed to by 5.0% very radical students and 8.9% radical students. Meanwhile, 54.8% very moderate students and 22.1% moderate students disagreed with that notion.

b. Caliphate as a form of governance “recognized” in Islamic teaching

A vague attitude was exhibited by respondents when 61.92% of school/college students and 37.5% of teachers/lecturers believed that Caliphate was a form of government recognized in Islamic teaching. Meanwhile, 38.08% of students and 62.42% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with the notion.

**Do you agree that the governmental system recognized by Islam is based on caliphate?**




Figure 6: Opinion on the Caliphate

In terms of opinion, those who agreed with the notion that “the governmental system recognized by Islam is based on caliphate” consisted of 46.2% very radical students, 19.5% radical students, 6.8% moderate students and 7.1% very moderate students. In terms of action, this notion was agreed by 1.8% of very radical students and 5.9% of radical students. Meanwhile, 63.1% of very moderate students and 16.8% of moderate students disagreed.

c. Dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

A vague attitude was also exhibited by respondents upon discussing about caliphate as a governmental system. 25.93% of school/college students as well as 50.93% teachers/lecturers supported the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that supports the formation of Islamic Caliphate in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 22.05% students and 27.95% teachers/lecturers did not agree with the government's decision. The rest, amounting to 52.02% of students and 21.12% of teachers/lecturers had no idea about it.

They agreed with the government's decision because they believed HTI: 1) wanted to replace the Republic of Indonesia with caliphate (51.66% students and 59.76% teachers/lecturers); 2) disrupted public order (26.35% of students and 23.17% of teachers/lecturers); 3) rejected democracy (18.46% of students and 11.59% of teachers/lecturers); and 4) other reasons (3.53% of students and 5.49% of teachers/lecturers).

#### **Do you agree with government's decision to dissolve Hizbut Tahrir?**




Figure 7. Opinion on dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir

### Reasons for supporting dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia




Figure 8. Reasons for supporting dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir  
d. Support to application of Islamic sharia in Indonesia

As many as 91.23% of school/college students and 69.25% of teachers/lecturers agreed that Islamic sharia had to be implemented for governing Indonesia. Only 8.77% of students and 30.75% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with the idea.

### Do you agree that the application of Islamic sharia in Indonesia must be supported?




Figure 9. Opinion on Support to the Application of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia

In terms of opinion, those agreeing with the notion that the “application of Islamic sharia in Indonesia must be supported” consisted of 42.9% of very radical students, 19.7% radical students, 8.2% moderate students and 7.8% very moderate students. However, in terms of action, the idea that the “application of Islamic sharia in Indonesia must be supported” was only consented by 1.8% of very radical students and 5.4% of radical students. Meanwhile, 71.8% of very moderate students and 15.3% of moderate students rejected the notion.

e. On Islamic law as Basis of Government’s Policy

As many as 75.2% of school/college students and 63.35% of teachers/lecturers believed that every governmental policy had to be based on Islamic law. Meanwhile, 24.48% of students and 36.65% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with the idea.

**Do you agree that every governmental policy must be based on Islamic law?**




Figure 10. Opinion on Islamic Law as base of government policy

In terms of opinion, those who agreed with the idea that “every governmental policy must be based on Islamic law” consisted of 46.6%



very radical students, 18.9% radical students, 7.0% moderate students, 6.9% very moderate students while 20.6% chose to be neutral. In terms of action, this idea was supported by 2.2% very radical students and 5.8% radical students. Meanwhile, 63.7% very moderate students and 19.6% moderate students did not agree with the idea.

f. Governance of Indonesia based on Islamic sharia and under leadership of religious experts

As many as 83.32% of school/college students and 65.53% of teachers/lecturers believed that a government based on Islamic sharia and under the leadership of religious expert would be the best for Indonesia. Meanwhile, 16.68% of students and 34.47% of teachers/lecturers disagreed.

**Do you agree that a government based on Islamic sharia and under the leadership of religious expert will be best for this country?**




Figure 11. Opinion on whether leadership by religious experts is the best solution

In terms of opinion, the idea that “a government based on Islamic sharia and under the leadership of religious experts is best for this country” was agreed by 44.7% very radical students, 19.6% radical students, 7.7% moderate students and 7.9% very moderate students.

In terms of action, this idea was only supported by 1.9% very radical students and 5.7% radical students. Meanwhile, 64.8% of very moderate students and 19.4% of moderate students rejected the idea.

g. Acceptance to Non-Muslim Regional Leaders

As many as 67.78% of school/college students as well as 67.08% of teachers/lecturers refused to be led by non-Muslim leaders. Meanwhile, only 32.22% of students and 32.92% of teachers/lecturers would accept non-Muslim leaders for their region.

**Will you accept a non-Muslim leader for your region?**




Figure 12. Opinion on non-Muslim leadership

h. Right of Regional government to enact regulations concerning religious matters

As many as 80.42% of school/college students and 86.02% of teachers/lecturers agreed that the government should have the right to enact regulations concerning religious matters. Meanwhile, 19.58% of students and 13.98% of teachers/lecturers disagreed.

### Do you agree that the government has the right to enact regulations concerning religious matters?




Figure 13. Opinion on Regional Governance on Religious Matters


In terms of opinion, the idea that “the government has the right to enact regulations concerning religious matters” was agreed by 43.7% very radical students, 19.6% radical students, 7.6% moderate students, 8.9% very moderate students, while 20.2% remained neutral. In terms of action, this idea was supported by 2.0% very radical students and 5.8% radical students. Meanwhile, 61.0% very moderate students and 23.1% moderate students rejected the idea. It appears that the moderate would find it difficult to position themselves.

#### i. Support to movements to enforce Islamic law

As many as 56.59% of school/college students supported movements aimed at enforcing Islamic law whereas 43.41% of them rejected the idea. In terms of opinion, the idea that “movements that aim to enforce Islamic law must be supported” was agreed by 52.9% very radical students, 14.0% radical students, 6.7% moderate students, 6.1% very moderate students, with 20.3% remaining neutral. In terms of action, this idea was supported by 2.7% very radical students and 5.7% radical students. Meanwhile, 61.5% of very moderate students

and 18.2% of moderate students rejected the idea.


**Do you agree that movements to enforce Islamic law must be supported? (School and college students)**



■ Agree ■ Disagree

As for support to movements that aim to enforce Islamic law such as a caning punishment for adultery was given by 62.56% of students and 52.17% of teachers/lecturers whereas 37.44% of students and 47.83% teachers/lecturers rejected the idea.

**Do you agree with movements to enforce Islamic law such as caning punishment for adulterers?**



■ Agree ■ Disagree

Figure 15. Opinion on movements to support Islamic law such as through use of caning as punishment for adulterers

In terms of opinion, the idea was agreed by 51.2% of very radical students, 14.5% radical students, 7.9% moderate students, and 6.4% very moderate students, with 19.9% being neutral. But in terms of action, this idea was only supported by 2.2% very radical and radical students respectively. Meanwhile, 62.1% of very moderate students and 17.1% moderate students rejected the idea.

- j. Acting upon Pancasila and 1945 Constitution being essentially the same as acting upon Islamic sharia

A vague response was shown by the respondents when 90.16% of school/college students as well as 93.17% of teachers/lecturers agreed with the idea that “acting upon Pancasila and 1945 Constitution is essentially the same as acting upon Islamic sharia.” Meanwhile, 9.84% of students and 6.83% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with this idea.

**Do you agree with the notion that acting upon Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is essentially the same as acting upon Islamic sharia?**




Figure 16. Opinion on notion that acting upon Pancasila and 1945 Constitution is same as acting upon Islamic sharia

In terms of opinion, the notion was agreed by 41.3% very radical students, 18.4% radical students, 8.5% moderate students, 10.3% very moderate students, and 21.5% who is neutral. But In terms of action, this notion is supported by 1.7% very radical and radical students, 54.2% very moderate students and 21.4% moderate students.

## 2. Perspectives on Jihad

### a. True jihad means waging wars against non-Muslims

An interesting finding of this survey is the recommendation for jihad that is interpreted by most Islamists as the enforcement of *Nizom Islami* (a new Islamic system or order), gained small support from the respondents. In terms of waging jihad, the teachers/lecturers and school/college students did not agree with the idea that jihad is equal to violence. As many as 62.29% of school/college students and 82.30% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with the notion that true jihad means waging wars against non-Muslims. However, 37.71% of students and 17.70% teachers/lecturers did agree with the idea. This means that some respondents viewed jihad as *qital*, especially when directed to fight non-Muslims.

#### Do you think that true jihad means waging wars against non-Muslims?




Figure 17. Opinion on whether jihad means waging wars against non-Muslims

In terms of opinion, the notion that “true jihad is war against non-Muslims” was agreed to by 52.6% very radical students, 18.0% radical students, 5.1% moderate students, 7.0% very moderate students, and 17.3% neutral students. While In terms of action, this notion was supported by 2.7% very radical students and 7.7% radical students. This idea was rejected by 57.2% very moderate students and 21.0% moderate students.

b. Bombing attack or suicide bombing in the name of religion is true jihad

As many as 76.65% of school/college students as well as 93.17% teachers/lecturers disagreed with the notion that a bombing attack or suicide bombing in the name of religion was true jihad. However, 23.35% students and 6.83% teachers/lecturers did believe it as such.

**Do you agree that a bombing attack or suicide bombing in the name of religion is the true jihad?**




Figure 18. Opinion on whether suicide bombing in the name of Religion is true jihad

This indicates that some respondents indeed believed that suicide bombing is Jihad according to Islam. In terms of opinion, those who agreed with the idea that “bombing attack or suicide bombing in the

name of religion is the true jihad” consisted of 48.6% of very radical students, 18.0% radical students, 6.0% moderate students, 7.4% very moderate students, and 20.0% neutral students. In terms of action, this notion was supported by 3.0% very radical students and 8.8% radical students. This idea was rejected by 56.1% very moderate students and 21% moderate students.

c. Assaults to *thaghut* and heretic state apparatus can be justified

As many as 69.71% school/college students as well as 86.02% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with the notion that assaults to *thaghut* and heretic state apparatus can be justified. However, 30.29% students and 3.98% teachers/lecturers did believe state apparatus could be assaulted for that very reason.

**Do you agree that assaults to *thaghut* and heretic state apparatus can be justified?**




Figure 19. Opinion on assault to state apparatus

In terms of opinion, those who agreed with the idea that “assaults to thaghut and heretic state apparatus can be justified” consisted of 48.1% very radical students, 19.4% radical students, 10.6% moderate students, 6.4% very moderate students, and 20.4% neutral students. In



terms of action, this notion was agreed by 3.0% very radical students and 7.5% radical students. This idea was rejected by 58.2% very moderate students and 20.1% moderate students.

d. Efforts by Densus 88 and National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) in Eradicating Terrorism

As many as 84.51% of school/college students as well as 86.34% teachers/lecturers agreed with the steps taken by Densus 88 and BNPT in combating terrorism. However, 15.49% of students and 13.66% of teachers/lecturers disagreed.

**Do you agree with efforts by Densus 88 and National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) in Eradicating Terrorism?**




Figure 20. Opinion on combating terrorism

e. Believing on the idea that ISIS and global terrorism are Western creation

Many respondents believed in conspiracy theories. As many as 66.16% of the school/college students as well as 79.81% of the teachers/lecturers believed that ISIS and global terrorism were Western creation. Only 33.84% students and 20.19% teachers/lecturers disagreed with the notion.




Figure 21. Opinion on whether terrorism is Western creation

### 3. Opinion on Victimization of the Muslim Community

A number of this 2017 PPIM Survey respondents seemed to have undergone some early process of radicalization. According to Quinton Wictorowicz, radicalization begins with a cognitive opening, i.e. when a person has found a perspective that provides explanation about the injustice around them.<sup>65</sup> He argues that the main issue that usually gets discussed during the early stage of radical activist recruitment is on victimization of the Muslim community. This issue is deemed effective for screening prospective activists as they can relate to the emotion of a Muslim. The sentiment that the Muslim community is currently being victimized was shared by 55.08 of these school/college students as well as 62.11% of teachers/lecturers. Meanwhile, 44.92% students and 37.89% teachers/lecturers did not share the sentiment.

<sup>65</sup> Quintan Wictorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism In The West*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005, pp. 83-133.

**Do you agree that the Muslim community is currently being victimized?**




Figure 22. Opinion on whether the Muslim community is being victimized

As many as 48.08% of school/college students as well as 54.35% of teachers/lecturers agreed that non-Muslims were more fortunate in terms of economy than were Muslims. However, 51.96% of students and 46.65% teachers/lecturers disagreed with that idea.

**Do you agree that non-Muslims are more fortunate in terms of economy than Muslims?**




Figure 23. Opinion on whether non-Muslims are more fortunate than Muslims in terms of economy

However, 63.21% of school/college students as well as 59.94% of teachers/lecturers did not agree with the idea that non-Muslims are responsible for the socioeconomic inequality in Indonesia. Only 36.79% students and 40.06% teachers/lecturers believed in the idea.

**Do you agree that non-Muslims are responsible for socioeconomic inequality in Indonesia?**




Figure 24. Opinion on whether non-Muslims are responsible for economic inequality

#### 4. Opinion on Relation with Non-Muslims

With regard to the relation with non-Muslims, school/college students and teachers/lecturers said they could coexist with people of other religions but not with the Jews. As many as 79.07% of the students as well as 83.35% of the teachers/lecturers agreed that Christians are not enemies of Muslims. However, 20.93% of the students and 66.15% of the teachers/lecturers felt that Christians were enemies of Islam. Meanwhile, 76.22% of the students and 66.15% of the teachers/lecturers believed that Christians did not hate Muslims. Still, 23.78% of the students and 33.85% of the teachers/lecturers did believe that Christians hated Muslims.

### Do you agree that Christians are enemies of Islam and that they hate Muslims?




Figure 25. Opinion on Christians

Anti-Judaism (anti-Semitism) was also growing among the respondents. As many as 53.74% of the school/college students and 57.76% of the teachers/lecturers agreed that Jews were enemies of Islam. However, 46.26% of the students and 42.24% of the teachers/lecturers felt that the Jewish people were not enemies of Islam. Meanwhile, 52.99% of the students and 63.66% of the teachers/lecturers agreed that the Jews hated Muslims. On the contrary, 47.01% of the students and 36.34% of the teachers/lecturers dispelled the sentiment.

### Do you agree that the Jews are enemies of Islam and that they hate Muslims?




Figure 26. Opinion on the Jewish people

Although most respondents could accept the existence of non-Muslims, only 55.1% of school/college students and 34.47% of teachers/lecturers would approve a plan for constructing houses of worship for other religions in their neighborhood. The remaining 44.49% students and 65.53% teachers/lecturers rejected the idea. However, in the case of giving donation, 70.36% of students and 64.60 of teachers/lecturers would not mind if non-Muslims donated Islamic institutions. Only 29.64% of students and 35.40% of teachers/lecturers rejected the idea.




Figure 27. Opinion on the Construction of Non-Muslim House of Worship and Their Donation

#### 5. Opinion on Relation with Apostates and Minority Sects within Islam

As many as 65.57% of school/college students and 81.37% of teachers/lecturers disagreed with the notion that apostates could be killed. However, 34.43% of the students and 18.63% of the teachers/lecturers believed that anyone guilty of apostasy from Islam could be killed.

Do you agree that apostates can be killed?




Figure 28. Opinion on whether apostates can be killed

In terms of opinion, those agreeing with the idea that “apostates can be killed” consisted of 51.7% very radical students, 16.4% radical students, 6.4% moderate students, 7.3% very moderate students, and 18.1% neutral students. In terms of action, the idea was agreed by 3.4% very radical students and 7.7% radical students. Meanwhile, 57.7% very moderate students and 21.4% moderate students disagreed with that notion.

With regard to relation with minority Muslim sects, 86.55% of the school/college students and 87.89% of the teachers/lecturers agreed that the government should prohibit minority sects that deviated from Islamic teaching. Meanwhile, 13.45% students and 12.11% teachers/lecturers rejected it.




Figure 29. Opinion on government prohibiting minority sects

In terms of opinion, those agreeing with the notion that “the government has the right to prohibit or dissolve religious sects/organizations that deviate from Islamic teaching” consisted of 40.7% very radical students, 18.4% radical students, 8.9% moderate students, 10.5% very moderate students, and 21.5% neutral students. In terms of action, this was supported by 54.0% very moderate students and



21% moderate students disagreed with that notion and thus did 5.1% radical students and 1.5% very radical students.

Both the teachers/lecturers and students found it difficult to accept Ahmadiyya and Shia followers. As many as 30.99% of the students put Shia as the number one most hated group while 19.72% of them considered the Ahmadiyya as the second most hated. Meanwhile, 64.66% of the teachers/lecturers ranked Ahmadiyya in the first place and 55.60% of them mentioned Shia as the second most hated group.




Figure 30. Hated Islamic organizations

As many as 51.00% of the school/college students agreed that the government had to protect Shia and Ahmadiyya followers. About 64.17% students also supported the government to repatriate Ahmadiyya and Shia refugees in Sidoarjo to their home. Meanwhile, 44.71% teachers/lecturers agreed that the government had to protect Shia and Ahmadiyya followers but only 34.16% of them supported the idea that the government had to repatriate Ahmadiyya and Shia refugees in Sidoarjo to their home.




Figure 31. Opinion on protecting Shia and Ahmadiyya followers

## Conclusions

As the results of 2017 PPIM Survey show, there has been an internal conflict among the students (Gen Z) and teachers in viewing the relationship between the state and religion. Construction of Islamism narratives can be seen when they responded to the questions about the implementation of Islamic sharia, support to Islamic caliphate, hatred to the Jews, and rejection toward Shia and Ahmadiyya. Religion-based political identities can be clearly seen in their opinion about non-Muslim leaders. They firmly refused to be led by a non-Muslim. However, they made a contrasting opinion when they agreed with the Republic of Indonesia and democracy as well as from their willingness to coexist with other believers (Christians).

The 2017 PPIM Survey also shows that the Islamism narrative that grows among students and teachers are only radical in terms of opinion but not in action that may lead to terrorism. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether or not Islamism transmission has occurred as a result of interpersonal relationship between children-parents in families or perhaps as a result of students-teachers in educational institutions. We also need to see whether or not the narrative has disseminated

through communal Quran reading and *halaqah*. These private and semi-private transmissions can mold one's perspective, attitude and action, in addition to creating a psychological and ideological affinity to build a collective movement.

In general, the 2017 PPIM Survey shows that as a country with the biggest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia can exhibit contradicting signals: some signaling that democracy can go while others indicate symptoms of fragmentation and Islamism that co-opts Islam. A free and active election in the Reform Era failed to produce a single winner because the nationalists and the Islamists were, are still, fighting each other. Democracy as the only game in town can survive even if some people deny it.

## 4

# **Islamic Studies: Introducing Other Religions and Groups**

The era of globalization, along with the rapid growth of internet, has challenged the education world to protect the student's morality and ethics by competing with the education provided by online websites. One of the issues requiring our biggest attention, in addition to pornography through online prostitution and drugs, concerns whether or not education can create a concrete formula to deter the growth of intolerance and radicalism.

According to the notes made by Ashidiqie in the past five years, i.e. from 2007 to 2012, violation to freedom of religion tends to be on the rise and its number continue to increase. Prof. Jimmly made the conclusion based on the data of complaints to the Human Rights National Commission and the monitoring reports from NGOs such as Setara Institute, The Wahid Institute, and Moderate Muslim Society. According to Setara Institute, violence and intolerance increased from 244 incidents and 299 actions in 2011 to 264 incidents and 371 actions in 2012 (Asshiddiqie, 2014).

According to recent sampling data from The Wahid Institute (2016), of the total 1,520 respondents, 59.9% have a group they hate, which lumps together non-Muslims, Chinese, communists, and other sub-groups. Of that percentage, 92.2% disagree with the notion of anyone from this group becoming official leaders in the government of Indonesia. As many as 82.4% of them in fact do not want to have them as their neighbors.

In terms of radicalism, 72 percent of Indonesian Muslims refuse to act radically such as committing an attack to a house of worship of other believers or making raid to places that are considered to be against Islamic sharia. However, 7.7% of them are willing to act radically if they have an opportunity to do so and 0.4% were reported to have committed radical actions. Yenny [Abdurrahmanwahid] noted that even if they amounted to merely 7.7%, it was still quite concerning because this means 7.7% out of 150 million Indonesian Muslims. In this sense, at least 11 million Indonesian Muslims are willing to act radically (Hakim, 2016).

The result of that survey was evidenced by records of the 11 terrorist attacks driven by intolerance that led to suicide bombing:

1. Bali bombing (2002)
2. JW Marriot bombing (2003)
3. Australian Embassy bombing (2004)
4. Bali bombing II (2005)
5. Ritz Carlton and JW Marriot bombing (2009)
6. Kalimalang bombing (2010)
7. Cirebon Mosque bombing (2011)
8. Solo Church bombing (2011)
9. Poso Police Headquarters bombing (2013)
10. Sarinah bombing (2016)
11. Kampung Melayu bombing (2017).

The intensity, moreover, tends to have increased with the invention of new modes of radicalism that are getting more extreme than simply suicide bombing. Currently, even without a bomb, radicalism can be committed by only using a single knife. Such stabbing terror incidents have been happening in the past two years:

1. Attack to Police Station in Tangerang (2016);
2. Attack using a sharp weapon to a police officer in North Sumatera (2017), and;
3. Attack using a sharp weapon in Faletehan Mosque, Jakarta (2017).

According to the data from the State Police of the Republic of Indonesia, from 2015 to 2016, there were at least 31 cases of terrorism, which were followed up with 336 suspects being arrested. Furthermore, their recruitment process was not as difficult as before; if they used to meet in closed and secretive rooms, now direct meetings can be arranged online using the internet.

## **Literature Review**

### *Sources of Religious Knowledge, Intolerance and Radicalism*

Intolerance as well as radicalism is believed to not emerge out of thin air. Information and knowledge related to it is obtained through various methods such as congenital knowledge, direct experience, vicarious experience, and strategic learning action (Forest, 2006). Congenital knowledge is knowledge that is passed from generation to generation and is believed to come from the progenitor. This kind of knowledge, according to Forest, is very necessary in the initial creation of an organization for the sake of indoctrination. When an organization starts to grow, a more modern way to obtain information will be required. Direct experience is equal to “learning by doing,” i.e. information that is obtained intentionally by making experiments. However, oftentimes this kind of knowledge is obtained with no plan and structure. One example of planned direct experience is the activity of experimenting with weapons. Vicarious experience or an experience that represents oneself is information obtained by observing other people’s or organization’s activity that has similarity. This method of obtaining information appears to be simple but also very complex. If this activity is conducted well and planned then it will be a very precious learning process for organization development. The last method of obtaining information is through strategic learning action. This is considered to be the most structured and explicit method. Organizations have plans for research and development, technological mastery, and even collaboration with other organizations. However,

religious knowledge, intolerance and radicalism will mostly come from two sources, namely external and internal sources.

### *External Sources*

An external source is defined as a source from outside that can influence one's attitude and decision.

#### 1. Formal Education

Formal education is one of the structured methods to deliver religious knowledge. This is because formal education has standardized religious knowledge in the curriculum, in this case the 2013 Curriculum. In general, Islamic Studies curriculum in Indonesia tends to emphasize the implementation of religious values, such as respecting diversity in school, house and the society. In addition, Islamic Studies also give a quite big portion to the understanding of Islamic sharia according to Al-Quran and Hadith (Suhadi; Yusuf, Mohamad; Tahun Marthen; Asyhari, 2015).

However, Suhadi et al. state that so far Islamic Studies in 2013 Curriculum has only provided a limited space for students in interpreting Islamic law. As a matter of fact, according to Suhadi et al., the 2013 Curriculum makes a restrictive rule for what students should wear (Suhadi; Yusuf, Mohamad; Tahun Marthen; Asyhari, 2015). This is what many educators have worried about for so long. Postman and Wiengartner, for example, argue that formal education is a producer of dominant ideology that could care less about the real need of students.

Holt's statement in his book *Underachieving Schools* needs to be taken seriously with regard to the function and process of learning in formal education.

"Almost every child, on the first day he sets foot in a school building, is smarter, more curious, less afraid of what he doesn't know, better at finding and figuring things out, more confident,

resourceful, persistent and independent, than he will ever again be in his schooling or, unless he is unusually lucky, for the rest of his life.” (Holt, 2005).

It turns out that the goal of formal education has long been perverted by certain parties. According to Dolnik (2007), many acts of terror are actually conducted by those who are well-educated – some of them are even educated overseas. The advantage of overseas education is a good western-style education that is more open to new ideas and opportunities to access more references, languages, and knowledge about the West. Scholars with such education are some of the most sought after people to innovate the terrorist’s technology (Dolnik, 2007).

## 2. Non-Formal Education

Non-formal education is defined as education outside of formal schooling. Some example of non-formal education is *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), courses, training, workshop and so on.

In a non-formal education, individuals have new groups with more varied members than in formal education. Oftentimes participants in non-formal education are those who are actually having specific agenda to disseminate ideologies. Participants in non-formal education will generally have greater freedom in time and in the person they mingle with. A relatively intense meeting, for example, can become a gateway to provide religious knowledge that might deviate. Non-formal education often contributes to the development of religious organizations.

Non-formal education such as *pesantren* is a strategic place for the dissemination of religious knowledge. The role of religious leaders in this education is important for the continuation of dissemination and indoctrination of a school of thought. In this kind of non-formal education, it is possible to produce students with high dedication and loyalty to the leaders. The Al-Mukmin Pesantren led by Abu Ba’asyir,



for example, is one of the *pesantren* that produce radical students through his Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) organization. Religious education delivered through such institution has resulted in students with radical religious understanding (Hefner, 2009).

### 3. Social Media

Undeniably, the development of social media technology has become part of the society that has significant influence in decision-making. The media often publish news concerning radicalism, including the operations of terrorist attacks. The media are not only used as a mean to spread information but also a tool to legitimize the existence of a certain group.

Technology has also been used by radical groups to provoke anti-tolerance and radicalism (Nur, 2016). Media can illustrate messages that some people want to be conveyed (Whittaker, 2004). The ability to use media appears to be an important issue in increasing the creativity and capability of radical groups to build their organizations (Dolnik, 2007).

Recently, a hate speech propaganda group has been arrested in Indonesia – they used the Whatsapp network. This group has commodified hate speech. In fact, there are quite a few individuals or groups who employ their service.

The use of social media for the purpose of increasing intolerance and radicalism culture recently has continued to increase. Freedom of expression with no regard has been on the rise. On Whatsapp, for example, there are certain groups who named themselves Quran reading group that discusses social or familial issues based on religious perspectives. However, informants of such groups often have no strong foundation in delivering their arguments. For members with limited understanding on religion, they can easily follow such arguments.

#### 4. Teachers

Teachers as defined in this paper are more than just teachers at formal education. Religious teachers in Quran reading or *pesantren* are also included in this category. In formal education, the achievement of curriculum goal fully depends on teachers. The competence and understanding of a teacher in delivering an information or knowledge will significantly influence how students interpret the information and knowledge.

In general, the world of education recognizes two major types of education models. The first is teacher-centered learning (TCL), and the second is student-centered learning (SCL). Both of them complement each other and they come and go due to historical influence and the development of society.

TCL, according to Huba and Freed (Ahmed Khaled, 2013), is a learning process that depicts a learning system that is centered around the teacher. A TCL process places students as passive receivers of information. The emphasis is in the acquisition of information, and the teacher plays a role as primary source of information and the evaluator. Individual growth of students is not really the main concern in TCL.

SCL is an education model that is focused on the experience and perspective of individual students with regard to their background, talent, interest, capacity, and needs. This type of education creates a conducive learning environment and can propel high motivation to learn and achieve for all students (McCombs, B. L. & Whistler, 1997). In essence, the 2013 Curriculum is emphasizing this type of education. But in practice, not every teacher has placed themselves as the facilitator of a student-centered learning.

Based on our experience so far, the teacher-centered process is still dominant. This means that knowledge transfer is still one way, from the teacher to the student. The teacher has a high position as the “owner” of knowledge while the student is placed as the “receiver” of knowledge with no right to argue. If knowledge about

religion is provided through teacher-centered method, this will create indoctrination.

## 5. The Internet

According to Jewkes, half of the members of radical organization in Saudi Arabia are recruited through the internet (Jewkes, 2011). The Internet is known as an effective tool for propaganda.

Since there is no rule in using the internet, especially in spreading information, any type of information can exist on the internet. People can also read anything on the internet, including obscure information about religion. In fact, religious hate speech has increased recently. People with limited knowledge on religion might absorb this information without filtering it. This is what then contributes to intolerance and radicalism.

The Internet is one of the media that extensively provide news about intolerance and terrorism. According to Dolnik (2007), broadcast of terrorist action that is not accompanied with complete information has created more terrorist followers. Organizations that have committed such things are named 'resolute actors' and have gained sympathy from the international community who could not understand the reason behind their action.

## 6. Books

Almost all of the cases of religious intolerance investigated by the police will involve books that teach extreme religious teaching.

## 7. Religious organizations

A religious organization is one of the places to nurture information and knowledge about religion and intolerance. Religious organizations play an important role in the development of intolerant activities. Hamas and Al-Qaeda are two of many religious organizations in the world with ties to extreme religious activities (Currie, 2002). The

research conducted by Darmawati H & THalib (2016) finds that the existence of radical religious groups have been identified among students of high school level. The youth, according to Darmawati H and Thalib, are a group that is highly vulnerable to penetration of religious ideologies.

Similar religious organizations have become an important external source, according to Forest (2006). Religious organizations tend to find similar organizations in order to strengthen their own. Relationship among organizations with extreme tendency is one of the methods to transfer knowledge and technology and to strengthen each other's existence (Dolnik, 2007).

According to Shihab (2017), external source is an important source to develop religious intolerance and radicalism. An issue that is said to have come from external sources is the reemergence of the Dark Age for the Muslim community due to the many political policies of superpower states oppressing the Muslim community. One example is the American support to Israel in the Arab-Israel conflict. In order to express their feeling about such injustice, the Muslim community often uses radical and intolerant acts. However, Shihab argues that no Islamic teaching condones intolerance and radicalism.

### *Internal Sources*

Internal sources are indirectly affected by external sources. According to Shihab, internal sources begin with efforts to modernize Islam after the colonization of Western Christian to the Muslims (Shihab, 2017). However, internal sources put more emphasis on delivered teachings.

An Internal source in the case of religious knowledge and intolerance stems from fellow members and leaders of an organization, if it is in an organization (Heffner, 2009). The leader of an organization must be able to convince its members to accept his information and doctrine.

Impacts of Islamic Studies to Intolerance and Radicalism

Islamic Studies is a conscious and planned effort to prepare students to know, understand, act upon, and believe in Islam, along with the demand to respect other believers in order to create religious tolerance and unity of the nation.

The impacts of its learning can be seen through two perspectives, namely direct and indirect impacts. Both impacts cannot be separated from the input, process and output in learning. Direct impacts of learning or instructional effects are the impacts derived from a learning process that directly result in certain knowledge and skills and this becomes the achievement of a planned learning. Indirect impacts of learning result from a learning process; they are not immediately visible and are not designed in (specific) learning activities. These indirect impacts are often related with development of attitude and value. These attitude and value become the core competence of every subject.

The direct impacts of Islamic Studies can be seen from the competence standard of Islamic Studies subject according to the 2013 Curriculum. Furthermore, these impacts can also be measured by their appearance in teacher's learning plans as written in the syllabi and RPPs. Based on the 2013 Curriculum, Islamic Studies in public schools is integrated with virtue education under the name of Islamic and Virtue Studies. The direct impacts expected out of this subject are that the graduates can become faithful, virtuous, knowledgeable, confident, and responsible people in their interaction with social and natural environment as well as becoming role models from this nation to other countries.

Despite the fact, morality and ethics that are integrated in religion are also direct impacts of a learning process. This is reflected in the stipulation of core competences 1 and 2 that include core competences for religion and attitude. Core competences 1 and 2 are "Accepting and acting upon the religious teaching that they believe in" and "Respecting and acting in an honest, discipline, responsible, emphatic

(tolerance, cooperation), polite, confident manner to interact with their surrounding social and natural environment” respectively.

Based on the above explanation, Islamic Studies should then be able to generate direct impacts to the growth of tolerance in acting upon religion and togetherness in the framework of religious tolerance.

The current curriculum for Islamic Studies provides a limited space to interpret and implement sharia according to Al-Quran and Hadith (Suhadi; Yusuf, Mohamad; Tahun Marthen; Asyhari, 2015).

### Research Results

In general, the Learning Model for Islamic Studies, Teacher's Radical Opinions, and Teacher's Learning Model for Islamic Studies have a significantly negative influence to student's radicalism. This indicates a positive response toward the learning model for Islamic Studies that can weaken radicalism (Figure 32).




Figure 32. Learning Model for Islamic Studies, Teacher's Radical Opinions, Teacher's Learning Model for Islamic Studies and Student's Radicalism

The potential for this influence can be seen in three aspects--namely the teacher, learning model, and student.

## Teachers/Lecturers

In formal education, the achievement of curriculum's goals fully depends on the teachers/lecturers. The competence and understanding of a teacher/lecturer in delivering an information or knowledge will highly influence a student's interpretation of the information or knowledge. With regard to Islamic Studies, teachers/lecturers have different opinions on what kinds of Islamic Studies material should be delivered to school/college students.

### Perception of Teachers/Lecturers on Islamic Studies




Figure 33. Percentage of teachers/lecturers' perception on goals of Islamic Studies

Figure 33 above shows the perception of teachers/lecturers on the goals of Islamic Studies. Based on the chart, the majority of teachers/lecturers collectively view Islamic Studies as a way to grow nationalism. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of Islamic Studies is emphasized on tolerance among fellow Muslims (86.02%). This is strengthened by the fact that the majority of teachers (92%) and lecturers (87%) state that they are providing a large proportion of materials that teach about religious tolerance (Figure 34).

### Proportion of Islamic Studies that teach about religious tolerance to school/college students




Figure 34. Percentage of teacher's perception on portion of Islamic Studies that teach about religious tolerance to school/college students

Although tolerance to religious diversity is high, this does not apply toward Shia and Ahmadiyya Muslims (average of 49%). Those with negative perception toward Shia and Ahmadiyya are more dominated by teachers (average of 53%) than lecturers (average of 46%), even though more teachers (92%) allocate a bigger portion to religious tolerance than lecturers (87%).



### Teacher's Perception on Goal of Islamic Studies




Figure 35. Percentage of teacher's perception on goal of Islamic Studies

### Lecturer's Perception on Goal of Islamic Studies




Figure 36. Percentage of lecturer's perception on goal of Islamic Studies

This phenomenon invokes several assumptions. The first assumption is that lecturers, due to having higher education than teachers, have a more open perspective on the various school of Islam, including Shia and Ahmadiyya. This enables lecturers to accept the goal of Islamic Studies being to accommodate tolerance issues on the two sects. The second

assumption is that the more open-perspective lecturers have, the more they can provide positive influence to student's perspective compared to that from teachers to students. However, our data reject this second assumption, showing that school students are actually more open-minded than college students. Figures 37 and 38 compare the students' view concerning the goal of Islamic Studies at school and college.

### High School Students' Perception on Goal of Islamic Studies




Figure 37. Percentage of school students' perception on goal of Islamic Studies

### College Students' Perception on Goal of Islamic Studies




Figure 38. Percentage of college students' perception on goal of Islamic Studies

Based on both Figures 37 and 38 we can see that more school students (67%) than college students (56%) support the goal of Islamic Studies being to mold tolerance toward Shia followers. Tolerance to Ahmadiyya followers is also exhibited more by these school students (63%) than by college students (59%). This shows us that school students are more tolerant than college students even if teachers and students are more close-minded.

One explanation for this phenomenon is that teachers/lecturers in actuality teach more contents than what the curriculum and syllabus have to offer. The data do show that school/college students are frequently presented with materials on faith, piousness, and worship in their Islamic Studies classes (Figure 39). These materials comprise the core competence according to the curriculum and syllabus at school and college.

Contents taught in Islamic Studies




Figure 39. School and college students' perception on contents of Islamic Studies

The teachers/lecturers confirmed this finding by reporting on the improvement that school/college students perceived in terms of the quality of their faith and piety to the One and Only God, from joining Islamic Studies classes (Figure 40).

### What school/college students felt after learning Islamic Studies (Teacher's Perception)




Figure 40. Percentage of teacher and lecturer's perception on what after learning Islamic Studies

This finding becomes a consideration to dive deeper into how teachers teach Islamic Studies, especially in the context of tolerance so that their personal opinion on tolerance would not negatively impact students' perspective. The inconsistencies surrounding higher-education background and perspective as well as in the teaching of tolerance in Islamic Studies make an interesting finding. In addition, the data also present a question on how school students can be more open-minded than college students.

Although in general school/college students think that teachers/lecturers are giving more emphasis on tolerance and act kindly toward other believers as well as nationalism, the percentage of school/college students of institutions governed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) is lower than those who come from institutions governed by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Ministry of Research and Higher Education (MRHE) (Figure 41). This reveals an interesting issue on how teachers/lecturers at MoRA-governed institutions actually teach Islamic Studies to make their students feel that the materials they receive have a potential to make

them intolerant toward other believers. Attention should also be paid to the teaching competence of Islamic Studies teachers/lecturers at MoRA-governed institutions. Islamic Studies teachers/lecturers at MoRA-governed institutions supposedly have more knowledge and higher skill competence than those teaching at institutions governed by MoEC and MRHE.

**School/college students' perception on emphasis put by Islamic Studies teachers/lecturers, based on the ministries governing their institutions**




Figure 41. School/college students' perception on the emphasis put by Islamic Studies teachers/lecturers based on the ministries governing their institutions

*School and College Students*

School and college students as participants of education learn from many sources by using many methods. Formal schools or universities are not the only sources of learning. As such, oftentimes student competence is not created from formal education process. This research in general reveals at least two things. First, school/college students have a relatively unstable and inconsistent opinion on many things, from their perspective to the materials, models, goals, and experience of learning Islamic Studies. This instability has left them vulnerable to the

influence of new perspectives that are spread in a convincing manner. Second, school/college students at MoRA-governed institutions have higher instability compared to those learning in institutions governed by other institutions. In many cases, positive perspective among students at MoRA-governed institutions is less prevalent than among students at other institutions. This poses a question as to how the Islamic Studies actually is being delivered at school, *madrasah* and university.

With regard to knowledge and action toward tolerance and radicalism, this research reveals that even school/college students in general have different – although not too significant – perception on many things. Data show that there are more students with positive perception although there are less students equipped with religious knowledge from other than school (Figure 11) compared to college students. Social media, for example, are more prevalently used by college students (61.10%) than by school students (48.50%) for learning about religion, in addition to formal knowledge from their school/university and *pesantren*. In studying religion, college students also use magazines/bulletins/leaflets, *liqo* and communal Quran reading more frequently than students.




Figure 42. Percentage of alternative sources of religious learning used by school and college students other than from school/university and *pesantren*

If in general most school/college students felt that the Islamic Studies materials they most often received in class were about faith, piety and worship (Figure 40), college students at Socio-Political Faculties and Humanities Faculties had a different perception. As Figure 43 shows, the majority of college students from two faculties believed that most materials they received focused on virtue and morality. This shows a difference in teaching deliveries at the two faculties.




Figure 43. Percentage on college students' perception on Islamic materials taught most often, based on faculties

Such a significant difference in perception was not found among school students. The majority of these students, either of science or other programs, shared a same perception, namely that faith, piety and worship were the most frequently taught materials. This should be an insight for higher education to standardize their Islamic Studies materials.

Another interesting issue concerning school/college students is the different perception between those studying in institutions governed by the respective ministry; for example, more students at MoRA-governed institutions than at other institutions believed that

Islamic Studies had influenced their behavior so as not to mingle with other believers (Figure 44). This is strengthened by a perception of school/college students at MoRA-governed institutions who have more potential to be close-minded compared to students from other institutions. For example, fewer school/college students of MoRA-governed institutions agreed that Islamic Studies should discuss about other faiths. The Ministry of Religious Affairs should address this issue by specifically reevaluating the Islamic Studies learning both at schools and colleges.




Figure 44. Perception of school and college students on the influence of Islamic Studies to their behavior in not mingling with people of other faiths

### *Islamic Studies Materials*

Learning materials are a compass with which educational goals are to be achieved. If the goal of education is to create students who are tolerant to other believers, then the materials should teach tolerance toward other faiths. This research aims at finding out whether or not the Islamic Studies curricula at school/college do support the habituation of tolerance among students toward religious diversity



and other believers. This research concludes two things. Firstly, the current Islamic Studies curriculum has achieved the goal of education, namely to instill piety and worship practice. Secondly, with regard to tolerant attitude and action, the current Islamic Studies curriculum has not provided enough space to instill tolerant behavior and action among students. In fact, the current curriculum has the potential to radicalize students.

A good curriculum is one that can provide linearity in three domains: the domain desired by the curriculum (the ideal curriculum), the domain given to students (the operational curriculum), and the domain actually received by the students (the attained curriculum). The 2013 curriculum for Islamic Studies basically gives an emphasis to piety and worship. This is in line with the materials delivered by teachers and received by students. Based on the research data, in general the three domains of Islamic Studies curriculum, either at school or college, are already linear.

However, with regard to diversity and tolerance, Islamic Studies curriculum at school or college level has yet to produce satisfying output. One example is with regard to tolerance toward Shia and Ahmadiyya followers. This research shows that school/college students are less likely to tolerate the two sects. This is true even though the teachers/lecturers believe they have provided adequate materials on tolerance. This is due to the fact that the Islamic Studies curriculum has not fully accommodated the value of tolerance, which results in teachers/lecturers not placing tolerance as the main goal of Islamic Studies. Thus the teachers, lecturers, and students alike believe that Islamic Studies materials should provide a space to discuss religious tolerance, either by discussing it with students of the same religion or with students of other faiths.

## Conclusions

The above discussion can be concluded as follows:

1. This research in general concludes that the Learning Model for Islamic Studies, Teacher's Radical Opinion, and Teacher's Learning Model for Islamic Studies have a significantly negative impact toward students' radicalism. This indicates a positive response to the notion that the learning model for Islamic Studies have a tendency to reduce radicalism.
2. Three elements contribute to radicalism and tolerance in Islamic Studies, namely: the teachers/lecturers, schools/college students, and Islamic Studies materials.
3. Teachers, and especially lecturers, have yet to become good facilitators in the delivery of Islamic Studies learning. Their background is not used to measure positive perception toward tolerance and diversity as a teacher's perception that is relatively negative has a high potential to grow intolerance among students. Teachers/lecturers at MoRA-governed institutions have a higher potential to instill intolerance compared to their counterparts in the other institutions.
4. School/college students have better tolerance-value than do teachers/lecturers. This is especially true for school students. School students have more positive perception as compared to college students in terms of tolerance. However, both school/college students have an unstable or inconsistent perspective on tolerance and this could allow external forces to penetrate intolerance value.
5. Islamic studies materials have not provided adequate space to instill religious tolerance. The materials tend to over-prioritize on fulfilling the goal of curriculum, which focuses on instilling piety and worship.
6. Islamic Studies should be able to introduce other religions and other groups to the students.



## 5 Poverty and Radicalism

In 2020-2030 Indonesia is projected to experience a demographic bonus during which there will be a significant increase in the number of its working-age population. It is estimated that the productive-age population, between 15 and 64 years old, will reach 70% of the total population (bkkbn.go.id, 2016). This condition has a huge potential for the state's multi-aspect development if the productive-age population can end up having decent quality and integrity. Otherwise, under bad management, the demographic bonus could become an obstacle for the continuation of the nation. In that regard, one of the issues faced by Indonesia currently is the rise of religious radicalism and intolerance among its youth.

It is obvious that if many Indonesian youths are plagued with radicalism and intolerance, they will only obstruct the socio-economic development, especially during the upcoming era of demographic bonus. Such things did happen in various countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where there shows a strong relationship between a demographic bonus and a prevalence of terrorism among youth (Schomaker, 2013). Economic development, for example, will grow well in a tolerant and open society, and vice versa. Such attitude and behavior will create mutual trust that will ultimately result in strong social capital and active participation from the society. That condition will obviously produce positive growth of a social climate that is healthy for national development. On the contrary, a society

with radical and intolerant religious perspective will weaken the social capital of the society. In turn, they will create conflicts and mutual hatred. Such condition will obviously be uncondusive for socioeconomic development (Grim, 2008).

Based on the above exposition, this study depicts a demographic condition in the world of education in Indonesia with regard to radical and intolerant attitude and behavior. This study is crucial given that the current generation who are enrolled at schools and universities will one day become part of the productive-age population during the demographic-bonus period. By mapping the demographic condition of education and its relation with attitude and behavior of the main actors within it, i.e. school/college students and teachers/lecturers, this study is expected to become the starting reference for policy-makers in managing--rigorously and effectively than otherwise, the issues of radicalism and intolerance at schools and universities.

The unit of analysis in this study is school/college students and teachers/lecturers at institutions governed by the Ministry of Religious Affair (MoRA) and Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC)/ Ministry of Research and Higher Education (MRHE). As explained previously, the age range of school/college students who are currently enrolled in school or university are those who will play an important role in the upcoming era of demographic bonus. As such, finding out their attitude toward diversity becomes crucial for the development of Indonesia. Other than school/college students, the other unit of analysis is teachers/lecturers. They are selected owing to their great potential in instilling diversity among students. The assumption is that they will instill moderate and tolerant values among students. On the contrary, if they have a radical perspective and attitude, they will have a great potential to produce students of similar proclivities. In addition, teachers/lecturers are actors who directly interact with students in class, hence their key role in instilling diversity among students (Parisi, 2017). By finding out the attitude toward diversity

among school/college students and teachers/lecturers, this study can see the complete picture of the relation between demography and the attitude toward diversity in Indonesian educational institutions.

In essence, Islam and education are inseparable in Indonesia. To separate the two, at least for now, is impossible. This is because Islamic education has a long history and has been embedded in the people of Indonesia (Elihami, 2016). Pancasila as a national philosophy has accommodated religion as an important part of the state. This is reflected in the first principle which reads “Faith to One and Only God.” The consequence is such that Indonesia is neither a secular not a religious state; rather, the national consensus of Indonesia has become what Jeremy Menchick (2017) referred to as Godly Nationalism, which goes to reflect that religion, to some extent, has become an integral part of the life of the nation of Indonesia. Such national consensus is also reflected in the implementation of Islamic education that has even started since the early days of independence. For example, in 1946, the Indonesian Central National Working Committee Agency (*Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat/BPKNIP*) obliged religious education as part of the national education system and be included in the national curriculum (Elihami; 2016). Furthermore, state’s intervention concerning Islamic education can also be seen in the authority of the Ministry of Religion to bureaucratize religious education (Ropi, 2017).

Due to its status as a country with the biggest Muslim population in the world, research on Islamic education in Indonesia has attracted many scholars. Research on Islamic Education initially pays more attention to the traditional model of Islamic education, especially in *pesantren* and *madrasah* (Smith and Woodward, 2014; Azra, Affianty, Hefner, 2010; Hefner, 2009; Solahudin, 2008; Bruinessen, 2008; Hasan, 2008). Lately, some studies have started to comprehensively discuss Islamic higher education (Islamic Religious University, PTKI) (Lukens-Bull, 2013). This type of educational institution is considered

to represent the fact and root of Islamic education within Indonesian Muslim community. That is evidenced mostly by the fact that major Islamic organizations in Indonesia have Islamic education; at least as an avenue to educate its members. Furthermore, Islamic education is not only owned by Nahdhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (which grow on Java Island), but also by other Islamic organizations outside the Island, such as Nahdhlatul Wathan (NW) in West Nusa Tenggara, Al-Khairaat in Central Sulawesi, Islam United (*Persatuan Islam*/Persis), and Jamiyatul Washliyah in North Sumatera – all of them have their own Islamic educational institutions.

Therefore, mapping the demography at school and university concerning attitude and behavior toward diversity is crucial. This research aims to fill in the gap of studies concerning religious attitude and behavior toward intolerance and radicalism among school/college students as well as teachers/lecturers. So far there has been no comprehensive study that illustrates the demographic condition of diversity attitude in a national scale. Not to mention with today's rise of religious conservatism, transnational ideology, and terrorist movement, this study becomes crucial for one to see the map of radicalism and intolerance in educational institutions.

## **Research and Findings**

### *Demography and Radicalism*

In terms of demography, disaggregated by sex, both female and male school/college students tend to have a radical perspective on religion. As many as 60.4% female and 56.2% male school/college students have a radical religious perspective. This condition is quite concerning especially when the prevalence of a moderate perspective among them only reaches 18.2% for female students and 22.4% for male.

Although intolerance and radicalism are quite prevalent among school/college students in terms of attitude, both female and male

students tend to be more moderate in terms of action. As many as 75.6% female and 72.7% male school/college students exhibit moderate religious action. Only 6.1% female and 8% male students exhibit radical religious action.

But as we dive deeper, it can be seen that male school/college students are more radical than female ones, both in terms of attitude and action. In terms religious attitude, there are 18.2% radical female students and 22.4% radical male students. Then, in terms of action, there are 6.1% radical female students and there are 8% radical male students. In both cases, male radical students are more prevalent. This can be explained by the fact that, psychologically, male teenagers are more likely to be unstable during puberty compared to female teenagers (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017).

The data show that both female and male students have a radical religious perspective and, in terms of behavior, both of them tend to be moderate. This finding should be noted because even if school/college students tend to be moderate in expressing their behavior, they still have a great potential to become radical due to their high prevalence of radical religious perspective.

If the demography is disaggregated on the basis of socioeconomic status, it can be seen that respondents have radical religious understanding. On the contrary, their level of action tends to be more moderate. For example, 50% of school/college students whose parents have lower and higher income on average do have a radical religious perspective. The data also show no correlation exists between economic status and radicalism prevalence. What this means is that we cannot assume students whose parents have lower income are more likely to be radical than students whose parents have higher income, and vice versa. For example, the prevalence of radical students among those whose parents have income below 1 million (59.1%) is lower than those whose parents have income of 1 to 2.5 million (63.2%), and those with income of 5 to 7.5 million (63.4%).



In terms of action, there is a correlation between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of radical action. The prevalence of radical action is higher among students whose parents have lower income than those whose parents have higher income. The percentage of students with radical action, according to their income level, is respectively: 10.3% for those whose parents have income below 1 million rupiahs; followed by 6.3% for 1 to 2.5 million income; 6.2% for 2.5 to 5 million income; 8% for 5 to 7.5 million income; and 4% for more than 7.5 million.

Similar to the sex-based disaggregation above, disaggregation by socioeconomic status also shows that students tend to be more moderate in expressing their action – more than 70% of them. However, one major note is that students whose parents have higher income tend to be more moderate than students whose parents have lower income. These data are consistent with their prevalence of radical action – that students whose parents have lower income tend to be more radical than those whose parents have higher income.

As for teachers/lecturers, if we disaggregate them by socioeconomic status, both their attitude and action tend to be moderate. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between socioeconomic status and moderateness of teachers/lecturers: those with income above 7.5 million are also more likely to be more moderate, both in terms of attitude (77.7%) and action (94.7%) compared to those with lower income. In general, it can be concluded that teachers/lecturers with higher income are more likely to have moderate religious attitude and action than those with lower income.

Table 2. Socioeconomic Status, Radical Opinion (RADOP) & Radical Action (RADAC)

<b>SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS</b>					
<b>RADOP</b>					
<b>School/College Students</b>	<1 mio.	59.1	23.4	17.4	0.047
	1-2.5 mio.	63.2	20	16.8	0.047
	2.5-5 mio.	54.7	20.3	24.9	0.047
	5-7.5 mio.	63.4	20.6	15.8	0.047
	>7.5 mio.	52	24	24	0.047
<b>Teachers/Lecturers</b>	<1 mio.	28.8	24.7	46.6	0.093
	1-2.5 mio.	26.8	26.7	46.5	0.093
	2.5-5 mio.	17	27	56	0.093
	5-7.5 mio.	23.4	17	60	0.093
	>7.5 mio.	12	11	77.7	0.093
<b>RADAC</b>					
<b>School/College Students</b>	<1 mio.	10.3	18.3	71.4	0.182
	1-2.5 mio.	6.3	20.9	72.8	0.182
	2.5-5 mio.	6.2	19.7	74.1	0.182
	5-7.5 mio.	8	19	73	0.182
	>7.5 mio.	4	16	77.5	0.182
<b>Teachers/Lecturers</b>	<1 mio.	10.9	24.7	64.4	0.188
	1-2.5 mio.	6.8	16.8	76.3	0.188
	2.5-5 mio.	10	15	75	0.188
	5-7.5 mio.	3	20	76.7	0.188
	>7.5 mio.	6	0	94.7	0.188

### *Demography and Intolerance*

In terms of intolerance, the data of this research display a pattern similar with that of radicalism, i.e. respondents' opinion, both school/college students and teachers/lecturers, are more intolerant than their action. Furthermore, since intolerant variable is divided into two, i.e. internal and external intolerance, there is a difference in the level of intolerance between the two. In general, respondents are more intolerant internally than they are externally, meaning that they are more intolerant toward fellow Muslims of different sects than toward other believers. This is representing their rejection toward Shia and Ahmadiyya followers.

If we disaggregate the demography based on sex to look at the level of tolerance toward other believers, it appears that school/college students as well as teachers/lecturers tend to be tolerant. There are 53.4% female and 50.3% male school/college students with tolerant attitude. As for teachers/lecturers, although their level of tolerance is still lower than school/college students, overall they also have high prevalence of external tolerance. But if we look at the percentage of intolerant respondents, the prevalence of those who are intolerant toward other believers is still quite high, i.e. 23.7% to 36.5%. Based on these data, male school/college students are the most likely to be intolerant with a percentage of 36.5%, followed by female school/college students (32.4%), male teachers/lecturers (32.2%), and finally female teachers/lecturers (23.7%).

In terms of external tolerance action, it appears that all respondents, disaggregated by sex, have a high prevalence of tolerant action with an average of 60%. But if we look at the level of intolerance, it appears that there are more school/college students with intolerant action compared to teachers/lecturers. Female school/college students are less likely to be intolerant (17.7%) than male (16.9%). The pattern in teachers/lecturers is also quite similar with female being 25.5% intolerant female and 23.5% intolerant male. While the external tolerance shows a higher likelihood of tolerance, the data on internal tolerance show a rather varied result. In terms of prevalence of internal tolerance among teachers/lecturers, both female and male are more tolerant than school/college students, namely 62.23% for female and 49.5% for male. However, they also have a quite high prevalence of intolerant attitude, i.e. 38.9% for female teachers/lecturers, and 24.6% for male. As for school/college students, they also show a quite high prevalence of intolerance toward different sects or groups within Islam, with the data showing that males are more intolerant (53.7%) than females (48.9%).

In terms of action, the data show a different pattern of tolerance among school/college students and teachers/lecturers, both for female and male. While teachers/lecturers are more tolerant in the case of internal tolerance attitude, their action tends to be very intolerant. Male teachers/lecturers are the most likely to exhibit intolerant action, namely 74.5% compared to female with a percentage of 59.6%. As for school/college students, there is a tendency for female and male students to have a similar prevalence of attitude and action between those with tolerant attitude and internal tolerance. Male school/college students tend to be more intolerant (37.9%) than female (30.9%).

Furthermore, if we look at their socioeconomic status, it appears that school/college students or teachers/lecturers with lower socioeconomic status tend to be more tolerant externally. On students, those whose parents have income of less than 1 million (50%) and between 1 to 2.5 million (53.3%) are more tolerant than those whose parents have an income of 2.5 to 5 million (48.9%) and above 7.5 million (44%). This fact is consistent if we look at their level of intolerance, namely those whose parents have income more than 7.5 million are the most intolerant (52%), while the others have lower prevalence – between 31.8% to 37.1%. A similar pattern is also found in teachers/lecturers, where teachers with lower income tend to be more tolerant. The data show that teachers with income less than 1 million are actually the most likely to be tolerant (52%) compared to those with higher income. In line with that finding, teachers with income of 5 to 7.5 million and above 7.5 million (39%) are the most intolerant externally.

Meanwhile, the distribution of external tolerance action is quite even among all income levels. Both school/college students and teachers/lecturers tend to be tolerant toward other believers. In terms of attitude, school/college students whose parents have income more than 7.5 million are the most likely to be intolerant, but in terms of action they are the most likely to be tolerant (69.4%). However, it cannot be inferred that those whose parents have lower income will

be more intolerant. In fact, 63.3% of students whose parents have less than 1 million income are more tolerant than those whose parents have income of 1 to 7.5 million. But in the case of teachers, those with income less than 1 million are the most likely to be tolerant (69.9%), while the most intolerant are those with income between 5 to 7.5 million (40%).

In terms of internal tolerance, school/college students with higher level of income are more likely to be intolerant than those with lower income; 68% of those whose parents have more than 7.5 million income show an intolerant religious perspective. This number is the highest compared to other socioeconomic statuses. In addition, this socioeconomic status is also one with the lowest level of tolerance, namely 16%. The most important thing to be noted here is that those whose parents have lower income tend to be more tolerant than those with higher income. This can be seen by the fact that school/college students whose parents have income of less than 1 million are the least likely to be intolerant with a percentage of 46%. However, in general, students tend to be intolerant in terms of internal tolerance.

As for teachers/lecturers, they tend to be more tolerant than school/college students in terms of internal intolerance. However, similar with school/college students, those with higher income are also more likely to be intolerant. Although those with income of 7.5 million are not more intolerant than those with 5 to 7.5 million income, the latter group is actually more intolerant (46.6%) than those with lower income. The highest prevalence of tolerance is shown by those with income of 1 to 2.5 million (61.4%) and the lowest prevalence is shown in those with income of more than 7.5 million (38.8%).

While in terms of attitude they tend to be tolerant, their behavior shows otherwise. School/college students and teachers/lecturers tend to exhibit intolerant action toward different groups within Islam. Furthermore, the data show that teachers/lecturers' action tend to be more intolerant toward groups within Islam. If we look at their socioeconomic status, the highest prevalence of intolerance among

teachers is shown by those with income of 5 to 7.5 million (76.6%) while the lowest prevalence is shown by those with income less than 1 million (56.2%). The same is also true with their level of tolerance. Teachers with income less than 1 million (28.7%) are more likely to be tolerant than those with higher income, including those with income above 7.5%, who are in fact the ones with the lowest prevalence of tolerance (17.1%).

This fact shows that there is no correlation between socioeconomic status and intolerant attitude and action among teachers/lecturers. In terms of socioeconomic status, many studies argued that poverty is the main driver of radical attitude. Radicalism and conflict are said to be caused by weak economic development (Helen Ware, 2005; Stevenson, 1977; Lundberg, 1927). There is a strong correlation between socioeconomic condition, growth of young population, and youth radicalism behavior. Arab Spring phenomenon can be interpreted in that context, that the worsening socioeconomic condition in some Middle-Eastern countries have driven the young generation to find alternative solutions by overthrowing regimes they deem as failures. The decline in economic condition has also resulted in the notion of a bleak future, which can turn someone radical, and the type of radicalism that is most relatable to youth in Muslim countries is religious radicalism (Fuller, 2004 p. 9-11).

This study shows that there is no strong correlation between poverty or socioeconomic factors and the prevalence of radicalism and intolerance. An interesting finding that we found is that in terms of attitude and action, school/college students and teachers/lecturers with higher socioeconomic status can show a higher prevalence of intolerance, while those with the lowest socioeconomic status (less than 1 million income) tend to be more tolerant. Therefore, factors that cause someone to become intolerant are rather complex. For a plural country such as Indonesia, the many social cleavages, one of the form being ethnic conflict and political competition, is one of the

main drivers for the rise of radicalism and intolerance (Panggabean and Smith, 2011; Piazza, 2006; Anderson and Shuttlesworth, 1998).

The same is also true for school/college students, namely those with lower income can actually be more tolerant in their action. Students whose parents have 5 to 7.5 million income are the one with the highest prevalence of internal intolerance, while those who are least likely to be intolerant are those whose parents have income of less than 1 million (32.1%). The same is also true in terms of tolerance. Students exhibiting the highest prevalence of tolerance are those whose parents have less than 1 million income (38.7%), while the least tolerant are those whose parents have income above 7.5 million (8%).

## **Conclusions**

This study shows that the correlation between socioeconomic status and diversity attitude among school/college students and teachers/lecturers at school and university in Indonesia is highly complicated. One example is the correlation between socioeconomic status and the prevalence of radicalism and intolerance. While in terms of radicalism there is a strong indication that school/college students whose parents have lower income are more likely to be radical than those with higher level of income, the data on intolerance show otherwise. As such, dividing the level of diversity into two categories, radicalism and intolerance, is crucial.

In general, this study finds two different patterns in the prevalence of radicalism and intolerance. In terms of radicalism, both school/college students and teachers/lecturers tend to be more tolerant in attitude but more radical in action. The data for external tolerance show the same tendency as radical attitude and action, but the data for internal tolerance show otherwise. The respondents are significantly more intolerant, both in attitude and action, toward groups or teachings that are considered to be heretic and deviant according to Islam than to other believers. Therefore, the state must commit further intervention

to intolerant attitude and action at schools and universities in a rapid and comprehensive manner. Instilling nationalism as well as moderate and inclusive Islam to school/college students and teachers/lecturers is required to address the current situation--not to mention the fact that those enrolled in schools and universities today will become part of productive-age population when Indonesia experiences its demographic bonus.





## 6

# Meaning of Life, Happiness, Religiosity and Radicalism

Some of the similarities between terrorists and radicals according to psychology (e.g. Bartlett, Birdwell & King, 2010) are they have experienced or are undergoing various levels of social exclusion (marginalization or being marginalized) in their life, have no faith toward the government, hate their state's foreign policy, and live in isolation in their community. With regard to radicalism process, McCauley and Moskaleiko (2011) formulated three processes of radicalization that have occurred so far, namely the mechanism at individual level, group level, and mass level.

This chapter discusses personal factors and how these factors interact with the environment. The personal factors that will be discussed are perceptions on the Meaning of Life, Happiness, Religiosity, Threat, and Diversity Experience. Analysis for each variable will be provided below.

At an individual level, the most prominent variables are rage and the desire to take revenge for the wound or suffering that they, or their peer, experienced (personal grievance), rage toward the injustice that befalls their peer group (group grievance), affiliation or participation in groups whose activities progressively lead to terrorism (a slippery slope), assisting their peer(s) who have become radical (love), seeking risk and power which especially occur among men in their self-discovery journey (status seeking), escape mechanism, and unfreezing (or a condition where an individual open up to new situation or

acquaintance after being isolated by their social life due to various reasons).

Radicalization through a group process includes the transfer or entrance of an individual into a like-minded group (group polarization). Meanwhile, there are three types of intergroup conflicts that tend to drive radicalization: competition with the state whereby members with a weaker commitment have dropped out (condensation); competition to gain the same support and resource (outbidding), and; internal competition within the group (fissioning). The four mechanisms will have a stronger effect if the group is isolated. In an isolated condition, cohesiveness and norm within the group will be amplified since the group member will have no or little access to other groups to compare their experience with.

The last mechanism is of mass level. The characteristic of this mechanism is great public acceptance toward the concept of 'villain' that threatens their life (hatred), mobilization of opinion and martyrdom to exhibit selflessness, and mobilization to support terrorist movements as a reaction to a state's over-exaggerated responses to terrorist attacks (jijitsu politics).

McCauley and Moskalenko also argued that the three mechanisms are not stages; they are, rather, nested. The mass-level mechanism can influence individual and group mechanisms and vice versa. However, notable things that remain consistent and significant within the three mechanisms are the elements of emotional experience, such as rage, embarrassment, guilt, humiliation, fear, love, and hatred. Another important note is that they will mostly occur at individual and group level, while the mass-level tend to radicalize public opinion.

By considering the above findings, it is necessary to trace personal factors that have been found to associate with radicalism and intolerance. This is important because emotional experience cannot be separated from personal factors. These personal factors were also argued in many studies on "lone-wolf" terrorists who worked alone

and had no affiliation with any terrorist group.

Based on the individual-level mechanism, sadness factor is one of the personal factors that strongly associate with radicalism. In line with that, Silber and Bhatt (2007, in McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) mentioned that a loss of meaningful life and isolation can often happen when someone loses a person closest to them, and this kind of condition is often found in cases of terrorism. Since it is not easy to measure someone's sadness, the variables of meaningful-life perception and happiness perception are used as proxies to find out how sad a person is.

As long as someone believes that their life is meaningful and that they can find happiness in life, we can assume it will be less likely for them to be involved in radicalism. This can be seen in the cases of lone-wolf terrorism. Several studies on bombing perpetrators found that psychological disturbance, which is often known as depression or loneliness or other kinds of emotional disturbance, will always be involved (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017).

Religiosity level factor is also often argued as a contributing factor of intolerance and radical actions. However, existing research to date have not been convincing in arguing the linear relationship between the two. An increased level of religiosity does not necessarily mean someone will become more intolerant and radical. Some literatures suggest that we review the definition and dimension of religiosity that is measured, such as from the aspect of internal, external and quest. This is because the relation between religiosity and intolerance or radicalism is not that simple. Some findings suggest that, especially in relation with intolerant opinion and action (see for example Kunovich & Hodson, 1999; Darvyri, et al., 2014), religiosity in the dimension of worship practice is found to be more associated with intolerant behavior toward other believers.

Other personal factors that have been found to contribute to radical opinion and action is the perception that Islam has been victimized.

Although not the sole factor, the perception that Islam has been so perceived is found to significantly contribute to some radicalism cases. Several studies found that economic aspects contribute more to radicalism than religiosity aspects (see for example Esteban & Ray, 2011; Richards, 2003). As such, this research aims to find out which one among the variables of meaningful life, happiness, piety or religiosity and threat that contributes more to the four dependent variables of this research, namely internal and external tolerant opinion and action, as well as radical opinion and action. For the variable of meaningful life, happiness and piety, we ask them the following questions: "Do you feel that your life is meaningful?," "Do you feel happy lately?," and "How religious are you?"

As for the perception of Islam having been victimized, we ask them 3 yes-or-no questions. They are: 1) "Do you agree that Muslim community is currently being victimized?," 2) "Do you agree that non-Muslims are more economically fortunate than Muslims?," and; 3) "Do you agree that non-Muslims are responsible for the socioeconomic inequalities in Indonesia?" In this stage, analysis and interpretation is conducted to each question and is not integrated into one total score.

### **Perception on a Meaningful Life**

Perception on a meaningful life is found to be significant only on Radical Opinion and Tolerant External Opinion variables and only among school/college students. This is in line with our hypothesis that as people find their life meaningful, they are more likely to be moderate and tolerant. The trend is also consistent with our hypothesis, namely that respondents' scores are mostly in the domain of Moderate/Tolerant or Very Moderate/Very Tolerant.

The fact that this perception is only significant among school/college students but not among teachers/lecturers indicate that there are demographic variables--such as education level, occupation and marriage--that moderate them. The other important thing is that, the

perception on meaningful life has no correlation with Radical Action and Tolerant External Action variables, and it has no correlation whatsoever with Tolerant Internal Opinion and Tolerant Internal Action. This means that the perception on a meaningful life “only” correlates with the radicalism/intolerance in terms of opinion, and not in action. This strengthens our hypothesis that there are two paths to radicalism, i.e. the refinement of opinion-situation-action, or the one that goes through the stage of personal experience – situation – action.

This finding also indicates that the first path of radicalization, i.e. through opinion, is actually a process that requires an inception to a meaningful life that leads to radical or external-intolerant condition. This inception is comparative-religious, i.e. a comparison that is focused on the condition of oneself and the religion they believe in deeply and the interaction leads to a negative result. As such, it is likely that someone will become more radical or intolerant, and vice versa. This comparative-religious condition is strengthened by the finding of this study that it only holds under the condition of radical opinion and external-tolerance opinion, not in internal-tolerance opinion.

### **Perception on Happiness**

The perception on happiness is only found to be significant to the variable of Radical Opinion, and also among School/College students. It is interesting because this contradicts our assumption. Theoretically, we assume that perception on happiness has a similar mechanism as the perception on a meaningful life: as people become happier, they will become more tolerant and moderate. This is likely to be so due to the single question that cannot truly capture the phenomenon expected in this variable, given that in many literatures, measurement on religiosity aspect is more reliable if conducted to all of its dimensions than otherwise.

The respondents’ answers are also mostly in the left domain, namely Very Radical or Radical, but they are not negative. This means

that majority of respondents tend to be Very Radical or Radical, and that they tend to be happy, although not as happy as their tolerant or moderate counterpart.

The finding that this perception is only significant among Radical Opinion also indicates that there is a different psychological mechanism between Radical Opinion and External Tolerance Opinion and Internal Tolerance Opinion, and also with Action. Given that the findings under perception on a meaningful life being relatively stronger (since it is significant in two variables), it can be said that happiness might not be an important factor that drives radicalism and intolerance, at least not as important as how a person finds his or her life meaningful. At this point the enabling environment factors, such as affiliation with a group, network or internet contents on one hand, and unfreezing on the other hand, might be a crucial stage in triggering radicalism and intolerance.

### **Perception on Religiosity**

This study finds that perception on religiosity is also similar with perception on happiness, i.e. it is found to be significant in the variable of Radical Opinion, and only among School/College students. However, its result and trend are quite in line with this study's hypothesis; that as people found themselves more religious, they will become more intolerant and, to some extent, more radical. This study finds that respondents who believe themselves to be religious are mostly among the Very Radical and Radical group. The trend is also negative meaning most respondents are in the domain of Very Radical and Radical.

The consequence is that, theoretically, quest-type religiosity tends to be more tolerant than worship-type religiosity. On the other hand, the question on religiosity in this study is only given in the form of self-report. It is likely that this i causes the result to deviate from the theoretical assumption.

The finding that religiosity perception is only significant to the radical opinion variable might become an important finding in order to clarify the mechanism of radicalism as explained in the literature review above.

Analysis on threat variables will be provided in two ways, one by one for every perception item, and then all combined.

### **Threat Perception 1: Agree that Islam is being victimized**

Threat Perception 1 is a variable that tries to see whether or not a respondent's opinion on the idea that Islam has been victimized (group grievance) can predict radical and intolerant opinion and action. Various theories state that identity saliency presented in victim framing can be an effective tool to nurture radicalism and intolerance. This is proven by this study: almost all variables are significantly affected by the opinion that Islam has been victimized. More importantly, this finding is not only found in the school/college students sample but also in the teachers/lecturers, with an almost similar pattern. The similarity is that this variable is not significant in internal tolerance action, both for students and teachers. This at least indicates a similar radicalization mechanism that works well among school/college students and teachers/lecturers.

It should be noted that with regard to our assumption, there is actually a difference between variables, where radical opinion actually goes to a different direction than radical action. The similarity of direction, whether on school/college students or teachers/lecturers, is positive. For radical opinion, positive direction means that theoretical assumption has been proven by the findings. Theoretically, people who agree with the idea that Islam has been victimized should be more likely to be radical. The finding of this study is consistent with the theory where respondents who agree with that idea tend to have greater radical or very radical scores. In terms of the trend, it is negative, which means that most respondents belong in the radical



and very radical domain.

The case is similar with the teachers/lecturers. This indicates that threat perception and radicalization strongly correlate and go beyond the possibility of being moderated by other demographic or situational variables.

Theoretically, the direction should be positive, namely as people become more radical or intolerant, they will agree that Islam has been victimized. A contrary finding is actually found in this research. Given that the respondents' positive trend, the distribution of respondents is mostly in the domain of moderate/tolerant, which can be concluded that there are more moderate and tolerant respondents who agree that Islam is indeed being victimized, compared to those who do not agree in the same subcategory. This finding is incredibly interesting because it indicates a certain dynamic in the respondents that can be categorized as moderate or radical in Indonesia. Thus even if they tend to be moderate and tolerant in terms of opinion and action, it does not mean that they would believe that Islam has been victimized. This contradicts our previous hypothesis. Using another perspective, it can also be said that even if they do not believe that Islam has been victimized, it does not mean that they will be more likely to be radical or intolerant. This finding will also require further attention to understand how the dynamics of perception of Islam as a victimized religion can predict a person's radical and intolerant opinion and action because statistically the correlation is indeed so significant. We need to find out how the dynamics of direction of hypothesis on radical opinion and action should be scrutinized, because this might be an evidence that group grievance alone is not enough to change a person into having radical opinion. This, once again, is consistent with the findings of our referred studies that argued that there are two paths to radicalism--the first through opinion-action, and the second is without opinion refinement but strong individual-emotional experience that interacts with enabling environment. It is possible that, in Indonesia,

the process of radicalization has gone through the second path.

What makes the radical opinion different is also interesting as it indicates that in addition to having different paths between radical action and opinion, there is also a differing path for radical opinion and internal tolerance and external tolerance. What makes radical action work in line with the same assumption as external tolerance opinion strongly (occurring among school/college students and teachers/lecturers) but a bit different from internal tolerance opinion and action (because there is a difference in significance, direction and trend between teachers/lecturers and school/college students) in the context of group grievance?

The finding of this variable also affirms that the aspect of tolerance action is indeed different from other action-aspects in this study, namely radical opinion and action, and tolerance opinion. The difference indicates that in this threat condition, the difference between tolerance and radicalism becomes clear.

On the other hand, it should be noted that Threat Perception 1 does not, to both school/college students and teachers/lecturers, significantly affect the variables of tolerant action, either internal or external. This raises a huge question, i.e. why does the perception that Islam has been victimized strongly predict the radical opinion and action as well as internal tolerance, but not to internal and external tolerant action? In a condition of group grievance, radicalization process can occur almost without going through the path of opinion-action and this indicates that the threat variable in the frame of "victimization" is a strong factor that triggers radicalization, whereas in terms of external tolerance, the "victimization" frame is not too impactful.

This might be caused by the fact that, definitively, intolerance contains a construct and requirement of action that is different from that of radicalization, which results in different cognitive paths required to go from opinion to action. Tolerance is a form of respect

toward the existence of other person or group while radicalization is basically a thought mechanism that focuses on the effort to replace an existing system/value with another system through ways that are essentially different. Therefore, the perception of “victimization” will be more an effective mechanism to trigger one’s self-retaliation mechanism than a mechanism to think about the existence of others.

It is interesting that this lack of significance is strongly found in the factor of external tolerance action compared to internal tolerance action (not significant to teachers/lecturers). It needs to be seen further whether or not opinion and action on internal tolerance among teachers/lecturers and school/college students is different, and if it is, which one is more tolerant and what factors can predict the difference. Based on the finding of this study, it seems that we make more sense if we read this insignificance as there is indeed a strong difference between internal and external tolerance opinion. It might be caused by the fact that, in the internal tolerance, the “threat” is stronger as it affects the wholeness of one’s concept of religion (in this case Islam) than when the “threat” comes from other parties having different religions. As such, tolerant action to other believers is not significant whatsoever, and tolerance action to different Muslims is still significant among school/college students, which is likely to have been caused by the fact that there is the factor of “knowledge on other religions, including the variants in Islam” that is different to school/college students and teachers/lecturers. This can be further explained in this study after looking at its interaction with other variables such as Diversity Experience.

**Threat Perception 2: “Non-Muslims are more economically fortunate than Muslims.”**

Similar to the previous variable, threat perception 2 is also significant in almost all variables especially in opinion. In radical action, teachers/lecturers are the only ones who are not significantly affected, whereas

in tolerant action to other believers and tolerant action to different Muslims, the cross-tabulation finding is only significant to school/students. This finding strengthens the previous finding, namely on the different paths between radical and intolerant opinion and action.

Theoretically, this variable should be significant to external tolerant opinion and action variable, but it is only true in the case of school/college students, not in teachers/lecturers. This might indicate that in terms of action toward religious diversity in Indonesia, demographic and environmental factors – which we assume to be naturally embedded when comparing between teachers/lecturers and school/college students – play a significant role. It should be noted, though, that in terms of radical action, it is actually teachers/lecturers that are significantly different, because teachers/lecturers who are significantly different in the proportion of response type in radical action. It is interesting to further test the dynamics between action and opinion between the two sample categories of this study.

It should also be noted that Internal Tolerance Opinion variable is always significant to the threat perception, whether in this variable or the previous one. Supposedly, the emphasis of this variable is no longer about group grievance but more about perceived injustice to religion. This might indicate that internal intolerance is indeed really strong and is the foundation, even if not the requirement, for external intolerance. This will obviously require further testing, namely by finding out the variable where external tolerant opinion and action is significant but its internal tolerant opinion and action is not. In this study, one such condition can be found in the variable of Diversity Experience.

Regarding the direction and trend of theoretical assumption, there is consistency with the previous threat perception, namely positive (+) finding for radical opinion and negative (-) for other variables. Especially for internal tolerant action variable, similar to threat perception 1, it has the same direction as radical opinion, i.e. positive.

Once again, positive here means the direction of finding is already in line with the prediction of literature; as people agree with the idea that non-Muslims are economically more fortunate than Muslims, they will be more likely to be radical/intolerant. It is interesting that this occurs in radical opinion and internal tolerant action, which is actually not in the different domain but a hugely different construct. Therefore, this point must be further analyzed to determine factors that might constitute the similarity of both.

### **Threat Perception 3: “Non-Muslims are responsible for socioeconomic inequalities in Indonesia”**

The third item of this Threat Perception also discuss the perceived-injustice aspect but specifically for the purpose of blaming non-Muslims. The theoretical assumption is that teachers/lecturers will consistently agree more to this idea than school/college students at least because there is a demographic difference between the two populations. Another factor that moderates religious and political refinement can also be expected to be a moderator that differentiates the result for the two types of respondents. However, the finding of this research is interesting because the conclusion is not that simple. School/college students are significantly more radical in opinion and action, and tolerant action to other believers, while teachers/lecturers are more significant in the tolerant opinion to other believers. This time, there is no similarity between the two populations.

Interestingly, it is only in this variable that there is a positive (+) direction of assumption for both radical action and tolerant action toward other believers among school/college students. It means that this finding is in line with the hypothesis. This is significant because this finding can be used as a basis to explain the mechanism for radical and intolerant action among school/college students in previous points. If such explanation is placed in the argument that this Threat Perception 3 is a variable that contains “blaming others” principle, then it might

be that teachers/lecturers are not significant because their knowledge on economic or legal injustice is better (hence avoiding radical and intolerant action) compared to school/college students.

On the other hand, it is interesting to see why the finding in teachers/lecturers for this item is significant to the category of external tolerant opinion, back with a negative direction of positive trend, which means that there are more tolerant people who agree with this opinion. There are other factors behind radical action and external and internal action among school/college students, most likely from the enabling environment and affiliation.

A factor that strengthens the finding in this item is the fact that there is no significance in the variable of internal tolerant opinion for both school/college students and teachers/lecturers, which indicates that this item is truly measuring respondents' opinion to the idea that supports perceived injustice by blaming external actors (non-Muslims).

### **Diversity experience 1: "How often do you hang out with people of different religions?"**

Diversity experience 1 aims to test the hypothesis of whether or not contact--in this case frequency of interaction--plays a role in the mechanism of radicalization and intolerance for school/college students and teachers/lecturers. For school/college students, the result is significant in all categories, either radical or tolerance, whereas for teachers/lecturers, this variable is significant only to variables concerning tolerance opinion and action namely opinion, action of tolerance toward other believers and tolerance toward different Muslims. This indicates that diversity experience is still important to instill tolerant attitude and behavior, either internal or external.

However, if we look at the direction, everything except radical opinion and internal tolerance is (-), which means that it contradicts the theoretical assumption that as people become more tolerant, they will

less likely to hang out with people from different religions. It can be said that even if they do not hang out frequently with other believers, it will not necessarily make them intolerant. Especially based on the trend, respondents are mostly tolerant, which means that this might only indicate the ratio of respondent's position.

It should be noted that the two items in the variable of diversity experience are action-variable, which means that, in a condition whereby respondents living in areas that are mostly occupied by Muslims, this question might not capture an accurate picture to answer the research question. Therefore, we believe that this item needs to be further analyzed to include those who live in areas that are relatively heterogeneous. In that way, the expected result can be more in line with the theoretical assumption.

Specifically for radical opinion and internal tolerance opinion, the direction of finding is in line with theoretical assumption, i.e. the more people hang out with those from different religions, the more tolerant and moderate they will be. It should be noted that there is indeed a different finding that strengthens the assumption that there is indeed a difference in the mechanism for radicalization and internal and external tolerance. At the same time, the experience of teachers/lecturers coexisting with other believers does not correlate with radical opinion and action variables, which shows that demography and additional factors might have a role in that mechanism.

### **Diversity experience 2: “How often do you work with people of different religions?”**

It is interesting to point out the result in the second item for diversity experience. In school/college students, the significance occurs in all domains of variables except for radical action, whereas on teachers/lecturers it also significant to radical action. Once again, this strengthens the previous finding that the mechanism for radicalization and intolerance is different for the two sample groups. The addition

this time is, for school/college students, the “working together” aspect, which is one level higher than “hanging out”, actually has no correlation with radical action although it still correlates with radical opinion. On the contrary, in teachers/lecturers, there is a positive correlation between this variable and radical action, which means that the more they work together, the more moderate they will be. This should be interpreted carefully. In order to drive a moderate behavior, cooperation between believers will be recommended, but for the younger population, there might be another factor that drives them to act moderately.

### **Conclusions**

In general, the following can be concluded from this study.

1. There is a difference in the mechanism to create radical opinion for school/college students and teachers/lecturers.
  - a. In school/college students, radical opinion correlates more with personal variables such as the perception on a meaningful life, happiness, vague tolerance, religiosity and threat. In addition to personal factors, environmental factors, which in this case can be seen from various life experiences, also show strong correlation.
  - b. However, this conclusion does not apply to teachers/lecturers. So far, there is only one personal factor that seems to consistently correlate with teacher’s radical opinion, namely threat perception (type 1 or group grievance, and type 2 or perceived economic injustice).
  - c. The huge difference is likely to have been caused by demographic variables and affiliation to religious organizations.
2. Radical action also occurs with different mechanisms for school/college students and teachers/lecturers



- a. In school/college students, radical action only correlates with one personal factor, namely threat perception 1 (group grievance) and threat perception 2 (perceived economic injustice).
  - b. In teachers/lecturers, personal factors and environmental factors, in this case experience of working together with other believers, show a significant correlation.
  - c. This finding indicates the importance of carrying out concrete activities that involve people from different religions as an effort to reduce radical behavior, especially for teachers/lecturers
  - d. In addition to collaborative activities, there also needs to be a method to reduce threat perception through various interventions such as programs that support transparency and engagement of youth in policy-making, especially youth from different religions. This will not only open a space for discussion but also enrich the narrative that supports their participation. We strongly recommend that the quality of interaction involves emotional experience as well, in order to build empathy.
3. Tolerance opinion for other believers also works with a different mechanism compared to radical opinion and action, but similar to the one that occurs to school/college students and teachers/lecturers, i.e. it strongly correlates with the personal factor of threat perception 1 (group grievance) and threat perception 2 (perceived economic injustice), as well as environmental factors, such as hanging out and working together with other believers.
    - a. One thing that should be noted is that this relationship works in reverse direction, in which the data indicate that as people become more tolerant, they will have a higher threat perception. This needs to be further analyzed, since it indicates that there is another variable that moderates the

tolerance opinion toward other believers, despite their threat perception.

- b. Our recommendation is to increase the experience of interacting with people from different religions.
4. Tolerance action toward other believers also works with a different mechanism from that of tolerance opinion toward other believers, and is also different for school/college students and teachers/lecturers.
  - a. In school/college students, personal factors, i.e. threat perception 2 (perceived economic injustice) and threat perception 3 (blaming non-Muslim), along with experience of working together and hanging out with different religion, are factors that strongly correlate with tolerance action toward other believers.
  - b. In teachers/lecturers, the only variable that strongly correlates is the environmental factor, namely the experience of working together and frequency of hanging out with people of different religions.
5. Tolerance opinion toward fellow Muslim from different sects also has different mechanism than tolerance action toward fellow Muslims from different sects, and is also different for school/college students and teachers/lecturers.
  - a. In school/college students, tolerance opinion toward different Muslim sects correlates with threat perception 1 (group grievance) and threat perception 2 (perceived economic injustice), and environmental factors, frequency of hanging out and working together with people from different religions. Given that internal tolerance opinion is essentially addressed to see the rate of tolerance of a Muslim toward fellow Muslims different sects (such as Shia and Ahmadiyya), then this finding is actually a bit confusing. This is likely to be caused by the fact that school/college student respondents

perceive Shia and Ahmadiyya as “other religions.” If it is true, it means that the understanding about other religions, especially Shia and Ahmadiyya, among school/college students must be improved.

- b. A similar thing also happens with teachers/lecturers that both threat perception 1 and 2 show strong correlation, and not only threat perception 1, group grievance. However, in the case of teachers/lecturers, there is no strong correlation with environmental factors, i.e. experience of hanging out and working together with people from different religion. This is interesting because it seems to indicate that teachers/lecturers do not perceive Shia and Ahmadiyya as “other religions.”
6. Tolerance action toward different Muslims is also different in the case of school/college students and that of teachers/lecturers
  - a. In school/college students, tolerance action toward different Muslims is influenced by threat perception 1 (group grievance) and threat perception 2 (perceived economic injustice), as well as environmental factors (frequency of hanging out and working together with people from different religion). This is the same mechanism as in the case of opinion. However, it should be noted that despite the non-significant difference, in the case of action the direction of finding for environmental factor is unclear. It means that people who hang out more frequently with different Muslims will not necessarily have better internal tolerance. This is likely to have been caused by their lack of comprehensive understanding on internal tolerance.
  - b. This is different in the case of teachers/lecturers, where it is found that environmental factors (frequency of hanging out and working together) strongly correlates to tolerant action toward different Muslim. Based on the direction, we

can conclude with confidence that the more they hang out and work with different Muslims, the higher their internal tolerance will be.

7. By considering the above findings, it can be concluded that these findings have strengthened previous studies that argue that the mechanism for radicalization and intolerance is different in the case of opinion and action. For radical and intolerant opinion, most can be traced from personal factors but it is not the case in terms of radical and intolerant actions that are more sensitive to environmental factors.
8. This research concludes that there is a strong likelihood that the dominant radicalization mechanism in Indonesia is group-level mechanism that interacts with mass-level mechanism. However, in making intervention policies, we should still pay attention to individual level.



## 7

# **Is Government Performance a Trigger of Intolerance and Radicalism?**

Issues concerning the relationship between the state and the Indonesian Muslim community's aspiration and interest have become an interesting topic for discussion among scholars. The relationship between the state or government with the Muslim community from time to time has been dynamic with its ups and downs. During the early days of the New Order, for example, most people argued that the relation between state or government and Islam was cold or not good. The government committed several repressive actions toward the Muslim community, especially the political power of Islam. This strengthens the assumption of their bad relationship. Others opined that the government was secular and anti-Islam. A change happened in the 1990s when the Muslims' perception toward the government became much better. This is obviously related to a number of President Soeharto's policies that were perceived to begin accommodating the interest of the Muslim community, as seen in the national education policies, Islamic courts, Islamic banking, and the rise of Islamic elements in the government and so on. So, once again, the relation between state and Islam is dynamic.

After the 1998 democratic reform, the condition was not much different. The difference was the fact that in this democratic era, the state or government no longer plays a central role as it did in Soeharto's regime. A number of state policies concerning Islam were not simply manifestation of good-intention or accommodation of the

regime but also a result of the struggle and process to influence the government with the aspiration of Muslim community. There has been a take and give process between the two. Channels for Muslim's aspiration were also growing. New Islamic parties were established, as well as Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah – all of them were given more access to policy-making in the government, much more than the previous era. But did these phenomena turn the religious condition in Indonesia better? There is no single answer to this question; it depends on the perspective that we use. On that note, it is crucial to find out as a whole what the actual public perception is, especially from the Muslim community as the majority, toward their current government.

We can also see the issues in the relation between the government and Islam by tracing it back to the history of this country. It can be said that one of the main issues in the development of modern nation-state relates to the question on how and when religion should be placed in statelike matters and in the state constitution. Without excluding post-colonial Islamic states and including Indonesia in its early days, the themes concerning the relation between Islam and state has always been a hot debate. Although many of our founding fathers who were involved in it, either those who represented nationalism, socialism, Islam, the Christian minority, or other minorities, have managed to find some consensus, it was only a temporary compromise that opened up any possibilities for sudden changes. The constitutions that have applied in Indonesia and Pancasila have provided a clear picture that, for us, Indonesia is not a secular country. Some scholars argued by using a different terminology to describe the system that applies in Indonesia, among others: unsecular democracy, theistic-democracy, religious-democracy, restricted pluralism, and a few other terminologies.

After the end of New Order, one undeniable fact is that the aspiration on Islamism has been on the rise, which is evidenced,

among others, by the demand to legalize Islamic sharia. The efforts to revive Jakarta Charter, which contained an article to enforce Islamic sharia to its believers, in the early democratic reform (1998-1999) shows a clear picture that some Islamic powers are not satisfied with the old principle and they demand a bigger portion for Islam in the constitution. After their failure to gain support for their proposal, they continued their struggle at regional level by providing Islamic nuances for some local regulations, which is later known as “Sharia Local Regulation.” Since 1998 to 2013, there were already at least 443 local regulations with Islamic nuances (Buehler, 2016). Most of those sharia-themed regulations were coming from district governments in West Java, West Sumatera and South Sulawesi. Unsurprisingly, this sharia movement created conflict. Some people support it and consider them to be positive since it instills religious values and faith, whereas others reject it because it is considered to be against the constitution of this state, which respects plurality and diversity. One thing that should be underlined is the fact that as this Islamism movement grows stronger, some indicators show that the rates of intolerance and religious violence in Indonesia have also been rising.

As we enter the reform era, issues concerning Islam and inter-religious affairs are growing. As religious identities grow stronger (especially Islam) in the society, a few number of crucial issues emerge, especially with regard to religious intolerance, persecution and violence. Furthermore, acts of terror that are committed *en masse* by Islamist-jihadist over the past decade after the reform have also made Indonesia one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Some cases of intolerance in the form of violence among fellow Muslim are almost routine, especially by targeting the minority Shia and Ahmadiyya. Such incidents include violence to Ahmadiyya follower in Cikeusik Pandeglang in early 2011 which killed 3 people, expulsion of Shia followers in Sampang in 2012-2013, and also to Ahmadiyya followers in Lombok, NTB, in 2013. Persecution to Ahmadiyya and



Shia followers in smaller scale has also continued to occur in many areas up to this day. Examples of external intolerance (toward non-Muslim) include prohibitions for the construction of churches, and restriction for them to have their worship. Over the past decades, the frequency of intolerant action, either internal or external, has continued to increase. This trend is obviously concerning because at the same time intolerant groups are becoming more organized and more capable in mobilizing their members. The formation of National Alliance against Shia (Annas) is one of the examples.

Issues of religious intolerance and radicalism are our collective responsibility, involving not only active participation from religious leaders but also the state in enacting their role and function to instill acceptance. Muslim community as the majority in this country should have carried a bigger responsibility in strengthening tolerance. One paradox that currently occurs and has become a real challenge, is that while on one hand Muslim communities can be more tolerant toward other believers (Christian, Hindu, Budha), they are less tolerant toward fellow Muslims that they consider deviant or heretic, such as Shia and Ahmadiyya (Menchik, 20-21). A similar pattern can be found in some other Islamic countries. Unsurprisingly, religious persecution in Indonesia has continuously targeted those they consider as deviant. Up to this day, the acceptance of Muslim community has been relatively low to followers of Shia and Ahmadiyya. It is ironic and disappointing because the existence of these sects, especially Ahmadiyya, used to be much welcomed by our founding fathers and a number of Islamic elites before and after the independence.

The state's position is also highly influential for the attitude of religious groups in interacting with other believers, including in creating a condition that enables persecution and intolerance. According to Menchik, a state's policy that promotes and protects minorities will increase tolerant attitude of social and religious groups. The reverse is also true – persecution carried out by the state to minorities will cause

an increase of intolerance of social and religious groups (Menchik, 20-21). Furthermore, a state's policy toward minorities might cause not only intolerant action but also intolerant opinion and attitude among the citizens. In the case of Indonesia, the high prevalence of intolerance and persecution toward Ahmadiyya and Shia might also correlate with the "continuing vagueness" of the government regulation, which leaves no legal precedence to protect them. This vagueness can be seen clearly in the Collective Decision Letter (SKB) of the Three Ministers, which signifies a lack of state's role in protecting the existence and rights of minority groups. This vague policy ended up opening a space for intolerant groups to continue their actions.

It is indeed ironic that as Indonesia is entering the era of democratization and liberalization, many of the state's policies toward religious minorities become more and more restrictive – the short era of Gus Dur being the only exception. It turns out that democracy does not guarantee better religious diversity and tolerance. A situation where democracy is not sufficient to strengthen religious tolerance and instead creating potential for violence is in line with the thesis of Hans G. Kippenberg (2011), which stated that democratic condition has supported mobilization and network of religion for the sake of election. But this is where it goes wrong. Politicians require support from religious groups in any kind of way and will do anything to influence them, thus the perspective, attitude and behavior they exhibit will be made in line with the interest of the politician. This is known as religion-politics. This kind of relation is obviously far from the ideal role of religion because it can easily be used by politicians who might actually support religious violence for their own gain. The weak level of trust to religious authority in the center of power, such as Indonesian Cleric Assembly (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/ MUI), is caused in part by the growing perception that the pattern of relationship is more political than religious.

For Kippenberg, interfaith initiatives from civil society and

international institutions will support conditions to enforce better law (including for tolerance). Many examples have indicated that social and religious cooperation that involves various believers can become a bridge for conflict resolution and peace. More than that, reciprocal interaction and relationship must continue in interfaith groups so it can turn into social capital which can provide great benefit for the sake of building mutual trust and sharing responsibility to deal with collective problems.

It can be assumed that the lack of internal or external tolerance, especially among teenagers and youth, is caused in part by the lack of space for and frequency of open and continuous interaction with those from different faiths. Prejudice that grows within society is in part contributed by a lack of understanding or knowledge about people from other religions--especially in the booming era of social media like today, where people are seduced to take a shortcut in consuming information and opinion to learn about Islam or other religions. The youth of Gen-Z should be wary of the double face of social media. On one hand, social media increases the number of information tremendously, making it much accessible for people to consume. On the other hand, the youth can be misled by wrong information if they are careless in selecting information. The same is also true in the case of religion. Many have the idea of learning about Islam through the internet and other forms of social media. But since nobody is guiding them, they can turn fanatical or intolerant, some even involved in terrorism. The following are the findings of the survey:

### **Government Performance, Law, and Economy**

Some structural conditions facilitate a number of people to get easily influenced by invitations to act radically or participate in militant organizations. One explanation often referred to is the emergence of a socioeconomic deprivation that causes people to believe that they have become a victim of some unfair policy. As such, a lack of good

governance can facilitate people to turn extreme, either at the level of opinion or action. it is no coincidence that many cases of violence and terrorism occur in countries categorized as failed states, especially in Africa and Arab.

Since Muslims make the majority population in Indonesia (more than 80% in fact), their perception toward the government has great influence in building a more stable and conducive relationship. It is a serious concern if the majority of people believe that they are not represented in government policies. The feeling of being alienated, whether in political process or other policy-making activities, is the central concept in civic culture studies. This condition will usually be found in countries that are lacking in or not having democracy that provides a proper space for public participation. One of its consequences is apathy. So how do the Muslim community assess their government in general?

#### Government Policies toward the Interest of Muslim Community




Figure 45. Opinion on government policies toward the Muslim community

The above survey finding indicates that a majority of Muslims assess the government's policy to be positive in the sense that the

policies in general have satisfied their needs and interests. Only a few of them--less than 20% of teachers/lecturers and less than 10% student respondents-- believe that the government's policy is bad. Based on this finding, we can make a more optimistic conclusion on the basis that the majority of Muslim community believe to be "an important part" of government's policy, they are not feeling alienated from what the government has done. Theoretically, their perceived satisfaction will bring about a rise in the level of political efficacy from the citizen in the long term by strengthening civic culture. On the contrary, the more people getting disappointed in the government, the more threatening they will be to democracy (Verba and Almond, 1963 and Pippa Norris, 2011). They believe that their aspiration and voice have been heard and that they can influence the government. This good condition is signified by trust toward the government behavior and policy, which stimulates the citizens to actively participate in many policy-making activities. For the government, this positive perception is a capital that must be maintained, especially since many extremists have been spreading the notion that the government's policies are not accommodating the interests of the Muslim community.

In Indonesia, aspects of good-governance that are not performing, especially in law enforcement, have been one a main issue for so long that it has frustrated many people. Until today, although in general the government has become more democratic, law enforcement in Indonesia has not made any significant improvement. A large number of respondents, in both student and teacher populations, have negative perception toward law enforcement. Around 69.80% school/college students believe that law enforcement in Indonesia is still unfair, while 80.12% teachers/lecturers express the same sentiment.




Figure 46. Opinion on law enforcement in Indonesia

This finding confirms a number of survey results from many institutions that place law enforcement institutions as one of the least trusted institutions in this country. Legal reform, absolutely, needs to be conducted to avoid a perception of legal deprivation that has been growing within the society. The more people believe that law enforcement has not been fair to them, the more motivated they are to rely on extreme solutions, including ones that involve violence.

In assessing economic condition, most people see that the national economy is still lacking or not ideal. As many as 70.60% of school/college students and 66.47% of teachers/lecturers believe that the current economic condition is lacking and really bad. With regard to economic inequality, the data show that the issue is serious. Perception among school/college students is such that the current economic inequality is already in bad condition (52.28) – which is also shared by teachers/lecturers (44.41%).




Figure 46. Opinion on economic inequality

As a matter of fact, economic inequality has become an issue since the New Order era with their centralistic governance up to this day. The government has launched several incentives to avoid an even worse economic inequality and disparity. The ubiquity of news about the declining economic power among the people, especially low purchasing power parity, might be one of the reasons that explain the high level of bad perception on economic inequality among our respondents. The question regarding national economic perception also shows a negative result. Only 33.54% of the teachers/lecturers believe that the national economy is good, whereas the rest 66.46% believe the condition to be less good or simply bad. The government should pay attention to this condition. The crosstab analysis shows a significant correlation between dissatisfaction toward national economy in general and the level of tolerance.




Figure 48. Dissatisfaction toward economy affects tolerance opinion and action toward other believers

The government must pay serious attention to the above illustration. It is demanded to carry out concrete steps to ensure smooth and fair law enforcement in this country. The same holds true in terms of economy: massive dissatisfaction toward national economy and negative perception on economic inequality, if not addressed quickly, can bring negative consequences to social and religious life. Most theories on radicalism explain the interrelation between perceived economic injustice in the society and the potential for radicalism and terrorism (Gurr, 2006). Similarly, a lack of good governance, either in the field of politics or law enforcement, is said to also contribute to violence and terrorism (Krueger, 2007). Poverty does not turn people radical; perceived economic injustice does. This perception can become a push factor for one to be involved in violence. Radical ideological values such as those on *jihad*, *thaghut*, martyrdom, and maneuvers to recruit members, can become a pull factor attracting people to be involved in violence. It is the duty of policy-makers, especially the government and political party, to work more seriously to cover the gap caused by economic and law enforcement condition that has been negatively perceived by the people.

## Conclusions

There are various religious attitudes and opinions among school/college students and teachers/lecturers regarding state ideology, democracy and Islamism values. In general, there is a radical and intolerant potential in their religious attitudes and opinions, especially



with regard to the implementation of Islamic sharia that they do not really understand. Yet with regard to extreme opinions such as on jihad, suicide bombing, jihad against non-Muslims, and on *thaghut* governments, most of them still do not share such extreme sentiments and still exhibit moderate Islamic perspectives. The fact that they show strong support to democracy as the best form of governance and that they believe acting upon Pancasila and 1945 Constitution is essentially acting upon Islamic Sharia, is a positive finding and should be used as a crucial social capital. In this regard, theological acceptance to the national philosophy appears to be strong. It should be noted, however, that democratic condition, as affirmed by Kippenberg, will not necessarily provide an effective tool for the emergence of peaceful religious attitude and behavior. More actions will be required, such as by strengthening the interfaith interaction and cooperation in various social works.

Policies of the government are perceived by respondents to be in line with the interest of the Muslim community as the majority population. Remarks that claim that the government of Indonesia has alienated the Muslim community's interest, or that it is anti-Islam, prove to be--based on this survey--bogus. Rejection toward those who believe that the government is a *thaghut* is also a positive point. Under the theological perspective, a powerful government is not a problem. This shows acceptance to or legitimacy toward a constitutionally-elected government.

In other matters, however, students' attitude and opinion are in a pretty concerning stage, especially when they are faced with a number of issues on Islamic sharia that has been campaigned by intolerant Islamist groups. Some intolerance indicators do show quite a high percentage and, as such, should become our common concern. Based on these findings, we believe a more active engagement by the stakeholders is needed, especially by the government and Islamic organizations, to pay more attention to the patterns and tendencies of

our young generation. Those positive indicators should not make us complacent. Rather, proactive roles will be required especially from the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who have the authority to undertake positive interventions to proliferate tolerant and moderate materials in the teaching of Islamic studies, both at schools and universities.



## 8 Civil Society Organizations: Where Are You?

*If a CSO contradicts Pancasila and we let it be, then our  
country Indonesia will eventually disappear.*

*(Azyumardi Azra)*

News about the dissolution of Islamic organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which was announced by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Wiranto, on 8 May 2017, has since been hotly debated by the people of Indonesia, a country currently under a crisis of identity. In his speech, Wiranto mentioned three reasons why HTI was dissolved: first, as a legal civil society organization, HTI has not made positive contribution to the process of development toward the achievement of national goals; secondly, HTI's activities have been strongly indicated to contradict with the principles of Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and NKRI, as regulated in Law No. 17 of 2013 concerning civil society organizations; third, HTI's activities have clearly caused conflicts within the society which in turn have threatened the security and order in the society, and have endangered the integrity of NKRI.<sup>66</sup>

On July 2017, President Joko Widodo responded to HTI dissolution by issuing a Government Regulation *in lieu* of Law No. 2 of 2017 concerning the amendment of Law No. 17 of 2013 on civil society organizations ("CSO Regulation"). Behind the issuance of this regulation is the government's conviction that the recent proliferation

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<sup>66</sup> See the full version of Wiranto's statement in [kompas.com](http://kompas.com), accessed on 20 November 2017.

of ideologies and teachings that go against Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution by CSOs, religious organizations, and perhaps also political parties. The government believed that the rapid proliferation of such ideologies had to be addressed immediately lest they disrupted the unity and integrity of the nation, which might result in national disintegration. Despite the strong rejection, the CSO regulation was officially promulgated into a law.<sup>67</sup>

The above event has reaffirmed the idea that the Government of Indonesia will take legal courses to deal with CSOs or political parties that attempt to undermine NKRI integrity. This is in line with the mandate of Ir. Soekarno, who once stated that Indonesia has never been created to be a theocratic state, but rather a state built upon Pancasila, a state that respects cultural and religious diversities, a big house that caters to everyone with no regard to any majority or minority.

Islamic organizations have been flourishing in Indonesia since the end of the New Order regime. It has been signified by the increasing religiosity of the Muslim community, a phenomenon that many have claimed to be a revival of Islam. This can be seen in the forms of increasing numbers of worship activities, communal Quran reading groups, Islamic fashion, and the emergence of Islamic parties. The New Order's downfall was not only used by political elites who desired changes, but also by Islamic movements with radical orientation. Those Islamic movements have given birth to fierce conflicts at discourse or movement levels alike.<sup>68</sup>

These new radical Islamic movements born around that time were much different from old Islamic movements such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, Al-Irsyad, Al-Washliyah, Jamaat Khair and so on. These new Islamic organizations have different ideological, philosophical and strategical foundations than the previous ones. They

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<sup>67</sup> See also in [https://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/10094/pemerintah-keluarkan-perppu-no-22017-tentang-perubahan-atas-undang-undang-ormas/0/artikel\\_gp](https://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/10094/pemerintah-keluarkan-perppu-no-22017-tentang-perubahan-atas-undang-undang-ormas/0/artikel_gp), accessed on 21 November 2017

<sup>68</sup> Khamami Zada. *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Teraju, 2002, p. 7

were deemed to be puritan, militant, radical, literalist, conservative and exclusive. These new organizations include FPI, Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Waljamaah, Hizbut Tahrir, HAMMAS, Muslim Brotherhood, and Majelis Mujahidin, most of which were born after the rise of Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (KISDI) and the Indonesian Muslim Labor Union (PPMI). These flourishing Islamic organizations have made the national political constellation to be crowded with Islamic aspirations, such as the demand to revive Jakarta Charter, introduce Islamic sharia, reject a female president, take action to interfaith conflicts in Ambon and to global Islamic solidarity issues (Palestine and Afghanistan), and so on.<sup>69</sup>

In addition, these new Islamic organizations vary greatly in their orientation. Some are more religious, social, and political than others. This is understandable as they are representations of the Muslim communities as majority population in Indonesia. As of July 2017, the number of religious organization according to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) reached 344,039, which is, by no means, a small number (MoHA, 2017).

Nowadays, not only are these radical Islamic movements targeting the government but also the education. Universities and schools have become a battleground for ideologies (conservative, liberal, leftist, and religious). The current radical Islamic movements appear to be gaining popularity among school/college students. To some extent, universities have become an extension of radical Islamic movements. For example, school/college students have now been affiliated with religious organizations. This creates a possibility for new religious ideologies to be introduced to schools, and this could be dangerous if the ideologies get introduced by radical religious organizations.

Therefore, it is important to include religious education into the national curriculum, since religious education plays an important role in character and nation building. Religious education also plays

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9

a significant role in creating social cohesion among many Muslim groups, promoting interfaith harmony, and making Indonesia a civilized country. On the contrary, as some studies have indicated, religious education at school has been penetrated by religious radicalism, which in turn has increased social disharmony instead of harmony. This will not only polarize the Muslim communities or interfaith relations, but also the people of Indonesia as a whole, who have different background.

Our data reveal that school/college universities are vulnerable to the influence of radicalism and that the current elements of religious education (teachers, schools, universities, textbooks) seem to have failed to address the radical movements. Thus far, no moderate and peaceful Islamic narratives have been developed to curb the proliferation. Today, radical Islamism has penetrated religious extracurricular activities, such as Rohis (Student's Islamic Club).

The process of radicalism typically occurs through religious discussions and studies in which Rohis informants often have affiliation with extreme organizations such as HTI, KAMMI, FPI, etc. As such, Rohis is turned into a fertile ground to produce the seeds of radicalism. In addition, Islamic radicalization among college students or the youth tends to occur clandestinely in order to close their mind to other Islamic perspectives, especially other believers (Anas Saidi, LIPI 2015). Besides ideological factors, a lack of competence on the side of teachers of Islamic Studies at schools has also caused students to find alternative teachers outside their formal education process.

Some studies and surveys have confirmed the continuous rise of radicalism activity at schools and universities. Firstly, the survey by LaKIP, conducted in 100 public high schools in the Greater Jakarta Area, shows that 49% of students agree with violence for the sake of defending religion (LAKIP, 2010).

Secondly, there radicalism has increased in five big universities in Indonesia, namely in UGM, UI, IPB, UNDIP and UNAIR. Indeed, the

movement to substitute the state system with Islamic Caliphate has been growing in popularity in many universities (LIPI, 2010).

Thirdly, in 2011, the Faculty of Social Politics of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah conducted a research titled "Survey on the Socio-Religious Radicalism among Students of UIN/IAIN" in 7 provinces in Indonesia. It finds that radicalism has become stronger at university level. One of the questions asked is: "Do you agree with committing jihad to take revenge against those who attack Islam?" Some 23.6% of students agree and 67.9% disagree, with the rest remaining neutral.

Fourthly, a study titled "Research on Motivation and Root Causes of Terrorism" to 110 perpetrators of acts of terror was conducted by the Indonesian Research Team, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, INSEP and Densus 88 in 2012. They revealed that based on education level, most perpetrators of terrorism came from public schools (63.6%) and universities (16.4%).

Fifthly, a study by the Maarif Institute confirmed the results of LIPI research, showing an expansion of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) movement – a radical movement that uses Islam to reject NKRI. This was caused by the growing popularity of radicalism in universities.

Sixthly, Setara Institute conducted a survey to 171 schools in Jakarta and Bandung and found that 9.5% of the students agreed with the act of violence committed by Islamic State or ISIS (Maarif Institute, 2015).

Seventhly, Setara Institute conducted another survey in Jakarta and Bandung focusing on High School Student's Perception on Tolerance, involving 171 public high schools, 114 sample schools (76 in Jakarta and 38 in Bandung), using a random sampling method. The survey found that student's favorite activity is sport (33.9%), worship (10.1%), and the rest is martial arts, boy scouts, youth red cross, school band, and others. Other than looking at student's activity, the survey also looked at their religious activity outside of school. As many as 35.4% respondents are participating in religious activities outside of school. While 57.6% reported otherwise. Next, the survey also detected



activities participated by students outside of school. As many as 27.3% participated in Rohis/Rokris, 22.3% participated in mosque activity, 9.1% in church activity, 20.7% in communal Quran reading. The rest participated in religious festival and studies. The survey also found that 48% students obtained religious knowledge from Islamic Studies teachers at school, followed by parents (18%), and informational media (12%). Of the 516 respondents (75.3%) who claimed to know about ISIS, 9.5% or 49 respondents agree with this movement. If we compare to the total respondents (684), these 49 respondents represent 7.2% of students. It means that 1 out of 14 students accept ISIS movement. This acceptance does not necessarily mean interest to join the ISIS movement. However, this figure is also a serious concern for Indonesia (Setara Institute).

Eighthly, Wahid Institute conducted a survey on the Potential of Socio-Religious Intolerance and Radicalism among Indonesian Muslims, involving 1,520 respondents in 34 provinces. The respondents were all Muslims aged above 17 years old or those who were already married. Held from 30 March to 9 April 2006 using a random sampling method, the survey found that of the total 1,520 respondents, 59.9% had at least a group they hated. The hated group include non-Muslims, the Chinese, communists, etc. Of the 59.%, 92.2% disagreed if anyone from the group they hated occupied a seat in a governmental office. As many as 82.4% of them in fact did not want to become neighbor to anyone from the group they hated. In terms of radicalism, 72 percent of them refused to act radically such as to commit an attack to a house of worship of other believers or to raid any place considered to be against Islamic sharia (Wahid Institute, 2016).

A recent research in 2017 by Alvara on the perception of Jihad among school/college students, involving a total of 1,800 respondents from 25 top universities and 2,400 top high schools, found that radicalism and intolerance among student was indeed concerning. Some 23.4% of college students and 23.3% of high school agreed to commit jihad to

establish an Islamic state or Caliphate (Alvara, 2017). Complementing the above studies, PPIM conducted a survey on the Attitude toward Diversity at Indonesian Schools and Universities titled “A Fire in the Husk: Diversity of Gen Z.”

### **Survey: Major findings on religious organizations**

The following points are results of the survey on attitude toward diversity at Indonesian schools and universities, by looking at the opinion and experience of school/college students and teachers/lecturers regarding Islamic groups/sects/organizations. The survey also aims to find out radical opinions and actions, as well as external and internal tolerance in opinions and actions.

#### **9.3% School/College Students & Teachers/Lecturers Feel Close to FPI**

The fall of the New Order in 1998 was followed with the emergence of a radical Islamic organization under the name of Islamic Defenders Front or FPI. This organization was established in Cisarua Bogor on 17 August 1998 by Habib Rizieq Syihab with the goal to advocate for and defend the weak, the victimized, and those who have been mistreated by the state or the market. They aimed to fight against evil and immorality with courage. FPI’s position in eradicating immorality has made this movement a manifestation of Indonesian radical Islamic movement (Syarifuddin Jurdi, 2016).

To this day, FPI followers can be found throughout Indonesia. Despite its small number, this organization has a big influence in Indonesia, especially with their actions to enforce *amr maruf nahi munkar*. On this organization, the national survey conducted in 34 provinces in Indonesia presented three major findings as highlighted here. Firstly, of the total survey population in the 34 provinces of Indonesia, 9.3% claimed that FPI is a religious organization that was “closest” to school/college students and teachers/lecturers, whereas 90.7% claimed themselves to have no close relation with FPI; secondly,



dissolving any Islamic organization that goes against Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and NKRI; 30.98% school/college students disagree and 17.64% say they have no idea. Secondly, 48.57% school/college students agree with the Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2 of 2017, whereas 20.66% disagree, and 30.77% say they have no idea. This finding indicates that school/college students truly want a strong government that can punish organizations who go against the national philosophies (Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and NKRI). The following figure illustrates the percentage of attitude and position of school/college students toward Islamic organizations.

### School/College Student's Position on Islamic Organizations




Figure 50. Position on the dissolution of any Islamic Organization that goes against Pancasila and 1945 Constitution

What about the position of teachers/lecturers on this matter? Apparently theirs is not much different from that of school/college students. Firstly, 78.26% teachers/lecturers agree to the dissolution of Islamic organizations that go against Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, 16.46% teachers/lecturers disagree, and 5.28% teachers/lecturers say they have no idea. Secondly, with regard to the CSO

Regulation, 50.62% of the teachers/lecturers agree, 31.06% of them disagree, and 18.32% say they have no idea.

According to the data the teachers/lecturers also exhibit a similar position as that of the school/college students; they mostly agree with the idea of dissolving any organizations that go against the national philosophies, which is also evidenced by the huge support to the CSO Regulation enactment.

Other than issues concerning such CSOs dissolution, the survey also asked school/college students' position on HTI dissolution, which was a hot topic back then. It went hot because this Islamic organization was considered to have gone against the national philosophies since 2016 to mid-201. HTI was finally announced as dissolved on 8 May 2017 by the Coordinating Minister for Politic, Legal and Security Affairs, Mr. Wiranto.

What about the position of school/college students on HTI dissolution? The survey finds it as follows: 25.93% of the school/college students agree to it; 22.05% disagree; and 52.02% have no idea. The majority of students/teachers agree with HTI dissolution.




Figure 51. Opinion on HTI dissolution

The school/college students and teachers/lecturers also gave their reasons. Most students (51.66%) and some teachers/lecturers (29.75%) argue that HTI has wanted to replace NKRI with Caliphate; 26.35% of school/college students and 23.17% of teachers/lecturers argue that HTI has disrupted public order; 18.46% school/college students and 11.59% teachers/lecturers say HTI must dissolve because they reject democracy; whereas the rest (3.53% school/college students and 5.49% teachers/lecturers) have other reasons. The following figure describes the aforementioned.

Reasons why school/college students & teachers/lecturers agree with HTI dissolution




Figure 52. Reasons why HTI must be dissolved

Some of the reasons from school/college students and teachers/lecturers above are strongly related to radicalism, external tolerance and internal tolerance, whether in terms of opinion or action. The following data explain on how opinion and action are interrelated. For example, a student may argue that HTI must be dissolved but it does not necessarily mean they will support or even do something about it.

Five Top Islamic Organizations according to School/College Students and Teachers/Lecturers

The survey in 34 provinces of Indonesia finds 5 top Islamic organizations most preferred by school/college students and teachers/lecturers. They are NU, Muhammadiyah, FPI, MTA, and LDII. To a total of 1,522 school students and 337 college students, the first favorite is the biggest Islamic organization, namely NU (40.08%), followed by Muhammadiyah (22.92%), FPI (9.31%), MTA (6.62%), and lastly LDII (6.19%).

5 Top Islamic organizations according to school/college students  
Of the following Islamic organizations, which one is your favorite?




Figure 53. School/College Students' Choices of Islamic Organizations

What about the teachers/lecturers? Do they come up with the same preference as the students? The result turns out to be not much different. NU and Muhammadiyah remain the first two choices above the rest. The slight difference is in these teachers/lecturers' inclusion of Nahdlatul Wathan in the top 5 Islamic organizations.

### 5 Top Islamic Organizations according to teachers/lecturers

Of the following Islamic organizations, which one is your favorite?




Figure 54. Teachers/Lecturers' Choices of Islamic Organizations

Students' and teachers' preferences of Islamic organization impacts their religious opinion and attitude in terms of radicalism, external tolerance, or intolerance. The following data highlight some findings. Firstly, school/college students affiliated with Islamic organizations tend to be radical but moderate in their action. The percentage is as illustrated in the figure below. Secondly, teachers/lecturers who are affiliated with NU have moderate religious opinion and action; teachers/lecturers affiliated with Muhammadiyah have radical opinion but moderate action; teachers/lecturers affiliated with MTA have neutral opinion and moderate action; and teachers/lecturers affiliated with FPI have moderate opinion and action.

### 6 Least Preferred Islamic Organizations

The following are six least preferred Islamic organizations according to school/college students and teachers/lecturers based on the survey in 34 provinces in Indonesia. The students (30.99%) selected Shia as the least preferred Islamic organization, followed



by Ahmadiyya (19.72%), HTI (10.56%), FPI (9.15%), JIL (7.98%) and Salafi/Wahabi (7.51%). Unlike school/college students, the teachers/lecturers chose Ahmadiyya as the least preferred with a pretty high percentage of (64.66%), followed by Shia (55.60%), JIL (35.78%), HTI (25.43%), Salafi/Wahabi (19.83%), and lastly FPI (14.22%).

### Is there any Islamic group/sect/organization you dislike?




Figure 55. Is there any Islamic group/sect/organization that you dislike?

### 6 Least Preferred Islamic group/sect/organizations according to school/college students & teachers/lecturers




Figure 56. Disliked Group

### **Five Preferred Intra and Extra-campus Organization according to school/college students and teachers/lecturers**

So far, several studies have found that school/college students are very vulnerable to the influence of radicalism and it seems that the elements in the current religious education (teachers, schools, universities, textbooks) have failed to address radical Islamic movements. No moderate and peaceful Islamic narratives have been developed, to date, to fight back against the proliferation of radical Islamism, which has nowadays penetrated religious extracurricular activities such as Rohis (Didin Syafruddin, 2016).

The process of radicalism typically occurs through religious discussions and studies in which Rohis informants often have affiliation with extreme organizations such as HTI, KAMMI, FPI, etc. As such, Rohis is turned into a fertile ground to produce the seeds of radicalism. In addition, Islamic radicalization among college students or the youth tends to occur clandestinely in order to close their mind to other Islamic perspectives, especially other believers (Anas Saidi, LIPI 2015). Besides ideological factors, a lack of competence on the side of teachers of Islamic Studies at schools has also caused students to find alternative teachers outside their formal education process.

The following are five intra and extra-campus organizations most participated by school/college students and teachers/lecturers. The survey found that Rohis is still the most preferred organization among the students (15.98%), followed by HMI (5.43%), PMII (4.68%), IPM (4.73%), and LDK (2.74%). Indeed, 25.78% of the teachers/lecturers were members of HMI; 22.05% members of PMII, and; 8.7% members of LDK.

These findings should be taken seriously by the government and school supervisors as they concern a possibility for radicalism penetration among school/college students.

**Students:** Of the following intra and extra-campus religious organizations, which one do you currently join?

**Teacher:** Have you ever become a member of the following student organizations?




Figure 57. Membership of Islamic organizations in school/campus

### The Influence of Islamic Organizations to Education: A Conclusion

This survey shows that the relation between Islamic organization and the opinion and action of teachers/lecturers and school/college students is quite concerning. About 9.3% school/college students and teachers/lecturers support FPI, which means that these school/college students and teachers/lecturers prefer radical organizations. FPI's distribution throughout Indonesia is almost even.

To these school/college students and teachers/lecturers, the five favorite Islamic organizations are NU, Muhammadiyah, FPI, MTA and LDII. The students and teachers who are affiliated with any one of the 5 organizations have intolerant opinion toward fellow Muslims and other believers, which means that Islamic organizations including NU and Muhammadiyah have failed in engaging with school/college students, resulting in their having intolerant opinion to fellow

Muslims and people of different faiths alike. It turns out that Islamic organizations that claim to have successfully fought for a moderate Islam are not tolerant themselves. This survey shows that school/college students with affiliation to NU tends to be radical, an indication that both NU and Muhammadiyah have failed in education. Therefore, as the biggest Islamic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah have the obligation to engage more in an education that can proliferate moderate religious ideas.



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## GEN Z: Uncertainty in Religious Identity

This book attempts to systematically present the many findings from the “School and College Student’s Attitude toward Diversity in Indonesia” survey, which indicates uncertainty in religious identity among the young generation. The respondents—all of them were school and college students—have a certain opinion on Islamism but at the same time they also exhibit behaviors that do not support their opinion. For instance, they agree with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, yet they also want Islamic sharia to be implemented in Indonesia. They agree that Islamic studies influence them to act intolerantly to Islamic groups that are deemed as heresies; however, they also agree that Islamic studies must teach about other religions, other groups, and Indonesia’s diversity. They agree that a student council is a democratic organization and should thus be owned by anyone of any religion, tribe, race and group. Yet, upon asked whether a student council’s president must be a Muslim, most of them agree to this sentiment. The book you are about to read focuses on such contradictions. The survey data referred to herein were taken from the findings of the National Survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (*Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat/ PPIM*) UIN Jakarta under the Countering Violence Extremism (CONVEY) program in 2017.



ISBN 978-623-94591-8-5

