

Economic programs for the youth have a strategic role in overcoming radicalism and terrorism. The governments, civil society and religious organizations have important contributions to the activities and economic empowerment of young people including those who are former terrorist prisoners, ex-combatants and young people who have the potential to become targets of terrorism and radicalism.

Moreover, economic programs also strengthen nationalism and social security in border areas, especially for young people and former terrorist and combatant prisoners. These activities will strengthen their confidence in building independence, giving space in the process of disengagement from terrorist groups and past violence, as well as reintegration in society.


This book is based on research through in-depth interviews with more than 100 respondents (students, youth activists, mass organizations, regional government, agency heads, local entrepreneurs, educational institutions), focus group discussions, and document analysis in Nunukan (North Kalimantan), Poso (Central Sulawesi), Solo (Central Java), Lamongan (East Java), and Medan (North Sumatra).

"Radicalism and terrorism are multifactorial. In addition to understanding of religion, there are factors injustice, economics, and law. An economic approach can help many ex-terrorists to return to society and eliminate their thoughts and violent actions. Therefore, the treatment to terrorism cannot be done by the government itself, it requires the involvement of local governments, academics and NGOs."

(Police Brigadier General Ir. Hamli, M.E., Director of Prevention of the National Counter-Agency)


"So far, Economic Empowerment is considered to be one of the most effective prevention approaches. However, this book is important because it provides a record for establishing cross-stakeholder cooperation so that economic empowerment would be more effective."

(Prof. Dr. Jamhari, M.A.-Team Leader of CONVEY Project)



YOUTH ECONOMY
AND CONTRA TERRORISM POLICIES

Editor: Badrus Sholeh



Youth Economy and Contra Terrorism Policies

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Proofreader:

Sanctuary Language Works

First Printed, December, 2019

Publisher:

Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN Jakarta

Translated from the original book titled "*Ekonomi Kaum Muda dan Kebijakan Kontraterrorisme*"
published by PUSTAKA PELAJAR, February 2018

ISBN 978-623-93015-0-7

Editor Acknowledgement

The involvement of youth in the economy becomes crucial for Indonesia. Economy not only gives them strong confidence but also effectively prevents them from engaging in terrorism and political violence. Based on Global Youth Wellbeing Index 2017, Indonesia is still far behind other countries in providing economic opportunities for youth. Indonesia is ranked at the bottom three.

Polling by Gallup 2013 on the youth economy in Southeast Asia indicated that Indonesia is expected to provide more access to the youth and involve them in economic policy. In term of economics engagement, Indonesia is far behind Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

More than fifty percent of Indonesians are under the age of 30. Therefore, the Gallup poll recommends stronger opportunities and roles for youth in workforce: *“The concept of engaging younger employees is starkly different from the more traditional focus on retaining employees. Pay and promotion in a hierarchical business structure are unlikely to jump-start the cultural change necessary to nurture the kind of “learning organization” that Gen Y workers will want to embrace.”*¹ The hierarchical pattern of relationship within Southeast Asian cultures also hampers ASEAN region leadership process that challenge the region to play a stronger international role .

Readiness is also being made for generation Z through more complex economic creativity and regional and global competition. Dynamics, security threats and internationally unstable political policy further strengthen our hope to provide the maximum foundation and opportunity for youth in entrepreneurial activities and other economic programs.

This book presents the result of field studies on the assessment of youth economic skills and counter-terrorism and political violence efforts in five cities in Indonesia: Nunukan- North Kalimantan, Poso - Central Sulawesi, Solo- Central Java, Lamongan-East Java and Medan-North Sumatra. Field studies were

1 Vibhas Ratanjee dan Larry Emond, “Why Indonesia must Engage Younger Workers,” 17 December 2013. Accessed on 09/02/2018 from <http://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/166280/why-indonesia-engage-younger-workers.aspx>.

conducted from 1 August until 30 September 2017 through in-depth interviews and FGDs by involving over a hundred respondents consisting of local government, central government, agencies, police, youth activists, students, university students, religious organizations, entrepreneur and other relevant stakeholders. The analysis was strengthened by seminars and workshops until the end of January 2018. The study was conducted by ten field researchers and five local partner agencies. This is one of the programs financed by CONVEY Indonesia managed by PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP.

We would like to thank the researchers and writers; Irfan R Hutagalung, S.H, LL.M, Dr. Muhammad Guntur Alting, M.Pd., M.Si., Nostalgawan Wahyudhi S.IP., M.A., Saifudin Asrori, M.Si., Sholehuddin, M.Pd; research assistants; Kaula Fahmi, S.S., Achmad Fanani Rosyidi, S.Sos., Kurnia Aswaja, S.Psi, Sarah Hajar Machmudah, S.Sos., Waki Ats Tsaqofi, S.S. They have conducted field studies, living in the research area for almost a full month.

Our gratitude goes to partner institutions for their willingness to accompany us in this study on the field, which are including; Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB) Medan, Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) Lamongan, Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (LPMS) Poso, Center for the Study of Islam and Social Transformation (CISform) Yogyakarta and Pancasila Jiwaku (Panjiku) Nunukan. The Mentoring from local partner institutions had made it easier for researchers to focus on in-depth interviews, FGDs and observations over time.

Thank you to PMU Convey Indonesia, PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP for trusting us in managing the program. Many thanks to Prof. Dr. Jamhari as team leader of Convey Indonesia, Mr. Ali Munhanif, Ph.D. and Kang Jajang Jahroni, Ph.D. representing PMU to maintain the quality of this program, Mr. Saiful Umam, Ph.D, Executive Director of PPIM UIN Jakarta, UNDP, Ms. Utami Sandyarani and Mr. Ridwan, other Convey Indonesia PMU Kang Fuad Jabali, Ph.D., Kang Ismatu Ropi, Ph.D, Ms. Hani Samantha, Mr. Dani, Ms. Dita Kirana, and the entire Convey Indonesia team, PPIM UIN Jakarta, and UNDP.

We also extend our gratitude to the Dean of Faculty of Social Science UIN Jakarta, Prof. Dr. Zulkifli, M.A., Vice Dean for Academic Affairs Dzuriyatun Toyibah, M.Si., Vice Dean for General and Financial Administration, Dr. Bakir Ihsan, M.Si, and Vice Dean for Student Affairs, Dr. Agus Nugraha, M.A., as well as; Dr. Iding Rosyidin, M.Si. (Head of Department of Politic Science), Suryani, M.Si. (Secretariat of Department of Politic Science), M. Adian Firmas, S.IP, M.Si, Ahmad Alfajri, M.A. (Head of International Relations), Eva Mushoffa, M.HSPS. (Secretariat of Department International Relation), Dr. Cucu Nurhayati, M.Si. (Head of Department of Sociology) and Dr. Joharotul Jamilah, M.Si. (Secretariat of Department of Politic Science). Thank you for the guidance and support in the implementation of PSTPG Faculty of Social Science UIN Jakarta.

We would like to thank the management of PSTPG FISIP UIN Jakarta who support this program until the end, the speakers and participants of national seminar and best practice workshop from December 2017 until the end of January 2018, especially Prof. Dr. Irfan Idris, M.A. (Director of Deradicalization of BNPT), and Brig. Gen. Ir. Hamli, M.E. (Director of Prevention of BNPT) who have assisted since research design to dissemination and audience with BNPT.

To our consultants and program implementers; M. Adian Firas, S.IP, M.Si., Ahmad Syaifuddin Zuhri, S.IP, LM, M. Kurnia Majid, S.Sos, and Gita Syardiana, S.E. we express our gratitude for your hard work and dedication.

Finally, thanks to Abah, Mother, Brother and Sister, and especially my wife, Anis Fuadah Z., who patiently accompanied and provided material and moral support so that the program went smoothly. May Allah SWT repay all their good deed with the best of reply.

This book has been part of my economics study program that posits youth as central to any effort to prevent terrorism and political violence in Indonesia. The Center for Middle Eastern Studies and Global Peace (PSTPG) FISIP UIN Jakarta is expected to continue this fine tradition for further research and advocacy. As the study recommends that terrorism prevention and mitigation cannot be undertaken by BNPT alone, it is important that central and local government stakeholders, mass organizations and academic roles be more active. The humanistic approach that Indonesia has undertaken in preventing terrorism will be the maximum outcome through comprehensive cooperation among stakeholders.

Jakarta, 11 February 2018

Editor and Director of PSTPG FISIP UIN Jakarta,

Badrus Sholeh, Ph.D.

Acknowledgement of Convey Indonesia

One of the causes of youth interest in joining terrorist groups is the lure of work and high salaries. But unfortunately, this issue has never been studied more seriously either by state institutions dealing with counter-terrorism, as well as research institutions or NGOs that pursue this field. Youth are often described as groups searching for identity, vulnerable to militant provocation and ideology, and so on. This picture of youth is not particularly helpful in formulating a systematic strategy for dealing with terrorism. If the government seriously prevents terrorism, then it should start with the empowerment of the youth economy. And if youth are economically empowered, one of the most important links of radicalism and terrorism will automatically cut off.

The general illustration of youth above was dismantled by the PSTPG (Center for Middle Eastern Studies and Global Peace), a campus institute in UIN Jakarta specializing in counter-terrorism studies. So, the book written by PSTPG filled the void above. This book carefully maps the problems faced by youth, especially in the economic field. This book also maps out which areas need to receive an economic empowerment program, the steps, and the challenges it faces.

One of the findings of this book is that if the youth are economically independent, terrorist groups will fail to sell their ideology to them. At least they have great difficulty finding new followers. Moreover, this book is based on a long and meticulous field of study by taking up areas that have been the "basis" of terrorism in Solo, Lamongan, Poso and Medan. We hope that this book can fill the study void if it does not interest many people. We also hope that this will attract research on socio-economics field and its relationship to terrorism and extremism.

This book was written by those directly involved in the field, by speaking and observing the youth in the area mentioned above. Therefore, this speaks honestly the problems faced by the youth. Through a deep ethnographic approach, this book not only presents important information about the economic empowerment relationship of youth and terrorism, but also criticizes the deradicalization program

which has been intensively carried out by the government. I welcome the PSTPG, which is under Dr. Badrus Sholeh, M.A., to participate in PPIM UIN Jakarta Project Convey of 2017. This book, although thin, does not diminish the importance and readability of both stakeholders, researchers, and society in general.

Jakarta, 28 December 2017

Jajang Jahroni, Ph.D.
Convey Project Officer PPIM UIN Jakarta

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CHAPTER 1

Prologue:

Youth Economy and Contra-Terrorism Policies

1. Preface

Countering terrorism policies has changed after the failure of security approaches. Dialogue efforts with terrorists and former terrorists become more effective patterns in not only countermeasures but also prevention of terrorism.¹ This communication and dialogue will build trust and a more humane relationship that not only open information for strategic and tactical interests, but also give the space to reflect the process of change out of the past circle of violence. This humanistic approach was undertaken by Indonesian government in handling terrorism through dialogue and economic empowerment by Densus 88 after incident of Bali Bombing in 2002, followed by BNPT, Ministry of Social Affairs, and other ministries.

Limitation of funds and time in economic activities results in lack of effectiveness and weak long-term impacts that are expected to occur post economic empowerment for former combatants and former terrorist prisoners. More than seventeen years Indonesia has been conducting countermeasures against terrorism, many youths are still interested in following the movement of terrorism, including through social media which is intensively conducted by ISIS.

The Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 Year 2009 on Youth states that the definition of Youth is "Indonesian Citizen aged 16-30 Years" (BPS 2015). The number of Indonesian youth is around 65 million or about 25% of the total population of Indonesia. UN ESCAP states that youth aged 15-24 in Asia Pacific amounts to 717 million or about 60 percent of the total world youth. They determine the future of Indonesia and the Asia Pacific countries. This book is a result of interviews over a hundred respondents, FGDs, and observations to Nunukan - North Kalimantan, Poso - Central Sulawesi, Solo - Central Java, Lamongan - East Java, and Medan - North Sumatra from 1 August until 30 November 2017. The respondent interviewed are students, activists of youth and student organizations,

1 Jonathan Powell, *Terrorists at The Table: Why Negotiating Is the Only Way to Peace*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

mass organizations, NGOs, employers, local government agencies, ministries and agencies in the central government related to the “Assessment of the Economic Program for Youth and Counter-Terrorism Efforts.”

The study is strategic to see how programs and economic activities for youth, men and women, and their impact on social, political and security stability, especially the prevention and counter-terrorism and radicalism. Economic activity has a strategic role in the process of disengagement of combatants and former terrorists out of circle groups and acts of violence and terrorism. Some respondents of former terrorist prisoners state that communities and economic programs give them the strength and resilience to be more confidently integrated in society and free from the calls and recruitments that terrorist groups always do. There has always been an attempt by terrorist groups to invite them to conduct acts of terrorism again for those who are free from prison.

2. Youth Economy and Terrorism

As the third largest democratic and the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia is challenged with how the state and society can overcome radicalism and terrorism movements within the country and South Asia. Among over a thousand four hundred terrorist prisoners who were involved in various acts of terror, the majority are youth. Youth are increasingly challenged after different patterns are used by ISIS in recruiting and influencing them to travel to Syria to swear allegiance to Abu Bakar al Baghdadi. By massively using social medias and blogs, ISIS gets strong responses from young jihadists. Several teenager students from Indonesia joined ISIS and left for Syria. Hundreds of youth still intend to travel to Syria but are hampered by increasingly stringent security monitoring. A comprehensive and cross-stakeholder approach to youth as prevention and countermeasures of terrorism is an important requirement. One approach is through providing economic programs for them. Whether the economy has an impact on radicalism and terrorism movements has been the topic of debates between analysts and policy-makers.

Youth who are seeking self-existence and especially in the economically disadvantaged conditions are the targets of terrorist groups. When affected by terrorist groups after meeting in prison, those previously involved in drug crime or murder, become stronger and more willingful to join terrorism. They claimed their criminal action is one of “Jihad” actions. Those who are in poverty and economic pressures are potential for recruitment patterns of terrorist movements. Thomas Koruth Samuel stated:

“The environment has also played a conclusive role in triggering favourable responses from young people towards terrorism and extremism. When there are few opportunities to break out of the cycle of poverty, perceived or real injustice and despair, there is a greater tolerance for violence.”²

The government’s economic program has received positive responses from youth and society. However, the programs are generally short-term and unsustainable. The programs are not monitored and evaluated for the effectiveness and improvement. Arifudin Lako, a former terrorist prisoner from Poso stated:

“There should be an evaluation. Some programs have been conducted here for several times, but they lacked monitoring. There must be a companionship. At least after the program was conducted, there must be data which will be useful for something or someone. So, Evaluation and monitoring is important. At that time, I received a computer; it should be reviewed what it was used for in the following years.”³

Arifudin considers BNPT not having a clear platform in conducting economic empowerment assistance. Arifudin saw the aid program of BNPT were often misdirected. In the case of Poso, the aid was provided for former terrorist prisoner, but many people who had never been imprisoned also received the aid. Arifudin also added the existence of practices that did not fit the program and activities that being implemented. He stated:

“And then, there is data collection problem. When I was in Makassar, I was once invited by BNPT because of the wrong targeting data collection which resulted in chaos in deciding who should get the aid.”⁴

The youth have equal opportunities and roles. Mahfudh, from the Public Works Department of Poso District, stated that combatants had opportunities equal to those of the others in the Public Works tender. However, there are directives from the district head and the district police that former combatants getspecial attention for peace and security. Mahfudh stated:

“In general, as it has been directed from district head and the police chief, they should be supervised for the sake of security stability.”⁵

Local governments have a strategic role in empowering the economy of youth, including in the context of preventing and countering terrorism. The attention of the local government is not only in Poso, but also in Lamongan.

2 Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative*, Kuala Lumpur: SEARCCT, 2012, p. 8.

3 Arifudin Lako, interview in Poso, 1 September 2017.

4 Arifudin Lako, wawancara di Lako, 1 September 2017.

5 Mahfudh, Dinas Pekerjaan Umum Poso, 28 August 2017.

Economic programs for youth need to be directed more effectively in accordance with local needs and contexts. Nunukan District, North Kalimantan, has a different challenge from other districts'. As a border area, Nunukan District poses challenges as a trade cross-border area between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The youth are involved in the circulation of goods between the countries, including the temptation to engage in black market, including drugs and smuggled goods. Nunukan is also a transit place for youths who want to work as migrant workers abroad. The terrorist group Jama'ah Islamiyah and ISIS also use this area for weapon smuggling from the Southern Philippines to Indonesia. The youth in this area only become chaperones and guides. The absence of terrorism and youth recruitment operations in the border area makes the Nunukan society do not feel disturbed by the circulation of weapons from outside Indonesia to Indonesia through the Mindanao-Nunukan-Parepare (South Sulawesi). They use traditional boats and big ships (Pelni) from Nunukan to Parepare South Sulawesi.

3. Stakeholder Coordination and Collaboration

Regional leaders strongly influence the comprehensive policy and coordination of relevant agencies in the regions in the provincial, district and city levels, including in the economic and counter-terrorism programs. Different from Nunukan, Lamongan District Government has more attention to the economic program for youth and counter terrorism efforts. The attention of the central government over Lamongan District since Bali Bombing in October 2002 was planned and controlled from Solokuro, Lamongan. This has prompted the local government of Lamongan to be more serious about combating radicalism and terrorism. Youth and sports agencies, social services, labor and transmigration services, cooperative services, and the Ministry of Religion of Lamongan showed a more serious attitude towards CVE (Countering Violent Extremism). The Youth and Sports Agency made a program of state defense in cooperation with Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) through ceremonial training and line-marching. Social Service received a negative response when trying to give aid of empowerment program but forced itself to make a report as an aid to the poor in Tenggulun Village, Solokuro Sub-district, Lamongan District. Ali Fauzi responds that:

*"This will be counterproductive to the da'wah mission and vision and to the keeping of YLP activist's morale in accompanying the former terrorist convicts and former terrorists."*⁶

The Ministry of Social Affairs has been involved in many counter terrorism activities, not only in assisting ex-terrorist prisoner and former combatants, but also in rehabilitating Syrian deportants and assisting them in community reintegration.

6 Ali Fauzi, Founder and Chairman of YLP, interview in Solokuro, Lamongan, 2 September 2017.

Critics also stated by Khoirul Ghozali, former terrorist prisoner and caretaker of Al Hidayah Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren) Medan, North Sumatra. Ghozali stated that the municipality and the provincial government have visited Al Hidayah several times. But they do not provide financial aid and attention to Al Hidayah program. In an interview with Medan municipal administration it was mentioned that they were not involved in the assistance and empowerment of Al Hidayah Islamic Boarding School as an Islamic Education Institution that overcomes and prevents radicalism and terrorism. The apathy of the local government and Islamic organizations in the coaching of the former terrorists and educational institutions in prevention of terrorism made Al Hidayah Pesantren suffered a decline in the learning process. Khoirul Ghozali expressed his disappointment:

“There are no funds from the Provincial Government, Regency Government, eventhough they have already come here. So, they lied if they said they did not know the conditions here. If they say they did not know, they must have shut it down ... They just assume it trivial, but later when there is a new incident they will be confused.”⁷

The lack of coordination and the apathy of government along with the central and regional organizations will make the economic program policy gives no significant impact on overcoming radicalism and terrorism. The growing number of terrorist movements creates new challenges for the state and society on how more comprehensive efforts should be made continuously in the long term.

4. Defense Concept

The study of terrorism has been the subject of cross-scientific attention since the WTC attack on 11 September 2011 and Bali Bomb attacks on September 2002 . International policy which focused on countering terrorism did not give maximal result because it was merely reactive to the occurrence of the terrorist attacks. Indonesia has detained more than 1,400 terrorists from 2002 to 2017 (Kompas, 21 December 2017). Though there are thousands of others who perform terrorism movements, including recruitment, training, and the formation of terrorist communities. The security approach is considered failed to comprehend and stem terrorism more comprehensively. In the era of Barack Obama, terrorism policy used softer approach, emphasizing in broader aspects and was expected to reach out to communities outside the core group of actors of terrorism. This policy, called CVE (Countering Violent Extremism), is to overcome violent extremism. Involving a wider range of government and community stakeholders, deradicalisation policy becomes an important part in overcoming terrorism. .

⁷ Khoirul Ghozali, former terrorist prisoner/caretaker of Al Hidayah, interview in Medan, September 2017.

Terrorism is not only a matter of security and strategic study but also related to economic, psychological, and even science issues. John Horgan and Mia Bloom see terrorism from a psychological perspective. Horgan states that terrorist disengagement is one approach to separating terrorists and former terrorists as part of an important stage of the transition process out of the snares of violent groups. Mia Bloom sees the role of women in the actions and as the victims of terrorism.

Economic and terrorism studies are becoming new in the study of terrorism. There are two reasons. First, terrorism movement uses cross-border financial resources. The response of many countries is to the mechanism of global financial circulation used by terrorist groups. Second, the prevention and counter-terrorism use the approach of economic empowerment to society and former terrorist. The second reason is the legitimacy of this study which is how governments and communities work together in overcoming terrorism through economic empowerment for youth.

5. Book Direction

The book is divided into five sections according to the five study areas. First, youth economy and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Medan, North Sumatra. In this section, we will look at how the government and community programs empower the youth economy. As a metropolitan city, Medan becomes a melting pot of various ethnic and social religions. Second, youth economy and CVE in Poso, Central Sulawesi. As a post-conflict area, Poso has an economic program for young people that is strategic for the development of peace. Youth economic activity is seen not only in the aspect of deradicalisation, but also the impact on different religious meetings in conducting economic activity. Third, the youth economy and CVE in Solo, Central Java. Solo serves as the base of Islamic activists. The struggle of Islamist and nationalist groups has made youth economic movement has political power in this city. The youth economy is done more independently without dependence on the government. The creative economy is growing well. In this section, we see how young former terrorist prisoner are also active in innovation and economic activity. Fourth, youth economy and CVE in Lamongan, East Java. In this section, we will see the involvement of communities and local governments in the youth economic program and how they are active in strengthening youth communities to address and prevent terrorism. Fifth, youth economy and border security in Nunukan, North Kalimantan. In contrast to other studies, the youth economic program in Nunukan is closely linked to border security including the strengthening of nationalism and the movement of state defense, although the region is a traditional cross-border route of drug and smuggling weapons business from the Southern Philippines to Indonesia. The book concludes with conclusions and recommendations for both central and local government ministries and agencies and civil society and religious organizations.

Table 1. Context of Study Area

AREA	CONTEXT
Nunukan, North Kalimantan	Understanding border areas, cross-border economic potential, and transit areas of crime and inter-state terrorism.
Poso, Central Sulawesi	Understanding post-conflict areas, youth involvement in economic activities that support the sustainability of peace, including addressing the potential for radicalism and terrorism in the region through economic programs.
Solo, Central Java	Understanding the areas that become the barometer of nationalist and Islamic activism, the role of government and society in economic empowerment for young people
Lamongan, East Java	Understanding the economic program for young people and the involvement of Islamic organizations and local government in this program. Also, the economic empowerment relationship for ex-terrorists and counter-terrorism.

CHAPTER 2

Youth Economy and CVE in Medan, North Sumatra

1. Preface

Tribal, language, cultural, and religious diversity become a reflection of plural society. The experience of Indonesian living side by side in such diversity characterizes a tolerant attitude based on mutual respect among diversified group of people. There are at least four elements in the concept of tolerance, which are to recognize the rights of others, to respect the beliefs of others, to agree on differences and to have mutual understanding.⁸ However, the tolerance does not apply to acts violating the laws of state, religion, and social norms prevailing in the society. The acts of terrorism and the spread of radicalism are some clear examples of violations of state and religious laws and cause unrest in society so that it needs to be handled thoroughly.

Terrorism is a modern phenomenon which since the incident of 9/11 shows a new and more extremist form of movement when compared to acts of terrorism in previous years.⁹ The emergence of modern terrorism is caused by several reasons, one of them is the increase of cross-border flow of people, goods, money, technology, and ideas that generally benefit non-state actors at the expense of the state. Terrorist groups have proven to be very adept at exploiting its mobility. The idea of radicalism that can easily be disseminated and accessed by everyone through social media signifies that there is a significant substance filter. Terrorist acts occurring in a country, for example, can inspire a person to do the same in another country, including some acts of terrorism have occurred in Indonesia in recent years. Thus, apart from the issue of terrorism that became the new tool of the superpowers to pressure other countries, a series of terrorism in Indonesia clearly have a great impact on the security and future of the country.

A series of terrorist attacks are quite intense in some regions in Indonesia. The forms of terrorist attacks ranged from suicide bombings, sharp weapon attacks,

8 The Habibie Center, *Cerdas Bermedia untuk Toleransi: Modul dan Laporan Kegiatan The Habibie Center 2010*, p. 158-159.

9 Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 282-289

until to bombing, firearm attacks and a combination of several forms.

The targets are the civilians, the police, to the government apparatus, or a combination of the three. The location of the attacks are also varied, ranging from tourist bars, hotels, posts and regional police headquarters, banks, places of worship, embassies, to the bus stations. The attack areas spread from the western tip such as Banda Aceh, Medan, Jakarta, Bandung, Samarinda, to tourist hubs in Kuta, Bali, Poso, Makassar, to Ambon. The city where the target of attack is not always in the big city of the province, but small towns like Tuban, Banyumas, Solo also become the target of terrorist attack. If the place and location of the arrestment is in the list of places or cities where the terrorist attack occurred, the list will be longer.

The perpetrators could be male or female - although so far only one female has been prosecuted in court and sentenced - from to old men.¹⁰¹⁰ The perpetrators are of various professional backgrounds, such as teachers, Civil Servants (PNS), and entrepreneurs. Likewise, they are from various ethnic labels. Since 9 September 2001, Indonesia has experienced many terrorist attacks. Although certainly not expected, terrorist attacks are believed to continue and will likely result in loss of life as well. This is because Indonesia does not yet have a clear and systematic scheme for handling terrorism.¹¹

The government and the society - in some situations and incidents - have sought to eradicate the existence of terrorist groups. These efforts can be classified into three general and loose categories: before the terrorist attack occurs, at the time of the incident, and post-incident. This category needs to be viewed in the form of an uninterrupted cycle and can also occur simultaneously. The first can be called counterterrorism, that is the effort done, mainly by the civil apparatus of the government, to oppose radicalism by protecting the society from the understanding and will eventually kept the society away from the radicalism. The target is wide and the media is varied, as far as it can reach. The second attempt is certainly repressive action, i.e. crippling the actors of terrorism and chasing them for legal proceedings. This action is only done by the police and specifically from the Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88).

The third attempt of deradicalization is to eliminate the view or belief of radicalism from those who have been affected, committed, or engaged in violent acts driven by radical understanding. The program targets are former perpetrators and those around them, either close relatives or those directly related to the perpetrators or former perpetrators who share the same views as the terrorists. The media can be very specific and the method can be very personal. In general, deradicalisation programs can be directed to anyone who has been affected by radicalism. The

10 One of the senior prisoners is Abu Bakar Baasyir.

11 <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/663604/indonesia-dinilai-belum-punya-skema-tangani-terorisme>

actions of police officers in combating terrorism in the form of repressive acts are well known. However, other non-repressive efforts, such as prevention, are rarely done.

The war on radicalism and terrorism is essentially not only the responsibility of the government, especially the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). The efforts to prevent and deal with acts of terrorism require the involvement of all elements in society, including the young generation. As a nation's asset, the future of a nation will depend heavily on the quality of its youth. The common characters of young people who tend to remain unstable, curious, and vulnerable become the challenge of the stakeholders in order to prevent them from the influence of radicalism, counterterrorism, countering violence extremism (CVE) and other political violence.

Therefore, in this section, the authors will provide a comprehensive explanation of the linkages between economic empowerment programs for youth in efforts to prevent the spread of ideologies and actions based on radicalism, counterterrorism, CVE, and political violence in the city of Medan, North Sumatra. The selection of this location is based on the argument that some terrorist groups use Medan as a place for the development of terrorism. As the other parts of this book, the first section will look at how the youth in Medan are responding to the growing ideology of radicalism and acts of terrorism. This explanation will then describe the economic empowerment aspect for the youth as one form of prevention of radicalism and terrorism understanding.

2. Medan and Terrorism

Medan has been several times attacked by terrorists. Until this section was written, the last act of terrorism in this city was an attack on the North Sumatra Police Headquarters that killed one policeman.¹²

In this city, several terrorist actors have also been arrested, prosecuted, and punished. In this city or in the suburbs also dwell and settled former terrorist actors who are trying to fill their lives by breaking the chain of radicalism among families of former terrorist prisoners. The population of this city in around 2.210.624 inhabitants¹³, around 1.207.541¹⁴ (54,6%) are Muslim, settled not only in the peace-

12 The attack was carried out by two perpetrators with sharp weapons on June 25, 2017. The two perpetrators successfully paralyzed the police, one of whom died at the scene and one critical. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3541617/> terror-di-polda-sumut-suspected-related-arrest-3-terrorist-in-field and <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/06/25/10592361/dua.terduga.teroris.masuk.ke.markas.polda.sumut.dengan.lompat.fence>

13 Badan Pusat Statistik Medan, "Kota Medan Dalam Angka 2016," p. 57. However, according to information from other sources, the population of Medan by Census in 2010, amounted to 2,103,783 and the projected population of 2016 amounted to 2,229,408; BPS, "Statistik Kesejahteraan Rakyat Kota Medan 2016" p. 19.

14 Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Medan, p. 179.

loving and moderate Muslim community, but also the very minority groups such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and Jama'ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD).¹⁵ In terms of population composition, Medan is a very pluralist city compared to other big cities in Indonesia. Thus, Medan is not in capability of guaranteeing that no one in its inhabitants thinks and acts as extremists, an attitude of action triggered by a fundamentalist religious outlook.

With the area of city more than 265,1 km²¹⁶ and the number of populations, urban residents tend to recognize each other primarily based on equal work, profession, and social status. Such a society is usually less concerned with the presence of foreigners in the neighborhood. Thus, Medan is a great place to hide for criminals including terrorists.

If it is agreed that Darul Islam (DI) is one of the roots of terrorism in Indonesia, Medan is no stranger to it. Although unlike Aceh, this capital of North Sumatra Province which once belonged to Aceh province is also the residence of DI members. Khairul Ghazali's father is a DI member who lives around the city. Geographically, Medan is close to the Malacca Straits sea boundary linking it to Malaysia, the place where DI member and followers escaped and settled, and also the place of other Islamic activists who reject the sole principle of Pancasila during the time of President Soeharto. Among them were Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar that later became a prominent figure Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) and involved in many acts of terror in Indonesia.¹⁷

It was from Malaysia that Abdullah Sungkar organized the recruitment of DI members and then sent them to Afghanistan to study the war.¹⁸ In general, because of bordering the sea, Medan and North Sumatra become an easy area for illegal traffic of people and goods including firearms.¹⁹

In addition, the proximity of the region to Aceh is another form of 'profit' for Medan. Although it is not an area of conflict, the conflict in Aceh has influenced many people in Medan. The spirit of resistance of the Aceh society to the central government exerted an influence those who reject the current system and government model. They resist the system and want to replace it with another system that is the most correct according to their beliefs. For this, Aceh contributes to inspiration.

15 According to the police, suspected terrorists who lived and were arrested in Medan were members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah. One of them is Jhon Hen who was on the board of the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia, Medan. <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2017/06/08/17005691/wife.3.terduga.teroris.di.medan.questioning.her.husband.s.circumstances>; <http://medan.tribunnews.com/2017/06/07/heads-assembly-mujahidin-admit-there-ex-administrators-secured-densus-88>

16 Badan Pusat Statistik, Tabel Statistik, <https://sumut.bps.go.id/frontend/linkTabelStatis/view/id/362>

17 Solahudin, *NII sampai JI*, hlm. 197,199; Adi Renaldi https://www.vice.com/en_id/article/nz8beg/meet-the-former-mujahideen-behind-indonesias-fight-against-terrorism,

18 Solahudin, *NII sampai JI*, p. 203.

19 <http://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/278628-senjata-di-aceh-selundupan-dari-selat-malaka>

About the dimensions of resistance to the central government, Medan has its own history. In addition to the resistance by DI to Jakarta, Medan in the post-independence period is one of the sites of armed conflict between the central and regional governments.

The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) is an example. The Elephant Council, a regional council opposed to the central government in Jakarta under the leadership of Colonel Maludin Simbolon was formed in the region. This is part of a regional armed resistance series joined into PRRI. Briefly, Medan or North Sumatra is generally viewed from various aspects as not a place alien to social and political upheaval, some of which lead to armed physical resistance and serious conflicts, both based on the interests of both material and ideological power, although it is not 'as good as' West Java which is known as the pioneer in the resistance movement, especially those originating from Islamic radicalism, the birthplace of Darul Islam.

Although the above facts have not necessarily an absolute direct correlation with a series of terrorism in Medan and the settlers or sympathizers in this city, they cannot be excluded as contributing factors. Thus, it should not be a surprise that Medan, which is generally a pluralist and tolerant city, is also a place for radical groups to live in, where terrorists launch attacks, run, hide, and are arrested. It also does not necessarily mean that the above factors make Medan the main reason for the settlement of sympathizers or terrorists.

3. Denial, Anxiety, Act and Tendency of Moderation towards Violence

After seeing how Medan historically and geographically intersects with radical movements and terrorism, it is also important to see how the views of government and non-governmental organizations, including religious organizations, in this city glimpse at terrorism. In general, all respondents without the slightest doubt reject any kind of terrorism. That action is considered heinous and contrary to the teachings of Islam. They condemned the attacks that claimed many civilian casualties. However, the rejection of this violence motivated by religious beliefs will not be uniform if related to: who is the perpetrator, the reason / motivation, the magnitude of the threat, the prevention, and the action against it. Firstly, not all respondents agree that the prevention taken by the authorities against suspected terrorists or suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism as a real action against terrorism. There are still those who believe that the combatting of terrorism is a mere apparatus. The arrestment, disablement, prosecution, or the punishment of terrorists does not entirely convince some respondents that it is real.

There is still a belief that terrorism is an issue exaggerated by primarily police or government. The threat is not as large as published and the perpetrators are

still doubtful whether they are from Islamic groups. The argument states that the authorities have some interest in maintaining the issue of terrorism. Rejection in term of this reason is not unique in Medan but is also commonly found in Indonesian societies as can be observed in social media or on certain sites.²⁰ There is a belief that terrorism is a theatrical act or created by the apparatus for certain political interests and for material gain. Some of them argue: “if there is no terrorist then there is no program (combating) and no BNPT.”²¹ There is also a belief that the perpetrator or terrorist group is not from an Islamic group. The reason is simple, that the perpetrators are not recognized by religious groups or organizations in the city of Medan such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Alwashilyah, etc. or groups of students or religious youth such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI) Indonesian Muslim Students (PMII), Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM), and others. Some are trying to prove that terrorism is a mere apparatus. This was done by linking this belief to the fact that some suspected terrorists were paralyzed by being shot until dead so that the concerned could not be heard in court.

Information which, according to this view, would be detrimental to the authorities. Rhetorically Masri Sitanggang, a figure who became MUI board of Medan city, in his blog asked:

“I am afraid that the invader’s mentality is infecting many of the nation’s youth so that their mind can be frightened by jihad and think as terror. I am afraid that this country will only be physically independent! Because, it is a big question why in this world’s largest Muslim country there is a “terrorist”: Who terrorizes who?”²²

The use of terrorism is deemed not neutral and biased to the interests of the authorities. In line with the belief that terrorism is not real, fictitious, or at least exaggerated, the use of the term terrorism also contains nuances of interest. The choice of the term seems to be obscuring the meaning and reason why the so-called terror act takes place. According to this view, as for example Masri Sitanggang-a terrorist must be blamed simply by looking at the act solely (an sich) without seeking to find out why it happened.²³

By using the term of terrorism, we are forced to blame the person for their acts of terror and stop to find out why the action took place. This is because if after the incident it is then preceded with the question of why the crime was committed, then the apology or moderation of the crime in question will arise and the authorities will not want it. There is a belief that terrorism is born from injustice in policies and

20 <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/politik-indonesia/2016/01/22/41830/pengamat-tindakan-teror-di-jakarta-merupakan-sandiwaraciptaan-polisi/#sthash.6cZDguxa.dpbs>

21 Resource from Badko HMI at FGD in Medan.

22 Masri Sitanggang, “Ada Apa dengan Jihad?!” <https://sisipandangmasrisitanggang.wordpress.com/2016/07/29/ada-apa-dengan-jihad/>

23 Interview with DR. Ir. Masri Sitanggang.

practices that are believed to continue.

The ruler chose that term to avoid this apologetic attitude which would bring about three unintended consequences. *First*, the crime of terrorism will be justified or at least moderated. *Second*, justification of crime will undermine its eradication efforts. *Third*, the apology or justification of terrorism acts which generally can be considered as acts of resistance to the government and the apparatus could bring justification of resistance and delegitimacy to the government itself. Thus, any government, democratic or non-democratic, will not allow itself to be de-justified or delegitimized by anyone, let alone by terrorists or groups that support them.

In addition to avoiding the emergence of moderation attitude especially apology against this crime, the government also want to mobilize support combating them.

However, the use of this terminology for certain circles is a manifestation of the authorities' interests. The interest so people do not question why terrorism exists. This is because the emergence of terrorism is believed to be the result of injustice in government policies and practices done directly or indirectly and consciously or unconsciously.

The third difference in looking at terrorism is related to motivation. Despite the fact that terrorism is real, divergent views emerge from the motivation of the act. As already mentioned before, to some people the rise of terrorism is due to the perception of unfair policies and practices by the rulers. The dimensions range from economic to political and social. For these people, terrorism is a reaction to that injustice. If this is the answer, then this is certainly not a single answer. Perhaps, there is another reason that might motivate such violent acts, such as the understanding of religious teachings.

For these people, it is hard to accept that the act of terrorism is also triggered or encouraged by religious belief. There are at least two explanations for this rejection, two related explanations: ignorance and denial.

The ignorance relates to the belief that terrorism is nothing but a fiction or existence from authorities. Terrorists have never existed, so it is irrelevant to the religious motivations underlying the act. If it exist, the relevant reason for discussion is the motivation of the ruler who creates them.

Another aspect is the denial that the understanding of teaching process can make people do crimes. The willingness to accept the fact that the teachings of religion in the hands of certain parties can be terrifying actions will not be easy to accept. This involves a lawsuit against the belief that religion is a way of peace and tranquility. It is impossible that a religion teaches us indiscriminately. A form of action that is in fact contradictory to the most fundamental doctrine of religion, the teaching of love and tolerance. Such rejection can occur because of the mixing of religious teachings and the subjects of understanding. Thus, it appears that religious people must be

good because the religion is great. If any person commits a crime because it is based on religion or religious teachings, then they must be lying. In fact, religion and its understanding are two different things as the difference between the text and the reader.²⁴ The text can always be true or at least neutral; it is the understanding that can be misinterpreted.

The rejection might appear because of the 'us' view which rally into a religious identity, while those whose religion or religious view are different will be addressed as 'them', and 'we' position ourselves as being opposed by 'them'. Therefore, any adversity that occur and is committed by groups or individuals associated with 'us' but not known by 'us', is surely 'their' job to discredit 'us' or at least seek to benefit from this incident.

What are we going to do if this happened? Do the institutions, programs, strategies, and approaches that have been implemented address this issue? Is there a verifiable result? The brief response to the above question is that the government as a policy maker and those concerned about this issue must be able not only to change the view that terrorists are dangerous and disabling but they must also accept that religion can serve as a basis for terrorism acts and address this issue from the religious side. Strong action against terrorists from religious groups should be released from wars against a certain religious groups while seeking the support from them. Once the perception has changed, the implementation of counter-radicalism and deradicalisation programs is believed to be more successful if done on target and with well-management.

4. Medan and Counter-radicalism and Deradicalization Program

If we use problem solving approach in viewing the existence of programs such as counterrorist and deradicalisation programs, these two interrelated programs are formed to solve problems by understanding the root causes. By simply looking at the term, we can assume that the problem of terrorism is a radical belief that brings the subject to a radical act of violence. If this logical flow is correct, it is also important to ask a question: Why radicalism followers do not always commit radical acts, especially with violence? It can even be believed that only few of those who think radically actually join terrorist groups and commit terrorism. What other factors that ultimately encourage people with radical views or ideologies that is derived from religious beliefs engage or involve in acts of violence such as terrorism? If this is successfully identified, have counterrorist and deradicalisation programs addressed this aspect? Conter-radicalism and deradicalization to prevent terrorism depart from the basic understanding that terrorism is caused by certain

24 Although it must be admitted there is also a view that it is impossible to separate between the teachings and its understanding.

important factors of religious understanding.

An exclusive model of religious understanding born out of an understanding of the scriptural text and the historical understanding of the propagation journey of the prophet.²⁵

The execution of counter-terrorism is not enough to be done only by the existing institutions such as police and intelligence services. Therefore, a new institution was established to conduct the special task of dealing with terrorist countermeasures. The body is named the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). The task of BNPT is to formulate policies then derive them into the form of programs and the strategies to implement and achieve the policy objectives. While the existing institutions are responsible for combating terrorism, the new agency is tasked with coordinating the effort to avoid overlapping and inter-institutional conflict of interest.²⁶BNPT also has an extension in the region called Coordination Forum for Counter-Terrorism (FKPT). However, its duties and functions do not duplicate the duties and functions of BNPT completely, but merely as a coordination forum. For the province of North Sumatra, FKPT is located in Medan. However, the mandate of North Sumatra FKPT, whose territory includes Medan, is not so far as to prepare and execute an economic empowerment program as a part of the implementation of the counter-radicalism and deradicalisation programs for youth in the city. Even so, it is important to first see how the macroeconomic conditions of Medan including the glimpse of the youth group condition.

4.1. Macro Economic Condition of Medan

The program of economic empowerment through the preparation of expertise or support effort is one of the efforts to prevent violent radicalism such as terrorism. Economic empowerment becomes highly relevant if it is done on the spot and to people who are in dire need. In Medan, the unemployment rate in 2015 increased compared to the previous year. According to 2015, Central Bureau of Statistics Medan (BPS), the number of unemployed was 108,243 from the total workforce of 984,037 people. In general, the unemployment rate is 11%.²⁷ In the previous year, the number of unemployed 92.437, whereas, the average number of population growth between 2000-2010 only 0,97%.²⁸ If it is assumed that population growth is 1%, the increase of unemployment is high. Nevertheless, the economic growth rate of this city in 2016 amounted to 6.26%, increased from the previous year amounted to 5,74%.²⁹ If we look at the national economic growth figures in 2015 and 2016 which

25 Discussion on the historical background of Islamic radicalism can be read in Solahudin *NII to JI*.

26 A brief explanation of the BNPT assignment can be access at <https://www.bnpt.go.id/tentang-bnpt>

27 Badan Pusat Statistik Medan, "Kota Medan Dalam Angka 2016", p. 71.

28 Badan Pusat Statistik Medan, "Kota Medan Dalam Angka 2016", p. 498.

29 Badan Pusat Statistik Medan, "Kota Medan Dalam Angka 2017", p. 457.

are respectively 4.88% and 5.02%,³⁰ the economic growth of Medan is still above the national growth rate.

Meanwhile, the unemployment rate of North Sumatra province in February 2015 was 6.39% and in August 2015 was 6.71%. Nationally, in February 2015 the unemployment rate was 5.81% and in August 2015 6.18%.³¹ Compared to North Sumatra and National unemployment rate, Medan unemployment rate is much higher. While nationally, the inflation rates of October 2015, 2016, 2017 sequentially are 3.35%, 3.02% and 2.67%,³² the inflation rate of Medan in September 2017 amounted to 1.08%.³³ From this, we can see that the inflation rate of Medan is still far below the National level. Nevertheless, Medan's macroeconomic condition is not brilliant compared to the national average.

4.2. The Importance of Economic Intervention for Youth

From the data above, although the economic growth rate of Medan is relatively higher than national, that number is not enough to decrease unemployment rate in the city. If youth groups forms a quarter of the population and make up about half the number of people in productive age, these figures are also very much affecting groups of people between the ages of 16 and 30. Thus, if there is an economic empowerment program for this group in a massive and sustainable way, it will certainly change the statistics significantly.

From the aspect of preventing terrorism, the large number of youth and the high unemployment rate is not an encouraging figure. If it is believed that one of the causes of the emergence of terrorism and the repetition of such actions is economic problems, then these unhealthy numbers must be fixed. The economic development efforts in Medan and in other places must be done and become the responsibility of certain SKPD (Local Government Work Units). SKPD in the economic field and responsible in that field does not execute its development program only within the framework of preventing terrorism, but certainly in the context of broad economic development.

BNPT and FKPT should look at the macroeconomic conditions of Medan as a basis for acting and cooperating with local government. From the data, it is clear that there is a room for intervention that must be immediately cultivated by the central and regional institutions in accordance with their respective duties. Given the large number of youth groups in the city, both sides need to set priorities. It is noteworthy that BNPT, FKPT, or intelligence group has a map of the youth group

30 Badan Pusat Statistik Berita Resmi Statistik No. 16/02/Th. XX, Accessed on 6 February 2017 https://www.bps.go.id/website/brs_ind/brsInd-20170208123344.pdf

31 Badan Pusat Statistik RI <https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/981>

32 Badan Pusat Statistik RI <https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/907>

33 Badan Pusat Statistik Sumatra Utara Perkembangan Indeks Harga Konsumen/Inflasi No. 55/10/12/Th. XX, 02 Oktober 2017 hlm. 2.

situations which are vulnerable to the idea of violent radicalism, its socio-economic conditions and what interventions are needed. From these data, local government through related SKPD can engage in economic empowerment interventions to the most vulnerable youth group as their top priority.

If they do not have this data, the priority should be to map youth groups which are vulnerable to radicalism exposure and identify their economic conditions. FKPT can cooperate with North Sumatra or Medan BPS to arrange this mapping. Then, regarding to this mapping, economic intervention to the needy youth group can be done.

4.3. Youth Condition in Medan

Like other cities in Indonesia, Medan also has many youth organizations such as student organizations and Youth Social Organization (Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Pemuda/OKP). Nevertheless, many members of these youth organizations, especially OKP, cannot be categorized as youth age groups according to Regulation No. 40 Year 2009 on Youth. According to Article 1.1 of the Act, youths are those aged 16 to 30 years. From the definition of youth, it is clear that they are included in the productive age because according to statistics, productive workforce age groups are those aged 15 to 64 years. Nationally, comply to a national economic survey (Susenas) in 2016, this youth group constitutes about a quarter of the total population of Indonesia totaling 62.06 million out of 257.9 million Indonesian.³⁴

In North Sumatra, the number of youth in 2016 was around 26.11%, decreased from the previous year which amounted to 26.33%. Compared to this data, it can also be deduced that the number of Medan youth was approximately equal to the number of youth nationwide, which was about one quarter of the total population. This number can be categorized into two parts, namely the group that still study (groups of students and university students) and group that no longer study. The second group can also be divided into three groups, i.e. unemployed group, working groups, and group taking care of households.

In the urban areas of North Sumatra, 28.44% of the youths still went to school, 71.23% no longer attended school, 0.32% never went to school.³⁵ Since Medan is an urban city in North Sumatra, these numbers can be used as a basis. Thus, that number was also the percentage of youth in Medan in terms of school participation rate in 2016. In terms of activities in 2016, about 9.93% of the youth were unemployed, 18.84% still attended school, and 17.12% took care of households.

And then about 42.80% of urban youth in North Sumatra were employed and about 4.96% of them did not match any of the four categories. Therefore, it can be stated that this number was also the percentage of youth according to weekly

34 Badan Pusat Statistik, "Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2016", p. v.

35 Badan Pusat Statistik, "Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2016", p. 182.

activities in Medan. Compared to national number in general, this is worse. The percentage of national youth employed was 51.86% and the national unemployment youth percentage was 8.85%.³⁶ Based on these figures the youth condition of Medan was not encouraging when compared to the national average.

Meanwhile, in terms of youth organizations, according to the Secretary of Medan Youth and Sports Affairs, there are about 60 youth community organizations in this city, but only 40 are considered active. They consist of youth-based or affiliated religious organizations such as: Anshor Youth Movement, Muhammadiyah Youth, Catholic Youth, etc. Other youth organizations are nationalist-based, such as Banteng Muda Indonesia, party-based youth organizations, such as Barisan Muda PAN, Gema Keadilan, etc. and parent-based youth organizations, such as Generasi Muda Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan and Putra-Putri TNI-Polri.

Most of these organizations are branch/regional organizations based in Jakarta or elsewhere. In accordance to the author's monitoring, the most notable youth organization is Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and Youth Employment Association (IPK). Billboards, banners, posters, labeled or painted vehicles, and uniforms of these two organizations are the most commonly seen in Medan. As mentioned above, many members and administrators of this organization can no longer be categorized as youth. All youth community organizations in Medan are legally under the Indonesian Youth National Committee Medan.

From the author's limited discussion with the elements of KNPI Medan, it is not revealed if there is any youth economic empowerment program to prevent terrorism done by OKP in Medan.

In the interview, the Chairman of North Sumatra HMI Coordinator Board, Septian Fujiansyah Chaniago, said that indeed terrorism was against Islamic values. However, Badko HMI Coordinator Board had never had of a program created specifically to counterterrorism. The response of this organization is limited to making discussions and seminars discussing about terrorism.³⁷

In the focus group discussions attended by the Medan Youth National Committee (KNPI), Muhammadiyah Youth, Anshor Youth and the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII) it was not revealed whether there is any program created by these youth organizations to provide empowerment to groups youth community according to their organization perspective to close the gap of terrorism, although all the them realized that terrorism was dangerous and contrary to Islam value, and one of the factors is because of economic reason.

From the government side, they have their own attention to youth. One of the attempts is by establishing ministries that deal with youth which is the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The ministry has the Deputy for Youth Empowerment,

36 Badan Pusat Statistik, "Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2016", p.182.

37 Interview with Chief of BADKO HMI North Sumatra, Septian Fujiansyah Chaniago.

which is responsible for improving the capacity and competence of youth to form an independent youth.³⁸ The scope of this youth empowerment work is national including Medan. Meanwhile, although not directly related to the economic empowerment of youth, the Ministry of Youth and Sports has also given Masters Degree scholarships to those who are active participating in the field of youth. The youth in North Sumatra including Medan also gets the opportunity.

University of Sumatera Utara (USU) in 2017 received a quota of 30 students from this scholarship scheme.³⁹ While in the level of the province or local government, Youth and Sport Services was formed by Local Government Work Units (SKPD) to be responsible for the youth. However, to avoid the danger of terrorism, the local government of Medan itself does not have a special scholarship program for their youth as part of the empowerment. In short, the number of youths who get the scholarships from the government is still very few. However, a number of youth can also receive scholarship from other government programs, such as from Educational Funding Institution (LPDP)

4.4 Local Government and Conter-radicalism and Deradicalization Program

With the perception of terrorism and economic condition of Medan as mentioned above, the main question arising is: How does the government respond to the danger of radicalism in the form of violence or terrorism? Before discussing further how the government as part of the system of Indonesia responded to this, it should be remembered that the law system in Indonesia has divided its affairs into the affairs of central government's and the affairs of regional government's.

The local government has no business of its own, while the affairs of local government are managed jointly. Thus, in understanding what should be or should not be done by the Medan government should be seen from the framework of this governmental affair as regulated in the 1945 Constitution and Regulation No. 23 Year 2014 about Regional Government as the elaboration of the main provisions of the Constitution.

In terms of governmental duties, the normative function of local government is to organize government affairs to protect, serve, empower and prosper the community within the region or city as regulated in the Regional Regulation. Based on this regulation, the local government's affairs are merely the affairs which are concurrent, i.e. affairs which are shared between the central government and regional / local governments. These affairs are divided into two types, which are mandatory and optional government affairs. The mandatory government affairs are also divided into basic and non-basic service affairs. In short the basic services of mandatory regional / local government affairs are :

38 <http://deputi1.kemenpora.go.id/statik/tupoksi>

39 <http://www.beasiswapascasarjana.com/2017/04/pendaftaran-beasiswa-s2-kemenpora.html>

- a. education;
- b. health;
- c. public works and spatial arrangement;
- d. public housing and residential areas;
- e. tranquility, public order and people protection ; and
- f. ocial.

While the non-basic service of mandatory local government affairs are:

- a. labour;
- b. women empowerment and children protection;
- c. food;
- d. land;
- e. environment;
- f. public administration and civil registration;
- g. community and village empowerment;
- h. population control and family planning;
- i. nexus;
- j. communication and information;
- k. cooperations, SMEs;
- l. capital investment;
- m. youth and sports;
- n. statistics;
- o. coding;
- p. culture;
- q. library; and
- r. archives.

There are also optional government affairs that must be managed by the regional government in accordance with the potential of the region, including:

- a. marine and fisheries;
- b. tourism;
- c. agriculture;
- d. forestry;
- e. energy and mineral resources;
- f. trading;
- g. industry; and
- h. transmigration.

Meanwhile, the central government's affairs which are not divided into regional

autonomy are:

- a. foreign policy;
- b. defense;
- c. security;
- d. justice;
- e. monetary and fiscal policy; and
- f. religion.

Considering the magnitude, scale of threat, strength and capability, the nature of movement, and the networks of perpetrators, terrorism is a threat to the state security, different from other forms of disturbance such as crimes and community protection issues. Looking at the distribution of functions between the central government and the local governments, it can be seen that prevention and combating terrorism are the matter of state security, which are supposed to be administered absolutely by the central government and not to be shared with the local governments. Thus, it is not the responsibility of the local government of Medan to prevent a series of bomb attack by terrorists in this city. It is the responsibility of the central government through institutions whose with national jurisdiction cover, such as the Police, State Intelligence Agency, BNPT with local or non-local institution, and criminal justice system.

From the principle of budget allocation and regional expenditure which are based on the amount of responsibility of each region / city and central government, it can be clearly known that there is no budget allocation by the local government for preventing terrorism, whether it is sourced from the transferred fund (fund given by the central government to the regions) or from the local revenue fund. Funding for counter terrorism is sourced from the State Budget (APBN).

If combating terrorism can be qualified into sections as introduced at the beginning (i.e. before, during and after incident), can local governments play a role? As it is already known, the economic empowerment program is included in the counter-radicalism and deradicalisation program. So, are the economic empowerment affairs of youths and families or former terrorist prisoners are also related to security matters so that local governments do not have to take care of it? Does not the program contain or at least intersect with basic services such as education and social, as well as non-basic services such as labor, cooperations / small and medium enterprises?

Direct observation in the field shows that the affairs of terrorism with all things related, such as preventive measures in the form of deradicalisation and counter-radicalism which can be classified into efforts to empower the youth and family of the former terrorist prisoners are not included in the affairs of Medan local government. This can be known from the interviews conducted with SKPD. From the interview,

SKPD has none special program related to terrorism such as deradicalization and counterterrorism, especially in the form of economic empowerment for former terrorist prisoner and their youth and families.

However, this does not mean that all SKPD are not at all in touch with this dimension of terrorist prevention. Unity of Nations and Politics (Kesbangpol) Medan, for example, task and function of SKPD are broad, covering the promotion of ideology improvement, national insight, vigilance, domestic politics, art resilience, culture, religion and economy in society. Thus, this institution is responsible for formulating regional and regional technical implementation in the areas of national awareness and conflict management with ideological background including economics. This becomes commonly agreed in the study of the root causes of the rise of terrorism, such as contradictions, ideological coercion attempts and economic inequality. Kesbangpol Medan has one division that specializes in handling conflict and awareness. This division is responsible for preventing the issue of social conflict, including terrorism. It is also recognized that the emergence of terrorism can be triggered by economic factors. However, Kesbangpol has not specifically formulated policies, undertook technical measures and used its resources to fight terrorism crimes, although Kesbangpol will surely not be directly involved in formulating an economic empowerment program. However, it is known by this agency that terrorism can lead to social conflict and its emergence needs to be anticipated early.

Thus, SKPD efforts will be directly align with counter-terrorism because the socialization and implementation of national insight aims to strengthen people's love to the country and to live within the country and community based on Indonesian philosophy and foundation which is Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945, while the national awareness aims to provide awareness to the community about the elements that can threaten the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. If done successfully, this will be in line with the goal of deradicalization and counterterrorism because radicalism and terrorism could threaten the existence of this country and are against the nation's philosophy and the Constitution of 1945.

Similarly, the Cooperatives and SMEs Agency and the Labour Office were established to foster and develop cooperatives and small to medium enterprises including assisting and assisting them to obtain financing or capital facilities. Meanwhile, Medan Labour Office was formed to perform the functions of developing and implementing technical policies in the field of labour such as unemployment problem solving, employment, industrial relations, work protection supervision, foreign workers, job training, and employment social security.

Reducing unemployment, improving the quality of labour resources as well as helping capital and giving supervision to small business are in line with economic empowerment programs for youth, former terrorist and their families. All these

three have the same goal which is providing them with activity and job so that they can be economically independent. This will certainly help preventing these people from engaging in fundamentalist movements or groups that implement their beliefs with armed violence.

However, these two agencies do not have any specific programs for youth groups, let alone for deradicalising the families of former prisoners and terrorist prisoners. The programs, services, facilitation, and assistance provided by these agencies are open to all inhabitants of Medan where there is no special segmentation or preferential treatment to certain groups. Former terrorist prisoners and their families can access the programs, assistance, services or facilities of the two agencies without distinction. There is no discriminatory practice for families or former terrorist prisoners to gain employment, endeavor, and also to get before and after work training. Requirements do not detain the former terrorist or their family to obtain employment status.

To obtain the status of job seeker, the applicant needs to only fulfill the requirements such as submitting photocopies of Medan ID card and diploma certificate. Applicants do not even need to include a police note (SKCK). If the applicant does not have a Medan ID card, he/she simply needs to submit a Medan permanent resident letter issued by the district officer where the applicant domiciles. The same thing applies for job training applicants. However, this information needs to be noted because the the Labour Office has never received a job application from former terrorist prisoners or their families. Thus, the equality for everyone in job seeking and obtaining the same opportunity to get benefit from vocational training have not been proven except normatively.

No difference from SKPD case mentioned above, Medan Social Service which is in charge of executing the programs both by the central and local government such as the implementation of social security and protection, social rehabilitation, and social empowerment has not made a specific program directed for former terrorist prisoners and their families.

However, similar as the Cooperatives Agency, SMEs and Labour Office as well as Social Agency opened the service for any citizen of Medan with no exception including former terrorist prisoners and their families. Nevertheless, the Social Agency has never received a report that they have already submitted requests for services related to the duties and functions of this SKPD. The question is whether the former terrorist prisoners or their families have never applied, or Social Agency has not realized that they have provided service to this group.

If the family of former terrorist prisoners have ever applied for service within the scope of the Social Agency but they do not know, this is a positive indication that the family of the former terrorist prisoners' existences have not been identified, at least by the Agency. Therefore, they feel their privacy is protected and at the same time

justify claims from SKPD that the services provide no discrimination. However, this may also indicate a weakness in the identification aspect of those who have potentially been exposed to radical movements. On the other hand, if indeed they did not come to ask for a service while in general it could be assumed they need it, the question is why are they reluctant to do so?

There is an assumption that they do not come to ask for services because of their reserved nature and the belief that one should not ask for help easily, especially to the government which they strongly reject. If this condition is true, then the new challenges are to integrate them into the society and make them accept the city government as their government.

If SKPD is not directly involved in terrorism affairs because they were formed to handle concurrent affairs that become obligatory to the local government or city, then and how about the Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (KKA) of Medan which is the vertical institution of the central government? From field studies, it is known that KKA is also not directly involved in the efforts of economic empowerment of youth or at least participate in an oriented program to improve skills so that this youth group can be economically independent and eventually escape from radicalism and acts of terrorism.

Nevertheless, KKA is involved in the scope of its duties and authority as an extension of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Medan. In this connection, KKA conducts religious counseling through specially recruited counselors whose status is either government or non-government employee. KKA can reach out to the people to convey religious messages through the counselors.

The aim is to provide religious point of view that can counter radicalism point of view. In addition, together with SKPD in Medan, KKA is also part of early prevention actions for violence triggered by religious motives. According to the interview with the taskforce, KKA were used to conduct meeting coordination with the security apparatus and SKPD such as Kesbangpol and Medan District Police. Thus, although not specifically and not part of the implementing elements of the program of deradicalisation and contraradicalism, KKA can also contribute in realizing the goals of deradicalization and contraradicalism programs even though not through economic empowerment.

The discussion on how the city responds to violent radicalism is impossible not to involve the efforts of Khairul Ghazali the owner and manager of Al Hidayah Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren), a place dedicated exclusively to the children of former terrorist prisoners. Although administratively this Islamic school is located outside Medan, it does not mean that Ghazali and his Islamic school are being ignored from this discussion.

One of the main problems in the prevention of terrorism is how to break the links of terrorism networks that originally started from the family. He pointed out that

some terrorists have children who are also terrorists. He established Al-Hidayah Islamic School with the aim to break the chain.

To break the chain of this movement is a crucial issue. In his Islamic school, Khairul Ghazali educates the children of former terrorists to not follow their father. There is enough evidence to suggest that radical attitudes and views are transmitted by close people like parents to their children, teachers to their students. Supposedly, the efforts made by Khairul Ghazali were developed and carried out in other places that required them. So far, according to him, there are two similar Islamic schools. The efforts to assist in the provision of land and location as well as infrastructure are carried out by BNPT and the central government through its regional agencies.

In accordance with the statement before, preventing terrorism is a matter of central government, so it is not strange that the greatest help obtained by this Islamic school comes from central government agencies such as police and Indonesia National Armed Forces (TNI). The involvement of local government in helping this pesantren seems minimal. In fact, some important officials in SKPD in Medan are neither familiar nor aware of the existence of this Islamic school, although the news about this school is common in Media.

This Islamic school which takes care of dozenteenage boys from former terrorist is not too different from other Islamic schools in general.

Both general and religious education are given. In other words, no special curriculum is used. However, in the education of Islam, the material presented is the peaceful Islam. This is demonstrated through the teaching of peace in the Islamic history and the Quran and Hadith. In his opinion, radicalism that brings forth the existence of terrorism is based on the misconception in the religion. It is important to counter this misconception for the sake of the children of the former terrorists who might have been exposed to radicalism from their parents.

It is undeniable that these children are victims, although it was indirectly. Thus, this Islamic school is built in order to provide protection for these terrorist victims as well. The grudge arising from the death of their father due to being shot or cracked down by the the Special Detachment 88 should be extinguished. Similarly, feelings of traumatic or depressed because of his father's terrorism must be eliminated. Nevertheless, the number of students who are successfully accommodated only a dozen people and all of them are boys. This number is still very small compared to the number of children of former terrorist prisoners. So far, Al Hidayah has not received student from non-former terrorist children. This is because the school which label itself as the school of hafidz (Quran memorizer) and *life skill* is still funded privately by the administrators.

Thus, the school's financial capability to develop education and provide teaching and learning facilities for students and teachers is still very limited. Besides the asset of religious education and vast land, this school is expected to provide economic

empowerment for their students in order to avoid the students from terrorism which is brought forth by the radicalism point of view. However, this school only educates children who have not yet been categorized as youth according to the regulation of Youth, and economic empowerment has not been seriously done especially due to the limited resources.

It is important to know the responses of SKPD which is in charge of the education in North Sumatra regarding the dangers of terrorism. North Sumatra Education Agency⁴⁰ has not a specific program of preventing terrorism among high school students within its jurisdiction either. Nevertheless, the Education Office conveyed the message of the importance of maintaining the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and peace in coordination meetings with the principals of secondary schools conducted at least twice a year. Moreover, messages are delivered to teachers in the implementation of the 2013 Curriculum.

To the students, the importance of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the attitude of tolerance is delivered through extracurricular programs such as Scouts (Pramuka). Vocational High School (SMK) programs that provide plenty of skills for economic self-sufficiency are expected to prevent them from falling into radicalism-terrorism movement. Regarding the fact that the event of short-term period of pesantren could be the mean of spreading radicalism, the authorities assumed that it might happen. Regarding the whether the children of the former terrorists have been bullied at school or not being accepted, the respondents have never heard or known about it.

The most responsible service in regards of youth development, the Youth and Sports Service, has yet any program for the youth, families or former terrorist prisoners that could prevent terrorism from happening again by long-time perpetrators or their families. Perhaps it is because the Secretary of Youth and Sports Office assumes that the terrorists who had ever done the action in Medan are not citizens but comers from outside the city. In fact, according to what is known and reaffirmed by the Medan Big City Police (Polrestabes), terrorist actors also come from this city. The perpetrators of North Sumatra Police Headquarters attack, for example, was conducted by Syawaludin Pakpahan who is a citizen of Medan with ethnic originating from North Sumatra province.⁴¹

Although the office do not have specific programs related to counter terrorism, the office has enough access to youth, especially through youth organizations. They can convey peace messages to them. The real question is can they also reach groups that have been affected by radicalism? With these group's characters that tend to be defensive and some even underground, the effort of approaching them is not an

40 Regulation No.23 of 2014 about Local Government determines that the secondary education affairs are provincial government affairs, not the affairs of the city or district government.

41 <http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/06/26/inilah-wajah-2-pelaku-penyerangan-polda-sumut>

easy job, especially if the Department only approaches the formal and ceremonial youth group or organizations.

As for the Government of Medan, as mentioned by the Secretary of the Region (Sekda), is aware that the problem of economic inequality can encourage people to go to the path of radicalism with violence. However, as reflected in interviews with the agencies within the Medan City Government, this government has not created a specific economic empowerment program for youth and former terrorist prisoners or their families. However, the Local Government assumes that with the regional autonomy and economic potential of as a large city,

Medan will be able to prosper its people and in turn will help inhibit the occurrence of violent radicalism such as terrorism. Therefore, opening and making investors comfortable in Medan are very important. Coordination with related institutions such as BNPT / FKPT is conducted, including for example helping the publication of books that narrating anti radicalism. Communication with religious institutions is maintained by the authority responsible for security.

Then, how do the police contribute in countering terrorism from its traditional duties? When the police perform a counter terrorism efforts either through preventive action or not, it is a form of task implementation relating to security and law enforcement, which is part of the central government's absolute affairs. The regional police is an extension of the central government vertical agency in the region. However, in addition to executing the central government's absolute matters, in an interview with police officers assigned to the Medan Metropolitan Police Station's intelligence unit, it is known that they have established good relations and bridged the interests of former terrorist or family prisoners with other parties, including obtaining vehicle registration, affairs with land agencies, business opportunities, and others.

In addition, the Polrestabes maintain communication with former terrorist prisoners as part of their efforts to win over their hearts as well as 'monitor' their whereabouts. This is expected to avoid this group from returning to the path of radicalism embodied in the form of violence.

It is also important to know how the prison contributes. Medan has class 1 prison and has coached prisoners who have been proven to commit terrorism. According to the Head of Prison Development, in general, terrorist prisoners in the LP are guided by BNPT. Parties from BNPT usually visit the prison to meet them. The goal is that after they have finished the conviction or coaching and return to society, they do not desire to join radicalism anymore.

When visited, Tanjung Gusta Prison was at the moment not coaching terrorist prisoners. In this prison the coached citizens including terrorist prisoners at that moment were given the opportunity to attend skills training, such as workshops, farming, as well as furniture and wickering skills. However, it is not easy to get

terrorist prisoners to join these programs. In fact, some of them shut themselves down and refused to be involved. Uncooperative attitude towards coaching still arises because their views and beliefs that working with officials or with government is off limits.

They consider the government or officers are forbidden idol (*thogut*). From here it can be seen that not all terrorist prisoners were successfully de-radicalized after coaching..

After the terrorist prisoners are freed, the prisons, according to the respondents' confessions, retain their data. However, communication with them is not maintained. Thus, their existence after leaving the prison is not monitored. Indeed, after being freed from prisons there are other units that have the task of continuing the coaching of former inmates. This unit is called Correctional Institution (Halfway House). However, Halfway House will only play a role in continuing the formation of a former terrorist prisoner if they voluntarily want to be nurtured here. Halfway House as the prison may not force ex-inmates to engage in this coaching program. Indeed, there should be no enforcement. If the inmates do not want to be involved in a coaching program inside or outside the prison because of their belief that working with the government or officers is a forbidden act, then the de-radicalization efforts for them in prison are unsuccessful. The possibility of them becoming recidivists reopens.

When the local government does not have a specific program to combat terrorism, what about religious institutions such as Indonesia Council of Ulama (MUI) of Medan?

MUI has a hierarchical structure ranging from Central MUI, Provincial MUI, Local MUI to District level. MUI is a platform of the Islamic scholars in spreading Islam, guiding the people, the enforcing goods and avoid evils which are done by issuing formal rules (*fatwas*) either asked or not about various aspects of the life of the people as well as channeling the aspirations of Muslims.

In the structure of MUI Medan there are several commissions, one of which is the Commission on Economic Empowerment of the Muslims. With the role and sections in MUI which are responsible for the economic empowerment of people, obtaining information on counter-terrorism from the economic dimension is highly relevant. However, MUI Medan does not have a special program of empowerment for youth, let alone the one orienting to the creation of expertise so that the youth groups can be economically independent and difficult to be tempted to engage in violence acts in the name of religion, such as terrorism.

However, like other respondents in general, MUI also observe that the emergence of terrorism can stem from economic problems, especially the problem of economic injustice. MUI sees economic imbalances, including the control of economic resources at the hands of small groups of a certain ethnic minority communities, as

one form of economic injustice.

This can cause conflict. MUI has also been involved in forums discussing the stability of Medan city associated with the potential religious conflicts with the police. However, according to Masri Sitanggang, such forum put parties, such MUI, more as an instrument offire fighter, not as partners in conflict resolution efforts.

5. Sharing Expenses

As described in Section 4 above, terrorism is handled by the central government because terrorism is a security affair and belongs to the absolute category of central government affairs. Field studies in Medan also show that the absence of a preventing terrorist program in terms of economic empowerment, particularly, can be interpreted as a legal requirement because it follows the applicable law. In other words, the authority under the Regional Government Act is the way it should be. However, does this Regional Regulation close the opportunity for central and local governments to share the burden by managing terrorism together? If not, is it necessary?

The Law of Regional Regulation does not close the possibility for the local government to participate in terrorism prevention through deradicalisation or specifically through the economic empowerment of youth groups. In general, as mentioned before, the Ministry of Youth and Sports has the responsibility to contribute in improving the ability, competence and competitiveness of youths. This responsibility can be directly done by the Ministry, but it may also be done by the local government through the relevant SKPD which in this case the Youth and Sports Office. Both can also work together according to their scope and task. SKPD does not need to view this responsibility specifically as a form of terrorism countermeasures; it is enough to refer it as an effort to empower youths that can be intended as an effort to combat terrorism in general.

In the same pattern, this can also be done by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small- Medium Enterprises as well as the other ministries relevant to the task of improving economic prosperity. Regional , in this case SKPD Medan, can do the same by help either through the funding scheme from the center or through local budget allocations in accordance with its ability. In short, the regional authority can also participate in tackling this terrorism problem even though it is not their affairs.

Nevertheless, because this counter terrorism can be done from various dimensions, the handling of this matter can also be done from the dimension of authority owned by the local government, at least in the matter of general prevention, by providing youth empowerment through human development programs in the region. However, the problem is whether the regional authority has seen human development issues in youth economic development aspect as an urgent need as part of the effort to combat terrorism in general or not? From

field monitoring in Medan, it can be concluded that human development including youth development and from the economic side has been and will continue to be done. However, it can also be concluded that the development is not seen in the perspective of terrorism prevention through economic empowerment, but aims to improve the welfare of the people, including youth in general.

From the monitor, it can be explained the reasons why this happens. From the Office of Youth and Sports, for example, this service is more concerned with groups of youths exposed to drugs than terrorism. This happens because for Medan as well as other cities, the threat of drugs is more real than the threat of terrorism. Medan residents are associated with narcotics such as bookies, dealers, users, and victims are very numerous. From the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), in 2017 it is estimated that there are about 350 thousand drug users in North Sumatra.⁴²

Medan population is 15% of North Sumatra population; 52,500 people of them are narcotics users. This number is certainly very large compared to the number of people involved or become victims of terrorism. Thus, it should be understood if the attention of Government against the dangers of drugs is much greater when compared to terrorism. Moreover, the problem of drug eradication is not included as the absolute matter of the central government as well as the handling of terrorism, but both are the affairs of regional government. Furthermore, it can be explained why in some cities including Medan there are drug rehabilitation centers but not terrorism rehabilitation center.

The same thing happens with other agencies or LKPD. It is not urgent for Cooperatives Agency as well as Small and Medium Enterprises Agencies to make plan and develop a cooperative program or small and medium enterprises for youths specially to counter terrorism. This is because the number of youths involved in this action is insignificant.

Thus, making a general-purpose empowerment program is considered more reasonable. Also, because the program is open without any restrictions which exclude the youth. So, in general, the benefits are open to these people as well.

The same applies with the Social Service, the Labour Office, the Education Agency, or other relevant agencies. The number of youth group involved in terrorism is not significant enough to draw their attention to create a program dedicated to this age group as a part of efforts to prevent terrorism. This is because there are still many other communities or other household groups that are more urgent to be given the attention. Nevertheless, the insignificant number of youths involved in terrorism does not close the potential danger of terrorism among this productive age group. Given the potential dangers of terrorism due to the powerlessness of

42 <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/daerah/17/08/27/ ovc1pk384-bnn-sebut-ada-350-ribu-pengguna-narkoba-di-sumut>. Lihat juga <https://sumut.antaranews.com/berita/165956/foto>

the economy as indicated by the statistical data, these terrorism countermeasures should not be the concern of the central government alone. The collaboration of central government and local government must take place in the real forms. Both must share the burden of countering terrorism according to the nature and function of each institution in accordance with the authority of each. Furthermore, the communities either individually or through community organizations also need to be involved.

The government needs to create a conducive climate and invite their involvement. Reflecting on the involvement of the community in drug prevention in Medan such as establishing drug user rehabilitation centers, it can be believed that the same thing can also be made by the society for the perpetrators or those exposed to radicalism as exemplified by Khairul Ghazali with his Islamic school.

6. Conclusion and Recommendation

The program of counter terrorism through economic empowerment as a part of the great efforts of counter-radicalism and deradicalization for youth has not yet been implemented in Medan. The city government or related parties in Medan have not made this youth empowerment program because of at least two reasons. *First*, the system of distribution of governmental affairs between the central and local government including Medan Government does manage the distribution in such a way, so the affairs of terrorism has become the central government affairs. *The second reason* is that the urgency of making and implementing this program has not been considered urgent. This is because the number of former terrorist prisoners or their family is not as much as the number of perpetrators or victims of drug abuse, for example The number is also insignificant when compared to the number of unemployed in Medan that must be overcome by the Department of Labour, including when compared to the number of poor people and those who need to get services from the Social Service or from the Office of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises.

However, this condition does not rule out the possibility of collaboration between central and local government agencies in providing youth empowerment efforts in Medan technically or legally. This can be done by staying on the duties and functions of each agency. This may be the case because the the central and regional governments affairs intersect with each other. Thus, the preparation and implementation of these affairs, and also other technical aspects can be coordinated between the central and the local government.

Youth empowerment in Medan is important because macroeconomically the urban welfare percentage rate of Medan is generally lower than the national average. Key economic indicators such as youth unemployment rate, the number of out-of-school youth, urban economic growth, show less encouraging signs.

Thus, development or economic intervention is important in this city although not necessarily in the context of countering radicalism. If this is done, it will in the end indirectly affect the effort of counter terrorism.

In addition, the attitude of some people to the acts of terrorism still needs to be changed. Views that can lead to apology or at least tolerance to terrorism still exist. That religion understanding is one of the causes of terrorism is still not fully accepted by some of those interviewed. Meanwhile, the history of this city also cannot be separated from the Islamic insurgency movement. Thus, there are other factors that make Medan important to be given the attention in the effort of counter terrorism. Based on these findings, some recommendations may be proposed. *First*, the central government agencies, working with the local government, need to map the social condition of the youth, such as their family background, educational and economic level, such as welfare, as well as to map out their views on religious radicalism. Regardless to the economic dimension, central or local government should have the data on which youth groups need to receive economic intervention and other forms of intervention, up to the village administrative level or even to the lower administrative level. *Second*, central and local government agencies need to collaborate to develop patterns, timeframes, and forms or models of interventions complete with the monitoring and evaluation program. Included in this is the method of assistance when intervening. In preparing the intervention, the government must also determine the scale of priority considering the number of youths who are targeted by the intervention is not small. *Finally*, in formulating the intervention's program, the community should be involved in a real participation so that they feel the program belongs to them and for their benefit as well.

CHAPTER 3

Youth Economy, Post-Conflict Development and CVE in Poso, Central Sulawesi

1. Preface

The issue of youth empowerment, especially in economic field will continue to be an ongoing discourse because indeed, youth is an asset of this nation. We often hear some of the terms among which are: Youth is the future of the nation, Youth is the next generation of the nation, Youth is the future leader candidate, Youth is the pedestal and hope of the nation, Youth is the nation's gold generation, etc.

From some of the terms of youth above, it is clear and unquestionable that youth is the greatest asset and the most valuable asset of this nation. History has also proven how the youth gait towards the progress of the nation, even since the time before the independence. For example, in 1928, youth from various parts of the country gathered to declare "Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath)". In 1998, the youth were also the driving force of the reform era. The youth has succeeded in overthrowing the New Order regime, so we are now in the reform era. This cannot be separated either from the active participation of the youth in donating the best works of the nation and Indonesia.

The illustration above proves that youth is the nation's best hope. Thus, the most strategic and most profitable investment in the future is to train, develop and empower the potential of youth across the archipelago. For the government, there is no word "loss" in spending state money to empower youth.

In the economic sector, the youth begin to show their capacity in creating and managing business groups, or even the ones large enough mass-based. However, many of the youth seems to have difficulties in developing their potential, even lost to the competition with other groups. This happens not only in big cities but also in the regions, such as Poso, Central Sulawesi.

At the post horizontal conflict Poso continues to struggle to catch up with other areas. However, it must be acknowledged that the consequences of the conflict have left considerable 'homework' for both the central and the local government. Poso, with all its shortcomings and advantages, requires more attention from the government.


The youth, as an integral part of Poso's future generation, still needs serious attention. They can not be ignored, they become part of the victims of the conflict that occurred several years ago; the effects of the conflict are still felt. This is a burden that must be bore by them, which must be different from the burden of the youth from different areas.

In addition to these issues, Poso is also highlighted due to its issue of radicalism and terrorism. Poso is even expected to be a region to continue the dream of establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia.⁴³ Basically the issue of radicalism and terrorism is not only in Poso; other areas are not spared from the development and influence of this understanding. Therefore, the youth in Poso is required to be able to deal with it. Many things can be done by the government; one of them is by economic empowerment forthe youth.

The economic empowerment for youths is not only done for those who are involved in the conflict and who commit terrorism (whether still in legal process or who have returned to society) but to families, networks and youth in general. The reason is because they are also affected by the situation in Poso, either directly or indirectly.

In some instances, the central government has made efforts to restore the Poso situation as it once was, as a safe and peaceful area. The government, through the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT)⁴⁴ in synergy with the local government and the security apparatus, has done a lot of coaching in the terms of religion, national insight, and independence through economic empowerment.


2. Geographical Condition



Sumber: <https://g035.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/kabupaten-poso/peta-kab-poso>

43 This idea was once discussed between Abu Thalut with Santoso and Ustadz Yasin in 2009, before the project began. Read Ansyad Mbai, *The New Dynamics of Terror Networking in Indonesia and Its Linkage to Transnational Radical Movement*, Jakarta: AS Production Indonesia, 2014. p. 31.

44 BNPT was established based on Presidential Regulation No. 46/2010 on National Agency for Combating Terrorism as amended by Presidential Regulation No. 12/2012.



Sumber: https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_kecamatan_dan_kelurahan_di_Kabupaten_Poso

Poso is one of the oldest districts in Central Sulawesi Province with Poso City as the capital. Currently, Poso is led by Regent Drs. Piet Ingkriwang, MM., Chairman of Parliament Drs. S. Pelima, and the Regional Secretary Drs. Amjad Lawasa, MM.

The total area of Poso is 24,197 km. Administratively this area is divided into 19 districts. This area has great potentials to be developed, including the plantation sector with the main commodities of cocoa, deep coconut, arabica coffee, robusta coffee, cloves, pepper, and cashew nuts. Food crops, including rice, horticulture, and other crops are still the mainstay of agricultural activities in the area. In the tourism sector, Togeang Island, increasingly packed with foreign tourists, has become the main asset of marine tourism development. There is also the festival of Lake Poso that has ever become a barometer of tourism development. This agricultural products has given a big trade impact. Trade became the livelihood of the people after agriculture. The existence of infrastructure in the form of adequate road makes it easier for traders to interact and to accelerate the flow of goods and services. In this area there is also Kasiguncu Airport, the main Port of Poso Harbor, various facilities and infrastructures, such as electricity power plant, clean water, gas, and telecommunication networks.

The latitudes and longitude of Poso lie in the coordinates of 1°06'44,892"-2°12'53.172" LS and 120°05'96"-120°52'4.8" BT. Based on its astronomical location, the length of Poso from the west end to the eastern tip is approximately 86.2 km, while the width from north to south is approximately 130 km.

Seen from the position on the surface of the earth, Poso District's is located in the forest areas and mountain valley. Other areas lie on the coastal area located in the

waters of Tomini Bay and Tolo Bay.

Geologically, the Poso Regency lies in the rows of mountain folds, Fennema and Tineba Mountain in the west, Takolekaju Mountain in the southwest, Verbeek Mountain in the southeast, Pompangeo and Lumut Mountain in the northeast.

The land area of Poso after being separated from Tojo Una Una Regency is estimated around 8,712.25 km² or 12.81% of the land area of Central Sulawesi Province. Compared to the size of mainland districts in Central Sulawesi Province, Poso District is in the fourth position.

In 2010 Kabupaten Poso had a subdivision expansion. Pamona Puselemba District is the expansion of North Pamona District, with an area of approximately 560,05 km². It consists of 10 rural areas, with Sangele Village as the district capital. Central Lore District has the largest area of approximately 976.37 km² or 11.21% of the total of Poso. The territory of Poso Regency is bordered by the natural boundaries, which are coastal areas and mountains/hills with administrative boundaries as follows:

1. North area: bordered with Tomini Bay and North Sulawesi Province.
2. South area: bordered with South Sulawesi Province.
3. East area: bordered with the Tojo Una-una and Morowali districts.
4. West area: bordered with Donggala District and Parigi Moutong Regency.

3. Socio-Economic condition of Poso

In terms of population, the native of Poso region is now mixed with the nomads who have been in this area since tens or even hundreds years ago. In addition to indigenous tribes, Poso and surrounding areas inhabited by immigrants from outside areas. This is because previously this area was also the destination of transmigration.

Along with the development and progress of the era, since the New Order era Poso District has been inhabited by many ethnic groups with various religions. Many Muslims come from Java, Bugis, Makassar, Mandar, Buton, Kaili, Tojo, Togeang, even from Arab. The Protestants come from Pamona, Minahasa, China, Mori, Napu, Besoa, and Bada from inland districts. Many Catholic groups come from Minahasa, China, and Flores. In Poso there are also Hindu people who come from Bali.

The population of various tribes, ethnicities and religions spread across 19 districts of Poso District, which are:

NO.	DISTRICT	TOTAL POPULATION	REMARKS
1	South Pamona	20.697	
2	West Pamona	10.514	
3	Southeast Pamona	7.293	
4	North Pamona	13.755	

5	Pamona Pusalemba	20.249	
6	East Pamona	10.727	
7	South Lore	6.332	
8	West Lore	3.164	
9	North Lore	13.403	
10	Central Lore	4.532	
11	East Lore	5.481	
12	Lore Peore	3.305	
13	Coastal Poso	22.644	
14	Coastal South Poso	9.953	
15	Coastal North Poso	17.659	
16	Poso City	22.815	
17	South Poso City	10.123	
18	North Poso City	12.451	
19	Lage	20.470	

Source: BPS Poso Regency, 2015.

The number of population is divided into several groups, which are:

No	Group Age	Gender		Total	Remarks
		Male	Female		
1	0–4	11.790	11.310	23.100	
2	5–9	10.653	9.761	20.414	
3	10–14	10.526	10.005	20.531	
4	15–19	10.208	9.414	19.622	
5	20–24	9.946	8.517	18.463	
6	25–29	10.557	9.525	20.082	
7	30–34	10.406	9.908	20.314	
8	35–39	10.108	9.159	19.267	
9	40–44	9.095	8.203	17.298	
10	45–49	7.524	6.969	14.493	
11	50–54	6.193	5.833	12.026	
12	55–59	4.956	4.768	9.724	
13	60–64	3.572	3.371	6.943	
14	65+	6.440	6.850	13.290	
	TOTAL	121.974	113.593	235.567	

Source: BPS Poso Regency, 2015.

From the data above, it appears that the number of young age groups is quite high. As known, according to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 40 of 2009, Youths are Indonesian citizens entering an important period of growth and development aged 16 (sixteen) to 30 (thirty) years. With this large number, this could be Poso District's potential economic growth

and development. Young age is a productive age, so it is up to the government to empower their potential.

Life Expectancy, Literacy Rate, Average School Duration and Human Development Index of Poso District 2010-2016							
Indicator	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(9)
<i>Life Expectancy Rate (year)</i>	70,13	70,09	69,99	69,98	69,96	69,95	69,92
<i>Expected Years of Schooling (year)</i>	13,16	13,15	12,87	12,39	12,21	12,07	11,92
<i>Mean Years of Schooling (year)</i>	8,67	8,52	8,49	8,42	8,37	8,32	8
<i>Human Dev- elopment Index</i>	68,83	68,13	67,65	66,94	66,2	65,59	64,81

Source: BPS PosoRegency, 2015.

From these data, it can be seen that the number of Human Development Index of Poso District is still at number 68.83. This is still relatively low, lower than the national average which is 70.18 in 2016.

The average level of education is 8.67 years. This means that most of the population is not even junior high school graduate. This data shows that the Poso society still needs considerable attention from the government. The following is an illustration of Pure Participation Rate (APM), Rough Participation Rate (APK) and poverty line of Kabupaten Poso.

Pure Participation Rate (APM) and Rough Participation Rate (APK) according to Education Level in Poso District, 2014 2015				
Educational Level	APM		APK	
	Net Enrollment Rate		Gross Enrollment Rate	
	2014	2015	2014	2015
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>SD/MI/ Elementary School</i>	93,53	95,38	105,89	108,74
<i>SMP/MTs/Junior High School</i>	81,75	80,48	91,76	95,84
<i>SMA/SMK/MA/Senior High School</i>	72,99	61,71	87,16	86,32

Source: National Social Economic Survey, March 2014–2015.


Poverty Line and Number of Poor People in Poso District, 2011-2015			
<i>Poverty Line and Number of Poor People in Poso Regency, 2011–2015</i>			
Year	Poverty Line (rupiah)	Total	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2011	286 000	43,0	20,10
2012	312 764	40,8	18,46

2013	343 358	41,3	18,22
2014	368 562	39,65	17,09
2015	378 190	42,64	18,16

Source: National Socio-Economic Survey

at the condition of HDI, APM, APK and the poverty line, it turns out that the economic growth rate of Poso Regency continues to increase every year. Below is the economic growth rate description of Poso District:


Laju Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Kabupaten 2009 - 2013



Source: BPS Poso District, 2015.

From the table above, it is clearly seen that every year Poso District's economy continues to increase significantly. This increasing economic growth rate can be an asset for Poso District to continue to grow, competing with other regions.

Laju Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Kabupaten Poso Berdasarkan Sektor Dominan



Sumber: BPS of Poso Regency, 2015.

The table shows that the service sector is a dominant sector that continues to increase, unlike the agricultural and trade sectors, hotels, and restaurants.

4. The Role of Government in Economic Empowerment, Specifically in Preventing Radicalism

Poso is the province of Central Sulawesi which has always been highlighted by various media, even the international media. However, the spotlight lies only in the aspect of the extremism movement in Poso District, while in other aspects it is not a concern, even though the natural wealth and coastal tourism potential and nature are not less exotic than other regions.

Not infrequently people link Poso with terrorism, because in Poso, gunfights still exist between terrorist groups and the security forces (military and police). If we look back, these cases did not originate by themselves, but started from various conflicts. They were accompanied by the spread of radical ideas brought by some community groups from outside of Poso. This wave of dissemination continues flowing directly or indirectly through social media. Even some people involved in the battles are not from Poso but from other regions that come to join the group. The death of Santoso does not mean that the efforts to cultivate hatred and dissemination of hostilities in the name of religion have ended. Therefore, the efforts of counter-narration, counter-ideology, and counter-radicalisation efforts must be continuously improved by strengthening the regulation and stipulating the plan of amendment to Bill Number 15 of 2003 on Criminal Acts of Terrorism to make it a law that can be referred for law enforcement officers.⁴⁵

In such situations, besides giving the guidance to the community, the government also does law enforcement efforts. Until now, many of perpetrators of terrorism have been secured, undergone legal proceedings in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations or received supervision while in or after the prison. Currently, some of the former perpetrators of terrorism have returned to Poso and rejoined the community.

The case of Poso is different from some other areas because it has different cultural roots and conflict. The case of terrorism in Poso and elsewhere can not be equated because the root of the problem is different.

Many cases of terrorism in Poso were originated from communal conflicts have not yet comprehensively resolved. The cases that have not been completely resolved trigger some people and some groups of people to commit acts of violence in the name of religion.

The communal conflict has left a trace that is still felt by some people there; some are traumatized, vengeful, and so on. Similar situation that happens to the youth there have at least the direct or indirect influence. However, Poso's condition

45 Irfan Idris, *Membumikan Deradikalisasi: Soft Approach Model Pembinaan Terorisme dari Hulu ke Hilir Secara Berkesinambungan*, Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2016, p. 300-301.

continues to improve upon the government full attention.

Along with the betterment of the security situation, the economic life continues to move forward. Community economics grows slowly but steadily progressing, the same with the economic activity among youth. Although it has not recovered completely, at least it has experienced a better development than ever before.

The economic empowerment programs done by both the central and the local government can touch the layer of these youth groups, although they have not been able to synergically and sustainably done. This is either due to the lack of synchronization of data owned by the stakeholders used for program policies and the availability of budget, or because of other causes.⁴⁶

Indeed, it is acknowledged that combating terrorism in an integrated manner that should not stop only when the prisoners of the terrorism are released from prison, but even more important is when they are out of prison. Development and empowerment must be continuously carried out through the synergy of various components of the government and the society.

The governments, both central and local, need to do real action to co-operate with communities in 'mentoring' by empowering interests, talents and potentials. One of the necessary empowerment is in the economic field. This economic empowerment aims to train them to become economically independent individuals and families.

This empowerment program can be an effort by government to equip them with practical skills of entrepreneurship that can be directly applied and developed into entrepreneurial activities with economic value.

Thus, this empowerment program is expected to resolve their family's economic problems by offering alternative jobs or training their skills according to the interests, talents, potentials and market needs that exist around their environment. Of course, this program needs to be conducted by various elements of both the central and local government by actively involving the components of existing society in order to integrate it with the community activities.

Furthermore, this economic empowerment approach is expected to help stifle the turmoil and radical thoughts of a person / group especially among youth because they feel the state is helping to overcome the economic difficulties. In this context, the state also proves its presence and preference to them.

Economic empowerment is expected to touch the root problem of the emergence and development of violent acts, especially those caused by the backwardness of the economic factor. Therefore, this economic empowerment activity is required to overcome or answer the problem. Economic empowerment is done by mentoring both in the context of mental readiness and entrepreneurial hard skills.

Besides, it takes supervision to grow the entrepreneurial motivation. Thus, economic empowerment is expected to lift their economic conditions, so it will

⁴⁶ interview with Budiman Maliki, Director of LPMS Poso, August 25, 2017.

improve their welfare. Therefore, this activity is very important and urgent to be done through clear and sustainable stages.

To illustrate, the role of the central and local government can be mapped, although in the implementation, both should synergize. It means the central government program should not be separated from the local government support .

5. The Role of Central Government

From the interviews with the respondents, several government agencies have done much for the development of Poso community, including economic empowerment, although the program's name is not as clear as the youth program by the Police and the Military. Both agencies are involved, not only from the security aspect in order to be conducive, but also to empower the communities through social activities, such as the development and rehabilitation of educational, religious and other public facilities, as well as other community activities, such as sports activities.

In addition to these two agencies, in 2016 the Ministry of Social Affairs along with National Commission on Human Rights also conducted economic empowerment for former terrorist and their families. Economic empowerment is conducted by providing sewing machine aid.

The sewing machine aid is expected to serve as a tool for entrepreneurship so to enable them to fulfill their daily needs. However, in some cases, the aid is not given to the right person. For example, the qualification of the recipient is not clear enough and some of the recipients do not have a sewing skill, so it becomes useless.

The matter of recipient qualification is questioned by the respondents we met in the field because there are some former terrorists and prisoners of the community who did not receive the aid, even though they needed it.

The existence of this sewing machine aid will certainly be very useful if done after some mapping based on the recipient's qualifications, market potential, interests, and talents of each potential beneficiary. After that, training and assistance should be conducted both in production and marketing.

Thus, this economic empowerment program will continue to roll and sustain. It will ven be easier in terms of monitoring.

Other than the Ministry of Social Affairs, the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) as a ministerial level government agency in charge of coordinating institutions in the handling terrorism also empowers the economy in Poso.

In general, the BNPT activities in Poso are not only in deradicalisation or coaching programs for those who have been in involved in radicalism, but their activities are also in many prevention programs based on all background of the community.

The terroism prevention program done by BNPT including through FKPT⁴⁷ has

47 FKPT was formed based on Head of BNPT Regulation No. PER-02 / K. BNPT / 1/2012 on Establishment of Coordination Forum on Terrorism Prevention in the Region.

touched various circles in Poso from youths, students, religious leaders, traditional leaders, to community figures. The activities are usually in the form of socialization of the danger of radicalism and its dispersion, inter-faith dialogue and strengthening of national insight. Central Sulawesi FKPT has not such program to empower youth economy specifically in CVE. FKPT programs focus more on prevention.

These prevention programs are carried out by BNPT itself, the Coordination Prevention of Terrorism Forum (FKPT) of Central Sulawesi Province, as well as BNPT in synergy with community groups in Poso.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, deradicalization programs in general have been run by various government agencies and communities in accordance with the role and capacity. The government agencies conducting deradicalization programs should not be limited to BNPT and the police force, but all ministries and state agencies should be involved in accordance with their respective duties and functions. Nevertheless, the current deradicalization programs have not been designed in an integrative, comprehensive, and systemic way, so the programs are still difficult to measure their success. In many ways, the programs still face many shortcomings and weaknesses. Conceptually, deradicalisation is all the means of transforming radical beliefs or radical ideologies into non-radical done by multi-disciplinary (religious, social, cultural, and others) approaches to people affected by radical beliefs. On that basis, deradicalisation is more about the attempt to make cognitive changes or moderate one's thoughts or beliefs.

Thus, deradicalization is a long-term program. It works on the ideological level with the aim of changing the doctrine and the terrorists' interpretation of their religious understanding. From the context of the above understanding, deradicalization can be interpreted as all efforts to transform radical beliefs or ideologies into non-radical through various multi and interdisciplinary approaches. As the activity program, the implementation of deradicalization can take the form of identifying, rehabilitating, reeducating and resocializing individuals or groups of people affected by radicalism by promoting the principles of empowerment, human rights, the rule of law and equality.⁴⁹

In general, the deradicalisation / coaching programs have been done in Poso are:

1. Religious understanding coaching

Religious coaching is a series of guidance for inclusive, peaceful, and tolerant religious understanding. This guidance refers to the moderation of ideology done by altering a radical and violent ideology into an inclusive, peaceful and tolerant ideology.⁵⁰

48 Interview with Mr. Muhtadin, FKPT Central Sulawesi, 5 September 2017 in Palu.

49 BNPT, *Blueprint Deradikalisasi*, 2013.

50 Agus SB, *Deradikalisasi Nusantara: The War of the Universe Based on Local Wisdom Against Radicalization and Terrorism*, (Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2016). p. 158.

This guidance is directed to the alignment of a doctrine understanding contextualized in the life of a nation and a state.

2. Nationalism insight coaching

This coaching is directed to the citizen's understanding and spirit of nationality towards their country. This guidance is to moderate the notion of violence by providing an understanding of Indonesian state and nationalism.

3. Psychological coaching

This guidance is directed to the mental reinforcement to renounce radicalism and to reunite in the society as good citizens.

4. Economic independence / empowerment coaching. This guidance is directed to the development of practical skills should be possessed by a person or group of people to survive living in a community. This guidance serves as the proof of the state's attention to its citizens who have committed extraordinary crime.

For coaching/deradicalisation, BNPT specifically directs its activities to former prisoners of terrorism cases, their family, network and people/groups that have the potential to engage in radicalism and terrorism. The guidance activities include the formation of religious understanding, psychology, national insight, and independence/entrepreneurship.

As an illustration of the BNPT program, in 2011 the BNPT Directorate of Deradicalization has conducted a baking entrepreneurship training to the families of terrorist prisoners in Palu City, with the participants from Poso. This entrepreneurship training is basically a part of the deradicalization program.

In the baking training program, the families of the terrorism act prisoners were given practical training, from the making of nastar, sponge cake, to the making of birthday cake. At that time, the participants were divided into several groups and each group were given a set of cooking utensils.

BNPT has provided practical skills and tools that can be used by them to create and develop a baking business in Poso. This is a stimulus for them to continue developing their in order to meet their daily needs.

Some notes on the economic empowerment programs that have been implemented by BNPT are:⁵¹

- a. Economic empowerment as part of the deradicalization program is done as an effort to develop self-reliance to 4 (four) groups of people which are former terrorists, their families, their networks and people/groups that are indicated/potentially have radical understanding of terrorism. So, the program's target qualification is not focused on the youth, but to whoever is included in one of the 4 categories.
- b. Economic empowerment is preceded by identification of the beneficiary data and the economic activity required by them. This is done to ensure that the aid

51 Excerpted from various sources about the implementation of deradicalization program.

is received by the right person and the right equipment is provided accordance with the needs of the participants.

- c. Economic empowerment is provided in the form of short-term entrepreneurship training, including the calculation of financing and provision of tools / goods / equipment needed to be an entrepreneur. So, the economic empowerment is not done by giving capital/money.
- d. Economic empowerment is given in accordance with Poso's potential, interests, talents and market trends, such as cattle, food, bike-taxi or other businesses
- e. Economic empowerment is carried out by coordinating with the related agencies in the region.

In terms of implementation, there are some notes on the economic empowerment programs directly given to target receivers, which are:⁵²

- a. Selection of participants or beneficiaries of the activities. The qualifications of the participants are sometimes unclear, resulting in many arguments regarding the names of the participants. According to them, there should be a clear standard and it should be hold strictly.
- b. Among the participants who included in the program, there are some who are not serious, and even give the impression that they just want to get the goods only, and then sell them again. This is certainly not in accordance with the main purpose of economic empowerment.
- c. Economic empowerment program is done by giving the aid through goods or entrepreneurial tools, not in the form of business capital. Such a program is more appropriate than the provision of business capital.
- d. Economic empowerment program is done individually by providing a kind of goods or tools/equipments that can be used for entrepreneurship.
- e. There are participants who are forced to write a certain equipment or entrepreneurial tool as an aid just because what they want can not be fulfilled. These kinds of participants will likely to sell the goods right after receiving. Most of them will use the money to fulfill their needs of daily living, although there are also some who use it to buy goods/tools for other kind of business.
- f. Participants who are provided with goods or entrepreneurship tools do not want to be put in one group; they prefer to be given individually. Their reason is that if it is done in groups, it will be easier to be separated.
- g. Many of the participants often change their mind when applying for the entrepreneurial tools. Apparently, they still do not understand the potential, interests, talents, and market segments of the business they want to do. They are also easily influenced by their friends.

52 Excerpted from interviews with some former terrorism prisoners and FGD, 26-27 August 2017 in Poso.

h. The very short trainings do not even touch the distributed equipments/ goods needed for the business. The trainings discuss more about the managerial and financial issues, not the practical skill. In the future, this needs to be considered before the activities are carried out.

6. The Role of Local Government

In addition to the central government, the economic empowerment program can not be separated from the role of local government strategy. Even the economic empowerment programs done by the central government agencies need to be kept in coordination with the local government, including the local security apparatus.

Many local government agencies have not any economic empowerment program for youths, let alone the one related to CVE. They focus more on the routine programs, specifically harmonious and religious guidance, such as the ones done by Kemenag, FKUB, Kesbangpol, and the others.

There is an agency that actually have no youth economic empowerment program or one related to CVE but in its implementation, the activities involved many former combatants in Poso. So, the former combatants feel much assisted, especially in earning income for their families.

The agency is the Public Work Department. In fact, according to the former terrorist prisoner, what is done by the office is very helpful. The requirements for them to get the job are also the same as other community members. So, in this case, no group is prioritized. Many of the former terrorism prisoners have had formal businesses already, so they can join business auctions.⁵³

The Social Service does not have a budget / fund specifically devoted to the empowerment of the youth economy in order to counter radicalism. The existing budget is for the public, not specifically to counter radicalism.

The Social Service is currently designing a program that can create activities that can hit the group, so that they can do social activities and get social assistance.

In the further plan, Social Service intend to budget so that the former terrorist prisoners can be involved in the program of Independent Economic Business (UEM).

This includes excellent programs at the Social Service. The plan is to include the former terrorist prisoner in this program. Meanwhile, the programs already run can be given to people with disability by sending them to join the training in Makassar, and then after they are able to plunge in the community, they will be accompanied and guided. In the next plan, this kind of program will also be given to former terrorist prisoners.⁵⁴

53 Interview with Upik and Irwanto Irano, August 26, 2017 in Poso.

54 Excerpted from interview with Mr. Fuad and FGD on Economic Empowerment related to CVE, in Poso.

The Department of Social Welfare of Poso District delivers many peaceful religious messages which are not exclusively for the youth but also for all groups including the children and the parents who are involved. However, the Department of Social of Poso District has not run any program related to economic empowerment. The programs are more to the religious field.⁵⁵ Therefore, an evaluation to know where the direction of the program is needed to be known. And then, there should be a target for the implementation of the program so that the aid is used only by the target person and not by the others. In other words, the qualifications of program recipients must be clear.

Based on the interview, the existing agencies and communities have not implemented an economic empowerment program for youth and former terrorist. Therefore, it is important for the stakeholders to collaborate and communicate with the local government, so that the economic empowerment for the youth and former terrorists can be included in the government programs to prevent the radical understanding developing in Poso District.

Some people view that the current approach is only project based because its implementation is not supported by accurate data and not owned equally by all the authorized agencies which will undertake the program. For example, a lot of help is not in accordance with the environment and its habits. Therefore, it is important to identify the data to avoid wrong targeting, so that the assistance provided becomes more useful. Plenty of help has been given only to the same people. Therefore, it is important to re-register the data comprehensively. .

In some cases, personal assistance makes them spoiled and undeveloped. Therefore, it is important to form/develop the existing group larger. There are many programs that seem to imposed, only utilizing the momentum to get the program. Therefore, supporting a group that has been running is more important than forming a new group that is not going to work.

The problem encountered in the field is that there are many businesses owned by the beneficiaries or former terrorist prisoners that are changing because of trend. This is because many people have worker spirit, not entrepreneur spirit. So, there should be an internship program for them, so that later they can develop their own skills.

According to the Poso District Youth and Sports Office, mucn of the information regarding the economic empowerment program in the center office does not reach the region. In fact, the region must 'pick up the ball' and request for information to the center office. Therefore, not many youths took part in many of the programs held by the Ministry, such as the Beginner Entrepreneurship . The economic empowerment programs for youths especially related to radical prevention has

55 Excerpted from interviews and in FGD on Economic Empowerment related to CVE, 11 September 2017 in Poso.

never been done by the office. However, the office develops the spirit of youth through sport to prevent them from the danger of drugs and to reinforce their spirit of nationalism.

Those who have many sports activities will be avoided from negative things.⁵⁶ No program in the field of youth economic empowerment has been accompanied by Youth and Sport Office. There has never been an economic empowerment program for youth related to prevention of CVE. There was once a youth group which submitted entrepreneurship proposals but could not be followed up because of lack of funds from the district government. Related to economic empowerment, in Poso District many youth communities have independent business, but they work on their own, and not accompanied by the office.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs does not specifically have an economic empowerment program for youth either through extension agents who have been scattered in various areas of Poso District⁵⁷ nor the Department of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises of Poso District.⁵⁸ According to Ministerial Regulation (Permendagri) 14/2016, there is no assistance for Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) in 2016, unless they access the SME Director General in Jakarta online and in groups. The business must have already been running and have the business permit as well. So, those who already have a business license can submit a program to the Director General of Cooperatives and SME without going through the office in Poso District.

The reason is because they were assisted several years before, and now they need the assistance only for its development.

In addition, there is also a grant program. However, the number of the proposals received is beyond the funds released. The program that is currently running is the program to monitor the running entrepreneurial programs. The enterprises that have been running are usually from the province, not the district. Starting from 2016, the district SMEs duties are just to monitor and direct.

The military in Poso is more helpful when asked by the related parties because their duties and authorities are different from the agencies under the local government. All these times, the District Command (Kodim) has helped the community fixing inappropriate for living houses, planting crops, making fermented fertilizers, etc. So, the helps are not specifically for youth economic empowerment program to prevent CVE.⁵⁹

Among youths, Kodim is often present to provide an understanding of nationalism to raise awareness and the spirit of nationalism. So, the love of youths towards Indonesia in Poso District is higher and there is no threat to the security

56 Interview with Mr. Mursid, August 28, 2017 in Poso.

57 Meeting results in Poso, facilitated by LPMS, August 26, 2017 in Poso.

58 Interview with Julen at Dinas UMKM, August 28, 2017 in Poso.

59 Interview with members of Poso District Military Command, August 28, 2017 in Poso.

there. In this case, communicating and interacting with the community is the the military way to be close to the community and create security in the surrounding environment.⁶⁰

As for the police, through the Regiment Police of Poso District, they have made many approaches with community. The proximity between the police and the community needs to be improved because it can synergize in creating a conducive security atmosphere. The police, through Babin-Kamtibmas (community security service), continue to unite with the community wherever they serve.

Related to economic empowerment among youth, indeed if it is seen from the task and functions it is not in accordance with the police's. However, the police have also helped in the form of livestock and other entrepreneurial equipment, especially to the former terrorist and their families.

In addition, Poso District Police together with related agencies have conducted many activities among youth, including conducting lectures at schools, colleges, and various community groups, which can prevent students from radical understanding. Babinkamtibmas plays major active roles in counteracting such understanding. In Tamanjeka, for example, they conduct such activities by forming soccer team in some areas. In coastal areas they recruit soccer players, while the Regiment Police prepares the ball, costumes and others, for the preparation of the competition.

This activity is intended so that youths do not participate in radicalism activity, and instead unite with togetherness, and play an active role in the sport. Poso District Police has a program called *Polisi Madagoraya* means good police.⁶¹

On its way, the program runs smoothly and in line with expectations. For the Quran recitation community, especially housewives, the Kamtibmas come down delivering lectures for peace and anti radicalism. In addition, the Regiment Police give many aids and handle former terrorist, their family, and victims by donating foodstuff and in making the driver's license. Thus, the police have also done a lot of sympathetic action to the community. In the future, the economic empowerment program for youth, especially in the framework of CVE, needs to be strengthened, and even specifically budgeted by the Regional Government of Poso Regency. In a focus group discussion attended by representatives from local government agencies, Poso District People's Representative Council (DPRD), and some organizations in Poso hoped that the House of Representative could organize economic empowerment programs for these youths.⁶²

60 Interview with member of Poso District Military Command, August 28, 2017 in Poso.

61 The results of interviews with members of Poso District Police, August 28, 2017 in Poso.

62 FGD results on Economic Empowerment for Youth related

7. The Role of Islamic Organization and Youth Organization

The Islamic organization and youth organization do not have specific programs of economic empowerment among youth to counter radicalism either. However, the Islamic Organizations do have a lot of *da'wah* to call for peace, tolerance, obedience in worship, and so on, and also mentoring for wives and / or families of former terrorist. Among others, there is Aisiyah (Muhammadiyah) which gives a lot of assistance to the wives of the former terrorist, those who are still in prison and those who are dead already. .

They need to be supported to have active role in an activity and not only depended on the mentoring. They need to be directed to the creative and independent economy. So, the former terrorist and their families are invited to join the community and gain trust. It is expected that they can continue to improve in terms of economy and others, and there is no desire to join radicalism anymore.

As for Komda Al-khairaat Poso, they strongly condemn the actions of terrorism. They have a program for youth also under the auspices of the Al-Khairaat Youth Association (HPA) which conduct regeneration and guidance to youth for not involving in the circle of radicalism understanding.⁶³

The group always provides direction to the member about the understanding of nationalism, diversity, and others. Therefore, HPA has an economic empowerment program for youth; moreover, there are big pieces of land given to them to manage properly. However, again it is the budget that hinders the implementation of the program. HPA is working to connect with several related agencies so that economic empowerment for youth can be realized immediately. Independent economics is one of the goals of the HPA which can make many youths self-sufficient in terms of economy. Meanwhile, the programs have been done so far are still in the form of seminars, so they have not touched on the implementation of independent economy. Similarly, PB Al-Khairaat has not an economic empowerment program specifically for youth about CVE. The programs of PB Al-Khairaat are more on education and *da'wah*.⁶⁴

The board of Muhammadiyah Poso District also agrees that people intend to do terrorism because they lack of understanding of the religion. As for the economic empowerment program for youth, they said that Muhammadiyah was concerned about it. However, the implementation still faces obstacles because of the funding factors and others. Nevertheless, the organization will continue to pursue such economic empowerment program, so the youth of Muhammadiyah will not get involved in radicalism understandings.⁶⁵

The management of GP Ansor in Poso District has only been re-established after

63 Interview with Fadly, September 4, 2017 in Palu.

64 Interview with Ridwan, September 5, 2017 in Palu.

65 FGD Results on Economic Empowerment for Youth related to CVE, 11 September 2017 in Poso.

a long period of inactivity. However, he said that in accordance with the central directives related to efforts to counter radicalism, they are ready to counteract the notion. So far, the program of economic empowerment for youth has not run, so it needs to be followed up,⁶⁶ considering the vulnerability of the young to radical understandings. Based on the circulated data, the ages of the youth who join ISIS are 20-40 years old.

Similar with GP Ansor, the National Youth Committee (KNPI) of Poso District states that there are about 60 Youth Organizations (OKP) in Poso District. However, KNPI is present only as the house to the existing OKP. They cannot provide much monitoring to each of OKP, so they do not know much about the economic empowerment program. However, KNPI continues to coordinate with OKP to work together to counter radicalism, resulting in security, peace and calm in Poso District.

According to the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB),⁶⁷ deradicalization is still limited to non-physical activities. Even in the Ministry of Religion Affairs combating radicalism is included in religious harmony program which does not have much budget. We must collaborate to ask the government to make the budget used for economic empowerment program. If the community already has an understanding and care regarding the former terrorist prisoners, there will be a common spirit to build the economy for them and their families. From FKUB itself, there is still no economic empowerment activity.

There was once a grant of Rp 30 million funds but it was for non-physical activities only, and cannot be used for the implementation of economic empowerment activities.

• *Suggestion/Recommendation*

1. For the Central Government, economic empowerment programs need to be measurable, programmed and sustainable. This program should start with accurate data collection, based on various sources. For example, the qualification/category of the recipient, the business units already in operation, the potential of the prospective recipient, and so on.
2. Before conducting the economic empowerment program, what need to do first is to mapping who can be entrepreneurs and who has the ability to work. From this process, those with entrepreneurial capabilities will be developed, while those with the ability to work will be channeled to industries or agencies that require labour.

⁶⁶ FGD Results on Economic Empowerment for Youth related

⁶⁷ Hasil FGD tentang Pemberdayaan Ekonomi bagi Pemuda terkait CVE, 11 September 2017 di Poso.

3. Economic empowerment begins from a well-prepared training, not just done for no reason at all. It is because from that training the participants can start and develop entrepreneurship.
4. Economic empowerment is done by advisory method.
5. Monitoring is needed to ensure the sustainability of the initiated entrepreneurship.
6. There need to be a structure of responsibility for monitoring the programs from the former terrorists. The context of Poso is different from other regions. Poso is a compounded district; many people from outside of Poso region come and develop business. To develop the spirit of the former terrorist prisoners', businessmen need to motivate them who to build their business from zero. Thus, the participants can be motivated and the soul for his business grows.
7. Economic empowerment needs to be conducted with internship system. For participants who will receive the aid, they need to intern in the kind of entrepreneurship they will be in. It is expected before they enter the industry, they already have the ability and understand what they should do. So, there will be no more fruitless after receiving the aid of economic empowerment.
8. For the Poso District Government, it is necessary to have a careful planning, involving various related agencies so that each agency supports and strengthens this economic empowerment program.
9. The relevant agencies need to be mobilized to actively engage the youth in their activities.

CHAPTER 4

Youth Economy and CVE in Solo, Central Java

1. Preface

The effectiveness of economic empowerment to decrease the potential for radicalism and terrorism (extra-ordinary crime) needs to be further tested. In fact, this study intersects with the social studies of economic empowerment and criminality. Economic empowerment is often considered effective in reducing crimes. These two have very close relationships because criminality is a shortcut for groups faced with economic frustration due to the pressures of life needs such as unemployment. Economic frustration becomes the motivation for a person to act against the law. An area with high unemployment rate will have high correlation with crime rate. Economic empowerment is considered necessary and effective to reduce criminal acts in the community.⁶⁸

However, some recent studies on economic empowerment and crimes began to deny the relation. Crime is not always associated with one factor, especially unemployment (economic motive)⁶⁹ because criminal acts have various factors such as psychological, social, medical, religious, and others.⁷⁰ In another study, it was found that in the long run, economic factors (i.e. unemployment) and crime did not have positive correlation.⁷¹ Therefore, economic empowerment in real terms does not have a direct impact on the decline in the number of criminal acts.

The study above certainly raises a critical question. So, what about the effectiveness of economic empowerment efforts to cope/reduce the potential for extraordinary criminal acts such as radicalism and terrorism in counter violence extremism (CVE) in Indonesia? On the one hand, radicalism and terrorism such

68 Jeffrey Leigh Sedgwick, "Deterring Criminals: Policy Making and the American Political Tradition," The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Washington, DC: AEI, 1980).

69 Matthew D. Melick, "The Relationship between Crime and Unemployment," *The Park Place Economist*, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2003.

70 K. Lee, "Unemployment and crime," Econometric Society Austral Asian Meeting, Canberra, 2009.

71 Zuzana Janko dan Gurleen Popli, "Examining the link between crime and unemployment: a time-series analysis for Canada," *Applied Economics*, Volume 47, Issue 37, 2015.

as done by Jama'ah Islamiyah and ISIS are 'competing' to seize influence among youths in Indonesia

On the other hand, such programs have been implemented by the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) either directly or through partnership programs such as with YPP Foundation in Solo and YLP Foundation which has just been established in Lamongan.

In this study, we want to assess the effectiveness of economic empowerment of young people in the framework of CVE by choosing Solo as a case study. How have the youth economic empowerment programs been conducted by both government and non-government schools, colleges and other entrepreneurship training centers, especially for the vulnerable groups affected by the development of radicalism and terrorism in Solo? How effective are the local institutions in conducting the economic empowerment of young people?

2. Solo in Economic Matter

Based on BPS data, the number of Solo residents reaches 514,171 inhabitants. The most populated subdistrict is in Banjarsari, but the highest density is in economic center located in Pasar Kliwon and Serengan. The largest population is in the 15-24-year-old school age group, reaching 100.8 people. While the age of youth ranges from 15 to 45 years is high enough to reach 252,893 people or 49.2% of the total population. The number of youth makes the city quite dynamic both in the wheels of the economy and social movements.⁷²

Agriculture is not the main economic sector in Solo. Due to Solo's geographical environment which is an urban environment, limited land is a major cause of low agricultural sector. Wetland in Solo decreases from 99.46 acres in 2012 to 95.39 acres in 2016, the main factor causing this decline is the conversion of land for settlement. The agricultural sector is not prospective for the community's economy, especially in some districts such as Serengan and Pasar Kliwon, which do not have wetland or empty land. Meanwhile, in Laweyan and Jebres the condition of the paddy fields are also very limited, each is under 20 acres. Only in Banjarsari wide rice fields are still available.⁷³

For the level of education, 16.6% of the people aged 15 years and over are only elementary school graduates. The people who graduated from junior high school are 17.1%, from high school / vocational school are 41.4, and from higher education D-3 / Bachelor degree reached 18.3%. Like in other areas, vocational schools are more desirable than high school (more than 60%). However, unemployment is mostly in high school/vocational school graduates, reaching 6,116 people.⁷⁴

72 BPS Surakarta, *Kota Surakarta dalam Angka* (Solo: BPS Solo, 2017).

73 *Ibid.*

74 *Ibid*

The minimum wage of Solo in 2016 was Rp 1,534,985. This number was still far below other cities. In provincial scale, as a city of batik producers, the minimum wage of Solo was lower compared to Kendal, which is not a priority center of the economy and tourism in Central Java.

The economic growth of Solo was quite good, reaching 5.32%, but the city still had domestic problem which is the unemployment of the working age which reached 4.53%. This was exacerbated by poverty in the city which reached a fairly high 10.95%. This rate was lower than 2010 which reached 13.9% and nine years ago which reached 16.13%.⁷⁵ However, this percentage is still high compared to other central cities in Central Java such as Magelang, Pekalongan, Salatiga, and Semarang. What should be noted from this unemployment rate is unemployment among men reaches almost 75% compared to women. Therefore, further research needs to be done to assess the high unemployment among men in relation with their massive involvement for the city.

Solo is planned to be the center of the creative economy industry where some potential handicraft products such as carving furniture, rattan, glass carvings, leather, and Keris can be developed. In the fashion sector, in addition to Pekalongan, Solo is a large batik center is a big batik center. Solo batik is exported to foreign countries and has become a unique symbol of Indonesia. In fact, in this city batik industry centres with various scales like Kampung Batik Laweyan, Kauman, Tegalsari, Tegalayu, Tegalrejo, Sondakan, Batikan, and Jongke continue to grow. Some famous brands, such as Danar Hadi, Batik Keris, and Batik Semar, are the the worldwide icon of Solo Batik production. The data from the Industry and Commerce Office of Solo stated that in October 2010 the value of furniture export from Solo reached US\$ 528,115, while batik reached 911.991 US dollars.⁷⁶

Several cultural sectors used as tourism icons such as wayang, gamelan, and traditional dances are potential in the middle of increasing tourism in Solo city. This is reinforced by cultural events such as Kirab Pusaka 1 Suro, Sekaten, Grebeg Sudiro, Grebeg Maulud, Grebeg Poso, Syawalan, and Grebeg Besar, which are cultural assets very important for tourist attractions. Along with the growth of tourism, services sectors such as travel and hospitality are growing so rapidly.

Culture and Tourism Office of Solo noted that the number of tourist visits based on tourism objects and hotel was quite high. In 2010 718,521 domestic tourists and 22,583 foreign tourists visited Solo.

The hotel rate until June 2010 reached 528,937 people. In 2009, 1,054,283 domestic tourists and 26,047 foreign tourists visited Solo.⁷⁷

In addition to cultural events, tourism, and creative industry centres, Solo has a

⁷⁵ Data BPS Centra Java 2017.

⁷⁶ "Industri Kreatif, Masa Depan Kota Solo," Kompas, 10 December 2010. <http://ekonomi.kompas.com/read/2010/12/10/05144252/Industri.Kreatif.Masa.Depan.Kota.Solo>.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

rich culinary tourism potential. However, this sector has not been explored to the maximum so it is still left behind by other cities, such as Yogyakarta and Bandung. Another quite unique potential has not been developed yet. Solo is one of three of Indonesia's great badminton shuttlecock production centres, especially the area of badminton shuttlecock industry centre in Serengan Sub-district. However, according to our observations in the field, the production of badminton shuttlecock is still based on a simple household industry that is still technologically far behind Tegal and Malang. A small shuttlecock badminton making industry employs at least 15 people around it. This is potentially positive for the development of communal-based economic empowerment in Solo.⁷⁸

Among the economic potentials of Solo, the most popular sector of employment is in the entrepreneurial sector reaching 39.9% (as Solo is a batik center). Unfortunately, the majority only become workers and employees in this sector.

The total of workers reached 169,558 inhabitants where 102,110 of whom worked in the labour employment sector. On the one hand, their existence is very important for the support of economic cycle from some large market activities that supply mainly batik products to all over Indonesia, such as Klewer big market, batik village of Laweyan, Kauman batik village, and Solo Wholesale Center (PGS).

On the other hand, Solo is not as ready as other cities such as Yogyakarta and Bandung, in the tourism sector, services and creative economic development especially among young people. The lack of guidance and empowerment to improve the capacity of youth human resources in these sectors has made the many of the potential areas not utilized optimally. Therefore, the participation of young people to enter the sector in the future is still very potential because tourism, services and creative economy development will grow dynamically in the city of Solo.

• *Solo in terms of Social, Cultural and Political*

Culturally, Solo is the heart of Javanese culture. In this city once stood the kingdom of Mataram which was the center of the important power in Java. Because it is located in the royal environment, it is not surprising that Solo is culturally known as an area whose people are accustomed to using the highest and refined Javanese language (*krama inggil*) as well as soft custom, courtesy, etiquette, and behavior which is very difficult to find in other areas.

Solo is a portrait of uniqueness. It is the center of dynamic social movements in Central Java, and is also the focal point of ideological spectrum encountered from the right to the left extreme. With only 44 square kilometers, it can be a barometer of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Nevertheless, in this city we cannot deny the major composition of the society who still embraces the syncretic version of Islam

⁷⁸ Field observations of researchers in household production centers shuttlecock in Serengan District.

(*abangan*). In this area grows various events movement contestation maintained since before independence. Islam is the major religion adopted by most population in Solo with the percentage of 88.6%. However, their Islamic entities are not single; in this area many Islamic and non-Islamic organizations grow both from the moderate to the extreme.

Islam in Solo was influenced by Islamic Mataram empire which is the center of power and the spread of Islam. The relationship between Javanese culture and Islam has been formed since Susuhunan Pakubuwono II (1726-1749). Mataram had a strong relationship with *Gebangtinatar Pesantren* (Islamic Boarding School) *Kyai Kasan Basari* in Tegalsari, Ponorogo, East Java. Therefore, many members of the royal family were sent to gain knowledge of religion in the *pesantren*. The Islamization movement was then continued by Susuhunan Pakubuwono IV (1788-1820) by inviting the Islamic scholars (*kyais*) to establish a boarding school in Solo.⁷⁹

In the early generations, the Mataram kingdom called *Kyai* from Banyumas, *Kyai Jamsari*, who later founded the first boarding school in Jamsaren Region. This *pesantren* was destroyed by the Dutch while *Diponegoro War*. Then *Kyai Muhammad Idris* from Klaten rebuilt this *pesantren* to its peak in 1905 by establishing the first modern Islamic school in Solo, *Manba'ul 'Ulum Madrasah*, on the initiative of R. Adipati Sosrodiningrat and headman (*penghulu*) *Tafsir Anom*. This school combines religious curriculum and secular education curriculum. It is one of the first modernist schools along with a modernist school initiated by the Hadrami organization, *Jama'at Khair*. However, unlike what *Khair Jama'at* attempted, the *Minba'ul 'Ulum* school was founded with the exclusive aim of producing more scholars (*ulama*) to serve as *penghulu*. In addition, this madrasa is only for members of the royal family and rich people and opened to the public only when the Solo Yoke suffered a setback.⁸⁰

Being in the center of power, Solo also developed as an economic center, especially as a center of batik production.

The phenomenal Islamic movement once grew up in this region like the *Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI)* or later known as *Sarekat Islam (SI)* founded by H. Samanhudi in 1905.⁸¹ SDI was a form of refinement of the previous organization named *Rekso Rumekso* (mutual guard / team work) that did not emphasize the Islamic identity.

79 Muhammad Wildan, "The Nature of Islamic Radical in Solo," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, vol. 07/01 (2013).

80 *Ibid.*

81 Ahmad Timur Jaelani, *The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism*, Montreal: Thesis Ph.D. in McGill University, 1958. The information about the year of the establishment was justified by Tamar Djaja who interviewed H. Samanhudi, Asmodimedjo, Kertoturano, Sumowerdoyo, Hj. Abduljadjak, Harsono Cokroaminoto, Abdul Moeis, Sjech Awad Sjahbal (close friend of H. Samanhudi in *Djamiat Khair* and *Al-Irsyad*), Ki Ahmad Bemawi, Raden Gunawan and Hj. Abdulhalim. Read M. Natsir, *Intergenerational Conversation: A Dad's Struggle Order*, edited by A.W. Pratiknya and N. Murbakusuma (*Petaling Jaya: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991*), 37-38.

Incorporating Islamic labels on the organization was considered emotionally effective to strengthen identity and sense of belonging. The establishment of this organization was a form of contestation of indigenous traders who wanted to get rid of hegemony of Chinese merchants in the field of batik industry. Chinese merchants then owned a powerful trade organization called Kong Sing, where H. Samanhudi felt harassed once he joined the organization.⁸² This illustrates that since the beginning of the 20th century, the Islamic movement did grow and contribute dynamically in Solo.

The existence of economic liberalization carried out by the Dutch since the end of the 19th century, made the capital asset owners greatly benefited by penetrating to the market,⁸³ so that most of the Javanese at that time were at the bottom of the economic level. Chinese merchants occupied prestigious positions in the economic strata. They monopolized the trade in basic materials used by natives to make batik imported from mainland China, such as cotton and ink.⁸⁴ In addition, Chinese traders also dominated the business chain in both urban and suburban areas.⁸⁵ This made the indigenous businessmen in Solo who sustained their life from batik industry felt very restrained.⁸⁶ So the boycott movement against Chinese business had ever happened in Solo.⁸⁷

Although the Islamic movement thrives in the city of Solo, the *abangan* community has (in Clifford Geertz terminology)⁸⁸ still become the majority. Historically, this happened because the effort of forming community enclaves for the sake of the colonialists interest.

The Dutch and the *Kasunanan* grouped the territories based on social, economic and cultural affiliations to facilitate social control. Areas with a strong Islamic environment would be clustered in the areas of Aristocrats (*priyayi*), Kliwon Market (Arab descentdants), and Laweyan (Islamic businessman / Islamic Scholars).⁸⁹

This grouping impacted on the limited expansion of Islamization in Solo society. Islamization stood out because it was in the center of the city, around Surakarta Kasunanan power and trade center, but physically did not spread throughout Solo

82 A.P.E. Korver, *Sarekat Islam: Gerakan ratu Adil?* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1985) p. 13.

83 Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite*, The Hague dan Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1960, 31-100.

84 Korver, *Sarekat Islam: Gerakan Ratu Adil?* 14-21.

85 De Kat Angelino offered in *batikrapport* P. 321, that in Surakarta, 1930, Batik production populated by 236 East Indies native (Javanese), 86 Arab people, 60 Chinese, and 3 Europeans. The Chinese dominations were not only over batik but also cigarette and textile manufacturing, see Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 295.

86 van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian*, 88-89.

87 Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories*, 295.

88 Clifford Geertz, *Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

89 Muhammad Wildan, "Mapping Radical Islam: A Study of the Growing Radical Islamic Movement in Solo," in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), *Islam Indonesia dalam Ancaman Fundamentalisme* (Bandung: Mizan, 2014).

For example, in the case of *Mamba'ul 'Ulum*, which was monopolized only for the royal family, the Islamization did not involve much of the role of society.

Another thing that needs to be observed is the process of Islamization occurred in Solo which was done politically-structurally. Initiated top down by the power of Kasunanan Surakarta, the Islamization movement did not arise because of grassroots initiatives like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. So, the process of Islamization took place rigidly and exclusively, not freely and dynamically in the community.

Therefore, it is reasonable that although the Islamic movement seemed dynamic and prominent in the city of Solo, but it was elitist and dominated by the educated people. Thus, it was natural that the *abangan* society remains the majority in the city. With the abundance of *abangan* composition, Solosociologically and culturally becomes more open to other ideologies. Thus, not surprisingly if Solo also became the basis of the PKI in the past. Even DN Aidit who became a fugitive after the movement of 30 September 1965 escaped to this area.⁹⁰ This had actually happened before. Misbach who was a figure of Islamic socialism movement also came from the Aristocracy. Even when there was a division of the Sarekat Islam organization, the SI Red (Marxist) that grew up in Semarang made Solo the base of the movement.⁹¹ The spectrum of social movements from the far right to the far left developed dynamically in this city. After the New Order regime, the city of Solo was controlled by the Golkar Party. Now post reform, PDI-P becomes the dominant party that controls the vote of the majority. Even Solo is known as the party's supporting team.

In the 2015 election, in the middle of the city which is frenzied as the center of the Islamic movement, PDIP carried a Christian mayor candidate to fight a coalition of Islamic parties and other parties. The victory of FX Rudianto-Ahmad Purnomo in the election reached a convincing voice, 60.39%. This acquisition was not surprising, given that in the elections in 2010 PDIP obtained a very bright voice up to 90.09%.⁹² Is the Islamic movement so weak in the city of Solo?

3. Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren)

When viewed from its scientific reproduction, there are two famous Islamic Boarding Schools (*Pesantren*) in Solo, namely Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, As-Salam and Al-Muayyad. The last two boarding schools apply the rule flexibly. As-Salam is a typical of the modern Gontor that is currently targeting the upper middle class,

⁹⁰ "Eksklusif G30S 1965: Pengakuan Penyergap Ketua CC PKI Aidit," *Tempo*, 17 January 2018. <https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1051324/surakarta-ultah-solo-great-sale-tawarkan-diskon-hingga-80-persen>

⁹¹ Takashi Shiraishi, *Zaman Bergerak: Radikalisme Rakyat di Jawa 1912-1926* (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiti 1997)

⁹² "Jokowi-Rudy's Phenomenal Victory," *Kompas*, 21 May 2010; "The Rudy-Purnomo Couple Sets as the Winner of the Solo Election," *Sindo*, December 17, 2015.

while Al-Muayyad is a boarding school of *salaf* that is not different from other NU boarding school. The interesting thing to discuss here is the Al-Mukmin Ngruki. This boarding school gained its reputation because of the figure of Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abdullah Sungkar and some acts of terrorism committed by its graduates.

Nevertheless, the entity of Ngruki pesantren is not solitary. Although the works of Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar are dominant (now continued by Abdurrohman Basyir who has a different view from his father about ISIS), the teachers in this school are from various backgrounds. Therefore, not all graduates of Ngruki have the same thought as Abu Bakar Baasyir. In terms of the curriculum, teaching, and internal activities, this school is no different from other Islamic boarding school.⁹³

Al-Mukmin Ngruki is the main boarding school that inspired the establishment of several new schools that have the similar ideologi as the early generations formed by Abu Bakar Baasyir. The locations are not centred in Solo, but spreaded in various areas such as Darus Syahadah, Ma'had Aly An-Nur, Al-Kahf, Ulil Albab, and Isy Karimah which are located in Sukoharjo, Boyolali, and surrounding areas. Several schools affiliated with terrorists deserve to be investigated. For example, Junior High School Salafi Darus Syahadah in Boyolali (Jemaah Islamiyah network) is one of which santri has conducted training in Pakistan and bombing at Australian Embassy Jakarta, Ma'had Ali An Nur in Baki Sukoharjo, and Ma'had Isy Karimah Sukoharjo.⁹⁴

These three schools are fractions of Al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo. The split occurred when about 500 santris and 70 ustadz (teachers) who generally came from West Java went out of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) which had affiliation with the Indonesia Islamic Nation (NII) fraction of the Ajengan Masduki network. The establishment of Islamic school Darus Syahadah was closely related to 500 students who dropped out of Al-Mukmin Ngruki. To accommodate these santris, Darus Syahadah started his program from junior high school. The same thing happened to Isy Karimah which initially opened high school level program but then began to open junior high school. Meanwhile, Ma'had Aly An-Nur was a based on higher education that focused its study program on the religious sciences.⁹⁵

• *Troops (Laskar)*

The organization in Solo is famous for its troops enforcing good deeds (*amar*

93 Based on interviews with Fajar Shodiq alumni and lecturer of IAIN Surakarta, Irsyad Fikri, Head of Isam al-Mukmin High School, Muchson Humas Ponpes al-Mukmin, and researcher observation at al-Mukmin pesantren, Ngruki.

94 Discussion with Dr. Muhammad Wildan and CisForm team at UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, August 25, 2017.

95 *Ibid.*

ma'ruf) by means of appealing, sweeping, and action on a large scale. Some of them are Jundullah, Sunan Bonang Hizbullah, Hawariyyun, Hezbollah Brigades, Barisan Bismillah, Al-Islah, Kaba Ka'bah (GPK) Movement, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Among the organizations whose prominent role is accommodating Islamic paramilitary and Islamic organizations in Solo are the Surakarta Islamic Youth Front (FPIS) and Surakarta Sharia Council (DSKS). Many parties equate FPIF in Solo with the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Both organizations are different but have the same social movement model. FPIS stands as a social response to the conflict of Ambon which is considered a religious conflict, although the organization is not involved in the conflict. In its development FPIS is very responsive to issues on a local and national scale such as drugs, alcohol, free sex, and gambling. Its existence is highly respected as an umbrella of Islamic movements in Solo. On the other hand, FPI does not agree with terrorist acts like the Bali bombings, the group is more interested in morality issues but does not advocate for top-down implementation of Islamic Shariah.

DSKS is an organization that stands on the response to the succession of local government of Solo from Jokowi to FX. Rudiantmo. DSKS is also very active in mass actions criticizing government policies that are considered unfair to Muslims. DSKS moves in various mass actions such as the Tauhid Solo Raya parade held in May 2015. This movement is the response to the Crusaders performed by Christians in April 2015. Moreover, the area is now led by the Christian mayor. Although the city of Solo (excluding New Solo) is still dominated by Muslims, suspicion of the issue of Christianization is also high.

The root of the anti-Christianization spirit in Solo has started since the missionary activity undertaken by Van Andel in Solo through education and health services. Since 1913 through a program conducted by Van Andel, Christian followers have nearly tripled. Even in Solo through his organization Van Andel could set up 83 Christian schools that housed about 12,000 of his native students. Also important were the establishment of the women school, Home Economics School and Queen Emma School, targeting rich and noble families. The idea of engaging in Christianization through education and health was not purely Van Andel's thought but in fact the thought of the church authorities' whose mission was to give education for the Easterners.⁹⁶ The Van Andel's program of Christianization was particularly successful in Manahan, Timuran, Danukusuman and Banjarsari.⁹⁷

96 Th Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads: Indigenous Churches, European Missionaries, Islamic Association and Socio-religious Change in Java 1812-1936* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1994) p. 103-106. Based on the data by Sumartana, from 1913 the number of Christian followers increased only by 75 people, becoming 945 in 1925. This number increased greatly in only 5 years to 2,208 people and became 5,115 people in 1943. Christianization in the city of Solo was more successful compared to other cities such as Yogyakarta, Magelang, Purworejo, Kebumen, Banyumas, and Wonosobo.

97 "Historisitas Kristenisasi dan Komunisme di Kota Solo," Panjimas, December 1, 2015, <http://www.panjimas.com/nahi-munkar/2015/12/01/historicity-kristenisasi-and-communism-in-the-city-solo>

• *The Tafseer of Al-Qur'an Council (MTA)*

In terms of large-scale routine Quranic study, Solo has the uniqueness of the Qur'an Interpretation Assembly (MTA). In the regular studies many attendees come in groups from outside of Solo. MTA is actually not a single organization that motors the movement centrally. The organization has representatives and branches in various regions throughout Indonesia like Islamic organizations in general. However, its centralized teaching that makes it attractive and different from other Islamic organizations. Several factors are considered to support the tradition. The first factor is the centrality of Ustadz Ahmad Sukino's leadership as an icon of dissemination of MTA teaching. The second is the spreading of the influence. In contrast to Muhammadiyah and NU whose line of *fikrah*, *manhaj*, and the types of movement that have spread and rooted among followers through schools, the spread of MTA influence is dominated by technology medias such as radio and television. His centralized Quranic studies in Solo was the only direct contact between the MTA leaders and his followers.

In the early period, the teaching of the MTA is actually closer to Muhammadiyah which disagreed with NU. However, MTA is more disciplined than Muhammadiyah in upholding the principle of faith (*aqeedah*). Its opposition to Nahdliyin religious practices, such as do'a qunut, recitation of Surah Yaseen, the tradition 7th and 40th days of the deceased, and various rules without any creed have made this organization's friction with NU sharp enough. This happens especially because the MTA followers who generally came from the abangan majority who were formerly NU followers. In contrast to other organizations, MTA does not appear to be interested in political activity while maintaining sufficient relationships with various state officials.

• *Student Organizations*

University student movement in Solo is the same as student organization in other areas. Some student elements, such as HMI, KAMMI, PMII, IMM, and various organizations of Campus Dakwah Institution (LDK) based on campuses. The role that stands out is actually the Solo branch of Hospitality Forum of Campus Dakwah Association (FSLDK) which is the main organization of various LDK organizations in the region. Their role is not really focused on the social movements like the paramilitaries (*the laskars*), but more focused on the campus movement. However, the organization is quite active in responding to Islamic issues locally, nationally, and internationally.

Among the junior and senior high school students involved in the Islamic spiritual movement, they formed the forum of Islamic Spirituality Activities of Junior and Senior High Schools in Surakarta (FAROIS).

The organization is very active in organizing various events including skills

and community awareness training. In fact, FAROIS is also actively responding to current issues, including government policies that are perceived as cornering. In applying the program, FAROIS also collaborates with LPR Kriya Mandiri (Religious and Independent Creative Scientific Youth Community). The assisted trainings done are still around leadership, organizing, mentoring, and Islamic studies. It is unfortunate that this forum does not extend its wings to guidance and empowerment of interests and entrepreneurship potentials among learners.

Major Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah in Solo are not as dominant and active as the local laskars. NU and Muhammadiyah often follow the joint rhythm actions conducted concurrently by Islamic organizations throughout Solo Raya. However, both organizations have their own standing position on various issues of radicalism and terrorism. Although it does not appear dominant, the socio-religious roles of these two organizations remain strong through educational and pesantren networks.

What is unique about these Islamic organizations is that although they often do some acts in Solo, their actions are often in the name of Solo Raya. This is because many of their members are from outside of Solo city, like Sukoharjo, so it makes it look big.

4. Economic Empowerment

Although many former terrorist prisoners and terrorists involved in Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) and ISIS are from Solo, surprisingly, based on our research, there is no program or special attention from the government regarding economic empowerment. From the interview with some government officials, it was found that they assume in the case of terrorism, both the prevention and control issues are the authority of the central government through BNPT or Densus 88. The function of local government, in this case the related agencies, is only to perform supportive functions.

When analyzing economic empowerment, the efforts for former terrorist prisoners and for youths need to be separated because each has a different approach. The first is the economic empowerment for youths in general which is not focused on the efforts to deradicalisation, but rather on preventing radicalization by opening employment in general. The large number of terrorist actors among youths is concerning. Therefore, it is hoped that this empowerment will lead the youth to positive activities. It is expected by the decline of unemployment and poverty rate among youth (productive age), they will not be easily trapped in terrorism activities. Meanwhile, the second is the more specific approach with the target of the former terrorist prisoners. The vulnerability of them being trapped and returned to their groups is very high. This is proven by the number of terrorism acts done by terrorist convicts. After leaving the prison, they were faced by the compulsion and the reality

of life (economic problems) to support his family. Unemployment is the major cause of the failure of deradicalization process for them. On the other hand, according to In'am, economic incentives in the form of family economic assurances are also provided by terrorist networks. This also drags them to go back to their networks. The confiscation system (*fa'i*) on bank robberies that amounted to a few billion is a form of fulfillment of the terrorist groups internal funds supply.⁹⁸

• *Economic Empowerment for Former Terrorist Prisoners*

BNPT often organizes events around Indonesia with various themes, such as understanding of the nationhood and love of NKRI, moderate understanding in religion, and economic empowerment programs in various places, such as hotels that eventually have funds for venture capital.

The economic empowerment training conducted by BNPT is a part of empowerment and motivation efforts for them done in various fields according to their demands and interests. The training is held at a representative site in Medan, Palembang and Lampung. In the implementation of this program, BNPT usually invites Ministry of SME, Halfway House, Ministry of Social Affairs, and Ministry of Agriculture as speaker.

The government, in this case BNPT, provides training options for terrorism convicts based on their interests, abilities, and backgrounds. Because of that, the themes of the training also vary based on demands and proposals from former terrorist. In'am exemplifies how he used his ups and downs experience in the culinary business when giving training in Palembang. One of the training and empowerment participants that he thinks is successful is Yusuf, a former terrorist prisoner who domiciles in Semarang. Yusuf is involved in several areas of business, such as car rentals, chicken steak restaurant, and now he wants to expand into the business of bird livestock.⁹⁹

According to In'am, the recent BNPT program is very good, unlike previously when training and monitoring to former terrorists were rarely held.

Former prisoners are somewhat lazy because they are accustomed to receiving aid and financial support from the network and so, less creative. They have ideological intelligence, but do not have the social intelligence to live in society. Former terrorist prisoners need to be motivated by business practitioners so they can practice them immediately.¹⁰⁰

Most BNPT programs are sporadic, incidental and not well programmed. In fact, some regard those programs aim only to finish the budget or created out of panic due to no clear program. In the case of Pasir Putih Prison, for example, when Abu

98 Interview with In'am, coffee businessman Gandroeng, August 25, 2017.

99 *Ibid.*; interview with Yusuf, a former terrorist convict who domiciles in Semarang, September 3, 2017.

100 Interview with In'am, August 25, 2017.

Bakar Ba'asyir and the group swore allegiance (*bai'at*) to ISIS, BNPT out of panic attack provided unreasonable support, such as providing treadmill (fitness centre) in the prison to the former terrorists.¹⁰¹

BNPT does not maximize the potential of government institutions, such as the Halfway House. After being freed from prison, they usually deal directly with the Halfway House for counseling and guidance so they can return to the society well. Halfway House is obliged to perform preconditions with relevant officials and surrounding community so that they can be well received in the society.

The Halfway House acknowledges that sometimes there are face hardships in communicating with former terrorist convicts, although they have a mandatory reporting obligation. That is for those who are on parole (PB). For former terrorist prisoners who are completely free, Halfway House has no right to control.

In our meeting with Halfway House, there are at least some obstacles. *Firstly*, Halfway House is constrained by cost issues. They do not have a budget slot for economic empowerment. The task performed for terrorist convict is in the form of assistance to prevent them from committing acts of terrorism again and persuade them to cooperate with the government. The same thing is also found when they seek cooperation with other institutions such as Social Services. Almost all agencies say they do not have a special budget allocation for economic empowerment for former terrorist prisoners, while the socio-economic problems of society are not fully covered by the existing budget.

In general, among local governments, these terrorism-related issues are considered central government issues, both in terms of budgets and programs through the full authority of BNPT. All budgets related to counter terrorism are centered on BNPT. This has an impact on the institutional mindset that considers the issue of counterterrorism not a fundamental.

Secondly, multi-institutional coordination is still very limited, so it requires special commitment and attention related to the problem of former terrorist prisoners in Solo. If they are entrusted to the Indonesian Training Agency (BLKI) under the Labour Office, for example, there will still be certain concerns from related parties when dealing with former terrorists. Halfway House does require communication and understanding between the related agencies regarding the importance of this issue. They officially has never cooperated with agencies that allowed cooperation in the field of economic development.¹⁰²

According to Eko Prasetyo, from his experience in mentoring ex-terrorist prisoners in Nusakambangan, he noticed a gap between the guidance given in prison and after the release. In fact, oftentimes the coaching program stopped and

101 Interview with Eko Prasetyo, NGO Sarekat Movement Indonesia activist, August 27, 2017.

102 Interview with Agus Rahmanto (Head of Breath), Siswanto (staff), and Mulyono (staff), 4 September 2017.

was discontinued at all. The process of transition back to the community is not easy for terrorist convicts. In the case of Kamarudin, the prison officer took the initiative himself at his own expense to escort and had him welcomed by the village head, neighborhood head, Regiment and District Command Regiment and Sector Police so that his presence was noticed and received.

However, this requires good interagency coordination efforts, and this is very rare. The process of returning to the community through the village apparatus often becomes chaotic because of the sudden entrance of the Sector Police to the program. The former terrorist prisoners are still traumatized and do not like the police, especially Densus 88 and BNPT. In many cases, the authorities appear to have no coordination. For example, when there is a new terrorism action, the Police and the Regiment Command individually without coordination comes and monitors the former terrorist to make a report for their boss. The authorities seem to be doing business as usual without considering the impact of intimidation and feelings experienced by former terrorist, which make them reluctant to collaborate with the government. It is important to note that they are not their group's recruits anymore. Such traumatic memories should be temporarily muted to build trust and facilitate the mentoring process.¹⁰³

Well programmed sustainability and coordination are the major weaknesses of the government. Continuing the program done from the prison time to the period of independence when being freed back to the community must be done.

The government can maximize the function of the Halfway House for coaching and monitoring. The most effective time for governments to provide guidance and coaching is when formal relationships between the state and former prisoners still take place, when they are in prison and on parole (PB). It is because at that time, their relationship and dependence on the government are still very high, so intense communication is possible. Such patterns were once applied to the case of Abu Tholut, who was given input, lectured, and counseled continuously by the Halfway House officer.¹⁰⁴

The relation between the Halfway House and former terrorist does not guarantee the prevention of their return to terrorism networks. At some points, the economy is not the main problem, but just the trigger. In the case of Bahrun Naim, he diligently reported to the Halfway House in his parole period. He proposed to start a business and also assisted by BNPT; however, he still went to Syria to join ISIS.

There are several things that should be observed. The prisoner empowerment program initiated by Eko Prasetyo and Prof. Sarlito Wirawan (UI) which started from Semarang prison had failed. The empowerment was done in the form of short courses of cooking and making calligraphy training.

103 Interview with Eko Prasetyo, August 27, 2017.

104 *Ibid.*

Even the training equipments, such as cooking utensils and calligraphy making machines which were quite expensive were also provided privately by Sarlito. However, the absence of continuous training and the lack of attention by the prison party to continue the program became a problem. On the other hand, Eko had also worked with the Australian Embassy to provide training according to their interests and talents. At that time, the demand of the prisoners was training of the method of medication and the medicine making called *thibun nabawi*. Although it was adjusted to their request and interest, after the training session, it just disappeared.

According to Eko, there are some influence pull and extence when terrorist is in prison. Other from BNPT or deradicalisation NGO activists, intense visits from family, members of their network and group to the prison are also very influential. It also affects the success of the various trainings given to them. Moreover, recently prisons do not consider this aspect of empowerment and training; terrorist prisoners are distributed to small prisons that have no special experience and expertise in handling this kind of prisoners. So, the success of training and coordination of sustainable programs will be even more difficult to reach.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵

Besides cooperating with government agencies in the incidental programs, BNPT has been working with several anti-terrorism activist organizations such as YPP (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian) led by Noordin Huda Ismail and YLP (Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian) led by Ali Fauzi. In Solo YPP has done a real coaching to accommodate the former terrorist convicts by involving them in the business of Dapur Bistik. This business started in Semarang in late 2009, and finally in Solo in 2012. It was begun with the spirit of the empowerment of former prisoner. It prioritized the social aspect of business by involving 5 former terrorists in Semarang and 1 in Solo.

At the beginning it successfully established three outlets in Semarang. The principle was to enable the former terrorists to communicate and socialize with the community as a team or with customers from the wider community. This social business was not without risk, and finally could only run until 2014. With unhealthy financial cash flow finally it was decided to close some business branches, especially those in Semarang. Only Dapur Bistik Solo is still running until now, but the former prisoners who used to work here gave up one by one.

According to Toyib's analysis, the failure could be due to the background of the former terrorists who were originally warriors and had never been restrained to remain idle and limited by certain work hours. A mobile work model, such as a car rental, is more appropriate. Another analysis, according to Toyib, is that they did not have the passion for culinary or feel uncomfortable because this business was considered part of the program BNPT.

Not only that, YPP also tried to open a bakery business that was mushrooming.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

Raw materials and equipment are expensive. YPP deliberately aimed for middle class segment, so that the quality and taste of bread could compete with other bakery businesses in Solo. Finally, YPP opened opportunities for all parties who wanted to invest in order to strengthen the capital so that it could compete. Although there were some people who invested, this business was not running because the business competition was not achieved.¹⁰⁶

Another program has ever collaborated by YPP was a car rental business driven by Yusuf (former prisoner Semarang). Yusuf was also trusted to hold a branch of the Dapur Bistik in Semarang which ended in failure. According to Yusuf, at first he had the rental business by operating three units of cars. In the beginning, the business ran smoothly. He made use of his former terrorist prisoner network and his family to operate this car rental business. However, because of various obstacles, he was forced to sell some cars until there is only one unit remains operating.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷

According to Faisal, the weakness of business initiated by YPP is that it was too imposing and narrowing the former terrorist prisoner business opportunity. In fact, their interests are very varied, so the business should all start from their own interests and talents. Selection of the specialization is not easy either. In an entrepreneurial class session with 40 participants conducted by Faisal, deciding specialization was the most difficult as it related to the training curriculum. Faisal once brought a chef who cooked lamb and Arabian cuisine because the participants were happy with the Arabian cuisine entrepreneurial model even though they did not really like it. However, this training were yet successful because their choice was only a temporary focus.¹⁰⁸

That failure then inspired Faisal to explore the interests and talents of former terrorist prisoners in a more natural way. Faisal visited his trainees one by one to understand their neighborhood and habits, and then asked for their opinion.

The business types and variations were adjusted to the environmental conditions, land and human resource ability. Faisal named his advisory method as a silent operation. In this way, he feels his initiative works better and real. Meanwhile, the assistance provided is not in the form of money but goods for business purposes.¹⁰⁹

According to In'am, in the future Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) led by Ali Fauzi can attract more involvement of ex-terrorist convicts. Noordin Huda (YPP leader) is not a terrorist, so psychologically the former terrorist prisoner has more emotional and comfortable affinity in YLP. They would feel like coming home. YLP programs are more real and right on target. In'am describes how Ali Fauzi's approach to former terrorists has been done since they are still in prisoner, such as holding soccer competitions. More exciting, In'am revealed, is that the former

106 Interview with Toyib, manager of Dapur Bistik, August 30, 2017.

107 *Ibid.*; interview with Yusuf, former terrorist convict, 3 September 2017

108 Interview with Faisal, NGO Activist, 30 August 2017.

109 *Ibid.*

terrorist convicts are already willing to perform flag ceremonies, appreciating the existence of this nation.

Some former terrorist prisoners in YLP Lamongan have become an *ustadz*, established an umroh bureau, raised livestock (like Ali Fauzi's business), including run Gandroeng café which is one of the pilot projects in the YLP empowerment program. The function of Kopi Gandroeng is to support the economic empowerment initiated by YLP by providing motivation, training and mentoring.

According to In'am there are several factors that make the former terrorists return to radicalism, but the most dominant factor is economy. According to him when a former terrorist prisoner returns to society, in addition to getting social pressure, they also get economic pressure. This urgent condition makes them easily dragged back to radicalism.¹¹⁰

YLP is actually newly formed, so the real results of YLP programs are not tangible yet. YLP is a direct partner of the BNPT empowerment and de-radicalization program. YLP actually serves as a shelter for former terrorist prisoners of Jamaat Jatis Islamiyah (JI) led by Ali Fauzi. In various events organized by BNPT, Ali Fauzi became an icon in the issue of deradicalization. The most basic problem of these terrorists is that they need to be embraced, encouraged, and acknowledged. In the various BNPT trainings he guided, In'am always left his phone number to the former terrorist prisoners so they could easily contact him, and on the other hand, facilitate him in controlling and mentoring the progress after the training. It is a small thing, but it can stimulate them to be proactively learn entrepreneurship.

In addition to taking care of former terrorists, YLP also empowers the families of the terrorists who have died or become prisoners. Usually the wives / widows and children will move to the area around Lamongan. YLP helps the family in the form of, for example, giving sending the children to school, or for those who have already graduated from school are directed according to their interests or sent them to college. YLP programs have very strong support from BNPT. For example, the establishment of a magnificent mosque completed in 3 months in Tenggulun, Lamongan around the Islamic boarding school founded by Ali Fauzi is a form of BNPT intensive support.

From our observations, on our way to the Siyono family's home in Klaten, we met Tomo, the deceased brother of Siyono. We wanted to explore the potential of economic empowerment for housewives. According to Tomo, the most appropriate economic empowerment for housewives is a business that does not take much activity outside the home and can be done inside, such as sewing, trading clothes, planting, or making footwares. This is due to the busy activities of the housewives who must not be neglected due to work.

The same thing is expressed by Joko, a former terrorist prisoner who pursue

110 Interview with In'am, 27 August 2017.

a business by selling, soup and chicken noodles. He recounted that during his imprisonment, his wife engaged in sewing clothes for both women and men. Not only did she receive sewing orders, she also sold her own clothing products. Joko said that he would appreciate it well if there was economic empowerment trainings. However he asked the government to consider several things.

Firstly, economic empowerment training should not be undertaken by BNPT. In addition to its non-expertise, the ex-terrorist convicts are still anti-BNPT and Densus 88. Joko suggested that the training should be directly under the programs of related agencies, such as the Department of Trade, the Office of SMEs, and the Social Service. The advantage of this approach is that it would create a more neutral and equitable atmosphere and the former convicts can directly socialize with other participants from the public.

Secondly, it is better for BNPT to evaluate the economic empowerment programs which are incidental, unsustainable, and not well planned. Joko revealed how he and his colleagues must in a short time decide what kind of business they would establish at the end of the entrepreneurship training event in a luxury hotel. Of course, this made him confused and surprised. The business facilities given to help them were not useful. The open-air carrier given by BNPT for his joint venture with two other colleagues are now unused.

Third, the training held by BNPT at the hotel could not touch the segment of former terrorist housewives who have lost their husbands. Joko proposed the government to conduct a training system by coming to the participant's home to invite them.

This training can take the form of business group training, so that the trainees can alternately gather at a participant's house like the social gathering (*arisan*) system, not in a hotel. This social gathering system would make the housewives feel comfortable.¹¹¹

• *Economic Empowerment for Youth*

The younger the ages of perpetrators of violence and terrorism the more attention to the behavior of young age can not be ignored. In this research, we try to visit the offices in Solo city to explore the special economic empowerment programs for youth which have been done and are being programmed.

Although it is a bit late, the creative economic segmentation by youth continues to rise. Unlike the old era when almost all youths focused on becoming employees, today's youth have a more daring mentality to jump into the business world. Businesses such as coffee shops and clothing which have become popular in Yogyakarta and Bandung now begins to penetrate to Solo. Entrepreneurs in this area are dominated by youths whose targeting youths as well. Clothing line may be

111 Interview with Joko, former terrorist prisoner, 5 September 2017.

able to target younger age such as elementary, junior high and high school students. A coffee shop business will be more interesting if it is in the urban environment especially around the university because its market segment is mostly students.¹¹²

The programs of the Trade Service which are currently concentrated on general market segment have not a special program for youth yet. The Trade Service cannot provide a special treatment, such as providing a place for business to youths or ex-terrorist convicts, unless there is a special policy from the higher institution, such as the mayor / regent and governor.¹¹³ Therefore it takes a more serious effort from the head of the region to look at this segment, especially in Solo, because of the high potential of radicalism in the area.

On the other hand, granting slots for business does not directly solve the problem. It is feared that the area becomes unproductive and unemployed if the youths or former terrorists have no entrepreneurial skills. If they have no bold mentality to have business or often go bankrupt because they can not manage the business then the area becomes useless. The area will not be supportive for the economic improvement in Solo. Therefore, it is necessary to increase cooperation with other institutions such as the Department of SMEs and the Labour Office so that they can be equipped with the skills to manage the business.

Youth empowerment should not be generalized. The needs, abilities, and level of education of each youth are different. Being a businessman or being trained in entrepreneurship is not the only solution. such as The case of seizure of parking area by the *laskar* (the term for youth paramilitary becoming the wing for Islamic movement) from the thugs is an example of economic empowerment by providing employment from the parking lot. The Trade Service once intervened to overcome this by dividing the contested parking area. The thugs could manage it during the day, while the young former terrorists during the evening.¹¹⁴

The Department of SMEs had ever communicated with the head of prison related to the empowerment of handicrafts produced by prisoners. However, they had difficulty marketing their products, especially because the online business world was not as common as now. This does not close the possibility out of the Department of SMEs assisting other groups such as youth groups. The program that can be conducted by the Department of SMEs is to develop their interest to produce creative crafts, such as products from waste in accordance with their talents and interests. The Department of SMEs can invite professional people to share how to create these creative products and help these small entrepreneurs to get microcredit.¹¹⁵

For the training of prisoners, clearer program and MoU between agencies are still

112 Interview with Suprpto, Secretary of Department of Trade Surakarta, 31 August 2017.

113 Interview with Suprpto, 4 September 2017.

114 Interview with Subagiyo, Head of Surakarta Trade Office, September 4, 2017.

115 Interview with Nurhayati, Head of Surakarta SME Office, September 7, 2017.

needed. It is because under the different ministries, program initiatives including funding should be prepared through Ministry of Law and Human Rights so that prisoners are not released without skill. Meanwhile, the Office of SMEs has only limited budget that can not be used to finance activities under other ministries; and so they can only support. However, this cooperation can be implemented within the capabilities and resources owned by the Office of SMEs. Moreover, according to Law no. 23/2014 the partial training is not allowed, let alone providing tool aids like sewing machines for the sewing training participants.¹¹⁶

The Office of SMEs is actually doing a lot of cooperation with many other communities such as people with HIV AIDS, people with TB, and the disables because they need help to get access to the market. The key is basically in the budget, because anything can be empowered.

They will work in groups and given budget slot because they cannot be mixed. For example, people living with AIDS cannot be trained together with the others to avoid unnecessary incidents.¹¹⁷

Funds can be found from the budget gap. According to Law No. 23/2014, the Office of Industry can allocate the budget to finance tools or business development training, but it should be for groups that already have legal entities such as established cooperatives. The use of CSR funds must be done through a single door that is through the Mayor of Solo. Individuals cannot access CSR funds; only legal groups are allowed. The latest CSR program promoted by the Mayor was the infrastructure policy to build Green Open Space. If the former terrorist has the skills in the field of infrastructure, he can participate in the development of the Green Open Space.

In the Office of SMEs, there is a mentoring and consultation system that already has its own mechanism. In the Ministry of Cooperatives, there is an Integrated Business Service Center (PLUT) which has 5 main points of assistance, including assistance in product quality and human resource capabilities, accessible market, institutional matters (whether already incorporated in certain groups or still under a cooperative), financing, and production side.

After assistance, the market and the products became good, and the production went well. More capital could be obtained through the group system (cooperative). The Office of SMEs has a program to assist in product making, packaging, permit, and market targeting; all are done until the products are marketable.¹¹⁸

The differences between PLUT owned by the Department of Cooperatives and the Work Training Agency (BLK) owned by the Labour Office are the training schemes and assistance. BLK skill trainings can take up to 2-3 months in which

116 *Ibid.*

117 *Ibid.*

118 *Ibid.*

they directly perform on the job training and internship. Those who participated in BLK program may choose the preferred training program according to their specialization. Meanwhile, trainings by Cooperative Office's PLUTare conducted only about a week, but the mentoring process is maximized up to 3 years. Both forms of empowerment are actually very helpful in economic empowerment and skill trainings for youths or former terrorists.

To facilitate the mentees, the Office of SMEs does not hesitate to help accompanying the flow of the form to ensure the beneficiaries get the financial scheme to run their business. The SMEs Office will usually hold partners from the banking sector by providing appropriate funding inputs (for lack of capital) because they have information on the socialization of capital through People's Business Loan (KUR) with attractive and potential offer, mainly from Bank of Solo. Twenty percent of the participants of PLUT program proclaimed by SMEs Office have been successful. This program will continue to be encouraged so the potential beneficiaries will continue to increase. Withing 3 years, the department of SMEs of Solo targets 1,000 SMEs to go to class (interview result with Nurhayati 7 September 2017). These programs are potential if they are cooperated with BNPT. In addition, youth and former terrorist prisoner will be accompanied maximally. This training model is not sporadic, very different from the BNPT entrepreneurship seminars which are almost always without mentoring and assessment. The Office of SMEs, unfortunately, has not motivated and entrepreneurship training programs for school and university students. Besides being very potential in encouraging entrepreneurship, such programs can channel positive activities for youths so that they will not get caught up in negative activities, such as radicalism and terrorism. The SMEs Office stated that the the entrepreneurship program has actually been independently applied in some universities through the Student Activity Unit in the field of Cooperatives, such as LPM UNS or students cooperative in schools.

In addition to the programs undertaken by SMEs Office, the economic empowerment program undertaken by the Muhammadiyah Economic Assembly is exemplary. The Economic Assembly conducts a business recitation program for young cadres of Muhammadiyah with trending business themes. The concept of this study is to broaden the horizons and motivate them. As for intensive business training, the Economic Assembly will establish a business school with a more established and measurable curriculum.

What's interesting about the Assembly Economy program is that in the middle of the online business world, they are working with [Bukalapak.com](https://www.bukalapak.com). The principle of this cooperation is the partnership of economic empowerment. The team from Bukalapak will conduct training and coaching for the participants of Economic Assembly by involving them into real partners in Bukalapak. It is a mutually beneficial cooperation; Bukalapak benefits from the partners of the

Assembly Economy, while Muhammadiyah is helped by its empowered member in online business. Periodically, Bukalapak reports to the Economic Assembly the sales achievements of the trainees. So, the success rate of the cooperation with online companies such as Bukalapak.com is very measurable.¹¹⁹

5. Best Practice

In the scheme proposed by the Halfway House, BNPT initiative to work with 17 institutions deserves appreciation. It is expected that the synergy can slowly solve the problems of terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia. When the ex-terrorists are on parole, Halfway House can act as a liaison between agencies, such as Social Service, SMEs Office, Trade Office, Industry Office, and Labor Office, to continue the economic empowerment program that has been started since prison. The Halfway House emphasizes the importance of a “foster father” system to expand cooperation networks in both production and sales.¹²⁰

In line with what the Halfway House expressed, the Chairman of the Branch Management of Nahdatul Ulama (PCNU), Hilmi Ahmad Saktidilah, said many aspects could be developed from economic empowerment for former terrorists. He revealed that at least there were two ways for BNPT to initiate economic empowerment for the former terrorists: through NGOs and local government.

If through NGOs, the synergy of BNPT economic empowerment of BNPT is included in the NGO's programs, in order to provide direct mentoring and skills. The advantage of working with NGOs is that they are more flexible in applying innovate programs for the former terrorists to achieve economic independence. In this case, economic empowerment for the former terrorist family can be conducted by proactively inviting them or by business group system.

If through Solo Government, economic empowerment is done by synergizing the programs and roles of the relevant agencies. The Local Government should give attention and priority to ex-terrorist convicts to get economic empowerment training under the related service. The advantages of this method is the former terrorists will gain formal access in the form of training, business licensing, business place slots, and market access assistance for the sale of products.

For the implementation of economic independence, Hilmi said, the existence of “foster father” is very important. *First*, they will provide more business resilience; the former terrorist is protected from early business failure. *Second*, it will provide direct learning about production gap, packaging, and market opening for products produced by ex-terrorist convicts. In the case of Solo which is the centre of batik industry, famous companies such as Batik Keris and Danar Hadi are very potential

119 Interview with Tri, Chair of Economic Assembly PDM Surakarta, 11 September 2017.

120 Interview with Agus Rahmanto (Head of Halfway House), Siswanto (staf), dan Mulyono (staf), 4 September 2017.

example of *foster father*. The grant of business execution tools for former terrorists can be provided based on the need and coordination resulting from the coordination with them.

Hilmi also stressed the importance of CSR funds from various potential BUMIN operating in Solo such as Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, Bank Solo, and others. Having to go through one way, the mayor should facilitate the excavation and distribution of CSR funds for deradicalisation and economic empowerment for the ex-terrorist convicts. These CSR funds can also be used for them who are mostly from medium to low class. It is not unlikely that these funds are coordinated for the wider need of poor housing renovation or Green Open Space program that are being promoted by the city government.¹²¹

Reflecting from the above input, the economic empowerment for youths and former terrorist convicts should not highlight the role of BNPT, Densus 88 and the Police. Their psychological trauma against BNPT and Densus 88 made them reluctant to participate in the training. According to Joko, a former terrorist convict who now opens a soto and chicken noodle business, empowerment undertaken under the programs of related agencies made them feel less intimidated. However, BNPT needs to work with the Labour Office and SMEs Office so that the ex-terrorist convicts can get training quota and priority.¹²²

The same thing was also said by Yusuf. In fact the excessive relationship between BNPT with NGOs such as YLP and YPP in fostering former terrorists indirectly formed a kind of hierarchy that makes them less independent. The involvement of agencies in the economic empowerment of the former terrorists will create, *first*, a more neutral and non-intimidating atmosphere. *Second*, it will make the presence of the state more noticeable in other faces (non BNPT and Densus 88). *Third*, it creates the more equal and independent relationship. *Fourth*, it is not exclusive and gives encouragement for them to work together and mingle with other community members.¹²³

BNPT needs to consider the concept of non-incident and informal training, not like the economic seminars conducted at hotels, but consider the concept of sustainable empowerment instead. As an input, Eko Prasetyo suggested that the economic empowerment done by BNPT could be more effective if the terrorist convicts are still in prison or on parole.¹²⁴ For an input, Nurhayati recommended that BNPT should be encouraged to maximize the role of government agencies, especially

Especially in terms of making MoU with the Ministry of Laws and Human Rights, and Ministry of SMEs so that the SMEs Office are enabled to conduct economic coaching since the terrorist convicts are still in prisons.¹²⁵ This MoU should continue

121 Interview with Hilmi Ahmad Sakdilah, Chairman of Surakarta Nahdatul Ulama Board Management, 5 September 2017.

122 Interview with Joko, mantan terrorist convict, 5 September 2017.

123 Interview with Yusuf, mantan terrorist convict, 3 September 2017.


124 Interview with Eko Prasetyo, 27 August 2017.

125 Interview with Nurhayati, September 7, 2017.

until a period of parole so that the Halfway House has a role to supervise, encourage, and ensure the former terrorists get quotas and are required to take part in training either in the BLK owned by the Labour Office or the PLUT owned by SMEs Office.


For students and university students, this economic empowerment program gets less response. They consider this program does not represent their needs and current environment that is focused on education. Only a small portion of them are quite appreciative with the offer of economic empowerment program, especially students and students who participate in SME cooperatives. They are more interested in modified programs related to their needs such as scholarships, student exchanges, student creativity programs (e.g. art performances, hobby clubs, seminars and training, essay contest and many more). They are also interested in the support and empowerment cooperation programs through intra organizations in schools / universities and student activities units.¹²⁶

Diagram 1.
Scheme of Youths and Former Terrorist Prisoners
Economic Empowerment for



126 FGD with students, spirits, takmir mosques, representatives of student institutions in Solo, Hall of Islamic High School Al-Mukmin (STIM), 6 September 2017.

Diagram 2.
Scheme of Students Economic Empowerment



BNPT continues to cooperate with the NGOs which concern about empowering former terrorists like YPP and YLP. This platform is socially acceptable for them because *first*, it helps get rid of the feeling of alienated and wasted like what they experience when returning to society. The existence of YPP and YLP is essential to create a conducive environment and community for the former terrorists so that they do not get back to radicalism and terrorism network. *Secondly*, the presence of NGOs also serves as

a facilitator between former terrorists and BNPT whose deradicalisation programs can still be co-operated with these NGOs. In addition, NGOs have a role of developing further empowerment programs, such as formation of cooperatives and realistic programs like giving help of entrepreneurship tools that has been initiated since they attended empowerment training in BLK and PLUT.

• **Conclusion**

Economic empowerment specifically for youth and former terrorists is absent in Solo, although Solo is a city that has a dynamic Islamic movement, which became a barometer of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Many terrorists in Indonesia are the graduates of or affiliated with pesantren located in Solo. Attention to this issue should be a priority in the future.

From the field observations it was found that the potential of economic empowerment can be actually be implemented as we discussed in Figure 1. This scheme considers the input from a former terrorist who is traumatic with BNPT as a deradicalisation funnel in Indonesia. Nevertheless, maximizing the function and

synergy between the Office of SMEs, Office of Labour, Trade Service, prison and Halfway House can be an alternative if it can be accepted by all parties.

This economic empowerment should be carried out continuously since the former terrorists are still in prison. *First*, the central role of the coordination of the prison and Halfway House is very important to ensure that the programs that have been collaborated with the Office of SMEs can run maximally. *Second*, it is important for the Halfway House as a transmitter of economic empowerment to communicate with the Office of SMEs, Office of Labor, and Trade Service. The role of Halfway House which is still central in the process of parole, allows to obliging terrorist convicts to take part in the program of BLK or PLUT already provided. *Third*, the NGOs as the provider of conducive environment and community serves as the barricade to prevent the former terrorist prisoners from getting back to terrorism networks.

The proactive role of the Mayor as the most authoritative party in Solo is crucial to the implementation of this scheme. The effectiveness of bureaucratic work and units of service will depend on the extent to which the mayor prioritizes this issue as something urgent and must be overcome.

CHAPTER 5

Youth Economy and CVE in Lamongan, East Java

1. Preface

In general, youth economic empowerment is an effort to increase the youth's potential in social, economic, and political process to create independence in all fields. The popularity of empowerment has increased as some of the youth are engaged in social and political radicalism such as crime, drug abuse, violence and terrorism. So, there is a tendency to equate the idea of youth empowerment with community empowerment. Poverty alleviation programs, such as the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM), Social Security Programs, Smart Indonesia Programs, the Village-Based People's Development Economy (Gemerlap) always include the youth element in the policy framework. Unfortunately, some studies show that youths participation and involvement that initially aim to provide greater opportunities for youth to strengthen identity and potential are often only artificial.¹²⁷ The implementation of community empowerment programs is often dominated by the elites and community leaders who are generally mature and older.

Age becomes an important limitation in determining social status categories. As children have "sponsored status" due to their dependence on parental or community provisions, adults have "primary status" due to their own ability and self-sufficiency. Youths are considered to have an "interim status" because of their partial position; some is provisioned by their parents and some is acquired through self-effort, which then gives a distinct prestige to them.¹²⁸ Law No. 7 of 2009 on Youth, sets the age limit of youth covering those aged 16-30. Based on this age limit, 2016 data shows that from about 257.9 million people of Indonesia, about 62.06 million people (24.06 percent) are youths.

127 Nugroho, B. A., & Astuti, P. (2015).

Partisipasi Pemuda dalam Menyukkseskan Program PNPM Mandiri Perdesaan di Desa Buluroto Kabupaten Blora. *Journal of Politic and Government Studies* 4 (2), 206- 220.

128 Monks, F.J., Knoers, A.M.P., & Haditono, S.R. (2002). *Psikologi Perkembangan: Pengantar dalam Berbagai Bagiannya*, Translation by Sri Rahayu Haditomo, Yogyakarta: UGM. 217

In addition to age limitations, other characteristics of youth are depicted based on social and political roles. Youth are described as agent of change, occupying strategic positions as mediators in reproduction and social transformation. On the other hand, youth are also often blamed for the destruction of norms and social order and involvement in various social and political issues in the form of drug abuse, acts of violence, and terrorism. As an agent of change, history records the important gait that youths play roles in the national struggle movement, seize of independence, and fall of the New Order that gave the rise to the era of reform and democratization in Indonesia. Youth is portrayed in the paradox “as both heroes and villains.”¹²⁹

The description above puts youth in an ambiguous state of having “more than one interpretation or explanation, multiple meanings, or several possible meanings.”¹³⁰ Ambiguity is characterized by the fact of representing oneself as a series of changes interacting with the often unpredictable effects. Such circumstances foster a state of ambivalence, “the coexistence of one person from an emotion or a contradictory attitude (such as love and hatred) towards a person or an object.”¹³¹ The development of globalization, characterized by the intensification of science and technology, also affects the social and political role of youths. The use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram among the young has proven to be able to become lighters of social and political changes in various parts of the world.¹³²

The dissemination of both facts and hoaxes can easily be found in social media adding to the ambiguity of the youth image. Indonesia’s internet penetration rate in the age group of 16-18 years is the highest which is 62.32 percent, followed by the age group of 19-24 years 56.88 percent, and the age group 25-30 years 41.00 percent. Most of the youth access the internet to open social media (88.35 percent) and get information / news (75.02 percent).¹³³ The ambiguity which is characterized by the reality of representing oneself as a series of changes interacting with the unpredictable effects causes one has to choose between conflicting reasons and explanations. This condition increases a state of ambivalence, that is, a condition of “coexistence of one person from emotional or contradictory attitudes (such as love and hatred) towards a person or thing.”¹³⁴ Various epithets are given for this generation like “Gen Y and Gen Z”,¹³⁵ “Facebook generation” or “internet

129 Jones, G. (2009). Youth. Cambridge: Polity. *Key Concepts for Understanding Curriculum*, 4.

130 *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* (Vol. 1428). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

131 *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* (Vol. 1428). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

132 Mahdi, W. F., & Al-Hattami, A. A. (2016). Youth & Revolution. Dalam *Education and the Arab Spring* (hlm. 83-94). Sense Publishers.

133 Badan Pusat Statistik, (2006). *Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2006*.

134 *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* (Vol. 1428). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

135 Gen Y, also named millennium generation, is a group of people with the age of teens to thirties years old (born in early 1980 to 2000), while gen Z is a group of people with the age of 10-19 years old.

generation", "generation of nowadays era", and others. Research PPIM UIN Jakarta, for example, shows that young people become 'open spaces' for the infiltration of various ideologies, religious understanding and also the growing understanding of minority intolerance in schools and universities.¹³⁶¹³⁶ These include blasphemous campaigns to the state and the enforcement of Islamic shari'ah. In general, the increase of radical religious understanding among the younger generation is due to the open up of opportunities for relationships with radical groups, along with their sources of discourse, and access to local and global information on issues and inequalities experienced by Muslim communities.¹³⁷¹³⁷ The easy infiltration among the youth of the Muslim community is at least caused by three things. The first is because the mass media has increased public awareness of the inequality in social, economic, and political, inequity that has occurred in many Muslim societies, corruption and mismanagement that disrupt the government and state institutions. The second is because the strength of Islam as a fortress is compared to some other religious traditions, to the process of differentiation and privatization that accompanies secularization???. Third is because Islamic preachers and leaders have competed effectively with the mainstream Islamic leaders to gain resources and respect. They do so by demonstrating integrity and efficiency in giving service to the oppressed and needy, and the aggressive dedication to their goals.¹³⁸

The occurrence of social and economic changes require adaptation, ability and readiness of youth individuals in the process of adjustment.¹³⁹ The economic empowerment of youth is one effort for the process of reducing and even fighting the involvement of youth in extremism, although there is no direct correlation between poverty, unemployment and the tendency for terrorist behavior among youth. However, young age which is the phase of self-discovery, characterized by curiosity and high desire to try various experiences of religiosity, becomes an easy space for the entry of various religious understandings, and extremism. The Youth Law Article 24 explains that, "youth empowerment is systematically and continuously implemented to enhance the potential and quality of the body, mental, spiritual, knowledge, and self-organizing skills and organization towards youth independence."

Empowerment comes from the word "power" which means the ability to do something or the ability to act, while empowerment means the process, the way, the act of giving power. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word empower contains two meanings, which are: (1) *to give power* atau *authority* to or give

136 <https://tirto.id/survei-uin-jakarta-intoleransi-tumbuh-di-banyak-sekolah-dan-kampus-czQL>

137 Vertigans, S. (2008). *Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes And Consequences*. Routledge, hlm. 82-83.

138 Appleby, S. R. (1999). *The Ambivalence of The Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

139 Blossfeld, H. P., Klijzing, E., Mills, M., & Kurz, K. (ed.). (2006). *Globalization, Uncertainty and Youth in Society: The Losers In A Globalizing World*. Routledge.

power, divert power or delegate authority to other parties; (2) to give ability, to enable or an attempt to give ability.¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ Theoretically, it is an effort to build the power of society by encouraging, motivating, and awakening awareness of its potential and working to develop it. Empowering the community means an effort to increase the dignity of the underprivileged society in order to escape from the poverty trap and backwardness. In other words, empowering is enabling and establishing independence to the society.

The community empowerment condition is defined as the ability of individuals to work together with the community in building the community empowerment. The World Bank defines empowerment as an effort to give the opportunity and ability to the (poor) community in order to enable them to express their opinions, ideas, abilities, and to give them the courage to choose something (concept, methods, products, actions, etc.) which is the best for the person, the family, and the community.¹⁴¹¹⁴¹

J. Rappaport defines empowerment as a multilevel constructive approach or application, resulting from individual, social, and collective interactions. Referring to the variety of indicators, there are: individuals, families, organizations and communities that have access and control in a social, economic, and political context aimed at promoting social justice and living.¹⁴²¹⁴² Rappaport outlines the empowerment function, that is first, the empowerment program focused on transforming at the individual level, especially in terms of psychological empowerment for personal capacity building, integrating perceptions of control, a proactive approach to life, and critical understanding in social and political environment. Secondly, empowerment at the collective level in which families, organizations and communities are involved in the process and systems that can enhance the skills or capabilities of their members, facilitate them in changing efforts, improve their collective well-being, and strengthen intra networks as well as extraorganization to improve the quality and integration of these collectives. In this context, youth empowerment has its relevance.

Community economic empowerment is the strengthening of the production factor ownership, distribution and marketing, as well as strengthening the society to get adequate salary/wage, information, knowledge and skill, which are done in multi-aspects, from either the society itself or the policy aspect. From all these, about 13.44 percent are included in the open unemployment category. This number has decreased compared to 2015 which was about 15.38 percent. This number shows

140 *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (Vol. 1428). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

141 Wouters, J., Ninio, A., & Doherty, T. (ed.). (2015). *The World Bank Legal Review Volume 6 Improving Delivery in Development: The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability*. World Bank Publications.

142 Rappaport, J. (1987). Terms of empowerment/exemplars of prevention: Toward a theory for community psychology. *American journal of community psychology*, 15(2), 121-148.

that out of every 100-youth labor force, there are 15 to 16 youths who are not working, are preparing a business or looking for a job.¹⁴³

Lamongan is known by national and international media for the involvement of its youths in Bali Bomb I (2002) and Bali Bomb II (2005). The Bali Bombing itself is an extension of the communal-religious conflicts that have occurred in Ambon and Poso. The name of Lamongan reappeared in April 2015 related to the process of deporting 10 Pacitan families after failing to join ISIS group in Syria.¹⁴⁴ The latest incident from Lamongan was the arrest of JAD (Jama'ah Ansharut Daulah) leaders.¹⁴⁵ This is a sign that Lamongan network has become part of an international network of terrorism. Lamongan seems to be a fertile ground for the development of radicalism and jihadists in Indonesia.

Lamongan District is also known as *pecel lele* and *Soto Ayam* street sellers in almost every major district in Indonesia. The tent stalls are easily found on the sidewalks from Jakarta, Surabaya, Lamongan, Ternate, to Papua. The invasion of Lamongan youths to trade is an option in the middle of the economic problem or unemployment. The high rate of unemployment could be one cause of increased radicalism involving youth.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, youth economic empowerment effort is expected to stem the infiltration of radical ideology for them in Lamongan.

This research report seeks to illustrate the efforts of economic empowerment of youth in Lamongan. Empowerment efforts are analyzed based on empowerment programs undertaken by central and local government, social-community organizations, political organizations, educational institutions, and youth organizations themselves.

2. General Provision of Community

Lamongan District is one of the northern coastal area of East Java Province with 47 km long coastline. The location of Lamongan is adjacent to Jombang and Mojokerto in the south, Bojonegoro and Tuban in the west, and Gresik in the east. The total area of Lamongan regency is approximately 1,812.80 square kilometers divided into three characteristics.

First, coastal and mountainous areas which borders with the northern coastline and Bengawan Solo river. The area is in the north and is an area of industry, tourism,

143 Central Statistics Agency. 2015; 2016, Indonesian Youth Statistics, National Socio-Economic Survey Results, p. vii.

144 IPAC, Indonesia's Lamongan Network: How East Java, Poso And Syria Are Linked. 15 April 2015. Report No. 18

145 <http://news.liputan6.com/read/2913537/peran-zainal-pemimpin-jaringan-teroris-jad-dibekuk-di-lamongan>.<http://news.liputan6.com/read/2914821/polisi-aksi-teror-di-tuban-terkait-teroris-lamongan>

146 Hasan, Noorhaidi. 2010 "The Drama of Jihad: The Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia" dalam *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. hal. 49-62

trade, fish auction, piers, and agriculture. *Second*, the Bonorowo area. This area is a lowland in which inundation often occurs in the central and northern regions. This area is an area of agriculture, trade, and offices. *Third*, the highlands and the mountains. This region is an area of agriculture, plantation, trade, and industry.

Administratively, Lamongan is divided into 27 districts, 262 villages, and 12 sub-districts. Lamongan Government Centre is located 50 km west of Surabaya, the capital city of East Java Province.¹⁴⁷ The population of Lamongan is 1,188,193 in 2016, with 576,812 men and 610,983 females, increased slightly from 2015, which was 1,187,795.¹⁴⁸ Based on age, the population consisted of 18.5% young age (0-14 years), of 77.05% productive age (15-64 years), and 4.45% old age (> 65 years). From these numbers, the population aged 16 to 30 years totaled 313,850 inhabitants, consisting of 161,860 males and 151,990 females.¹⁴⁹

In educational aspect, BPS data shows that the level of Gross Participation Rate (APK) of Lamongan population are: 386,196 under school age, 389,169 Primary Schools, 247,878 Senior Secondary, 223,669 High School, 8,922 Diploma, 43,714 Undergraduate, 2,697 Masters, and 28 Doctorate.¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile, the Pure Participation Rate (APM) of Lamongan population in 2006 are: 14.94% 15 years old and over have not/never attended school, 18.06% still in primary education, 25.79% primary school graduates, 21.63% junior high school graduates, 17.25% senior high school graduates, and 2.89% university graduates. So, based on these data, the average level of education of Lamongan residents is primary school graduates or 6 years of education.¹⁵¹

In religious aspect, like other East Java society, the majority of Lamongan society embraces Islam. Based on BPS data of 2015, the composition of religion is: Muslim 1,338,441 people, Protestant 2,896 people, Catholic 551 people, Hindu 269 people, and Buddhism 86 people, Khonghucu 6 people, and mysticism 17 people.¹⁵² Although Islam is the major religion, the difference in the affiliation with certain religious organizations, especially Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, can be clearly seen in the dynamics of social relation in Lamongan. Both religious organizations compete with organizational identity. In some villages and sub-districts, mosques and buildings of NU and Muhammadiyah are facing each other, not infrequently horizontal conflicts happen caused by the affiliation with religious organizations. Religious social organizations such as LDII, FPI, PERSIS, Al-Irsyad, HTI, Hidayatullah, MTA, and al-Wasiliyah also have followers, but the number is less than NU and Muhammadiyah. In addition, the portrait of difference is also

147 Badan Pusat Statistik Lamongan (2016), *Kabupaten Lamongan dalam Angka*, p. 1-3.

148 Badan Pusat Statistik of East Java (2016), *Provinsi Jawa Timur dalam Angka*, p. 42.

149 Badan Pusat Statistik Lamongan (2016), *Kabupaten Lamongan dalam Angka*, hlm. 94.

150 Badan Pusat Statistik Lamongan (2016), *Kabupaten Lamongan dalam Angka*, hlm. 136-137.

151 Badan Pusat Statistik Lamongan (2016), *Kabupaten Lamongan dalam Angka*, hlm. 184.

152 Badan Pusat Statistik Lamongan (2016), *Kabupaten Lamongan dalam Angka*, p. 283.

reflected in the choice of education between general education (Elementary and Junior High) and religious education (MI and MTS or Pesantren/Islamic Boarding School). According to BPS data of 2016, the total population of primary education age (Primary and Junior High School) was 192,568 people. Most people inhabiting the northern and central regions chose to send their children to religious education (Islamic Boarding School or Madrasah Ibtida'iyah or Tsanawiyah) rather than sending their children to a public education institution. As for the southern region, most of the people chose public schools.

Another aspect of population in Lamongan is the condition of poverty. The number of poor people in Lamongan in 2014 amounted to 178,470 people, this number decreased by 7.65 percent compared to 2013 which amounted to 186,120 people. Meanwhile, Lamongan poverty line in 2014 has increased compared to previous year which amounted to Rp 289,403/capita/month. BPS Lamongan data shows that the poor people are mostly in the District of Babat which is 2,168 people and the least are in District Sarirejo which is 218 people.¹⁵³

• ***Regional Economic Growth***

Lamongan District's economy grew by 5.90 percent based on the calculation of Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) based on constant price in 2016. The agricultural sector, especially crops and horticulture, gives significant impacts to economic growth. The second largest contributor to the economy is the trade, hotels and restaurants sector.

The magnitude of the contribution of this sector, among others, is supported by the private subsector of entertainment and recreation. The manufacturing industry sector is the fourth largest contributor. The biggest contribution to this sector is the food, beverage and tobacco industries. The economic growth of Lamongan Regency from 2011 to 2016 is as the following table:

Table of Economic Growth
Lamongan Regency Periode 2011-2016 (%)

Year	Economic Growth
2011	7,02%
2012	7,12%
2013	6,65%
2014	6,02%
2015	5,77%
2016	5,90%

From the data above it is seen that the economic growth is slowing down, from 7.02% in 2011 to 5.90% in 2016. One cause of the decline in economic growth was the decreasing of contribution from agricultural sector. The decline in agricultural sector

153 Badan Pusat Statistik Lamongan (2016), *Kabupaten Lamongan dalam Angka*, p. 307.

growth contribution from 2011 to 2016 was caused by the decline in production volumes due to climate change.¹⁵⁴

3. Economic Empowerment for Youth

• *The Role of Central and Regional Governments*

As previously noted, youth economic empowerment program is part of the government's program of community empowerment, especially the program of poverty reduction. PNPM Mandiri program, for example, is a national program on poverty alleviation. The program was first launched in 2007. The PNPM Mandiri program was designed with the concept that community empowerment required greater involvement of local government as well as various parties to provide opportunities and ensure achievable success.¹⁵⁵

Broadly speaking, the program can be classified into four types of activities, including: development or improvement of basic infrastructure activities that can provide economic benefits for the poor, improvement of education and health services, supporting activities for the productive economy of the community, and Savings and Loans for Women (SPP). All programs are formulated and contested by the community with 'open choice principles' in which the community selects the type of development project needed in a meeting attended by all elements of the village. After proposals are collected, an inter-village meeting attended by village representatives will make the final decision of which project to fund.

Once block grant funds are allocated, social and technical consultants will assist the socialization, planning, and implementation of the activities. In the village meetings some people who will be part of the project implementation team should be selected to run the project. The technical facilitator will assist the implementation team to develop infrastructure design, project budget, quality verification, and supervision.

Lamongan is one of the districts in East Java Province that get fund allocation from PNPM Mandiri. The allocation of PNPM Mandiri funds in 2013 was Rp 53.95 billion, an increase compared to Rp 27.35 billion in 2012.¹⁵⁶ The funds were allocated for infrastructure development such as kindergartens/early childhood education, health posts, village road construction, and clean water installations.

Several studies have been undertaken regarding the achievement of objectives and effectiveness of PNPM Mandiri program. Nurnaini (2011) assessed that PNPM Mandiri Program, especially for the development of human quality such as the implementation of training activities, the provision of venture capital, and scholarships for poor school-aged children, was still not on target which was

154 Interview with head of food security field.

155 pnpm-mandiri.org

156 <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/01/18/16214433/alokasi.dana.pnpm.mandiri.untuk.lamongan.rp.5395.miliar>

the poor.¹⁵⁷ The study of Syukri, M. & Mawardi, S. (2013) on participation and representation of PNPM program implementation concluded that the decision making of the program designed to increase participation and representation of all community group was often only done by village elites, village apparatus and community leaders. Villagers were generally not well-informed about the various development information, except for the information about direct assistance programs, such as Rice for the Poor and Cash Direct Assistance programs. The participation model implemented by PNPM had no significant impact on the governance (participation, transparency, accountability) at the village level.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, Nugroho's (2014) study about youth participation in succeeding independent PNPM program concluded that the youth's involvement in planning, monitoring and implementation process of the program was very low. One of the obstacles is the lack of socialization and direction for the youth. In addition, empowerment programs are mostly done by contractors, so youth can not provide input for the program.¹⁵⁹ In addition to participation and representation issues, PNPM Mandiri program in Lamongan regency is also not free from corruption.¹⁶⁰

Community empowerment program, including the one for youth, is a Village Fund Allocation program (ADD). The fund which is sourced from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget are transferred through the District Revenue and Expenditure Budget, and then used to finance governance, development implementation, community development, and community empowerment. As village government is the lowest government unit, provision of Village Fund Allocation holds the leading role in village's governance, development, empowerment and public service.

The base of ADD program implementation is Regulation no. 6 of 2014 about Villages. The Village regulation that recognizes the existence of villages, which authority is based on origins (tradition), serves as a strong foundation for the rights of rural communities to be able to mobilize initiatives to reduce poverty, as in article 18 number 7 and article 18B number 2 of the 1945 Constitution.

Article 18 number 7 is the legal basis for the village position as part of the regional government. The elucidation of article 5 of the Village Regulation on the village status illustrates the setting based on article 18 number 7 as a local self-government. While article 18B number 2 is the legal basis for the village position as a legal united

157 Nuraini, S. (2017). Penanganan Tunggal Dana Bergulir (*Non-Performing Loan*) Paska Pelaksanaan PNPM Mandiri Pedesaan. *Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Bisnis Airlangga*, 1(1).

158 Syukri, M., & Mawardi, S. (2013). Qualitative Studies of the Impact of PNPM-Rural in East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi.

159 Nugroho, B. A., & Astuti, P. (2015). Youth participation in Successful of Pnpm Mandiri Perdesaan Program in Buluroto Village of Blora Regency. *Journal of Political and Government Studies*, 4 (2), 206- 220.

160 <https://news.detik.com/jawatimur/2452751/ketua-upk-pnpm-korupsi-dana-rp-900-juta-ditahan-kejari-lamongan>

community that has the authority to regulate and manage the affairs of its own community or often referred to as a governance community.

The management of ADD is based on the Minister Regulation of Home Affairs No. 113 of 2014 about Village Financial Management Guidelines. The management of ADD is in unity with the management of village finance, which overall activities include planning, budgeting, administration, reporting, accountability and village financial control. In the General Implementation Guidelines for Village Fund Allocation (ADD) of Lamongan District No. 3 Year 2011, it is stated that the purposes of ADD are to:

1. Improve the performance of village government in implementing government services, development, and socialization in accordance with its authority.
2. Improve the role and function of village social institution in the process of channeling aspirations, deliberation in decision making and empowering the community in the process of development implementation.
3. Increase participation, role and creativity of the community in the development.
4. Encourage productive economic business activities.
5. Provide facilities and infrastructure for the development of economic activities.

Based on the purpose, the usage of ADD is divided into operational fund of village government and community empowerment. Especially for community development and empowerment, ADD fund can be used for:

1. Development of physical facilities/infrastructure (environmental empowerment) that can support economic activities and encourage the acceleration of village advancement.
2. Economic empowerment, primarily to foster the Village Economic Institution and Village Owned Enterprise.
3. Human empowerment to support improvement in education, health, and social activities.

Unfortunately, as with other empowerment programs, ADD programs have not been able to achieve the expectations. Istifazhuddin's study (2016) concluded that the efficiency of the implementation process of ADD policy in Nguwok Village, Modo District, Lamongan Regency, is still inefficient and not in accordance with the implementation plan set.¹⁶¹

In addition to community empowerment programs sourced from the central government, the local government of Lamongan also conducts an empowerment program known as the Lamongan People Village-Based Economic Development Movement Program (Gemerlap). This program was officially endorsed on 14 June

161 Istifazhuddin, A. H. (2016). *Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Kebijakan ADD (Alokasi Dana Desa) di Desa Nguwok, Kecamatan Modo, Kabupaten Lamongan* (Disertasi doktoral, Universitas Airlangga).

2011 based on Regent Regulation No. 13 of 2011. Gemerlap program aims to improve welfare and increase rural employment opportunities. The target beneficiaries of the program are rural communities that already have independent business possible to be developed into a village community business, whose products can be developed becoming the superior products of the village. The program stimulates villages and districts to increase the production of their superior products. The stimulation is in the form of capital assistance and intensive technical coaching, especially to stimulate the mentality of society so as not to give up and to struggle to succeed. The implementation of the program is carried out by several Local Government Work Units (SKPD) in Lamongan Regency government. Gemerlap program includes: a. agriculture and forestry, b. farmings, c. fisheries, d. cooperatives, commerce, and industry.

The implementation of the program begins with socialization that is held in two stages. The first phase of the regency level socialization is held in the regent's office. The second phase of socialization is carried out at the district level. After that, selection will be done to several community groups. Groups that have passed the selection will be verified by the team consisting of SKPD program implementers. Some of the groups that have received Gemerlap program funds were Ternak Sumber Rejeki duck farmer group in Tawangrejo Village, Tambak Terpal lele fish farmer group in Sambeng Kecamatan, and duck farming group managed by housewives which received Adhikarya Pangan Nusantara Food Security Award with the category of Food Sustainability Development Perpetrators in 2012. The program also led Lamongan to get Autonomy Award 2012 in the special category of Local Economic Empowerment (Productive Women).

In addition to the above empowerment programs, several community empowerment programs are also conducted by the Local Government Work Unit (SKPD) of Lamongan Regency in accordance with their main duties and functions, such as Social Service, Labour and Transmigration Offices of Lamongan Regency. The Office of Labour, for example, performs the functions of formulating and implementing technical policies in the employment field such as preventing the problems of unemployment, employment, industrial relations, supervision of work protection, foreign workers, job training, and social security of employment. One of the authorities of SKPD is to provide status for job seekers. To obtain the status, the applicant simply fulfills the requirements such as submitting a copy of Lamongan ID card, or certifications. Applicants do not even need to include a letter of police record (SKCK) in their application. If the applicant does not possess Lamongan ID card, the applicant can simply carry a Lamongan resident domicile letter issued by the village office where the applicant domiciles. In 2016, policies pursued in relation to quality improvement and development of workforce competence, among others through the development of community work skills, strengthening facilities

and infrastructure of the Training Center, and the dissemination of labor market information through job market fair.

In the social field, this office is in charge for running the central and local government programs of Lamongan Regency, such as the implementation of social security and protection, social rehabilitation, and empowerment. The central government program, which is administered by Lamongan Social Service, is linked to the Ministry of Social Affairs' assistance to the Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian,¹⁶² such as life skill or vocational training programs for former terrorist prisoners, as well as Smart Indonesian Card, Healthy Indonesia Card, and Prosperous Family Card for their children.

Lamongan Office of Cooperative, Industry and Trade are some of the foundations of regional economic development. Based on the division of authority regulated in the Government Regulation no. 37 of 2007 about the distribution of government affairs, there are two matters which become the authority of Lamongan Office of Cooperatives, Industry, and Trade. The affairs of Cooperatives and SMEs are to be the mandatory and optional duties of Industry and Trade Office, and the implementation is held by the provincial and regent government. The existence of cooperatives as economic pillars is expected to stir the region's economy.

Generally, the activities of the Office of Cooperatives and SMEs can be described as follows. The *first* is to increase the percentage of active cooperatives. This includes to improve institutional and cooperative quality programs, institutional inspection and cooperative activities, KSP / USP conventional health and sharia health assessment activities, monitoring activities for sanctions and institutional rehabilitation and business. The *second is* to increase the business scale from micro into small business classification (SMEs).

The activities also cover the program of creating conducive climate for SMEs and cooperatives, formulation of small and medium enterprises policies, cooperative and SMEs clinic services, business legal facilitation, socialization activities of understanding cooperative rules and legislation principles, development activities of Indonesian National Work Standardization (SKKNI) of cooperatives and SMEs human resources. The *third* is the growth of new entrepreneurs, including the implementation of entrepreneurship training and improvement of collaboration network of cooperatives and SME enterprises. Some forms of cooperatives in Lamongan Regency among others are KUD (Village Unit Cooperative), Kopkar (Employee Cooperative), KSU (Multipurpose Business Cooperation), KSP/KSPS (Save and Loan Cooperatives), Koptan (Farmer Cooperatives), KMDH (Forest Village Cooperatives), and Kopwan (Women Cooperatives). The achievement of cooperative performance improvement in Lamongan Regency is acknowledge

162 <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3606781/mensos-siapkan-program-khusus-untuk-mantan-napi-teroris>

with the acceptance of awards, such as Women's Cooperative Achievement of East Java Province level by Amalia Kandangrejo Village Cooperative, Kedungpring District with 3 billion 200 million rupiah asset.¹⁶³

Regulation no. 20 of 2008 stipulates the definition of micro, small and medium enterprises. Micro Enterprises are productive businesses owned by individual and/or individual business entity that fulfill the criteria of micro business as regulated in this law:

- a) having a net worth of at the most Rp 50,000,000.00 (fifty million rupiah) excluding land and building of business premises; or
- b) having annual sales of at the most Rp 300,000,000.00 (three hundred million rupiah).

Lamongan people are also known for having high entrepreneurial spirit. Lamongan diaspora are famous for their business in selling fried catfish and chicken soup cuisine in all of the archipelago. Their tent stalls are easily found on the sidewalks from Jakarta, Surabaya, Lamongan, Ternate, to Papua. The spirit of Lamongan youths to trade is one solution during the economic crisis problem. The economic crisis seems to have enhanced the ability of each SME in absorbing labours. In other words, the sector has been instrumental in overcoming the unemployment problem caused by the economic crisis. This can not be separated from the ability of SMEs to respond the economic crisis quickly and flexibly compared to the ability of large businesses.¹⁶⁴ Anyhow, there is an opinion that says informal sector does not give any significant life improvement to the workers. Living from informal sector is just living in subsistence.¹⁶⁵

The most responsible office in the affairs of youth coaching is the Office of Youth and Sports. The vision of this office is "the realization of productive, accomplished and innovative youths and personnel of sport", and the missions are: 1) to actualize productive, accomplished and innovative youths; 2) To actualize sports which are qualified, accomplished and socialized; 3) Realizing youth and personnel of sport who are independent and prosperous. Broadly speaking, the program activities of this office are related to awareness, empowerment, and youth development. There are three areas which are the responsibility of this office, namely areas of awareness, empowerment, and youth development in Lamongan District.

The youth awareness sector is a new field in the duties and functions of Youth and Sport Office of Lamongan Regency, so it has no special program for youth, families, or former terrorist prisoners. Related to the efforts of terrorist countermeasures or

163 <https://www.bangsaonline.com/berita/3014/kopwan-di-lamongan-beromzet-rp-23-m>

164 Sulistyastuti, D.R. (2004). Dinamika usaha kecil dan menengah (UKM) analisis konsentrasi regional UKM di Indonesia 1999–2001. *Economic Journal of Emerging Markets*, 9(2).

165 Basri, F.H. (2002). *Perekonomian Indonesia: Tantangan dan Harapan bagi Kebangkitan Ekonomi Indonesia*. Erlangga.

prevention of repeated terrorism by the old perpetrator or his family, the Youth Section Head of Youth and Sport Office in Lamongan revealed, "We are entrusted by the Ministry of Youth and Sports not to go into technical affair of terrorism, but only in the service area which is awareness."¹⁶⁶ Youth empowerment program are done through activities to generate the potential and active roles of youths which are undertaken through "country defense training every year. "We ask the participants to apply to the district head and send the copies to the UKP which will then be forwarded to organizations such as KNPI, IPNU, Anshor".¹⁶⁷ Youth development activities as disclosed by the Secretary of Youth and Sport Office, "are able to produce reliable athletes by talent seeking done through sport selection and training activities"¹⁶⁸

The Council of National Unity and Politics (Kesbangpol) Lamongan District.??? The task and function of SKPD are to promote the improvement of ideology, nationalism, vigilance, domestic politics, art, culture, religion and economy in society. The Council of National Unity and Politics conducts the coaching of domestic politics, state ideology and national unity, facilitation, activities of nation and politics unity, the implementation of strategic studies in the field of national unity, coordinating the activities of national and politics unity with institutions and or related institutions. The percentage of social conflict handled by the council reaches 100 percent and the percentage of registered Civil Society Organizations (CSO), politics organizations and NGOs is 96.58 which in line with the set target.

In addition, SKPD also works with religious leaders in creating harmony among religious communities in Lamongan Regency. The form of the cooperation is manifested in the Forum of Religious Harmony (FKUB). This institution is a "cultural diplomacy", a form of symbiotic relationship between religious actors and government agents that are mutually beneficial. Religious figures become one of the institutions that are dependable in establishing inter-religious dialogue. Such a dialogue model can be called an institutional dialogue, a dialogue between institutional representatives of various religious organizations involving government-recognized religious assemblies.¹⁶⁹

From the field study, it was found that the Office of Religious Affairs Ministry (KKA) of Lamongan Regency was not directly involved in the youth economic empowerment efforts, let alone participated in an expertise improvement program aimed to make the youth economically independent and eventually avoided radicalism and terrorism. So, when there are small explosions from Lamongan, they are done by individuals, not on behalf of specific institution or organization.

166 Wawancara 28 September 2017.

167 Interview on 28 September 2017.

168 Interview on 28 September 2017.

169 Asrori, Saifudin (2017). *Politik Kerukunan di Indonesia; Model Dialog Kelembagaan Antar Umat Beragama*. Tangerang Selatan, Young Progressive Muslim.

Office of the Religious Affairs Ministry (KKA) only give coaching and guidance.¹⁷⁰

The Ministry of Religion makes serious efforts to provide guidance to the religion, "There are two coaching activities. The first activity is held once a week in prison; every Friday the coaching is for terrorist prisoners. The second activity is Friday sermon."¹⁷¹

- ***Social-Religious Organization Participation in Youth Empowerment***

CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) become an important feature of Indonesian society. Regulation no. 7 of 2013 on Community Organizations describes CSOs as organizations voluntarily founded and formed by the community based on the similarity of aspirations, wills, needs, interests, activities and objectives to participate in development to achieve the goals of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila. As in the provisions of Regulation of Community Organization Article 9 (1) and Article 11 paragraph (1) explains that, CSOs can take the form of a legal entity or non-legal entity, while the legal entity may take the form of associations or foundations. Article 12 states that the requirements for the establishment of associations are certificate of establishment, funding source, NPWP in the name of association, and others.

CSOs can be divided into three groups, namely: 1) CSOs active in a specific field. CSOs included in this group are usually professional organizations, such as Indonesian Sociology Association (ISI), Association of Indonesian Farmer Harmony (HKTI), Association of Indonesian Market Traders (APPSI), and others; and 2) CSOs active in more than one field, such as: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dan Muhammadiyah. These organizations are active not only in religious practices but also engage in other social areas, such as education, health, and other social issues; 3) Youth organizations and students.

Various forms of CSOs arise from awareness and greatly empower the community because the organization is a manifestation of the awareness and participation of community, embodied in various forms of community programs and activities, in accordance with their vision and mission, including conveying views, criticism and perhaps a counter-concept of the various government policies. CSO involvement in community empowerment activities is often more focused when compared to programs from government agencies. *Majelis Taklim* (Learning Assembly) for example, is a religious social group that grows and develops in the middle of society. Its existence contributes to the creation of lifelong learning traditions and learning society.

In general, the *Majelis Taklim* functions as an educational, da'wah, social, and

170 Interview on 28 September 2017.

171 Interview on 28 September 2017.

partly economic institution.¹⁷² Its existence is strengthened by Regulation of National Education System Chapter VI Article 26 Number 4 which states that the *Majelis Taklim* is part of non-formal education organized by the community which requires educational services, serves as a substitute, addition, and/or complement to formal education in order to support lifelong education.

Some CSOs have undertaken community economic empowerment activities, including youth empowerment. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), for example, is an organization of scholars in spreading Islam, guiding the people, enforcing *amar makruf* (good deeds) and *nahi mungkar* (avoid evils) which is done by issuing *fatwa* either asked or not about various aspects of life of the people as well as channeling aspirations of Muslims. In addition to providing *fatwa*, MUI contributes to social empowerment, such as conducting training on Islam and sharia, such as teacher cadre education (training to form ulama cadres). In the social and economic field, MUI has involved in establishing Bank Muamalat Indonesia and *halal* certification and establishing cooperation with international agencies such as UNICEF and WHO; and become an assessment agency for food, medicine, and cosmetics (Institute of Food Assessment and Cosmetics, LPPOM).

MUI has a hierarchical structure ranging from Central MUI, Provincial MUI, Regency/Municipal MUI to District level. There are several commissions in the structure of MUI Lamongan; one of them is the Commission of Society Economic Empowerment. With the role and the presence of organs in the MUI that are responsible for the economic empowerment of the Muslim society, obtaining information on countering terrorism from the economic dimension is very relevant. However, MUI Lamongan has not a special empowerment program for youth especially ones oriented to the creation of skills in order to make them economically self-sufficient and difficult to be tempted to engage in religiously motivated acts such as terrorism.

However, like other respondents, MUI also sees that the emergence of terrorism can stem from economic problems, especially the problem of economic injustice. MUI sees economic imbalances including the control of economic resources at the hands of small groups of ethnic minority communities is one form of economic injustice. This can cause conflict matters. MUI has also been involved in several forums discussing the stability of Lamongan Regency related to potential religious conflict with the police.

Other CSOs that have concerns about community empowerment are Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The organization was established on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya by some Islamic Scholars in East Java including KH. Hasyim Asyari (Tebu Ireng) and KH. Wahab Hasbullah (Tambak Beras). NU is the largest Islamic organization

172 Asrori, Saifudin (2014). Pemberdayaan Perempuan Majelis Taklim Darun Nisa: Analisis Kapital Sosial. *Jurnal Bimas Islam*, Vol. 7 No. 4 year 2014. 755-779.

in Indonesia, perhaps even in the world, with around 40 million members. NU also funds schools and hospitals as well as organizes communities to help reduce poverty. As an organization founded by *kyai*, the existence of Nahdlatul Ulama can not be separated from Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren). The relationship between NU and Pesantren is illustrated by Luken-Bull, as “NU is the pesantren writ large; the pesantren is NU writ small.”¹⁷³ Many NU empowerment activities are conducted through boarding schools. In addition, NU also has 44 universities, and is involved in economic and agricultural studies, and social activities including family planning.

Structurally, NU comprises Syuriah (the highest council), Tanfidziyah (executive council), and Mustasyar (advisory board which gives input to both councils). The structure extends to provincial, regency/city, and some overseas. In addition, NU also has autonomous bodies, institutions, and committees, namely:

1. Nahdlatul Ulama Dakwah Institution (LD-NU).
2. Nahdlatul Ulama Ma'arif Educational Institution (LP Ma'arif NU).
3. Nahdlatul Ulama Service Institution (LPK-NU).
4. The Nahdlatul Ulama Economic Institution (LP-NU).
5. Nahdlatul Ulama Agricultural Development Institution (LPP-NU).
6. Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyah Nahdlatul Ulama (RMI-NU).
7. Nahdlatul Ulama Association of Pesantren.
8. Nahdlatul Ulama Family Institution (LKK-NU).
9. Nahdlatul Ulama Takmir Masjid Institution (LTM-NU).
10. Nahdlatul Ulama Human Resources Research and Development Institution.
11. Nahdlatul Ulama Counseling and Legal Aid Institution
12. Nahdlatul Ulama Health Institution (LK-NU).
13. Nahdlatul Ulama Halal Board Institution (LBHNU).
14. Indonesia Muslim Labour Association (SARBUMUSI).

Relating to the youth vulnerability, the youth involve in the acts of violence in Lamongan because of several reasons, which are:

First, the closed attitude of the pesantren al-Islam. The Chairman of the PC NU revealed “the people were initially closed, had a business ... but because of the closure no one knows.”¹⁷⁴ The existence of extremist groups in Lamongan can not be separated from the influence of pesantren in Tenggulun village, Solokuro sub-district. Tenggulun Village is one of the remote villages located in the hinterland of Lamongan. The village is located in the middle of a stretch of dry fields and fish ponds, banana trees, and corn stretches. The distance between Tenggulun Village and Lamongan is about 60 km. To reach this village, we can use two-wheeled or four-wheeled vehicles, but not available public transport. Public transport only reaches

173 Lukens-Bull, R. (2005). *A Peaceful Jihad: Negotiating Identity and Modernity In Muslim Java*. Springer. 17.

174 Interview with PC NU Lamongan 29 September 2017.

the junction of Paciran road and Solokuro District. Then within 10 km it must be continued by motorcycle. Similarly, from Solokuro Village (the capital district) to 7 km away Tenggulun Village can only be reached by riding a bike-taxi. The remote location of the pesantren eases the educational and teaching activities to be done closely and secretly. It is also recognized by Lamongan chief police, "Maybe even I as an authority can not get into their circle."¹⁷⁵

Second, the interest in Ngruki's extreme network. Before Al-Islam was established in 1993, the family had founded a pesantren but it did not last long. The beginning of radicalism in Al-Islam began with the introduction of several large families of Ustadz Chozin to continue their education at Pesantren Al-Mukmin Ngruki. The interest in Al-Mu'min was described by Ustadz Chozin by recounting, "Having seen many pesantrens, the only pesantren I think fit is only al-Mukmin Ngruki. We saw the discipline of its students and also the discipline of the management,"¹⁷⁶ This affiliation took place in the form of assistance for teachers who were accepted by al-Islam from al-Mukmin, Ngruki. The NU Branch Management Chairman revealed that: "Originally the source is the same, from Ngruki, Solo. This includes the one caught behind the residential police station. It has nothing to do with Al-Islam. When being tracked by the apparatus, it also has nothing to do with Al-Islami. However, if it is further traced, it is indeed the same movement category as it evolves and spreads in Ngruki and surrounding areas"¹⁷⁷

Third, the Tenggulun residents were 90% NU followers (approximately 2,263 inhabitants) while 10% were Muhammadiyah followers (approximately 251 inhabitants). The two groups often intersected with each other in the time before Amrozi erupted. The friction between NU and Muhammadiyah were overwhelming; they insulted each other outrageously, accusing each other as infidel easily.¹⁷⁸ Hence, when Pesantren Al Islam taught an aqidah different from the belief of the most citizens', which were NU and Muhammadiyah, people tended to remain silent, allowing all activities related to the existence of the Pesantren. This attitude of the community and government officials of Tenggulun village resulted in the loss of monitor and control both by the community and the village government apparatus towards all forms of development and threats in the surrounding environment.

According to NU community of Lamongan Regency, those extreme acts are the responsibility of individuals and groups. Based on the division of authority, the acts of terrorism problem is the authority of the central government, in this case is BNPT. However, NU will be actively involved in the process. The board of NU are involved with the police and the District Command, interfaith discussion regarding

175 Interview on 11 September 2017.

176 Wawancara pada 13 September 2017.

177 Wawancara pada 13 September 2017.

178 Interview on 13 September 2017.

tolerance and harmony have been conducted with Nation and Politics Agency.”¹⁷⁹

Another CSO that has attention for empowerment is Muhammadiyah or Muhammadiyah Persyarikatan. The mass organization was founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta as a reformist social-cultural movement, which advocated *ijtihad* (an individual interpretation of the Holy Qur’an and sunnah) as opposed to *taqlid* (absolute obedient). Since the establishment, Muhammadiyah has adopted a platform of reform that combines religious and secular education, primarily as a way of promoting the vertical mobility of Muslims to ‘modern’ communities, while also seeking to purify the practice of syncretic Islam. Muhammadiyah manages many hospitals, and universities or colleges. Currently, Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia with 29 million members. Although Muhammadiyah leaders and members are often actively involved in shaping politics in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah is not a political party. It has devoted itself to social and educational activities.

In its activities, Muhammadiyah is supported by several autonomous organizations:

1. Aisyiyah (Women Association)
2. Youth of Muhammadiyah (Youth Association)
3. Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (Young Women Association)
4. Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (School Student Association)
5. Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (University Student Association).
6. Tapak Suci Putra Muhammadiyah (Pencak Silat).
7. Hisbul Wathan (Scout/Pramuka).

Regarding the vulnerability of youth in Lamongan District to get involved in terrorist activities, Muhammadiyah admits that there has been a cooperation between Muhammadiyah and Al-Islam Pesantren. The board of Muhammadiyah Lamongan revealed that “The cooperation with Al-Islam is done during Ramadhan. We empower Al-Islam students, while guiding and leading them to Muhammadiyah movements so they know about Muhammadiyah movement. It is more about social and educational thinking changes. The dakwah introduces to them what educated Islam is. However, we also supervise and teach the basic of Muhammadiyah.”¹⁸⁰

Unfortunately, the cooperation has not yet led to economic empowerment cooperation. The interview result revealed that: “We do not cooperate with them in the terms of economy, although Muhammadiyah itself has an economic assembly. We promote the economy within the scope of Muhammadiyah by conducting trainings in terms of agriculture and farming.”

179 Interview on 13 September 2017.

180 Interview with Muhammadiyah Executive Board on 28 September 2017.

In addition to community organizations, community empowerment is also conducted by youth organizations. These organizations aim to collect all the potential of youth both students and university students who fall into the category of youth and even those who are not educated.

Many types of form are taken by youth organization, such as PMII, HMI, IMM, BEM, and regional organizations. Youths gathered in a youth organization experience the process of regeneration, interaction, and leadership test. Unfortunately, the role of empowerment has not been done in this organization.

4. Empowerment of Former Terrorist Prisoner by Peace Circle Foundation (YLP)

The laying of the first stone of Baitul Muttaqin Mosque renovation and the construction of the Quran Educational Park (TPA) in Solokuro, Lamongan on Wednesday, March 29, 2017 marked the beginning of Peace Circle Foundation (YLP). The foundation, which is aimed at empowering former combatants, is expected to provide hope for former terrorist convicts to be empowered. As expressed by its founder, Ali Fauzi, *“So far we are always confused when terrorist prisoners are free from prison and don’t know what to do. Jobs are difficult to find, but they have children and wives to support”*.¹⁸¹

The presence of YLP is expected to provide a place for ex-terrorist prisoners to get support with the same style but with different payloads. It upholds and preaches the values of peace, love, tolerance, and friendliness of Islam, not the anger of Islam. YLP activists are expected to dedicate themselves to creating justice and peace through nonviolent means, operating at various distances from life-threatening conflicts, in relationships with the religious community and its official structure which in some settings, may seem too bureaucratic, routine, or safe.

The urgency of empowerment conducted by YLP is at least based on two important reasons. *First*, the capability possessed by former terrorists in the use of weapons, propaganda, and bombing creates barriers to the employment opportunities. *Secondly*, the existence of the stereotype of former terrorists makes it hard for people to connect with them. The picture is as expressed by Sumarno, *“... we have a bitter experience, when everyone is not approaching to us ...”*¹⁸²

For that reason, it is important to empower the former combatants. Ali Fauzi, felt compelled to engage in empowerment efforts, *“If nobody cares about them, usually they will join radicalism again, or at least involved in terrorist networks again.”* This idea received support from BNPT, as expressed by the Head of BNPT Suhardi who was so happy when it was the former combatants who took the initiative. Without saying much, he immediately agreed to help and facilitate. *“Such moves are the*

181 Interview with Ali Fauzi on 28 September 2017.

182 Interview with Sumarno on 28 September 2017.

most effective way to suppress the rate of terrorism," he added. Suhardi revealed, there are about 1,500 total terrorism prisoners and about 560 who have just been free from prison in 2016. The good thing is, he added, only three terrorism prisoners actually returned to terrorism."¹⁸³

Although some of Lamongan's extremist group activists have metamorphosed into groups oriented towards de-radicalization and peace efforts, they cannot be separated from the dynamics of the pro and contra in the external and internal groups. Internal dynamics occurs in connection with al-Islam pesantren and members of the Jemaah Islamiyah network. Ali Fauzi said, "There are still many friends who suspect our activities." Dynamics also occur in external groups. In one interview, one local government employee revealed, "It's because everything is controlled by a conspiracy theory. However, we can see the fact that today those who initially terrorist activists, have turned into the process of deradicalization."¹⁸⁴

Those nonviolent groups consisting of former terrorists are perfectly effective, because they know the network, they know the cells. "It's the cell broke up, even we talk with Fauzi it's not the deck, my children who are in pesantren are changing a lot and many people did not like and become angry. Ali Fauzi also say the same thing, I am due to close to BNPT is my network many people do not like me."?????

Regardless of the pro and contra dynamics of YLP's existence, it is hoped that this group will build a 'new community', which can gradually defy the extremist beliefs of their imprisoned families. Ali Fauzi revealed:

"It is important that we are here when they need us. However, if it is too theorized, it is difficult. I have been profiling more than 40 friends and students why they are returning, why they join the old group. This foundation serves as an alternative to create a new community. The concept is the same, which is to help each other, but the content is different. If they speak violence, we speak peace. The method is the same. For example, if they have a project to Yemen, we also go to Yemen. However, the matter is different.

They love to go to the mountain. We also love it, but the content is different. That's what counts. It is even more ideal if this foundation is supported by them. We can make them counter narrative, but this has never existed yet."¹⁸⁵

The Peace Circle Foundation (YLP) has identified about a dozen families in need of economic support. If a family has difficulty finding school fund for their children, they help them enroll in al-Islam. They also freely express the views of *jihād* without fear of being isolated from their group, as they gain strength from their community. In addition, incorporated individuals can express their aspirations, economic needs and ideological beliefs without fear and anxiety.

183 <https://www.jawapos.com/read/2017/03/30/119820/eks-kombatan-kumpul-di-lamongan-dirikan-yayasan-lingkar-perdamaian>

184 Wawancara 28 September 2017.

185 FGD result in Lamonan.

- *Collaborative Empowerment Efforts among stakeholders*

The first program conducted by YLP is to collaborate with stakeholders because they have a huge role in the development and sustainability of former terrorist prisoner empowerment. Nevertheless, Ali added, there needs to be a prevention which involves all components of society. "The community must be involved; community leaders, religious leaders, youth leaders, it is our duty together to unify perspectives, that the terror is perpetrated by groups that want to destroy our country," he explained.

If the stakeholders can synergize well, the continuity of deradicalization in Solokuro will sustain. *First*, the role of pesantren al-Islam becomes very important in the sustainability of this program, because this community is brought together for their attachment to al-Islam. Almost all exponents of YLP have links with al-Islam, both as families, teachers, and students. Support to YLP is in line with the changes occurring in pesantren al-Islam. For pesantren al-Islam, the involvement of religious teachers, students and alumni of Pesantren Al Islam in the cases of the Christmas Eve Bombing in 2000 and Bali Bombing in 2002, really became a turning point for the change of pesantren orientation from *jihad-dakwah-tarbiyah*, into *tarbiyah-dakwah-jihad*. The effort of Pesantren al-Islam to reduce radicalism in the surrounding environment is done by acculturating with the surrounding environment, being active in social activities such as school committees and joining Muhammadiyah, establishing caretaker board and engaging actively in deradicalization activities. The same thing was delivered by Muhammad Chozin, the brother of Ali Fauzi. The foundation according to him can prove that the synergy between the people with the security is not just rhetorical, as it used to be.

Secondly, the Tenggulun Village community and its entrepreneurs have an active role in the implementation of the activities carried out by the Peace Circle Foundation.

Third, the collaboration with local government, central, police, military, and BNPT. As stipulated in the legislation that acts of terrorism are a national problem, the problem solving is administered by the central government through BNPT. In designing the deradicalization program, this agency uses four approaches, which are reeducation, rehabilitation, resocialization, and reintegration. The government collaboration will result in cooperation, as revealed in an interview with Ali Fauzi,

"Maybe at the mean time, there is no funding. So, as our mainstay, we have donors from local businessmen. We also recruit donors from friends who have business in Tenggulun, Lamongan. Previously, there was no fund from the government to support the work plan. Maybe in 2018 we will apply funds to the government of Lamongan Regency because they also care about this foundation. We already have many empowered friends who mostly have become employees of our entrepreneur friend's project."

When the government institutions have not provided concrete form of empowerment, the form of empowerment is done by the community.. In the interview Ali Fauzi revealed, “ The acts of terror committed by *jihadists* serve as a critics to the absence of the state”. Many deradicalisation activities are the result of the activists’ contribution and sympathizers’ donations. The Regent Fadel, who contributed a car to the operations of Peace Circle Foundation, hoped that this could be a synergy in the mean of de-radicalization.

- ***Social and Cultural Approach***

The approach conducted by YLP in deradicalization is divided into two. The *first* is non-material effort to change jihad ideology, from the understanding of jihad as fighting, killing, violence on the infidels’ enemies of Islam into jihad as charity worship. It is surprising that old terrorist actors reappear if their doctrine is still firmly attached. Ali likens terrorism as a disease that is already in an alarming state and needs more specialized treatment. “Like a disease, these terrorists have complications. They need specialists and peace campaign from people who have ever contracted the disease. We have experienced this virus for years, but *alhamdulillah* we can recover and rise, and now, we want to heal others”, he explained.

Preventing them from using social media is certainly a tough job. Especially now social media becomes a trend for youths. Thus, what we can do is only enlightening activities.

Ali said, “The challenge is getting more severe because terrorism in Indonesia has already been affected by global terrorism. The challenges ahead are heavy, given that local terrorism is always influenced by global terrorism.”

Their understanding, especially about the concept of jihad, can not be underestimated. It cannot be countered simply with conventional syar’i propositions. It is because the books they use as doctrine references are no ordinary books but the books of *fiqh* (law) written by world ulemas, such as the book entitled *Al-Jihadu Salabina* (Jihad in Us) by Sheikh Abdul Baqi Ramdun, *Kitabul Jihad* by Sheikh Ibnul Mubarak, and *Fi At-Tarbiyah Al-Jihadiyah*, by Syiekh Abdul Azam. Here is the problem. the doctrines formed from those books are very powerful. Changing their beliefs is not enough only with momentarily deradicalization programs, especially just from seminars and study forums. The indoctrination process must be carried out by the approach of brotherhood, through formal or non-formal institutions, through *dauroh*, *i’dad*, *rihlah*, *mukhoyyamah*, and others.

The *second* form of empowerment is material efforts, such as giving soft loans, capital loans, school fees for their children, medical aid, and so on, although the nature of material empowerment is still personal. Capital finally exists, but in step by step. Now, the problem is how to build the perspective that peace is more beautiful, how to provide therapy not to let them easily provoked, while relying

onfunds from the government which are usually focused on programs. Thus, the success of building a new community relies heavily on non-material and material support. Both supports must be provided simultaneously and can not be separated.

5. Conclusion

The economic empowerment program for youths in Lamongan is part of the community empowerment program. Various programs have been conducted either by the central government, such as PNPM Mandiri program, or local government programs, such as the Gernerlap Program, aimed at reducing poverty in Lamongan Regency. The program is also designed to increase youth participation. Lamongan Local Government also made various efforts to improve services through the Local Government Work Unit (SKPD). The Office of Labour and Transmigration, for example, improves the quality and development of the competence of the workforce, among others through the development of community work skills, strengthening facilities and infrastructure of work-training centers, and dissemination of labor market information through job market fair.

Cooperatives and SMEs Offices perform services to increase the percentage of active cooperatives the scale of business from the classification of Micro Enterprises to Small, and the growth of New Entreprises. Youth service is also carried out by the Office of Youth and Sports, done through its field of duty which is the empowerment of youth. Some of the activities undertaken are the training state defense, revitalization of youth organizations and empowerment of athletes. Empowerment is also done by National Unity and Politics (Kesbangpol) Lamongan Regency . The social conflict handled by National Unity and Politics reaches 100 percent and the mass organizations, political organization and NGOs registered is 96.58%, in line with the increased target set by the Interreligious Harmony in Lamongan Regency. While the Office of Religious Affairs Ministry (KKA) of Lamongan Regency implements empowerment efforts through religious coaching and guiding.

Community empowerment including for youths are also conducted by community organizations. One of the characteristics of Lamongan society is the strength of the civil society whose power is gathered in various mass organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Some community empowerment activities are carried out by these two organizations, such as education and training activities, as well as community empowerment programs. In addition, Lamongan community also has a high entrepreneurial spirit. Economic crashes have caused them to become traders and migrant labourers in some countries.

In relation to the vulnerability of youth in engaging in acts of terrorism, the central government through BNPT and local governments has been cooperating with Peace Circle Foundation which is working to deradicalize youths involved in terrorist activities.

CHAPTER 6

Youth Economy and Border Security in Nunukan, North Kalimantan

1. Preface

The youth becomes an interesting issue in Indonesia. It is because there are still a lot of youth problems that cannot be overcome properly, although the institutions handling youth issues are quite complete in Indonesia ranging from ministerial to official levels in regencies/cities.

Youth problems are experienced everyday by every generation. The major issues of youth include the low levels of youth education, the number of youths involved in the drug abuse, and the youth involvement in acts of terrorism demonstrated by a series of terror cases in Indonesia. Another problem is the small budget of youth development, especially the youth empowerment programs, resulting in low level of community satisfaction on youth empowerment services conducted by state institutions.¹⁸⁶

The solution to the problem is very much dependent on youth empowerment policies formulated and implemented by the government, including the involvement of non-governmental organizations such as religious and civic organizations.

Theoretically, empowerment is the various multi-level approach and constructive application as the result of individual, social, and collective interactions. In a broad sense, empowerment refers to a variety of indicators which are individuals, families, organizations, and communities.¹⁸⁷ These are the indicators that gain access and control in social, cultural, political, and especially economic context, aiming to improve the quality of life.

Therefore, in the current context youth empowerment is very important because it is part of the national development strategy. It is important to see how far have the government programs through government and non-government agencies, particularly in the economic field, been running. To assess the effectiveness of these programs, better evaluation and improvement are needed, especially in Nunukan,

186 <http://fisip.ui.ac.id/evaluasi-kebijakan-pemberdayaan-pemuda>

187 <https://futureleadersummit.org/artikel/pemberdayaan-pemuda-melalui-proyek-sosial>

North Kalimantan, which is the location of this study.

2. Profile of Nunukan District

Nunukan is one of the districts located in the northern region of North Kalimantan. Nunukan is rich in natural resource potentials in which some of these potentials have not been optimally utilized.¹⁸⁸ Natural resources and their products, particularly from mining, forestry, are the major sources of local revenue.

The general description of the conditions and potential of Nunukan can be described as follows. Nunukan Regency lies between 115°33' to 118°03' east longitude and 3°15' to 4°24' north latitude. The territory of Nunukan in the north is directly adjacent to the state of East Malaysia-Sabah, the east to Sulawesi Sea, the south to Bulungan and Malinau Regencies and the west to East Malaysia-Sarawak.

The total area is 63.68 km² or 7.06% of the total area of North Kalimantan, while the ocean area as far as 4 nautical miles from the outer shoreline to the sea is 1,408,758 km². The regency of Nunukan consists of nine districts,¹⁸⁹ which are Krayan, Krayan Selatan, Lumbis, Sembakung, Nunukan, South Nunukan, Sebuksu, Sebatik and Sebatik Barat.

• *Regional Economic Growth*

The economic growth in Nunukan was recorded at 7.13% in 2015 for GRDP with oil and gas. As for the GRDP without oil and gas, the rate was 7.10% or only slightly different. Based on the price applied, GRDP with oil and gas of Nunukan Regency increased from Rp 3.173 trillion in 2008 to Rp 5.362 trillion in 2012. In other words, the increase was about Rp 2 trillion or about 60% higher than the national growth rate in that period.

Based on its structure, Nunukan's economy is dominated by mining and quarrying, followed by agriculture. In general, the agricultural sector and the mining and quarrying sector dominate the economy of Nunukan with an average share of up to 70% per year of total GRDP. The data shows that the mining and quarrying sector had a share of 39% of total GRDP in 2013. This portion raised to 58% in 2014, but then fell to 47% in 2015. In 2016, this sector was still dominant with a portion of about 52% of the total GRDP.¹⁹⁰

The agricultural sector has remained in the second position in the last decade. This sector plays largest role in the economy after the mining and quarrying sector. In 2012, the agricultural sector had a share of 37% of the total GRDP.¹⁹¹ The portion slightly decreased to only 22% in 2013, then increased to 26% by 2015. In 2016, the agricultural sector remained in the second position with the role of 22% of

188 <https://karyanunukan.wordpress.com>. Kondisi Geografis Kabupaten Nunukan.

189 Badan Pusat Statistik Nunukan (2016), *Kabupaten Nunukan dalam Angka*, p. 3.

190 <https://kaltim.antaranews.com>-Laju Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Nunukan 6,72 persen.

191 Profile of Nunukan 2015.

the total GRDP.

The other two sectors that are also quite dominant, although with a much smaller portion, are trade, hotel and restaurant, and service sector. The trade, hotel and restaurant sectors ranked third with a proportion of 9% of total GRDP in 2013. This number had increased to 10% in 2006 and 12% in 2014, although it decreased to 11% in 2015.

The service sector continues to occupy the fourth position in the last decade. The government services sector is the most dominant in this sector. In 2012 this sector had 5% portion of the total GRDP Nunukan. This number had decreased to 4% in 2013, although it increased again to 8% in 2015 and 2016.

In 2015 the labour force in Nunukan Regency was 70.88% of the total population aging 15 year- old and over, whereas the total working populatio wasi 88.17% of it. The Working Age Group is divided into two groups, which are Workforce and Non-Workforce. People belong to the Workforce are working or looking for work, while those who are in the Non-Workforce category are those who are attending school, housewives, etc.

Along with the increase of population, the number of Workforce also experienced growth. The workforce has increased from 71,021 in 2015 to 115,819 in 2016. This indicates that in the five-year period there was a rise in the Workforce of 44,798 people or about 63%. Along with the increase in life necessities, the minimum wage in Nunukan Regency had also experienced adjustment. In 2013, the average minimum wage was Rp 787,033. The average minimum wage continued to rise to Rp 1,186,000 in 2014, or rose Rp 398,967 (50%) from 2012.

Growth also occurred proportionally to the number of working people and those seeking employment. The total working population was 65,667 in 2015 and 102,126 in 2016. There have been 346,459 or 55.5% growth in over five years.¹⁹²

Based on data, it appears that although the number of working people continues to increase, the Unemployment Rate in Nunukan continues to increase too. Unemployment Rate describes the number of people who are not working but looking for a job. The open Unemployment Rate in Nunukan once experienced a decline from 7.53% in 2008 to 5.94% in 2012. However, the number continued to increase to 7.67% in 2013 and became 9.52% in 2014, until finally it became 11.83% in 2015. Nevertheless, there has been a steady increase in Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR).


Comparing the number of job seekers to Unemployment Rate, the number of unemployed increased not only in proportion to the total workforce, but also in absolute terms. The growing number of unemployed people is certainly a challenge for the government. LFPR illustrates the size of the population included in the labor market. It has risen dramatically from 55.05% in 2013 to 64.89% in 2014. In

¹⁹² *Nunukan Regency Profile (2016)*. Badan Pusat Statistik Nunukan, p. 4.

subsequent years, LFPR continued to increase despite a more moderate growth rate. LFPR in 2015 was 65.06% and then increased to 68.68% in the year, until it was 70.88% in 2016. Employment Opportunity Level is the complement of Unemployment Rate. Job Opportunity Level is a total employed workforce .

• *Minimum Regional Wage*

Employee incomes or wages, always get the attention from the government. This can be seen from the increase of Minimum Regional Wage (UMR) compared to the increase of average minimum living needs every year. The increase of the average minimum living needs every year that increased during 2005 to 2008 but decreased in 2009. In 2011, the average minimum life requirement was Rp 1,106,819/person, and in 2012 increased to Rp 1,278,985/person and continued to rise in 2008 to Rp 1,670,172/ person. The minimum life requirement in 2009 decreased compared to Rp to Rp 1,574,612 in 2008. Similarly, in 2007 UMR which was Rp 787,000/ person increased to Rp 842.000/person in 2008. In 2013 UMR increased again to Rp 1,574,612/person, equalizing minimum living needs of that year.



Graphic 2. Growth of Minimum Wage Rate & Minimum Living Needs

• *Education*

Education is an absolute requirement of human development to create qualified Human Resources (HR) to improve development in Nunukan and in the nation in general. Formal education is a formal process from elementary to university. To support the successful development of education, formal education is generally held in schools. Thus, the number of people who graduate from formal education shows the availability of qualified human resources in the region. The more people finish high school, the better quality the human resources have.

Table 4. Number of Schools, Students, and Teachers In Public Education
Year 2015-2016

Unit		Year		
		2014	2015	2016
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of schools				
• Kindegarten (TK)	Total	17	25	27
• Extraordinary School (SLB)	Total	1	1	1
• Elementary School (SD)	Total	136	139	140
• Junir High School (SLTP)	Total	39	39	38
• Senior High School (SLTA)	Total	17	17	18
• University (PT)	Total	3	3	0
• Vocational School (SMK)	Unit	1	2	2
Number of students				
• Kindegarten (TK)	Total	669	1.107	1.097
• Special Education (SLB)	Total	15	15	15
• Elementary School (SD)	Total	25.021	22.121	20.543
• Junir High School (SLTP)	Total	5.412	5.844	5.901
• Senior High School (SLTA)	Total	2.510	2.983	4.608
• Vocational School (SMK)	Total	366	485	515
• University (PT)	Total	302	0	0
Number of teachers / lecturers & principals				
• Kindegarten (TK)	Total	46	72	95
• Special Education (SLB)	Total	3	3	5
• Elementary School (SD)	Total	1.192	1.171	1.231
• Junior High School (SLTP)	Total	384	497	403
• Senior High School (SMU)	Total	249	287	386
• Vocational School (SMK)	Total	34	46	63
• University (PT)	Total	60	0	0

Source: National Education Office of Nunukan Regency

• **Fisheries and Marine Subsectors**

The fishery sub-sector, especially marine fishery, is expected to become a prime commodity for economic growth in Nunukan Regency due to its geographic position which has a wide marine area. The potential of sea fishery in 2008 reached 4,585.36 tons.

General fishery production which in 2007 reached 146.43 tons, decreased to 146.10 tons in 2008 with 395 units of public water fishing vessels, while the number of fishing vessels for marine fishery in 2008 was 2,679 units.

• **Mining Subsector**

Although the potential of natural resources and substantial mineral resources of Nunukan is high and appealing to mining investors, many still have not been

optimally utilized. This is closely related to the sustainability of geological and mineral resources information in order to manage mineral, energy, ground water resources, environmental management, natural disaster mitigation, land use, and spatial structuring of mining areas.

The mining industry in Nunukan includes oil and gas mining, and non-oil and gas mining. The mining products, such as oil and natural gas, have a huge influence in the economy. The development of production of crude oil, despite a decline, still contributes to the economics. In 2006 the production of crude oil was as much as 1,363,203 MMSTB decreased to 275,880 MMSTB in 2007. For natural gas, in 2007 the production amounted to 407,648 MMSCF, while for coal in 2006 the production was 1,165,287.39 tons, increased to 1,174,428.81 tons in 2007 and again to 1,540,318.39 tons in 2008.

• *The Potential of Border Area*

Nunukan border area has great potential to be developed, not only the potential of natural resources but also the potential in the field of services, trade, and tourism.

The region of Nunukan which most districts are directly adjacent to Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) has a huge potential in services and trade due to heavy traffic of trade with Malaysia. Therefore, other areas that can lead to trade, like processing industry need to be developed more.

The potential of nature in Nunukan which has a major contribution is mining and quarrying materials. , In 2007 crude oil production reached 275,880 MMSTB, natural gas 407,648 MMSCF, and coal 1,174,428,81 tons, reaching 3,467,537 tons in 2013 .

With the average podzolic soil condition and sufficient rainfall, the border area is ideal for plantation , especially for oil palm, cocoa, rubber and industrial plantations forest.

The potential of oil palm plantations is also very large. The area of land continued to increase from 2014 to 2015, from 34,217.00 Ha to 50,435.82 ha and to 51,244.55 ha. If the productions are utilized in the manufacturing sector, it will be more useful and can increase other sectors, such as trade, compared to directly selling the production of plantations without being processed first.

The tourism sector is one of the contributions which improve regional income and economy. In the border areas, there are several potentials that have not been developed and can be used as one source of funds. The strength of tourism in this border region includes the form of ecotourism in the form of forest, river, cascade, and marine tourism combined with cultural tourism. The cultural tourism is the wealth of traditional values that are still firmly attached to daily life. Local cultural attractions include a long betang house (long house) and traditional art from each tribe in the border.

3. Overview of the Current Problem of the Nunukan Society

To get an overview of the latest problems faced by the community in Nunukan Regency, this paper refers to the results of observation and interview during the research in Nunukan, reinforced by the research publication on the potential of remote islands.

• *Current Potential of Nunukan*

The potential of Nunukan Regency is:

- agro industry (plantation and forestry)
- marine and port service
- international trade
- mining
- tourism¹⁹³

These potentials need to be supervised, protected, and managed well in order not to run out and eventually damage the environment. Viewed from the existing spatial activities in Nunukan, it is interesting to study which potentials can provide income for local governments and communities, especially the potentials of natural resources and the sea. There is some investments in these potentials, but the problem is that the investor's offices are not located in Nunukan Regency, but in Tarakan instead.

It is because the facilities and infrastructures in Nunukan are not complete yet. In the future, the huge homework for the government of Nunukan is the completion of facilities and infrastructure, such as transportation. Development will only remain focused on certain points if there is no equitable support of infrastructure network. Currently the Local Government starts constructions with a scissor system. This means the development is done from two directions, from the capital to remote areas on the outskirts, and at the same time from remote areas to the centre of government. If the road network is available thoroughly, other potential sectors, such as oil palm plantation, tourism, mining, will be accelerated more rapidly.¹⁹⁴

In Sebatik Island, one of the very close districts to Nunukan, some of the new roads have partially been paved but many other have not. Roads are important to connect one area to another. If no attention is given to the road development and maintenance, people will have difficulty bringing their plantation and farm products to the market. This is the case in Sebatik Island, where the community sells fish catches and vegetables to Tawau, Sabah, Malaysia because water transportation is very easy and cheap. In contrast, it takes a long time, approximately 1 hour by public transportation (public transport) and boat from Sebatik Island to Nunukan

193 Siregar, Chairil N (2015). *Analisis Potensi Pulau-pulau Terpencil dalam Rangka Meningkatkan Ketahanan, Keamanan Nasional, dan Keutuhan Wilayah NKRI di Nunukan, Kalimantan Timur*.

194 Siregar Chairil, hlm. 5.



Island to sell the vegetable and fish. This condition complicates the flow of goods from Sebatik Island to Nunukan, and vice versa.

• *Economic Conditions*

The income of Nunukan Regency comes from gardening, farming, fishing, self-employed, civil servants, and private sector. The location of Nunukan and Sebatik which are geographically separated causes the social interaction between the two places limited. Sebatik residents prefer to sell and buy daily necessities by crossing over to neighboring Tawau, Sabah, Malaysia because it is closer, cheaper, better and easier. Similarly, the people in Nunukan more often shop in Tawau, Sabah, Malaysia than in Sebatik. The fish and vegetables suppliers themselves actually come from the Indonesian Islands close to Malaysia who do not prefer to sell to Nunukan Island due to the longer time taken compared to selling to Tawau, Malaysia.

The islands of Nunukan and Sebatik only became the marketing point of Tawau, Malaysia. The revenue of Nunukan and Sebatik communities' derived from real sector such as agriculture, small industry, fishery, plantation, and mining are all used to buy foods, clothings and housing materials (e.g. iron, cement, etc.) as the manufacturing industry from Java Island and Malaysia. This is known by consumption, while some of the savings are then disbursed again as working capital.

Nunukan Island has become a marketing outlet for Malaysia for products, such as sugar, rice, salt, oil, eggs, milk, electronics, radio, HP, computers, and refrigerators, etc. And more ironically is that fish and vegetables from Sebatik sold in Tawau market, Malaysia are brought and sold back in Nunukan. It can be calculated how much advantage obtained by Tawau Malaysia from the people of East Kalimantan, specifically Nunukan and Sebatik every day. This is caused by the limited inter-island transportation in North Kalimantan. And because of it, investors are still not much interested either. To overcome this, it is necessary to determine the specific space for economic activity that will more directly drive the economic activity. Local government need to try to anticipate areas which can be grown into regional economic centers. These strategic and fast-growing areas may be the areas that have already shown signs of agglomeration, such as the centres of crop production, horticulture, plantation, husbandry, and fishery. In Nunukan Regency, there are many potential areas can be developed as centers, including Sebatik, Sembakung, Kragan, and Lumbis in order to achieve equity in economic development.

• *Social and Cultural Conditions*

The indigenous people of Nunukan are the Tidung Bulungan and Dayak whereas the migrants are the Bugis, Javanese, East Eastern Islander and Torajan. The effort to develop the social culture of Nunukan society is focused on the improvement of

intellectual, moral, ethical quality, supported by various scientific research, while institutional development is focused on the effort of creating good governance.

In the mass media sector, especially in TV broadcasting, it is dominated by Malaysian TV. It is because Malaysian TV broadcasts can be caught well, so it attracts the people of Nunukan and Sebatik. Not only are daily necessities ranging from soft drinks, milk, fruits, meat, mosquito repellent, and bread, come from Malaysia but almost 70-80% of the existing grocery stalls in Sebatik and Nunukan sell Malaysian products. To go to Tawau, Malaysia from the closest border from Sebatik, people only need to pay 10 RM. Not only Malaysian food and goods enter the island of Nunukan and Sebatik, but also Malaysian TV broadcasts are very popular among the society because TVRI's signal cannot be received in Sebatik. To enjoy TVRI broadcast people must use a satellite dish which cost Rp 2 million or cable TV subscription.

The transmitter in Nunukan is 300 watt VHF and in Sebatik 1,000 watts VHF, while Malaysian radio and television (RTM) is now 10,000 watt. Malaysian TV broadcasts can be very clearly received in Sebatik and Nunukan. This condition is very worrying because the swift flow of information broadcast through TV1, TV2, and TV3 Malaysia to the border community is an ambush of Malaysian culture to Indonesian culture at the border. Even so, many Indonesian in Sebatik Island, whose majority are Bugis descendants still have strong love for Indonesian culture. Nevertheless, there are many Malaysian cultures absorbed by the border community. This condition can gradually affect national resilience in the future generations.

• *Local Wisdom*

Local wisdom basically means the wisdom of the local community in managing natural resources traditionally based on the variations of species, such as the varieties of rice planting, the types of wood used for building materials, the types of plants used for medicine, and various types of animal huntings.

The high diversity of species being used will minimize the possibility of these types being pressured; the traditional management is essentially in line with forest conservation. Unfortunately, many people do not use the local wisdom, and break the rules instead. This is mostly done by the immigrants. In general, the immigrants want to take resources from the region for their personal interests only.

The traditional forest management developed when spears and chopsticks were used are put aside by firearms, chainsaws and trawlers. With increasingly modern equipment, it is getting easier for people to catch animals and collect more plants. Not to mention the activities of timber theft, the taking of commercial forest products, and the construction of roads begin to threaten natural resources. With the emergence of such threats, people within the area are regarded as the most

appropriate asset for maintaining and managing natural resources through their local wisdom.

• ***National Resilience Factors***

The development of the border areas is important to maintain the unity of NKRI. The border regions give strategic values in supporting the success of national development. The border areas are valuable to the nation and state as they: :

- a. Have important value for the sovereignty of the state.
- b. Have the capability to drive socio-economic prosperity of the surrounding community.
- c. Have the capability to build networks with other regions and neighboring countries.
- d. Contributes to regional and national defense and security.

Some of the problems faced in the border of Nunukan - Sebatik Island and Malaysia are:

1. The unclear border line due to the destruction of the stakes, and the too much distance between each stake.
2. The uncoordinated natural resource management which has made the resources taken by the foreigners, such as the cases of illegal logging. The unclear borderline stakes have made losses to Indonesia.
3. The strategic function of the border areas as the front outlet affects the security defense as there are many border crossers to and from Indonesia and Malaysia.
4. Poverty due to regional isolation has triggered high desire for the local people to cross the border to Malaysia to improve life, given the economy in Malaysia is better than in Indonesia.
5. The facility and infrastructure gap between the two regions of the two countries triggers the people's economic orientation, such as from Sebatik Island to Tawau, Malaysia rather than to Nunukan Island due to its closeness, lower cost, and more qualified products.

In managing the border areas of the country, there are several important issues were studied:

- a. The unclear sea and land boundaries, which consequently often cause conflict. Losses are always on the side of Indonesia and this condition directly afflicts the Indonesian. At the time of Ambalat dispute, many fishermen searching for fish were chased by Malaysian police. On the ground, there are cases where some of Indonesia people's houses are divided by the borderline; some part of the house is in the territory of Indonesia, while some other is in the territory of Malaysia.

b. Illegal exploitation of natural resources, especially forestry and marine resources. Due to the vastness of the protected and secured area, it is not easy to keep the border whether it is on the ground or at the sea.

The problem of Askar Wataniah is only exaggerated by the mass media; in reality it is not like that. According to the Chairman of West Kalimantan Panca Marga Youth (PPM), Zainul Aripin, another lesson to be learned from the unveiling of this phenomenon is that Malaysia as a neighbor country has long ago prepared the defense aspects in guarding the country's borders. For example, in case of war, the infrastructure development or highways built in border areas, ranging from the city of Kuching to Sabah with the quality of the prime road known as "Highway Borneo", can change function into a foundation of war planes and logistics carrier such as the Hercules plane. In Sebantik, which is close to Malaysia, a Malaysian residence has been built, equipped with Malaysian Police post. The Malaysian placement in the forefront of this line has referred to the country's defense and security aspects (Pontianak Post, 2008). The question arises for Indonesian state is whether we have prepared our defense and security at the border. In Nunukan Regency a unit called the Special Regiment of the Frontier (RKP) will be set up. This regiment is an elements of communities entrusted to support the duties of security monitoring. RKP consists of selected personnel recruited from members of PPM (Panca Marga Youth) Nunukan.

Security issues that happen frequently in Nunukan regency are:

- a. illegal logging
- b. fish theft and robbery with murder
- c. black market
- d. cruise
- e. illegal Indonesian migrant workers
- f. conflict
- g. drugs
- h. terrorist (still in alert status, but need to be anticipated)

Robbery with murder often happened to fishermen from Nunukan, Bulungan and Tarakan. It happens to farmers, and shrimp fishermen in the three places mentioned above as well. According to some sources, robberies with murder are usually reported to the police, but non-casualty robberies are not reported.

Nunukan fishermen suffer from terrorist acts by the Royal Malaysian Police and Navy, while the fishermen are still in the waters of Indonesia, which is about 10 km from the coastline of Nunukan. The terror acts done not only pursuing, hitting the fish boats, and also throwing gas bullets to the fisherman. This can not be justified and should be reported to the Malaysian Chief of Police and the Royal Malaysian Army Commander.

Illegal logging is not only done by communities around the forest, but also by legitimate license holders issued by the central and regional governments. Illegal logging is one of the causes of tropical forest degradation in East Kalimantan which currently has lost 331,258 ha or 71.2% over a 2-year period (World Bank Report, 2003). Illegal logging can be undermined by the law enforcement and the government's commitment to combat, but that is not enough considering the limited number of borders and limited number of security personnel and inadequate support facilities. This now makes illegal logging increasingly widespread through the sea.

Illegal fishing is done by the foreign capitalists by using Indonesian fisherman to avoid them from legal pitfalls. Serious attention needs to be paid serious so that the foreign capitalists do not arbitrarily finance Indonesian fishermen to catch fish in Indonesian sea. In addition, Indonesian fishermen should also be informed of law violation they commit so that they do not do that anymore and other fishing groups can learn from it.

The fate of illegal Indonesian migrant workers in Nunukan is very worrying, while they are the citizens with equal rights for protection from various dangers, such as hunger, fear, and persecution. Indonesian migrant workers have the awareness to lighten the burden of the state. The workers know that unemployment will only become a burden to the state.

The party responsible for the people is the government, which has policies, scenarios, plans, and interests. However, the impression is that the government is less responsive to the problems of TKI.

4. Economic Empowerment of Youth in Nunukan

The following will discuss the direction, characteristics, and problems and patterns of government policies related to the empowerment of youth generation.

• *The concept of Youth*

Youths are individuals who are experiencing changes both physically and emotionally, which make them great human resources for present and future development.

Internationally, WHO refers "youth" as people within the age of 10-24 years; they within the age of 10-19 years are called "adolescence". Another definition of youth is an individual with dynamic, even turbulent and optimistic characters but has not stable emotional control yet (Mulyana, 2011: 12). Youths face a period of social and cultural change.

Looking from the age side, youths are in the period of biological and psychological development. Therefore, youths always have different aspirations from the aspirations of the society in general. In a positive sense, these different aspirations are called the spirit of reform.

In Indonesian vocabulary, youth are also known as *Kaum Muda* or *Generasi Muda* (young generation). Often, the terminology of youth or young people has different definitions. The definition of youth above is more from technical definition by age category, whereas another definition is more flexible, saying that youth/young generation/young people are those who are progressive and have the spirit of reform.

Referring to the Regulation No. 40/2009 on Youths, they are defined as Indonesian citizens entering an important period of growth and development aged 16 (sixteen) to 30 (thirty) years. Meanwhile, in the demographic and anthropological context, youth generation is categorized into the preparatory age of entering the workforce or productive age between 15-40 years.

Currently, there are 40,234,823 Indonesian citizens in the category of youth generation. From the socio-cultural point of view, this young generation has diverse nature with a wide variety of ethnic, religious, economic, domicile, and linguistic. They have the living ecosystems characteristics that are divided into the communities of fishing, farming, mining, trading, offices, and so on.

• *The Concept of Empowerment*

According to Kartasasmita (1996), empowerment is an effort to increase the dignity of society which in the present condition is not able to escape from poverty trap and backwardness. Community empowerment is a concept of economic development that encapsulates social values. The purpose of community empowerment is the realization of Indonesia's economic structure which is based on economic activities.

Empowerment is an effort that must be followed by dynamic strengthening of the potential or power that is owned by every society. Therefore, more positive steps apart from creating climate and atmosphere are needed. This reinforcement includes concrete steps, involves giving inputs and opens access to opportunities that in the end will make them more empowered.¹⁹⁵ Community empowerment in this case is the effort to build the capability of Nunukan community, especially the youth as one of community group that develops life in marine waters and lives in marginal conditions, to improve their access to capital, information, and fishery technology. Thus, the people can more easily market their fish products, get surpluses, and increase their welfare (Kartasasmita, 1996).

• *Government Policy on Youth Empowerment*

As stated in Regulation No. 40/2009 articles 9 and 13 on Youth, it is affirmed that the central government, local governments, and communities collaborate in youth

195 Sinkoh Frans dkk, 2017. Peran Pemerintah dalam Pemberdayaan di Kecamatan Pasan, Kabupaten Minahasa Tenggara.

services in empowerment efforts, while in Article 7 and Article 8, youth services are directed to foster patriotism, dynamics, culture of achievement, professionalism spirit, as well as increase the participation and active role of youth in building themselves, the society, the nation and the state.

In Article 8 it is also mentioned that the youth service strategy is given by providing state defence training, competition and youth appreciation, improvement and expansion to obtain job opportunities according to their potential and expertise and equal opportunity to express opinions, freedom to be involved in activities and organizations within the regulation, improvement of youth capacity and competence, youth mentoring, more opportunities to acquire and improve education and skills, and youth cadre preparation in carrying out advocacy and mediation functions that their environment needs.

In addition, the essence of empowering youth as stated in Article 24 and 25 of Regulation No. 40/2009 is implemented in a planned, systematic, and sustainable way to increase the potential and quality of physical, mental, spiritual, knowledge, self and organizational skills towards youth independence through the improvement of faith and piety, improvement of science and technology, the organization of state and national defense, the affirmation of youth economic independence, the improvement of the physical quality, art and culture of youth, and/or research implementation, and also youth activities supervisory.

• *Role of the State*

The presence of the state in economic empowerment for youth, can be traced from the government institutions programs through the region and local government agencies and services.

However, before further understanding of the policy on youth empowerment, it should be acknowledged that each of these policies and programs can be divided into two: the directly and the indirectly related youth empowerment policy program. The direct program is the program directly related to youth problems. It is usually done right under the ministry or related agencies. The indirect program of youth empowerment policy, on the other hand, is a program that does not directly position youth as the problem. This is usually done in the form of cross-ministries or certain agencies.

Referring to the above explanation, the government policy in empowering young generation can be divided into five pattern of policies, that are:

1. Empowerment policy by agencies/ministry without involving other elements.
2. Empowerment involving two specific offices/ministries.
3. Empowerment cooperation involving non-government elements
4. Empowerment by certain ministries or agencies to support NPOs or community groups.

5. Independent youth empowerment program related to uniqueness in certain areas.

In this research report, the researcher does not refer to the five categorization patterns. Instead, this refers to simpler classifications based on the need and focus of this research to see how far the youth empowerment programs have been done by the local government through the programs by the institution as the state's extension and the programs conducted by local religious and community organizations.

5. Youth Empowerment Policy Conducted by Government in Nunukan

The research result shows that this pattern is usually focused only on the relevant ministries, so every government agency conducts programs in accordance with its functions, such as youth empowerment program conducted by the State Ministry of Youth and Sports or an out-of-school program conducted by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

In accordance with the focus of this research, the researcher wants to see whether there are programs related to the youth empowerment, specifically related to economic empowerment, exist in every government agency in Nunukan.

The data was collected from some of the agencies in Nunukan, which are the Cooperatives and SMEs Office, Social Service, Youth and Sports Office, Education Office, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Nunukan Community Institution, and Marine and Fisheries Office.

The Cooperatives and SMEs Office, based on the results of interviews with its Secretary, Sarinah, stated that empowerment programs undertaken were to conduct entrepreneurship training programs. This program is implemented three to five times a year and usually held in the SMEs Center building or district community hall. This form of employment training program is done according to the type of profession each participant has.¹⁹⁶

The Social Service holds its empowerment program through Karang Taruna (Youth Group) by forming a business group of cooperation. The types of businesses developed are adjusted to the potential of Nunukan which are fish and seaweed business. The respondent stated that they had difficulty intervening because of funding reason. In addition, the main task of this Office is to handle Social Welfare Problems consisting of 26 types.¹⁹⁷

The program of Youth Office, based on the interview, had not find any empowerment program focusing on the economic field. Its service is only to carry out its duties in the form of budget assistance to KNPI (Youth Committee), sports

196 Interview with Sekretaris Dinas Koperasi dan UMKM, 29 August 2017.

197 Interview with Andi Ahmad-Kepala Dinas Sosial Nunukan, 30 August 2017.

performance improvement and youth programs, such as youth SKMD, youth pioneer, and youth leaders.¹⁹⁸

The Correctional Institution, based on the interview with the institution head, Agus Baharudin, had the special guidance and empowerment pattern for the prisoners carried out in the form of training programs, such as making wicker, making cupboards, car/motorcycle workshops, making sandals. The choice of skill trainings were extracted from the prisoners' desire and potential. It should be noted that among there were none involved in terrorism. Based on the data, 70 percent of them were drug prisoners.¹⁹⁹

Based on observation and interview with the Secretary, Syafaruddin, no empowerment program through education channels conducted by Education Department was given in the form of trainings for student entrepreneur spirit, business management, or start-up business. As for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, there was a desire to include materials for entrepreneurship spirit building Aliyah students, but according to the Head of Nunukan Religion Ministry Office, this desire could not be realized yet. However, there will be collaboration with other related institutions.²⁰⁰

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has not any economic empowerment program either; the task is appealing more to morale. The Head of Religious Affairs Office of Nunukan Regency, H. Saberah mentioned that the place of worship was not only as a center of worship but also as a centre of intellectual development and economic empowerment. He said that there was a mix of spiritual and socio-economic activity. Therefore, a representative place for worship was needed. Places of worship should also be managed professionally, not carelessly.²⁰¹

Since Nunukan is one of coastal areas, one of the Marine and Fisheries Office program is the empowerment of the community through National Program for Independent Community Empowerment in the Marine and Fishery Sector . The target of this program are the poor people of marine and fisheries who are the member of fishing business group, fish processing business group, and seaweed cultivation business group.

The existence of the program is expected to improve the welfare of the community in the area. Therefore, the implementation of the program should be fully evaluated as one of the efforts to improve and develop the management, so that the purpose of the program can be fully benefitted the coastal community. Unfortunately, the fact is the program has not been fully able to overcome the poverty level of coastal communities in Nunukan.

This program has been run before this research was conducted, and there has

198 Interview with the Secretary of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, 5 September 2017.

199 Interview on August 29, 2017.

200 Interview on 28 August 2017.

201 Interview on 29 August 2017.

been a research by Muhammad Jufri Yusuf, a Public Administration Major from Mulawarman University of Samarinda, who sees this empowerment process by focusing on several issues:

- (a) The fishermen's access to knowledge, technology and regeneration,
- (b) Participation of social, religious, and cultural institution,
- (c) Community empowerment in the micro sector,
- (d) Business commercialization and access to capital. The elaboration of this program will be discussed in the best practice section of this report.²⁰²

• *The Role of Non-Government Institutions and Civil Societies*

To see how the role of the non-governmental institutions, the steps taken are to collect the initial data from the organizations in Nunukan and then to see their work and contribution in relation to the youth economic empowerment. The non-governmental organizations in the context of this research can be religious institutions and community organizations, including the independent community organizations in Nunukan.

Based on data, the religious institutions in Nunukan are Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, Persis, and Yayasan Hidayatullah. The researchers have the opportunity to meet with all the leaders of these organizations and explore the economic empowerment program.

The interview result with the leader of Muhammadiyah, Ustadz Khalisah indicated that Muhammadiyah has not specific program to empower youth economy related to terrorism prevention. Although Muhammadiyah is known for several business charities such as educational institutions, orphanages, hospitals, other social institutions, for the context of Nunukan there is no specific economic empowerment for youth. The furthest it can do is to enlighten the people through *tabligh* activities through Quranic studies, and Friday sermon administered by the Tabligh Muhammadiyah assembly.²⁰³

For Nahdlatul Ulama, in the interview the chairman, Ustadz Herman, mentioned that NU is aware of the importance of economic factor; because of economy people can commit suicide, violence and even drug abuse. In the religious principle it is said that "*kaadal fakru ayyayakuuna kufran*"- meaning poverty or pauperism can plunge one into disbelief". Although NU currently has not specific program for youth economic empowerment, NU determined that in the future they will try to realize empowerment programs to improve welfare, especially for youth, through economic empowerment.²⁰⁴

202 Yusuf, Jufri Muhammad (2013). *Studi tentang Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pesisir di Kabupaten Nunukan*. eJournal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 2013, 1 (4): 1594-1607.

203 Interview with Muhammadiyah PIC in Nunukan on 30 August 2017.

204 Interview with the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama Nunukan, September 5, 2017.

Yayasan Hidayatullah is also one of the religious organizations in Nunukan whose contribution to the development of Islam in Kalimantan is generally very large. Almost all provinces, cities and districts in Kalimantan, show that the existence and penetration of this organization is strong, including in Nunukan. In Nunukan there is a boarding school which is managed by Yayasan Hidayatullah. The interview with the leader shows that Hidayatullah has not a program that focuses on the empowerment of the youth economy yet. Similar with NU and Muhammadiyah, its contribution is still in the process of raising awareness and enlightenment through religious lecture activities.²⁰⁵

6. Prevention Efforts Against Radicalism and Terrorism

Based on observations and interviews, none of Nunukan inhabitants have been involved in acts of terrorism and radicalism. Indeed, there are some news of some people who were indicated to be influenced by radicalism. However, because of the persuasive approach of religious leaders and local authorities it could be prevented or handled properly.

In the case of Nunukan, the link with terrorism is not in the context of countermeasures but rather in the prevention efforts. The following will describe some efforts made by Indonesian Military, Police officers and local government, including Islamic mass organizations, community leaders and religious leaders in the efforts to prevent radicalism.

To prevent radicalism, Islamic organizations in Nunukan such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah, and DDI guide the people through Friday Sermons, weekly Quranic studies in which at every religious momentum the materials of the study are about Islam as God's blessing to world, tolerance, human compassion and Indonesian unity.²⁰⁶

The Ministry of Religious Affairs, as mentioned by the Nunukan Regency Ministry Head, H. Sabera, directs the religious instructors in various areas to convey religious messages to the society. In Nunukan there are 102 religious instructors from government and honorary employees who are given direction to convey the message of the danger of radicalism through their religious message in *majlis taklim*, public lecture, Friday Sermon, religious holidays and specific Quranic studies.²⁰⁷

At the lowest level of government, it has been instructed that the heads of the neighborhood should collect the data of old and new residents, and stick labels and ID cards on the doors of their houses to control the movements of the newcomers.

The layered entrances of the border waters are strictly guarded by the security forces coordinating with the patrols, and also undertake the state defense program

205 Interview with Ustadz Zikrullah pada 14 September 2017.

206 Interview on 5 September 2017.

207 Interview with Head of Nunukan Regency Religious Affair Ministry on 7 September 2017.

attended by 100 people, instilling nationalism and love of Indonesia to prospective migrant workers through the cooperation of the National Military and District Command.

7. Analysis of Best Practice

Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries during the last two years has held a national program called Community Economic Empowerment Program (PEMP Program). This program is an integrated fishery business program, starting from the planning stage and implementation, to evaluation. Integration is also manifested in productive economic activities undertaken by communities, not focused on specific activities, but scattered into interrelated activities. Similarly, integration is realized through the involvement of stakeholders from various parties, government agencies, communities and private sectors.

Although the program is not intended exclusively for youths but for Nunukan community in general, if youths are seen as people with productive age, then this program has at least captured many youth groups. This program can also be a model for other agencies including local government and various parties to look at how economic empowerment program can be implemented by looking at local potentials.

One of the potentials owned by Nunukan is the potential of fisheries and seaweed. The results of Siregar's research published in the Journal of Sociotechnology 13th edition 7 April 2008 shows that as the great asset owned by this nation, the existence of fishery sector needs to be preserved. It is well-known that some fishermen have a bad habit of catching fish using a 60meter tiger trawl nets. This will damage the coral reefs and make small fish die. As a result, the catches of the fishermen gradually begin to decline. The fish habitat is damaged and there is not enough plankton for the fish to eat anymore.²⁰⁸

In the foreign market, fish catches products are given very cheap price. The reason is that the fish sizes are not the same and the quality does not meet the standards of eligibility. These conditions make foreign businessmen extort our fishermen. The weaknesses in the packaging and preservation put the fishermen in the lower bargaining position. The Nunukan fishermen in the end choose to sell their fish catches to Malaysia because it is better priced, so there will be no catches left to decay.

In Nunukan no ice factory needed by fishermen to keep the fish from quickly rotting is available. Besides, the national standard ports have not been able to function properly. The cleanliness of the harbor, the lack of facilities and supporting infrastructure, and the inconvenient place for sales transactions make the foreign

208 Siregar, Chairil (2008). *Analisis Potensi Daerah Pulau-pulau Terpencil*. Jurnal Socioteknologi, 13th ed, 7 April 2008.

ships reluctant to lean to do fish transaction in Nunukan. Foreign ships prefer to lean on Tawau, Malaysia, rather than in Nunukan, because they feel safer and more comfortable to make transactions.

Due to the problems and constraints faced by fishermen, so many communities and youth turn to seaweed cultivation so the regeneration process of fishermen in Nunukan does not work in line with what is expected.

The following is a brief description of Coastal Community Economic Empowerment program which may provide an overview of both the integration of fisheries management and production, which can be a model for empowerment process especially for youth in Nunukan District.

1) Implementation of Appropriate Technology

The efficient technology developed by the Office of Fisheries and Marine (DKP) Nunukan is the seed garden with a selection system in which farmers can develop superior seeds that are ready to be cultivated, as well as method of drying known as hanging method.

The system is much more efficient in terms of time and result than the overlay drying method of on the floor which taked 7-8 days and must be periodically reversed in the hot sun. The method of hanging system is also superior in terms of results because the seaweed will not shrink so much that it tends to be heavier compared to the overlay system and does not need to be turned back periodically.

2) Local Technology Development

There is a local technology developed by the coastal community of Nunukan in seaweed cultivation called the long line method. The long line method is a cultivation method using long stretched of straps. This cultivation method is much in demand by the community because the tools and materials used are more durable and easily obtained. This technique uses 50-100 meters of string which both ends are given anchor and big buoy. Plastic or styrofoam big buoys are positioned every 25 meters and small buoy in the form of pieces of styrofoam/ rubber sandals or used 500 ml mineral bottles are positioned every 5 meters.

3) Community empowerment in micro sector, includes:

a) Minimarket

There are only few minimarkets in Nunukan because the society still tends to shop and sell their crops from garden while shopping for their daily needs in traditional markets.

b) Solar Distribution Packages

In Nunukan subsidized fuel package for seaweed farmers is not available yet. but the government through the Office of Marine and Fisheries provides a recommendation letter to get subsidized fuel. Seaweed farmers are given letters of recommendation to obtain subsidized fuel in large quantities used

to carry out their activities. As for people who are not seaweed farmers, if they do not have recommendation letters, their purchases will be limited by the subsidized fuel suppliers.

c) Seaweed Cultivation

The target of seaweed aquaculture production in 2015 revitalization program was 50.763 million tons. The stretch of coastline and islands with the rocky and sandy as well as the support of sheltered and relatively calm waters are very supportive in the seaweed cultivation business.

Human resource support which is mostly traditional fishermen is potential to develop this alternative type of business. The increasing market support for this commodity also serves as the backdrop for this alternative venture.

d) Postharvest Process

Postharvest process is the determinant of seaweed quality because through drying, the moisture content and its cleanliness can be determined. Unstable weather prevent the farmers from drying optimally.

5) Business corporatization dan Capital Access

Support for individual business has long been done by the government of Nunukan by providing help in the form of business capital for the fishermen or seaweed farmers. The efforts made by the local government, especially in Nunukan are:

a) Empower communities from powerless into a powerful, independent, and civil society.

b) Exploring the faded values of the society.

c) Involve the community to participate in the implementation of the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM).

d) Economic Network

The running of economic network for coastal communities can be seen in Nunukan, particularly in the form of village unit cooperative. This is intended to control the price of seaweed to keep the price stable during the harvest season. The position of Nunukan Regency as one of the 14 members of the National Seaweed Breeding Network is also beneficial to this area. Nunukan and Brebes Regencies, the two regions involved in the network, get the priority of using research results, such as when researching at IPB. The research results are prioritized for the members.

e) Banking and Non-Banking Access. As a local government owned bank, Kaltim Bank actively provides business capital loan to the seaweed farmer community to increase production output through the injection of funds, although the amount is still very limited.

• *Supporting and Impediments Factors of Nunukan Regency Community Economic Empowerment*

1) Fishery Cultivation Potential

One of the potentials in Nunukan is aquaculture resources, consisting of 25 acres of embankment, 2.31 acres of pond, 406.14 acres of sea. In 2010 this location has been exploited for various types of commodities. This shows that seaweed is a superior fishery commodity. It has been proven that the quality of Nunukan seaweed is one of the best in Southeast Asia.

2) Socialization

The expected outcomes of the socialization process is the understanding of the concept, principles of procedure, policy, and stages of the implementation of seaweed cultivation program and the strengthening of capital and seaweed cultivation business group by the supporting actors, such as the instructor and the community as perpetrators as well as target beneficiaries. To achieve a complete understanding of the program, the socialization process is not only done at the beginning of the program but continuously until the end of program implementation.

3) Community Participation

Community participation is the involvement of the community either directly or indirectly in every stage of the program implementation of seaweed farmer community empowerment. From the work mechanism described, it is clear that the pattern of community participation is very dominant in all stages of the seaweed farmer empowerment program community empowerment, starting from the stage of planning, implementation, control, supervision, and evaluation. This can be seen from the number of Joint Business Groups formed by the community in every village. Therefore, it can not be denied and should be clearly understood that this program can only succeed if it gets the response and attention from the community.

4) Human Resources

One of the factors that determine the sustainability of this community empowerment program is the quality of human resources. In this case, it means the perpetrators of this seaweed empowerment program. The advisors are the main actors in supporting each program.

5) Budget

Budget is an important factor in the implementation of this seaweed farmer community empowerment program because budget is the driving factor of all elements of a government agency. In the implementation of the capital and the seaweed cultivation business group strengthening program, the basic budget for the cultivation development and the instructor can be obtained from the Central Budget Fund, Special and General Allocation Fund, Marine and Fishery Office of North Kalimantan Province, and Regency government.

6) Facilities and Infrastructures Condition

The existence of facilities and infrastructures in an agency is one of the assets to support the implementation of its duties and functions. With the facilities and infrastructures, the purpose of program and activity can be implemented optimally.

CHAPTER 7

Youth Economy and Terrorism Prevention Strategy

This chapter will tell the best examples from several regions in Indonesia of how former terrorists are now actively involved in overcoming terrorism and how central and regional cooperation is done in economic activities as prevention and countermeasures against terrorism. John Horgan states that separating violent individuals and groups from the others (disengagement) is important. In Indonesia the disengagement of former terror prisoners continues outside the prison.

There are various patterns and models a terrorist did to change and leave violence. Religion, family, interaction, dialogue and community are among the reason for them to fully commit to abandon past experiences of violence and strengthen themselves in community development for peace and productive socio-economic activities. Understanding of these patterns can be drawn into government policy in preventing and combating terrorism through multi-stakeholder cooperation. John Horgan states that *“many potential ways out of terrorism, and that if we tried to identify them there might be implications for the development of policy initiatives.”* Horgan conducted deep interview with dozens of ultra-nationalist and radical jihadits.²⁰⁹


Julie Chernov Hwang for six years has conducted in-depth interviews with a hundred jihadists in various cities in Indonesia from various groups including Jama'ah Islamiyah, Mujahidin Kompak, Ring Banten, Laskar Jihad and Tanah Runtuh. Chernov Hwang saw many changes in the individuals and jihadist groups in Indonesia because of various religious and psychological reasons. They abandoned past violent experiences, and were committed to developing a peaceful community through socio-economic and other social work.²¹⁰ Ali Fauzi and Arifuddin Lako are among those who transformed themselves and have strong influence over hundreds of former terrorists and other combatants. Lako affirmed that *“Rumah Katu Community is a medium for mediation and interaction*

209 John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 6.

210 Julie Chernov Hwang, *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018.

between former terrorists, former combatants, and other youths, both Muslims and Christians.”²¹¹ Lako is appointed as the director of Komunitas Rumah Katu, and now producing documentaries and short films of Poso conflict, how to prevent violence, and create peace permanently as a lesson for the millennials. Prisons as rehabilitation centres have a powerful influence on their transformation from violence to peace. Interaction between terrorist prisoners and enough reflective time can make self- transformation in prison, although some of them are still back to the violence community, especially those who are disappointed by the lack of social support and rejection in society. The transformation of former terrorist prisoner and combatants in this context consists of two things: first, through community empowerment, and second, through cross-sectoral cooperation.

Indonesia has great potentials of youth participation in supporting government and community programs. In *The Global Youth Wellbeing Index 2017* Indonesia ranked number 2 in citizen participation and number 11 in youth education. However, in the economic opportunity aspect, Indonesia occupied the bottom three ranks. In terms of gender and ICT equality the ranks were even lower, number 21 and 23 respectively. This shows an important challenge for government and communities to drive youth in entrepreneurship and economic empowerment. In general, in Asia Pacific region Indonesia’s rank was in the middle, number ten.²¹²



Graphic: Economic Opportunities for Youth in Indonesia and Asia Pacific of 2017²¹³

This graphic explains how the position of Indonesian youth in 2017 among Asia Pacific countries, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, Japan, China and India. Economic opportunities for Indonesian youth was (20), better than

211 Arifuddin Lako, interview in Poso, 22 January 2018.

212 “The Global Youth Wellbeing Index,” accessed on 1 February 2018 from <http://www.youthindex.org/country/indonesia>.

213 Retrieved from the Global Youth Wellbeing Index 2017. Accessed on 10 February 2018 from <https://www.youthindex.org>

India (23) and the Philippines (24), but far behind Vietnam (17), China (9), Thailand (7), Japan (6) and Australia (4). Indonesian youth were very strong in Citizen Participation, ie two (2), a level below Australia that occupies the highest position of one (1).

Indonesian youth as citizens are very active in social, political and economic participation. Unfortunately, it is not accompanied by mentoring, targeted, competitive education, and enough business capital. This is felt by young people including ex-terrorist convicts in doing business. The funding from BNPT and local governments are inadequate to support the sustainability of stronger and longer-term businesses.

1. Role of the Government

Economic empowerment is an important factor in driving someone not to act of terrorism. Business activities encourage them to refuse a solicitation of terrorist acts. Government and community support in economic activities gives them the confidence to make a change from a violent past into a productive and beneficial person or group.

Empowerment and business training are also given to youth to prevent the rampant circulation of drugs, as happened in Nunukan, North Kalimantan. Youth are tempted by the ease of getting money from being drug couriers. Seventy percent of the Nunukan prisoners are from drug criminal cases.

At the UN General Assembly in September 2014, President Barack Obama stated that the approach to entrepreneurship was very strategic in preventing and overcoming radicalism and terrorism. Steven R. Koltai of the Brookings Institute affirms that:

“President Obama is right that entrepreneurship is a powerful antidote to violence. Entrepreneurship is a job-creating machine, and jobs provide the growth and economic hope that are the foundation of peaceful, civil societies. . . huge numbers of young people in the Middle East and North Africa do not have jobs—youth unemployment rates can exceed 35 percent—and it is these young men, disillusioned and frustrated, who are drawn to extremism”²¹⁴

Economic aid was provided for former terrorist prisoners and combatants in various regions. BNPT is the most important government institution in providing economic aid. In an interview, a Solo prison officer stated:

“BNPT does not provide capital but provide goods in accordance with the desired business. Those who want to become a seller are given carts, those who want to livestock are given goats, those who want to

214 Steven R. Koltai, “Fighting ISIS with Entrepreneurship,” 7 Oktober 2014. Accessed on 30 January 2018 from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2014/10/07/fighting-isis-with-entrepreneurship/>

sell online are given laptops. But unfortunately, because of their needs, many items are sold again.”²¹⁵

Agus Rahmanto, Siswanto and Mulyono assure that the economy becomes a supporting factor, while ideology is the first aspect that needs to be addressed for terrorist change. They continued:

“Economic factors are not that significant to change the situation, because the first one is the ideology. Economy only encourages; it is possible to break down the activity, at least to reduce the activity in terrorism. His business in the economy might be able to reduce his activity. His love of bombing can be diverted for food. But ideologically, if there is a trigger from outside, they might return.”²¹⁶

The government has the most crucial role in using the economic approach to overcome the challenges of terrorism and transnational criminals. A comprehensive approach is needed, and to fulfill the targets the government needs to collaborate with the community because in some aspect, the government is less effective in entering the youth community. In Solo, some youths, especially former terrorist prisoners, do not accept the presence of BNPT and Police in their economic empowerment. The Department of Trade and the Office of Cooperative and SMEs will be more easily accepted because they are considered neutral. They have trauma during their arrestment and detention.

The next expectation is on the society. Reintegration of youth in the society has an important impact. Public acceptance and community’s full support will provide a sense of security and comfort in conducting economic activities productively and sustainably.

2. Community Strengthening

The former terrorist community is the driving force of the community in preventing the development of terrorism in Indonesia. They are no longer dependent on the government, but independently strengthen the community network in overcoming the challenges of terrorism. Their movement is criticized and challenged by terrorist and radical individuals and groups who still retain anti-government attitudes and secretly move to build strength.

Ali Fauzi used to be a terrorist training instructor in Mindanao under the command of Jama’ah Islamiyah. As an explosives instructor, he certainly had an important influence on hundreds of former terrorists and former combatants spread across Indonesia. After the Bali bombing in October 2002 where Fauzi was also allegedly involved, he went through a transformation process from being the commander

215 Agus Rahmanto, Siswanto dan Mulyono, interview in Prison, Solo, 4 September 2017.

216 Agus Rahmanto, Siswanto and Mulyono, Interview in Halfway House Solo, 4 September 2017.

and terrorism instructor to become the leader of counterterrorism, preventer of acts of terror, peace mobilizer for ex-terrorism prisoners and former combat veterans of Ambon, Poso and Mindanao conflict. Similarly, Khairul Ghozali, once involved in CIMB Bank robbery and being imprisoned for several years, is now the driving force of the education institution for former terrorist children of Al Hidayah Pesantren in Medan, North Sumatra.

Agus Martin known as Hasan, born on August 17, 1981, is a former terrorist prisoner from Lamongan. He has an important experience of how economic programs and community support keeps those who are free from prison for a strong terrorism case avoided from an outside impulse to re-engage in terrorist movements and acts. Hasan is a member of Lamongan Peace Circle Foundation who attended the FGD participants. In the FGD forum on September 4, 2017 at YLP office in Tenggulun, Solokuro, Lamongan he stated: "Let me introduce myself. My name is Hasan, free from prison in 2016. Perhaps the obstacles for us, former terrorist prisoners, are the soft skill and how we live after free from prison. A lot of our comrades get involved in terrorism again because they have no job and no skills ... I can feel them because after 4 years of prison, if nobody embraces us, they (terrorist group) will embrace again."²¹⁷

Ali Fauzi in front of former combatants and convicts who joined the Peace Circle Foundation (YLP) in the FGD stated that the youths involved in terrorism have ideological reasons, community networks and material benefits. YLP uses the same pattern of ideology and community toward peaceful, friendly Islam. Community support gives them the strength and confidence to transform from a violent experience to peace. Ali Fauzi stated: "It is therefore important to form a new community that provides similar support in the same style, but with different content. Its content is tolerance, peace, love and not angry Islam. The success of building a new community needs material and non-material support, and those must be provided simultaneously and can not be separated."²¹⁸

3. Multi Sectoral

Brigjen Police Hamli, Director of Prevention of BNPT, stated until the end of 2017 Indonesia has arrested more than 1400 people linked to terrorism. It becomes an urgent need for cross-sectoral and regional cooperation to handle the radicalism and terrorism. The government also noticed the transition of deportants and returnees from Syria. Rehabilitation is done by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Once they are stated as enough, they are returned to their respective areas, and Ministry of Social Affairs no longer has the authority in the region to continue the assistance for the deportants and returnees. Hamli stated that "the local government is expected to

217 Hasan, former terrorist prisoner, FGD in Solokuro, Lamongan, 4 September 2017

218 Ali Fauzi, Direktur YLP, FGD in Solokuro, Lamongan, 4 September 2017.

assist the deportants and returnees. The lack of roles and responsibilities from the local governments in handling and combating terrorism becomes an obstacle.”²¹⁹

The economic program for youth as the prevention and countermeasures of radicalism and terrorism requires cross-sectoral cooperation between ministries and central government agencies, and more importantly the involvement and responsibility of local governments and communities. The interviews with five provinces on agencies, former combatants and terrorist shows how weak regional engagement is in economic activity and other policies related to the handling of terrorism and radicalism.

Poso Community Development Police, M. Masloeman, pointed out the importance of the regions to be involved in youth economic empowerment conducted by the central government, including those directly handled by BNPT. Coordination with regional elements will ensure the success of economic programs for combatants and former terrorist. M. Masloeman stated: “At the post-law enforcement, BNPT has widely assisted their process of returning to their community; however, there is still no progress, maybe only a small fraction is successful.

After entrepreneurship mentoring training in Jakarta, has been no well mentoring execution for the former terrorist prisoners. Actually, local elements must be involved so that the economic empowerment program can be implemented properly.”²²⁰

Poso, as a post-conflict area, has a special character in handling former combatants and terrorists. The economic program for youth has not only the goal of overcoming radicalism and terrorism, but as a vehicle and an important instrument for the creation of more permanent security and peace. The conflict of Poso is used by the terrorist group as recruitment and to gain support from Muslim community for them who are using revenge as a reason for terrorist acts. Mahfud, Poso Public Works Office, stated that “in general it is as the direction of the Regent and the Chief of Police that they (former combatants) should be considered for the sake of security stability.”²²¹ Although security and peace are the important aspects in every direction of local government leaders, the services still hold the principle of quality and capacity.

Mahfud, Public Works Office of Poso, assured that “The Office Head and we as the official do not give special treatment to them. When their criteria meet for the item, yes they will get the item.”²²²

Cross-sectoral cooperation became the concern of the governments in 2018.

219 Brigjen Pol Hamli, presentation at the National Seminar at Grand Shahid Jaya Hotel Jakarta, Wednesday, December 20, 2017.

220 Kasat Bimas Polres Poso, interview in Poso, 30 August 2017

221 Mahfud, Department of Public Works Poso, interview in Poso, 1 September 2017.

222 Mahfud, Dinas PU Poso, interview in Poso, 1 September 2017.

Through the National Action Plan for Combating Extremism (NAP-CE), BNPT involves 32 Ministries and Government Agencies in the prevention and counter-terrorism nationwide. Thus, the communication and coordination of the central and local, as well as between offices will be performed more strongly. Chomidin, on behalf of the Head of BNPT, Komjen Pol. Suhardi Alius, stated “BNPT laid four pillars in the coordination of NAP-CE drafting, which are the pillar of prevention, law enforcement as well as strengthening legislation, deradicalisation and counter radicalization, and partnership and international cooperation.”²²³

4. Conclusion

The youth economic strengthening program is important not only to prevent and combat terrorism but to overcome social, border, and criminal problems. Internationally the position of young Indonesians occupied the middle level in various aspects. However, Indonesia ranked at the bottom in *The Global Youth Wellbeing Index 2017*, including in gender equality, major challenges in the aspect of economic opportunity.

The government and society have taken an economic approach as a strategy to tackle terrorism. The government also uses approaches to overcome the problem of drug and human trafficking on the border of Nunukan, North Kalimantan. Marketing constraints and business assistance are one of the reasons why some youth-initiated businesses are declining. In fact, some businesses are closed for not making a profit. Some of the survivors are always doing business innovation by looking at the opportunities and strengths of online marketing. The Office of Cooperatives and SMEs Solo acknowledged the shifting efforts undertaken by young people are no longer on offline business, but more dominantly on online entrepreneurship. Therefore, the Office of Cooperatives and SME Solo took several online marketing companies such as Bukalapak to motivate young people in Solo in doing more sustainable business.

223 “BNPT-UN Women Gelar Konsultasi Publik RAN-PE Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah ke Terorisme,” accessed on 1 February 2018 from <http://teraju.id/berita/nasional/bnpt-un-women-gelar-konsultasi-publik-ran-pe-berbasis-kekerasan-yang-mengarah-ke-terorisme-6803/>.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The youth has different patterns of economic activity. They combine aspects of independence, creativity, innovation, and online networking, as well as social media. Mentoring, improving innovation, and quality of business products through a more established business group at the regional and national level will ensure their economic activity to run more sustainably. This includes youths who engage in terrorist group and have experience religious conflict in the past. John Horgan states that the process of disengagement through a variety of approaches and activities is important for those who have the potential of getting out of the terrorist group circle. Economic programs, discussions, and dialogue can be the platform in this process of separation, although individuals and groups have different times and approaches depending on their understanding and experience in the terrorist acts and groups.

They have determination and commitment to change and abandon the experience of violence in terrorism and conflict through economic programs. The Government especially the Police (Densus 88) and BNPT start with the initiative in tackling terrorism through economic approach but the initiatives are short-term and the fund are limited. Business capital aid tend to end in consumption. The presence of local ministries, agencies, and entrepreneurs in assisting the economic empowerment of youth is very important, especially in the assurance of assistance and long-term sustainable business support. This is also for youths involved in acts of terrorism, conflict and other criminals.

The terrorism prevention and deradicalisation program applies various approaches. One of them is through economic empowerment. A study in five cities of five provinces in Indonesia, which are Nunukan (North Kalimantan), Poso (Central Sulawesi), Solo (Central Java), Lamongan (East Java), and Medan (North Sumatra) from August to November 2017 indicates that the economic program has a strategic role on the former terrorist prisoner youth, former combatants and those involved in criminal acts in changing and separating them from the past violence

groups.

Youths in Nunukan have challenges amid the pressure of cross-border drug business group through the vast border of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. Seventy percent of the prisoners in Nunukan are due to drug trafficking cases. They also chose to work in oil palm plantations in Sabah, Malaysia although it is illegal. Training and capacity building of entrepreneurship, handicrafts, and culinary business are conducted by the Labour and Transmigration Offices and the Cooperatives and SMEs Office of youths, especially hundreds of people deported from Sabah, Malaysia due to illegal migration. After training, they are expected to develop a business in Nunukan. Unfortunately, most of them keep coming back to Sabah working without bringing their official documents. Some youth activists choose to keep developing businesses and work in Nunukan and Sebatik Islands. The ease of trading materials began to be felt since the period of President Joko Widodo who built Indonesia from the border and sea toll concepts that provide certainty of marketing and availability of goods to the islands and border areas.

The economic empowerment in Poso, Central Sulawesi, has different functions and roles. As a post-conflict area, youth are faced with the complexities of conflict trauma, slow investment and development, and also the social segregation that has not yet recovered. There are other factors that must be set to solve socio-political and legal problems more seriously.

Poso has become a central location for terrorism because grudge and injustice still strongly felt by the community. The efforts of NGOs activists and local government continue to be done through a variety of training and limited capital grant. Youth of former Poso combatants began to build economic activities independently without being dependent on government aid. Together they build communities to develop plantations and agriculture, entrepreneurship and other economic activities. The presence of government and society in their economic programs will keep them strong and sustainable in entrepreneurship and building self-reliance. It is expected that economic activities will engage youths across ethnic and religious communities to create more permanent peace development in Poso.

The experience of youth economic empowerment programs in Solo and Lamongan are interesting. Local communities and entrepreneurs play more active roles in assisting and supporting youth economic activities. Students and youth activists undertake entrepreneurship training in collaboration with online businesses such as Tokopedia and Bukalapak. Creative economic innovation becomes an icon of their efforts to build stronger, independent and advanced business in the long run.

In Lamongan, some local businessmen are concerned with accepting former convicts to work in their companies. The absence of stigma and the acceptance of former prisoner, former terrorists and combatants in the regional and central

business world are crucial in the nationwide effort to address radicalism and terrorism into a common responsibility of society and government.

Local government and agency in Solo and Lamongan are also more active in the approach and economic empowerment of youth in the context of preventing and countering terrorism and radicalism.

The economic program for youth in Medan, North Sumatra, is not focused on overcoming terrorism and radicalism. As a metropolis of youth across ethnic, regional, and ordinary religions, it is used to economic activities. The existence of Al Hidayah Pesantren as a center of the rehabilitation and deradicalization of ex-terrorist children who are potentially exposed to terrorist movements which was developed on the initiative of Densus 88 and BNPT did not receive sufficient support from local government and local stakeholders. Livestock and fishery businesses as important assets for the independence of educational institutions did not develop well due to the weak regional support in Al Hidayah Islamic Boarding School. However, many youth and teenagers are sent and come to this institution to be directed in economic, religious and other skills to be free from the burden of history and the influence of radicalism and terrorism.

The economic program for youth has a strategic role in combating radicalism and terrorism. Governments, civil society and religious organizations have important contributions to the activities and economic empowerment of youth including those former terrorist prisoners, former combatants and those who are become the potential target for terrorism and radicalism movements. The economic program also strengthens nationalism and socio-security defenses in the border area.

The economic programs and activities for youths and former combatants will strengthen their confidence in building self-reliance, provide space in the disengagement process of terrorist groups and past violence and reintegration with the society. Interviews with former terrorist prisoners and former combatants shows that they managed to release the pressure and influence of terrorist groups, who were still trying to engage them in acts of violence and terrorism, through economic activities both individually and through communities and cooperatives. Training of various skills, business capital, product innovation, and mentoring for them will ensure the sustainability of their efforts to get out of the cycle of past violence and be fully integrated in the community.

The youth economic programs are still dominated by government programs (BNPT, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, and related agencies in the region) and in the short term. The roles of the stakeholders, local government and local entrepreneurs in economic activities for youth and former terrorist prisoners and combatants are still limited. The importance of long-term and sustainable economic programs by involving governments and communities

together will make the economic program for youth stronger and have more permanent influences and impacts. This is also important for the certainty of peace in post-conflict areas.

The biggest obstacle felt in the empowerment of the youth economy is the strong sectoral ego of the ministries, government institutions, the central government, and local governments, as well as the services. Preventing terrorism and radicalism among youth requires working with all government and community stakeholders. National Action Plan (NAP) of BNPT 2018 which involves approximately 32 ministries and government agencies became the starting point of lowering the sectoral ego and starting to think of the interests of the nation and society.

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- In-depth interview with former terrorist prisoner and FGD, 26-27 August 2017 di Poso.
- In-depth interview with Upik and Irwanto Irano, 26 August 2017 in Poso.
- In-depth interview with Fuad and discussion on FGD concerning Economic Empowerment related to CVE, in Poso.
- In-depth interview and discussion on FGD concerning Economic Empowerment related to CVE, 11 September 2017 in Poso.
- In-depth interview with Mursid, 28 August 2017 in Poso. In-depth interview with Julen di Dinas UMKM, 28 August 2017 in Poso.
- In-depth interview with Kodim Poso Officer, 28 August 2017 in Poso.
- FGD results on Economic Empowerment for Youth related to CVE, 11 September 2017 in Poso.
- Interview with Fadly, September 4, 2017 in Palu. Interview with Ridwan, September 5, 2017 in Palu.
- FGD results on Economic Empowerment for Youth related to CVE, 11 September 2017 in Poso.
- FGDs with students, spirits, mosques takmir, representatives of student institutions in Solo, Hall of Islamic High School Al-Mukmin (STIM), 6 September 2017.

Discussion with Dr. Muhammad Wildan and CisForm team at UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, August 25, 2017.

Interview with Agus Rahmanto (Head of Halfway House), Siswanto (staff), and Mulyono (staff), 4 September 2017.

Interview with Eko Prasetyo, activist of NGO Sarekat Movement Indonesia, August 27, 2017.

Interview with Faisal, NGO Activist, August 30, 2017. Interview with Hilmi Ahmad Sakdilah, Chairman of PCNU Surakarta, September 5, 2017.

Interview with In'am, coffee businessman Gandroeng, August 27, 2017.

Interview with In'am, coffee businessman Gandroeng, August 25, 2017.

Interview with Joko, Former Terrorist convict, September 5, 2017

Interview with Nurhayati, Head of Surakarta SME Office, September 7, 2017.

Interview with Tri, chairman of the Economic Council of PDM Surakarta, September 11, 2017.

Interview with Subagiyo, Head of Surakarta Trade Office, September 4, 2017.

Interview with Suprpto, Secretary of the Surakarta Trade Office, September 4, 2017.

Interview with Suprpto, Secretary of Surakarta Trade Office, August 31, 2017.

Interview with Toyib, manager of Dapur Bistik, August 30, 2017.

Interview with Yusuf, a former terrorist prisoner who is domiciled in Semarang, September 3, 2017

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Pusat Studi Timur Tengah dan Perdamaian Global FISIP UIN Jakarta

The Centre for the Middle East and Global Peace Studies (Pusat Studi Timur Tengah dan Perdamaian Global/PSTPG) was established in November 2015. It is an autonomous institution within Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta. It was launched by Dean Prof. Zulkifli on March 3, 2016 during the seminar series on the Map of Terrorist Networks in Southeast Asia after Jakarta Attack with IjenPolH.M. Tito Karnavian, Ph. D, chief of Jakarta Metropolitan Police, and Professor Rohan Gunaratna, head of International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research as the speakers. The Centre's mission is to conduct research, training and community development on the issues of the Middle East geo-politics, International Conflict, Counterterrorism and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia and the World, to strengthen regional and global engagements on relevant studies, and to publish strategic analysis on political violence, conflict, terrorism and deradicalisation. The Centre will focus on three main topics: the Middle East: Geo-politics and Geo- strategy, Global Peace, Security and Strategic Studies, Counterterrorism and Counterradicalism.



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