

REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS

Lessons from Former NII Activists,
Ex-Gafatar Followers, and ISIS Deportees/Returnees



**Policy Research for Rehabilitation of Former NII Activists,
Ex-Gafatar Followers, and ISIS Deportees/Returnees**
IMCC– PPIM UIN Jakarta – UNDP Indonesia

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CONVEY REPORT

Rehabilitation of Victims:
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and ISIS Deportees/Returnees

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Executive Summary

This study draws upon field research on former members of the Indonesia Islamic State (NII), Fajar Nusantara Movement (Gafatar), and deportees and returnees of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The NII group under study is specifically that of the former NII KW9, a group believed to be led by Panji Gumilang who also ran Al Zaytun, a large Islamic Boarding School (pesantren) in Indramayu. The former Gafatar activists studied here are those who received rehabilitation programs from the government after being forcibly evicted from West Kalimantan for being declared dangerous and perverted. Meanwhile, the ISIS group members here are those who had aspired to join as well as those who had joined the organisation.

With regard to this project titled Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)/ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), NII KW 9 did not include groups believed to be pro-violence, although most of their former activists stated otherwise. This group used religion as a tool for the collection of money on behalf of *infaq* (charity) to build an Islamic State in Indonesia.

The Gafatarians here exclude those believed to be pro-violence. The group itself was found to be focusing on food security and a pluralistic religious life. The existence of this group became a national issue when it was declared heretical and violator of mainstream Islam by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and was accused of committing treason to the state. The members were then subjected to massive violence and their constitutional rights have been ignored by the state to this day.

Meanwhile, ISIS is considered a very dangerous group especially over its propaganda in the name of Islam. It is massively persuading Muslims all over the world to join and immigrate to Syria. Some of the members from Indonesia were deported before arriving in Syria while others arrived but chose to return home to Indonesia. ISIS was declared by the United Nations Security Council resolution on 15 August 2014 as a terrorist organization. On 11 October 2014, the Indonesian government through the courts also stated ISIS as a forbidden terrorist organization.

This research attempted to unravel how former activists, deportees and returnees were interested in joining these groups. It

further describes how they came out of or became separated from the groups. In addition, this paper is expected to be a reference material for policy formulation.

Keywords:

NII, Gafatar, ISIS, Rehabilitation of Victims, Terrorism and Violence, Non-Violence Group

I. BACKGROUND

The journey to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia never seems to disappear. Although its leadership has disappeared and the organization has been declared off limits by the government, there has always been an attempt to revive this movement. To this day, its activity has taken many forms, ranging from smooth to hard movements. Those who move in subtle ways enter members of political parties or community organizations. They openly support the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia and experience in communities, educational institutions, or businesses.

Local regulations of Islamic Shariah are subtle ways that may be undertaken in the forms of community, emerging syariah financial institutions (sharia banks, sharia insurance), hijab syari, integrated Islamic schools, and Islamic property. Meanwhile, those who choose the hard ways are terrorist groups. They want a total change by replacing the existing system. Therefore, they are anti-democracy with various contents. Anyone who disagrees with their group will be considered an enemy and their blood is lawful to shed.

The first group to have ever proclaimed an Islamic state in Indonesia is Darul Islam (DI).¹ This group is believed to be a composite of several Islamic groups, such as Laskar Hizbullah and Sabillillah, scholars and people from farmer groups. The Islamic State founded by this group was called Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). The country was founded on 7 August 1949 in Cisampah village, Cisayong, West Java. Since then, West Java has been the basis of NII movement; even its traces are still strong today.²

Solahudin in a book entitled *NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (NI until JI: Salafy Jihadism in Indonesia)*, describes how fractions of this organization then form a more extreme and more internationally oriented group. The group was named Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) in which some of its elites were involved in acts of terrorism, the biggest being on Bali Bombings on 12 October 2002. Later, some authors also continued JI's journey to the most brutal groups in the modern political context of ISIS, although many believe that more JI transformations are becoming Al-Qaeda rather than ISIS.

1 Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia* (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, Mei 2011), p. 53-77.

2 Holk H. Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo: Angan-Angan yang Gagal* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2011) p. 54-85; and Pusat Rehabilitasi Korban NII, *NII Vs NKRI: Telaah Singkat Penanganan Kasus NII KW9* (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik DKI Jakarta, 2016) (Document).

If its historical thread is to be drawn, it is obvious how the ideology developed by NII has had a significant role in terrorism movements in Indonesia. From 1999 to 2013, many of those involved in the actual bombing of their ideological trajectory were active in NII. They were usually dissatisfied with NII activities that had not changed in terms of movement to establish a true Islamic state. For example, there were Imam Samudra and Mukhlas. Both were main perpetrators of Bali Bombings on 12 October 2012 for which they had been active in NII. Iwan Darmawan, bomber at Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, had also been active in NII Banten. Iwan is now a supporter of ISIS with Aman Abdurahman, a man who was originally a Salafist movement before transforming into a jihadist group supporting ISIS.

Most recent cases clearly reveal that those who have been active in NII are still involved in terrorist acts in Indonesia. An example is the bombing in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta, on 24 May 2017. A person named Asep Sofyan (known Asep Karpet also known as Abu Daffa alias Abda) participated in the bombing that killed three members of mobile-brigade police officers. Thus, in looking at the problem of radicalism in Indonesia it is important to discuss NII, its activities and its former NII. Not only that, their transformation after NII also is interesting to examine and reveal because some of the former NII memers transformed their movements from being rebellious into peaceful ways. This was the starting point of the study.

II. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is based on the results of research on three groups that have been studied in policy research for the rehabilitation of former NII activists, Gafatar and ISIS deported and returnees by the IMCC (2017). The result of this research also included implementing a reentry program in Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren) that included ISIS returnees. First, NII was investigated because this group had contributed significantly to the acts of terrorism in Indonesia, and many former members had become key actors of the terrorist movement. The research focused on the people involved and how they get out of NII KW9 and how they subsequently did social reintegration independently; also whether the government needed to do rehabilitation programs on former NII KW9 members.

There have been several studies on NII. Two of which were quite interestingly written by Holk H Dengel titled *Darul Islam-NII and*

Kartosuwirjo: Angan-Angan yang Gagal (2011) and a book written by Solahudin titled *NII Sampai JII; Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia* (NII to JI; Salafy Jihadism in Indonesia) (2011). The rest are books that discuss the misguidance of NII and the victims of NII.

Secondly, Gafatar has become interestingly researched after some expulsion in some parts of Indonesia, the last one being in West Kalimantan, in 2016. The media coverage narrated of on this group as being a heretical group about to be committing treason against the Indonesian government. Gafatar was accused of treason by the government and declared heretical by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Although its alleged accusations could not be proved in court, the stigmatization of Gafatar as a dangerous group has not recovered and the government has not yet taken any rehabilitation measure to them.

was undertaken in 2016 a research from A research on this organisation was conducted a team from the Research and Development Department of the Ministry of Religion in 2016 in Jakarta; the results were published in the form of a book titled *Peran Pemerintah dalam Penanganan Eks-Gafatar* (or "The Role of Government in handling Ex-Gafatarians." One of the findings is that there is no strong regulation to handle groups such as Gafatar, so local governments have different perspectives in their resolution. The Ministry of Religion in the research still mentioned that Gafatarians were an extremist group.³ Furthermore, two other books were also published about Gafatar: One was , written by Amin Djamaludin; , the other being self-defense notes from Mahful Muis, Ahmad Mushaddeq (a former NII activist who came out in 1996), and Andry Cahya. While Amin wrote accused Gafatar as a heretical group Meanwhile, Mahful and his friends explained about Gafatar and Millah Abraham.

A former Gafatarian interviewed in IMCC research (2017) expressed his disappointment in the government, not in Gafatar. It is important to note that in practice, Gafatar also incorporates Pancasila as an ideology acceptable to the group. Gafatar is also not a pro-violence group. But in fact, as they are opposed by mainstream Islamic groups, Gafatar is regarded as an extremist and is prohibited in Indonesia. Some of its elite leaders (Mahful Muis, Ahmad Mushaddeq, and Andry Cahya⁴) were imprisoned for blasphemizing Islam.

3 Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, *Peran Pemerintah dalam Penanganan Eks Gafatar* (Jakarta: Balai Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama Jakarta, 2016)

4 "Tak Terbukti Makar, Petinggi Eks Gafatar Divonis Lima Tahun" (Tempo, 7 Maret 2017) <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/853574/tak-terbukti-makar-petinggi-eks-gafatar-divonis-lima-tahun>

The third is ISIS, a dangerous group that uses violence to achieve its goals. The government through the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) estimated that about 800-1000 Indonesian traveled to Syria to join the armed groups there (mostly joined ISIS) in the period of 2014-2016. However, the number of people who were deported per December 2017 and who followed the rehabilitation program from the government amounted to only 250 and 18 returnees. Deportees here are people who wanted to “migrate” to Syria to join ISIS, did not manage to reach Syria, and were deported by local authorities. Meanwhile, by returnees we mean people who did reach Syria and joined ISIS, got disappointed with the situation there, and returned to Indonesia. The difference between the two is that deportees still have the desire to migrate to Syria and live under the auspices of Islamic state, whereas returnees no longer have such a wish, even they are deeply disappointed by the condition there that are inconsistent with the nice view they got from some sources on the internet.

With regard to involvement with ISIS, the background and profiles of those involved are no longer linear with that of the NII group. An example is depicted in Triyono’s case. Triyono was an employee of the Ministry of Finance who quit his job to join ISIS in Syria. Prior to joining, he was deported by the Turkish government in 2017. Besides him, former chairman of Depok-West Java National Youth Committee (KNPI), Dody Riyanto (2000-2013) also reportedly joined ISIS. Neither Triyono nor Dedy had any radical background.

The research used qualitative methods by conducting structured interviews and literature reviews. The focus emphasized on how they got involved in the first place and how they got out of the groups. The number of respondents interviewed was 46 people, comprising 20 ex-NII, 16 ex-Gafatarians, and 10 families of ISIS deportees and returnees. This study was conducted from August 2017 to February 2018.

III. NII TERRITORY AND NON-TERRITORY

Broadly speaking, there are two major thoughts within the NII faction, namely the fundamentalist and the pragmatic. The fundamentalist NII is a group that puts forward strict Islamic teachings (Salafi Jihad) in the pattern of its struggle. This group is strongly upholding its ideology and principles. The fundamentalist NII is represented by a group led by Abdullah Sungkar, Ajengan Masduki, and Gaos Taufik.⁵

5 Solahudin, *NII Sampai Ji: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia* (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, Mei 2011), p. 227-233.

A. Sekarmadji Maridjan (SM) Kartosoewirjo, Founder of NII¹

Kartosoewirjo was a scholar. His last education was at *Nederlandsch Indische Artsen School* (NIAS), the Dutch East Indies medical school in Surabaya. He was also initially known as a freedom fighter, a prominent figure of the Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), and a student of H.O.S. Cokroaminoto. He was self-taught in Islamic knowledge, primarily from reading Dutch translation works. Just after his marriage, Kartosoewirjo influenced religious views of a few people, including his father-in-law (who was an *anjengan* or local kyai) and West Java scholars, especially from Malangbong. The idea of an Islamic State had been initiated by Kartosoewirjo since he was active in political parties. However, it was only in 1948 that NII became maturely initiated by like-minded West Javanese clerics as well as Masjumi politicians, PSII, and army military in Hizbullah and Sabilillah. As far as his religious background was concerned, Kartosoewirjo was not as adequately knowledgeable or experienced as Achmad Dahlan (founder of Muhammadiyah) or Hasyim Ashary (founder of Nahdlatul Ulama or NU).

Meanwhile, the pragmatic NII proponents want an establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia by making every means possible in its process, regardless of its own Islamic values. This includes working with anyone who helps the program, regardless of their ideological or religious differences. This pragmatic group is represented by Abu Karim Hasan and Abu Toto, also known as Panji Gumilang. The NII leadership of Abu Toto was also known as NII Region IX (NII KW9) or NII Al Zaytun.⁶

At the same time, however, these two scholars shared a common goal of making Indonesia an Islamic state and of replacing Pancasila with the Islamic Sharia as a source of law. Both streams have had many supporters whereas the other NII group that lies between the two groups of thoughts, do not have a significant number of supporters. NII fundamentalists generally recruit members of young people who have good religious knowledge. The rationale of Islam is very strong in determining the direction of the struggle. While the pragmatic NII recruit members of youth who have low knowledge in Islam but have high spirit. The basis of the struggle is to justify any means against the

6 Pusat Rehabilitasi Korban NII, *NII Vs NKRI: Telaah Singkat Penanganan Kasus NII KW9* (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik DKI Jakarta, 2016) (Dokumen).

enemy, regardless of religious values.⁷

The fundamentalist NII led by Abdullah Sungkar then left NII in 1993 and formed Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). JI developed international affiliations with militant organizations with global goals, in contrast with NII, which still focuses on national-level objectives. After Abdullah Sungkar passed away in 1999, his followers who were affiliated with international jihad groups opted for Jihad with terrors to fight America and its allies. Some of its fractional members then carried out several terrorist bombings in Indonesia, the biggest one being Bali Bombing on 12 October 2002 that killed 202 people.

To garner networking support and file operators in committing acts of terror, JI members recruited other like-minded NII activists, such as NII Ajengan Masduki and Gaos Taufik. As a result, most terrorists came from the same root. Meanwhile, NII pragmatists (NII KW9) do not use terror in their action. However, the recruitment by Abu Toto group spurred recruitment of terrorist candidates by laying down militancy against NKRI and hatred to it.⁸

These two thoughts, in subsequent developments, are also referred to as NII territory and NII Non-Territory. NII Territory is a group of NII followers who claim to be connected in leadership with the first NII leader, Kartosoewirjo. This faction was held by Panji Gumilang known as Abu Toto. They called it NII Territory because this group had a clear territory, namely Al-Zaytun Pesantren in Indramayu, West Java. This group is also known as NII KW9, which has undergone some evolution of its movement.⁹

Meanwhile, NII Non-Territory is NII faction that has no clear territory. The group was later believed to have many activists who migrated to pro-violence (terrorist) Islamic groups. Pro-violence group led by Abu Umar, the Book Bombing group Pepi Fernando, Santoso Daeng Koro Group, and Kuningan Bombers, Heri Gulun are examples of this group. In addition to this, these groups have also mixed with

7 Pusat Rehabilitasi Korban NII, *NII Vs NKRI: Telaah Singkat Penanganan Kasus NII KW9* (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik DKI Jakarta, 2016) (Document).

8 Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia* (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, Mei 2011); Pusat Rehabilitasi Korban NII, *NII Vs NKRI: Telaah Singkat Penanganan Kasus NII KW9* (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik DKI Jakarta, 2016) (Document).

9 The results of Program Design Workshop, "Research Policy for Mentoring Former NII, GAFATAR Members Convicts and ISIS Deportees and Piloting Re-Entry Program for Gafatar Members" are organized by IMCC PPIM UIN Jakarta, UNDP through Indonesia Convey Program in Bogor 29-31 August 2017 document).

other ideologies such as Salafi, Ikhwanul Muslimin and Syiah.¹⁰

However, it does not mean there are no members of NII KW9 group who migrated to terrorism. Examples here are the bomber in front of the Australian Embassy, Iwan Darmawan (also known as Rois, former member of NII Banten) and Wihara Bombe Miko (former member of NII Jember). Iwan once donated gold to Al-Zaytun while he was still active in NII KW9. Iwan's group is also known as Ring Banten. The group broke away from NII KW9 and later took part in a terrorist network commanded by Dulmatin during the military training in Aceh in 2010.¹¹

A number of acts of terrors were perpetrated by former NII KW9 followers. Among others, in 1999 they committed an act of terror in Mosque Istiqlal and plotted the assassination of the then Minister of Defense, Matori Abdul Jalil. The perpetrators were from the military wing of NII Battalion of Abu Bakar Company F, or known as the Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN) led by Yoyok. Other terrors included the Christmas bomb and Kuningan Bomb in 2004; book bombs, Sukoharjo bombs, and Tim Ightiyalat in 2011; terror to police in 2012; a bomb-action plot at Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta 2013; and the bombing in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta. Some of these perpetrators were former NII activists.

B. Asep Sofyan Case: From NII to Kampung Melayu Bomb¹²

The case of Asep Sofyan displays that anyone who has been active in NII can in the next stage embrace terrorism. The story of Asep also shows the stages involved before engaging in terrorism networks.

Asep was born in Bandung on 3 October 1980. His interest in Islamic studies began in 2009. At that time, he was a scholar of Darul Tauhid Pesantren in Geger Kalong Girang, Bandung, belonging to the famous Da'i Abdullah Gymnastiar. In his third year there, Asep thought he still did not get what he wanted to learn about Islam. In 2011, he decided to join NII after someone named Rudi invited him from Sumedang. This ignited further Asep's intention to learn and understand religion in its perfection. When studying Islam under Rudi, Asep was required to pay a charitable tuition of IDR 3,000. Asep always paid more than IDR 20,000. The money given was then used for da'wah activities.

10 Result of Workshop Desain Program, Bogor 29-31 Agustus 2017.

11 Result of Workshop Desain Program, Bogor 29-31 Agustus 2017.

12 Document of Indictment on behalf of Asep Sofyan aka Asep Carpet aka Abu Daffa aka Abda (Kejaksaan Negeri Jakarta Utara, 2 November 2017).

In 2012, Asep invites his brother, Riki, to join and study under Rudi. NII recitation was carried out from one place to another, including at Asep's own house. From the recitation routine, Asep became acquainted with other members and the activity lasted until 2015. Asep also participated in the study of ANAS (National Alliance of Anti Shi'ah) group at Al-Fajr Mosque, Bandung, West Java. He routinely attended it once a week on Wednesday night, which was led by Ustadz Rahmad Baiquni. The content of the recitation was about the movement of Shiite apostasy of Iranian Shi'ah in Bandung. According to the study, Shi'ah in Bandung was founded by Al-Mutahari Foundation led by Jalaludin Rahmat.

In 2015 Asep met Kang Soleh, a former NII activist, who visited Asep's house in Babakan Sangkuriang. They talked about how NII had gone wrong, namely: firstly, NII claimed that they were the Islamic State in Indonesia; secondly, NII did not follow the Sunnah, and; thirdly, NII conducted a wrong way of baiat, which was directed to God, whereas baiat was supposedly be directed to the leader of Islamic group.

Later in the same year, Asep quit from NII because there was a misunderstanding of tauhid. At the end of 2015, with the presence of ISIS, Asep took interest in studying in this organization. Asep was then invited to join Kang Soleh's network at Jamaah Ansharu Daulah (JAD) Bandung to support ISIS. Intrigued by Kang Soleh's invitation, he finally swore allegiance to Abu Bakar Al-Bagdadi, the ISIS leader.

Furthermore, Kang Soleh invited Asep to follow recitation activities in his house, at Kamika Street, Bandung. The weekly recitation was run every Monday night after the Isha prayer. The contents of this recitation varied from monotheism, recognition of the nature of *syirik* (heresy), also the prophets' creeds. Asep joined the recitation for about a year. However, the recitation had to be dissolved because Kang Soleh was arrested by police in early 2017 as he was involved in a bombing terror case in Cicendo, Bandung. The news of Kang Soleh was arrested was known through a Telegram account called Motor Racing. Afterwards, Asep reminded himself of Kang Soleh's arrest by paying charities to him and to the Mujahiddins' wives.

Prior to that, in early February of 2015, after ISIS was declared in Bundaran HI, Jakarta, Asep was invited by Kang Soleh to get to Khairul Anam in Miftahul Huda Pesantren, Karawang. Khairul Anam was the Amir (leader) pf JAD of West Java. There were already Abu Sofi, Abu Faiz, Fani, Ustadz Ujang, and Rizal. They were then coaxed

by Khariul Anam to be loyal to Abu Bakar Al-Bagdadi, the ISIS leader. In that meeting, Ujang had chosen Asep's house as the venue of to meet with other JAD members, also as part of the structure of JAD in Bandung.

During his time joining JAD, Asep heard about the plan for a shelter, as a result of a meeting at Cimahi in March 2017, for them (Wives of husbands arrested by the police). The house was sold by Kang Soleh at IDR 130 million and would be paid by JAD members by a joint venture. Asep, serving as treasurer, collected the money by using his own BRI bank account. It was Kang Jajang who conceived the idea of establishing such a shelter. The idea arose because many men had been arrested by the police.

On 24 May 2017 two JAD Bandung members named Sukri and Ichwan Nurul Salam committed a suicide bombing in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta. It killed three police officers and wounded several people. Earlier, on 27 February 2017, a member of JAD Bandung, Yayat Cahdiyati, who was also a former terrorist prisoner, plotted a suicide bombing in Arjuna Urban Village office, Cicendo Sub-district, Bandung using a pan bomb, which was a *triacetone triperoxide* (TATP) explosive type. The bomb accidentally exploded itself before it blasted.

On 19 May 2017, a recitation was held at the As-Sunah Mosque. They discussed three points in religion. First, to keep God truthfully; second, the virtue of Jihad as the pinnacle of charity in Islam. The recitation was conducted after the Friday prayer led by Ustadz Iqbal, followed by Abu Hasan (Ahmad Sukri), Iwan Nurul Salam, Suyitna Waris, Abu Rehan, Renal, Dian, Tedi, Kang Ocu, Muslih, Seno, Rijal, Si Mas, Kang Zamzam, Kang Wahid, Ilham, Fauzan Amir, Sulton, and Heri.

The jihad referred to in the Quran is to fight infidels. The unbelievers to whom we have the right to fight are the genuine infidels, namely the Jews, the Christians, and the Syiah. Apostate disbelievers, i.e. people who come out of Islamic Shari'ah, then are kafir *thogut*, including the government that does not run the shariah of Islam (Allah) and the law implementers such as the police, military and civil servants. The study also taught that Jihad could be pursued by suicide bombing. Jihad suicide could be done by throwing sharp weapons, firing with firearms or blowing oneself up to the main target of the police.

The recitation also exemplified the incidence of a suicide bombing in a music concert in England. According to Asep, the recitation was very interesting and he was motivated to perform jihad by migrating to

Syria to join ISIS. As we know, the bombers in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta Sukri and Ichwan participated in that recitation. Asep's case shows that radicalization still occurs. Young people like Asep, Sukri and Ichwan are particularly vulnerable to being recruited by radical groups of pro-violence.

IV. GAFATAR, NON-VIOLENT YET FORBIDDEN

The case of Gafatar became most intriguing after MUI issued a false fatwa in 2016 and thousand of its members had to be evacuated from its hijrah site in Mempawah, West Kalimantan. Gafatar vouches itself as not a pro-violence group. As it is written in point 2 of Gafatar's oaths, "I will not steal, nor commit adultery, nor kill, nor lie, and will be virtuous and will do good to others."¹³

In many of their campaigns, this group showed its support to the ideology of Pancasila. According to Gafatar, Pancasila ideology has been proven historically to bring peace and prosperity to the archipelago.¹⁴ In fact, Gafatar also said that Pancasila as a set of noble values had to be actualized so that the the principles of Pancasila could become a guide in every line of life.¹⁵ In many ways, Gafatar's teachings cited of Indonesian ancestors-- from Jangka Jayabaya in the book of Musarar, Palon-Nayagenggong, Serat Darmongandul, Uga Wangsit Siliwangi, to Ronggowarsito about Satrio Pininggit.¹⁶ According to research results from the Research Team of the Jakarta Religion Institute, the handling of Gafatar case in the future should be a model for completion of similar religious flows in the future.¹⁷ This is despite the fact that their deprived constitutional rights are still ignored by the government.

Ahmad Mushadeq and Millah Abraham

Abdussalam, known also as Ahmad Mussadeq, was the spiritual leader of Gafatar. Speaking of Gafatar almost necessitates a discussion on this figure. Mussadeq began to be active in the Islamic movement when he was studying the Isa Bugis Group. Then he joined NII group in 1987. In the early 80s, NII Jakarta area was led by Abu Karim Hasan who popularized the monotheism of Mabadi Tsalasah, which

13 Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, *Peran Pemerintah dalam Penanganan Eks Gafatar* (Jakarta: Balai Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama Jakarta, 2016), p. 41.

14 Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, p. 39.

15 Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, p. 37.

16 Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, ... p. 39

17 Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, ... p. 377

is now used as the main doctrine of NII under the leadership of Panji Gumilang.

When active as one of the leaders of NII Jakarta, Mushadeq used a nickname of Hilmy Mubasyir. He declared an exit from NII in 1996 for having different views from those of the current leader, Panji Gumilang. Upon exiting, Mushadeq was still coordinating with Tahmid Kartosoewirjo to continue his work in NII. However, the move ran aground; in the vision of NII figure Panji Gumilang no one was in accordance with his progressive views. In 1998, Mushadeq broke free from Tahmid Kartosoewirjo and other old NII figures.

With comrades sharing his vision, Mushadeq formed a new entity to fulfil his dream. In 2000, he formed Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyah, said to be a rival of NII leader Panji Gumilang. The monotheism it used actually remained the same as that of Mabadi Tsalasah, but the naming system of its organizational structure was different. All patterns in the movement such as its recruitment, baiat, doctrine to the program were relatively similar to that of NII.

The change of his teachings took place when Mushadeq felt he had had a divine revelation. According to him he was appointed as "Rasul Al-Masih Al-Maw'ud" on 23 July 2006 after staying ascetic on Gunung Bunder Bogor for 40 days and 40 nights. He claimed himself to be appointed as "Rasul" right on the fortieth day of his hermitage. Mushadeq did this based on the example of Prophet Musa and Prophet Isa. The development of this teachings took place fast. Approximately 1,000 new followers were recruited each month, spreading to West Sumatra, East Java, Yogyakarta, Riau, and Sulawesi.

The number of Al Qiyadah followers is estimated to reach 41,000 in nine regions in Indonesia including Jakarta, Lampung and Makassar. The majority of its members are students (about 60%). According to the police records, its followers in Jakarta amount to 8,972 people whereas in Central Java, especially Tegal, they reach 511, led by Ejam Muhtadi; and in Cilacap the number stands at 1,444, led by David Fatonah. In Yogyakarta, 5,144 followers are recorded, led by Mushadeq himself, 60% of whom are students.

In Surabaya it has 2,610 followers, led by Muzakir. In the region of West Sumatra, its members are scattered in Padang at about 1,306, led by Malik Akbar. In Lampung it reaches 1,467, led by Muhyidin Al Muntajar; in Batam, 2,320, by Yozua Ibn Khatab; and in Makassar Sulawesi, 4,101 by Imam Khawari.

The activities carried out by Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyyah include the “Six Programs”, which are: *qiyamullail* (tahajjud for muslims and contemplation for adherents of other religions), *tahfidz* Al-Quran (memorizing the Qur’an verses and their meanings, and Quran-based insights), *talwiyah* (dakwah/sermons), taklim (scholarship), sedekah (alms for operational activities), and shaff (arrangement) for da’wah series, including appointment, transfer and dismissal of the board membership.

The cadres of male congregations are appointed voluntarily after forty days joining Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyyah. They have to receive special training including on the understanding of Qur’an, missions, history, and emerging ideologies, as well as knowledge about the whole characters of faithful adherents, especially of Islam and Christianity. Those who have reached the level of Buruj and Shiraj will get education of martial arts and physical endurance. They are required to be able to operate computers and support administrative activities. Meanwhile, women congregations are usually married off to fellow male members to support each other in the activities.

On 29 October 2007, Mushadeq and six of his followers surrendered to Metro Jaya police headquarters and was prosecuted by the law. On 9 September 2007, Mushadeq declared his “conversion” after discussions with Said Agil Siradj, Agus Miftah, and Bachtial Ali. He then uttered the two-sentence creed and withdrew his claim as a prophet, promising to be obedient to the Shari’a of Islam, the pillars of Islam, and the pillars of faith. Since then, Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyah has dissolved. On 23 April 2008, Mushadeq was sentenced to four years in prison at South Jakarta District Court. He was charged under Article 156a of the Criminal Code on the Blasphemy of Religion. After the verdict in 2009, Mushadeq founded the Millah Abraham Community (Komar), which later became the way of life to establish Gafatar on 14 August 2011.

Gafatar declared by 14 DPD on 21 January 2012 in Kemayoran, Jakarta. Due to the many pressures from society and MUI Fatwa also due to the difficulty in obtaining the registered permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs, finally, on April 2015, Gafatar was disbanded. On 7 March 2017, the East Jakarta District Court panel sentenced Mushadeq to five years in prison together with its elite official named Mahful Muis. They were subjected to articles of the Criminal code (KUHP) on the religious blasphemy, particularly Article 107 of the criminal code on an evil conspiracy to commit treason. Relating the case to the demands of treason, the judge finally disproved all allegations as

unproven, so that all the three were acquitted of treason.

The false fatwa and allegations of being harmful to the state apparently were also acquitted of Mushadeq. MUI ordered the making of his fatwa to be removed from Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyah although, in fact, Mushadeq had learned his lessons. The government suspected that Mushadeq belonged to NII, which had wanted to overthrow the Indonesian government. In this case, MCC declared Gafatar as heretical and dangerous because it was associated with NII. This is considered the same as the legacy of the Communist Party of Indonesia.¹⁸

V. LESSONS FROM THOSE INVOLVED

A few major findings of this research can be used as a reference to understand how perpetrators became involved in their groups.

Based on the interviews on general issues, they joined NII and Gafatar because they knew some close people therein or got invited by close friends, relatives, or teachers. These patterns are commonly found in many other organizations. In the language of Marc Sageman, this model in the case of Al-Qaeda is referred to as social affiliation with the form of friendship, kinship, and discipleship. Most people involved in terrorism cases led by Al-Qaeda are also due to such models.¹⁹

The reason why deportees/returnees wanting to join the extremist group of ISIS is because of the influence from the media, especially the social media. This as expressed by Nurshadrina.²⁰ She went to Syria because she was interested in the narration of hijrah and Islamic Caliphate in Syria that is widely disseminated on social media. Nursahdrina was one of the 18 returnees who made it back to Indonesia after escaping ISIS. Nur was the second child of Joko Wiwoho and Ratna Nirmala. Her father was then director of the Integrated Services One-Door Entity Agency (BP) in Batam. Nur was forced to quit school while in her second grade of high school because she decided to move to Syria.

Nur said she would often read from websites that compelled fellow Muslims of their obligation to emigrate. The command of hijra is to the blessed earth of Sham. In addition, the lure is obtainment of a guaranteed life as in the time of the khilafah during by Prophet of

18 Results of Public Discussions of Research on Non-Violent Yet Forbidden Groups organized by IMCC in cooperation with PPIM UIN Jakarta and UNDP through Convey Indonesia program, in Jakarta on 22 March 2018.

19 Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 107-119.

20 The Interview Result IMCC with Nurshadrina on 20 October 2017 in Depok, West Java.

Muhammad, which caused the prophet and the family to move to Syria. Nur explained that the motive of herself and her family in going to Syria was because of the promised prosperity of life of freedom and decency that got propagated. They also believed that the land of Sham (territory of Syria and its surroundings) was a blessed country. Apart from being the place of the Imam Mahdi, the country of Sham is a country that implements the Islamic Shariah so that the opportunity to live as an entirely complete moslem under the umbrella of the Caliphate can be implemented.

Social media have had a strong appeal to influence people, especially of the ISIS ideology. Take for example, a case experienced by Ade Ahmad aka Abu Daud aka Abu Marwah.²¹ Ade was arrested by Densus 88 Police on 8 January 2016 at a house in Koja, Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. He was involved in throwing a Molotov at a minibus car with the TV One logo on the celebration of New Year's Eve 2016 in Bandung Square. Ade himself was born in Bandung on 17 January 1967. Since early 2014, he had followed the news about the conflict in the Middle East, especially news the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Syria. Then, he began to join a group account on Facebook that discussed the khilafah in Syria, where he also befriended fellow Facebook users who support the establishment of the khilafah. In the group profile, Ade was involved in discussions about the conflict in the Middle East, the formation of the Islamic Daulah led by Abu Bakar Al-Bagdadi, and about migrating to Syria for jihad.

In addition, Ade also joined an anti-Shia group. In the group, Ade said that the perpetrators of violence in the Syrian conflict were the Shi'ah and the victims were the Sunnis. In Syria, the regime was being led by Shi'ah groups. The group also discussed Shiah as not being a part of Islam. Shi'ah is a heretic; Iran is a Shiah group. Ade also joined ANNAS (National Alliance of Anti-Shia Alliance).

In 2015, Ade befriended onFacebook Iben alias Ahmad Sharif and Abdullah Syafei aka Abdullah Azzam. They were in the group of Abu Umar in North Jakarta. They were friends because of one view of the presence of the Islamic Daulah in Syria and Shi'ah apostasy. Since then, Ade has often re-shared news about Daulah Islam in Syria and Shi'ah. During interacting with them, Ade became aware of the concept of monotheism, *al-wala walbara* (loyal only to Islam or, otherwise, disloyal), and while supporting the Islamic state, he had

21 Document the Indictment on behalf of *Ade Ahmad alias Abu Daud aka Abu Marwah* (Kejaksanaan Negeri Jakarta Timur, May 2016)

to be loyal to the daulah's orders. Ade also believed that jihad was obligatory for every Muslim. The jihad in question was fighting Shi'ah because they had slaughtered the Sunni group in Syria. Their jihad also included fighting America and its allies for helping arms, funding, military training, and bombing operations in Syria harming Muslims.

However, because they could not emigrate to do jihad to Syria, they agreed to carry out these jihad actions in their own country, more specifically in Bandung area with the target of Shi'ah groups. It is commonly known that the largest population of Shia groups in Indonesia is in Bandung.

Furthermore, in the case of NII, the religious knowledge of its recruited members was commonly average and, as a result, they were easily deceived by doctrines on religious concepts such as heaven, hijra, Islamic state, martyrdom, jihad, and economic aid in the Islamic state. In the case of Gafatar, they were attracted because of the promises and expectations of economic prosperity, as well as social activities. As for the case with ISIS deportees/returnees, they were interested in the concept of the end of the age to come in the country of Sham, the land of the blessed caliphate, and there was also a yearning [for wives] to follow husbands who had gone there first.

The concept of heaven promised to NII recruiters can bewitch those with little understanding of Islam. This was experienced by Agus Dedi who was known as Ahmad Shodiq.²² Agus was a former activist of NII KW9. He was recruited into NII by his friend in 1992. At that time, Agus was known as a thug who liked to pick a fight. Therefore, the promise of heaven to be pursued by way of jihad into enlightenment made him want to apply immediately. In addition, there was also hope for free education later for his children. For Agus by becoming a member of NII, he would be able to get the prosperity in this world and hereafter.

Agus was born in Bandung on 17 August 1967. Before entering NII, he worked as an employee in a spare part workshop in Bandung. His father was an odd worker, while his mother was a tailor. His last education was junior high. Economically constrained Agus did not continue his education. When he first joined NII, Agus had to perform stages such as *baiat* to be faithful to NII, emigrated from the state of Indonesia to NII, and afterwards committed to building NII by charity and alms each month. Due to his courage and expertise in automotive,

²² The interview result of IMCC Research Team with Agus Dedi aka Ahmad Shodiq on 28 September 2017 in Bandung, West Java.

Agus was immediately placed as a KW7 lajnah staff covering South West Java. He is in charge of arranging all the security and sustainability of NII activities, such as the process of hijra, munakahat, and tahkim wal tribunal.

Agus was a bachelor before joining NII. He got married in 1995 with a NII woman, witnessed by Abu Fatin--governor of KW7 who was still a DPO of the National Police Headquarters for alleged treason. Agus with his wife then lived in accordance with the location of the headquarters of its activities in NII. As a commitment to building NII by giving charity and alms each month, Agus recruited people to join NII. His recruiting targets were his own family. From her parents to her five younger siblings, all of them were baptized to NII. Agus's last position at NII was as staff of Lajnah Tanfidziyah KW7.

However, in the case of deportees wanting to join ISIS, some of their motive was not just because of religious reason. For example, the account below was expressed by Ahbar Muzakir.²³

Ahbar was born in Bogor on 27 August 1982. He was educated in UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta majoring in Psychology. However, when he entered semester 3 he decided to quit college. Ahbar also had time to study at the Institute of Islamic Studies and Arabic in Cibinong, Bogor. During his time, Ahbar claimed himself an alumnus of Khusnul Khotimah pesantren in Kuningan. He also was actively involved in the organization of Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) Branch Ciputat when still at the faculty of Psychology UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. Ahbar also followed the recitation activities organized by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

In 2017, Ahbar Muzakir was deported by the Turkish government as he was about to migrate to Syria. Ahbar said that the departure of his hijrah was based on his own desire, not the solicitation or coercion by others. Ahbar also said that his intense desire to emigrate was driven by his sense of empathy during the war in Syria in 2012. Seeing the news of the war that occurred in Syria, Ahbar admitted of directly registering himself as a volunteer, but to no avail. In addition, his hijrah motivation was also based on his understanding of the Book of *Al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah*, a book on how the beginning of man until the Day of Resurrection.

Ahbar also believed in end-time traditions, like *ya'tu 'alaika bil syam*, which means "go you to Sham." In surah *al-Isra* verse 76, it

²³ The interview result of IMCC Research Team with Ahbar Muzakir on 4 October 2017 in Bogor, West Java.

is mentioned that Sham is the land of the prophets so that when the end of time, Sham will become the earth of hijrah for the Muslims. However, before that happens, there will be tremendous slander among them in wars. The statement Ahbar learned from hadith *malhamah kubra*, is that there will be no doom until you fight with 80 flags. One flag is 12,000 troops. Despite failing to migrate to Syria, Ahbar believed that his intention had been recorded by Allah as the practice of his pilgrimage hijrah. Ahbar said that if there as an opportunity to volunteer again, he would do it again.

He was arrested by the Turkish Government and was jailed for approximately 1 month. During the process of detention and investigation, Ahbar admitted that Turkish police treatment was good enough. However, he regretted the process of his arrest at a gunpoint in front of his wife and children. After being deported from Turkey, Ahbar obtained a rehabilitation program from the Indonesian government. The rehabilitation process was carried out for approximately one month at Marsudi Putra Handayani Social Institution (PSMP Handayani) under the coordination of the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2017.

According to Ahbar, as he quoted the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, there are five phases in leadership. The first is the prophetic phase; the second phase is of *Khulafaurrasyidin*, namely Abu Bakr Ash-Shiddiq, Umar bin Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali bin Abi Talib. The third, the start-up phase of *'adlan* or royal system, is begun by Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan. Furthermore there is a phase of *mulkan jabbariyyan* or dictator leadership system. The last phase is khilafah phase of *'ala min hajjinnubuwwah*. Ahbar strongly believed in this hadith.

This is different from the case of Gafatar. Many of the respondents interviewed were former NII KW 9 members who harbored disappointment at Panji Gumilang's leadership and eventually quit. When invited to join Gafatar with Ahmad Mushadeq as its spiritual figure, they joined. Rudi Handoko and Muhammad Syamsudin were examples,²⁴ both former NII KW 9 activists. Rudi Handoko was born in Bogor on 6 June 1964. He was domiciled in Parung District, Bogor Regency. Previously, in 1993, he was active as an NII member. His extended family was of Betawi ethnicity. His education was up to being a junior high school graduate. Before joining Gafatar in 2014 after a friend's invitation while still a member of NII, he was a traveling food

²⁴ The interview results of IMCC Research Team with Muhammad Syamsudin on 4 October 2017 in Bogor, West Java.

vendor in local schools.

He went to West Kalimantan to join a Gafatar program that promised him a piece of land for food security. He sold all his possessions worth of Rp 10 million and took his wife and two children along. Together with other Gafatar members from Bogor district, he was placed in village Landak of Ngabang district. His first activity was to open land for rice cultivation and various vegetables. However, before enjoying the harvest season, he was repatriated by the government due to unrest in Mempawah area. He still retains his West Kalimantan ID card.

Meanwhile, Muhammad Syamsudin, from Jakarta, was born on 6 February 1970. Domiciled in Parung district, of Bogor regency, he used to be called Isya. Previously, he was a member of NII in Jakarta. He was of Betawi ethnic origin. He worked in a car interior shop daily. In 2010, he went to East Kalimantan to start his own car interior service business. He then met a member of Gafatar who was a professor and who got his interest to join the organization. In his view, its program was real humanitarian and social. Finally, he was asked to become chairman of the City Leadership Council (DPK) in Samarinda, East Kalimantan.

Muhammad later worked with the Governor of East Kalimantan, Awang Farouk Ishak, in social action and blood donation activities in Samarinda City. In early 2016, he was repatriated simultaneously by the government due to unrest in Mempawah. Yet at that time, his car interior business had grown rapidly that allowed him to accumulate some land assets in East Kalimantan. At the time of his return, he was adjudicated by the village and told to reread the two-sentence *shahadah*. Until now, he still believes in the teachings of Gafatar because it does not contradict the ideology of Pancasila. Currently, he returns to work as an interior car and sofa repairman at his home.

To non-former NII activists, interest in joining Gafatar is usually driven by the promise of prosperity that is the domain of the Gafatar campaign, especially in food security. An example is the story of Kasdirin.²⁵ He was born in Pekalongan, on 11 November 1958, and lived at Kampung Setu RT.001 / 005. 24 Bojong Gede Village Bojong Gede District, Bogor Regency. He only graduated from junior high school. He joined as a member of Gafatar as his friend was invited to become a construction worker in Bekasi. Kasdirin also attended various Gafatar programs in the social actions of the community environment and the

²⁵ The interview of IMCC Research Team with Kasdirin on 6 October 2017 in Bogor, West Java.

action of blood donation. Finally, in 2015, he participated in the Gafatar program to West Kalimantan in Mempawah area. However, after just 2 months settling there, he was also repatriated by the government due to unrest in the area. His main motive to live in West Kalimantan was economic; he went there by ship with high hopes to improve his family welfare. Despite his old age, Kasdirin still lives in his parents' home. Even today, he still believes in Gafatar. His current profession is selling children's toys.

Friendship is the most important factor in understanding why someone joins a certain group. An offer or invitation from a close friend can make it all the more interesting. In the case of ISIS, however, people joined because of the radicalization of social media; the narratives were more or less the same as the ones on hijrah, jihad, and living under the auspices of the Islamic state that became its pullers. From this lesson, ulama's role is important in explaining that those narratives are not to be used to justify violence. In the case of Gafatar, the presence of this group is crucial when the government has not seemed to focus its policy on the welfare of society. Groups like Gafatar will always draw attention when a government has not succeeded in optimally prospering the people.

VI. LESSONS FROM QUITTERS

In addition to understanding how they belong to certain groups, another important thing is how they opted out of the groups--except in the case of Gafatar. It is important to learn how they can be released, and how coaching should be done, including how to keep them from falling back to other groups of similar opinions in cases of NII and ISIS. In 2007, a group advocating NII activists who came out as NII Crisis Center noted there were about 70,000 NII quitters. Some of them opted out of the NII after experiencing some kind of inner shock; some moved to similar organizations²⁶ such as terrorism movements, and even out of Islam.²⁷ However, not a few of them became moderate.²⁸

One of the factors that NII activists left the organization was because they were disappointed with their leader's behavior and

26 Abdullah Baraja is a former NII activist who founded Khilafatul Muslimin. Moreover, several people involved in the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) are former NII activists such as Irfan S. Awwas.

27 Syaifudin Ibrahim is a former teacher council member in Al Zaitun and has now converted to Christianity.

28 For this case it could refer to a group founded by former NII KW 9 and NII Crisis Center members, many of whom later became moderate in their thinking.

misappropriation of the religious shari'a. This disillusionment in John Horgan's term is called a *psychological disengagement* of someone out of disappointment; the fact that happens does not match what one hopes for. Horgan gives an example of a Jemaah Islamiyah activist, Nasir Abbas, who left his organization out of disappointment with the actions of his group that attacked innocent people. It is important to note that when they leave the NII, it does not mean they are joining any other moderate group. Former NII members have contributed significantly to bombing in Indonesia since 1999-2017.

As for the case of Gafatar, on average none of them expressed disappointment over Gafatar. In general, they are disappointed with the government's policy of evacuating them from Kalimantan. Suparta is one of the respondents who have lived more than a year with the Gafatar community in West Kalimantan. During that time he felt his life was economically and socially much better than before. For example, his livestock business in West Kalimantan with Gafatar has improved. Another respondent, Agus Supriyadi, said that there was nothing wrong in Gafatar because Gafatar did *not* disagree with Pancasila. In addition, campaign activities were only about food security which, according to Agus, actually helped the Indonesian government.²⁹

On the other hand, in cases of deportees that have never reached the destination, no one expressed disappointment towards the ISIS. In fact, they still have a desire to migrate and live under the auspices of Islam. Returnees who have felt and reached the destination expressed disappointment towards ISIS because what was spread through the media did not resemble actual facts. Adnan Ruswandi, for example, said that most importantly he had the intention to move and have the desire to stay under the auspices of the caliphate.³⁰ Compared to returnees, deportees still have strong ideologies about their support for ISIS. Moreover, three deportees who had received a rehabilitation program from the Indonesian government were then arrested by Densus 88 for planning terrorism acts.

Nurshadrina is one of the respondents. A returnee, she was one of 18 returnees who managed to return to Indonesia after escaping ISIS. She and her family went from Indonesia and intended to stay under the auspices of Islam. According to the news that she got from the internet, living under the auspices of ISIS would be completely

29 The interview results of IMCC Research Team with Agus Supriyadi on 6 Oktober 2017.

30 The interview results of IMCC Research Team with Adnan Ruswandi on October 6, 2017.

free and blessed as in the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Once she arrived there, the fact was far from reality. She and her family decided to leave the ISIS region to return to Indonesia.³¹

Therefore, in formulating a strategy to handle this issue, it is important to take the lessons from the stakeholders--in this case those who came out--by reviewing this question: whether or not they have disappointment towards the group. It can be used as an initial assessment for the government, in this case BNPT. Our research proves that people who are disappointed with their group are much more likely to follow the deradicalization program than those who have not been disappointed. He who is disappointed is already out of his group. While he who has not been disappointed still has confidence in it. Moreover, the process of deradicalization to bring them in the moderate direction is also important, especially for BNPT. An exception to the case here is a former Gafatar who was disappointed with the government. Therefore, it is important for the government to immediately restore its good name among others by returning or restoring their constitutional rights.

VII. RESPONSE TO NII, GAFATAR, AND ISIS

So far, the handling of this problem concerns that done as emergency response only. The government seems to act after the case or event, while the preventive aspect is not a priority. The presence of the Terrorism Act in 2003 is a response to the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. In addition, until now Indonesian government has not yet had regulations to deal with the global terrorist movements, such as the emergence of ISIS leaving several issues in Indonesia in term of terrorist foreign fighters, homegrown terrorism, and lone wolf terrorism (self-employed terrorists).

Another example of an emergency response is the emergence of a false fatwa statement by the MUI in the Gafatar case. This also occurs in group such as the Ahmadiyah and Lia Eden group. In this case, after the issuance of the fatwa, it is usually followed by the persecution of a religious group to a cult, a joint decree of three Ministers and the evacuation of the perceived member of the group. Then, the government action stopped after it felt no more turmoil. In fact, in certain contexts, the case of Gafatar still leaves the ownership problem of the land deprived of owners that were expelled from Kalimantan and from some other areas, as well as stigmatization over extremist group members. The government needs

³¹ The interview results of IMCC Research Team with Nurshadrina on 20 October 2017.

to carefully issue a circular letter against any group that is declared as an extremist group. Otherwise, the impact would be like the persecution and violence perpetrated *to ex-Gafatarians*.

The claiming of a certain group on a national scale by a government's partner organization, in this case the MUI fatwa against Gafatar, which was declared heretical, cannot be denied as a precedence that has triggered the development of problems and the emergence of violence against Gafatarians. When the MUI stated that Gafatar was heretic, Gafatar members were subjected to violence by other groups. Therefore, to prevent fatwas from breeding violence to/on certain people or groups, there should be transparency in the making of fatwa by MUI and the existence of comparative fatwa by other Islamic organizations that are also quite representative in Indonesia, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. NU has a mechanism to issue a religious view called *Bahtsul Masail*, while Muhammadiyah has a fatwa institution called as *Tarjih* institution. The existence of comparative fatwa is important, because deciding cases in Islamic law is not easy and often leads to many disagreements. It is therefore important for law enforcers not to use the MUI fatwa as the basis of a single national law in deciding a case. It is important to note that the MUI fatwa is not the basis of Indonesian law. Therefore, law enforcers cannot make a decision on the basis of the fatwa.

One of the main problems in this issue, especially NII and ISIS is the lack of a broad perspective on the way of religion. Therefore, learning from those who came out and also provided wide avenues, opportunities and insights to former NII and ISIS activists should be a priority. Most former NII activists we interviewed expressed confidence and were on the right path when deciding to quit their group after gaining a broader perspective on many aspects such as religious leaders and other friends. Similarly, the importance of offering facts that are tangible (the process of cognition dissonance).

What is also important for media here is reintegration or rehabilitation programs through moderate pesantren specifically for cases of NII and ISIS deportees or returnees. IMCC has intervened to returnees in pesantren Al-Hikam Depok, a pesantren built by the late KH Hasyim Muzadi, a leading moderate Islamic figure. The method was considered quite effective in giving them perspective on how widespread Islam was and not as narrow as they had imagined. From the testimonies of the participants, joining the program held at this pesantren at least helped strengthen their belief about the decision to

stay out of the group.

So far, pesantren as an educational institution has not been integrated in the handling of radical groups, fundamentalists and extremism. Pesantren in general only provide religious education but not enough space for those who want to do self reflection, repentance or hijrah process. The most prominent constraint that pesantrens are worried about is the influence of the group towards the students. Clearly, in this case pesantren needs support from various parties, especially from the government to facilitate the formation of pesantren that teaches moderate Islam with the specific purpose of strengthening the reintegration program of nationhood for those who have been exposed to the ideology of extremism and terrorism.

Societies can influence one's opinions and actions to find another way. Some of our research respondents stated that they joined NII, Gafatar or ISIS in a sequential because of a hostile, bad economy and exclusive environment that did not mix with many communities.

It is important to encourage, strengthen and develop what has been done by some civil society groups, one of them being Wahid Foundation, which has done peace programs in several areas in Indonesia.³² In addition, it is also important to integrate the program with the economic sustainability of a community with their village. The best practice or experience of an area that has been carried out by important civil society groups can be disseminated to other areas. The government in this case needs to determine the standardization of a successful (advanced) village in which one aspect characterizes diversity with the strengthening of tolerance and strengthen the values of peace.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The research results of former NII, Gafatar³³ and ISIS should be a concern for state institutions such as BNPT, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Easternmost Villages, the Ministry of Home Affairs and law enforcement. BNPT needs

32 "Wahid Foundation Inisiasi Pembentukan Kampung Damai," (Republika, 9 September 2017) accessed on: <http://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/17/09/08/ovyxsk-wahid-foundation-inisiasi-pembentukan-kampung-damai>

33 Gafatar has protested over the IMCC research title and findings. Firstly, they disapproved of the title juxtaposing the organization's name with NII and ISIS, which would mislead people into generalizing Gafatar organization as that of NII and ISIS. Gafatar, they maintain, is neither a radical nor pro-violence group. Secondly, Gafatar asserted that they had been a victim of community violence due to the MUI fatwa declaring Gafatar as heretic

to determine two important aspects in assessing a group by using an initial assessment among people who are disappointed by the group then decided to leave the group with people who have not expressed disappointment so that they still believe in the ideology of the group.

Of the two aspects above, the easier and more important to deradicalize by the intervention program is the people in the first aspect who have experienced the process of disappointment in the group. People who have not felt the process of disappointment need to have another approach before entering the deradicalization program—excepting Gafatar, which is not considered an extremist group as stated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs can be the instrumental in approaching people who have not felt the process of disappointment by way of dissonance cognition that the government and the people of Indonesia are not as bad as what they imagine. The government's response in handling such problems is still limited to emergency response, which means that it merely responds *ex post*, after the incident. In the future, the presence of a country moving from upstream to downstream in solving this problem becomes very important especially when accompanied with clear regulations. In addition, the state should be able to guarantee the basic rights of its citizens irrespective of their status of being declared heretical by other groups as in the case of Gafatar.

It is important for law enforcers (the police, prosecutors and judges) to not use MUI fatwa as the basis of national law in deciding a case unless they also present a comparative fatwa issued by another representative Islamic organization such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs should be able to make Islamic Boarding School institution as a pilot project for rehabilitation and reintegration programs, especially for former ISIS activists. So far, boarding schools as educational institutions have not been integrated in the handling of pro-violence groups in the name of religion.

Civil society groups should also play an active role in dealing with such issues. It is also important to note that the should not be not talking solely about peaceful village programs with a series of cognitions but also integrates them with economic sustainability of a community. The government in this case needs to determine the standardization of successful (advanced) villages in a manner that characterizes Indonesia's diversity. This can be done in cooperation with Kemendes (the Ministry of Disadvantaged Villages).

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Robi Sugara is executive director and co-founder Indonesian Muslim Crisis Center (IMCC), also lecturer in conflict resolution in International Relation (IR) State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He holds a master's degree at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore in 2015 in the field of strategic studies and terrorism studies. Some of his short writings are: "Menyoal Keterlibatan TNI dalam Pemberantasan Terorisme" (Majalah Forum Keadilan, June 2016); "Santoso: The Terrorist Leader from Nowhere". Counter Terrorist Trends & Analysis (A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Volume 6, November 2014); "New Map of Indonesian Jihadists: Pro-IS and Non-IS?" (RSIS Commentary No. 204, October 2014); "Indonesia, Malaysia and the Fight Against Islamic State Influence" (The Diplomat, 11 September 2014); "Declaration of a State of Islam "Caliphate": Will Discord among Indonesian Jihadists Breed Violence?" (RSIS Commentary No. 135, July 2014).

ORGANIZATION'S PROFILE

Indonesian Muslim Crisis Center (IMCC) was founded by Robi Sugara and Maria Ulfa in August 2015 and obtained the legality on 28 May 2016. The establishment has been motivated by various unrest and violence surrounding the condition of Muslims in the world, whereby violence is committed in the name of Islam. On 11 September 2001, following the bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) twin buildings in America that killed thousands of people, the perpetrators proudly said that their action was based on the orders of Islam. When Bali Bombing, which killed 202, On the 12 October 2002, people said of the action as part of Islamic teachings. IMCC exists to address such concerns and discontents. The vision and mission of this institution are manifested in the motto: "Creating Indonesia free of Violence," by which the institution aims to continue to encourage religious groups, especially Muslims, so as not to commit acts of violence, let alone in the name of religion, because violence will only harm the religion.



**Enhancing the Role of Religious Education in
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