Muslim Youth MILLENNIALS

CULTURAL HYBRIDISATION, CONSERVATISM, AND CHALLENGES OF RADICALISM

by Irfan Abubakar and Mohamad Nabil

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CONVEY REPORT

**MUSLIM YOUTH MILLENNIALS:
CULTURAL HYBRIDISATION, CONSERVATISM,
AND CHALLENGES OF RADICALISM**
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research aims to gain a deep understanding of the underlying factors of millennial Muslim youth's attitudes and behaviours (15-24 years old) in responding radicalism and extremism. Involving 935 young Muslim activists from various organisations with various ideologies in 18 cities/regencies, this qualitative research finds that in general the attitudes and behaviours of Muslim youth can be categorised as moderate, despite the strong campaign of radical and extremist ideologies during the last few decades. Political attitude moderation among Indonesian Muslim youth is made possible by the strong institutionalisation of Pancasila in their attitudes and behaviours development. Pancasila as a common belief of Indonesia also has become an important component in the organisation network establishment both in schools and universities as well as Youth Organisation (OKP) and mass organisation outside the campus. Orienting on their organisation's vision and mission, Muslim youth in the organisation are strengthened in personality building which aligns with Pancasila ideology. In turn, this personality building can become some sort of a structural antidote against the invitation and persuasion of radical and extremist ideologies.

Despite being moderate, some Muslim activists in this research show a conservative tendency. In general, the ones who are conservative come from preaching organisations, such as ROHIS (Islamic Spirituality), LDK (Campus Islamic Preaching Organisation),

KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Students Movement Association) and other preaching organisations. The conservatism was obvious when they responded to tolerance and diversity issues. The main marker of their conservative attitudes was the emphasis on Islamic identity when they were asked to respond to issues that put Islamic culture and non-Islamic culture face to face. The most obvious example of conservatism is their attitudes on Christmas greeting; there are many of them who refuse to extend Christmas greeting even though previously it was not an issue.

This study finds that there are at least three factors that cause religious conservatism among preaching activists. *First,* they generally experience the phenomenon of cultural hybridisation, a term in cultural studies which describes an intensive contact and encounter with people from different organisation affiliation as well as cultural and religious type. Cultural hybridisation causes them to not be a fanatical about their origin social basis any longer. They are open to new things, new ideas, even new tradition. However, at the same time, their openness toward the massive flow of information, especially from social media, causes them to be more careful when they must answer sensitive issues for which they have not found certain answers. Taking cover behind the fortress of Islamic identity is believed to be a safe strategy especially in the middle of cultural globalisation wave that is considered to threaten the sustainability of Islamic culture.

Second, intensive contacts with various events, practices, problems faced by Muslims in the country and overseas, thanks to the information technology revolution, strengthen the solidarity among Muslims. In turn, this will strengthen the desire to identify oneself with all Islamic things. The strengthening of Islamic identity is reinforced by the commitment to implement the organisation's vision and mission to invite Muslims to be close with Islamic values, norms, and culture. *Third,* the development of scripturalism in religious understanding also contributes to the conservatism strengthening. Scripturalism is an understanding that makes *dalil* (proof) the holy book are interpreted literally as the main source in understanding and living a religious life.

In the context of tolerance, religious literalism drives the acceptance of communal tolerance in responding to religious differences and diversity. Referring to Jeremy Menchik (2016), communal tolerance is a type of tolerance that is grounded on the respect for communal values in practicing tolerance. The opposite of it is civil tolerance, that is a tolerance which makes respect for civil individual rights as the basis of

tolerance practices. The implication of communal tolerance can be seen in the cases of non-Muslims' house of worship establishment in Muslim neighbourhood. Communal tolerance cannot always successfully maintain the tolerance standard, which is tolerance toward other people's different religions whose existence might cause discomfort. It is not rare for communal tolerance to lead its followers to intolerant behaviours and even violence and discrimination if the attitude is also accompanied by ethnic, racial or religious prejudice.

Different from preaching activists, Muslim youth who are active in moderate-progressive extra campus organisations, such as HMI (Islamic Student Association), PMII (Indonesian Islamic Students Movement), IPNU (Nahdlatul Ulama Students Association), and IMM (Muhammadiyah Students Association), have civil tolerance. This is made possible because the organisations platform has integrated the values of universal humanity, human rights and equality as a part of their organisations' mission and structure. With civil tolerance, these Muslim youth can practice tolerance toward religion and interest differences without having to face a dilemma between collective rights and individual rights. Using contextual interpretation on the Holy Book, they believe that the protection of civil rights is a concept that aligns with Islamic teachings. Therefore, in general, they have no problem with Christmas greeting, choosing a non-Muslim leader, the establishment of non-Muslim's house of worship, and so forth. Only on interfaith marriage issue that some of them, such as PMII and IPNU, have communal perspective attitudes, they generally forbid interfaith marriage unless toward *Ahlul Kitab* women.

In line with the attitudes of moderate-progressive Muslim activists, activists with nationalist orientation also have civil tolerance due to the same reason. Their organisations embrace nationalist values and can accept democracy, individual freedom and human rights. However, in contrast to the previously mentioned activists, they tend to avoid talking about religious issues, especially if the issues are perceived to be sensitive. There is an impression that there is fear among nationalist activists to be openly involved in religious discourses.

It is previously written above that the majority of Muslim youth are not interested in radical ideology construction because it is not suitable with the value and norm system that they believe in and embedded in their cognitive and behavioural awareness. However, a small number of this research's respondents admitted that they have been involved in a radical movement. This research finds two factors that support the

radicalisation process toward those youths. *First,* there is an alignment between the youth's hope with the radicalism framing that they receive. That acceptance leads them to identify themselves further with the radical movement. In the words of Wiktorowicz (2005), they go through a crucial process of cognitive opening so that they can increase their commitment toward the organisation's vision and mission. Emptiness and less meaningful feeling in socioreligious life become one of the push factors that drives them to seek for answers and offers on the meaning of life. At the same time, for radical ideologues, that situation is seen as an opportunity to recruit new members.

Based on the research conducted, this radicalization model did not occur in a simple way, but through a gradual and complex process until one finally found a cognitive gap towards radicalism.

Second, based on this research,the majority of youth experience radicalisation process through their social environment, whether it is due to family, kinship, as well as school relationship. In turn, the norm system bond that is built exclusively by the leader of radical group forces someone who has experienced radicalisation to increase their loyalty toward the organisation and its purpose and mission. The construction of radical as well as extremist milieu if not countered can spread to the surrounding environment so that it expands the radical ideologysympathisers circle.

In a theoretical aspect, this study expands our perspective in understanding radicalism and extremism issues in their relationship with youth. By using institutionalism theory perspective, the reasons why the majority of Muslim youth reject radical and extremist propaganda can be made clearer. In addition, this study also enriches our understanding of the tolerance concept that is practiced among Muslim youth.

Based on the description of findings above, some recommendations are proposed to become inputs for the stakeholders, especially the government and educational institutions.

1) Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education (BPIP) needs to implement medium-term and long-term programmes with the purpose of shaping Pancasila character in Indonesian youth;

2) Ministry of Education and Culture to implement the policies that make ROHIS and LDK as a medium to develop Pancasila personality in students. Specifically for programmes in ROHIS and LDK, there needs to be a civil education with the emphasis on the strengthening of Islamic arguments toward civil values;

3) Ministry of Religious Affairs needs to develop modules that aim to increase the understanding of Muslim students toward the value of democracy, human rights, and other civil values.

4) Ministry of Youth and Sports to develop programmes that support dialogue and cooperation between Muslim and nationalist youth organisations to strengthen the shaping of Pancasila personality and the civil and nationalist values.

5) Ministry of Youth and Sports to develop programmes that aim to embrace former members of HTI and other radical organisations so they can actively participate in constructive socio-youth activities.

A. Background

Bomb terror cases that involve extremist groups in Indonesia have decreased in number, however the role of radical groups in articulating Islamic ideologies increases. This is shown by the unceasing propaganda of Islamic Caliphate implementation and antipathy toward democracy system among educated Muslim youth.[1] On the other hand, some Muslim youths showed interest and trust toward the leadership of hard-line figures, such as Habib Rizieq Shihab and Ustadz Bachtiar Natsir (Survey of Research and Development Agency of Religious Affairs Ministry Regional Office, Central Java, February-March 2017). Massive and unprecedented 411 and 211 rallies, with the main figure Habib Rizieq Shihab, were the evidence of their high support toward these figures' leadership.

Furthermore, there is enough evidence concerning the increase of intolerance attitude among Muslim students. From some study results on senior high school students and university students, it was revealed that 9.5% of respondents tended to be intolerant toward minority groups. Some of them were even sympathetic to terrorists such as Amrozi and ISIS (PPIM 2008, Rahima, 2009, LAKIP 2010, Maarif Institute, 2011, ACDP, 2015, PPIM, 2016). From the Campus Islamic Research, it was discovered that 65% of student respondents supported sweeping actions which were conducted arbitrarily by radical Islamic mass organisations (Directorate General of Higher Education, Ministry of National Education, 2007).

The phenomenon of strengthened sympathy of some youths toward radical agenda and hard-line Islamic activism pioneering above happened in the context of massive interaction and communication

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1   See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksloLRxTJao. This video contains the *bai'at* of thousands of students in ITB campus, January 2017 to establish Islamic caliphate.

on the internet which involved youth as dominant actors (APJII, 2016).[2] Not only for the purpose of entertainment, Muslim youth access various knowledge from the internet and social media (Hasan, 2013). Social media is like two sides of a coin, on one hand, it can be used to disseminate useful and productive information and knowledge. However, on the other hand, it can also be used to spread hate provocation. In the context of Islamic ideologies radicalisation, social media has been used as an effective medium in spreading the propaganda of radical and extremist ideologies *(PPIM, 2017; PSBPS UMS, 2017; Graduate School of UIN Yogyakarta, 2017).*

Some researchers have tried to explain the causative factors of Muslim youth's interest toward radicalism and extremism. One of which was the research of Bamualim, et al. (Bamualim, et al. 2002). The research showed that alienation and social frustration due to the failure in socioeconomic competition caused some of the Muslim youths to join radical mass organisations, such as FPI (Islamic Defender Fronts), Jihad Troop, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) and JAT (Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid) (Bamualim et al. 2002). The conclusion of this research was also strengthened by Nilana et al who studied the influence of socioeconomic factors on radicalism among youth. According to Nilan et al. some of the youths failed to achieve their dreams due to economic factors. As a result, as a consolation, they turned to religion, with the risk of becoming the recruitment target of radical groups. *(Pam Nilan, Lynette Parker, Linda Bennett and Kathryn Robinson, 2011).* Using a slightly different perspective, Noorhaidi Hasan (2015) found that identity crisis in the middle of modernisation and globalisation wave had pushed the Muslim youth to become interested in the invitation of radicalism and extremism.

However, radicalism does not only grow in underprivileged and marginal communities, but also in educated and privileged communities, including those who attend prominent universities. Some research explained that the construction of Islamic identity among preaching activists had developed into a struggle to defend Islamic identity and ideologies. This was made possible because campus preaching activism (common in 1980s-1990s) happened in the context of fading

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2   Survey of Internet Penetration and Indonesian Internet Users Behaviour conducted by Indonesian Internet Providers Association (APJII) in 2016 found that around 75% of millennials used the internet, and 97.4% of 132.7 million internet users used it for social media. Indonesian Internet Providers Association, *"Laporan Survey Penetrasi dan Perilaku Pengguna Internet Indonesia,"* [Internet Penetration and Indonesian Internet Users Behaviour Report Survey]. Jakarta:2016.

students' loyalty toward various major ideologies and state ideology *(Rosyad, 2007; Bamualim, 2015).*

Even though the studies mentioned above managed to reveal various social and economic factors which drove students into radicalisation, those research did not go deeper into the contribution of structural-institutional and psychosocial factors in shaping their attitudes and behaviours when responding to radical and extremist ideology campaigns? This perspective is important considering that general observation shows that not all youth who are exposed to radical ideologies are influenced. Various recent research concerning the perception of Indonesian citizens (above 17 years old) on Pancasila ideology and 1945 Constitution show that the majority of citizens (above 80% in average) still believe in Pancasila ideology, constitution and democracy system *(CSRC, 2010; Wahid Foundation, 2017; CSIS, 2017).* In addition, despite the strong modernisation and globalisation wave that Muslim youth face, the observation shows that there are more Muslim youths who choose moderate religious perspective rather than radical religious perspective.

Focus of Study

This research tries to dig and go deeper into the factors that influence the attitudes and behaviours of Muslim youth in responding to violence, radicalism and extremism. Muslim youth who become the subjects of this research are not only limited to those who are involved in radical or hard-line organisations. It also widely involve Muslim youth who are active in various intra and extra campus organisations as well as mass organisations of various Islamic branches and different ideology spectrums. Therefore, this study specifically and comparatively sees how institutional and psychosocial factors contribute to young Muslim activists' acceptance or rejection toward radicalism and extremism. In addition, it is no less important that this research also digs deeper on how learning resources that they access on the internet and social media also shape their attitudes and behaviours in responding to the issues above.

Before discussing research questions further, the definition of some key terms in this research which are often subject to debate needs to be explained. Essentially, 'radicalism' and 'extremism' mean not 'moderate' or not 'mainstream' (Schmid, 2011). Radicalism and extremism are used as two spectrums of Islamism wave, a perspective that perceives Islam not only as a religion that manage social and

individual problems but also manage state administration problems. To put it simply, Islamism in this research is divided into three types: 1) hardliner Islamic movement and activism, 2) radicalism, and 3) extremism. The dominant characteristic of the first type is the desire to alter the society social order that is filled with sins into a "cleaner" order through raiding and sweeping methods. The dominant characteristic of the second type is its strong desire to alter the society social order through state political control by turning secular state ideology into Islamic state or caliphate. However, their struggle does not use violent methods (raid/sweeping) as the groups in the first category. This group also firmly rejects violent methods such as terrorism. The dominant characteristic of the third type is fighting for their ideological dream with violence, including terrorism and it can be ensured that it opposes system or state.

By taking into account the research problems and some conceptual clarification above, this study asks some interrelated main questions. *First,* what structural-institutional factors that cause most of the Muslim youth who are a part of various internal and external campus organisations to be interested in the radicalism campaign and while others are not? *Second,* concerning the first question, how do state ideology and religious norms factors also shape their responses toward radicalism and extremism campaign? *Third,* how do their socialisation in various forms of social milieu and organisations affect their responses toward those issues? *Fourth,* how does increasingly massive communication and interaction on digital media affect their attitudes and behaviours toward radicalism and extremism?

In general, this study can provide theoretical enrichment in explaining the current phenomenon of Muslim youth in responding to state ideology and applicable legal norms, especially when the system is faced with the socio-religious norms that also become the guidelines in their social life. In connection with it, this research also helps in explaining how current Muslim youth understand the concepts of diversity, tolerance, and democracy in the framework of both value structures. This is important considering that the responses of Muslim youth on the issue is not categorical, but assuming that there are variations as a result of symbiotic and dialectical relationship of different structures of values which influence their minds.

Another contribution of this research is to help stakeholders gain a good understanding on the development of current Muslim youth activists' diversity style especially considering the massive

information and communication flow and exchange due to the advanced development of digital technology. Of course, information openness provided by the digital technology gives an ample space not only for the interorganisational interaction but also for interideologies and interfaith interaction. How youth are still searching for identity respond to massive information that they face on the digital media is an interesting issue to study. This research certainly holds importance for policymakers in the education sector because it can help them understand how digital media influences the youth's character building.

Of course, it is no less important that this research helps in understanding the role that can be taken by organisations whether it is school, campus, and extra campus organisation as well as mass organisation in supporting or preventing radicalism and extremism influence among Muslim youth. Government authorities specifically Ministry of Education and Culture as well as Ministry of Religious Affairs can maximise the roles of those organisations to support more inclusive school educational programmes, as well as to nurture the civil values, democracy, and human rights.

Theoretical Perspective

In the study concerning the responses of Muslim youth toward radicalism and extremism, contemporary researchers utilise some theoretical information in social sciences. One of which is framing theory which is a development of Social Movement Theory (SMT). In framing theory, the Muslim youth's acceptance toward radicalism and extremism is determined by the alignment between the campaigned radical system and the interests and values of Muslim youth who are exposed to the campaign. Another theory that is often used is social psychology, an approach that tries to explain how collective milieu, such as an organisation, shapes the attitudes and behaviours of its members in responding to violence and radicalism.

This research is conducted by taking into account the theoretical information above. However, considering the complex social and cultural factors that influence the problems in this research, other theories in social science and cultural study are also considered. From social sciences, information on institutionalism theory is obtained; and from cultural study information about "cultural hybridisation" is obtained. The significance of the last theories will be explained after discussing framing and social psychology theories. However, it needs to be said that opening up to various available theoretical theories

does not mean that this research aspires to find all of the answers on the problems examined.

Talking about framing perspective, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008) explained that radical ideologues and activists try to construct, produce and eliminate meanings. They try to give meaning using the most appropriate method to reflect and convey the interests, attitudes, and beliefs of the prospective constituents. The higher society's acceptance toward radical movement meaning, then their desires to identify themselves with that movement are higher. Radical ideologues diagnose the problems, show responsibilities, offer solutions, strategies, and tactics, as well as give motivation in order to convince the prospective participants to become active. The key to mobilisation lies on whether the reality constructed by this movement can convey the interests of its prospective supporters. Mobilisation happens when there is an alignment between exposed individuals' interests, values, and beliefs with the movement ideology.

Using the same approach, Quintan Wiktorowicz conducted an in-depth study on the al-Muhajirun group in London, United Kingdom. He discovered 4 development model components for radicalisation. The youths who were interested in radicalism have gone through a 4 phase-process until they truly become radical. On the first phase, youth start to open up to a new world perspective (cognitive opening), offered by radical ideologues. After becoming interested in the ideas offered, they enter the second development phase, that is making religion as the only meaningful way of life (religious seeking). This second phase allows them to accept the narrative and moral values of the extremist group (frame alignment). After going through this phase, Muslim youth fanatically accept radical and extremist doctrines (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

In contrast to theframing perspective, social psychology theory sees that the existence of youth in radical living environments can sow extreme attitudes and behavior.Individuals who have been exposed to extreme ideology, their extremities will increase during their process in the milieu that supports that ideology. By using the same logic, those who are involved in moderate milieu, even though they are exposed to radical ideologies, they do not automatically go through a religious radicalisation. However, the most important thing to be emphasised, their perception toward radical and extremist ideologies and movements are heavily influenced by the perspective bias of the organisation where they are in. This is because an organisation has

internal norms to control the attitudes and behaviours of its members (McCauley and Segal, 1987).

However, both framing and social psychology theories still leave questions that need further explanation. Despite the unceasing radicalism and extremism campaigns both online and offline, the majority of Muslim youth still do not experience what Wiktorowicz calls as cognitive opening, let alone replacing their life perspectives with radicalism or extremism. Reading institutionalism theory gives a little insight that radical construction that is campaigned needs to go through the dominant social norm system that has been institutionalised first in the minds, behavious and personalities of Muslim youth (Parsons, 1971). The strength and fragility of the social structure that is based on Pancasila in the cognitive awareness and belief of society will determine their vulnerability level toward radicalism and extremism.

On the other hand, youth nowadays live in a millennial era that is marked with massive communication and interaction on the internet due to digital technology advancement. Currently, the world experiences that the flow of global culture enters the local society cultural awareness. Muslim youths in Indonesia are no exception. They also experience the heavy influence of this global culture. In cultural studies and globalisation perspective (also post-colonial studies) the phenomenon of global culture flow will lead to a cultural blending process. Using the metaphor of biological hybridisation, this phenomenon is also referred to as "cultural hybridisation". Kersten on his study (2009) on Islam in Indonesia discovered that cultural hybridisation phenomenon has happened in Indonesia even a few decades ago. He found the manifestation of cultural hybridisation in some pioneer Islamic thinkers and figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Abdurrahman, Gus Dur, and Kiya Mustafa Bisri. According to him even though those figures are rooted in Islamic organisations with different styles, NU and Muhammadiyah, they have experienced cultural hybridisation. The hybridisation that they experience does not only happen to internal Islamic tradition, but also to the tradition and culture outside of Islam.

Currently, the research shows that a more puritan Islamic style has entered Islamic culture stage in Indonesia, as shown by the strengthening of Salafism and Wahhabism in the last decade. The interaction between the recently strengthened ideologies and the Islamic sects that have been long established enables a new development in Islamic cultural hybridisation among Muslim youth.

Social psychology that emphasises the influence of an organisation on its members needs to be complemented by cultural perspective. It can enrich our perspective in order to explain the reason some Muslim youths in the same ideological spectrum can accept the more puritan Islamic perspective, yet some others reject it.

Framing theory, social psychology theory, institutionalism theory, and cultural hybridisation theory are all read not to narrow the meaning conveyed by the respondents to the researchers. These theories are meant as perspectives in analysing the diversity of data that is given by respondents to the researchers as a part of their interpretation of contemporary religious radicalism and extremism phenomenon.

B. Methodology

This research is an applied qualitative research using Interpretative Phenomenology Analysis (IPA) approach (Roller, 2015; Smith et al., 2009). By using this approach, the research aims to understand, analyse, and explore how the respondents perceive religious violence, radicalism, and extremism phenomenon that they see, observe or even experience. The respondents were Muslim youth whose ages were between 15-24 years old (in accordance with United Nations standard). In addition, the respondents were limited to those who were actively involved in various organisations and school, campus institutions as well as youth and Islamic organisations, In order to obtain a comparative perspective, they were chosen from organisations based on the criteria above by taking into account different religious styles and ideological spectrums.

The respondents were chosen using intensity purposed sampling technique. This technique aims to choose the research respondents in a certain way so that they can reflect the characteristics of the groups under study as well as to ease the analysis of their different perspectives, behaviours and attitudes on the issue under study. In addition, a small number of respondents were also chosen from a group called significant others, that were people who were considered to influence their attitudes and behaviours. Among them, there were educators, family members, and local religious figures.

The total number of research respondents that was planned were 936 persons. They came from 18 Cities/Regencies: Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Solo, Yogyakarta, Lamongan, Balikpapan, Pontianak, Medan, Bandar Lampung, Pekanbaru, Manado,

Bima, Makassar, Bulukumba, and Banda Aceh. These locations were chosen because in these regions, even though not in all of them, there have been violent cases on behalf of religion, communal conflicts, and on certain level radicalism and terrorism.

The total number of respondents that were successfully recruited was almost on target, which was 935 persons. From a gender balance perspective, female respondents who were successfully interviewed almost reached 30%, the minimal proportion of female respondents that was required in the research design. The gender composition of research respondents can be seen from the graph below

Graph 1
Distribution of Respondents in 18 Cities/Regencies Based on Gender

In accordance with the plan, the total number of respondents (FGS and in-depth interview) from intra school and campus organisations was 396 persons. The composition was as follow: the Student Council (OSIS) were 126 persons; ROHIS (Islamic Spirituality), 72 persons; Students Executive Body (BEM), 90 persons; Campus Islamic Preaching Organisation (LDK)/Islamic Students Activity Unit (UKMI), 108 persons. However, in the implementation, the total number of this category was 437 persons, more than planned. The composition also changed, where there were categories with more or less than planned number of respondents. As a note, the total number of respondents from LDK only achieved 65% of the planned target. The detail can be seen in the graph below.

**Graph 2**
Distribution of Respondents in 18 Cities/Regencies Based On Intra School and Campus Organisations

LDK/UKMI 16%
OSIS 31%
BEM 31%
ROHIS 22%

As for FGD and in-depth interview respondents who came from organisations and institutions outside of school and campus who were successfully interviewed were 451 persons. From its composition, most of the respondents (other than significant others) came from moderate Islamic organisations with modernist and traditionalist orientation (140 persons), followed by an open organisation with nationalist orientation (138 persons). Almost one-fourth of the respondents came from Islamic mass organisations with *dakwahis* (preaching) orientation (88 persons). While the other one-fourth came from liberal/progressive (36 persons), hard-line (25 persons), and radical (24 persons) organisations. As for significant others, there were 48 persons. See the graph below:

Graph 3
Distribution of Respondents in 18 Cities/Regencies Based On Religious Style and Ideology of Organisation Outside School and Campus

Open-Nationalist 31%
Modernist-Traditionalist 31
Liberal-Progressive 8%
Radical 5%
Hard-line 6%
Preaching 19%

Data collection was conducted for two weeks and an in-depth interview and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) techniques were utilised. In-depth interview aimed to dig deeper on the information needed especially for information that was perceived to be sensitive if it was expressed openly to other people. FGD technique aimed to confirm the findings from in-depth interviews. In addition, group dynamics from various ideological tendencies when they were openly discussing various issues could be captured through FGD.

After the data was collected, the researchers analysed the data thematically with the purpose to see the entirety of data and identify the same issues and main ideas. In the end, data analysis aimed to find the same patterns and concepts that could further explain the essence or meaning of Muslim youth's attitudes and behaviours in responding to various issues. Due to the time limitation, prior to working on the field, issues and themes to be discussed in interview and an FGD were agreed upon. After data collection was done, the researchers conducted data coding by grouping the data based on the relevant theme. This method was proven to be helpful in synchronising data collection and data analysis methods, especially considering that this research was conducted within a relatively short period of time, involved a wide area, and conducted by many researchers.

The themes that became collection and analysis references were made in such a way in order to help the researchers when they conducted an in-depth interview or led a FGD. Even though the starting point of this research were violence and extremism phenomenon, the themes discussed in this research had wide scope. The themes spanned starting from religious education and learning experience, religious experience, interaction and socialisation with families, organisations, and non-Muslims, access toward religious literacy, to behavioural pattern in interacting on the internet. Other themes that were also discussed were issues of diversity and tolerance, individual freedom and human rights, as well as state ideology and democracy. While the last theme included violence, radicalism and extremism issues.

The report that is presented is the result of national data analysis. In addition to the national report, this research also provides a regional report that is written by each researcher. This national report is written by taking into account the important findings in regional reports and other inputs from the participants of research results socialisation seminar in some cities. From joint workshop with the researchers, the keywords that are believed to mark the phenomenon of millennial

Muslim youth in responding to radicalism and extremism have been obtained. Some keywords are cultural hybridisation, moderate with a conservative tendency, tolerant but communal, and radicalism challenge. These keywords can be discussed and debated in order to obtain conceptual clarity, and also to ensure that these are supported by available data. Last but not least, the discussion of these concepts are mainly to clarify the connection between cultural hybridisation phenomenon and the strengthening of Muslim youth's conservatism trend on one hand, and radicalism challenge on the other hand.

C. Muslim Youth: Cultural Hybridisation, Conservatism, and Challenges Of Radicalism

1. Youth and Cultural Hybridisation

In general, this study found that the style of diversity of Muslim youth who were the subjects of this study was open and accommodating to different perspectives, although at the same time showed a careful tendency to respond to religious issues that were considered sensitive.. The causative factors, among others, is the sociocultural process that they experience ever since they were young until they have become adults requires a smooth interaction with different religious traditions and cultures. Intercultural interaction has become more open and intensive due to the globalisation of digital information and communication. They experience what is called cultural hybridisation in cultural studies perspective, that is a culture crossing process that is caused by a smooth and intensive interaction between communities with various social, religious and cultural backgrounds. This cultural hybridisation causes the Muslim youth who experience it to be no longer rigid in assessing various social, political and religious problems that they face. On the contrary, they tend to be open and accomodating toward new religious values and perspectives that might be different from their original social basis perspective. At the same time, considering psychological development that is still in the searching for identity phase, various assessments and perspectives of Muslim youth are still temporary.

In a wider context, this cultural hybridisation is made possible by the experiences they have received since childhood to teenage years and or until they study in universities. There are not many Muslim youths who have linear experience in one religious tradition, both on a family level as

well as after they are free from their families and join an Islamic student organisation. In general, family religious background is not inherited linearly by Muslim youth. Likewise, the organisations they are in are often not linear, starting from elementary level to advanced level (in school, campus, and after graduating from university, and even until now. In addition, the urban characteristics of Muslim youth, where migration from rural to urban areas, or changes in status from student studies to university, cause them to have a strong curiosity and interact with new things they have never received before when they were in the village or at school.   As an example, the majority of Muslim youth in this research have religious experience background, or to be precise religious affiliation and activities that describe cultural hybridisation process. One of which is described in M. Fauzi Syukron's experience, an informant from Yogyakarta. Syukron is actively involved in IPNU and PMII, but grew up in two traditions, which were Muhammadiyah and NU. "NU and Muhammadiyah are the same, only their domains that are different," said Syukron. He attended a campus that belongs to Muhammadiyah, he chose this campus due to its excellent accreditation. In Muhammadiyah campus, he often receives Al-Islam and Muhammadiyah subjects in some semesters, and learns a lot of things about Muhammadiyah. While studying there, he lives in Al-Munawwir Krapyak Pesantren. According to him, in addition to being prominent and good, Krapyak pesantren is also not from UMY campus. He admitted that he makes a lot of friends and interact with moderate Muslim figures. In his confession, he supported Habib Rizieq Shihab's way of thinking and struggle, despite his disagreement with his movement. In addition to admiring Habib Rizieq, he also admires Aa Gym, Gus Dur, and Gus Mus.

The similar phenomenon can also be found in Aldinah's experience, a female respondent from Jakarta. Aldinah is a student of UIN Jakarta and she is actively involved in IMM Ciputat, South Tangerang. She said that her father has a unique religious journey. She previously did not know that her father once 'migrated' to NII. Her mother has NU background, and she also once joined NII following her father. However, her father left NII, and so did her mother. Telling about her experience during senior high school, Aldinah admitted that she was a part of liqa (gathering to study with friends in school Musholla). However, she felt bad because the people considered themselves as the most righteous ones, and often talked about Muhammadiyah, NU, and so forth. After two years of participating in liqa, she then joined IPM (Muhammadiyah Students Association). Even though she is no longer active in liqa and

now she is active in IMM, spiritually, she feels empty. "Back then I enjoyed being in *liqa* because there was a memorisation requirement. That is the emptiness tha I felt in IMM". She did not agree with the mass demonstration such as 411, 212 and 299 movements. She had some critics toward Sang Pencerah website (unofficial website managed by Muhammadiyah young activists). According to her, she did not agree with some news contents in Sang Pencerah website. "Sometimes there is news that makes NU cornered. Media is supposed to be neutral even though it belongs to Muhammadiyah," she said.

Other factors that support cultural hybridisation among Muslim youth is the easy and quick access to information on the digital media and social media, including access to religious information. As a consequence, there is an opportunity for them to give a relatively independent and flexible assessment on diversity style that is displayed through digital media, an assessment that might be different from the perspective of the organisation they are in or exceed their origin social basis perspective. This phenomenon can be seen in Fakhruddin Alwi's profile, a student from UI (University of Indonesia), Jakarta. Alwi admitted that he used to learn in a traditional pesantren in Kebumen with a dominant NU culture. Continuing his study in UI Jakarta, Alwi chooses to be actively involved in LDK because he "wants to protect himself from the exceptional Jakarta society." Alwi considered himself as an NU person, and felt that he is a fundamentalist because he is a pesantren alumni. He even called himself a "straight line NU," a term that he used by himself. Just like most university students, Alwi actively uses social media with its many applications: Instagram, Facebook, Line, and Whatsapp. Through digital and social media Alwi stays informed with information concerning Islamic figures that is often displayed in online media. He shared his assessment on the information in digital media,

> *"I keep myself informed, NU Online, Muhammadiyah... Personally, now I am more like a straight line NU. For nationalist early figures, Natsir, Hamka. As for the recent ones, Yusril. As for the new ones Bachtiar Nasir because his communication method looks more academics...Youtube is more modern. As for NU, Gus Solah; for Muhammadiyah, Haedar Nasir, Muhammadiyah Youth, Dahnil. I like Dahnil because his communication method looks more empirical, the data are clear. Another one is Ustad Adi Hidayat."*

It is interesting to note, despite admiring Bachtiar Natsir, a figure of Defending Islam 212 Action, Alwi was critical toward the 212 movement. In his opinion, it was okay to do 212 rally but he mentioned that the movement "must be proportional". In his perspective, there were many excessive actions in 212 rally, such as insulting other people. He said, "Islam does not teach us to insult." "Sometimes I get upset when I see posts [on social media] even though it looks as if it glorifies Islam. Furthermore, I dislike people who [try to] glorify Islam using that method, by cornering, for example, Ahok and the others," he said.

In many ways, this cultural hybridisation gives many "positive" tendencies in the sense that there is an open mind to accept new values without leaving the old socioreligious basis at all. However when Muslim youth are presented to the issues that they consider as sensitive issues such as diversity and tolerance which include Christmas greeting and interfaith marriage, for example, the tendency toward conservatism is still quite strong. It is true that educational background and religious affiliation of Muslim youth determine their perspective in a dynamic way. However, there is a rationalisation process that is done by Muslim youth in their own way. Someone can seem to be very 'literal-textual' in understanding Islamic teachings, yet at the same time, he or she shows a more 'open' social attitude.

From this phenomenon, it seems that a prudent attitude emerges, especially in determining the religious perspectives and attitudes of Muslim youth in a cosmopolitan society. Therefore this research discovers the fact that the current phenomenon of Muslim youth, especially among student activists and students, is often marked with 'textual-literal' in the way of thinking (textual in thinking), however, it is 'moderate and contextual' (contextual in practices). Prudence and taking the safe action by referring to literalism aspect are natural for students. Especially considering the religious issues discussed in this research are related to *ijtihad* and even many of them are controversial in Indonesia, such as Christmas greeting, non-Muslim leadership, and interfaith marriage cases. In this context, this research claims that the youth's religious perspectives are a phase where those perspectives are based on religious normative arguments. Therefore, it is only natural if there is a conservative tendency. However when the proposed themes and discussion have been brought into the public aspect, many of their thoughts have been moderated.

2. Moderate But Tend to be Conservative

The study found that not only Muslim youth are more open to new ideas die against cultural hybridisation that they experience, their religious social and politics also show moderate attitudes and behaviours. Muslim youth who are subject to this research in general believe that Pancasila is the appropriate state ideology for Indonesia because of sociological and historical factors, as well as due to its alignment with Islamic values. Using institutionalism theory from Parsons (1971), this research claims the strong formation of Pancasila system of norms in Muslim youth's behaviours and personalities explains why most of them are not too affected by caliphate or Islamic state ideologies construction that has been massively campaigned for a few decades. Rejection toward violence as a means to push social and political changes is inherent in that ideological belief.

However, it is interesting to note that even though they are moderate, millennial Muslim youth tend to be conservative. This conservatism trend stands out especially among them who are a part of preaching organisations, such as ROHIS, LDK, KAMMI, and other preaching mass organisations, such as PUI (Islamic People Association), Wahdah Islamiyah, and so on. In addition to the prudence in facing the issues which are perceived to be sensitive, conservatism is also made possible by the acceptance of Islamic sermons that contain literalism and Islamic culture affirmation amid the massive flow of cultural globalisation. This conservative attitude surfaces especially when responding to the issues that are perceived to place Islamic doctrines vis-à-vis non-Islamic values. For example, issues on human rights, religious tolerance, and religious freedom. Related to this matter, one of the trends that stands out is the behavioural change in terms of Christmas greeting. There are quite many informants who admitted that they used to give Christmas greeting, but recently decided to stop, even though their friendships with non-Muslim continue.

Before describing in details about the conservatism trend above, the discussion will start by describing the answer to this following question, why do Muslim youth tend to be moderate despite unceasing radicalist propaganda?

Pancasila, Islam and Nationalism

Rejection toward radicalism and extremism campaigns among millennial Muslim youth is made possible because the framing does not successfully change Pancasila ideology construction that has been

strongly embedded in their awareness. Support from Islamic young activists toward Pancasila has a strong relationship with Pancasila's alignment with Islam and nationalist values that they also believe in. On a certain level, the same thing applies to their perception on democracy and human rights, as it will be explained later. Some moderate groups support Pancasila because it functions to unite the nation and becomes the fundamental in managing the diversity of Indonesia *(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika – Unity in Diversity).* Even though they do not deny the Pancasila's compatibility with Islam, the acceptance and support toward it are not associated with the Islamic argument itself. Therefore, the idea of Islamic law implementation in Pancasila framework as a formal law does not get a positive response. Likewise, the same thing happens with propaganda that makes caliphate a government system. Youth who support this outlook mostly come from organisations with a strong nationalism basis such as GMNI, KNPI, PMII, IPNU and Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). The nationalist style can be captured from the statement of Rifai Samu, an activist of IPNU Bitung, North Sulawesi. Samu asserted, "It is difficult to replace the state ideology of Pancasila with a caliphate system because Indonesian society is diverse. In fact, the implementation of Islamic law will cause chaos."

Such nationalist arguments which do not always belong to young activists on the social basis of nationalist organizations, some of those in the category of da'wah movements (SPIRIT, KAMMI, LDK) also use the same arguments to support Pancasila.Muhammad Rajabi Syahrullah, a Rohis activist from State Senior High School (SMAN) 1 Tasikmalaya, argued that Pancasila is the result of ulemas *ijtihad* for Indonesia, not to benefit certain groups. According to him, Pancasila is the ideology of all Indonesian citizens and the appropriate state system democracy. Therefore, the Islamic state system is not suitable with Indonesian context. Likewise, Syahrulah, Rafli Tjolleng, ROHIS Vice Chairman from SMAN 4 Manado, also used the diversity argument to rule out Islamic law implementation and caliphate establishment. In his opinion: "Pancasila is the ideology of all Indonesian citizens and democracy is really appropriate to be implemented in Indonesia." For him Pancasila is final, the caliphate is not needed because it is not suitable with the historical, cultural and political context of Indonesia.

The second type is those who fully support Pancasila especially because the entire content and essence of Pancasila principles are Islamic in nature, in the sense that they match the principles of Islamic teachings. This perspective was often expressed by Muslim activists

from different organisations, starting from HMI, IMM, PMII, KAMMI to Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). In fact, some hard-line Islamic activists such as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troop) and Ikhwanul Muslimin also showed similar perspective. The point is, Pancasila is perceived as a part of the essence of Islam, both as a doctrine and an identity. Zulfata, a HMI cadre in Aceh, said:

> "*Pancasila is something big that needs to be developed and implemented for all Indonesian citizens. Pancasila is an interpretation of universal Islamic law, there is no contradiction with theological issues, there is no contradiction with any religion. Only people who do not understand Pancasila who think that Pancasila sides with non-Muslims; only people who fail to understand Pancasila implementation and the meaning of Pancasila sanctity that make people suspicious toward Pancasila.*"

As for the third type, they have ambivalent attitudes in acknowledging and accepting Pancasila. It is said to be ambivalent because even though they acknowledge the compatibility of Pancasila and Islam, they demand a re-Islamisation of Pancasila by returning the spirit of Jakarta Charter. FPI activists are a part of this group. In addition to FPI, some Islamic movement activists in Bogor, such as Islam Tarbiyah movement, Amar Makruf Nahi Munkar Islamic movement (*ahl al-sunnah wal-jama'ah* sect), and 212 action alumni Islamic movement are in this group. Affirming the position of his organisation, Khalid Tobing, an activist of FPI Pekanbaru, said that FPI is fully aware that the first principle of Pancasila is a contribution and a form of concern from Muslim for Indonesia, as a differentiator between Indonesia and communist and atheist countries. However, Tobing regrets the omission of seven words from the first principle of Pancasila and considers it as a historical accident. Therefore, in his opinion, Pancasila must be returned to its original form by fighting for Islamic law implementation for its followers.

Of all respondents in this research, a small number of informants who are a part of radical movements reject Pancasila as the state ideology. HTI activists represent a consistent attitude in "opposing" Pancasila. Even though they verbally acknowledge Pancasila, they basically desire for caliphate system and Islamic law enforcement, a desire that contradicts the spirit of Pancasila. In addition to HTI, there

are some organisations with similar political ideologies in some regions. For example, in Bulukumba there is Islamic Preaching Youth Forum (FPDI). FPDI followers reject all human laws except for the laws of God, including Pancasila. However, FPDI activists do not support violence including sweeping and raiding. The same perspective also belongs to youth who study in al-Islam pesantren Tenggulun, Lamongan.

In Lampung, some young activists join a Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) movement, under the leadership of a Caliph named Abdul Qodir Hasan Baraja. Different from HTI, KM has already implemented a limited caliphate system and requires its followers to reject secular law system because it is considered as *toghut (tyrant).* However, KM does not require its followers to rebel against the Indonesian state or establish its own country *(daulah).* Even though the organisation is considered to contradict Pancasila, KM informant admitted that he does not worry if someday his organisation will be disbanded by the government. In his opinion, the preachings conducted by KM followers are peaceful preachings. Therefore, there is no reason for the government to disband it because his organisation is not registered to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Sholeh, one of KM followers, argued:

> *"Caliphate concept of Khilafatul Muslimin is no different from ISIS, which is to allegiance to the Caliph. But we are different from HTI. HTI's caliphate concept is still an idea. Khilafatul Muslimin has a clear and real Caliphate concept because we have performedallegiance to Caliph Hasan Baraja since 1997."*

Human Rights, Individual Freedom, and Islamic Parameter

In addition to the strong belief in Pancasila ideology, religious moderation displayed by Muslim youth is also made possible by relatively wide acceptance of democratic values, especially human rights and individual freedom, even though with an understanding that is also associated with Islamic belief. In this aspect respondents who accept human rights and individual freedom are divided into two categories. *First,* those who see that Islam and human rights walk hand in hand, there is no contradiction between them. Those who are active in KNPI, Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), IPNU, PMII, and HMI support this perspective. They think that individual freedom and human rights are in accordance with Islamic fundamental values and doctrine.

The first type can be seen from the opinions of two moderate Islamic movement activists, each of them represented by PMII and HMI activist. Eidat Ahmad Firdausa, a PMII activist of Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic Studies Institute (STAINU), Tasikmalaya, perceives that Indonesia is already familiar with individual freedom and human rights. As proof, every individual is free to choose an educational institution, is free to live wherever they want to, and is free to speak out their opinion. Firdausa thinks that an individual freedom is not a Western ideology that is used to attack Muslims in Indonesia, because in his opinion individual freedom and human rights are incredibly needed by humans. Representing HMI, Bambang, Chairman of HMI Bandung Regency, believes that having a religion is an individual right, the state is obliged to protect the rights of its citizens. Since religion is an individual right, in his opinion, there is no need for a group to disband religious activities of other groups, especially using cliche reason such as, "because the activities are not based on law".

A similar perspective was also expressed by some of KAMMI and LDK activists. Wawan Maulana, an activist of KAMMI Bandung City, criticised hard-line Islam community who disbanded Christian religious activity in Sabuga at the end of 2016. He stated, "Don't become an excessive Muslim". It means that Muslims must be fair because one year later there was an event where Muslims did collective Dawn Prayer in Bandung square without even considering the permit. Akbar, an LDK activist of Bima City, with NU background, also supports human rights. In his opinion, "God entrusts blessings and welfare to the system, to the state. When the state is absent from people's problems, then it is our obligation to voice and remind those negligent parties."

The *second* type, Muslim youth who agree with individual freedom and human rights, but the freedom itself must be limited by local religious and cultural values. This perspective is supported by those who are mostly active in OSIS, ROHIS, LDK, BEM and in certain degree external campus organisation such as HMI and KAMMI. According to this perspective, individual freedom is the freedom to do what we want in positive aspects. With the existence of individual freedom, Muslims can respect what each individual chooses, and do not force their own desires. For some of them, up to a certain limit, Indonesia has given a space for individual freedom, among others in religious aspect where all Indonesian citizens are allowed to choose their own religions and beliefs. However, individual freedom and human rights cannot be used as an excuse to allow practices that are prohibited by religions, such

as dressing openly in public and actions of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT). A conservative perspective in assessing human rights and individual right can be seen from the statement of Alma Fidya, an administrator of STHG Student Activity Unit Tasikmalaya. According to her, LGBT is an individual freedom but it violates the existing norms. This view is strengthened by Acep Guntur Alam, Chairman of Pemuda PUI (PUI Youth) in Tasikmalaya, who rejects LGBT and sees it as a mental illness that must be cured.

In general, there are only a few numbers of Muslim youths who firmly reject individual freedom and human rights. They are, among others, FPDI and Salafi activists in Bulukumba, HTI activists in Bandung, IMAMTA activists and LDMPM UMS activists from Surakarta. These groups also accuse individual freedom and human rights as Western ideologies that aim to destroy Islam in Indonesia. Andika Permadi Putra, an activist of HTI Bandung, perceives human rights as a derivative of capitalist ideology. He said that Islam does not know the term human rights, but only the word "rights". Andika only sees two things in human rights: pluralism and liberal economy. His attitude is based on the realities he often sees, where the people who insult Prophet are let free, unlike in Islam where the people who insult the Prophet deserve a death sentence. Even though Andika rejects individual freedom and human rights, he does not accept violence as a method to achieve a purpose. He admitted that not even once did HTI do anarchist actions, such as damaging public facilities and conducting violence against other people. The perspective that rejects violence is also supported by other HTI activists, such as Santi from Yogyakarta. However, it is interesting to note that even though she rejects human rights, Santi considers various events that she refers to as religious criminalisation and disbandment of studies as stains on human rights which are only a mere slogan.

Mass Organisations Act and HTI Disbandment

However, from the three groups mentioned above, there are quite many of them who disagree with Act on Mass Organisations Number 16 of 2017 and HTI disbandment. In addition to HTI itself, preaching and even nationalist activists also stated their disagreement with HTI disbandment. With the exception of those who mostly have NU backgrounds, both among PMII and IPNU activists. They generally support Mass Organisations Act and HTI disbandment. The influence of the organisation's perspective seems to stand out in the assessment

on this issue. However, it is important to note that the disagreement of some Muslim youths, other than HTI itself, of course, is not based on their sympathy toward HTI ideology, but because of the argument of human rights and freedom itself, including the freedom to associate for other Islamic mass organisations. For HTI activists, the disbandment is state oppression against Islam and Muslims. Fadilah Nurhidayah, a HTI activist in Medan stated her argument:

> *"In the Mass Organisations Act, the threatening ones are Socialism, Marxism ideas. Islam is not included, it is not threatening. This is called as not being able to remain because Indonesian ulemas can (threaten for) freedom (if) Islam is called threatening. They will win if HTI is based on Islamic principles then why must it be contradicted with Pancasila? There is no relationship at all."*

Meanwhile, for nationalist activists, some of them think that the disbandment does not only violate human rights, but it is also a form of new authoritarianism that is used as a government tool to silence the critical voices of citizens. Muhammad Widodo, a KNPI activist from Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth) Surakarta, argued that HTI disbandment using Mass Organisations Act is a political policy. He perceives that the government held a grudge toward certain groups and utilised that opportunity to destroy the groups that contradict with the government and the groups that support the government, in his opinion that is depravity of democratic practices. Meanwhile, preaching activists who reject HTI disbandment accuse the policy as a form of attack toward Muslims. However, this rejection is not because of their agreement with HTI ideology, but because of its procedure that is considered to be arbitrary, without going through the legal process. This perspective was expressed by Rasyid Zaelani, an activist of KAMMI Surakarta, someone who admitted that he fully supports democracy, and accepts human rights as well as individual freedom as things that are needed by the plural Indonesian citizens.

For NU young activists, they argued that the disbandment is right because HTI campaigned an ideology that contradicts with Pancasila. Having an ideology that wants to erase Pancasila and establish a caliphate is a rebellion toward Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Therefore, for the people who have this mindset, the government is correct to disband HTI. In Tasikmalaya, Sidik, an IPNU activist, said

that because HTI was a mass organisation that opposed Pancasila, it must be disbanded. The same perspective is supported by Acep Sofyan, General Treasurer of al-Mumtaz, an organisation with NU basis in Tasikmalaya. It is interesting to note Faizi's argument, an activist of PMII Yogyakarta, who supports Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) on Mass Organisations Number 1 of 2017 (prior to its enactment into Act on Mass Organisations Number 16 of 2017).

"I agree with Regulation in Lieu of Law on Mass Organisations, for me it is a part of a regulation so that the right to associate does not become a tool for a group to oppose Pancasila. That regulation in lieu of law becomes the government's reason to prevent an ideology that opposes Pancasila, and it pushes the strengthening of state ideology. Declaration of caliphate state that is done by thousands of university students, is it not a crucial condition? Threatening our state ideology? What if they are distributed to campuses and encourage other students to establish a caliphate? If there is no preventive effort from the government, there will be many other cases."

Communal Tolerance

It is previously mentioned that young Muslim show moderate diversity attitudes with a conservative tendency. One of the topics that describe this phenomenon is diversity and tolerance. In responding various issues concerning tolerance and diversity practices, from neighbouring with non-Muslims, saying merry Christmas, responding to non-Muslims' house of worship, to interfaith marriage, most of the Muslim youth are quite tolerant. Only a few people who show obvious intolerant behaviours. However, there is a different emphasis and orientation concerning tolerance construct that they understand and implement. Some of them show a more conservative tendency, or, using the term by Jeremy Menchik (2016), communal tolerance or tolerance without liberalism. This perspective is mainly supported by preaching activists (ROHIS, LDK, KAMMI, and other preaching groups). On a certain level, moderate activists such as HMI, IMM, and even PMII and IPNU support this kind of communalism. On the other hand, some Muslim youths have tolerance that is more civil oriented i.e. civil tolerance. This perspective is supported by the established Islamic student movements' activists such as HMI, PMII, and IMM, and also by youths with a nationalist orientation such as GMNI, Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth, and KNPI.

Communal tolerance as defined by Menchik is a tolerance paradigm

that is based on Islamic teachings that prioritises collective rights over individual rights. With this kind of perspective, it does not mean that supporters of communal tolerance reject secular law system, they still accept it as long as it does not contradict Islamic law and nationalism values that are based on Godliness (Godly nationalism) (Menchik, 2016). On the other hand, civil tolerance is marked by the integration of individual rights concept into Islamic understanding framework that sees individual freedom, democracy and human rights as integrative parts in Islam. Some of the civil tolerance supporters have exceeded mere tolerance and stepped toward pluralism, an ideology that makes diversity as a principle in responding and managing differences. The expression "celebrating differences" is an appropriate phrase to describe the spirit of pluralism.

From the strengthening of conservatism perspective, a communalistic tendencyfor tolerance practices is closely related with the desire to maintain and nurture Islamic identity amid the heavy flow of global cultural values that are perceived as a threat toward Islamic culture. So it is not merely because they are in the middle of uncertainty when they are required to respond to socioreligious situations for which they do not have sound answers. Using psychosocial perspective, the existence of a growing Islamic solidarity in the awareness of Muslim youth can lead to the strengthening of their self-identification toward something that has Islamic undertone and differentiates them from other groups. However, this self-identification with something Islamic does not always mean there is a religious understanding radicalisation as formulated by McCauley and Segal (1987). Rosyad (2007) who conducted a study on the revival of Islamic preaching activism in campuses in Bandung after the reformation found that after unceasing information globalisation, educated millennial Muslim youth increasingly show a stronger self-identification toward global community entity.

The strengthening of Islamic identity representation among preaching organisations' activists, especially during the post-reformation decade (Hasan and Abubakar, 2011), happens simultaneously with transmission processes of Islamic teachings that emphasise scripturalist style. Scripturalism is defined as a method to understand Islam by referring to the scripture, al-Qur'an and al-Hadits, with a literal understanding, without comparative reasoning or contextual interpretation process. In scripturalism, there is no understanding model that tries to understand the meaning of scripture in accordance with the hadits emergence concept and take the general principles

to be applied in a new changed context. This diversity scripturalism affects the formation of preaching activists' understanding in defining religious tolerance concept. They formulate the tolerance concept based on the verses or hadits that are believed to provide principles that give limitation on what is allowed and what is prohibited in practicing tolerance.

In this conceptual framework, tolerance is understood only in *muamalah* or social interaction area. Tolerance will not happen in a relationship situation that is defined as *aqidah* area. Indeed, the point where a socioreligious relationship is considered as trespassing *aqidah* boundary is not really clear. However what is meant by no tolerance in *aqidah* is the disagreement with or not supporting other people's belief or *aqidah* even under the pretext of tolerance. In other words, communal tolerance rejects relativism in religion, a rejection that explains the similarity between communal tolerance principle and civil tolerance that also assumes there is a rejection of different belief (Cohen, 2004; Habermas, 2004; Bretherton, 2004). Zuriah, an administrator of LDK IAIN Pontianak, who is also an activist of KAMMI Pontianak asserted the boundary of tolerance:

> *"What we should be tolerant of, if the issue is about religious law which is a formal standard then it cannot be tolerated, if we tolerate economic issues, scientific issue concerning Indonesian language, English and so on, we can still tolerate those things, but if the subject of tolerance are aqidah, Islamic law, we cannot possibly be tolerant of those things because they are the standard regulation in our religion. For example, on Muslim or non-Muslim leader, in Islam there is a command to choose a Muslim leader, then choose Muslim leader, choose a leader who is knowledgeable on aqidah."*

Furthermore, the expression of no tolerance in aqidah can hint an avoidance to have a close relationship with non-Muslim due to a concern that the relationship might decrease their loyalty toward the teachings of their own religion. The fear of fading aqidah due to excessive tolerance is felt by Andi Mardika, an activist of Middle East Alumni Association (IKAT), Aceh. Mardika perceives that the behaviours of Muslims who live in Aceh border as excessive tolerance, especially when they eat together at an event, sometimes it leads to religious violations, such as eating pork and interfaith marriage.

The same fear can also lead to intolerance if it is accompanied by a prejudice. This is shown by Umi Nur Khasanah, an activist of LDMPM (Community Service Students Preaching Institution), UMS Surakarta, who admitted that she can live side by side with non-Muslims in daily friendship as long as it is not related to religious matters. For her, relationship to religious matter includes living near a non-Muslim's house of worship in her neighbourhood. Khasanah admitted that she dislikes it if there is a church across her house, and she hopes that there never will be. At the same, time she believes that Muslims are treated unfairly by non-Muslims and she hopes she can help to enforce Islam by "reminding her friends that Islam is experiencing a crisis and about to be eradicated".

On a practical level, the tolerance concept as mentioned above is seen in the rejection toward "Merry Christmas" greeting. There are quite many students, university students, as well as preaching organisations' youth activists, who consider that saying merry Christmas to Christians, even if it is their friends, is forbidden. Syifa, Chairman of OSIS SMA 49 Jakarta, never says merry christmas because she is worried that she might be influenced by Christians' behaviour that she believes to be wrong. It is interesting to note, Syifa admitted that she previously did not know about the law on Christmas greeting, and just recently knew about the debate on this issue. In anticipation, she chose not to say it. Sucia Ramadhani, a young author, a student of Universitas Indonesia (UI), received the information about the prohibition to say merry Christmas after she attended university. Despite having many Christian friends, she decided not to say merry Christmas to them.

Perception of communal tolerance does not only apply in religious celebration cases but also in the political aspect, especially in electing and accepting non-Muslim leaders. However, in the non-Muslim leader election issue, the responses of communal tolerance supporters vary, from completely reject it, ambivalent, to normatively reject it but accept it in practice. The example of people who completely reject it can be read in M.Arfan's response, an activist of LDK Hasanuddin University, Makassar. When questioned about his opinion on the statement "it is better to choose a fair non-Muslim leader than an unjust Muslim leader." Arfan thinks that the statement is illogical because it may lead most people to make an association that all Muslims are bad, and all non-Muslims are good. When it is associated that choosing a non-Muslim leader is a part of human rights, Arfan tends to see it from an Islamic perspective, that individual rights must be limited by al-

Qur'an and al-Sunnah provisions. Even though choosing a leader is an individual right, but because Islamic doctrine forbids it, the individual right must submit to Islamic teachings. This is the example of putting Islamic argument above civil argument.

The ambivalence between religious argument and human equality argument in the non-Muslim leader election issue is shown in the response of Tika Larasato, a member of YISC Al-Azhar, Jakarta. According to Liarianti, "from a religious perspective, non-Muslim leaders are clearly prohibited. From humanity perspective, if they are competent, then why not, as long as they can maintain Islamic principles. I have watched Zakir Naik's video on Youtube, he said that if someone nominates a Muslim, then we choose the Muslim one even though the non-Muslim one is actually more competent." It is obvious here, that even though she is ambivalent in the beginning, the final conclusion of Liarianti is more determined by religious argument rather than civil argument. The same ambivalent attitude is also shown by Eni Marfuati, an activist of LDMPM (Community Service Students Preaching Institution), UMS, Surakarta. Even though she agrees with the rights and obligations of equality between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, but Marfuati cannot accept non-Muslim leaders. When asked what if a non-Muslim leader is elected in a region whose residents are mostly Muslims, she said that she is confused on how to respond to it.

Negotiating religious reasoning and civil reasoning can be seen from the response given by Fina, Secretary General of BEM UI, who admitted that as long as it is possible she will choose [leader candidate] who is a Muslim. She will not choose a non-Muslim leader, however, if non-Muslim leader is eventually elected as the leader, then whether she likes it or not she has to comply with state regulation. Similar with Fina, Bayu Putra Martama, an activist of IMAMTA, UMS, Surakarta, in the beginning admitted that he cannot accept non-Muslim leaders. However, due to demand of political reality, where (Surakarta) a non-Muslim leader has been elected, he has no alternative but to accept it on a condition that the work programmes "do not oppose religion".

Tolerance "Provided That It Does Not Disturb"

In addition to limiting the scope of tolerance with theological partitions. Some preaching Muslim youth activists also give another condition, which is "provided that it does not disturb." If it is analysed using language logic, the expression "provided that it does not disturb" shows a paradox in understanding tolerance concept, where the

expression itself shows a logical contradiction *(contradictio interminis).* That is because the word "tolerance" ("toleration" or "tolerance") contains the meaning of "withstanding or enduring something that is disturbing".[3] In other words, the expression of tolerance "provided that it does not disturb" is a method to limit the tolerance itself when it is considered to sacrifice higher interest. In a communal framework, higher interest is collective rights whose legitimation comes from the holy book's doctrine that is understood literally. In civil principle, tolerance is also limited, but the limitation is determined by to what extent that the attitude does not endanger universal values, which are individual rights, Therefore, acts of violence and terrorism which are disturbing cannot be tolerated because those actions can sacrifice the universal values.[4]

The psychological boundary "provided that it does not disturb" in its practical implementation is often related to the majority-minority relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in a Muslim-dominated area. In the case of church construction in a mostly Muslim community, the establishment is considered to be disturbing, even though it may not be so in the individual's perspective. Some cases show that protests against church construction often led to vandalism and persecution. From a communal perspective, protest and vandalism are rooted in the collective distaste of a Muslim community toward the church's existence. The strong influence of communal values in managing house of worship conflicts forced the government based on the recommendation of interfaith figures to issue a Joint Regulation of Religious Affairs Ministry and Home Affairs Ministry Number 9 and Number 8 of 2006, which regulates the requirements for the construction of minority religion's house of worship in a majority religion area. Ironically, referring to this regulation some groups in Islam often complain the presence or construction of churches in Muslim areas, even after the church receives a construction permit.

Communal tolerance paradigm is not always consistent to maintain tolerant attitude and behaviour in its generic meaning, that is to refrain oneself from being harsh and negate something that is not approved or liked. Empirical experiences in the interaction with non-Muslims are marked by dispute, exclusivism and communal prejudice that can easily trigger and justify intolerant attitudes and behaviours.

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3 See the meaning of "Toleration" concept in "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" dalam http://www.iep.utm.edu/tolerati/, accessed on 5 February 2018.
4 See ""Toleration" in "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy"…

That attitude can be seen from the response of Muslim youth who experienced communal conflict with non-Muslim, including conflict concerning the house of worship. Rivan Widiyanto, an activist of Muslim Troop (LUIS), Surakarta,[5] when questioned about his opinion on other religions' house of worship construction in his area, admitted that he has no problem with it as long as it does not disturb Muslims' activities. "But if it is disturbing, then it is mandatory for Muslims to fight with violence against them."

The minimum experience in encountering different religious groups often strengthens the exclusive attitude of Muslim youth, moreover, the attitude is influenced by a growing religious prejudice. In turn, this attitude will justify the rejection toward other religious groups' activities in their area, and often followed by violent actions. On the other hand, religious doctrine is used to legitimate and sanctify that attitude. It is interesting to note the narrative of Arif Marifudin, a member of LDK IAIN La Rayba, Bogor, who admitted rejecting a church around his house in Mount Salak District, Bogor. Marifudin considers that his attitude is based on an Islamic jurisprudence doctrine that reads *al-'adah muhakkamah,* which means custom can be made as a source of law. According to him, Muslims in his village consider that the existence of other religions' house of worship violates the local custom in that region. However, since the 2000s that tradition is perceived to be disturbed by the construction of Gua Maria Church. Some local Muslim residents protested that church construction. Included in that protest was his own teacher who had a close relationship with an FPI figure and an Indonesian Military (TNI) soldier. According to him, that church was successfully damaged by the people and its construction was successfully cancelled by involving the assistance of public figures.

Civil Tolerance

Unlike the Muslim youth activists who are involved in preaching organisations, the activists of students' movement organisations such as HMI, PMII, and on a certain level, IMM, show the understanding of tolerance that is based on civil perspective, but still based on Islamic argument. In their perspectives, tolerance concept is based on civil values whose conceptual is built from the convergence between universal humanity values and Islamic values which are interpreted

5   LUIS is an Islamic organisation that is often reported on the media due to its activities that involve violence and persecution, such as conduct sweeping on entertainment area, read: https://news.detik.com/berita/3375724/terkait-aksi-sweeping-5-tokoh-laskar-solo-ditangkap-polisi accessed on 5 February 2018.

using a contextual approach, not scripturalist. Furthermore, some of them have passed *maqam* of tolerance toward *maqam* of pluralism, which makes diversity as a principle in managing differences. In this aspect, they are different from the preaching activists who tend to firmly reject that kind of pluralism principle. For the last group, pluralism is identical to relativism which sacrifices loyalty and commitment toward the exclusive truth of Islam. However, for these progressive Islamic movement activists, pluralism is one of the forms of Islamic teaching manifestation that is more valid and solid in managing diversity that becomes the fate of Indonesia.

Arsyad, who is also a Gusdurian activist, Makassar, admitted to being actively involved in the discussion and activities of South Sulawesi Interfaith Network. He is accustomed to visiting open house of other religions' religious celebration, and even does his praying in a church. Different from the opinion of some preaching activists who refuse to become too close to non-Muslims because they are concerned that their aqidah purity might decrease, Arsyad feels the opposite, by closely socialise with other religions' followers, he "feels more becoming a Muslim". This religious perspective is obtained by Arsya because he uses Islamic learning methodology called *istiqrai* method that is to conduct research, religious text comparative study, and so on. According to him, in addition to *istiqrai* approach, there is another Islamic study approach, which is *istidlal,* it is usually done by picking an al-Qur'an verse and turns it into a *dalil*. Arsyad admitted that the second method is weak in capturing a more essential meaning of Islam.

Basically, civil tolerance departs from the values of equality among citizens. And respect for each citizen's fundamental freedom that is guaranteed by the state. As previously mentioned, tolerance essentially assumes there is an initial condition where a citizen does not agree with the thoughts and activities of other citizens. However, the said citizen decides to endure his dislike and allow other people to do so. Civil tolerance is reflected by that person's attitude who practice tolerance because he respects other people's rights and freedom, despite whether the individual rights correspond or contradict with communal values and interest of his own religious group. An outlook with this perspective is shown by some activists of HMI, PMII, Gusdurian, IMM, and UIN alumni, who become the respondents of this research. M. Bambang Pontas Rambe, Chairman of HMI Bandung, Bambang an HMI activist, Untan Pontianak, and Akbar, HMI activist who is also

an administrator of KNPI Medan, generally show clear attitudes that religious tolerance is a consequence of respect toward religious rights and freedom which are protected by the state. Therefore, violence on behalf of religion, including attacks on houses of worship, is the reflection of a violation toward that freedom principle.

Civil tolerance and pluralism paradigm when they are realised in practical issues such as Christmas greeting, it does not create an uncertainty, in fact, it results in a clearer attitude that is tolerance without condition. In responding to Christmas greeting issue, Bambang Sudarmono, HMI, Pontianak, thinks that it is not a problem to say it because it cannot be interpreted as cheating on God. In his opinion that is based on personal belief as long as we do not believe in it then it is not a problem. Bambang gave an example if a president or lecturer says merry Christmas and they are called infidels, then it will not be funny, as long as someone does not believe in it, it does not have to be a problem. In Christmas greeting context not all preaching activists in LDK and ROHIS forbid Christmas greeting. There are also some people who allow it. For example Rahman, who is active in LDK Muslim University Indonesia, Makassar, has a quite contextual perspective on Christmas greeting. He sees that from a humanity perspective, it is okay to say merry Christmas. However, in his opinion, as long as there is no intention to follow their aqidah.

Likewise in the case of the construction of houses of worship, there are no problems that can cause conflict.. Maulana Yusuf, Secretary General from Siliwangi Young Generation Students Association (IMA), Tasikmalaya, does not mind if there is a church or other house of worship around or near his house. He even advised Muslims to practice tolerance to practice tolerance because they live in Indonesia, a country full of diversity. It is interesting that Yusuf who has civil perspective, admitted to being a follower of an Islamic party, the Crescent Star Party (PBB). The same thing is also affirmed by Akbar from HMI and KNPI Medan, Akbar even believes that house of worship is a need of the residents. "church is constructed because there are its followers nearby. Maybe it is like school, because a village is in a remote location so that the people do not have to go to the city to get an education."

Just like the two religious issues above, Muslim youth activists who have civil values do not see the election/acceptance of non-Muslim leaders as an aqidah issue. It is seen as a mere political issue. Yogi Purnama, an activist of IT Study Forum in Nurul Islam Pesantren, Garut, thinks that it is okay if Indonesia is led by a non-Muslim, "as long as

he is able to lead righteously. If not, then whatever the religion is, I will oppose it." Similar with Purnama, Nur Ani, administrator of BEM Language and Literature of Hasanuddin University, Makassar, thinks that even though the majority of Indonesian citizens are Muslims, Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Therefore, the leader does not have to come from the Muslim community. What the nation needs is a fair leader who is willing to work to build the nation or region, a leader that can bring goodness and welfare to the society.

Muslim activists who are active in GMNI, Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), or KNPI, do not have any doubt to practice tolerance toward the people of other religions. Similar to progressive Islamic movement activists, they are fully committed to Pancasila, nationalist, and civil values which are included in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. However, they generally do not show any interest to talk about religious issues because the issues are perceived to be sensitive. Therefore they choose to avoid it. As a consequence, the contribution of these nationalist activists toward various intolerance and violence problems involving religious issues is not maximum. Even if it exists, their involvement cannot exceed nationalist rhetoric, such as maintaining Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) and national unity.

Askar, Chairman of GMNI South Jakarta, admitted that he is indifferent on religious issues. Ahok case that involved a series of demonstrations in 2016, which led to Ahok imprisonment by the judge who ruled the case in North Jakarta State Court in 2017. This case seems to affect the nationalist activists who are becoming more careful in dealing with religious matters. This impression can be captured from Askar's narrative below:

> "From the point of view of Islamic beliefs, it is natural for them to be angry toward Former Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. But as seen on the field, we can also analyse that there is a political interest which drove the mass. Ahok did insult the religion. He went into an area that he did not know well. He was not educated about Islam since childhood. Ahok was supposed to be careful in his words or in discussing religious matters. And he was supposed to be able to control himself. Because, no matter what, religion is very sensitive."

3. Radicalism and Extremism Challenge

In this research, it is discovered that a small number of Muslim youth who are involved in radical movement or experience radicalisation is made possible by two factors. *First,* the alignment between interests, values, and beliefs that they have with the radicalism construction that they receive from radical ideologues. On a certain level, teenagers who are searching for something more meaningful in their life or searching for an identity (Venhaus, 2010), might be successfully identified by extremist ideologues to be offered the meaning of life and identity that can satisfy their psychological thirst. In the theory of Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005), they have to go through a cognitive opening moment, a crucial phase where they experience an introduction and become interested in religious ideology, before leading them to radical ideology and makes it as a life principle. *Second,* social milieu factor also influences radicalisation process. The activists of radical movement such as the ones who join JAT in Bima, Khilafatul Muslimum in Lampung, as well as the jihadist in Solo and in Lamongan, become radical because ever since their childhood they are raised in a radical family and relatives.

The relationship between anxiety in searching for the meaning of life and a stronger identity with the vulnerability to be exposed and interested in radical ideology can be seen from the narrative of a respondent in Lampung, whose alias is Toni. Toni admitted that he does not come from a family with a clear religious basis, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. When he entered middle school, especially during his teenage years, he was exposed to a religious style introduced by Jamaah Tabligh. The encounter with Jamaah Tabligh made him enthusiastic in doing the rituals mandated by the religion. However, when salafi ideology got in, it made him falter a little bit. Dissatisfied by both ideologies, he went on a further search, and in senior high school, he was exposed to the religious ideas promoted by HTI. From the exposure with various groups and religious understanding, he indirectly compared one against the others, and then he felt that he was suitable with HTI. In his opinion, in addition to having a strong fundamental, HTI had a clear Islamic sociopolitical dream as a political community (ummah), which was to establish Islamic leadership under a caliphate.

Another example of the process called self-radicalising is also found in another region such as Solo, Central Java. A respondent who becomes the subject of this research admitted that his family's

religious background was unclear because they mostly got religious recitation from the television. However, during his study on campus, he chose to be actively involved in KAMMI and IMM. However, instead of being active in Muhammadiyah, which is mostly followed by many IMM cadres, he chose to be actively involved in a hard-line organisation in Surakarta, which was LUIS (Solo/Surakarta Muslim Troop). Radicalisation level of this respondent has not reached radicals or jihadist, but he already experienced a cognitive opening by making his life purpose, to serve *amar makruf nahi mungkar*, which often use violent and illegal methods.

It is important to emphasise that cognitive opening is not always linear with radicalisation process, because sometimes the opposite happens, "moderatisation process," it depends on the accompanying context. Findings in Bulukumba region and other areas, for example, show moderatisation process. A Muslim activist who was involved in the struggle of KPPSI, Jundullah Troop, and PPSI (Islamic Law Enforcer Youth) to enforce Islamic law in South Sulawesi became out of context when the Governor and Regent candidates who supported those jargons failed. When the candidates of leaders who supported Islamic law lost, those jargons did not get sufficient responses from the society and other local leaders. Therefore, whether they wanted to or not, the activists who were previously active in KPPSI, Jundullah Troop as well as in PPSO, choose to be active in movements which are unaffiliated to a certain religious ideology or aspiration like the previous ones. They prefer to work in community empowerment field which is not directly related to religious issues such as AGRA (Agraria Reformation Movement Alliance).

In addition to being influenced by radical ideology construction that is campaigned, Muslim teenagers and youth experience radicalisation due to the influence of their social environment. Militant and radical groups form an enclave, a community that is relatively closed, in order to keep and maintain the family and community network so that they will not leave the Islamic movement and activism that they have been involved in. As reaffirmed by McCauley and Segal (1987) the group that is made cohesive, isolated from public life, will increase the obedience of its members toward the group's regulations and norms. Khilafatul Muslimin that is centered in Lampung, has implemented Islamic life under a Caliph who is quite strict in controlling his members to remain consistent in living their lives based on Islamic law.

Lamongan District, East Java provides a quite comprehensive example on a complete radicalisation process of Muslim youth who became martyrs in suicide bombing terror. Wildan Mukhallad, an ISIS jihadist from Lamongan who was reported to be killed in a suicide bombing in Iraq, on February 2014. Wildan was a Lamongan youth from a family that went through a cultural hybridisation process. He studied in Al-Islam Pesantren in Tenggulun, which was managed by the family of Amrozi, a convict of Bali bombing 2002. In his young age, the youth from Lamong decided to end his life in a land full of conflicts at the border of Iraq and Syria. Wildan was not the only youth who did suicide bombing. There were many Lamongan Muslim youth who had departed to Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, on 7 April 2017, National Polices Densus 88 Counterterrorism Squad arrested two youths in Lamongan District, who were suspected as terrorists.

The support of radical milieu is truly evident in maintaining radicalisation in Tenggulun, Lamongan. The problem is, since Bali bombing in 2002 it has been 19 years that the extremist hotbed there does not stop at all. During the interviews and observation in Lamongan, many residents in that area do not question that as radical and extremist attitudes and behaviours. What is quite surprising is that those who are activists of nationalist organisations such as GMNI, KNPI and Pemuda Pancamarga (Pancamarga Youth), do not perceive Amrozi as a terrorist and extremist. A respondent from Pancamarga Youth stated that he does not dare to call Amrazi as a terrorist, he admitted that there is a dilemma between the methods and the purpose. He disagrees with his method that sacrificed many people but he agrees with Amrozi's purpose. In fact, according to him, Balinese people did curse and hate Amrozi when the Bali Bombing happened but after that, Balinese people themselves stated that they also disliked the places bombed by Amrozi because those places were filled with sins.

D. Conclusions

This qualitative research finds that strong institutionalisation of Pancasila norms system in the behaviours and personalities of Muslim youth make them religiously moderate, despite the unceasing radicalism and extremism campaigns. Despite being moderate in political attitude, most of them tend to be conservative especially in responding to socio-religious issues which are perceived as sensitive. Conservatism among some of Muslim youths, especially among preaching activists, is caused by some interrelated factors. *First,* cultural hybridisation that they have

experienced since childhood to teenage years and in university cause them to be open toward new ideas, traditions, practices, and even different ideology. On the other hand, the same thing makes them tend to be prudent in responding to the issues for which they have no sound answers due to their knowledge limitation. In this perspective, conservatism reflects the prudence of millennial Muslim youth amid a life that is getting more cosmopolitan.

Second, the increasingly intensive contact, due to massive information globalisation on the internet, with various events, practices and traditions of Muslims in the country as well as overseas, pushes the strengthening of Islamic identity among preaching activists (ROHIS, LDK, KAMMI, and other preaching mass organisations). This is increasingly maintained because the norms of preaching organisations historically demand their activists to do the organisation's purpose to invite Muslims to increase their obedience toward Islamic values and norms. *Third,* the development of literalism in religion also contributes in strengthening conservatism, especially in responding to tolerance and diversity issues. Literalism often legitimates the tolerance construct that is understood in limitations which do not interfere aqidah purity. In that literali interpretation they respond to tolerance issues such as Christmas greeting, choosing non-Muslim leaders, responding to the construction of non-Muslim's house of worship, interfaith marriage, and so on. As a logical consequence, they practice communal tolerance, as described by Jeremy Menchik, that is a type of tolerance that places Muslims' collective rights above citizens' individual rights. House of worship conflict cases depicts the tension between communal and civil paradigm.

Even though there is a tendency to be open toward different new ideas, their assessments on the issues discussed in this research still reflect the strong influence of social milieu where they socialise. This does not only happen to those who come from moderate and nationalist Islamic organisations, but also to those who join militant and hard-line organisations. Activists of HMI, PMII, and IPNU generally show attitudes that are consistent with their organisations' norm systems and perspectives. In addition to being moderate, they also have civil tolerance, which is a type of tolerance that makes individual rights as a basis for practicing tolerance. However, their acceptance toward civil, human rights and democracy does not leave uncertainty and dilemma between choosing Islam or human rights. They tend to show an interest to interpret Islam contextually so that the individual

freedom is accepted not as a foreign value but as an integral part of Islamic doctrine. In the practice of tolerance, this strategy does not cause ambivalence and inconsistency between normative values and practical reality.

Nationalist activists who join youth organisations such as GMNI, KNPI, and Pancasila Youth, to mention a few, in general, they still strongly reflect their organisations' perspectives. With the exception of KNPI activists, because of its function as a parent organisation, the perspective of its administrators on a certain level carry the bias of their origin organisations. In addition to being moderate in political thoughts, they also reflect civil tolerance. However, different from the activists of HMI, PMII, IPNU, and progressive Islamic organisations, the nationalist activists show the avoidance toward religious discourses. For some of them it might be caused by the interfaith and nationalist characteristics, but for the others, there is a fear in going into religious issues because it is perceived to be sensitive. As a result, their contribution in responding to conflicts with religious undertone is not maximum.

Last, this research concludes that youth experience radicalisation due to their psychological urge to search for the meaning of life and a social identity that is stronger than before. Emptiness and uncertainty in a social role on one hand and an unclear religious social basis, on the other hand, can potentially bring them a closer radical and extremist narrative that offers certainty, loyalty and a bigger commitment in life. Alignment between the problems faced by prospective radical members with the promises offered by radical ideologues will become an entry point for them to get involved deeper in radical and extremist life milieu. In turn, the bond of the norm system that is built exclusively by radical group leader forces someone who has experienced radicalisation to increase their loyalty toward the organisation as well as its purpose and mission.

In summary, personality building based on the values and norms system of Pancasila, constitutional, democracy and human rights in Millennial Muslim youth can prevent them from becoming radical and extremist. The institutionalisation of those values in student, youth, and Islamic organisations will strengthen moderation and create a permanent immune system against the infiltration of radical and extremist ideologies.

On a theoretical level, this study expands our perspectives in understanding radicalism and extremism issues in their relationship

with youth. By using institutionalism theory perspective, it can be made clearer why the majority of Muslim youth reject radical and extremist propaganda. In addition, this study also enriches our understanding of the concept of tolerance that is also practiced among Muslim youth.

Based on the conclusion above, there are some recommendations from this research results that can be a consideration of all stakeholders, especially the government and educational institutions.

1) Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education (BPIP) needs to revitalise the role of Agency for the Propagation of Pancasila (BP7) in New Order era as an agency that has successfully nurtured Pancasila values and norms system in youth personalities, especially Muslim youth. BPIP needs to implement medium-term and long-term programmes with the purpose of shaping Pancasila character in Indonesian youth. On a policy level, BPIP needs to develop coordination with related ministries (Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Youth and Sports) in order to support Pancasila character building programme among youth.

2) Ministry of Education and Culture to create and intensify the policies that make ROHIS and LDK as a medium to develop Pancasila personality in students. Specifically for programmes in ROHIS and LDK, there needs to be a civic education which involves all of them across Indonesia with the emphasis on the strengthening of Islamic arguments toward civic values;

5) Ministry of Religious Affairs needs to develop modules that aim to support the acceptance of Muslim students toward the values of democracy, human rights, and other civil values.

6) Ministry of Youth and Sports to develop programmes that support the strengthening of regeneration in moderate extra campus organisations based on nationalist, Islamic and humanity values as basis for the development of dialogue and cooperation programmes between Muslim and nationalist youth organisations to strengthen the shaping of Pancasila personality and the civil and nationalist values.

7) Ministry of Youth and Sports to develop programmes that aim to embrace former members of HTI and other radical organisations so they can actively participate in interest and talent development activities, without getting stuck in ideological indoctrination. The purpose is to make them feel the sense of ownership toward Indonesia with its nationalist vision and norm system for the benefits of the country and its people.

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AUTHOR PROFILE

Irfan Abubakar since 2010 up until now has been working as the Chairman of CSRC UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. The lecturer of Faculty of Culture and Humaniora UIN Jakarta is an academics with a wide range of interests in cultural studies and social sciences. Graduated from Arabic Language and Literature undergraduate study, IAIN Jakarta (1995), Irfan continued his study in Graduate School of IAIN Jakarta and earned master degree in Islamic Studies in the same university (1999). In 2000 he participated in a joint research on Islamuc Philosophy and Phenomenology in Faculty of Arts, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

After joining CSRC in 2003, Irfan studied about conflict resolution in AMAN's School of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Bangkok, Thailand (2005). His interest in issues in conflicts drove him to participate in an Advanced Course in Security Studies in APCSS, Honolulu, Hawaii (2015). The graduate of Gontor Pesantren has written and edited many books and training modules on various themes, fron Islam Philanthrophy, Islam and Peace, Conflict Resolution, Islam and Human Rights, to Islam and Democracy. He also researched and wrote some articles on the media on Hate Speech issue. Thanks to his works in 2011 he was crowned by *Campus Indonesia Magazine* (August, Vol.5) as one of 20 top Indonesian academics (for humaniora field) under 45 years old. As the expert of hate speech during the last few years Irfan Abubakar

has been regularly invited as a speaker in various seminars and trainings attended by national Indonesian police officers.

Mohamad Nabil finished his elementary and middle studies in Annuqayah Pesantren, Guluk-Guluk, Sumenep, and continued his undergraduate study in Islamic Politic in UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. After that, he got his master degree from Graduate Programme of School of Philosophy Driyarkarya, Jakarta by writing the thesis *Melawan Kapitalisme: Kritik Egalitarianisme G. A. Cohen terhadap Teori Keadilan Libertarianisme Robert Nozick [Combatting Capitalism: Egalitarianism Criticism of G.A. Cohen on Libertarianism Justice Theory of Robert Nozick]*.

ABOUT CSRC

Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture/CSRC is a study and research institution in religious and sociocultural field, established by the Rector Decree of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta on 28 April 2006. This centre is a development of Language and Culture Centre (PBB UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1999-2006), considering the increasing demand to develop religious (especially Islamic) studies and research in sociocultural and political relationships. The purpose is to find out and understand the important roles of religion in order to achieve a fair, prosperous, strong, democratic and peaceful society.

The importance of this development can be seen from the increasing role and influence of religion in public space. Day by day, religion does not only become a conversation topic of all layers in society, in national and international level, but its influence is getting stronger in public space, amid the heavy flow of modernisation and secularisation.

One evidence of the strengthening religion in public space is the growth of identity, symbol, and social institutions with religious undertone. Islamic expression, it must be admitted, gets a strong position in Indonesian public space. However, Islam is not the only entity in that space; there are also other entities that fill our public space. As a teaching, ethical source, and inspirator for the construction of social institutions, Islam often appears in its various expressions, because it is practiced based on multi-interpretations from Muslim communities with different backgrounds. As a result, from various

sources, various Islamic interpretations and sects are born; therefore the noble religious teachings and values are often implemented in a unique undertone. Sometimes it appears in various portraits of exclusivism, but it is not rare for it to be present as social ethic source, inspirator for the development of science and technology, mediator for social integration, as well as motivator for socioeconomic empowerment of civil society. Islam also influences the formation of sociopolitical, economic, and educational institutions that more or less have positive roles in national development. In this context, the presence of Islam in public space is not something to worry about. On the contrary, religious ethics and ethos need to be appreciated by the society and supported by all parties, especially the government.

The presence of CSRC aims to revitalise the religious role in that context. Religion must be actualised in the form of ethics and thos at the same time, in order to influence a good and accountable system formation. In the future, a careful religious transformation needs to be done in order to answer various challenges faced by the people, that is getting more complex day by day, amid the heavy flow of social change and globalisation. Considering the flow of change is faster than the people's ability to upgrade their capacities, an appropriate strategy is required to face it.

In accordance with its duties and roles, CSRC tries to give contribution in research, information, and training sector to facilitate various initiatives that can push the strengthening of civil society thorugh policy development in socioreligious and cultural fields. Hopefully, in the future, Islamic institutions develop to become production centres instead of becoming a social liability. Therefore it is expected that Muslims can increase their roles in sociocultural and economic life in a positive and constructive manner.

CONVEY
INDONESIA

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