

**ISLAMIC
CLERICS'
PERCEPTION ON
NATION-STATE:
AUTHORITY, NEGOTIATION AND
RESERVATION**

PusPIDeP Yogyakarta – Postgraduate UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta
PPIM UIN Jakarta – UNDP Indonesia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the most prominent phenomena of democratic transformation in post-1998 Indonesia is the revitalization of public space that necessitates the plurality of power and public discourse. Along with the development of public space and a participatory culture, democracy contributes greatly to facilitating new actors from various educational and professional backgrounds to participate in conversations and attempts to define Islam in relation to the state and society. The emergence of new actors offering new discourses and habitus has implications for the destabilization of conventional, political and religious authorities. In the midst of an increasingly competitive climate, *ulama* (Islamic clerics) emerged as important agents and political actors amid populism in public piety in the past two decades. Some of them even sympathized with the rise of Islamic populism which came together with the strengthening of identity politics.

This study maps the perceptions of Islamic clerics about the nation-state and derivative concepts such as tolerance, citizenship and nonviolence by looking into clerics in 15 cities (Medan, Jakarta, Bandung, Surakarta, Makassar — which represent the metropolitan cities of Islam— Banda Aceh, Padang, Surabaya, Palangka Raya, Banjarmasin — which represents the cities with the traditions of mainstream clerics— Pontianak, Denpasar, Ambon, Manado, and Kupang — which represent the cities with a distinctive issue of Muslim minority).

The general overview of this study shows that the acceptance of clerics to the concept of nation-states is quite high, i.e. 71.56%, while those who reject such concept number 16.44%. The difference in the level of rejection and acceptance can also be seen from the aspects of the three city clusters above. Although the difference in percentage rates is not too large, the level of acceptance of the concept of nation-states in cities with Muslim minorities tends to be higher (26.44%) compared to Islamic metropolitan cities (22.89%) and mainstream Islamic cities (22.22) %). If we look at comparisons between cities, there are also differences in the numbers of rejection and acceptance to the concept of nation-states. Clerics in **Pontianak** (86.70%) and **Manado** (86.70%) show the best attitude towards accepting the concept of nation-state, followed by clerics in **Surabaya** (80.60%) and Ambon (80%). Meanwhile, cities whose clerics tend to reject the concept of nation-state are Surakarta (30%) and Banjarmasin (30%), followed by Padang (26.70%) and finally Aceh (23.30%) and Bandung (23.30%). This shows the different dynamics of attitudes towards the concept of nation-states in various research locations.

In addition to the findings above, this study also found acceptance of nation-states that are limited or reserved. Reservations for nation-states are found in clerics categorized as 'conservative' and 'exclusive', which is the meeting point category between the lowest acceptance category and the softest rejection category (based on the theory employed in this study). Among other things, the majority of clerics mentioned their agreement to freedom of expression and argued that there were no exceptions to non-Muslim groups (Banda Aceh, Padang, Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Surakarta, Surabaya, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Denpasar, Palangka Raya, Kupang, Manado and Ambon), but show high resistance to internal religious differences such as disagreeing with minority Muslim groups to hold associations in Muslim communities or holding public positions (Banjarmasin, Kupang, Palangka Raya, Bandung, Banda, Surakarta, Padang and Medan).

RECOMMENDATIONS

This research offers several important recommendations to be considered by the government, stakeholders and the community:

1. Encouraging issues of citizenship and tolerance to become an integral part of Islamic clerics' religious discourse and encourage clerics to formulate strategies for the realization of their practices in a pluralistic society.

2. Including materials on citizenship and tolerance in the Islamic cleric education curriculum both for Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) and universities.
3. Encouraging the idea of civil Islam, namely Islamic articulation related to democratic values as a paradigm of religious thought in religious institutions such as the MUI, *pesantren*, Islamic universities and Islamic socio-religious organizations.
4. There is a need to choose, recommend or even compile Islamic religious literature that is in harmony with the present context (but at the same time also has a strong and accountable scriptural foundation) to be distributed and used as a basis for religious discourse in government-run educational institutions, and state institutions.
5. Encouraging and facilitating clerics who hold the paradigm of contextual Islamic thinking to "compete" in intervening the *majlis taklim* space in order to control the discourse and practice of Islam in public.
6. Intervening the clerical discourses with the national cultural agenda so that cultural pluralism and views become facts that must be considered in religious articulation by clerics.
7. Eliminating all types of laws, government regulations or government decrees that are deemed inconsistent with tolerance and citizenship values, and are often used as a basis for certain parties to carry out social intimidation against groups that are considered 'heretics'.

ISLAMIC CLERICS' PERCEPTION ON NATION-STATE: AUTHORITY, NEGOTIATION AND RESERVATION

This research is part of the Convey Program which was jointly initiated by PUSPIDEP Yogyakarta, Postgraduate Department of UIN Sunan Kalijaga and PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. This research maps and discusses the perceptions and views of clerics from various social, political, and religious backgrounds about the format of nation-states, along with the basic concepts that support them. This research also provides an overview on the position of Indonesian clerics – who are divided into various social, economic and political backgrounds – in addressing the ideas and format of the present-day nation-state of Indonesia. As is known, the debate involving clerics, regarding the basis and format of Indonesian state has been going on since before independence.

Polemics about the relationship between religion and state are recurrent and usually strengthened when there are important changes in the country's political landscape. In this context it is important to re-examine the extent to which the debate between clerics are still ongoing related to the basis and format of the state, by exploring their perceptions and views on the nation-state.

On a broader scale this research wants to see the political direction and future of the nation-state of Indonesia. Clerics have long proved themselves to be important actors who have political, sociological and cultural influence towards the historical dynamics of Indonesian society.

Previous research on Islamic clerics can be divided into four parts. First, research on MUI, both to its fatwas such as Mudzhar (1990, 2001), Hosen (2003, 2004), Adams (2012), Sholeh (2016), Sirry (2013), and its political behavior, such as Ichwan (2005, 2012, 2013, 2016), Menchik (2007), Hasyim (2014, 2015), and Saat (2016). The second research on Islamic clerics in cultural contexts, such as Hirokoshi (1987), Dhofier (1999), Mansurnoor (1990), Pribadi (2013), Hoesterey (2015). The third research on Islamic clerics in historical contexts, such as Azra (2004) and Hisham (2001). The fourth part is research on Islamic clerics in general political contexts, such as Van Dijk (1996), Bruinessen (1990), Berhend (2003) and Kersten (2015).

Apart from the study on MUI after the New Order, which alluded to their political views and behavior, there were still not many who tried specifically to see the perceptions and views of Indonesian clerics regarding the nation-state. This research fills the gap by comprehensively mapping the perceptions and views of clerics regarding the nation-state and see the extent to which their perceptions and views relate to the current problems that confront Indonesia.

This research was conducted in 15 cities. City selection was made based on 3 categories: a) Islamic metropolitan cities where Muslim urban culture is very strong (Jakarta, Medan, Bandung, Makassar and Surakarta); b) cities with a large population predominantly dominated by clerics (and Islamic traditions) (NU and Muhammadiyah; Banda Aceh, Padang, Palangka Raya, Surabaya and Banjarmasin), and; c) cities with distinctive minority issues (Pontianak, Denpasar, Manado, Kupang and Ambon). With the diversity of locations chosen, this study will be able to understand the map of cleric's perceptions and views on nation-states on a national scale, as well as local dynamics and nuances that contribute to shaping their perceptions and views on the nation-state.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

In this study, Islamic clerics are defined as religious scholars and religious entrepreneurs. Religious scholars are people with formal religious education background of studying and exploring Islamic texts specifically through educational institutions such as Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), world-leading Islamic universities, such as Al-Azhar, Ibn Saud, Tarim Hadramaut and UIN/IAIN as well as those who study specifically through the strict *majelis taklim* tradition of clerics. They have deep knowledge in the fields of fiqh (Islamic law),

monotheism, Sufism and other Islamic fields. With these educational and knowledge backgrounds, they gain authority in conveying religious messages and are recognized by their congregates. Often religious scholars are also leaders (of religious organizations) or religious leaders who are active in running the wheels of religious organizations and have their visions set on the community. In clerical studies, a religious scholar is generally associated with traditional religious authority.

The rapid development of educational institutions and the birth of new media in Muslim countries in turn contributed to the emergence of new religious authorities. Unlike traditional religious authorities, new religious authorities generally do not have a strict religious educational backgrounds. They obtain religious knowledge through available and easily accessible sources such as translated books, recitations, and listening and following recitations in new media such as television and the internet. In academic studies, this new religious authority is also referred to as religious entrepreneurs because of their ability to package religious messages through various media such as writing, training, and short videos and deliver them through new media so as to reach a wider audience.

In this study the measurement of clerical attitudes towards nation-states employed an attitude scale developed from four-dimensional concepts namely pro-system, anti-violence, tolerance and pro-citizenship. The **pro-system dimension** is defined as an attitude and an understanding that respect and accept the nation-state system, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, NKRI, and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). In this dimension, there are also pro-government aspects which are attitudes and understandings that respect and accept the format of government, the legitimacy of governments in power, namely governments elected through electoral democracy, and open to aspects of community participation from diverse political and social backgrounds. Furthermore, the pro-system also means the attitude of accepting legal products produced through referral of the state constitution by involving the government and parliament, and placing the Constitutional Court as the highest institution in deciding on reviews regarding inconsistencies in the laws within the constitution.

The **anti-violence** dimension is defined as an attitude that pays attention to promotion of life and the right to life (Anand, 2017) and explores anti-violence attitudes at the personal level both real and latent (Galtung, 1969). While the dimension of **tolerance** is limited in

the context of religious tolerance, which is defined as the attitude of a person in accepting differences in religion and belief in the context of social life. Tolerant attitude itself emphasizes the form of acceptance of other religious beliefs (external tolerance) as well as differences in internal religious denomination (internal tolerance) (Woolf &Hulsizer, 2002).

The **pro-citizenship** dimension is the attitude of acceptance of the principle of citizenship which includes several basic principles such as the principle of justice which refers to a form of justice and equality for all citizens before the law, the principle of recognition that refers to state recognition of individual diversity, and the principle of self-determination which emphasizes the right of individuals to make decisions on their own behalf as citizens without any intervention and control from other parties, including the state. In addition, there is also the principle of solidarity which refers to the capacity of individuals to unite with others in an effort to fight for what they are entitled to as citizens (Lister 2008).

There are two important elements in the pro-citizenship dimension. First, pro-democracy is an attitude or viewpoint that respects and actively encourages democracy to operate as a system of government where political sovereignty is controlled by the people and directly controlled by the people (Campbell 2008). Second, pro-human rights (human rights), namely attitudes and views that recognize human rights that refer to human rights as stated in the Indonesian Constitution (amended 1945 Constitution). More specifically, the human rights included here are reserved in accordance with the context of research on cleric, namely the level of acceptance of the basic concepts of human rights, religious rights, religious rights, and non-discriminatory treatment.

Characteristic	Sub-characteristic	DIMENSION			
		Anti-Violence	Pro-System	Tolerance	Pro-Citizenship
Acceptance	Progressive	v	v	v	v
	Inclusive	v	v	v	v
	Moderate	v	v	v	v
	Conservative	v	v	v	-
Rejection	Exclusive	v	v	-	-
	Radical	v	-	-	-
	Extreme	-	-	-	-
Unidentified	Unidentified				

Table 1. Theory of Cleric Characteristics

In this study, Islamic clerics are grouped into seven characteristics based on their acceptability and rejection of the concept of nation-state. These seven characteristics are progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative (in the acceptance attitude scale); exclusive, radical and extreme (in the rejection attitude scale). Progressive refers to clerics who are actively anti-violence, pro-system, tolerant and pro-citizenship. Inclusive refers to clerics who is passively anti-violence and pro-system, but is actively tolerant and pro-citizenship. Moderate refers to clerics who are passively anti-violence, pro-system, tolerant, and pro-citizenship. Meanwhile, conservative refers to clerics who are passively anti-violence, pro-system, and tolerant, but actively anti-citizenship. On the scale of rejection, exclusive refers to clerics who are passively anti-violence and pro-system, but actively intolerant and anti-citizenship. Radical refers to clerics who are passively nonviolent, but actively anti-system, intolerant and anti-citizenship. And finally, extremes refer to clerics who are actively pro-violence, anti-system, intolerant and anti-citizenship.

METHODOLOGY

The relation between Islamic cleric and the state is a complex problem in the Islamic world. Research methods and designs are very vital to assessing the validity of arguments and findings. This study employs quantitative methods (surveys) to map perceptions on nation-states (and their derivative concepts) and qualitative methods (in-depth interviews) to explore the explanations and variables of the cleric's perception.

This study conducted a group based survey with respondents from a group of clerics or Muslim religious leaders. This survey involved 450 respondents in 15 cities (30 respondents in each city). Because there is no data on the population of Indonesian clerics – both by state and private institutions – the data collection on the population of clerics in each city was the first step taken. The sampling method in this study used the proportionate stratified random sampling technique by considering the distribution of respondents' sampling adequately from each group of clerics and the character of the city.

The grouping of strata was based on the background of the religious organization/movement in which the distribution and variation of respondents in each city was determined by looking at the following four categories: Firstly, **mainstream clerics** who are closely associated with MUI, NU/Muhammadiyah/Persis (adapting to the local context),

with the priority of clerics who have a boarding school base and/or became leaders/thinkers from the campus environment. Secondly, **clerics from the “new” Islamic movement** (salafi, tarbawi, or tahriri, etc.) who have the potential to problematize the nation-state in their discourse and movement. Thirdly, **clerics/figures from minority groups** in Islam, such as Shia Ahmadiyya, etc. Fourthly, **new clerics** who tend to be religious entrepreneurs, usually clerics in this category are relatively young (less than 40 years old) with most of their audience being young people.

In addition, the selection was also based on factors of age, gender, and level of education. The proportion used was 50% of the cleric population data in each region obtained from the initial mapping carried out by researchers with research assistants in each region. Then a random process was carried out by taking into account the representation in each of the strata, so that the samples number 30 clerics in each city/research location. This survey used a 95% confidence level, and with a known standard deviation of 33.69, while the standard error stood at 1.59 with a margin of error of 3.11. The measurement of the characteristics of clerics employed an attitude scale consisting of 70 items with Cronbach alpha reliability level of 0.98.




Figure 1. Gender ratio of cleric respondents

The survey respondents consisted of 76.22% men and 23.78% women. Total respondents who claimed to be affiliated to NU (including

Fatayat, Muslimat, Ansor, etc.) numbered 22.22%, Muhammadiyah (accounted for Aisyiah, Naswiatul Aisyiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, etc.) amounted to 15.78%, Ahmadiyya and Shia made up 5.33% and the remaining 35.56% came from various clerics affiliated with various organizations or movements both at national and local levels which amounted to no less than 40 organizations or groups. As a consequence of the research location in urban (city) areas, the educational background of cleric respondents in this study was rated as highly educated. The largest percentage of respondents had doctoral degrees (31.31%), followed by those with master degrees (30.63%) and bachelor degrees (29.28%) respectively. Meanwhile those with high school education level only amounted to 6.08%.

Education Level




Figure 2. Education level of cleric respondents

In-depth interviews were conducted to explore the results of the survey and explore issues that have not been answered by the survey. Interviews involved 10 informants from 30 survey respondents. The interviews were conducted with key informants by considering the representation of the group of clerics above and the unique issues from the survey findings. Questions in interviews were generally arranged by taking into account three main points. First, what were the perceptions and views of clerics regarding the concept of nation-states, along with its derivative concepts? Second, what were the

clerics' responses to the efforts of certain political forces in society to change the format of the nation-state? Third, what was the source of knowledge/thought/literature that also influenced the perceptions and views of scholars regarding the concept of the nation-state and where did they obtain the source of knowledge and how they appropriated it?

SURVEY RESULT

Acceptance and Rejection toward the Concept of Nation-State

The general overview of this study shows that the acceptance of clerics to the concept of nation-state is quite high, namely 71.56%. Meanwhile, those who reject amounted to 16.44%. From its characteristic aspect, this survey showed that the largest portion of clerics were moderate (34%) and inclusive (23.33%), while conservative and exclusive clerics amounted to 9.33% and 9.79% respectively. The rest, on one hand, were groups of progressive clerics amounting to 4.89% while on the other hand, were radical and extreme clerics amounting to 4% 2.67% respectively. What did these numbers mean? It showed that those in middle-range level (inclusive-moderate-conservative-exclusive) were in the biggest portion while those in progressive and radical-extreme made up the smallest portion. It seemed to explain the high cohesiveness on one hand, but also the recurring challenges for nation-state discourses among the small group of clerics.




Figure 3. Characteristic of clerics in each city

The difference in the level of rejection and acceptance can also be seen from the aspects of the three city clusters that have been described previously, namely the Islamic metropolitan city, the mainstream Islamic city, and the city with Muslim minority. Although the difference in percentage rates was not too large, the level of acceptance of the concept of nation-states and its derivatives in cities with Muslim minorities tend to be higher (26.44%) compared to Islamic metropolitan cities (22.89%) and mainstream Islamic cities (22.22%). From the characteristic aspect it also showed a similar pattern.

Looking at comparisons between cities, there were also differences in the numbers of rejection and acceptance to the concept of nation-states. Clerics in **Pontianak** (86.70%) and **Manado** (86.70%) showed the best attitude towards accepting the concept of nation-state, followed by clerics in **Surabaya** (80.60%) and **Ambon** (80%). Meanwhile, cities whose clerics tend to reject the concept of nation-state were **Surakarta** (30%) and **Banjarmasin** (30%), followed by **Padang** (26.70%) and finally **Aceh** (23.30%) and **Bandung** (23.30%). This showed the different dynamics of attitudes towards the concept of nation-states in various research locations. Obviously there were many factors that caused differences in attitudes, both in terms of the cleric's personal and subjective opinion as well as historical and cultural factors in each city.

Dimensions of Acceptance and Rejection and the Character of Clerics

The tendency of acceptance and rejection is interesting if we look at it using the four-dimensional aspects employed in this study. The highest acceptance was in the dimension of **anti-violence** (acceptance 92.89%; rejection 7.11%) and **pro-system** (acceptance 90.22%; rejection 9.78%). Meanwhile, acceptance in the other two dimensions was somewhat lower, namely the dimension of **tolerance** (acceptance 76.44%; rejection 23.56%) and **pro-citizenship** (acceptance 69.11%; rejection 30.89%). Up to this point, the acceptance level from the highest to the lowest were anti-violence, pro-system, tolerance, and then pro-citizenship.

Inter-regional analysis of these dimensions showed that clerics in the city of Manado had the highest anti-violence attitude, as much as 100%, whereas clerics in Denpasar showed the lowest anti-violence support of 16.70%. The Clerics in Jakarta recorded 100% level of pro-system attitude, while the lowest is in Surakarta, as much as 9.78%. In

the dimension of tolerance, the highest was in Pontianak and Manado, which together amounted to 90%, while the lowest was in Banjarmasin at 43.30%. The last was the pro-citizenship dimension where the highest was found in Manado and Ambon with each amounting to 83.30%, whereas the lowest attitude of pro-citizenship was found in Banda Aceh at 53.32%.

In addition to mapping dimensions, this study also examined seven cleric characters. The largest portion of clerics were moderate (34%), followed by inclusive (23.33%), exclusive (9.78%) and conservative (9.33%). progressive and radical clerics were few in number, respectively at 4.80% and 4%. Furthermore, the percentage of clerics with extreme characters was the lowest, as low as 2.67%.

In more detail, the data showed that in regions or cities with Muslims as minority, there was a higher prevalence of progressive, inclusive and moderate cleric (respectively: 2.22%, 8.67%, and 12.44%) compared to metropolitan Islamic cities (progressive 2%, inclusive 7.33%, moderate 11.11%) and mainstream Islamic cities (progressive 0, 67%, inclusive 7.33%, moderate 10.44%). On the contrary exclusive, radical and extreme were less prevalent in cities with Muslims as minority (respectively: 2.22%, 0.44% and 0.67%) compared to metropolitan Islamic cities (exclusive 3.56 %, radical 2% and extreme 1.11%) and mainstream Islamic cities (exclusive 4%, radical 1.56% and extreme 0.89%).

Quantitative analysis showed an interesting finding of the characters of clerics between cities. **Progressive** clerics were most prevalent in **Jakarta** (13.80%), **Manado** (13.80%), and **Ambon** (13.80%), followed by the cities of **Surabaya**(9.70%), **Medan** (6.70%) and **Makassar** (6.70%). **Inclusive** clerics were most prevalent in **Jakarta** (41, 40%), then in **Pontianak** (36.70%), **Surabaya** (35, 50%), and in **Makassar** (33,30%). **Moderate** clerics were most prevalent in **Kupang** (53, 30%), followed by **Surakarta** (50%), and **Palangka Raya** (46.70%). Most **conservative** clerics were found in **Aceh** at 23.30%, in **Pontianak** at 16.70% and in **Banjarmasin** at 13.30%.

Meanwhile, **exclusive** clerics were most prevalent in **Padang** (20%), followed by **Bandung** (16.70%), **Jakarta** (13.80%), **Aceh** (13.30%), and **Banjarmasin**. **Radical** clerics are most prevalent in **Aceh** (10%) and **Banjarmasin**(10%). Lastly, **extreme** clerics are most prevalent in **Surakarta**(13.30%) and **Banjarmasin**(6.70%).

NEGOTIATION AND RESERVATION

In addition to the findings above, this study also found acceptance of nation-states that were limited or reserved. Reservations for nation-states were found in clerics categorized as 'conservative' and 'exclusive', which was the meeting point category between the lowest acceptance category and the softest rejection category (based on the theory employed in this study). Among other things, the majority of clerics mentioned their agreement to freedom of expression and argued that there were no exception to non-Muslim groups (Banda Aceh, Padang, Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Surakarta, Surabaya, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Denpasar, Palangka Raya, Kupang, Manado and Ambon), but showed high resistance to internal religious differences such as disagreeing with minority Muslim groups to hold associations in Muslim communities or holding public positions (Banjarmasin, Kupang, Palangka Raya, Bandung, Banda, Surakarta, Padang and Medan).

In addition, although the majority of clerics accepted the nation-state system and democracy, they defined democracy differently from what was understood in the constitution. The fact that democracy was "the only game in town" made discourse of another system, including caliphate, illogical to be offered at the national level. This reserved acceptance was based on the view that the current system was not considered to reflect 'partiality' towards Muslims. Therefore, Islamization of the system was a realistic choice rather than replacing it with another system (Makassar, Jakarta, Medan, Bandung).

Many clerics refused to equate the current democracy (which focused on direct election and acclamation) with the concept of *syūrā*. For them, *syūrā* was the principle of exchanging ideas to find the right opinion (*tabādul al-ārā li ma rifati al-shawāb*), while the democracy that ran today worked at the level of quantity contestation minus the attention of quality. Some clerics considered national leadership as not the same as the concept of *waliyyu 'l-amr* because the latter included the aspects of *irāsāt al-dīn* (protection of Islamic religion) and *siyāsāt al-dunyā* (social and politics). According to them, the current national leadership did not carry out *irāsāt al-dīn*.

A. DYNAMICS OF ISLAMIC METROPOLITAN CITIES

1. *Surakarta: Contestation, Negotiation, and Imagination of Islamic State*

Surakarta (popularly known as Solo) is an important city that

displayed intensive contestation between religious authorities. Radicalism and Islamic conservatism in this city began to strengthen with the emergence of Islamic state discourse which was rolled out by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in the 1970s. Both established the Ngruki Al-Mukmin Islamic Boarding School in 1974 which developed rapidly and soon became known as the center of Islamic activism which actively rolled out discourses on the establishment of an Islamic state while opposing the government and the power system in Indonesia. They had fled to Malaysia to avoid being arrested by the New Order government, but then returned after the fall of Suharto. Along with other Islamists such as Muhammad Thalib, Irfan S. Awwas, and Sobarin Syakur, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) in August 2000, which aimed to encourage the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia (Jamhari 2004). The leadership friction at MMI then forced Ba'asyir to separate himself and form the Jamaah Ansjarul Tauhid (JAT). The emergence of ISIS in 2014 made the JAT again split into two namely the Jamaat Ansharu Khilafah (JAK) which pledged their loyalty to ISIS, and the Jamaah Ansjaru Syariah (JAS) which refused to support the Al Qaeda terrorist organization (Cf. Jones 2005; Oak 2010; Solahudin 2013). For both followers of JAK and JAS, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir remain an important and respected figure.

In the 1980s, the map of Islamic activism in Solo became increasingly complex with the presence of Tarbawi and Salafi movements. Tarbawi movement, which was developed by Egyptian alumni with the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood (IM), entered Solo by building small groups called *halaqoh* in various universities, especially Sebelas Maret University of Surakarta (UNS), while the Salafi movement was developed by LIPIA alumni and universities as well as Islamic study institutions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The Islamist groups above competed for the position of religious and political authority with mainstream groups in Solo. Clerics who rejected the nation-state generally believed in the unity between Islam and power (*din wadaulah*). They developed this view in a more ideological direction, such as the obligation to have a pure monotheism, *wala 'wa bara'*, following the principle of justice, and the obligation of jihad. In terms of leadership, these clerics wanted a model of *Imamat* leadership, which had absolute authority, as well as the realization of God's will, which was seen as the embodiment of the principle of *al-walā' wa al-barā'* (loyal to fellow Muslims and leaving others). They also wanted a single interpretation in understanding Islam, which also

affected the rejection of pluralism in society. They were of the view that a system of democracy or pluralism was a notion taught by the West to destroy the faith of Muslims. This thought encouraged them to believe that there were restrictions on the basic rights of citizens and rejection of non-Muslim leaders.

In the context of Solo, the thought of clerics who rejected the nation-state by endorsing the use of violence to realize ideological and political visions were built on three main factors, namely: historical, social, and religious activism. Through a long dynamic process, intertwined with social, economic and political changes in Solo, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had become a symbol of the marginal resistance to the state. This discourse of resistance to the state that echoed among clerics was more akin to the discourse of social protest that resonated more broadly, precisely when the security forces tried to roll up terrorist movements that were responded to by Solo radical clerics as evidence of state arbitrariness against Muslims and more favorable treatment toward non-Muslim groups as well as protection of 'liberal' groups and groups considered liberal and heretical such as Shia and Ahmadiyya. Their radicalism acts were justified under the frame of *amarmakruf* and *nahimunkar*.

Even so, the acceptance of Solo clerics towards the concept of a nation state was classified as high (66.67%). Moderate clerics saw the election of Rudi Hardiyatmo— who was a non-Muslim – as mayor -- as an inevitability because the mechanism of democracy had produced this decision. Moderate clerics believed that all citizens must be fully respected, including those who became public officials, even if they were not Muslims. They also viewed the need to uphold humanity, and rejected all types of violence in addressing differences. The network of moderate cleric was widespread in Islamic boarding schools, *majelis taklim*, socio-religious organizations, academia, educational institutions, independent associations, professionals, traders, and a very broad community that exceeded the boundaries of class, sex, gender, profession, tribe, nation and education.

Surakarta




Figure 4. Characteristic of Clerics in Surakarta

Contestation, negotiation, and acceptance of social and religious issues in Solo have made this city dynamic. This was at least influenced by the factor of openness of political structure as a result of negotiations between various religious, social, and political forces. The clerics who rejected democracy, the ideology of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia still evolved with an ever-changing pattern, such as the pattern of recruitment carried out both through educational institutions and *majelis taklim*. These clerics had also developed discourse through various religious activities such as *tablig akbar*, discussions, demonstrations, and also the media. The publications they made focused on strengthening the ideology of resistance to the state, for example the obligation to establish the Islamic Caliphate as a requirement for believers of Islam.

Nevertheless, the openness of the political structure made clerics who rejected the idea of this nation-state no longer had the ability to build movements in a massive and systematic size. The pattern of management of government power that was more inclusive and participatory, by involving various elements of society, had encouraged new awareness among clerics to then look back on the principles of their resistance to the state. Although still calling for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate, rejecting democracy, encouraging the enactment of Sharia-based Regional Regulations, and calling for jihad, their discourse had experienced several shifts. In the context

of Solo, the involvement of oppositionist clerics in various community development programs such as the development of consultation programs to determine development priorities in each region had made them take responsibility for the environment around them. These oppositionist clerics then interacted and were involved in negotiations on determining regional development priorities. This process opened up the possibility of oppositionists learning from the various mindsets and diversity that existed in society. This condition then made the oppositionist clerics more realistic in seeing the problems of social life that continued to develop.

In addition, the dynamics in Solo also significantly influenced the growth of the Muslim middle class. The pattern of violence-based movements developed by oppositionists was currently experiencing a decline in support and sympathy from the community, especially the rapidly growing Muslim middle class in the city of Solo. It was true that many middle classes were affected by Tarbawi and Salafi ideologies, but the models of violence offered by opposition groups in achieving their goals were judged varyingly. Many of the middle class worked as professionals, educators, journalists, civilian state apparatus, academics, and entrepreneurs who had extensive networks, not limited to one or two communities. This broad association and access opened up access for them to understand the diversity of the community. The acceptance of diversity in turn made violent-based jihadist ideology increasingly lose its relevance. Jihadists who rejected the existence of a democratic system were no longer seen by the Muslim middle class as a group that fought for Islam, but on the contrary they were seen as the main perpetrators of the politicization of religion. In the view of the middle class, Islam was politicized for their own sake.

2. Bandung: Conservatism of Public Islam

The city of Bandung reflected one of the metropolitan cities where religious conservatism painted a picture of public Islam because conservative clerics played an active role in the discourse contestation through various means and media. This interpretation was of course not to say that mainstream Islamic discourse (which was relatively more progressive) had fewer bearers. The level of clerics' acceptance on the idea of the nation-state was quite high, as much as 56.67% - with a rejection rate of 23.34% and unidentified at 20%. However, the discourse of mainstream clerics did not dominate and was unable to control Islamic discourse in the public sphere. It was true that the

majority of clerics in Bandung accepted the Indonesian nation-state, the national philosophy of Pancasila and the democratic system, but quite a number of clerics had proposed reservations regarding the system of government, and raised problematization at the level of citizenship, and intra-religious tolerance. Theologically, this reservation and problematization was based on literal interpretations of religious texts. This theological basis underlaid the idea of how Islam must play a role in the context of the nation-state which was the arena of contestation.

However, what was equally important was the factor of political affiliation of conservative clerics in recent power contestations. The clerics' perception of the nation-state reflected in the above characters was much influenced by their position in the country: whether they were included in the system and structure of the state and whether or not they enjoyed the benefits of state policy. In other words, Islamic conservatism was a negotiating strategy for a number of clerics in Bandung in making deals with the state. The problem in the context of nation-states was the fact that conservatism dared to 'sacrifice' the values inherent in nation-state philosophy, such as equality of citizens' rights, tolerance, and secularization. Religion-based identity politics and Islamic orthodoxy were raised to eliminate the rights of citizens outside of the few identities.



Figure 5. Characteristic of Clerics in Bandung

Conservatism in this case was related to movements and views that defined Islamic religious beliefs and practices in accordance with the text of Qur'an and Sunnah or the religious practices of the first Muslim generation. The above were the construction of orthodoxy which was believed by conservatives – taking distance from the progressive mindset of new issues and the mindset of accommodating local culture. In Bandung, conservatism dictated the discourse of public Islam and appeared to be a 'true' measure of Islamic discourse. Many factors that shaped the dominance of conservatism in Bandung included the memory of the past about the struggle to build an Islamic state, the triumph of Islamist discourse in *majelis taklim*, and the role of the state (regional government) which gave space as a consequence of political negotiations and democratization.

The establishment of ANNAS (Anti-Shia National Alliance) in 2014 strengthened Islamic public conservatism in Bandung. ANNAS took their stance against the Islamic minority groups whom they considered heretical, especially Shia whom they said had dared to appear openly, and no longer hid their identities with *taqiyyah* (clandestinely). The ANNAS clerics saw the existence of Shia as very 'dangerous', especially the propaganda which presented Shia as a school of thought that could be tolerated in Islam. According to them, Shia is a 'deviant' group and cannot be part of Islam. It should be noted that the founders of ANNAS were conservative and hardline Islamic figures who were members of the Islamic Clerics Forum (FUUI) such as Athian Ali Moh Dai, Amin Jamaluddin, Lutfi Bashori, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, DaudRasyid, Ihsan SetiadiLatief, and AdianHusaini.

The political position of FUUI could be said to be quite strong in Bandung when viewed from the presence of the Mayor of Bandung at that time, Dede Rosyada, and the Governor of West Java, Ahmad Heriawan, in the "2nd Indonesian Clerics and Islamic Community Conference" with the agenda of "Formulating Strategic Steps to Address Misdirection and Humiliation by Shia" in 2012. The ANNAS Declaration in 2014 was also attended by representatives from the West Java Regional Government. In some cases, ANNAS Bandung tried to strengthen its influence and conducted political negotiations with the Bandung City Government. The mayor of Bandung at the time, Ridwan Kamil (2013-2018), had been in the spotlight for giving permission to use the Persib stadium for the conference of IJABI group in 2015. ANNAS then 'pressed' the mayor not to give permission for similar events in the future. Their arguments were that Shia is

considered heretical and “intolerant” because they insulted friends of the Prophet who were highly respected in Sunni Islamic theology.

The existence of ANNAS can be understood as an arena of negotiations between conservative clerics and regional governments. ANNAS came with the discourse of defending orthodoxy, namely the ‘salvation of Islamic community’ agenda against the Shia propaganda and influence. This discourse became so hegemonic that other Islamic groups who disagreed with ANNAS were unable to speak out loudly or openly match the discourse that was launched by ANNAS. Conservatism had succeeded in winning public opinion with heroic narratives, and those who tried to advocate for minorities will have their Islamic commitments ‘questioned’ or even considered part of Shia. To win this discourse, ANNAS took various steps to consolidate with clerics, leaders of Islamic movement, Muslim activists and mass organizations to give full attention to the efforts they called a jihad *amarma’rufnahimunkar*.

Theoretically, the position of the state greatly influenced the views and attitudes of community organizations. State protection for minority groups would encourage social actors to be tolerant. On the contrary, state persecution of minority groups would increase intolerance among social actors (Menchik 2016, 23). However, in the current climate of democracy in Indonesia the problem was more complicated. Populist democracy required negotiations between officials who wanted public support and important elements in society. Conservative groups that won public discourse would more easily influence the state (government) in terms of policies against minorities.

3. Jakarta: The Shift from Mainstream Religious groups and MUI from Moderatism to Conservatism

Although most clerics in Jakarta tend to fully accept the concept of nation-state, there was also a tendency of reservation from conservative clerics that should be further explored. In his book, *Conservative Turn*, van Bruinessen and other researchers asserted that the Indonesian Muslim community was turning to conservatism in some ways, beginning with the shift of intellectuals to the political realm (Bruinessen 2013). What was revealed among Jakarta clerics in this study at a certain level was in line with what was described by Bruinessen and other writers in the book, mainly related to the political axis which fueled the strengthening of conservatism among clerics. Ideology and religious understanding explained their conservative attitude, but the political arena spurred the strengthening of conservatism. In fact, this political

arena on several issues had changed the attitude of religious groups that were considered moderate, namely the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Umat Islam, which were moving towards an increasingly conservative direction. Likewise there was a similar shift in the body of the MUI (Zulkifli 2013; Hamzah 2017). The shift in the religious attitudes of the above organizations then gave strong legitimacy to the conservative notions of the Muslim community at large.

Jakarta




Figure 6. Characteristic of Clerics in Jakarta

Muhammadiyah’s moderate attitude, for example, was considered to be declining along with the debate over certain issues that arose in the hot situation of political circles in the context of the election of leaders and officials in Indonesia. This, according to several studies, was due to the emergence of the Muhammadiyah variants associated with developing politics (Efendi 2014). The issues that most clearly illustrated this were the issues of national leadership and the school of thoughts in internal Islam. This attitude was evident in the political arena that mingled with religious issues in Indonesia as in the case of alleged blasphemy by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), which gave rise to strong reactions from the public that Ahok committed blasphemy and had to be legally accounted for. Some members of Muhammadiyah who were influenced by radical and conservative notions of transnational movements (Burhani, 2013) appeared to be actively involved in the reaction against Ahok.

This kind of conservatism was also displayed by clerics in the Central MUI circle in Jakarta. Some studies have found that there

was a shift in the religious attitudes of the MUI today. The MUI was established to help the government respond to religious issues. Over time, changes in leadership and political situation, had changed its tendency from providing support to the government to emphasizing correction to the government and even showed an attitude that was not in line with government policy. Later the attitude of the MUI often showed its populist and Islamist tendencies (Burhanuddin 2007; Ichwan 2013), including several decrees related to blasphemy, such as a decree on the Ahok case. The view of the MUI which affirmed the blasphemy of religion by Ahok, for example, inspired mass mobilization in the actions of ‘defending Islam’ and underlying the establishment of an ideological forum, the National Defenders of Fatwa Movement (GNPF). The attitude of the MUI could be explained by the growth of conservatism in Indonesia in general, and in Jakarta in particular.

4. Medan: Reserved Islamists and Islamization of Pancasila

The national narrative conceptualized by clerics in the city of Medan involved dynamic contestation. Clerics with a variety of categories had varied religious perceptions so that they ultimately influenced their views on national narratives. Political patronage played a very important role in shaping religious tendencies. Without a deeply rooted Islamic tradition, religious tendencies were strongly influenced by national and local political issues. As a result, there was a tendency for Islamism to strengthen in Medan as a result of the recent strengthening of Islamism in Indonesia.




Figure 7. Characteristic of Clerics in Medan

Mainstream clerics – with the exception of NU clerics – and some young clerics in Medan tend to support candidates as legislative members and prospective regional/national leaders who aimed to smoothen the implementation of Islamic values. The spirit of Islamism explained the orientation of their religious and political attitudes. They did not expressly want a change of government system into a system that resembled the political history of Islam in its early days (read: caliphate) because they realized the replacement of Pancasila system with caliphate would violate Indonesia's history. Therefore, Islamizing the Pancasila was a more realistic choice.

One of their ways to carry out the Islamization of Pancasila was to take action, if the opportunity presented itself, to return the seven words in the first principle of Pancasila, "Believe in God, with the obligation to implement Islamic sharia for its believers." They believe that these words did not reduce the plural and democratic nature that existed in the Pancasila system. The argument was that the return of the seven words was specific only to Muslims who were the majority population, so non-Muslims remain undisturbed by these additions. In a way, they hoped that even though the state's symbol and system was Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, Islamic values could still be formally included.

When the majority of the clerics represented by mainstream clerics in Medan wanted to carry out Islamization of the Pancasila, at the same time that desire was also paralleled with the desire to make Islamist reservations. This meant that they would be more willing to support legislative/governor candidates who supported Islamic local regulations. They did not care whether the person they supported was a capable legislative member or governor, they only cared with the fact that they were Muslim.

The strengthening of Islamism influenced the formation of national narratives among clerics. Islamism even provided space for mainstream clerics to carry out Islamization of Pancasila in an effort to form a more Islamic Republic of Indonesia. Populist Islamism in Medan formed a discursive authority to include those who were considered true clerics and clerics who would threaten the integrity of the NKRI which in fact was a theologically different minority of clerics. On the other hand, minority clerics expressly expressed their support for the Republic of Indonesia as the final form of nationality. National narrative was a clerical contestation space in shaping Islamic political narratives.

From another perspective, nationality was the stage of narrative

contestation to gain religious authority. That was how nationality was narrated by the clerics to influence the congregation in religious assemblies. Nationality became a struggle for narrative and authority at the same time. In the experience of Medan Muslims, a strong conservatism had found a paradoxical and relatively fluid presence that had slowly shifted towards a more moderate direction. This revised Martin van Bruinessen's thesis (2013) that Indonesia experienced an increasingly conservative tendency. The dynamics of Islam in the experience of clerics in Medan showed a more accommodating shift in Islamism even though it was accompanied by Islamic reservations. Of course, this accommodative shift was in turn very conditioned by democratic political space, increasing economics, and the success of clerics to understand and act upon Islam in a relevant and proportionate manner.

5. Accepting Democracy in a Halfhearted Manner

Concerns about the rise of Islamism movement in South Sulawesi had long been held by various groups, including the regional government. In 2002, for example, the Government of South Sulawesi Province held a poll on the implementation of Islamic Law in this region. The poll was conducted by a team formed by the provincial government, namely the Concept Study Team for the Implementation of Islamic Law in South Sulawesi (PKPSI Sulsel) involving respondents from various groups, including 24 regents, 60 local parliament members, 81 religious leaders, and 60 community leaders. The results of the poll at the time showed that the majority of the people (91.11%) agreed to the discourse on the application of Islamic Sharia in South Sulawesi, even though they differed in their opinion regarding the format and form of implementation of Islamic Sharia itself. The results of the polls showed that 59 percent of the people wanted the structural application of Islamic Sharia through legislation, 32 percent agreed to the implementation of Islamic Sharia culturally without having to go through the establishment of legislation, while the other nine percent did not show any preference (Juhanis 2006; Mujiburrahman 2013).

However, the findings of studies related to Islamism in South Sulawesi had a tendency to present positive results, where it was believed that the Islamist movement that developed on a national scale in Indonesia did not have a significant impact on the formation of a similar movement in South Sulawesi. Some studies have even concluded that the pattern of movements that developed in South

Sulawesi tended to be in the form of post-Islamism which was more inclined to an accommodative pattern of the government system. There was no indication of a problem related to the acceptance of Muslim communities in South Sulawesi towards the concept of nations (Karim 2011). The BNPT study itself did not show data that the actions of extremism or terrorism were developed in Makassar. The Islamism movement in Makassar was believed to only grow to the level of militancy and radicalism (Hidayah 2013). The survey results did not indicate an attitude of refusal of clerics to the concept of nation-states, where 70% of clerics were in a progressive, inclusive and moderate spectrum.

Makassar




Figure 8. Characteristic of Clerics in Makassar

Rejection of democracy and the system of the nation-state itself couldnot be seen solely from expressions and movements which blatantly blasphemed and rejected democracy in public space (Hilmy 2015, 441). The strength of the democratic system in Indonesia and the broad acceptance of the people of the nation-state system made the movement of individuals and groups who rejected the democratic system very narrow. Even though the discourse related to alternative systems besides democracy, including the caliphate system, was expected to continue be advocated by certain groups, the discourse of rejecting democracy in this country remained unpopular up to this day.

In general, the views of Makassar clerics regarding democracy and nation-states did not indicate a rejection of existing system. Although

survey data and interview results indicated that there were no clerics in Makassar from all categories that openly rejected Pancasila, as the basis of the state and as the democratic government system, the results of the interviews indicated that there were indications of ambiguity in the understanding of several clerics regarding the democratic system. Although clerics clearly stated that they accepted a democratic system, for example, in reality they defined democracy differently from what was understood in the constitution.

Fragmentation rose related to the acceptance of clerics to the democratic system, where they accepted the system in certain aspects but they rejected other aspects of the existing system. Others accepted the system conditionally. Some of the cleric's responses even indicated that they were in fact substantially anti-system, but they accepted it solely because there was no possibility of resisting it. The fact that democracy was the only system that was accepted made the discourse to offer another system, including caliphate, illogical to be offered at the national level. The political system that developed in Indonesia today made the discourse of rejecting democracy unable to get adequate support from the public. In some cases, rejecting democracy could be interpreted as a suicide attempt that was counterproductive for campaigning. In this case, the anti-systemic understanding of some clerics were more of a hidden agenda, where the possibility of resonance was determined by the presence or absence of the opportunity to articulate it in the future.

B. CLERICS IN MAINSTREAM ISLAMIC CITIES

1. Banda Aceh: Clerics, Nation-State, and Religious Ethno-nationalism

The level of acceptance among clerics of Banda Aceh was quite high (66%) and it raised a question, given Aceh's turbulent nature in the past, signified by the Darul Islam and GAM rebellion, and human rights violation that had not been resolved up to this day. This fact gave an impression that the two movements had not been influential among clerics. However, there were also quite a lot of clerics who rejected nation-state, as much as 23.33%. Revolution in most states was not conducted by the majority, but by the militant minorities. The problem was that the minority who rejected nation-state in Banda Aceh was not militant.

Banda Aceh




Figure 9. Characteristic of Clerics in Banda Aceh

The high number of clerics who rejected nation-state (rejectionism) can be seen in two possibilities. The first possibility was the increasing tendency of rejectionism among clerics, under the assumption that clerics were pacified by the new order and had only been strengthened recently. However, there was a second possibility, that perhaps the data actually reflected the decline of rejectionism among clerics, given that Darul Islam and GAM rebellions had occurred – the remnants of which could not be easily eliminated. This meant that the level of rejection was very high before, and lately it had actually been on decline because of the political changes that took place in Aceh, such as the end of GAM-Jakarta conflict and the official implementation of Islamic Shari’a in a “top-down” manner. Should the first possibility be true, then this showed that sharia politics was ineffective, because it thickened religious ethnocentrism which confronted the concept of the nation-state in a new pattern, no longer armed, but with affirmation of independence and self-governance, which was done with justification of legislation made by Jakarta. But should the second possibility be true, then it showed that de-extremism and de-separatism efforts by the New Order and the post-New Order government were successful. However, unfortunately, there was no previous research that measured the level of acceptance and rejection toward the concept of nation-state during and/or immediately after the conflict. Hence we cannot claim whether the rate of rejection had increased or actually declined.

History showed that the tendency of accepting and rejecting

nation-state was dynamic, sometimes rising and sometimes decreasing – which was very dependent on the context. At the beginning of independence, the clerics' acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state was so great that a number of Aceh clerics decreed the joining of Aceh to the Republic of Indonesia, but in the hope of implementing Islamic law in the Indonesian context. When Sukarno promised that possibility, the cleric mobilized the people of Aceh to donate huge amounts of money and jewelry to buy the first civilian aircraft and, supposedly, gold for the peak of Monas. However, this acceptance turned into rejection when Sukarno reneged on his promise by not approving the application of Islamic law. This led to the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion led by Daud Beureueh. DI was finally able to be conquered in 1962. However, rejection did not decrease, and it actually rose when another rebellion also emerged, namely the Free Aceh Movement led by Tgk. Hasan Tiro in 1976. The rebellion went tediously long, and took a huge toll, and only ended after the Helsinki MOU in 2005 (Aspinall 2005; Morfit 2007), seven years after the fall of Suharto.

However, before the conflict ended, there were two things that Jakarta had done to Aceh. First, the process of de-extremism and de-separatism through soft and hard methods. The soft method was done by incorporating some clerics who accepted nation-state by accommodating them into the Indonesian Cleric Council, Golkar Cleric Work Unit (Satskar Cleric), and other efforts. The hard method was carried through firearms, as in the case of Teungku Bantaqiah (Ahsan 2017). Secondly, Jakarta had approved the adoption of Islamic law since 1999 and then officially enacted it in 2001. Meetings between Acehese religious leaders and the central government were carried out both in Aceh and in Jakarta (Miller 2009). This was considered as part of a security approach to win the hearts of the Acehese religious community and elite, in the face of GAM, which did not have an official agenda of applying Islamic law (Kingsbury, 2007; Ichwan, 2007).

In the context of the dynamics of the perception of the above clerics, the process of de-extremism and de-separatism on the one hand and the application of Islamic law on the other hand was quite successful in changing the perception of Acehese clerics towards the nation-state. However, it was not completely successful. There were at least two reasons to consider these efforts as partially successful: first, there was no cleric who continued the struggle of Darul Islam to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia, the Islamic State of Aceh, or the Islamic Kingdom of Aceh. This research showed that there were no extremist

signifier, namely active pro-violence, anti-system, intolerance, and anti-citizenship. This made the ideology of Islamism which rejected the concept of the nation-state not the dominant ideology. Secondly, the lack of clerics who joined and supported GAM's struggle. This was later evident when ex-GAM established the local political party Partai Aceh (PA) and the cleric organization of Nanggroe Aceh Cleric Council (MUNA) in 2009. Very few clerics joined the party. Dayah clerics even supported many other local parties, the Aceh Sovereign Party, even though the party would not be able to survive.

The absence of progressive clerics, in the context of Aceh that applied sharia, could be understood, because clerics in general—unlike the intellectuals – base their thoughts on the text were very conservative in making new and critical interpretations of it. In addition, the lack of progressive clerics among them was because the mainstream school of thought among Aceh clerics was the Dayah-based *Ahlussunnah Wal-Jemaah*, and/or Aceh universities that did not develop progressive Islamic understandings. Moreover, progressive thinking was stigmatized as deviant behavior. Some cases of persecution against local religious leaders because of accusations of deviating could deter a person's will to think differently. There were also those whose houses were destroyed, got their *pesantran* burned, and were even killed. Progressive thinking could be accused as deviant or misguided behavior. This made the ideas of democratization and human rights which were usually carried out by progressive groups only supported by intellectuals and human rights activists and women, and very few clerics advocated them. This also caused contextual interpretations of sharia and nation-states difficult to grow among clerics.

What must be underlined from this Banda Aceh case, and Aceh in general, was that efforts of de-extremism and de-separatism were quite successful, but were not or have not been fully completed, because the wounds of the conflict could not be fully cured. Meanwhile, the justice efforts against human rights violations during the period of conflict had gone nowhere, even though the institution to manage it had been established. If GAM's ethno-nationalism first demanded independence, then Aceh is now a "provincial-state", and if DI first demanded an Islamic state, Aceh is now a government based on sharia which is still part of the NKRI. This concept was not fully able to erase the sense of "nationality" of the Acehnese people, and was also not able to completely erase their desire to implement the Islamic political system. However, the two desires were able to be channeled with the

concept of “nanggroe sharia in the frame of NKRI”. This turned the post-authoritarianism and post-conflict democratization in Aceh to the sharia-ization of bureaucracy (making the bureaucracy more *shar’i*) and bureaucratization of sharia (making sharia more bureaucratic) on the one hand and the sharia-ization of society on the other. The project “nanggroe sharia in the frame of NKRI” was actually the translation of religious ethno-nationalism in its “soft” form, not in its “hard” form like that of Daud Beureueh and Darul Islam. So, what happened is canalization of Islamism in the context of religious ethno-nationalism. With this concept, Islamist ideology did not lead to the formation of an Islamic state, but an Islamic province - “nanggroe sharia in the frame of NKRI”.

2. Palangka Raya: Clerics and Narratives of “Politics of Difference”

The majority of clerics in Palangka Raya accepted the ideas of nation-state, especially in the pro-system and anti-violence dimensions, but showed reservations to the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship. Reservation in this case meant incomplete acceptance of the concept of nation-states – which in this study were placed in four dimensions, namely pro-system, anti-violence, tolerance and citizenship. The reservation of most clerics in Palangka Raya on the dimensions of tolerance and citizenship in Palangka Raya couldnot be separated from the history and creation of a non-holistic nation-state in Central Kalimantan, where the discourse of ethnicity was stronger than civic discourse. This limited acceptance was mainly on the issue of interfaith relations, especially Islam-Christian and religious minorities. Despite accepting the validity of electorally elected non-Muslim leaders, most of them stated that non-Muslim leadership tended to override the aspirations and interests of Muslims. The same is true of religious minorities.

Palangka Raya




Figure 10. Characteristic of Clerics in Palangka Raya

The attitude of the majority of Palangka Raya clerics who rejected the existence and expression of religious minorities, especially fellow Islamic groups such as the Ahmadiyya and Shia, also illustrated a significant reservation on the issue of citizenship. The majority of clerics mentioned their agreement to recognize the existence of Kaharingan, but rejected the existence of Ahmadiyya and Shia. Rejection of Ahmadiyya and Shia seemed to be in line with the findings of Jeremy Menchik (2016) who said that the majority of NU, Muhammadiyah and PERSIS clerics accepted interfaith differences, but rejected internal religious differences. According to Menchik, this was related to the building of the Indonesian nation-state which was not based on secularism, but Godly nationalism.

In addition, religious discourse was also closely related to ethnicity. The relationship between ethnicity and religion was often parallel, but sometimes one overcame the other. Although the fact was not so, Islam was generally identified with ethnic Banjar. Meanwhile, plural Protestant Christians were associated with Dayak ethnicity. However, this association was not always stable. The Sampit conflict proved how ethnic identity (in this case the Dayak) overcame religious identity (in this case Islam). However, on the issue of regional leadership, the issue of religion seemed to overcome ethnicity. In this context, most Bakumpai Dayaks prioritized religious issues rather than ethnicity.

The paradox and ambivalence of nation-states in Palangka Raya was also inseparable from the history of the formation of Central Kalimantan province in the late 1950s, which, according to Klinken (2006), was stronger in state-building than nation-building. “State-building” was more administrative and ambivalent. Despite being part of the NKRI, the discourse of ethnicity was stronger than civic discourse.

However, the Palangka Raya case also showed, borrowing Partha Chatterjee’s words, ‘politics of difference’ with the central government’s narrative about the nation-state. Different historical experiences regarding the ‘nation’ showed different modular forms. As a result, the relationship between religion and ethnicity in Palangka Raya was crucial and complex, but also fluid.

3. Banjarmasin: Reserved Spaces

Among Banjarmasin clerics there was a reluctance to fully accept the derivative concepts of nation-state, especially in the issue of tolerance and citizenship. This reluctance couldnot be fully interpreted as a rejection of the nation state, but became a reserved space and at the same time created a heterodoxy variant of the nation-state ‘doxa’. The reservation rooms could be seen at least in the following circumstances.




Figure 11. Characteristic of Clerics in Banjarmasin

Firstly, in some informants, there was the strong idea that proportional justice (understanding of justice based on the proportion of numbers to determine the rights and obligations of a citizen) was a double-edged knife, as seen in the issue of majority-minority relations and the human rights paradox. On the one hand, proportional justice provided balanced rights to each community group in a democracy according to the population. At the same time, proportional justice eliminated the human rights inherent in individual citizens because of their humanitarian entities, not in relation to other human beings based on numbers. The paradox in proportional justice was in understanding the obligation and rights based on the assumption of the majority and minority, while democracy in the nation-state respected each individual as a single entity that had the same rights and obligations as other individuals, regardless of the predicate of majority or minority.

Second, the reserved space occurred because of the distance between the clerics' conceptual understanding of the nation-state and their perceptions of current political practices, both at the local, national and global levels. Conceptually, there were hardly statements that explicitly, even implicitly, rejected the concept of nation-state. At the same time, such acceptance by some clerics was accompanied by rejection of some praxis of its derivative concepts, such as the concept of *ulilamri*. The refusal was based on the government's current assessment which was considered to have not met the *ulilamri* category.

Third, in contrast to the second reserved space that showed deep conceptual understanding, but did not necessarily relate to their perceptions of existing political practices, some Banjarmasin religious leaders did not have a deep understanding of the concept of nation-state and political jurisprudence in Islam. This condition explained the emergence of a reserved understanding among them. With regard to national leadership, for example, one figure viewed that the government in Indonesia could not be categorized as *ulilamri* solely because Indonesia was not an Islamic state. Even so, this government was still considered legitimate because Indonesia was indeed not based on Islam.

Fourth, the reserved space was formed because of the distance between conceptual references and contemporary Islamic literature references, including digital media (for example about human rights issues and non-Muslim conspiracy, women leadership). In the second reserved space, it had been revealed that conceptual understanding

of the nation-state in a number of informants was sometimes at a distance with their perception against existing political practices. This perception of practical politics was formed among others by Islamic literature references. An informant eloquently explained the concept of statehood in Islam by referring to classical Islamic literature. However, when the interview questions were directed at the contextualization of Islamic state concepts with contemporary issues, such as the issue of human rights and non-Muslim leaders, the informant no longer referred to the primary books, but to a small line of translated books written by Islamic leaders from the Middle East, such as al-Albani, al-Nabhani, and A'īd al-Qarni. Without specifically referring to a particular book, the informant only referred to the issue such as human rights as an issue formed by the West to dominate Muslims.

Fifth, reservations arose because of the theological position of Islamists in the concept of leadership in Islam in particular. This phenomenon occurred in two cases from individuals with different group affiliations. The first case occurred in the position of a Salafi cleric regarding non-Muslim leadership and obedience to *ulilAmri*. In the issue of obedience to *ulilamri*, the informant explicitly stated the obligation of absolute obedience, as an order of hadith. The cleric based his opinion on the hadith which ordered complete obedience to the leader even though he was an Ethiopian servant. This Ethiopian servant was interpreted more broadly to include non-Muslims, when he became a leader he was subject to the law to be obeyed as *ulilamri*. At the same time they limited the ability to appoint non-Muslim leaders, only when there was no other choice. As such, a Muslim must elect Muslim leaders even with lower qualifications than non-Muslim leaders.

Another case is the leadership of women in the view of a Tarbiyah female cleric who declared full acceptance on the concept of the nation-state as a collective agreement, and the equal rights of all citizens to be appointed as leaders, including women. Even so, she could not accept women's leadership because there is a hadith that "threatens" destruction for a nation led by woman.

4. Surabaya: Cleric Fragmentation, Negotiations and Reservations about the Nation-State

In general, the acceptance of Surabaya clerics on the concept of the Indonesian nation-state and its derivatives was very strong even though almost all of them also had various reservations and even some attempted to bargain on certain matters. Their acceptance could be ideological, namely accepting based on principle, but could

also be realistic, namely accepting because of the current condition faced or because it was the reality. The acceptance of Surabaya clerics on the principle of anti-violence – namely the rejection of the legitimacy to use violence in achieving goals – was very high. The principle of anti-violence as part of the concept of nation-state was generally agreed upon, but again there were views that appeared to be inconsistent regarding this matter especially in relation to attitudes towards minority groups that were considered heretical. So, despite the variations, the reception of Surabaya clerics against the nation-state principle was generally very high.

Surabaya




Figure 12. Characteristic of Clerics in Surabaya

However, a problem arose which pertained to the principles of tolerance and citizenship which emphasized equality and justice of rights and obligations for every citizen, including minority groups. The negotiations and reservations given by the Surabaya clerics generally concerned these two matters. Partial tolerance and limited acceptance of citizenship, which were sometimes inconsistent, ambiguous and even paradoxical, formulated an important reservation in the view of Surabaya clerics against the nation-state although there were also many other reservations

The high rate of acceptance of Surabaya clerics for the nation-state could be easily understood by studying the Islamic and national history that “unified” in Surabaya. The Jihad Resolution of 22 October 1945 and the Surabaya War of 10 November 1945 were monumental

historical events that showed the strong sentiment of nationalism amongst Muslims, especially among clerics and “*santri*”s (Islamic students). Surabaya was also one of the nodes of transportation on land, sea, and air for the surrounding areas in the country. The cosmopolitan character of this city had been visible since the days long before independence. This was an equally important explanation regarding the strong acceptance of the people in the city towards the principles contained in the nation-state concept. However, several incidents of terrorism in the name of religion that struck the city of Surabaya recently also raised a number of questions regarding the possibility of penetration from anti-system radical groups in this provincial capital that had become the headquarters or base for NU.

5. Padang: Identity Politics in Clerical Space

Padang clerics can be said to be very attached to Islamic religiosity, since the arrival of Islam and as illustrated in its union with Minang customs, up to the struggle of Tuanku Imam Bonjol and the initiation of PRRI/Permesta - these were historic events that marked the close relations between Islam and Padang community. Religiosity was intertwined with political Islam in various levels and interests. The acceptance of the Padang city clerics on the concept of nation-states and its derivative concepts could be seen from the framework of accommodative attitudes between religion and the state that were associated with elements of locality. The traditional proverb “*declining customs, rising sharia*,” was upheld by Minang clerics as a harmonious linkage between Muslimness and citizenship logic was perceived as quite effective and efficient for the moderation of Islam in the city of Padang

Padang




Figure 13. Characteristic of Clerics in Padang

The issue of identity politics, as reflected in the reservation, contestation, and negotiation on the concept of the nation-state, reinforced the argument that Indonesian-Islam relations continued to be accepted and underwent a process of construction and reconstruction in the minds of the people. In the midst of the construction of Islamic-Indonesian identity, one could not separate this from the various political interests founded on the basis of religious jargon and religious symbols, such as the formalization of Islamic law and the firm attitude on issues of government programs such as immunization.

The historical context proved that the issue of NKRI, Pancasila and Unity in Diversity were important platforms for the nation-state, as seen in observations and interviews of the cleric leaders of the city of Padang. Those concepts have long been understood and interpreted in the Minang community in the midst of exclusivity, conservativeness and radical views amongst some clerics on the concept of nation-state, where the definition of radical character here referred to an active attitude in the context of the intolerance dimension and not fully accepting the principle of citizenship.

Thus, the struggle within the body of the cleric institution was actually a description of identity politics that occurred in the socio-political space (read: political Islam) that intertwined with aspirations, interests, and partiality in the context of religiosity – the enforcement of Islamic law. Supported by the *pesantren* background and moderation

of Islamic organizations, the Padang clerics played a central role as the pillars of the nation-state principle. They purported as a counterweight to the tension between religious and state issues, including attitudes towards religious minorities. This vision, in Menchik's narrative (2014, 621), balances individual rights, religious groups, diversity of beliefs, and obedience to God. This was the main and fundamental portion as the brightest color of Indonesian Islamic discourse..

The politics of identity was observed quite clearly in the religious space of the city of Padang which was generally moderate. This factor seemed to 'delay' the moderate character of Padang clerics. In its praxis, such inclusive and moderate authority could grow together with the exclusive. There were confrontational attitudes and contestational ideas as separate points, but there was also a negotiative attitude as a meeting point that was reflected in several local and national religious political issues. In this sociological-anthropological level, the concept of the nation-state became a discursive fragment, wherein the inclusive encouraged or pushed the clerics' attitude towards that of a moderate Indonesian Islamism for the future of Indonesia, and which coincided with the aspirations and voiced interests echoed by Islamic and pacifistic authorities that were strongly exclusive.

C. CLERICS IN MUSLIM MINORITY CITIES

1. Pontianak: Islamism and Challenges of Tolerance and Citizenship

Broadly speaking, Pontianak clerics showed positive attitude towards the idea of nation-state. Pancasila and democracy were well received. However, the monolithic attitudes and views of clerics regarding nationalism underwent post-Reformation changes. The presence of freedom of opinion and a critical voice towards nationalism was often accompanied by the inclusion of new actors in Islamic missionaries in Pontianak. Fragmentation of political and religious authorities had altered the monolithic picture.

Pontianak




Figure 14. Characteristic of Clerics in Pontianak

Pontianak, and also West Kalimantan in general, were known as areas with a high number of minority religious followers. History recorded that the diversity of religions and tribes was one of its strengths. This diversity explained how the perceptions of Pontianak clerics constructed perceptions and views about the nation-state. The reality of religious diversity was an important consideration for them to choose the form of the Pancasila nation-state and NKRI rather than, for example, an Islamic state. Their views on non-Muslim minorities were also classified as progressive, in the sense that they were nonviolent, pro-system, tolerant, and respected civic rights. However, it also appeared that there were vulnerabilities in the relationship between the majority of Muslims and non-Muslim minorities. Religious tolerance began to erode on certain aspects, for example the discontinued habit of congratulating non-Muslims on holidays. The lack of tolerance of some Pontianak clerics against the Muslim minority which were considered as deviating from the true version of Islam seemed to be influenced by the general discourse that had developed throughout Indonesia.

The attitude of Pontianak clerics towards minorities seemed ambiguous. A harsh attitude was shown against minorities who were deemed not in accordance with "true Islam" or declared heretical. The same thing did not happen to minorities who were considered to be within the limits of "true Islam". "The true Islam" here was interpreted as Sunni Islam which was the mainstream Islam in Indonesia. So, the

Salafi minority or the Jamaat Tabligh, for example were not declared heretical and were considered to be included in Sunni Islam. Since its establishment, the MUI had played an important role in giving birth to decrees about these Muslim minority groups. These decrees had a big influence on the community as seen in various cases, ranging from violence against the Ahmadiyya congregation, Lia Eden, to Gafatar. Survey data showed that over 57% of thirty respondents supported MUI's decrees on heretics.

By comparing decrees about Shia and Ahmadiyya, we could see the ambiguity of the MUI towards both. The Indonesian Cleric Council explicitly stated that the Ahmadiyya was heretical, but they had not declared the Shia as heretics. The MUI, through a decree issued in 1984, only warned of differences between Shia and Sunnis and the dangers of Shia if they entered Indonesia. This decree about Shia seemed to have an influence on the attitudes of religious leaders or clerics outside the MUI. The attitude of MUI was reflected in the attitude of Pontianak clerics towards Shia and Ahmadiyya. Their resistance to Ahmadiyah was very high. The decree of MUI regarding the heresy of Ahmadiyah seemed to have a strong influence on their rejection (MUI Decree Number: 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005).

Some Pontianak clerics had divided between theological and citizenship issues. In terms of theology, they did not tolerate Ahmadiyya at all. This theological attitude raised an ambiguous attitude in looking at civic rights and resolving the Ahmadiyya case. On the other hand, they acknowledged that the government must provide protection to the Ahmadiyya community and not support the use of violence against the Ahmadiyya community other than to make people aware that Ahmadiyya teachings were contrary to the teachings of Islam and the government must limit their movement so as not to spread the teachings.

Even though it was predominantly Muslim, Pontianak was characterized by a large non-Muslim population. The Muslim and non-Muslim harmonious co-existence had been nurtured for a long time. This awareness of religious diversity seemed to be reflected strongly in the Pontianak clerics' positive views about co-existing with non-Muslims. The growing awareness of the need to maintain harmony among followers of differing religions was later echoed in the people of Pontianak. This couldnot be separated from the experience of ethnic conflict that had occurred in various regions in West Kalimantan after the New Order (van Klinken 2007, chapter 4). They were made

aware of the potential for conflicts that arose from ethnic, cultural and religious diversity.

The vulnerability of intolerance towards non-Muslims could also be read from changes in diversity that occurred on a national and local scale. Convey 2017 research interview data indicated a change in attitude towards non-Muslims. The tradition of saying Merry Christmas or Happy Chinese New Year to non-Muslim ethnic Chinese neighbors were later considered to be no longer commonplace. It was undeniable that this change was a result of the stream of Islamization which was recently carried out by new actors in Islamic missionaries such as Salafi, Ustad Abdul Shomad and Felix Siauw. In this case, their missionary through social media such as Youtube were very influential in changing attitudes towards non-Muslims.

2. Denpasar: Muslim Identity and Negotiation of Local Citizenship amidst the Rise of Ajeg Bali Political Culture

In the local history of Bali, Hinduism and Islam coexisted peacefully. However, after the 1998 Reform there were developments in the rise of the Ajeg Bali idea which encouraged social and political consolidation of Muslims. These had driven Muslims to redefine their social identity in Bali. Survey data showed high acceptance in the dimensions of pro-system and anti-violence, but acceptance in the dimension of tolerance and citizenship tended to be low. It seemed that the rather low acceptance of tolerance and citizenship that was generally related with aspects of daily life showed the reaction of Muslims toward the strengthening of Bali's Hindu identity politics. This contestation was part of the challenge of pluralism in an effort to find a multicultural citizenship model (Hefner 2001: 3; Kymlicka 1995).

The rise of the Ajeg Bali movement which pushed into the political realm and local cultural policy demanded Balinese Muslims to negotiate with the situation. The cultural policy was very clear in favor of the dominant culture that existed. One of the signifiers was the Governor of Bali's issuance of Governor Regulation Number 79 of 2018 concerning "Balinese Customary Clothing Day". Some Balinese Muslims viewed traditional clothing in the regulation was nothing but a form of traditional Hindu clothing. The policy was aimed at maintaining the religion, culture and language of Bali amidst the onslaught of globalization through the flow of tourism and at the same time also became a fortress against the influx of Muslim migrants who were increasingly prominent in Bali.

Muslims in Bali who were generally religious and held their religious identity as something important in order to live side by side (and face to face) with Hindus who were no less religious in making the Hindu identity an important element in their cultural, social and political life. For this reason, both needed to build a dialogue on how to develop mutual understanding, i.e. how to build a mutual feeling of security and comfortable communication.

Denpasar




Figure 15. Characteristic of Clerics in Denpasar

Harvey Cox' expression of "pluralism and tolerance are biological children of secularism"(1965) felt increasingly obsolete, including for conversations about citizenship in Bali where religiosity was strong. The expression came from the experience of European history which gave birth to the political concept that nationalism and tolerance were produced by secular-liberal ideologies which were now in many places beginning to be abandoned. Through his research on the contribution of Islamic organizations to democracy in Indonesia which examined the movements of the three largest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, namely NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, Jeremy Menchik (2016) proposed a thesis on "tolerance without liberalism" and based nationalism on Godly nationalism. According to him, the paradigm derived from the European experience could no longer be an absolute benchmark for developments in non-Western countries.

The paradigm usually placed two extreme positions. On the one hand, tolerance could only be realized if the community experienced a

secularization transformation. On the other hand, if the religious identity strengthened, it would result in a clash of civilization. In reality, this was not the case, for example NU had a high tolerance commitment without having to become secular. For Menchik, Islam's commitment to democracy was a fruit of long experiences of interaction between groups among Muslims, the interaction between Muslims in relation to religions, especially Christians, Islamic political thought, and the influence of modernization of the state system (Menchik 2016, 4).

In a more micro space in Bali, it was found contradictory positions of Muslim democratic practices. On the one hand, Balinese clerics show high acceptance of the principle of the nation-state system, but did not want to accept liberalism which was characterized by the idea of equality of citizens, for example not giving space to LGBT in public space. Menchik's analysis was not entirely new. Previously, Robert W. Hefner (2001, 4) emphasized the importance of sociology and anthropology regarding pluralism and democracy in Southeast Asia to not only follow suit about measuring developments in the field using a list of their suitability with the principles of liberalism.

But the question remained, was the development of Godly nationalism like that not worrying? In a country where religious identity flourished and divinity perched firmly in one of its national pillars, Pancasila, tolerance without liberalism and Godly nationalism was an inevitable track. The problem was in the Balinese context, did Bali still remain open to multiethnic and multi-religious openness? It could not be denied that the process of narrowing the openness space had begun to occur, but it was part of the dynamic challenges of local pluralism formed as a consequence of deliberative democracy and multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Hefner 2001). Challenges at the local level according to Jaques Bertrand (2004, 4) became part of local grievances that were not to be condemned, but should be broken down by placing them in the context of relations between citizens and local government policies. In the Balinese context, the Governor's Regulation on the obligation to wear Balinese traditional clothing on the one hand could encourage inculturation of Muslim culture in Bali, but on the other hand if similar policies continued to develop, it could trigger consolidation and resistance from Muslims.

3. Kupang: Imagined Islamic State, Disturbed Politics of Identity and Tolerance

The acceptance of Kupang clerics to the ideas of nation-state and

its derivative concepts was quite strong. However, reservation and contestation also affected this acceptance as seen in the emergence of imagined ideas of Islamic state and the application of sharia which were considered as solutions to the “problem” of the nation. This reservation needed to be interpreted within the framework of Islamic-Christian relations which was the main character in the dynamics of Muslims in Kupang. The existence of the imagined Islamic state, although very limited, could be referred to the position of Muslims as a minority and Islamic leaders and Islamic country seen as entry points to become politically stronger. This phenomenon was also influenced by the strengthening of identity politics at the national level.

The response to the issue of sharia formalization was indeed not homogeneous. The majority of clerics stated that the formalization of sharia in Indonesia was not important because the constitution and Pancasila already contained values that were in harmony with Islam. However, clerics who stated the need to formalize sharia in Indonesia also emerged in the context of Kupang Muslim minority. This condition could be read from various angles. First was the emergence of fragmentation among mainstream clerics in line with the strengthening of Islam as a symbol and identity politics. NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI clerics were no longer fully regarded as entities that had homogeneity perspective. The second one still triggered by the strengthening of Islam as a political identity which implied the strengthening of conservatism, reservations and negotiations regarding the concept of NKRI and its derivatives emerged which were previously considered established. NKRI was not debated, but the formalization of Sharia also believed to be a solution and the caliphate considered a more ideal and Islamic form, and therefore needed to be aspired.

Regarding the issue of tolerance, Kupang held a strong cultural tolerance between Muslims and Christians who were bound by kinship as a result of interfaith marriages which was built on the principle of “mutual understanding (*tahu sama tahu*)”. The dynamics of local politics and strengthening of identity seemed to be able to tear down the construction of cultural tolerance that had the potential to be “fire in the husk.”

Quantitative data showed that 26 out of 30 Kupang informants were positioned as pro-tolerance. The high level of tolerance among Kupang clerics was certainly not surprising given that Kupang and NTT were more widely known as a place of harmony between Christians as the majority and Muslims as a minority. The kinship that was

emphasized by interfaith marriages was one of the keys to cultural tolerance, especially between Muslims and Christians. Another reason for the high tolerance in Kupang was the efforts of religious leaders from both Muslims and non-Muslims in maintaining peace,, especially in the wake of tensions that arose between followers of these two religions as had occurred in the 1998 riots.

Kupang




Figure 16. Characteristic of Clerics in Kupang

A number of clerics say that expressions of acceptance and appreciation for other groups have changed as time went by. Some young religious activists or preachers expressly stated that they no longer wished Merry Christmas to Christian families and relatives, and no longer visited on Christmas day. This change was due to the widespread view that prohibited Muslims from saying Merry Christmas. More substantially, the increasing conservatism among Muslims in Indonesia and the strengthening of religious identity influenced the dynamics of Muslim-Christian relations in Kupang. In addition to the issue of Christmas celebrations above, interfaith marriages were suspected of being part of Christian proselytization efforts.

Regarding tolerance to the Muslim minority, both quantitative and qualitative data showed low numbers. Quantitative data, for example, showed that, 21 out of 30 respondents agreed to the community's rejection of the group that was considered heretical by the MUI. Likewise on the idea that Ahmadiyya was created to divide Muslims, 20 respondents agreed. Rejection of the Shia was also still relatively high,

although it was still below the number of rejection for Ahmadiyya. The refusal could be explained by the general view that Ahmadiyya and Shia were heretical Muslim groups who must be “straightened out” or invited to rejoin the majority Islam. Nevertheless, they rejected the use of violence against the minority Muslim group.

4. Ambon: Maintaining NKRI and the Challenges of Young Cleric who tends to be Conservative

Ambon’s Muslim population composed of approximately half of the total population, namely 205,502 people per 2017 from the total population of Ambon which was 390,032 people (Adherents of Religion, n.d.). As part of the Indonesian nation, Ambon Muslims strongly supported the formation of Indonesian State because of the historical experience of the colonial era which was very discriminatory to them. Religious polarization had occurred since the Portuguese era, when conflict occurred between the Portuguese and local residents which resulted in the separation of residential locations. During the Dutch colonialism, this segregation became increasingly visible when the Dutch privileged Christians compared to Muslims. Muslim-Christian polarization was said to have been created by the Dutch. So, when the Dutch suffered defeat and Japan came, Muslims welcomed with great enthusiasm the spirit of nationalism to build a new country called Indonesia, while the Christian community felt more comfortable with the Netherlands (Kadir, 2013).

In conjunction with Christians, Ambonese Muslims had quite a dark experience, especially when Islamic-Christian relations were torn apart by bloody conflicts that took thousands of victims in 1999-2002. It aroused awareness in the Ambonese people to continue to foster harmony and comradery, in reconstructing the past that had been destroyed, by preserving local cultural values such as *pela gandong*, *salam sarani*.

The majority of clerics in Ambon accepted the idea of a nation-state. Of the 30 respondents only 3 clerics could be categorized as rejectionists, 2 of them were exclusive while the other was extreme. Interestingly, young clerics tend to be in a lower spectrum of acceptance compared to the older clerics, even to the level of extreme attitudes. Extremism was influenced by the presence of extreme Javanese clerics who came to preach in Ambon. This extremism could be seen from the attitude of those who rejected the Pancasila democratic system, and viewed a non-Caliphate government as *thāghūt*, which could be ‘legally’ killed according to their Islamic belief.

Ambon




Figure 17. Characteristic of Clerics in Ambon

Some time ago, a group of extreme clerics preached at the Islamic Center in Waehong. Most of the audiences were young people who were looking for identity. This showed that this extreme group gained sympathy and support from the Ambonese community even though the support was very small. They were not detected by the mainstream clerics who assumed that there were no Laskar Jihad or caliphate advocates in Ambon. This was certainly an alarming issue for the life of nationhood in Ambon and Indonesia. This phenomenon could be explained by the fact that when the Muslim-Christian conflict took place, the majority of these young clerics were still very young in that the memory of the conflict did not leave any sensitivity regarding the importance of fostering better relations with Christians to coexist in peace.

However, Islamism in Ambon was not a dominant discourse. Indeed, Islamic trends were increasing and some clerics have become a little more conservative, but in Ambon context there was another more important matter that was of concern to these clerics, namely to enhance the quality of Muslims in Ambon in order to be able to live side by side and collaborate with their Christian brothers and sisters. It could be said that improving the quality of Muslims by providing better education was a way to maintain the continuity of the life of nationhood.

5. Manado: Challenges of Muslim Minority Citizenship

Manado was another city where the issue of Muslim minorities had risen. Regarding the nation-state, clerics in Manado generally accepted the idea. Democracy was one of the issues that was often discussed among Manado clerics. Some clerics saw that the substance of democracy did not conflict with Islamic values. The Manado Clerics accepted democracy because it was considered to be the only relevant system that could give benefit for the people, although it was acknowledged that it was not a perfect system. Their assessment on the weakness of democracy was based on empirical experience as a minority in the middle of the Christian majority. A number of Manado clerics considered that some discriminatory treatments still occurred, especially related to the difficulty of requesting permission for an open religious event in public spaces. Different conditions were indicated by the ease of the administration process for Christian religious events. In 2014, for example, Muslims in Manado were suddenly not given permission by the Manado city government to use public facilities, namely the *Sparta Tikala* soccer field to carry out Eid al-Fitr prayers, even though previously the Muslim communities had used the soccer field each year to perform Eid prayers, as one of the locations for Islamic Commemoration Days .

Manado




Figure 13. Characteristic of Clerics in Padang

This situation gave rise to suspicion among clerics about the process of 'covert Christian proselytization'. The attitude of some

Islamic leaders (in fact) could be interpreted as expressions of disappointment with the political map and government in the city of Manado. For the past few decades Muslims had never occupied the number one position or occupied strategic posts in government in this area, hence the notion that Muslims were deliberately marginalized in political-government matters emerged among the clerics. In addition, the recruitment of employees in government agencies originating from the Muslim community was very limited so that this added to the feeling of disappointment and marginalization among Muslims.

In other words, the reception and positive response of Manado clerics to the ideas of the nation-state was accompanied by their disappointment with the imbalance of civic rights at the local level. Political institutions in Manado were considered to have not accommodated much of the political interests of Muslims.

CLOSING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Acceptance to the idea of nation-state or NKRI as the sovereign and united territory was very high among clerics. The few rejections could be explained as their reservation to the concept of nation-state and the mobilization of opposition toward the current government. The biggest homework with regard to clerics' nationalism discourse was the urgency to mainstream ideas of tolerance and plurality among different religions and within the same religion, as well as recognition towards equality in civic rights.

This research offered several recommendation points that should be considered by the government, as well as stakeholders and the community:

- Encourage issues of citizenship and tolerance as an integral part of the Islamic clerics' religious discourse and encourage clerics to formulate strategies for the realization of their practices in a pluralistic society.
- Include materials on citizenship and tolerance in the Islamic clerics' education curriculum for Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) and universities.
- Encourage the idea of civil Islam, namely Islamic articulation related to democratic values as a paradigm of religious thought in religious institutions such as the MUI, *pesantren*, Islamic universities and Islamic socio-religious organizations.
- Strengthen the need to choose, recommend and compile Islamic

religious literature that are in harmony with the present context (but at the same time also has a strong and accountable scriptural foundation) to be distributed and used as a basis for religious discourse in government-run educational institutions, and state institutions.

- Encourage and facilitate clerics who have the paradigm of contextual Islamic thinking (to compete) in intervening in the *majlis taklim* space in order to control the discourse and practice of Islam in public.
- Intervene into clerical discourses with national cultural agenda so that cultural pluralism and views become facts that must be considered in religious articulation by clerics.
- Eliminate all types of laws, government regulations or government decrees that are deemed inconsistent with tolerance and citizenship values, and are often used as a basis for certain parties to carry out social intimidation against groups that are considered 'heretics'.

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