



**CONVEY
INDONESIA**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Enhancing the Role of Religious Education in
Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia**

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SUMMARY**

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Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM)

UIN Syarif Hidayatullah

Jl. Kertamukti No.5, Pisangan, Ciputat Timur,

Tangerang Selatan, Banten

Telepon: +62-21 7499272, 7423543

Email: ppim@uinjkt.ac.id, Website: ppim.uinjkt.ac.id

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WRITERS

PPIM UIN Jakarta

TRANSLATOR

Gaby & JTS

PROOFREADER

Sukasah Syahdan

LAYOUTER

Ahmad Jajuli

PUBLISHER

PPIM UIN Jakarta

Gedung PPIM UIN Jakarta

Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat,

Ciputat Timur, Tangerang Selatan

Banten, Indonesia 15419

Phone. (021) 7499272, 7423543

Emai: ppim@uinjkt.ac.id Website: ppim.uinjkt.ac.id

CONVEY Indonesia at glance

Multiple terrorism attacks in several regions in Indonesia for the last decade showed that the tendency of violent-extremism (VE) is getting stronger time after time. The number of violence acts in Indonesia based on religious identity and intolerance has also steadily increased over the past ten years.

Of those concerns, a movement called Counter Violent Extremism for Youth (CONVEY) was initiated by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The movement was formed with the aim of building peace in Indonesia by enhancing the potential role of religious education in promoting inclusiveness and tolerance, as a way to counter radicalization and VE.

Moreover, CONVEY is formed to identify and to address the problems behind the rise of VE across the youth, whether in schools or campuses, and to integrate the constructive potential role of religious education with learning and teaching methods that focus on the values of Indonesian local wisdom and its diversity.

Several main objectives of CONVEY are producing evidence-based knowledge through research and surveys that are sensitive to gender values, strengthening the advocacy and involvement of stakeholders in combating VE, and increasing public awareness and knowledge about the threats as well as solution of VE problems in the society. Indeed, in the CONVEY implementation, PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP is working closely and teaming up in utilizing this project outstandingly.

Foreword

The problem of Violent extremism (VE) is neither a new social problem nor a matter of any particular country, region, or religion. VE is an old problem as old as the age of human civilization itself. It is caused by many factors such as politic, economy, social change, ideology, or even family. Unsurprisingly that the conflicts among youth were happened in Ambon, Maluku transformed and grown up from juvenile delinquency into communal conflict.

The complexity of VE, though this is an old problem, must be solved by involving many parties in handling it. Maximizing the role of civil society organizations as well as educational institutions may become a way to grasp VE's intricate situations. An imitation called CONVEY (Countering Violent Extremism for Youth) Indonesia Project is being intended to gather and to embrace civil society organizations,

campus-based research institutions, and governments to take an active role in dealing with VE issues in Indonesia. CONVEY was initiated by Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) State Islamic University (UIN) of Jakarta since PPIM is fully aware that this issue must be solved together with our local wisdom means.

In implementation, CONVEY aims religious education as the basis of its programs. This departs from the belief that preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) should also create a strong prevention system in the community. It is imperative to use education to cultivate a tolerant and open-minded culture in the realm of youth. Moreover, education is also one of the channels that can link this program with Indonesia's millennial, the generation who will continue the sustainability of this country.

Why CONVEY is very concerned with youth? It is because they are a group which are very vulnerable to being influenced by extremism groups. Youth's curious nature such as wanting to try something new or even something that is considering heroic, is quite effortless to being exploited by extremist groups. Therefore, enhancing education, especially religious education, to continue to provide inclusive educational material, care for diversity, and prevent youth from violent-extremism is essential.

Since the beginning of its launching in 2016, we understand that not much has been done by this project. Yet, at least, by disclosing to the public and stakeholders about one of CONVEY's research findings at which many students have already been exposed to the VE ideas, we believe that to foster a shared awareness of the importance of education is rather significant. In last one year, however, there are small steps of us that can be found in various CONVEY products, such as research report, book, weekly bulletin, videography, infography, policy brief, and executive summary. We hope, by any chances,

these products will contribute to the peacebuilding development in Indonesia.

My greatest thanks, moreover, goes to the great individuals at Project Management Unit (PMU) who have devoted themselves to this project, especially to Fuad Jabali (Project Manager) and Ismatu Ropi (Deputy Project Manager). For the Project Officers and Technical Advisers–Din Wahid, Didin Syafruddin, Ali Munhanif, Jajang Jahroni, Dadi Darmadi, and Hamid Nasuhi–I salute to them for making our activities to be always running in the right path. Indeed, I also thank to our youth colleagues–Herda Maulida, Narsih, Dani, Ridwansyah, Wiwik Julistianti, Dita Kirana, Utami Sandyarani, Endi Aulia Garadian, Hani Samantha, Abdallah Sy, Syaifa Rodiyah dan Amalia Nurul–for willing to sacrifice their leisure time for CONVEY’s sake.

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Ciputat March 22, 2018

Jamhari Makruf
Team Leader Project Management Unit (PMU)
CONVEY Indonesia

Table of Contents

Convey Indonesia At Glance____**v**

Foreword____**vii**

Table Of Contents____**xi**

Fire On Chaff: Study On Religiosity Within Gen Z____**1**

Directions And Forms Of Religiosity In Muslim Youth:

Conservatism, Hybridation Of Identity, And Radicalism Challenge____**13**

Forms, Disseminations, And Accessibility Of Islamic Literature Among
Millennials____**23**

Salafi Pesantren In Indonesia: Research On Salafi Movement

Database____**33**

Radicalism In Website And Social Media____**43**

Strengthened Student Development Policies (Osis) In Order To

Strengthening Unity And Inclusiveness In Both Public And Islamic Senior
High Schools____**57**

Economy Of The Younger Generation And Combating Terrorism In
Indonesia____ **69**

Assessment Of Social And Economic Empowerment Programs In
Extremist Dominated Border Areas ____ **77**

Assessment Of Social And Economic Empowerment Programs In
Extremist Dominated Border Areas ____ **83**

An Assessment Of Economic Empowerment Of Former Terrorist Convicts
And Combatants In Greater Jakarta, Lamongan, And Poso ____ **91**

Revitalizing The Boy Scout Movement And The Karang Taruna
Neighbourhood Association To Ward Off Extremism-Violence ____ **101**

Readers’ Response On The Publication Of The Muslim Muda Indonesia
Bulletin ____ **117**

Contributing Partners ____ **123**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**FIRE ON CHAFF:
STUDY ON RELIGIOSITY
WITHIN GEN Z**

**THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ISLAM AND THE SOCIETY
(PPIM), STATE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY (UIN) SYARIF
HIDAYATULLAH, JAKARTA**



Background

This research wants to seek the views and attitude on religiosity of students and educators in both schools and universities. Most schools and universities provide Islamic studies subject, which is intended to strengthen civic values (freedom, equality, justice, tolerance and unity) based on Pancasila and Constitution of Indonesia. Schools and universities also play an important role in building collective identity, encouraging democracy consolidation and acting as a space to form public civility.

Ironically, both schools and universities have lost the essence of the mentioned process. Educators, who are entrusted as architects of civility, tend to show intolerance and radicalism instead. Their exclusive religious attitude closes its gate for tolerance. The classroom that is supposed to be a space for dialogue has turned into a space for indoctrination.

It is possible that students learn radical and intolerant belief due to closed dialogue space in class, which motivates them to seek alternatives by looking for religious references on the internet. The freedom of internet access gives them the access to radical sites. Islamic studies subject provided by schools and universities does not allow for comprehensive Islamic insights but instead limit their sense of diversity.

Therefore, it is important for us to work together against the situation mentioned above. For example, the existing curriculum on Islamic studies can be used to promote the Islamic value "Rahmatan Lil'Alamin" (blessing for the universe) and improve national values along with the relation between Islam and Indonesia. Ir. Soekarno once exclaimed, "To worship God in Indonesia is to worship God in culture, which is in civilization, mutual respect, manners, and without religious egoism" on Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work

for Independence assembly, June 1, 1945 (Feith & Castle, 1988, p.24)

Research Method

In this research, our survey target population consists of students and teachers in high schools along with university students and lecturers within the milieu of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education and Culture, and Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education.

This survey is conducted from September 1 to October 7, 2017 in all 34 provinces in Indonesia, in which 1 district and 1 city are picked randomly each. The number of school is picked using proportional sampling technique, so that there are more samples in districts or cities with more schools. The total of samples in this survey is 2,181 people, which consist of 1,522 Muslim students, 337 Muslim university students, 264 teachers and 58 lecturers in Islamic studies.

This research utilises two tools to measure intolerance and radicalism level. The first one is Implicit Association Test (IAT) measuring tool to determine the potential of intolerance and radicalism implicitly. The second one is self-report questionnaires on judging intolerance and radicalism as well as factors that influence them. This survey emphasizes the issues on religious tolerance in Indonesia, such as *khilafiyah* issues (differences in opinions) within Muslims, views on Ahmadiyya and Shia, religious freedom, etc. This research also explores their perception on Islamism (relation between religion and state), on subjects such as Pancasila and Constitution of Indonesia, sharia law, Islamic state, *jihad*, and Islam's compatibility to democracy.



Findings

First pic:

Intolerance and Radicalism in Students

Explicit Measure

- *Intolerant opinions by students*
- *Radical opinions by students*
- *Intolerant actions by students*
- *Radical actions by students*

Implicit Measure

- *intolerance*
- *radicalism*

Notes

dark orange: very intolerant/radical

orange: intolerant/radical

pale yellow: neutral

light green: tolerant/moderate

green: very tolerant/moderate

Looking at the opinion graph, we can tell that students tend to share intolerant religious views. It reflects from the distribution between radical opinion, inter-religious tolerance and intra-religious tolerance. From those 3 categories, the most intolerant (dark orange colour) is shown as radical opinion (58,5%), followed by intra-religious intolerant opinion (51,1%) and inter-religious intolerant opinion (34,3%).

As for the action graph, it is shown that students display rather moderate/tolerant religious acts. Those who fall under intra-religious radical action only consist of 7,0% and inter-religious intolerant action being 17,3%. However, the intra-religious intolerant action is relatively higher at 34,1%.

Second picture:

Intolerance and Radicalism in Educators

Explicit Measures:

- *Intolerant opinions by educators*
- *Radical opinions by educators*

- *Intolerant actions by educators*
- *Radical actions by educators*

Implicit Measures:

- *intolerance*
- *radicalism*

Notes

dark orange: very intolerant/radical

orange: intolerant/radical

pale yellow: neutral

light green: tolerant/moderate

green: very tolerant/moderate

On the opinion table, educators tend to share tolerant/moderate opinions, which is in contrast with the students'. This fact is displayed through the distribution of educator's opinions, as intra-religious intolerant opinion, inter-religious intolerant opinion and radical opinions are relatively lower (33,9%, 29,2%, 23,0% respectively).

Yet, on the action table, there is a significant difference between intra-religious intolerant action and radical action. Educators are more likely to possess the tendency to act very intolerantly as intra-religious intolerant action bar reaches 69,3% high, while radical action and inter-religious intolerant action being 8,4% and 24,2% respectively.

Within Level

Islamic studies learning model >> -0.086 >> Student Radicalism

Between Level

Educator's radical opinions >> 0.016 >> Student Radicalism

Islamic studies educators learning model >> 0.040 >> Student Radicalism

The scheme above displays that the learning model of Islamic studies possesses the potential to form radicalism within students, with educator's radical opinions and its Islamic studies learning model sharing the same potential as well. That means, an educator plays a very important role in the process of character development, whether one will turn out intolerant or radical. We also have to put more attention on improving the capacity and skills of educators.

Code	Does religious study play a role in setting limitations of interacting with people of different religion?	Frequency	Percentage
1	Very much	431	23,18%
2	Rather much	479	25,77%
3	A little	396	21,30%
4	Not really	124	6,67%
5	Not at all	429	23,08%
	Total	1859	100,00%

Jihad means war against non-Muslims



From the table above, we can conclude that students think that religious study plays a huge role in influencing them not to interact with people of different religions.

Religious information sources

Internet (social media accounts & blogs/websites) 54,87%

Television 33,73%

Recitation (Tabligh Akbar) 14,31%

Magazines/ bulletins/ pamphlet 2,85%

Others 2,21%

The data above has shown that 54,87% youngsters tend to search for religious information through the internet (blogs, websites and social media). The second place is books/bibles with the percentage of 48,57%. Television reaches the third place with 33,73%.

Jihad is one of the issues that is often brought up by jihadist movement, as for them jihad is *qital* (war) and is intended against non-Muslims. As much as 37,71% of respondents agree that jihad means to fight against non-Muslims.


Relation with Non-Muslims: educators and students can accept other religions (co-existence) except for Jewish.

- 83,85% educators and 79,07% students claim that Christians are not an enemy of Muslims.
- 66,15% educators and 76,22% students think that Christians don't hate Muslims.
- 64,60% educators and 70,36% students do not mind if non-Muslims give aid for Muslim institutions.
- 55,51% students and 34,47% educators would allow the building of non-Muslim's place of worship in the environment they live.

- However, 57,76% educators and 53,74% students agree that Jews are the enemy of Islam.
- 63,66% and 52,99% agree that Jews hate Muslims.

Relation with the minorities of Muslims: educators and students have difficulty accepting Muslims whose views are of Ahmadiyya and Shia.

- 30,99% students pick Shia as the most hated minority, with 19,72% students pick Ahmadiyya as the second. Instead, 64,66% educators pick Ahmadiyya as the first place with 55,60% say Shia being second.
- 44,72% educators and 49,00% students disagree if the government has the obligation to protect Shia and Ahmadiyya followers.
- 87,89% educators and 86,55% students agree if the governments forbid the existence of minority groups that are considered to deviate from Islam.
- 34,16% educators and 64,17% students support the governments to return Ahmadiyya and Shia refugees in Sidoarjo back to where they belong.



Majority of students (>70%) agree that in Islamic studies class there should be a content or discussions about another religion. 74,99% respondents agree to include discussions on diversity between religions in religious study materials to reduce negative prejudices of another religion. 65,03% agree that students should exchange thoughts on their own religious experience so they can understand more of one another. Then, 63,69% agree that educators should have their students discuss problems together from the viewpoints of another religion in Islamic studies class.

Chart:

Do you agree if Islamic studies include subjects about religions other than Islam?

Yes – No

Teachers – Lecturers

Even though more than 50% of teachers and lecturers agree to include subjects about religions other than Islam, the number of lecturers who agree are comparably larger than teachers.

The situation of the supporters of intolerance: perceived economic and law disadvantages

- Economic condition, especially the gap between rich and poor, are viewed as severe by respondents. As much as 52,29% state that it's severe or very severe. 43,46% state that it's quite severe.
- Law is not enforced fairly, as 69,80% of respondents perceived it as unfair to very unfair.

Muslims as victims

- 62,11% educators and 55,08% students agree that Muslims are treated unjustly at this moment.
- 54,35% educators and 48,04% students think that financially, non-Muslims have more advantage compared to Muslims.
- 40,06% educators and 36,79% students believe that non-Muslims are responsible for the economic inequality in Indonesia.

Nation: positive attitudes are shown to Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia

- 91,93% educators and 80,74% students disagree to the statement that Indonesian government, based on Pancasila and 1945 constitution, is *Taghut* (believes in something other than Allah) and *Kafir* (one who doesn't believe in God).

- 86,02% educators and 69,71% students disagree to the attacks intended at state officials who are considered Taghut and Kafir.

Jihad: educators and students disagree that Jihad equals violence

- 82,30% educators and 62,29% students disagree that Jihad means to fight against Non-Muslims.
- 93,17% educators and 76,65% students disagree that bombings or suicide bombs in the name of religion is considered Jihad.
- 81,37% educators and 65,57% students disagree if apostates can be killed.

Recommendations

1. Introductions to religious studies should be integrated into Islamic studies curriculum.
 - Content-wise, in Islamic studies, religious literacy and interfaith education should be developed.
 - More practices on diversity and problem solving should be conducted, so students can share their experiences and stories on the religious values that honor humanity.
 - Various education methods that are more interactive and suitable for students, such as audiovisual, Infography, social media, etc.
2. Reform recruitment, education and training for teachers of Islamic studies.
3. The government should develop an open, tolerant, and inclusive religious study.
4. Government should also give more chances for teachers to undergo training on nationality, Islam and Indonesia.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**DIRECTIONS AND FORMS OF
RELIGIOSITY IN MUSLIM YOUTH:
CONSERVATISM, HYBRIDATION
OF IDENTITY, AND RADICALISM
CHALLENGE**

**CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION AND CULTURE (CSRC),
STATE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY (UIN)
SYARIF HIDAYATULLAH, JAKARTA**



Foreword

This research's intention is to learn the basic structure of attitude and behavior among millennial Muslim youth (15-24 years of age) on violence and extremism. Involving about 935 youth Muslim activists (555 in-depth interviewees and 380 Focus Group Discussion interviewees) with various ideologies in 18 cities/districts, this research finds out that generally, the attitude and behavior of Muslim youth are considered moderate, though at the same time the communal and scriptural conservatism's influence is getting stronger.

This latest tendency creates an opportunity for intolerance attitude and behavior to appear along with the support for radicalism and extremism among Muslim youth. This study introduces a few themes as a guidance for deep interview and FGD to measure their support to violence and extremism. These themes range from the simplest, such as experience and study on religions, to the most complicated such as violence and terrorism. Specifically, the suggested themes include these points:

- 1) Religiosity: The understanding of religion and its experience on Muslim youth,
- 2) Religious education and teachings,
- 3) Diversity and tolerance,
- 4) Individual freedom and human rights,
- 5) Nationalism,
- 6) Radicalism and extremism.

Muslim youth activists received various education and religion teachings, ranging from family values, formal education to informal education. For formal education, they learn religion in general school and religious school starting from elementary years to higher degree. Integrated Islamic school is a popular alternative

for religion study. However, in this millennial era, social media has become children's best friend, as well as a place to learn about religion. They generally like digital-friendly Islamic leaders since they can access their lectures or *tausiyah* easily, anywhere and wherever they want. **This research found out that generally, social media's influence significantly decreases religion study within family and the role of religion teacher at school.**

Hybridation of Identity

Other than that, a relatively dominant sign among the current Muslim youth, as this research found out, is that they experience a phenomenon called hybridation of identity. It means that there is a "contradicting" affiliation and religious orientation based on the social-political-religious dynamics and interactions that they have with their social environment. This hybridation of identity phenomenon is also interpreted as the birth of new identity caused by mixing culture, traditions, value and principles that Muslim youth are holding, as a result of intensive interaction process between an individual or a group of people with its surrounding context and tradition. Anyone can be "accommodative" to new values earned from family, teacher, environment, educational institute, organizations, etc.

The hybridation of identity of Muslim youth is caused by their experience from childhood to adolescence, or until college years. Not many of Muslim youth ever has a linear experience in 1 religious tradition. In this context, the hybridation of identity in this research can be seen in these aspects below:

- 1) Family's religious background generally isn't inherited to Muslim youth;

- 2) Educational institutes or religious understanding, either obtained from family, formal institutes, informal ones, internet, and social media, show contradictions in the culture, social, and politics-economy values;
- 3) Organization or activism that they belong to often are not linear, from basic level to advanced level (at school, university, after graduating, or even until now);
- 4) Urban character in Muslim youth, where urbanization or a brand new university student status make them interact with new things that are not obtained at the village or at school. The connection and encounters with a wider and complex world make them experience hybridation of identity until now (on process)

On tolerance, human rights and state ideology

The response to the religiosity and tolerance among Muslim youth in this research is divided into two patterns. The first view emphasizes communal tolerance. This view is made possible by the dominance of scripturalism in religion, which is the religious behavior that refers to literal al-Qur'an and al-Hadith postulates, without getting through the process of reasoning comparison, and without the contexts in any paragraph or hadith, so general principles can be implemented in the ever-changing social-historic situation. Scripturalism influences the way religious tolerance limits are made, which are allowed and which are not. In communal tolerance, collective values are prioritized over individual values, so the associations and interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims are accepted as long as they don't sacrifice those collective values. This view is supported by most of dakwah activists (ROHIS, LDK, and other dakwah community outside of the school and universities).

The second view is based on civic tolerance. This view is mostly

supported by Islamic student movements such as HMI, PMII, IMM, and other progressive Islamic organizations outside campus. This civic tolerance is practiced consciously and actively based on civic/democratic values, highlighted by an open and contextual Islamic conception. On a certain level, some progressive Islam activists have acted beyond tolerance by making diversity as their principle of living religiously. This civic tolerance is also supported by nationalist youth such as GMNI, Pemuda Pancasila, and KNPI. However, nationalist civic tolerance is characterized by a distant tendency with religious discourse because it's perceived as sensitive. Consequently, the religious tolerance shown might come off as passive.

In line with the attitude and behavior of Muslim youth for diversity and tolerance as described, their response to individual freedom and human rights is still relatively strong with elements of conservatism, communalism and scripturalism. Towards this theme, there are three views. First, the view that agrees with individual freedom and human rights, with an exception that the freedom is limited by some religious and cultural values. Communal aspect is still strong in the first ideal. This view is supported by most Muslim youth that are active in ROHIS, LDK, OSIS, BEM and to some degree, community and youth organizations like IMM and KAMMI. Secondly, the view that repulses all individual freedom and human rights. They think that human rights concept came from the west and not from Islam, as human right concept is introduced to Muslims to destroy them by creating an unlimited individual freedom. Generally, this view is supported by most Muslim youth that are active in Islamic organizations that support khilafah, such as HTI. To this group, individual freedom and human rights have to be evaluated with Islamic parameters. Thirdly, the view that believes that Islam and human rights walk together. Those who are active in PMII, HMI, IPPNU, KNPI, Pemuda

Pancasila, and progressive Islamic organizations support the view that individual freedom and human rights do not clash with Islamic values.

However, from all those three views, most do not agree with mass organization legislation and the dismissal of HTI. Muslim youth in all circles, from ROHIS to the nationalist ones, do not approve of HTI dismissal, except those with NU backgrounds, either in PMII or IPPNU activists circle. For NU youth activists, the dismissal of HTI is appropriate as HTI's campaign is an anti-Pancasila ideology.

Concerning women roles in Islam, conservative and Islamic Muslim youth still view women as not suitable to be a leader. Referring to al-Qur'an Surah Al-Maidah (34): "males are in charge of women," they expressly reject female leadership. This group agrees that if women become leaders, they will violate female nature. ROHIS, LDK, HTI, Gema Pembebasan, Khilafatul Muslimin (KM), FPI, LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta), to certain degrees, support this view. GMNI, PP, and moderate Islam such as PMII, IMM and HMI instead view feminism as something that has to be campaigned as equal rights and social justice. They hope for gender equality, where women play active roles in public space and have the same opportunities with men. More than that, they want that female subordination to male to be reduced so emancipation can bear good result.

The support of Muslim youth to Pancasila also has four tendency that can be described as followed. First, supporting Pancasila as a whole because Pancasila is believed to be the unifying symbol of diversity and nationalism. Most youth that support this view come from nationalist organizations such as GMNI, KNPI, PMII and Pemuda Pancasila. Second, accepting and supporting Pancasila fully because the content and principles are Islamic, as in compatible with Islamic principles. Third, accepting and supporting Pancasila

as ambivalent. In this typology there are 2 groups: Muslim youth who joined mass organizations like FPI, who accepts Pancasila as state ideology, but has an ideological agenda to bring back Pancasila to Piagam Jakarta spirit; while HTI activists accepts Pancasila despite their double agenda to implement shari'a and khilafah. Because of that, HTI activists' view on Pancasila needs to be seen critically as a political statement. Fourth, rejecting the idea of Pancasila altogether. The rejection can be seen in Bulukumba, Lamongan, Tasikmalaya, Lampung, Bogor, and other places. In Bulukumba, FPDJ activists (Forum Pemuda Dakwah Islam) only accept Allah and reject any man-made law, including Pancasila. In Lamongan, students in Pesantren Al-Islam Tenggulun refuse to accept Pancasila as the basic and purpose to live in civilization. In Lampung, some youth activists hope that Khilafatul Muslimin to be lead by a Khalifah named Abdul Qodir Hasan Baraja. In Bogor, there is a young generation who wants daulah islamiyah (Islamic country) based on Islam shari'a in every aspects of life. This utopian pattern is followed by the Muslim youth who once were HTI activists.

Violence and Extremism

In regards of violence, there are three tendencies and Muslim youth behavior about the misconduct among society: first, rejecting all raids and sweeping. This first tendency is the most dominant among Muslim youth in Indonesia in almost every places and organizations. Second, accepting all raids/sweeping without violence. This second tendency is more dominant among ROHIS and LDK, and OSIS, BEM, and moderate/nationalist circles. Third, accepting raids/sweeping fully. This third tendency appears more among Muslim youth activist circles who joined organizations that often conduct hisbah (amar makruf nahi munkar).

Related to radicalism, this research claims that Muslim youth activists tend to reject radicalism and extremism by trying to make a social-political change revolutionarily and comprehensively. The idea of replacing Pancasila with khalifah, in which its resonance is strong in HTI, Khilafatatul Muslimin, Jama'ah Muslimin's activists circle, is ignored. However, Muslim youth activists also show a scripturalist and conservative religious pattern with strong emphasis on communal values above civic values. On a certain degree, this scriptural and conservative religiosity is vulnerable to radical message when their social relation with other religious groups is tinged with social exclusivism and communal prejudice.

The consequence of conservative and scripturalist views among youth can be seen on field research in places, where they are trying to reformulate Islamic concepts that were developed in radical community. One of the examples is the notion of khilafah rising among the youth, and not limited in HTI circles only. There are circles of Muslim youth that believe khilafah will rise when it's time, regardless of whether it's preached or not like how HTI and the others did. Meanwhile, generally, almost all Muslim youth in Indonesia, whether it's in the circles of OSIS, ROHIS, LDK, BEM, and moderate youth organizations (especially the nationalist ones), don't believe in rising khilafah or Islamic leadership. For the youth in this category, they believe that it will be very hard to change Indonesia with Pancasila into khilafah country with shari'a law.

This research found a strong indication that very little millennial Muslim youth activist follow extreme attitude or religious behavior. Even if there is some, that notion is only followed by those who originally joined jihadist groups. Even most Muslims moderate the meaning of jihad. Interestingly, at certain places there are a few anomalies as a result of peer influence. For example, in Lamongan,

there were a group of Muslim youth that shockingly stated their support to what Amrozi did (the bomber of Bali). What is even more surprising is that some nationalist activists like GMNI, Pemuda Pancamarga and KNPI even stated that Amrozi is not a terrorist.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Generally, the attitude and behavior of millennial Muslim youth towards radicalism don't show any persistent tendencies. However, at the same time they also display conservative attitude and religiosity, with communal, scriptural and puritan pattern. Nevertheless, they are basically open to moderate values and principles and zero violence, with enough respect for individual freedom and human rights, although limited by religious and culture norms. This attitude is also reflected on how they tell their social relationships with other different religious communities.

The patterns and identity of religiosity is a reflection of learning process, experience and understanding of religiosity influenced by the complex religion, culture and social-politic context. Hybridation of identity, as mentioned before, strongly influences the forming of views, attitude and behavior. The complexity of issues that are faced by millennial Muslim youth gives them a conservative tendency in religiosity, especially those who are still at school or early college years. Their knowledge is very limited, and as they're searching for their own identity, it pushes them to follow normative views when given sensitive issues like diversity and tolerance, individual freedom and human rights, nationalism and radicalism and extremism.

However, the conclusion above shouldn't be taken as something linear and constant. Because all of the ideology spectrum from Muslim youth in the research also shows small cracks where the tendency towards conservatism and radicalism appear. Starting

from ROHIS, OSIS, BEM, LDK, HMI, IMM, PMII, KAMMI, and even nationalist organizations such as GMNI, Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Pancamarga, and KNPI show the cracks. In this research, their support towards religious doctrines in valuing diversity and tolerance, individual freedom and human rights, support towards Pancasila and democracy, and support towards radicalism and extremism as written above, is relatively consistent.

From the conclusion above, there are a few recommendations from this research that can be taken to consideration by all policy makers, from central to district government, university, religious organization, civil organization, young organization, and the whole society:

- 1) broaden the associations among Muslim youth with people from different backgrounds, especially from different race and ethnic. For example, ethnic camps, religious camps, etc. These meetings will let Muslim youth learn other groups with a more respectable and open way;
- 2) limit the movement and activism of conservative Islam, radicalism in formal education institutes without counterproductive measure, such as ban, restriction, etc;
- 3) introduce civic values discourses for conservative groups such as ROHIS and LDK through formal curriculum in schools and universities;
- 4) schools and universities can't ignore programs of ROHIS and LDK such as liqa to proceed without any interventions from school or campus authority with civic values discourses;
- 5) expose and introduce various interpretations in Islam towards conservative groups with more popular methods;
- 6) support moderate communities to be active in broader dakwah areas such as ROHIS and LDK, and not only inside BEM.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**FORMS, DISSEMINATIONS,
AND ACCESSIBILITY OF
ISLAMIC LITERATURE AMONG
MILLENNIALS**

**Postgraduate School of State Islamic University (UIN)
Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta**



Background

The vulnerability of Indonesians, especially students and college students, towards radicalism, extremism, and terrorism is heavily related to their uncertainty in facing structural problems and uncertain future. The most obvious impact of modernization and globalization is felt by the millennial. Born within these 25 years, they are natives to the digital culture. In this uncertain situation, millennial face the massive influence of Islamic ideology that comes along offering hopes and dreams about change. Built on the narration that emphasizes the importance of going back to Islamic fundamentals and the exemplary of early generations, it tries to create a distance and demarcation between Islam and open society, which is pictured as full of sins like *bid'ah* (innovation), *syirik* (shirk) and *kafeer* (disbelief). Even though it seems utopian, Islamic ideology has its own attractiveness, particularly because its offer to articulate injustice and frame the spirit of resistance against establishment.

The role of Islamic literature in nurturing Islamic ideology among students is highly significant. Islamic ideology slips inside religious books and texts that are spread among students. In fact, literatures that try to sell Islamic ideologies – that are focused in demanding total Islamic implementation in all aspects of life that lead to the desire to replace democratic system with *khilafah*, even if drastic measures are needed – come flooding the social arena and landscape around Indonesian high schools and universities.

Research Focus

The focus of this research is to see the patterns of production, transmission and dissemination of Islamic literature with its pattern and tendency, also to learn more about its accessibility and reception among the millennial.

Research Method

The research was conducted in 16 cities, which are Medan, Pekanbaru, Padang, Bogor, Bandung, Solo, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Jember, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Palu, Mataram, Ambon and Denpasar. These cities are chosen considering the dissemination, typology, and important characteristics attached. As sampling, we chose some public and private high schools, vocational schools, and madrasah Aliyah, along with state corporations under Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education and Ministry of Religion with private corporations that represent the diversity map and the spread of secondary education institution in each city. Data was collected through observation, survey, FGD and involved more than 320 participants ranging from students and college students, along with in-depth interview that involved more than 280 interviewees.

Key Findings

Islamic literatures are produced by publishers who are affiliated with growing Islamic organizations and movements in various cities in Indonesia. Solo becomes the city that gives birth to most publishers who are actively producing Islamic literature, followed by Jogjakarta, Jakarta, and Bogor. In this context, the role of the agency cannot be ignored. There is a parallel connection between the growth of Islamic literature production and the growth of Islamic movements in the cities mentioned above.

Solo becomes the main city for publishers and bookstores such as Jazera, Arafah, Aqwan, Al Qowam, and Gazza Media, all of whom are close with Pesantren Ngruki and actively producing books on jihad in Indonesia. Era Adicita Intermedia, a publisher that actively publishes books on tarbawi, also resides in Solo. That is

also the case with Al-Ghuroba, Zamzam and al-Qalam who publish on Salafi, as they also expand their influence in Solo. Some of their counterparts reside in other cities, such as Al-Qamar Media (Jogjakarta), Pustaka Ibnu Umar (Bogor), Pustaka At-Taqwa (Bogor), Darul Haq (Jakarta), Pustaka Imam Adz-Dzahabi (Bekasi), Pustaka Imam asy-Syafi'i (Bekasi) and Risalah Ilmu (Cibubur). Meanwhile, in Jogjakarta, Pro-U Media, a publisher that is related to Jogokaryan mosque, are actively producing tarbawi literature in various genres, including popular ones. In Jakarta and Bogor, Al-Fatih Press and Khilafah Press are expanding their wings, as they publish books that emphasize the importance of khilafah.

Islamic literatures from all the publishers mentioned above reached the millennial through intermediate actors, including distributors, sales agency, store owner, seller, book fair organizer, Islamic movement figures, and dakwah activists. They try to distribute Islamic books through sales network and certain bookstores, in which they will be displayed in certain strategic corners. Periodically, agency network, distributors, merchants and bookstores will hold Islamic Book Fair to attract people on a wider scale.

The rise of digital culture has shifted the interest of millennials from printed media to online media. They prefer to access Islamic content through the internet. Many of them learn Islam through online media, such as smartphone app, facebook, instagram, youtube, line, and whatsapp. Through this shift, a lot of publishers have started to produce digital-based Islamic literature.


Sales agent and bookstores are connected with ROHIS and LDK activists, who are responsible for organizing Islam mentoring, recitations, halaqah, daurah, liqa', mabit (night of faith and taqwa) and other activities. Students who participated in ROHIS and LDK

activities demand a lot of Islamic literatures since the ROHIS and LDK activities need them to master the key Islamic literature. Every member is encouraged to read 5 pages a day. Many students express their preference in learning religion through mentoring, liqa' and halaqah since the relationship between them and murabbi (mentor) are close and more informal. If there's a high interest of certain books, ROHIS and LDK activists will hold a book review inviting the author.

Responding to the spread of Islamic literature that tries to sell Islamic ideology in various ways, government has done a few breakthrough with the help of the related ministry, one of them is by publishing a standard Islamic education textbook for high school called "*Pendidikan Agama Islam dan Budi Pekerti*" (Islamic Religion Education and Character). Through 2013 curriculum, this book tries to provide "moderate-progressive" Islamic material, with certain emphasis on character building. The situation is similar with Madrasah Aliyah. The main books for lectures are books published by Ministry of Religion, whose hope is to "maintain peace and harmony among religious people", written explicitly in the foreword. However, in some places, there's still a gap between that hope and reality. Unlike Islamic Religion Education books used in high schools and MAs, Islamic Religion Education book for University Students by Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (2016) has failed to become the main textbook for Islamic Religion subjects in universities. Instead, lecturers encourage students to read books they write, or a compilation of texts from various sources in the form of modules, handouts and presentation slides.

Nevertheless, the gap in Islamic literature filled with Islamic ideology is still open enough to influence the aspiration and views of students. This gap opens not only because of unclear discussions

and stakeholder’s distrusts, especially for university-level Islamic education, at those books, but also because of excessive pressure on morality and character building issues. The previous issue doubles uncertainty among youth, especially students, on facing the future that’s filled with “moral panic” issues caused by promiscuity, drug abuse and other juvenile mischiefs. They then try to shield themselves by exploring Islamic literatures that give strong messages on moral decadency as the outcome of the west’s secular culture or contemporary world pictured as full of sins, and all of these can only be fixed by implementing shari’a completely. This is where jihadi, tahriri, salafi, tarbawi and popular Islam literatures find a gap to enter the students’ way of thinking.



Even on a limited scale, jihadi literature – which describes the world now as a full-fledged war caused by ignoring absolute sovereignty of the divine and encourages Muslim to uphold jihad wherever they are – has filled Indonesia’s Islamic literature map. Two of the most popular books are *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* by Abdullah Azzam dan *Jihad Jalan Kami* by Abdul Baqi Ramdhun. They are published by Jazera Solo and Era Intermedia respectively, and both publishers reside in Solo. Other than those two books, *Kepada Aktivis Muslim* by

Najih Ibrahim, published by Aqam Solo, is also read by students in some cities in Indonesia.

Tahriri literature follows behind and has successfully spread its influence among students, even broader than jihadi literature. This kind of literature includes translated books by Taqiyyuddin An-Nabhani and Abdul Qadim Zallum. In the development, Hizbut Tahrir activists or their sympathizers adapted and appropriated tahriri ideas into straightforward language, simple and fit with the current Muslim youth's aspiration. Included in this category are two books written by Felix J. Siau, a highly active author and a popular ustadz among youth in social media, titled *Beyond the Inspiration* and *Muhammad Al-Fatih 1453*, both favored by millennials.

Salafi literature has also succeeded in spreading its influence among students, in a way that's even more than tahriri. Among the salafi literature targeted for students are translated books by Aidh al-Qarni, such as *La Tahzan* and *Pelajar Berprestasi*, both published by Qitshi Press. A more classic salafi literature, such as Ibnu Qayyim al-Jauziyah's works, or the ones written by contemporary salafi authority such as Nasir al-Din al-Albani and Muhammad Salih al-Utsaimin, are also spread widely among students.

Compared to salafi literature, tarbawi books, whose mission is to spread Ikhwanul Muslimin ideology, have succeeded in deepening their roots among students. Early release from tarbiyah literature is translated Ikhwanul Muslimin ideologies such as Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Said Hawwa. In modern context, the tarbawi literature that is consumed by students are books that appropriate ideological mission of Banna, Qutb and Hawwa into a message of gradual change by first instilling Islamic morality and commitment. The books are written by Salim A Fillah; *Jalan Cinta Para Pejuang*, *Saksikan Aku Seorang Muslim*, and *Dalam Dekapan Ukhuwah*, and

by Solikhin Abu Izzuddin, titled *New Quantum arbiyah: Membentuk Kader Dahsyat Full Manfaat*.

We have to emphasize that tahriri, salafi and tarbawi literature have succeeded, on a certain level, in attracting students, while jihadi literature fails miserably. Even though the amount is adequate, its influence is limited to those who are connected intensely with jihadi figures or supporting institutions. This happens because jihadi literature gives only black-and-white choices and forces them to follow dangerous codes of conducts and movement. One of the jihadi literature is *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* by Abdullah Azzam.

Facing the wave of Islamic literature, millennials are still able to select, adapt, and appropriate, based on their tendency as millennials who grow in this current consumption culture. They are not easily carried away into certain ideologies vortex, particularly those who dictate and limit them with black and white choices. Instead, students are trying to find literatures that relate to their mood and cultural identity, while showing the way to solve their daily problems and build optimism on facing challenges and future.

In this context, Islamic books and magazines that carry daily, popular themes earn a vital spot among students. Their influence is the broadest compared to other genres mentioned above. The key is, other than slipping in ideological messages, popular Islamic literature provides an easy-reading content that offers practical guide to life. In the form of fiction, popular and comic, they provide short narrations with simple, not patronizing language, completed with attractive illustrations. That way, they enter the students' mind as students are looking for alternative ways to get rid of their dilemmas and paradox in life.

Among the books that fall into Islamic popular category, there are *99 Cahaya di Langit Eropa: Perjalanan Menapak Jejak Islam Eropa*

by Hanum Salsabiela Rais and Rangga Almahendra, *Ayat-ayat Cinta, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih, Api Tauhid* by Habiburrahman el-Shirazy, *Hapalan Shalat Delisa* by Tere Leye, and *La Tahzan for Hijabers* by Asma Nadia. Other notable works are Felix J Siau's *Udah Putusin Aja!* and *Yuk Berhijab!*

It's important to emphasize that even though Islamic literature are described in such a way above, moderate Islamic texts stand still and progresses despite the tendencies of ideologies and genre. Muslim Indonesia still produce alternative Islamic books as a counter measures against the Islamic literature wave. These alternative texts include traditional Islamic textbooks, moderate and progressive Islamic texts, and counter narrative texts that balance out the spread of radical understanding.

Recommendation

1. To compensate the spreading influence of ideology in Islamic literatures by Islamic movement network, government has to strengthen Islamic literature whose mission is to raise moderate mainstream Islam, so it can be used as the main standard for students to learn Islam.
2. The availability of moderate Islamic literature needs to be followed by raising awareness and expanding insights for all stakeholders who are involved in Islamic teachings at schools and universities, especially teachers and lecturers, so they can explain the literature properly.
3. Emphasis on character building, as if demanding all students to study to be a religious individual of character, has to be decreased if government is unable to provide proportionally correct literature and understand student's way of thinking. The absence of such literature will only pave a way for ideological Islamic literatures

to develop even more and stick in their influence among students through extracurricular Islamic activities.

4. If government can't control and limit the Islamic literature circulating in the market, it can compensate the spreading of dangerous Islamic ideology literatures by pushing the publications of books that carry moderate mainstream Islam ideas, including translated texts by progressive Muslim author from various parts of the world, by private publishers with certain incentive.

Since the target market is for students, literature works need to be written in such a way that they're popular, attractive and offer practical guides in facing life challenges without overly patronizing. These works can be served as fiction, comic books, or other popular forms.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**SALAFI PESANTREN IN
INDONESIA:
RESEARCH ON SALAFI
MOVEMENT DATABASE**

**The Center for the Study of Islam and the Society (PPIM),
State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta**



Foreword

In these two decades, we have seen the rise of Salafi Movement in Indonesia. Salafi Movement is a movement that claims itself as followers of Salaf, which is the first three generations of Muslims, with its motto “return to Al-Qur’an and Hadiths”, and makes Salaf as the third source after Al-Qur’an and Hadiths. This movement was brought by the alumni of Saudi Arabia and Yemen at the end of 1980s by holding Salafi teachings. This movement received a warm welcome and the advocates of this movement have succeeded in establishing pesantren, madrasah and schools in a number of cities in Indonesia. A few Salafi pesantren now succeeds in continuously publishing magazine with a great number of subscriptions. Even now, Salafi radio and television channel has also been established.

Some Salafi pesantren caused a controversy and tension among society. August last year, we were shocked by an Islamic Scholar burning a red and white banner at Ibnu Mas’ud pesantren in Bogor, along with some Bogor residents repulsed the construction of Imam ibn Hanbal mosque, where Salafi recitation took place regularly. Negative reactions against Salafi movement also appeared in a few cities such as Batam¹ and Surakarta².

Even though researches on Salafi Movement in Indonesia were conducted by a few experts such as Noorhaidi Hasan³, Din Wahid⁴, Jajang Jahroni and Jamhari Makruf⁵ and Sunarwoto⁶, some of

1 Media Zainul Bahri, “Islamisme Terselubung versus Moderat Islam: Mencermati Geliat Radio-Radio Dakwah Di Batam,” in *Suara Salafisme: Radio Dakwah Di Indonesia*, ed. Din Wahid and Jamhari Makruf (Jakarta: PPIM, 2017).

2 Sunarwoto, “Contesting Religious Authority: A Study of Dakwah Radio in Surakarta Indonesia” (Tilburg University, 2015).

3 Noorhaidi Hasan, *Salafis, Jihad, and Drama* (Bogor: IIAS, 2005).

4 Din Wahid, “Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia” (Utrecht Universiteit, 2014).

5 Jajang Jahroni, “The Political Economy of Knowledge: Salafism in Post-Soeharto Urban Indonesia” (Boston University, 2015); Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., *Gerakan Salafi Radikal Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2004).

6 Sunarwoto, “Contesting Religious Authority: A Study of Dakwah Radio in Surakarta Indonesia.”

their research did not show the data on how many Salafi pesantren in Indonesia currently. In 2004, International Crisis Group (ICG) identified 29 Salafi pesantrens along with their figures in Indonesia.⁷ After ICG, no researches have been conducted to establish the database of this Islamic movement. With this background stated above, Center for the Islamic Study and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta conducted a research on Salafi Movement Database in Indonesia. This executive summary only briefly explained the findings of the research related to Salafi pesantrens.

Research Method

This research was conducted in 25 cities/districts in 13 provinces, which are: Jakarta, Banten (South Tangerang and Pandeglang), West Java (Bekasi, Bogor, Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Cirebon and Indramayu), Central Java (Temanggung and Surakarta), Jogjakarta, East Java (Surabaya and Lamongan), West Nusa Tenggara (Mataram, West Lombok, East Lombok, and Bima), South Sulawesi (Makassar), Riau (Pekanbaru), Riau Islands (Batam), South Kalimantan (Banjarmasin and Martapura), Maluku (Ambon), and Aceh (Banda Aceh). These regions were selected based on the previous research in which it was shown that the growth of Salafi movement was significant there compared to other regions. Data sampling was done for 2 months (August 15 to October 15, 2017), involving 15 researches and 25 research assistants.

Research Findings

This research found 111 Salafi educational institutes, which consist of 95 pesantrens, 11 elementary schools, 3 higher education

⁷ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix," ICG Asia Report (2004: International Crisis Group, 2004).

institutes, and 2 vocational institutes. Salafi pesantren is an Islamic boarding school that teaches the books of Salafi, especially those written by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, and Ibn Taymiyyah, such as *al-Ushul al-Tsalatsah*, *Kitab al-Tawhid*, *Kasyf al-Syubuhah*, and *al-'Aqidah al-Wasithiyyah*. Salafi pesantren is not to be confused with Salafiyah pesantren, which is affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (a traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia) that teaches kitab kuning (Islamic texts used in Islamic educational institutes in Indonesia) and perpetuate traditions.

This following research found that a big part of Salafi pesantrens (59%) is trying to integrate their curriculum with the national curriculum, and the rest, being 41%, refuses to do so. The former is affiliated to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. They implement Saudi Arabia curriculum for religion classes, and use national curriculum for general classes. These pesantrens are trying to achieve accreditation (mu'adalah) from Saudi Arabia, and at the same time they can take national exams or equation tests for Elementary, Junior High and Senior High standards. By doing so, the graduates of these pesantrens can continue their education to schools or universities.

On the other side, the latter is affiliated to Yemen, since the most of their leaders are the pupils of Syeikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i in Yemen. These pesantrens only teach religion by copying the curriculum, materials and teaching methods in Dar-ul-Hadith, Dammaj. The only general classes added are Indonesian language and Mathematics. These two are added since they are deemed important for communication and business transaction. The consequence is, these pesantrens are not able to participate in any national exams. The graduates can continue their education only to institutions that are related in their network, or to Yemen.

The difference in affiliation is partly caused by the access to funding sources from abroad. Salafi pesantrens receive funding from the Middle East, both institutions and individuals. The two institutions that donate the most, especially during the establishing period of pesantren, are Jam'iyah Ihya al-Turats al-Islami (Kuwait) and Sheikh Eid bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association (Qatar). However, after the terrorism act at New York World Trade Center (WTC) in 2001, the flow of funding has now been changed. Some associations that were suspected for terrorism acts had their rights frozen and Indonesian government tightened their supervision on the flow of the fund. Therefore, Salafi pesantren was expected to be able to find their own fund so they can be independent financially. Some Salafi pesantren that are able to increase their own quality in education have succeeded in funding themselves thanks to high registration and tuition fee. Other than that, there are still fund from individual Salafi supporters.

The affiliations above also influenced the formal education curriculum on Salafi pesantren. Those who are affiliated to Yemen offer Kindergarten, Tahfizh for Elementary Years, *Tadrib al-Du'at* (leadership program), and *Tarbiyat al-Nisa* (for girls). Since early years, Salafi pesantren inculcate Salafi teachings in very simple ways. For example, kindergarten students are not taught to sing, listen to music, draw or paint living beings. Meanwhile, the Tahfizh program is one of the best course in the pesantren, which expects students to memorize al-Qur'an in 6 years. *Tadrib al-Du'at* are programmed to produce leaders for Salafi, and usually attended by high school graduates or university students. *Tarbiyat al-Nisa'* is oriented to prepare girls to become a salehah woman. Those who are affiliated to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait offer formal education for all levels, from kindergarten to university.

Then what differs Salafi pesantren with other pesantren/madrasah? For this, we need to probe further on materials and texts taught in Salafi pesantren. Compared to traditional pesantren that emphasizes in fiqh (jurisprudence), Salafi pesantren emphasizes in aqeedah teachings, then hadith and fiqh. For aqeedah teachings, they used texts written by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, such as *al-Ushul al-Tsalatsah*, *Kitab al-Tawhid*, *Kasyf al-Shubuhah* and *Masa'il al-Jahiliyah*. Another text is *al-'Aqidah al-Wasithiyah* by Ibn Taymiyya, along with its syarah by Muhammad bin Salih al-Utsaymin, and *Aqeedah al-Thahawiyah* by Imam al-Thahawi with its syarah by Ibn Abi al-Izzi. For hadith materials, the texts are the same with other texts that are used in other pesantrens, such as *Shahih Bukhari*, *Shahih Muslim*, *Bulughul Maram*, *al-Arba'in al-Nawawi* and *Riyadh al-Shalihin*.

The difference is the syarah of those texts. Salafi pesantren uses the syarah written by Salafi leaders, like Syeikh Muhammad Shalih al-Utsaymin. Meanwhile, in fiqh aspect, Salafi pesantren teaches fiqh that is based on hadith. One of the texts taught there is *al-Wajiz fi Fiqh al-Sunnah wa al-Kitab al-Aziz* by Abd al-Azhim ibn Badawi and *'Umdat al-Ahkam* by Ibn Qudamah with its syarah *Taysir al-Allam* by Abdullah bin Abdurrahman bin Salih Alu Bassam. *Shifat Shalat an-Nabi* text by Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani is filled with simple guidance on how sholat is practiced by prophets.

Other than 3 materials above, of course Islamic values are also taught. Just like Tafseer, Ushul Fiqh, Akhlak, and Sirah Nabawi. In Tafseer study, the most used script is *Tafsir Ibn Katsir* and *Tafsir al-Sa'diy*. Arab language usage is also considered seriously. At this part, the texts used are *al-'Arabiyyah li al-Nasyi'in* and *Silsilah Ta'lim al-Lughah al-Arabiyya* (both published by LIPIA), *al-Ajrumiyyah* by Muhammad bin Daud al-Shanhaji and *Talkhish Qawa'id al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah*, by Ghufran Aunur Rafiq, mudir Ma'had al-Furqan Gresik.

All of the above materials are directed to teach and inculcate Salafi teachings to santri. There are 3 important Salafi teachings. First, Tauhid is divided into *Tauhid Rububiyah*, *Uluhiyyah*, *Asma wa Sifat*, and *Mulkiyah*. Second, *al-Wala' wa al-Bara'* that can be simply translated to love and hate, or association and disassociation. This concept emphasizes that Muslims has to love and appreciate all efforts that are intended to glorify Muslims, and at the same time Islam has to hate everything that hates Muslims and all the groups that want to destroy Muslims.

Muslims have to work to uphold the honor of Islam and progress of Muslims, and hate everything that harms Muslim. Third, *Sami'na wa atha'na* (obedient to the ruler). This doctrine teaches Muslims to be fully obedient to rulers; they can't rebel to any rulers; how bad they are as long as they still let Muslims perform their obligations; and they can't criticize government in the public eye. Generally, this doctrine is the same with Sunni doctrine, but Salafi followers just accept it unconditionally. Salafi followers, for example, forbid any strikes.

Other than that, in the pesantren, santris are not only taught Salafism doctrines, but also to get used to implement them on daily life. They are taught to live according to the Salafi manhaj (views and behavior). Therefore, santris are not able to listen to music, watch televisions, or draw living beings. They eat in groups of 4 or 5 people from one big plate, keep their beard for adult male santri, avoid *isbal* (wearing pants and sarong above ankles) and wear veils for women.

In a glance, there are no issues with Salafism doctrines and teachings, as seen as on the texts taught there. Then, why does the appearance Salafi pesantren, just as mentioned above, create tension and conflicts in the society? Many factors cause the conflict, ranging from social behavior to economic jealousy. One of the

factors can be traced back to the Salafism teachings or doctrines, especially doctrines about tauhid and *al-wala' wa al-bara'*. Tauhid means worshipping God, the opposite of syirik. In the real practice, Salafi's emphasis on tauhid often insults traditional Muslim community, because Salafi community judged other community to be conducting polytheism and heresy. Meanwhile, *al-wala' wa al-bara'* doctrine in reality gives Salafi followers a feeling of exclusivity. They limit communication and association, because they're afraid to be contaminated by other views that contradict Salafi. As a result, if not being understood really well and practiced wisely, both doctrines above can create conflicts among society.

Conclusion

1. This research has succeeded in identifying 111 Salafi educational institutes in 25 cities/districts. We believe there are more in numbers since some regions are not in the data. This shows that Salafi pesantren growth rate is quite high.
2. Salafi pesantren is not monolithic. Some are oriented to Yemen and repulse national curriculum, while the others are oriented to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which tend to be more accommodative to parents' requests on implementing national curriculum.
3. Salafism teaching, especially Tauhid and *al-Wala'wa al-Barra'*, makes Salafi followers very purist and militant, in which it might create conflict and tension among society.
4. Donations from the Middle East and local, both institutional and individual, are very instrumental in the growth of Salafi pesantren. Along with the declining financial support from abroad, now Salafi pesantren is trying to be independent financially.

Recommendation

Based on this research, Center for the Islamic Study and Society has concluded some important suggestions directed to the government:

1. Government, especially the Ministry of Religion, has to communicate and conduct dialogs with Salafi pesantren leaders, especially those that are affiliated to Yemen. Government is expected to embrace them with various ways, such as financial help, so they feel appreciated. By then, it's expected that government can also conduct training for Salafi pesantren.
2. To complete data/amount of Salafi pesantren, the Ministry of Religion should conduct a similar research in other cities and districts gradually and continuously, so government can have an exact data of them. An accurate data is needed to create a policy related to religion education.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**RADICALISM IN WEBSITE
AND SOCIAL MEDIA**

**The Culture and Social Changes Center (PSBPS),
Surakarta Muhammadiyah University (UMS)**



Research Orientation

Indonesia, just like other countries, is fighting the ever-complex threats of terrorism, radicalism, and extremism. Researches on radicalism and violence extremism issues received internal and external criticism since it frames Muslim as the source of radicalism and violence. This criticism is also intended to the biased media, since it focuses on the incidents and violent acts conducted by Muslims while it ignores the positive and constructive sides of them. Currently, United Nations tend to use the approach “Preventing Violent Extremism” (PVE) than the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), to promote a more comprehensive, effective, inclusive, and continuous strategy in the fight to keep peace and global safety.

Earlier researches in Indonesia showed signs on the rising of violence extremism in education instances and media. International researches have shown the same result: *Rand Corporation* (2014) confirms that website-based media plays a big role in the radicalization process among terrorist and violence extremist. Field evidence also shows that social media increases the chance for an individual or a group of people to become radical through the spreading of extremist information, communication and propagandas. Brookings Institute (2016) reported that more than 46,000 twitter accounts were controlled by ISIS supporters to post violent materials and content to recruit new followers through YouTube, Google, Facebook, etc. The ease of access in virtual world has worsened this acute problem.

Even though there has been a research on radicalism and violence extremism in online media before, there hasn't been an academic research that focuses on how Indonesian social media user in producing and reproducing radicalism and violence extremism content. This research is intended to fill the void, through

analysis on the making, spreading and consumption of radical and violence extremism messages, by taking into consideration the macro geopolitics context from extreme ideologies and movements. Researchers, policy makers, and practitioners who are concerned about this domestic and global violence threat, need to reframe new approaches that are based on online media and social media.

Research Purpose:

To understand the role of website and social media in producing and spreading radical ideologies that support or refuse radicalism and violence extremism.

Research Focus

The focus of this research is:

- 1) The popularity of Muslim organization websites among internet surfers;
- 2) Response on websites for radicalism issues;
- 3) Social media response for radicalism issues;
- 4) Background and the motivation to create and spread radical message.

Research Method

The methods used on this research are:

1. Digital survey by using web-mining/web-scraping technique on 14 Muslim organization sites since January 1, 2016 to October 20, 2017
2. Web-mining on social media accounts (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter) that were found creating radical messages
3. Interviews with 10 (out of 14) editorial staff of Muslim organization websites

4. Interviews with 15 social media users (5 Facebook, 5 Instagram, 5 Twitter)
5. Focused Group Discussion (FGD) with stakeholders that consist of academician, religious leaders, government, entrepreneurs, Muslim mass organizations, and media

Outcome

The outcome of this research is the knowledge and understanding based on the newest field data (evidence-based knowledge) which will be used to suggest policy on innovative and creative efforts that are more effective, inclusive, and holistic to prevent and ward off radicalism and violence extremism, especially those on online media and social media in Indonesia.

Objects

1. Websites

There are 14 (originally 15) Islamic organizations websites as the resources of this researches, which represent 3 categories:

- a. Mainstream Islam Organization websites (affiliated with mainstream Islam organizations): NU Online (<http://nu.or.id>) and Muhammadiyah (<http://suaramuhammadiyah.id/>)
- b. Islamic websites that are affiliated with contemporary Islamic organizations: Forum Umat Islam (<http://www.suara-islam.com/>), Hidayatullah (<https://www.hidayatullah.com/>), Majelis Mujahidin (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/>), Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (<http://dewandakwah.or.id/>), Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran (<https://mta.or.id/>),
- c. Unaffiliated websites (independent using Islamic attributes): Portal Islam (<http://www.portal-islam.id/>), Era Muslim (<https://www.eramuslim.com/>), VOA-Islam (<https://www.voa-islam.com/>),

islam.com/), Muslim Moderat (<http://www.muslimoderat.net/>), Arrahmah (<https://www.arahmah.com/>), Thariquna (<http://www.thoriquna.id/>), Dakwatuna (<https://www.dakwatuna.com/>)

2. Social media

There are 3 social media platforms that are used as research object, which are: Facebook (FB), Instagram, and Twitter. According to *wearesocial.com*, current FB users have reached 2 billion users, and Indonesia ranks fourth worldwide with total users of 111 million. Instagram is the 3rd most used app worldwide with total users of 600 million. Twitter ranks 6th globally, with most users based in Indonesia.


Result summary

The research result can be described briefly as below:

1. The popularity of Islamic websites among internet users

The popularity of Islamic websites among internet users are based on the amount of views and website rank. The respective data is the result of rank count in Alexa (<https://www.alexa.com>) and SimilarWeb (<https://www.similarweb.com>), two sites that provide rank count service based on user traffics on respective websites. Alexa updates rank data every day, while SimilarWeb updates every month.

a. Amount of visits



Based on rank count in SimilarWeb, the highest amount of visits to Islamic Organizations Websites during July-September 2017 is made by Era Muslim, with a total visit of 9.521.000 or 3.173.000 a month. The most visited mainstream Islamic organization website is NU Online, with a total visit of 6.585.000 or 2.195.000 a month, while the most visited contemporary Islamic organization website is Hidayatullah, whose total visit amounts to 4.568.000 or 1.522.000 a month. Among the non-affiliated Islamic website, the most visited is Era Muslim, who gathers 9.521.000 visits or 3.173.000 month.

b. Website ranking

Data from Alexa was taken 2 times on October 9th and 29th 2017, while data from SimilarWeb was taken on October 28th and November 30th 2017. The comparison between data on October 9th and 29th 2017 shows that most Islamic websites had an increase on their visit counts. The highest spike happened in Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran website, which is 769. Websites that experienced a decrease in their visits are Arrahmah, Suara Islam, and Majelis Mujahidin. The highest ranked Islamic websites in Indonesia until October 29 2017, according to Alexa, was Portal Islam, which reached #473 on October 9 2017 or #463 on October 29 2017.

According to the data from SimilarWeb on October 28th 2017, the highest ranked Islamic website was Era Muslim, which reached #489 nationally and #22,825 globally. The 2nd highest was Portal Islam, which reached #532 nationally and #26,416 globally. According to the data taken on October 28th 2017 and November 30th 2017, Islamic websites that had a spike on their visits were Era Muslim, Portal Islam, NU Online, Hidayatullah, Muslim Moderat, and Dewan Dakwah. On the other side, the websites that had a decrease were VOA Islam, Dakwatuna, Arrahmah, Suara Islam, Suara Muhammadiyah, MTA, Thoriquna, and Majelis Mujahidin. The comparison between Alexa and SimilarWeb count shows that Alexa and SimilarWeb ranked differently on #1 and #2 (between Portal Islam and Era Muslim), #4 and #5 (between Hidayatullah and VOA-Islam), and #7, #8, #9 (among Muslim Moderat, Arrahmah, and Suara Islam). Both Alexa and SimilarWeb placed NU Online on #3 and Suara Muhammadiyah on #10.

2. Islamic organization websites responses on radicalism

Mainstream Islamic organization websites have been actively responding on radical phenomenon in the society and consistently

spreading messages of peace according to the missions of each organizations, as well as rejecting radical narration. The messages of peace in mainstream Islamic organization websites are well placed in both editorial column and their articles.


Most contemporary Islamic organization websites don't respond to radical phenomenon. They create contents that are related to their own activities. Websites function as a platform that spreads organization activities and events to the public. Therefore, contemporary Islamic organization websites don't actually respond to radical phenomenon in the society.

A part of non-affiliated Islamic organization websites support radical phenomenon. The support for radicalism reflects through a few key words, such as "establish khilafah!" and "Islamic Indonesian!" in which both implied anti-system. Phrases such as "Kill Ahok!" and "Kill priests!" also implied violence. Radical messages and hate speech are also found on parts of non-affiliated websites, especially Portal Islam, Era Muslim, and VOA-Islam.

3. Radicalism in Social Media

Amount of social media accounts as research objects reaches 437 accounts, which consists of 180 Facebook accounts, 200 Instagram accounts, and 57 Twitter accounts. Those accounts can be divided into 3 categories, which are: (1) accounts with real name, (2) accounts with fake name, and (3) accounts with group identity. The percentage of those three categories in each social media platforms is described in picture 4.


Picture 4: Account types in three social media platforms



- Facebook account with real name: own name or complete name like these accounts; *Irdiana Wahyuni, Fahmi Yahya Nuryanto, Stefanus Robby Cahyadi G, Andhika Saputra Ardhiansyah*, or real names in brackets such as *Apiek Danken (Moh Anwar Kholiq)*.
- Fake name accounts usually combine other people's names, made-up names, short names, and incomplete profile data. These accounts belong to the category above: *Cinta dan Anugrah, Tria Minoru, Kaum Kecebong, Jack, bravo, Mak Lambe Turah, and Ibnu Fulan* (now erased).
- The third one is usually Facebook accounts; these accounts' names use certain community or organization names such as *Ahmadiyah Menjawab Fitnah, Aliansi PNS Anti Korupsi, Pemuda Pancasila, Cyber Pancasila, Indonesia Menolak Syi'Ah*.

Just like in Facebook, most accounts in Instagram also use real identity as their username, such as @saraandriyani, @andria.fp, @sakina__ina, and @ikeramdhanaa. Accounts with fake names usually use made-up usernames that don't sound like a real name, such as @pakmadon, @conan_edogawa007, @cebong_otak_korengan, and @coklat_semut. Accounts with community/group names use usernames that reflects their own names, such as @forumberitaviral, @mediarakyat_, @rakyatbersuara11 and @generasi54.

In Twitter, accounts with real name are as such: @fahidaidris, @mochpramono, @mahendradatta, and @rizma_widiono. Accounts with fake usernames are: @DragonAries233, @GuruSocrates and @AyoMimin. Twitter accounts with community/group names are: @LaskarCyberMus1, @pengikut_ulama, and @TNasionalis. These accounts in these three platforms can be categorized into 4: (1) producer, (2) distributor, (3) producer and distributor, and (4) consumer. The percentage of each categories in three social media platforms are described in picture 5.



Picture 5: Percentage of roles in social media user on spreading radical message

Most social media users in all platforms don't give out complete information in their profile. From 437 social media users on three platforms, only 111 users (25,40%) explicitly tell their gender, 157 users (35.32%) tells where they live, and 48 users (11%) puts their education degree, while 0% writes their school name. From 111 users who expose their gender, 86 users (77%) are male and 25 users (23%) are female. From 157 users who tell where they live, 5 are from North Sumatra, 2 from West Sumatra, 1 from Riau, 2 from South Sumatra, 1 from Lampung, 67 from Jakarta, 11 from West Java, 4 from Banten, 21 from Central Java, 8 from Jogjakarta, 19 from East Java, 2 from West Kalimantan, 2 from South Kalimantan, 1 from East Kalimantan, 1 from Central Sulawesi, 1 from South Sulawesi, 1 from Bali, 2 from West Nusa Tenggara, 1 from East Nusa Tenggara, 1 from West Papua, and 1 from Papua. From 48 users who reveal their education, 15 graduated high school, 1 graduated vocational school, 27 undergraduates, 4 master degrees and 1 doctoral degree.

However, based on the interview result with social media activist, they learned about religion from books about history of the prophet (tarikh), Islamic jurisprudence, Youtube, and religious figure. Among popular religious figures in social media, the ones that are able to be identified through web-scraping are Yusuf Mansur, Abdullah Gymnastiar, and Felix Siauw.

Major Discoveries

1. Most Islamic organization websites that are popular among internet users are non-affiliated Islamic organization websites.
2. In responding to radical phenomenon in the society, Islamic organization websites have different stances.
 - a. Mainstream Islamic organization website consistently creates content that battles radicalism

- b. Contemporary Islamic organization websites are passive (not supporting, not fighting) radical phenomenon in the society.
 - c. Resources that are widely used in mainstream and contemporary Islamic organization websites are popular figures in their respective organizations.
 - d. Parts of non-affiliated Islamic organization website support radicalism.
 - e. Most Islamic organization websites that have high visit counts are non-affiliated websites.
3. Social media user responds to radicalism are:
 - a. Most social media users who create and spread radical content user fake names and community names.
 - b. Resources that are widely spoken of among social media users are not popular figures in mainstream Islamic organization websites.
 4. The motivations of social media users in creating, distributing, and consuming radical contents are: (1) wanting to make their social media accounts as a media to criticize government; (2) wanting to make their social media accounts to stop hoax or news that are not necessarily true; (3) wanting to make their social media accounts as da'wah media.

Implications

1. Contemporary and non-affiliated Islamic organization websites teams need to be reached to work together and get involved in peace-making efforts and fight radicalism that leads to violent extremism, with inclusive approach and non-violent methods.
2. To support peace-making efforts and fight radicalism, advocacy measures are needed, either related to media or internet etiquette (netiquette), especially for millennials.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**STRENGTHENED STUDENT
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES (OSIS)
IN ORDER TO STRENGTHENING
UNITY AND INCLUSIVENESS IN
BOTH PUBLIC AND ISLAMIC
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS**

Maarif Institute: for Humanity and Culture



Background

Ever since the culture of freedom and democracy has been getting over the last two decades in the wake of *Reformasi*, exclusive and radical religious thinking has been infiltrating formal institutions of education on a non-stop basis. Both private schools, specifically those operating under the auspices of religious institutions such as NU and Muhammadiyah, and public schools have become the object of infiltration by radical groups capitalizing on the weak outlook on nationalism.

Radical networks exploit the restricted knowledge students obtain on religion at school, compounded further by a strong sense of curiosity on the part of those students, in order to infiltrate schools with a radical understanding of religion that is nuanced with violence. Through Student Council—well known as OSIS—activities, religious activists and mentors with affiliations to radical organizations plant religious thoughts tinged with intolerance, exclusiveness, and anti-nationalism.

This turns ever more worrisome as teaching staff, specifically teachers of Islamic education and civics, are failing to demonstrate a proper level of capacity to playing a role in consolidating an ideology of nationalism and to spreading a religious understanding that is inclusive and tolerant. And which is further compounded by the lack of knowledge of teaching staff and school leaderships regarding the map of movements for intolerant and radical groups, resulting in an outlook and attitude that is permissive on part of school leaderships towards networks of radical movements and their activities implemented through school activities.

The combined effect of these processes has played a significant role in undermining the resistance of schools against the spreading of radical ideologies. So is there a scholastic contestation going on

between radical and moderate groups on the way OSIS is managed? How do schools interpret and implement regulations concerning the management of OSIS handed down by Jakarta that oftentimes are influenced by local government regulations? With regard to the potential for radical groups to penetrate schools, have school's special policies in place yet to ward off and anticipate such actions? How are unity values being internalized in the OSIS body, values that will have a bearing on its working programs? And are there good OSIS management practices in place at schools that are replicable for other schools or subnational regions?

The assessment's significance lies with the effort to identifying answers to those questions. Assessment results are expected to contribute and produce policy recommendations that are more directed, systematic, and implementable in order to thwart ideologies of violence in schools. More specifically, these expectations are based in the context of revitalizing OSIS-related policies and strengthening the role schools play in early detection of emerging radical networks and organizations by way of religious activities. Because it cannot be ruled out that failure to take policy steps more comprehensive in scope targeting scholastic OSIS activities would see educational and cultural activities at school help undermining a vision for and values of a pluralistic nationalism among school students all because of an erroneous understanding of what comprises OSIS's duties, mandates, and functions. It should be kept in mind that OSIS is there to promote character building, ensuring students to embrace unity and progress and to celebrate pluralism. It is therefore expected that recommendations given as part of the assessment would allow stakeholders to promote initiatives and strategies that instill students with a nationalism and a religion that are informed by values of tolerance and inclusiveness.

Methodology

The research applied a qualitative method in the collection of data by conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews. A total of six cities in Indonesia were selected as research sites, namely Padang City (West Sumatra, Cirebon District (West Java), Sukabumi District (West Java), Surakarta City (Central Java), Denpasar City (Bali), and Tomohon City (North Sulawesi). The districts/ cities were selected in consideration of distribution, typology, and their inherent characteristics.

By taking these considerations into account, 40 schools were selected as research samples (i.e. purposive sampling). The public/ Islamic senior high schools (SMAs/MAs) were exclusively selected based on references to past findings of schools showing prevalent intolerance and radicalism whereby a similar mapping exercise was to be done for MAs. Schools were selected based on the categories of being urban-rural, elite-non-elite, and homogeneous-heterogeneous.

From October 2-21, 2017, a total of 440 informants were interviewed as resource persons. They included principals, vice principals for student affairs, OSIS administrators, OSIS member and non-member students, school committees, and school supervisors for both SMAs and MAs. Others interviewed included individuals who could contribute additional input by building on the information provided by previous respondents (i.e. the snowballing process).

Key Findings

The research's title "Strengthened Student Development Policies (OSIS) in Order to Strengthening Unity and Inclusiveness in Both Public And Islamic Senior High Schools" contains four key words

that need defining, they are: policies, unity, inclusiveness, and radicalism.

In the context of this concept, policies are defined as regulations affecting the outlook and management of OSIS activities. This can be indicated from (1) regulations handed down from Jakarta and local governments, e.g. Minister of National Education Regulation (Permendiknas) 39/2008 concerning School Students' Development, and Instruction of the Mayor of Padang 451.442/Binsos-iii/2005 of 2005 concerning the Implementation of Teenage *Wirid* Sessions, Morning Prayers Teachings and Anti-Gambling/Drugs Sessions, and Muslim clothing for public/ Islamic elementary school, public/ Islamic junior high school, and public/ vocational/ Islamic senior high school students; (2) rules agreed upon in school residents meetings denoted within school regulations; (3) consensus on incidental affairs normally not thought of before and not denoted in regulations; and (4) habits bound by cultural hegemony.

Meanwhile, unity denotes a complete condition made up of religion, customs and traditions, and a plural historical heritage that is expected to have longevity provided that it continues to be revered and not be forsaken ever by anyone. This is indicated by: (1) Recognition as an aspect of tolerance, including, among others, access to places of worship, practices restricting certain groups, and the imposing of a value based on a specific belief; (2) Representation as a political aspect, including, among others, representation in OSIS and the right to run in OSIS elections; and (3) Redistribution as a social economic aspect, including, among others, access to school funds and access to scholarships.

Inclusiveness refers to an accommodativeness towards otherness that would allow for an openness of outlook and behavior towards things that are different, namely by (1) adopting a positive outlook

on difference and (2) building cooperation with people or groups that are different to work towards a common goal.

While radicalism refers to Martin F. Marty, and is often equated to fundamentalism, i.e. a social (political, economic, and religious) phenomenon that overlaps with matters pertaining to ideology or with action diametrically opposed towards those things that a group wishes to change. This is indicated by (1) refusal of the system in place, creating a sense that a fundamental change needs to be brought about; (2) an unwillingness to interpret religious texts; (3) an oppositeness towards ideas and attitudes that differ from theirs; and (4) if possible, a need to take control of the economic political systems and of religious beliefs.

Here the conceptualization is primed to serve as a springboard in order to explain the research findings. The following are the key findings obtained of the study:

A Contestation Between Radicalism and Moderatism

Radicalism infiltrates schools through three gateways, i.e. alumni, teachers, and school policies. Alumni gain access through extra-curricular activities. Five out of the six schools that made up the research sample for Surakarta, for instance, were managed by alumni whom are affiliated with Kriya Mandiri through liqa and halaqah activities. It is this tarbiyah leaning that is inherent to the organization that dominates the Islamic affairs (Rohis) activists in Surakarta. Similar situations were identified both in Padang and Sukabumi.

Teachers engage in indoctrination inside and outside the classroom. An English language teacher with SMAN 1 Jamblang, Cirebon, believes that the country is thagut, which he shares with his class. Because of this understanding, he has refused to pay fees

to the PGRI (Republic of Indonesia Teachers Association). At one time he even sent non-Muslim students of his to Islamic boarding school Ar-Royyan for failing his class.

School principals, out of ignorance, often make and pass policies that open the door wide open to intolerant and radical groups when seeking to strengthen the students' religious beliefs. SMAN 5 Surakarta, for instance, brought on board Islamic boarding school Darus Syhadah, Simo, Boyolali, often referred to as the real Al-Mukmin for its steadfast adherence to the principles and teachings of Abdullah Sungkar, to instruct its students.

The radicalism taking place at schools has been met with a response from religiously moderate groups. One place where this has happened is at SMAN 1 Plumbon, Cirebon. A Rohis volunteer at the school was approached by a female Muslim who had with her a stack of curricula for Islamic studies delineating topics about the Khilafah, the Islamic State, and ways of socializing according to Islam, and who engaged in advocacy activities by resorting to network organizations outside the school. To sever the ties of intolerance in embryo, potentially leading to radicalism, the Rohis volunteer initiated the establishment of the Nahdlatul Ulama Students Association (IPNU) and the Nahdlatul Ulama Female Students Association (IPPNU), in addition to engaging the Fahmina Institute, in order to provide Rohis with an intervention through the promotion of values of openness to achieve a greater degree of inclusiveness. However, this type of support often goes through many changes as school principals get replaced. The initiative that made a point of engaging the youth organization at the school is no longer making any waves because the principal has no grasp of the map of radical movements while at the same time the Rohis volunteer has been replaced.

The Forgotten State Authority

At the highest level is a set of regulations that act as an umbrella to OSIS activities, such as the ministerial regulation concerning students' development activities. These regulations constitute a legal umbrella that allow OSIS to play a role in the character development of students with an emphasis on unity and the celebration of pluralism. On the other hand, because the management and implementation of scholastic education fall under the responsibility of the local government, the local government too has produced a set of policies regulating OSIS-related activities. Oftentimes these conflict and even impede the implementation and operation of OSIS activities as outlined on the national level.

This overlap and ambiguity of OSIS umbrella regulations have led schools to reduce OSIS activities to pertain to religious strengthening only. As a result, many extra-curricular activities are now focused on religious activities only. The Character Education Program, initiated by the state in 2011, is oftentimes interpreted solely to the extent of ritual practices and the representation of a certain religion in a monolithic sense. This has contributed to the undermining of a vision and of values of a pluralistic nationalism among students.

This interpretation of the policy is seen as being highly discriminative or being irrelevant to minority groups. It's even seen as unsuitable for the needs of a public senior high school, a place which should be more exposed to the reality of difference. Take for instance the compulsory wearing of the hijab for all female students in Padang City. Though it was not made mandatory for non-Muslim students, in practice an indirect coercion is taking place. Due to peer pressure they feel compelled to wear the hijab; not wearing one would set them apart as being different among a Muslim majority.

A Vulnerable Resistance

The lack of understanding and awareness of schools regarding the map of radical movements have undermined the school residents' resistance mechanism against radicalism. So far, no specific school policies have been identified that would allow for early protection against the penetration of radical ideologies and movements. However, a number of schools have a resistance mechanism in place by way of (a) a Resource Persons Control and Filtering System. This mechanism has been applied at SMAN 6 Surakarta and a number of SMANs in Cirebon and involves the vetting of mentors or resource persons hired from outside the school. OSIS traces the track record and scientific capacity of a resource person and passes this information on to the Supervising Teacher and all the way up to the School Principal, and (b) an Early Detection System. Although being only a personal initiative, a teacher of Islamic education with SMAN 1 Plumbon, Cirebon, attempted to set up an early detection system by compiling a list of students' behavioral traits indicative of having been exposed to radical ideologies and movements, e.g. refusal to salute the national flag citing the thagut excuse.

Internalizing Values of Unity

The view that OSIS, through its student activities, is a scholastic catalyst has given OSIS administrators an edge when it comes to proposing programs. However, the transmission and translation of values of unity are oftentimes being restricted along primordial lines in the name of religion, with the support of the school. The idea of liyan or people of different religions and beliefs has oftentimes led OSIS to accommodate members of a certain religion, class, group, or even sex, with the support of teachers. Take for example SMAN 3 Denpasar, which is reluctant to involve non-Hindu students

in its OSIS management citing that the organization's main duty is to assist the school organizing religious ceremonies, and MAN 1 Padang, which says that women are unfit to lead.

Searching for a Resistance Model for Schools

The resistance model has a casuistic quality. Because it's effective at one particular school or in one particular subnational region, it doesn't necessarily mean it will do equally well elsewhere. The research identified the following scholastic resistance model:

1. Vetting of mentors as was previously mentioned in the "A Vulnerable Resistance" finding.
2. Encouraging students to learn from teachers, not off the Internet, as is promoted in SMAN 6 Surakarta.
3. Bringing teachers, parents, and students closer together by requiring X grade students to travel to school (SMAN 3 Surakarta) accompanied by their parents for a period of one year, to allow for a greater degree of involvement on the parents' side.
4. MAN 3 Sukabumi (Surade) established its own Islamic boarding school as a dispenser of a moderate view on religion in order to end the students' dependency on outside sources for information about religion.
5. SMAN 1 Plumbon, Cirebon, established a youth organization (IPNU and IPPNU) and engaged a moderate group (Fahmina Institute) in order to ward off radicalism, as is outlined in the "A Contestation Between Radicalism and Moderatism" finding.
6. A sociology teacher with SMAN 1 Jamblang, Cirebon, who also happens to be the school's Flag Hoisting Unit (Paskibraka) coach, firmly believes in the virtue of making field visits to places of worship as being the most realistic way of exposing students to the concept of unity.

7. A history teacher with SMA Kristen 1 Tomohon initiated field visits to historical sites, Waruga, and the Tondano Muslim Heroes' Cemetery in an effort to expose students to local wisdom and that "we are all brothers".
8. The Carnival of Unity wherein students don the traditional wear of national heroes of a different religion, ethnicity, culture, and subnational region is something the OSIS of SMAN 1 Cirebon District came up with.
9. Cirebon's Ministry of Religious Affairs played an active role by engaging a number of Islamic boarding schools as part of a capacity building exercise for teachers and students to ensuring a strengthened nationalistic viewpoint.
10. The Education Fund Allocation for the welfare of school teachers and principals is an initiative of the Education Service of Tomohon City to maximize the growth of a culture of tolerance and harmony at schools.
11. It has also organized in seminars addressing topical issues. One topical issue addressed during a seminar on Islamology in response to the *Aksi Bela Islam* in Jakarta, late 2016, emphasized the teaching of an Islam that abides by the principle of *Rahmatan lil 'Alamin* (pity for the entire world).

Recommendations

Research findings produced the following recommendations:

1. There is a need for the Ministry of Education and Culture (Kemendikbud) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag) to come up with regulations that allow for the engagement of moderate civil society groups that have a proven track record of developing and assisting values of tolerance, inclusiveness, and unity. Meanwhile, there is a need for Province Education Services,

Regional Offices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and schools to adopt a sense of fastidiousness when inviting and bringing on board groups that are to instruct students at schools, such as was the case in Cirebon District.

2. There is a need for Kemendikbud, Kemenag, and local stakeholders (Province Education Services and Kemenag Regional Offices) to reformulate and disseminate regulations concerning OSIS using straightforward language. This serves to avoid regulations passed at the national and subnational levels from overlapping.
3. There is a need for Kemendikbud, Kemenag, and local stakeholders (Province Education Services and Kemenag Regional Offices) to formulate a standard operating procedure (SOP) for early detection systems, complaint mechanisms, and radicalization response mechanisms at schools and for the standardization of mentors in OSIS activities.
4. There is a need to bring schools, parents, and students together to engage and socialize in cross-ethnic, -religion, -race, and -culture meetups as part of OSIS activities, which could take the form of inter-school dialogs by making a point of celebrating religious, ethnic, and cultural differences.
5. There is a need for schools to strengthen unity and an ideology of nationalism through school resistance models of which several have been identified under the research, e.g. making field trips to different religious and ethnic groups.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**ECONOMY OF THE YOUNGER
GENERATION AND COMBATING
TERRORISM IN INDONESIA**

**Research Center For The Middle East And Global Peace (PSTPG),
Faculty Of Social Sciences And Politics (FISIP),
State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta**



**PUSAT STUDI TIMUR TENGAH
DAN PERDAMAIAN GLOBAL**

Preface

The younger generation is faced with a strong challenge of identifying ways to curbing the effects of radicalism and terrorism. Ideologies of violence and terror make their way in through social and online media. Articles, Friday prayer sermons, and teaching materials available on the media abide predominantly by a radical jihadist ideology, pointing the way for the younger generation, specially school and university students, to an ever more radical understanding of religion. In a National Survey of PPIM UIN Jakarta involving school and university students in Indonesia, it was identified that 23.35% of the school and university students stated that “acts of terror in the form of suicide bombing is recognized in Islam,” and that 37.71% acknowledged that “jihad (*qital*) is an Islamic value aimed at non-Muslims.”⁸ A majority of the respondents (52.29%) consider the economy and the gap between the rich and poor to be extremely bad while 43.46% consider the economy to be in the doldrums. Radical thoughts and views among school and university students serve as potential material and a target for radical and terrorist groups to enlist in pro-violence movements.

Law 40/2009 concerning Youth Affairs defines the younger generation as “Indonesian citizens aged 16-30 years” (BPS 2015). The younger generation numbers approximately 65 million persons or approximately 25% of the total population of Indonesia. UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) stated that in Asia Pacific the younger generation aged 15-24 years totals in excess of 750 million persons or approximately 60 percent of the total number of the younger generation globally.⁹ They

8 PPIM, “Api Dalam Sekam Keberagamaan Gen Z: Survei Nasional Tentang Keberamaan Di Sekolah Dan Universitas di Indonesia” (Ciputat: Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta, 2017).

9 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Youth in Asia-Pacific | United Nations ESCAP,” accessed March 12, 2018, <http://www.unescap.org/resources/youth-asia-pacific>.

decide the future of Indonesia and that of Asia Pacific countries.

This research assesses the experiences of young people who formerly were terrorists and combatants and who transformed themselves into community leaders and ended up persuading hundreds of youths and other former terrorists to abandon the path of violence. Support from the BNPT, the Ministry of Social Affairs, local governments, and business groups at the district, city, and province levels has boosted their self-confidence in bringing change and providing benefit to the community. The research looks also into the importance of securing Indonesia's border territories with neighboring countries Malaysia and the Philippines.

Method

The study comprises interviews with over one hundred respondents, FGDs, and field observations in Nunukan (North Kalimantan), Poso (Central Sulawesi), Solo (Central Java), Lamongan (East Java), and Medan (North Sumatra) conducted over a period spanning between 1 August 2017 and 29 January 2018.

Respondents interviewed included school students, university students, youth and campus activists, community-based organizations, NGOs, entrepreneurs, local government services, and ministries and institutions in Jakarta that have relevance to the "Program Assessment of the Economy of the Younger Generation and Combating Terrorism in Indonesia."

This study sets out to understand and evaluate government policies passed through the BNPT and the relevant ministries to bring about economic empowerment as an approach to and a mechanism for preventing and combating terrorism. The research's argument is that an economics approach is effective to preventing the younger generation from engaging in terrorism. The main

takeaway from the research is the importance of bringing about economic empowerment in a systematic and sustainable fashion through the cooperation and involvement of all stakeholders.

The Younger Generation and Counter-Terrorism

The younger generation, specifically former terrorist convicts and former combatants, is determined and committed to change and to substitute the violence experience of terrorism and conflict for economics. The government, specifically the police force (Densus 88) and the BNPT, has engaged in a preliminary initiative to countering terrorism using an economics approach. As an initiative, it has a short term outlook and limited funding. Capital assistance ended up in fact becoming consumption.

The presence of ministries, services, and local entrepreneurs in economic empowerment initiatives targeting the younger generation does indeed bear significance, notably with regard to the underwriting of assistance and support needed to ensuring longer term and sustainable productivity. The younger generation here include those with past involvement in acts of terrorism, acts of conflict, and other acts of crime.

The Younger Generation and Border Security

The younger generation is facing a challenge of having to deal with a slow economy and with security issues in border territories. The dependency on commodities from neighboring country Malaysia continues to be a specter, and there are concerns this could undermine love for the fatherland and nationalism. Therefore, compared to other subnational regions, the younger generation in Nunukan District and Sebatik Island have been exposed more intensively to national defense training.

They are also facing pressure from international drugs traffickers that operate over the geographically extensive border routes traversing Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Seventy percent of the youth incarcerated in Nunukan District had been convicted of drugs trafficking charges. They also worked in oil palm estates in Sabah, Malaysia, albeit illegally.

In addition, they had offered their services as a guide for such transnational terrorist movements as JI and ISIS. At a multistakeholder FGD at the Kesbangpol offices of Nunukan District, the following was shared: “Two out of ten Indonesians hail from Nunukan and have been involved in acts of terrorism in Marawi, south of the Philippines.” They enter through official harbor entrances.

The Younger Generation, the Economy, and Peace

Economic empowerment in Poso, Central Sulawesi, abides by a different set of functions and roles. As a post-conflict region, the younger generation has been exposed to the complexities of conflict trauma, slow investment and development growths, and lingering social segregation.

NGO activists, the national government, and local government continue roll out training courses and hand out capital in a restricted fashion. The younger generation--former Poso combatants--have been starting to build the economy independently without being dependent on government assistance.

Working in groups, they engage in community building to develop plantations and agriculture, entrepreneurship, and other productive activities. The presence of the government and the community in their economics program will ensure they will keep strong and sustainable in promoting entrepreneurship and building

independency. It is expected that productive activities would engage youth cross-ethnically and cross-religiously in the effort of building a more permanent peace in Poso.

Multi-stakeholders

The local government and services in Solo and Lamongan have been playing a more involved role in their approach and empowerment of youth productive activities as a part of preventing and combating terrorism and radicalism.

Youth productive programs in Medan, North Sumatra, do not focus on addressing terrorism and radicalism. As a metropolis, cross-ethnic, -region, and -religion youth are familiar with productive activities. Islamic boarding school Al-Hidayah, a rehabilitation and deradicalization center for children formerly involved in terrorism and for those who could potentially become exposed to terrorist movements, is the brainchild of Densus 88 and BNPT but does not receive sufficient support from the local government and local stakeholders.

Challenges

The biggest obstacle encountered in youth economic empowerment activities is the ever strong sectoral egos evident among ministries, government institutions, Jakarta, local governments, and services. Addressing terrorism and radicalism among the younger generation requires a concerted collaboration of all government and community stakeholders. The 2018 National Action Plan for the Prevention of Extremism (RAN-PE) of the BNPT engages 32 ministries and government institutions, and represents a baseline to keeping sectoral egos in check and to start thinking of the interest of the nation and the community.

The Indonesian Muslim Community remains divided on the dangers and threats radicalism and terrorism pose to the younger generation. Even the chairperson of Muhammadiyah's youth arm still thinks of the "terror event in Medan as a ploy to divert attention from political issues going on in Jakarta." The New Order style argument, in that the acts of terror committed by youth in Medan, Lamongan, Solo, Poso, and Jakarta were part of a conspiracy, has the effect of fragmenting the community's view on ways to proceed in addressing the radicalism and terrorism challenge of Indonesia.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Economic empowerment is an effective way to prevent terrorism. The youth community, including former terrorist convicts, has engaged in economics strengthening initiatives in Lamongan, Solo, and Medan. They have successfully managed to curb the influence terrorist groups have over community members thanks to the assistance from and productive activities implemented by the government (BNPT and Ministries) and the community.

The BNPT cannot by itself implement productive programs for the youth as part of preventing and combating terrorism; synergy and cooperation are needed on part of all the stakeholders: ministries and state institutions, the national government and local governments, the business world, and the community.

This research has been put forward for recommendation to the BNPT, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs in order to strengthening the economy of the younger generation as a way to curb radicalism, terrorism, and other acts of crime commonly associated with this group. There is also a need for the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Research and Technology-Higher Education, and the Ministry of

Religious Affairs to shed more attention to the younger generation's economy. More strongly guided training and instruction activities will provide them with an edge when competing in the regional job market part of the ASEAN Economic Community.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
PROGRAMS IN EXTREMIST
DOMINATED BORDER AREAS**

**Institute For Research And Community Service (LP2M)
The State Islamic Institute (IAIN) Manado**



**Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian
Pada Masyarakat (LP2M)**

Background

There are several regulations to confirm the importance of the border areas' development. One of them is the President Regulation number 44 year 2017. This regulation revokes the authority of BNPP (National Institution of the Border Areas Administration), an institution that was formerly given tasks to administer in the border areas and gave it to related ministries and local governments. According to the regulation, the social economy empowerment programs in the border areas are intersectoral.

Border areas have different social economy problems compare to other areas. Illegal business, human trafficking, isolated community, weak law enforcement, low education, and poor health services are among social economy issues at the border areas.

The national government determines to develop Indonesia from the fringes, territorial and villages to strengthen the NKRI (Unified Country of Republic Indonesia). However, infrastructure development is still the main priority. So far, the social economy empowerment programs in the border areas are very limited. The limited programs are still centralistic, political and unrelated to the efforts of counter violent extremism.

Methodology

This report is based on the assessment of social economic empowerment programs in extremist dominated border areas which includes field research, FGD, research finding seminar, Serial Engagement Meeting I and II, and policy brief dissemination in the border areas of 1) Kepulauan Sangihe, North Sulawesi, 2) Nunukan, North Kalimantan, and 3) Batam, Kepulauan Riau.

Assessment Result

The social economic empowerment programs in the border areas ranging from 1) providing tools for fishery, marine, farming and industry, 2) giving trainings of production, processing, packaging, quality control and marketing, 3) licencing of business and economic activities, 4) establishing business centres, 5) giving training for enhancing the entrepreneurship awareness, 6) tourism conscious, 7) providing discounted staple logistic through discounted market, 8) providing free transportation services for staple goods, 9) assisting and counselling service, 10) providing of the national flag to fishermen in the border areas.

The assessment result of LP2M IAIN Manado shows that every program has strength and weakness. The weaknesses of the programs include poor program information, poor representative of social groups in terms tribes, religions and races, unselected participants, poor coordination between programs' implementers and other related institutions, change and unsustainability of programs' implementation, unachieved post-programs economic activity enhancement, program inability to solve the community major problems.

However, LP2M considers the training programs for seaweed processing and cultivation in Nunukan, North Kalimantan as one of the best practices of social and economic empowerment programs in the border areas. This program is the best because, first, it gives opportunity to many people, secondly, to utilize the sea as an economic resource of seaweed business, which, thirdly, has good marketing that it, fourthly, increases people's welfare in Nunukan.

The assessment result of the LP2M IAIN Manado also shows that the social economic empowerment programs has not been

connected to counter violent extremism in the border areas. Meanwhile, the counter violent activism in the areas heavily focus on capturing and preventing the extremist suspects to travel in and out of the border areas. Other activities of counter violent extremism in the border areas are increasing neighbourhood security system through updating workers, visitors, and fugitive data, and increasing community alert by involving media to give alert and awareness about threats of extremism and asking for participation of local and religious leaders in eliminating intentions emerged from jihad interpretation and a conspiracy theory toward Muslims.

The limited social economic empowerment programs in the border areas that is connected to counter violent extremism due to the fact that few residences of the border areas involve directly in extremism activity and that they mainly act as companion to extremists from other areas. Whereas the social economy empowerment programs which is connected to the counter violent extremism in Indonesia is provided to terrorist convicts and combatants.

Border areas are used more as a traffic lane for extremists' movement rather than as a recruiting post. This lane for extremists' movement is also a lane of trading long existed between people in border areas and neighbouring countries. People who live in the lane international trading are necessary involve in the counter violent extremism. Their involvement in this movement can be conducted by coordinating social economic empowerment programs provided by government and non-governmental institutions with organizations leading the counter violent extremism such as BNPT (National Body for Counter Terrorism) and Police Department.

The provision of social economic empowerment programs in the traffic lane of extremism movement will increase people's consciousness of the state's roles and functions. Mutual and

beneficial relationship between state and people in the extremism movement traffic lane not only will increase public trust toward state but also achieve the economic justice in the border areas and increase people's participation in counter violent extremism. Besides, a certain number of financial awards, scholarships awards, home makeover, and or granting status as government officials to people who assist counter violent extremism directly can be initiated to increase people's participations in counter violent extremism.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
PROGRAMS IN EXTREMIST
DOMINATED BORDER AREAS**

**Daya Makara Universitas Indonesia (UI) –
Division of Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR)**



Background

The many deradicalization programs implemented by both public and private institutions have yet to show significant results. In fact, the dissemination of radical thought continuous unabatedly in the general public, including among inmates. In view of this situation, it is only proper for all parties to join forces, formulate the issue, and identify a solution to address the issue.

Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) – Daya Makara UI, working in cooperation with the Research Center for Islam and the Community (PPIM) of Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Indonesia, has assessed a number of deradicalization programs implemented by institutions at correctional institutions.

Methodology

The research employs qualitative methods such as interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) in the data collecting process. We interviewed individuals directly involved in deradicalization programs, including people with implementing institutions, correctional institution officers, and inmates formerly enrolled in the programs. Through the interviews and FGDs, the research obtained an impression and was allowed to evaluate the program's degree of effectiveness and successfulness. Interviews and FGDs took place separately both in terms of venue and time over approximately a two-month period from mid-October to late November 2017.

Assessment's Respondents

Three target groups sharing different backgrounds were recruited as respondents to the assessment:

1. Four non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that implemented deradicalization programs for former terrorist convicts at correctional institutions: the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (YPP), Search for Common Ground (SFCG), UNICRI, and the CDS.
2. Four correctional institutions (Lapas) housing terrorist convicts and that have worked together with other institutions in the implementation of deradicalization programs: Lapas Cibinong, Lapas Pasir Putih, Lapas Cipinang, and Lapas Kedungpane.
3. Inmates formerly enrolled in deradicalization programs and living in one of the research correctional institutions.

Findings

The assessment's key findings can be summed up as follows: there is no proper coordination in place among organizations implementing deradicalization programs at correctional institutions, be they government institutions, NGOs, or research institutions. This consideration is of vital importance as coordination of program planning, funding, and implementation very much make up the fabric to the blueprint for the management of terrorist convicts.

"Let's not do the discussion, let's just stick to the assessment. They are wise even to the profiling bit: numbers 1 and 5 never fail to ask this question, they know this because of repetition. They have been informed beforehand, so they have memorized it" (Lapas Cipinang staff member).

Another finding of the assessment is that there is no clear governmental decision as to which party has the ultimate authority and responsibility in the implementation of deradicalization programs at correctional institutions. In the field, there is a dualism of authority present between the National Counter-Terrorism Body (BNPT) and the Directorate General for Rehabilitation (Dirjenpas)

of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights Affairs (Kemenkumham). This has implications on the line of communication under deradicalization programs implemented at correctional institutions by external parties, e.g. NGOs and research institutions.

“Procedure-wise everything must indeed receive the go-ahead of Dirjenpas. There must be first an MoU in place with the Dirjenpas. Dirjenpas acts like a single gateway. Although there are some, like the other day--. I’ll just go ahead and mention names. It was PRIK. At first when they would come over, they’d be accompanied by someone from Dirjenpas” (Lapas Semarang staff member)

As for the capacity of correctional institution officers, there is a lack of uniformity in terms of implementation directives and in terms of individual criteria applied to civil police officers as counselors for terrorist convicts. This could potentially lead to a differential in effectiveness among deradicalization programs implemented at each correctional institution. Civil police officers are not selected based on capacity, but are rather appointed directly by the correctional institution’s head. Furthermore, they don’t have a clear career structure. Even if they are burdened with a greater degree of risk, e.g. receiving threats from convicts and their affiliated networks or becoming exposed to radical teachings.

“Civil police have not been made part of the structure just yet, they are simply appointed by the correctional institution’s head without using clear criteria. There is no structure, and there’s no incentive plan. It’s not clear, and they actually have my sympathy.” (Dirjenpas staff member)

In terms of the technical aspect of deradicalization programs, there is a need to inquire into the demography of terrorist convicts housed at each correctional institution to ensure proper targeting. The degree of effectiveness for and response of terrorist convicts

towards deradicalization programs differ from one deradicalization program theme to another, if compared to other themes. In addition, because of a lack of coordination among program implementing organizations, terrorist convicts cannot be monitored for the long run once they are transferred around correctional institutions.

“Rehabilitation should be about dialog. Have them become part of the solution, don’t just cover the economy side of things. It’s only a handful who are still wanting economy-wise. But to us who are single-minded, it’s not just about the economy. Even though I have never been rich, even though I’ve always lived in poverty, I have never thought about economics. What’s important is what the counseling can bring to the boarding school, how it can benefit the Islamic community. Creating an Islamic environment.” (A terrorist convict at Lapas Cibinong)

Additionally, selecting the themes that are interesting enough to ensure program attendance by terrorist victims requires a focus and represents a challenge in and of itself. From the research it can be concluded that terrorist convicts tend to refrain from discussion topics that contest one ideology against another, and if they do participate it would simply be to facilitate the obtaining of a remission or parole.

“The first thing that comes up in my mind is sustainability, what comes next after the activity. It’s normal for the guys to hold an activity once, twice a month, while our interaction with the idea isn’t exactly a short-term project. Isn’t that so? We’re in here for the long haul and have been wrestling with it for a long time. We, and also the guys, would like to engage in discussions with people of different convictions so that despite what we believe, what we understand today, we can open ourselves up to new things and perhaps take into consideration input from others or perhaps we could give ours to others based on what we understand, so in that way we can complement each other. If it were up to us guys, we are open for

discussion, if God wills it. But not to force any belief on anyone. it's not about forcing one's beliefs, the principle is to discuss, it's not about bringing your truths to the table and to stake out your turf. This is what you should understand because the things that we discuss among our ulema are not things that are fixed in *ushul*, but rather just tributaries. (A terrorist convict at Lapas Cipinang)

“So if you want to discuss, let's go and discuss. We have proposed this many times to the powers that be at the BNPT, whom probably are better off facility-wise to organize events like these so that we can do it on a live platform, to let others in on it, to keep things in the open. The truth that we have carried all this time is that of the religion of Islam. It is our desire to anchor any and all of our actions in the teachings of Islam. According to what we understand. If we turned out to be wrong, okay, let's talk it over with ulema from other organizations. Bring them over, inform us, but don't force anything on anyone. Don't force each other things. Let's just discuss.” (A terrorist convict at Lapas Cipinang).

A participant of the assessment program, Search for Common Ground, offered a new paradigm to the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program rolled out at correctional institutions: 1) inclusive programs that are not only meant for terrorist convicts but also for inmates convicted for other crimes, and (2) raising training topics that are non-confrontational to the ideological beliefs of convicted terrorists. Based on the findings, the research team decided to support the Conflict Management Training (CMT) and the Life Management Training (LMT) initiatives implemented by Search for Common Ground at a number of correctional institutions in Indonesia as a best practice for deradicalization programming at correctional institutions.

“Perhaps it's the inmates who lack the courage to interact or to speak out. But during the Common Ground event everyone talked

about what they wanted once they're back free or while doing time." (A terrorist convict at Lapas Cipinang).

"Common Ground runs the CMT-LMT programs. Conflict Management Training. Management training. It was well received by the inmates here. They can explore the program's ins and outs. They're even interested in the module. They are interested to take and apply the module in the outside world." (Lapas Semarang staff member)

Recommendations

Based on the assessment that we have done, we recommend the following policies to stakeholders, notably the BNPT and Kemenkumham:

1. Key Stakeholders to Deradicalization Programs at Correctional Institutions

There is a need for stakeholders to book a legal umbrella that sets out parties holding the primary authority and responsibility in the management of terrorist convicts living in correctional institutions. This is important because it's expected to be able to prevent miscoordination in the implementation of deradicalization programs. The legal umbrella also regulates lines of communication deployed among program implementing partners and as well as the broad outlines of syllabuses for counseling plans for terrorist convicts. The Directorate General for Rehabilitation plays a key role in this regard, and it is for that reason that DASPR Daya Makara UI recommended the directorate as a key stakeholder in the management of terrorist convicts and deradicalization programs implemented both internally or with the involvement of other institutions.

2. Capacity Building of Correctional Institution Staff Members

It is a fact that a capacity disparity exists among correctional institution staff members for counseling terrorist convicts, and that there is a

concern on part of the staff to the exposure they receive from radical ideologies. This has resulted in DASPR Daya Makara UI recommending parties from governmental elements with an interest in the matter to prepare and implement capacity building programs for correctional institution staff members to counsel terrorist convicts. Capacity building can take the form strengthened understanding of radical teachings and how to counteract these, or increased knowledge on and skills for counseling terrorist convicts outside ideological aspects. In addition to capacity building, correctional institution staff members interacting with terrorist convicts in person--referred to as *pamong* (civilian police)--are incorporated officially into the personnel structure of correctional institutions and provided with the incentives and responsibilities that come with the job.

3. Deradicalization Programs: Technicalities and Content

The formats and themes rolled out under radicalization programs for implementation at correctional institutions vary widely. As do their degree of effectiveness. DASPR Daya Makara UI recommends the increase of programs that have the following qualities:

- Inclusiveness; engaging convicts in general

- Corresponding to the demographic circumstance of terrorist convicts at each respective correctional institution

- Refrain from polarizing Islamic ideologies

- Have specific goals in the counseling of certain behavior

Based on the assessment, it's noteworthy to mention that the government supports the Conflict Management Training – Life Management Training (CMT-LMT) activity pioneered by Search for Common Ground as a program that deserves to be continued and maintained under deradicalization programs implemented at correctional institutions as assessed by the DASPR Daya Makara UI team.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**AN ASSESSMENT OF
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
OF FORMER TERRORIST
CONVICTS AND COMBATANTS
IN GREATER JAKARTA,
LAMONGAN, AND POSO**

**Peace Indonesia Alliance (AIDA)
Indonesian Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI)**



Introduction

The collaboration built between Peace Indonesia Alliance (AIDA) and the Indonesian Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI) resulted in an assessment of economic empowerment programs for former terrorist convicts and combatants in Greater Jakarta, Lamongan, and Poso. Supported by the Research Center for Islam and the Community (PPIM) of UIN Jakarta and the United Nations for Development Programme (UNDP), the activity was titled “Assessment of Existing Economic Skills-Oriented Program for Former Terrorist Convicts with Policy Recommendation on Economic Empowerment for Former Terrorist Convicts and Support for Best Practices.”

The assessment targets economic empowerment programs for former terrorist convicts and combatants in Indonesia and focuses on the beneficiaries’ degree of radicalization. A good intervention program should measure/ evaluate the beneficiaries’ degree of radicalization prior to program delivery. The purpose is to solicit baseline information that will later on serve as a benchmark or a reference point for the monitoring and evaluation of progress and effectiveness achieved during and after program implementation. Building on the initial thesis that increased productive capacity will bring about decreased radicalism, the second variable focused upon is economic status. This evaluation of economic empowerment programs was carried out to identify the extent interventions have impacted former terrorist convicts and combatants in Indonesia.

Methodology

This is a descriptive research of which purpose it is to obtain an overview of the impacts economic interventions have had. The research applies an *ex post facto* approach wherein data as an

analytical unit (respondents' characteristics) have been in place before the research is conducted.

In this research what is meant by economic programs are cash and non-cash economic assistance programs. Cash assistance is assistance in the form of hard cash (hard money) and special cash (in-kind). Meanwhile, economic assistance in the form of non-cash takes the form of economic training (both for hard skill and soft skill competences). In terms of material, training courses can be divided into two types: pure economic training, and mixed training whereby entrepreneurship material is mixed with deradicalization material.

The research population is made up of former terrorist convicts and combatants in Indonesia that at one time participated in economic empowerment programs. The research employs a non-probability sampling method whereby not all individuals of the population share the same opportunity to be sampled. The technique was resorted to considering the impossibility to cover the entire population and the restricted availability of data for former terrorist convicts and combatants that at one time received assistance. Samples were selected based on accessibility during data collecting.

The main variable measured under the research was economic impact measured from present employment and income, and the degree of radicalization. The population of research respondents was made up of former terrorist convicts and or former combatants whom were in the past beneficiaries of both cash and non-cash assistance. Terrorist convicts are defined as those individuals who were involved in armed communal conflicts, e.g. in Ambon, Poso, and even in Mindanao, the Philippines, but whom were never involved in the criminal act of terrorism. Data collecting and processing employed both a qualitative and a quantitative (mixed) approach.

The research used a radicalism questionnaire as a measuring tool to gauge the respondents' degree of radicalization, which is formulated in an independent fashion according to the deradicalization challenges faced in Indonesia. Also used as measuring tools to indicate the impact of economic programs were Subjective Well-Being Scale and Domain Life Satisfaction Scale, and the measurement of economic status adopted from economic censuses. Data processing was done quantitatively using descriptive and correlational statistics in order to obtain an overview of the beneficiaries' degree of radicalization and economic status.

Data collecting employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches by means of questionnaires, interviews, and observations. Interviews were held with beneficiaries of economic programs and with program implementing organizations. The sample size of beneficiaries was 38 former terrorist convicts and former combatants who at one time received economic assistance, and who hailed from three territories: Greater Jakarta, Lamongan, and Poso. Breakdown: 11 former terrorist convicts from Greater Jakarta, 17 former terrorist convicts and former combatants from Lamongan, and 10 former terrorist convicts and former combatants from Poso. Meanwhile, 12 organizations have delivered economic programming to the participants. They include government institutions such as the BNPT and the local government of Poso, and CSOs such as YPP, PRIK, UI, IMC2, etc. BNPT is the largest entity to deliver economic assistance. Data collecting lasted from August to November 2017.

Research Results

Research results indicate findings regarding the implementation of economic and direct cash assistance programs, which can then be

used as evaluation tools for the implementation of deradicalization programs.

Program Evaluation and Measurement (Assessment)

Nearly across the board in terms of program implementation a fundamental weakness can be identified that causes programming to deviate from the set course. This key weakness is due to the fact that no proper baseline and final measurements are made of the beneficiaries of economic assistance.

The object of measurement and evaluation is the participants' degree of radicalization and the economic capacity. The inadequacy referred to here is the fact that a majority of assistance delivery institutions failed to conduct baseline and final evaluations and measurements. Some organizations conducted baseline measurements and evaluations, but failed to do so at the end of the program. This is despite the fact that the activity is important to measure programmatic impacts and successfulness.

Correlation Between Programming and Degree of Radicalization

The study did not identify a correlation to exist between the number of purely economic training courses and the degree of radicalization. This means that the quantity of training courses delivered does not have a bearing on the increasing or decreasing of the participants' degree of radicalization. On the other hand, a negative correlation was identified to exist between the number of economic training courses delivered and the delivery of cash assistance combined with deradicalization material, with the degree of radicalization. However, the findings are not final yet because a bias exists with regard to the respondents as beneficiaries of the economic programs implemented by either the BNPT or CSOs, whom have been preselected by way of direct appointment based

due to their already reduced degree of radicalization.

This can be deduced from the fact that 21 former terrorist convicts as program beneficiaries have become disengaged or have shown to have a low degree of radicalization. During the period they were incarcerated in correctional institutions, the convicts showed themselves to be cooperative and when they submitted a parole request they were prepared to meet the requirements of swearing loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and being prepared to serve as justice collaborators. The same applied to 17 former combatants, whom have associated themselves with former terrorist convicts that have demonstrated disengagement. Take for instance the former combatants from Lamongan who have become Lingkar Perdamaian activists under the auspices of Ali Fauzi.

Program's Degree of Successfulness

A majority of participants have yet to successfully transform the cash and the in-kind assistance into productive capital. Only 2% or seven individuals have managed to transform the cash or in-kind assistance (i.e. capital expenditure) into productive, economic capital. The seven persons had own businesses before, and the cash assistance was used to increase their capital. Delivery of economic assistance becomes useful to a participant's productive activities when the beneficiary already has a business in place prior to receiving the assistance.

The research indicates there to be a lack of correlation between economic training and the perceived economic benefits derived from the program. Meaning, the delivered economic training courses failed to address the participants' economic needs. One way this can be explained is that the training courses were not designed based

on an evaluation and measurement of the participants' needs.

A positive correlation was identified to exist between cash and in-kind assistance delivered with the perceived economic benefits obtained. The perceived economic benefits do not represent the participant's economic objective, e.g. increased earnings following receipt of cash assistance. According to the participants, the greater the assistance delivered, the more economic benefits are derived. Cash assistance is considered to be more useful than economic training courses. They furthermore consider cash assistance to be far more beneficial than economic training courses.

The fact no correlation exists between training and perceived economic benefits is because of the lack of proper delivery of technical assistance and monitoring and evaluation (M & E). A total of 55% or 21 individuals claimed to have received technical assistance and M & E input, although by technical assistance they refer to assistance that's restricted to the delivery of cash assistance or the delivery of technical assistance in the procurement of goods to be used as capital (i.e. capital expenditure). Afterwards participants had not received assistance or M & E inputs again. As a result, cash or capital expenditure received have on the whole become unproductive.

Potential for Radicalism

Deradicalization programs concern themselves with reducing degrees of radicalization, which in turn has linkage to increasing hope, perceived quality of life, and perceived aspects of life presently. This can be explained as follows: because the correlation works in both directions, and is not a causality, the fact that the beneficiaries of deradicalization programs are respondents that have demonstrated from the outset a reduced degree of radicalization needs to be taken

into account. For now it is assumed that deradicalization programs are beneficial to combatants/ former terrorist convicts of whose degree of radicalization have been low from the outset anyway.

Although all participants have reached the disengagement stage and have declared terrorism as having lost its legitimacy in Indonesia, a total of 65.8% or 25 individuals remain potentially vulnerable to resorting back to violence if a specific condition was met. Namely, in the event a communal conflict, such as the one in Poso and Ambon, should take place and claim Muslim victims, they are prepared to again commit acts of violence. Based on the findings it can be concluded that communal conflicts can act as a trigger for spontaneous recovery, causing a person to suddenly relapse into an old behavior long abandoned.

Recommendations

1. To produce economic programs capable of reducing degrees of radicalization, it is key to combine economic intervention with deradicalization activities or ideological interventions designed to reduce the participants' degree of radicalization.
2. To produce an economic program that would give off economic benefits and reduce degrees of radicalization to a maximum extent, three program stages are called for:
 - a) Pre-intervention activities in the form of evaluations and measurements or baseline studies done for the prospective participants. During pre-intervention activities, evaluations and measurements are done for the prospective participants, beginning with the measuring of the degrees of radicalization, the economic circumstances by means of economic instruments, and the entrepreneurial competences of the prospective participants. Competences of the prospective

participants need to be measured to identify their capacity for entrepreneurship. Baseline studies like these are important not only to identify the correct interventions, but also to produce data that will help monitor and evaluate the degrees of successfulness of economic interventions implemented.

- b) Interventions. Programs would commence with ideological interventions to reduce the participants' degree of radicalization. Following the interventions, the degree of radicalization is again evaluated and measured to identify the extent of economic assistance that is to be delivered. This second measurement of the degree of radicalization is compared against the baseline. It serves to concurrently evaluate the impact the ideological interventions have. Next, training in entrepreneurship and direct cash assistance, or in-kind assistance, are delivered. During the training in entrepreneurship, ideological interventions must be delivered continuously to make sure the training does indeed reduce the degree of radicalization.
- c) Entrepreneurial assistance and monitoring and evaluation. Business mentoring or providing technical assistance becomes key to participants, specifically to helping them address issues in the field. In many cases, cash assistance failure or capital expenditure not translating into productivity is due because participants finding it difficult to address the many issues encountered in the field to finally give up midway. During the mentoring process, ideological intervention activities must be kept up to keep on reducing the participants' degree of radicalization. Mentoring and monitoring activities are concluded with an evaluation. Evaluation activities encompass the evaluation of successful economic interventions and

ideological interventions by means of economic tools and tools designed to measure degrees of radicalization. The final results will then be compared against the baseline with regard to economic capacity and the participants' degree of radicalization.

3. During when the program is ongoing it is key to build connections among the participants with local economic institutions, government institutions, moderate groups, and victims of terrorism. This is not only important to facilitate monitoring and to assist the participants dealing with business hurdles along the way, but will also be useful to the deradicalization effort and the social reintegration of the participants in local communities.
4. There is a need for the government to implement a broad range of efforts to prevent communal conflict, e.g. the sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Poso. The reason is because communal conflict acts as a trigger to spontaneous recovery whereby participants that have undergone disengagement suddenly find themselves involved again in acts of violence.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**REVITALIZING THE BOY
SCOUT MOVEMENT AND
THE KARANG TARUNA
NEIGHBOURHOOD
ASSOCIATION TO WARD OFF
EXTREMISM-VIOLENCE**

**Paramadina Institute Of Ethics And Civilization (PIEC)
Universitas Paramadina**



Background

Both the Boy Scout Movement and the Karang Taruna neighborhood association have a long history as youth organizations. Both contribute greatly to cultivating a spirit of nationalism and a love for nature (Pramuka), and a spirit of creativity and productivity (Karang Taruna).

However, ever since *Reformasi* the exploits of Pramuka and Karang Taruna have taken a setback. Pramuka, for instance, is lacking popularity with school students. A 2016 survey by Setara Institute identified that Pramuka is popular with only 11.2% of the students and is placed third after sports and Islamic affairs (rohis). The same goes for Karang Taruna. Karang Taruna organizations in the subnational regions that were once active have lost their vigour and some can be said to be even in suspended animation.

An assessment research conducted by PIEC (2017) indicated two main underlying factors to the phenomenon. First, the political liberalization that has taken place in the wake of *Reformasi* have given birth to a plethora of political parties and ever increasing political activity both in Jakarta and the national regions. It has proven to be a big lure for a great number of younger people to enter the world of politics, notably because political activities remain to be rife with transactional practices, something we commonly refer to as money politics. Second, the ever-mushrooming presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of international, national, regional to local levels dealing with an ever-greater variety of issues, has caused Karang Taruna to become less and less popular.

This clearly is a reason for concern. Amidst the ever-decreasing relevance of youth organizations, teachings and movements grounded in intolerance and radicalism gain momentum ever more

strongly among today's young. This reality is happening because they (being teenagers) are in a phase transitioning from being children to becoming adults. They are in search for their identity, they seek challenges and adventure, they have yet to have any dependents. This situation places them in a position of becoming vulnerable to infiltrations of views that could potentially implicate them in ideologies and activism of extremism-violence.

Why This Assessment Is Important

The mandates and roles of the Boy Scout and Karang Taruna organizations are clearly explained in legislation concerning youth organizations. For the boy scout movement Pramuka, there exists at least several regulations that form the basis to its existence, namely first, Law 12/2010 concerning the Boy Scout Movement; and second, Permendikbud 63/2014 concerning Boy Scout Affairs, which explicitly regulates on boy scout education as a mandatory extra-curricular activity.

In the meantime, the legal umbrella for Karang Taruna is denoted, first, in Law 6/2014 concerning Villages, Article 13, which states that the Karang Taruna forms part of the village governmental structure as a Village Social Institution. Second, Permendagri 5/2007, Article 1, which regulates on guidelines for the general management of social institutions, including Karang Taruna. Third, Permensos 77/2010 concerning Karang Taruna Guidelines. Fourth, Permensos 23/2013 concerning Karang Taruna Empowerment.

With mandates like these, Pramuka and Karang Taruna, as organizations, are expected to become centers of youth activities, both inside and outside of schools. Because of that, the weakening popularity and significance of the two organizations in the lives of the younger generation has encouraged PIEC Universitas Paramadina

to join forces with PPIM UIN Jakarta to assess ways to revitalizing Pramuka and Karang Taruna.

Method

This research employed a qualitative method. Research stage activities that have been implemented include:

1. Assessment research on obstacles and opportunities for the development of Pramuka and Karang Taruna by means of in-depth interviews. With regard to Pramuka, interviews were conducted with approximately 100 school students and Pramuka volunteers at public senior high/ vocational/ Islamic senior high schools in four locations: Bogor, Sukabumi, Serang, and Pandeglang. With regard to Karang Taruna, interviews were held with 50 managing members and workers in the four territories.
2. Surveys on the resistance of Pramuka and Karang Taruna against extremism-violence. With regard to Pramuka, a survey was done involving 150 school students from Bogor and Pandeglang who participated in a camping trip. With regard to Karang Taruna, a survey was done involving 70 youth training participants from Sukabumi and Serang.
3. Focus group discussions (FGDs) about policies on Pramuka and Karang Taruna; the Pramuka FGD was attended by 15 representatives of the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kemendikbud), the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag), the Ministry of Youth and Sports (Kemenpora), Kwarnas, schools, Pramuka, youth figures, etc. In the meantime, the Karang Taruna FGD was attended by 15 representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos), the Ministry of Village Affairs (Kemendes), District/City Karang Taruna Forums, Karang Taruna members and volunteers, sociologists, etc.

4. The FGD on the Designing of the Pramuka and Karang Taruna Revitalization Module was to serve as material to ward off radicalism and extremism.
5. Module trials took the form of (Pramuka) camping trips and (Karang Taruna) training courses on nationalism, creativity, and tolerance. Camping trips were held in Bogor and Pandeglang, which were participated by about 150 boy scouts while the training courses were held in Serang and Sukabumi and which were attended by 70 Karang Taruna members.
6. FGD on the policy brief with stakeholders of Pramuka, Karang Taruna, and CVE. Attended by 15 representatives from Kemendikbud, Kemenag, Kemenpora, BNPT, Kemendes, Kemensos, etc.

Research Findings

Boy Scout Movement

1. Obstacles: A number of factors have been identified as obstacles to the development of Pramuka activities. They arise out of institutional policies passed by schools, students' interests, and (Government) policies at a more macro level. Most school administrators no longer place Pramuka as a priority extra-curricular activity, and have instead chosen to focus more on academic aspects. As a result, Pramuka has found itself in a deadlock. The 2013 curriculum has forced many schools to become study-oriented, due to the multiple and complicated subjects, notably so with regard to competence and grade standards.

Another obstacle is the students themselves. The emergence of new, technology-based youth activities has made Pramuka activities look like an artifact of the past and out of vogue.


Nearly 71% of the respondents that were interviewed stated that learning semaphore, learning code, and doing other such boy scout activities are not interesting to them. On the other hand, the Internet, social media, and computer games have become the order of the day as activities to do after school. Pramuka activities are regarded as uninteresting because of the impression students have about them, namely the semi-militaristic nature of it: the high-level discipline, violence such as verbal bullying (snarling), etc.

Yet another obstacle is the lack of Pramuka volunteers at some schools. Specifically, volunteers that have passed the KMD (Basic Competence Course) and the KML (Advanced Competence Course). Ideally, one volunteer should be in charge of 150 to 200 boy scouts. However, at some schools with a student body of over 1,000 students there are only one or two volunteers available that have passed the KMD and the KPL. As a result, the development of boy scout education has not progressed the way it should do. A lack of proper coordination of the relevant ministries (i.e. Kemendikbud, Kemenag, and Kemenpora) is also a factor, reflected in the multiple overlapping policies that have been passed and the implementation of the policies. For instance, boy scouts, especially those at the Siaga and Penggalang levels, are aged 7-15 years old. In the meantime, the boy scout movement does not fall under the auspices of the Kemendikbud, but instead it's being managed by the Kemenpora, which deals with youth affairs and sports, and the youth here is aged 17 years and up.

2. Opportunities: To date Pramuka is seen as the most effective medium to cultivate students with nationalistic values. At a time when the nationalism of many students is fading, the boy scout movement can be counted on as an effective medium to

address the issue by instilling and implementing Tri Satya and Dasa Dharma--Pramuka's underlying principles. Pramuka also has a long tradition and history, being an organization with a large membership spread over the entire nation, from Sabang to Merauke, from big cities to remote villages and the interior. Data indicate that Pramuka presently counts more than 20 million members, covering elementary, junior high, and senior high school students. Moreover, as of 2014, Permendikbud regulates Pramuka as a mandatory extra-curricular activity, and as a result all schools automatically include boy scout activities as part of their curriculum.

In that context, the research identified that the Pramuka organization occupies a strategic position to disseminating anti-violence and anti-extremism values to the younger generation, especially those of school age.



KS: very poor; **K:** poor; **B:** good; **BS:** very good. Sections marked in red fall under the category of 'early warning'

Based on the above table, a few advantages Pramuka has to curbing extremism-violence can be pointed out. Pramuka's resistance against ideological propaganda of radicalism and extremism is overall good; on average 67% responded with a B/ Good and Very Good, and only 33% responded with a K/Poor and KS/ Very Poor.

Religious tolerance, faith, religious rituals, and religious experiences received likewise a fairly good response (on average 85% responded with Good and Very Good). Students felt they had a strong belief in the religion they practiced, they also regularly say their prayers, in particular the five daily prayers, give alms, fast, and have done other forms of religious obligations notably the giving of charitable gifts. Students also felt that their religious experience rendered them with a positive influence in terms of emotional stability, considerate behavior, and feeling remorseful after having perpetrated a misdeed. Only religious knowledge (as the respondents hailed from SMAs, SMKAs, and MAs, leaving only MAs to claim to be at a good level) and social consequences leave room for improvement (they are unsure about the boundaries of tolerant practices). For both issues, on average 35% of the students responded with Good and Very Good. MA/ Islamic senior high school students were given Islamic subjects almost on a daily basis, i.e. 5-6 school days a week, receiving comprehensive lessons in fiqh, tarikh-tasyri, Koran-Hadith, etc. Meanwhile, SMA and SMK students only received religious lessons in a general sense, and only two hours a week at that.

Meanwhile, Pramuka's nationalism is overall good, especially when it comes to pride, unity, and self-sacrifice (an average 87% answered Good and Very Good). Students who are members of Pramuka have a sense of pride of being an Indonesian citizen as they

consider the Indonesian nation as a big nation with a huge population, a multitude of cultures, ethnicities, and religious convictions, and that is making strides economically. The students also had a sense of the importance of unity in the face of a diversity of ethnicities, languages, and religious convictions. They are prepared to sacrifice for the nation. However, as Indonesia is not in a wartime, they feel that the form of sacrifice to make is by learning hard to advance the nation. Compliance is wanting (which is in reality a common issue in Indonesia) as is contributions made (on account of their young age). For both issues, on average 42% of the students responded with Good and Very Good. They feel they're facing a dilemma when interacting in a public space. On the one hand they are taught discipline and the need to adhere to Pramuka regulations, but on the other hand they experience the opposite on part of a great number of community members. Sometimes they make their voices heard, though these fall on deaf ears, and sometimes they give in to the community's attitude of breaking both discipline and regulations.

Karang Taruna Neighborhood Association

1. Karang Taruna's fate is not that different. A number of challenges have marginalized its role as a rural youth organization. Internally, most of its members, i.e. in general more than 60%, are unemployed and lowly educated (senior high school graduates, some having only made it to junior high or even elementary school). This has bearing on the organization's low level of creativity and productivity. Both Karang Taruna in urban (Bogor and Serang) and rural (Sukabumi and Pandeglang) settings share the same high percentage in terms of unemployment and low education (in excess of 60%).
Meanwhile, externally, a great number of NGOs, CBOs, and


political parties have emerged as a more interesting alternative to the younger generation, especially financially. It does explain the story behind the youth who carried out the JW Marriot bombing. Dani Dwi Permana (17 years) was a Karang Taruna member in his village in Bogor. However, as he came from a poor family and had difficulties paying for his SMA school fees, he found a job working as the village's *marbot* (prayer house caretaker), which helped him to pay for his school fees and left him some change as pocket money. As time went by, Dani decided to abandon his association to Karang Taruna altogether. The case demonstrates at least that even though Karang Taruna is a government organization, a lack of consideration has had the effect of undermining one of its member sense of strong nationalism.

The main factor implicated in Karang Taruna's development efforts is the lack of village support. Most developed Karang Taruna organizations enjoy strong support from their village chiefs. There are indeed some cases wherein a Karang Taruna organization did manage to grow in spite of a lack of the village chief's support. In the ensuing leadership term, the Karang Taruna chairperson was elected village chief. This means that the Karang Taruna does occupy a strategic position in the village, although this fact sometimes goes unnoticed.

Another issue is how government policies designed to support increased creativity and productivity of Karang Taruna organizations lack equality and sustainability. Karang Taruna, especially in remote villages, has a sense of lacking Kemensos fosterage. Meanwhile, those that had enjoy fosterage on more than one occasion regard the assistance to be lacking sustainability.

2. Opportunities and Strengths: Karang Taruna's opportunities and strengths are reflected in the spirit of mutual cooperation

that exists among the membership in a broad range of activities. Karang Taruna remains a vehicle for youth activities capable of reducing the extent of criminality in the environments of rural and urban village communities. This can be perceived from the accustomed coordination that's in place between the organization and the police force, allowing for the rendering of supervision relating to village order and security in a proper fashion. This has potentially placed Karang Taruna as a youth organization capable of warding off the dangers of extremism-violence and radicalism among youth. According to the PIECE assessment, Karang Taruna demonstrates a resistance against thoughts and movements grounded in extremism.



KS: very poor; **K:** poor; **B:** good; **BS:** very good. Sections marked in red fall under the category of 'early warning'

Karang Taruna's resistance against ideological propaganda of extremism is overall good; on average 65% responded with a B/ Good and Very Good, and only 35% responded with a K/Poor and KS/ Very Poor.

Fairly good in terms of religious tolerance, faith, religious rituals, and religious experiences. An average of 80% responded with Good and Very Good. Members of Karang Taruna have a strong conviction in the faith they adhere to. They pray on a regular basis, in particular the five daily prayers, give alms, fast, and perform other forms of religious obligations notably the giving of charitable gifts. They also felt that their religious experience rendered them with a positive influence in terms of emotional stability, considerate behavior, and feeling remorseful after having perpetrated a misdeed. Only religious knowledge and social consequences leave room for improvement (as is the case with Pramuka, they too are unsure about the boundaries of tolerant practices). For both issues, on average 40% of the students responded with Good and Very Good. The average Karang Taruna member does not have a proper command of religious knowledge. Only a handful, i.e. less than 30%, are madrasa, Islamic boarding school, or IAIN alumni. Most are SMA, SMK, SMP, and SD graduates. A majority, i.e. in excess of 50%, are SMA and SMK graduates.

In the meantime, the nationalism of Karang Taruna is good overall, especially in terms of unity, contribution, and self-sacrifice. An average of 80% responded with Good and Very Good. Members also had a sense of the importance of unity in the face of a diversity of ethnicities, languages, and religious convictions. They have a sense of self-sacrifice for the nation, including to go to war with other countries or to defend the nation by such means as conscription. Only the qualities of pride and compliance still leave room for improvement. For both issues, only 47% responded with Good and Very Good. Members in general claim to be proud to be Indonesia, because it is a great nation, rich in natural resources, rich in culture, and is home to many ethnicities. However, they also

express a disappointment with regard to their poor natural capital and culture. They also do not feel proud as corruption in Indonesia remains rampant with the perpetrators mainly being officials and people part of Indonesia's elite circle, who they deem to be already well off in the first place. They feel they're facing a dilemma when interacting in a public space. On the one hand they are aware that acting without discipline and against regulations would disrupt social order, but on the other hand they experience a great number of community members to do exactly that. Sometimes they make their voices heard, though these fall on deaf ears, and sometimes they give in to the community's attitude of breaking discipline and regulations.

Recommendations

Boy Scout Movement

1. For school principals, in their capacity as the Guiding Council for the Pramuka Movement (Mabigus): they should give their full support to the Pramuka movement. Support can be given in the form of appeals, supervision, material support, and moral support to ensure that the Pramuka movement in each respective school will garner ever stronger interest from the students and see the implementation of ever more activities. Moreover, as per the Permendikbud, Pramuka is a mandatory extra-curricular activity. They should also engage parents and other relevant parties in an effort to advancing Pramuka.
2. For the Minister of Education and Culture: in the planned revision for Permendikbud 63/2014 concerning Pramuka as a Mandatory Extra-Curricular Activity there is a need to include a proposal to have Pramuka Education made into a publicization medium for Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) purposes, specifically

through the block model (school environment orientation period or MPLS), in addition to the actualization and regular models. Under the block model, publicization will focus more on general knowledge about CVE (identifying the hazards of VE, its ideology and activism, etc.). While the actualization and regular models focus rather on how to deal with VE among students, how to prevent VE, what campaigns to run, etc. A revision should also shed more light on matters pertaining to the Management Organization (OTK) for the Permen's implementation to ensure that the shortage in Pramuka volunteers at schools, an issue raised in the PIEC assessment research (2017) and the Pramuka FGDs, can be addressed.

3. For the BNPT and Kwarnas: there is a need to turn the spirit of anti-extremism violence into a creed (or a set of special skills) under the existing Police Work Unit. The special skills needed include: knowledge about VE both in terms of its ideology and its activities, ways to identifying early on when VE is afflicting students, ways to addressing it, ways to preventing it or running campaigns to prevent VE from afflicting other schools and individuals.
4. For the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports; there is a need to clarify in the Pramuka Affairs Law whether it remains under the auspices of Kemenpora or is relocated to Kemendikbud, because, aside from being school-based, Pramuka's membership falls in the age bracket of 7-25 years, while the Kemenpora deals with youth aged 17-45 years. There is a need to revise the Pramuka Affairs Law in order to have it placed under the auspices of Kemendikbud instead of Kemenpora.

Karang Taruna Neighborhood Association

1. For rural & urban village chiefs: As village fund allocations are regulated by policy, the issue now concerns implementation in the field. Village chiefs should show full support to the Karang Taruna activities held in their respective villages, specifically by means of village fund allocations obtained from seven sources for Karang Taruna programming, including with regard to CVE activities. Activities can take the form of publicizations, simulations, preventive actions, etc. As for urban villages, because they are not eligible for rural village funds they are expected to promote Karang Taruna through financial aid obtained from government (through Perda, Musrenbang, etc.) and non-governmental (e.g. corporate social responsibility/ CSR funds) sources and so on to bankroll Karang Taruna activities, e.g. the arts, sports, national defense, creative productive enterprises, and social welfare efforts including the CVE activities mentioned earlier.
2. For BNPT: there is a need to use Karang Taruna in an optimum fashion in CVE activities. There is a need to develop its potential as a dissemination forum for such values as nationalism in general, guarantee Karang Taruna's presence in all rural-urban villages of Indonesia, and ensure direct interfacing with the younger generation in their each respective territories.
3. For the Ministry of Village Affairs: a revision of Permendes 2/2015 concerning Guidelines on Village Conferences and other related Permendes should see that how the Karang Taruna fares is no longer dependent on the village chief. Whether the Karang Taruna progresses or not has been much dependent on the village chief's commitment, making it predominantly a political issue. A revision should see that technocratic and participatory approaches can become implementable in the field.

4. For the Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos): There is a need for Kemensos, as per Permensos 77/2010, as the entity in charge of Karang Taruna's fosterage, to ensure that fostering programs cover a greater number of Karang Taruna organizations, with a focus on those in the interior, have more sustainability, and are geared towards the application of local potential. There is a need to intensify fosterage to bring Karang Taruna's revitalization to fruition.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**READERS' RESPONSE ON THE
PUBLICATION OF THE MUSLIM
MUDA INDONESIA BULLETIN**

The Political Literacy Institute



Background

The unabated phenomenon of radicalism in Indonesia is the main reason why this research is important. A number of researches and surveys indicate that radicalism has spread out to part of the Indonesian population (BNPT, 2017), something that not infrequently has led to acts of extremism and terrorism (Wahid Foundation & LSI, 2016). If left unaddressed, it will damage harmony in Indonesia.

Mosques, as a point of congregation for Muslims, become a hotbed for the dissemination of radical, extreme, and political movements. One radical movement that is massively propagating its ideology is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Utilizing a Friday bulletin that is published every Sunday, the movement is very militant in campaigning its ideas of struggle, i.e. rejection of democracy and the establishment of the Khilafah Islamiyyah on the native soil of Indonesia. In a resolute fashion, by means of the bulletin *Kaffah*, HTI disseminates its propaganda to the public on a massive scale claiming the Khilafah Islamiyah to be superior to democracy. One way is to continuously expressing and viewing that the Government's policies are false and deviate from sharia law. As a result, the propaganda has to a certain degree managed to implant its influence in the community's psyche.

And because of that this research was conducted in the context of mapping the Friday bulletins that are going the round at mosques in Greater Jakarta. The research outcomes are very important to providing a counter-narrative to the bulletins published steadfastly by the HTI group. By way of a Friday bulletin called *Muslim Muda Indonesia* (Young Muslims Indonesia), we are trying to offer an alternative to the Friday's prayer congregation to introduce variety and diversity in Islam, and at the same time to demonstrate that in

the framework of a state even a democracy has civic values. At the end of the day, we aspire to have the Muslim Muda Indonesia bulletin to act as a mouthpiece in the dissemination of messages of peace and tolerance to maintain the Republic of Indonesia's integrity.

Research Methodology

To produce a thick and deep meaning and description, we opted for a qualitative approach in the research. Data were collected by way of interviews, observations, and documentation. A total of 36 respondents were interviewed as part of the research, comprising mosque caretakers, *khatib* (reader in the mosque)/ *imam* (mosque congregation leader), and members of congregations accustomed to reading Friday bulletins.

The research lasted from February 1-28, 2018, in six territories: Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, South Tangerang, Tangerang City, and Bekasi. Following are the mosques located in the six territories:

1. Mosques in South Tangerang; Mosque al-Mughirah Situ and Mosque Al-Ittihad
2. Mosques in Jakarta; Mosque Al-Aqwam and Mosque Al-Wiqoyah
3. Mosques in Depok; Mosque Jami Al-Khairatul Islam and Mosque Jami Nurul Muhajirin
4. Mosques in Tangerang City; Mosque al-Ijtihad and Mosque Al-Muhajirin
5. Mosques in Bogor: Mosque Darul Jannah and Mosque Al-Huriyah
6. Mosques in Bekasi; Mosque Amar Ma'ruf and Mosque Al-Ikhlash

The above mosques had been selected because they have been indicated to be distribution spots for the bulletin *Kaffah*. Even though the government has outlawed HTI activism because the organization is deemed prohibited, HTI activities, including the distribution of its

Friday bulletin, go on as usual. The content of *Kaffah* is admittedly more lenient than their previous bulletin, *Al-Islam*, in which they openly opposed Indonesia's democratic system.

Several Findings

1. A total of 78% of the research respondents claimed to have caught sight of and read the Friday bulletins that go the round at their mosque every Friday. Meanwhile, the remainder of the respondents claimed to have caught sight of the bulletins, but not on every Friday.
2. With regard to effectiveness, *Muslim Muda Indonesia* can be said to have successfully propagated messages of tolerance, inclusiveness, and equality. This is indicated by the response of readers, which totaled to nearly 86%. In the meantime, the remaining 14% was of the opinion that it did not differ much from the other Friday bulletins.
3. So far, the *Muslim Muda Indonesia* readership has acknowledged the bulletin to have been rather effective in warding off the dissemination of ideas of radicalism. At least, 44% of the respondents regarded the bulletin's content to be very effective in providing a counter-narrative to radical ideologies in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the remainder was of the opinion that bulletin to have been doing a fairly good job at curbing radicalism.
4. Some of the bulletin's columns and features are a favorite with readers. Of the various material it has to offer, poetry (5%) shares the least popularity. Most of the readers (53%) do like the bulletin on the whole, without differentiating and marginalizing one feature over the other.
5. To take a position on *Kaffah*, we asked respondents whether or not they agreed if *Muslim Muda Indonesia* continued its circulation

at mosques. A total of 83% responded that they agreed to have the bulletin kept in circulation. Only 3% responded there to be no need yet or for it to be unnecessary to keep it in circulation.

6. With regard to what medium is effective and enjoys popularity as a source of information, a majority cited television as a valid source of information capable of influencing their awareness and insight on how to practice their religion. Additionally, the respondents still make use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Line, etc. as media that play a rather big role in information dissemination and in influencing their awareness and insight on how to practice their religion. In the meantime, only 5% believed the bulletin could become a reference and source of information that expands religious awareness and insight.
7. In the research we observe that some mosques have distributors ask for permission from the mosque caretaker to circulate their bulletins. But at the same time, some mosques neglect the practice. As for the latter this clearly represents a potential hazard as they allow themselves to become hotbeds for the planting and breeding of radical and extreme ideologies.
8. Inputs from research respondents regarding *Muslim Muda Indonesia* were relatively uniform and can be summed up as follows:
 - a) It is advised to refrain from printing Koranic verses in the bulletin, it would do to just print the translation.
 - b) It is better to use more accessible language to allow the content be understood by readers of all classes and backgrounds.
 - c) It is hoped *Muslim Muda Indonesia* would cover factual issues.
 - d) It is advised the bulletin would make a breakthrough in terms of themes, layout, and design to pique the readership's interest. In fact, several mosque caretakers hope there will be an edition of the bulletin for children and teenagers.

Conclusion

The research concludes that *Muslim Muda Indonesia* has successfully propagated a discourse of Islam that is gentle, tolerant, and neutral. In addition, throughout the research nothing was there to indicate that mosque caretakers or members of the congregation were involved in radicalism and extremism, let alone terrorism. The same impression was obtained during when khatibs were delivering their Friday prayer's sermons. Moreover, in general, the khatibs made a point of disseminating information that is true and in line with the Koran, Hadith, and other relevant sources. Making reference to books written by ulema, both those of the past and contemporary, is likewise important to make sure *Muslim Muda Indonesia* can respond to factual issues taking place in the midst of the community.

Recommendations

1. The distribution of *Muslim Muda Indonesia* continues to be very much needed as HTI continues the distribution of its bulletin. An alternative publication must for that reason be made available at mosques in order to offer Friday prayer's congregations with variety to keep them from becoming swayed by elements of radicalism.
2. The intense popularity of social media as a information dissemination tool must be utilized to spread messages preaching inclusiveness and tolerance to readers. Light-hearted but deeply meaningful messages should be widely propagated through various platforms of social media, e.g. Facebook, Instagram, Line, Twitter, etc.
3. It is advised that stakeholders engage in proper coordination with all mosque caretakers in Indonesia in order to remain vigilant at all times against radical ideologies that oftentimes crop up in a mosque's environs.

Contributing Partners



The Center for the Study of Islam and the Society (PPIM), State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta

PPIM is an autonomous research center within the sphere of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. It was originally established on April 1, 1995, with the intention of facilitating a number of bachelors hailing from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds to conduct research, assessments, training courses, and dissemination of information on Islam and Indonesia in particular, and on Islam and Southeast Asia in general. Presently, the PPIM is a university-based strategic assessment center in Indonesia with a track record in conducting assessments of social and religious issues while boasting an extensive body of publication and a network spanning domestically and foreign countries.



Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta

CSRC is an assessment and research center with a focus on religion and social-cultural issues, and was established by virtue of a decree passed by the president of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah on April 28, 2006. It is an offshoot of the Language and Culture Center (PBB) of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, and came as a response to an

increased demand for the development of religious (in particular Islamic) assessments and research in the context of social-cultural and political relations. Its purpose is to identify and understand what key roles religion has to offer in order to create a society that is just and prosperous, strong, democratic, and peaceful.



Postgraduate School of State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta

Since academic year 1983/1984, UIN Sunan Kalijaga has pioneered a formal education track for bachelors wishing to attain a master's and a doctorate. This was based on the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs 26/1983, re-enacted by virtue of the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs 208/1997 and the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs 95/1999. In academic year 1985/1986, for the very first time the Postgraduate School produced its master's graduates and since then the doctoral program was rolled out as well.



The Culture and Social Changes Center (PSBPS), Surakarta Muhammadiyah University (UMS)

The PSBPS is a center with an interest in issues relating to culture, specifically cultural diversity and social changes, expressed both in the form of instruction, assessments/ research, and action. Its programs are based on Islam's underlying principles and universal

humanitarian values while placing an emphasis on relating and contextualizing these principles and values to the requirements of the time, and informing the directives social change should take.



Maarif Institute: For Culture and Humanity

The presence of Maarif Institute forms an inseparable part of the Islamic Thought Renewal (PPI) present in Indonesia today. The renewal movement is as much as a certainty as it is a historical demand. The complexity of modern life, further compounded by attending contemporary issues such as democracy, human rights, pluralism, gender, interfaith and intercivilizational dialogs, and a plethora of other issues demand a new understanding and explanation from Islamic teachings. In addition, the Maarif Institute forms an inseparable part of the sociological needs of the union of Muhammadiyah, although it's not affiliated to this organization and without depreciating the commitment to continue extend the institute's social radius.



Research Center for the Middle East and Global Peace (PSTPG), Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics (FISIP), State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta

It was established in November 2015. The institution sets out to become a beacon in the fields of community research, training, and

development with a focus on Middle East geopolitics, international conflicts, counter-terrorism, and peace building in Southeast Asia and the world. The organization was formally launched by Prof. Zulkifli at a seminar themed “The Map of Terrorist Networks in Southeast Asia After Jakarta Attack”.



The Public Research and Service Institute (LP2M) of the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) Manado.

LP2M IAIN Manado is an institute that sets out to bridge all research and service activities that have direct bearing on the community to allow university lecturers and academic practitioners to apply and develop science both at campus and in the community. In principle, the institute has the duty and responsibility to implement, coordinate, monitor, and assess public research and service activities by providing university lecturers with technical guidelines on research writing and public service.



Daya Makara Universitas Indonesia (UI) – Division of Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR)

DASPR team members have taken an in-depth look into terrorism and deradicalization since 2007. In 2007, under the auspices of Prof. Sarlito, a research was commenced to look into the motives of acts of terror committed by Islamist groups. Moreover, in 2009, DASPR built a cooperation with the Koranic Research Center (PSQ) to pilot

re-education programs for convicted terrorists, former combatants, and former mujahedin. The cooperation produced a book titled *Kekerasan Atas Nama Agama* (Violence in the Name of Religion).



Peace Indonesia Alliance (AIDA)

AIDA was established to bring about an Indonesia that's more peaceful through the participation of both the victims and perpetrators of terrorism. AIDA targets former perpetrators of terrorism because they represent a full image of what it means to be a terrorist, while victims represent a full image of the sadistic reality terrorism-induced violence brings. The victims and former perpetrators can complement each other and work towards a common aspiration: to never have to have perpetrators of violence and victims of terrorism anymore. In addition, AIDA wishes to build an Indonesia that is peaceful based on the values of mutual respect, mutual trust, and a sense of brotherhood. AIDA has as its mission the empowerment, training, and promotion of terrorism victims as ambassadors of peace.



Paramadina Institute of Ethics and Civilization (PIEC)

Universitas Paramadina

PIEC was established to disseminate a view to the public that

religion should not be manipulated to justify injustices perpetrated in a broad variety of fields. PIEC seeks to mold the community's normative-critical understanding by having people ask and answer the questions as to what qualities ethical development should demonstrate, what could be justified ethically in the name of economic progress and welfare, and through discussions of a broad range of ethical dilemmas arising out of such efforts.



The Political Literacy Institute (The Policy)

The Policy was established on December 12, 2008, by a group of young activists, intellectuals, and progressive journalists. It is an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit organization funded primarily by grants and non-binding donations sourced from a broad range of parties. As per the organization's vision, it seeks to build both public awareness on rational, knowledge-based politics and political capacity while encouraging the emergence of critical individual and communal political participation that is grounded in intellectual and moral maturity, both organizationally and socially, in order to expedite Indonesia's democratization.



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Gedung PPIM UIN Jakarta, Jalan Kertamukti No. 5, Ciputat Timur,
Tangerang Selatan, Banten 15419 Indonesia

Tel: +62 21 7499272 | Fax: +62 21 7408633 | E-mail: pmu.convey@gmail.com

Website: <https://conveyindonesia.com>



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