


The massive interaction and digital communication in society has created a dualism impression between the real world and the digital world, making it difficult to properly recognise the boundaries between the virtual world and social reality in the real world. This complex millennial life phenomenon involves the most dominant social actors, which are youth that are not just experts in using technology

but whose natural way of thinking is hard to separate from ontology and digital epistemology. They are popularly called the youth of today.

The symptom called in this book as hybridisation of identity allows them to open a variety of available sources of information, but at the same time they are required to find a way of life in order not to lose direction. The openness to the variety of information helps the religious moderation process among Indonesian Muslim youth, but on the other hand it can put them in a position that is vulnerable to intolerance and even religious radicalism.



Muslim Youth MILLENNIALS

**Conservatism, Hybridisation of Identity,
and the Challenge of Radicalism**



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*

Authors:

Chaider S. Bamualim, Hilman Latief, Irfan Abubakar,
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Glossary

AGRA

Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movement (*Aliansi Gerakan Reforma Agraria*)

API

Alliance of Islamic Movement (*Aliansi Pergerakan Islam*)

APJII

Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (*Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia*)

ALMUMTAS

Alliance of Muslim Activist Society of Tasikmalaya (*Aliansi Masyarakat Aktivist Muslim Tasikmalaya*)

ANNAS

National Anti-Shia Alliance (*Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah*)

Balitbang

Agency for Research and Development (*Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan*)

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

BEM

Student Executive Board (*Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa*)

BMI

Brigade Manguni Indonesia

BNPT

National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*)

BPH

Daily Management Board (*Badan Pengurus Harian*)

CONVEY

Enhancing the Role of Religious Education Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia

CSIS

Centre for Strategic and International Studies

CSRC

Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture

CNN

Cable News Network

DA

Darul Arqam

DEMA

Student Council (*Dewan Mahasiswa*)

Ditjen

Directorate General (*Direktorat Jenderal*)

DKI

Special Capital Region (*Daerah Khusus Ibukota*)

DPK

Class Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Kelas*)

DPM

Student Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Mahasiswa*)

DPW

Regional Leadership Council (*Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah*)

FGD

Focus Group Discussion

FJI

Forum Jihad Islam

FKPT

Forum of Communication for the Prevention of Terrorism (*Forum Komunikasi Pencegahan Terorisme*)

FP-BUMI-LK

Front Pembela Barisan Umat Islam Lancang Kuning

Formaci

Ciputat Students Forum (*Forum Mahasiswa Ciputat*)

FKMH

Hizbullah Students' Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Hizbullah*)

FPDI

Islamic Youth's Dakwah Forum (*Forum Pemuda Dakwah Islam*)

FPI

Front Pembela Islam

FPIS

Front Pemuda Islam Solo

FUI

Forum Umat Islam

GAM

Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*)

GAMAN

Amar Makruf Nahi Munkar Movement (*Gerakan Amar Makruf Nahi Munkar*)

GARIS

Islamic Reform Movement (*Gerakan Reformis Islam*)

GEMA Pembebasan

Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan

Gerindra

Gerakan Indonesia Raya

GMNI

Indonesia's National Students Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*)

GMT

Generation of Madani Tasikmalaya (*Generasi Madani Tasikmalaya*)

GP Ansor

Ansor Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Ansor*)

GPII

Islamic Youth Movement of Indonesia (*Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia*)

HAM

Human Rights (*Hak Asasi Manusia*)

HIMAPERSIS

Association of Islamic Unity Students (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Persatuan Islam*)

HMI

Association of Islamic Students (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*)

HTI

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

IAIN

State Islamic Institute (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*)

ICCT

International Centre for Counter Terrorism

IG

Instagram

IKAT

Alumni Association of Middle East (*Ikatan Alumni Timur Tengah*)

IMA AMS

Siliwangi Youth Student Association (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Angkatan Muda Siliwangi*)

IMAMTA

Ikatan Mahasiswa Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an

IMM

Muhammadiyah Student Association (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah*)

IP

Interpretive Phenomology

IPA

Science (*Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam*)

IPM

Muhammadiyah Student Association (*Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah*)

IPNU

Nahdlatul Ulama Student Association (*Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama*)

IPPNU

Nahdlatul Ulama Women's Student Association (*Ikatan Pelajar Putri Nahdlatul Ulama*)

IPRA

Association of Youth Assalam (*Ikatan Pemuda-Remaja Assalam*)

IPS

Social (*Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial*)

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ITB

Bandung Institute of Technology (*Institut Teknologi Bandung*)

JAD

Jamaah Ansharud Daulah

JAT

Jamaah Ansharut Tahid

Ji

Jamaah Islamiyah

JIL

Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*)

JUSTIS

Intensive Study Friday (*Jum'at Studi Intensif*)

KBBI

Indonesian Dictionary (*Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*)

KAMMI

Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unity (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*)

KM

Khilafatul Muslimin

KNPI

National Youth Committee of Indonesia (*Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia*)

KPPSI

Islamic Law Enforcement Preparation Committee (*Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam*)

LDK

Organisation of Dakwah Campus (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*)

LDDK

Basic Training of Campus Dakwah (*Latihan Dasar Dakwah Kampus*)

LDMI

Lingkar Dakwah Mahasiswa Indonesia

LDMPM

Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Pengabdian Masyarakat

LGBT

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (*Lesbian, Gay, Biseksual, Transgender*)

LJ

Laskar Jihad

LKN

National Resilience Agency (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional*)

LMD

Dakwah Management Training (*Latihan Manajemen Dakwah*)

LMI

Indonesian Muslim League (*Liga Muslim Indonesia*)

LPAS

Laskar Pemburu Aliran Sesat

LUIS

Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta

MAN

State of Madrasah Aliyah (*Madrasah Aliyah Negeri*)

Medsos

Social Media (*Media Sosial*)

Menkominfo
Ministry of Communication and Informatics (*Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika*)

MDC
Muslim Designers Community

MMI
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

MPI
Mahasiswa Pecinta Islam

MTA
Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an

Mts
Madrasah Tsanawiyah

MUI
Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*)

NAD
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam

NDP
Basic Values of Struggle (*Nilai Dasar Perjuangan*)

NII
Indonesia Islamic State (*Negara Islam Indonesia*)

NIK
Cadre Identity Number (*Nilai Identitas Kader*)

NKRI
The Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*)

NRI
Republic State of Indonesia (*Negara Republik Indonesia*)

OKP
Youth Organisation (*Organisasi Kepemudaan*)

ORMAS
Civil Society (*Organisasi Kemasyarakatan*)

OSIS
Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah

PAN

Partai Amanat Nasional

PAS

Pembela Ahlus Sunnah

PBB

United Nations (*Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa*)

PBB

Partai Bulan Bintang

PERPPU

Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang

PERSIS

Persatuan Islam

PGRI

Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia

PII

Indonesian Muslim Students (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*)

PKD

Pelatihan Kader Dasar

PKI

Partai Komunis Indonesia

PKL

Pelatihan Kader Lanjut

PKS

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera

PMII

Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia

Poltek

Politeknik

PP

Pemuda Pancasila

PPSI

Pemuda Penegak Syariat Islam

PPIM

Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat

PTIQ

Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Al-Qur'an

PUI

Persatuan Umat Islam

ROHIS

Rohani Islam

SD

Elementary School (Sekolah Dasar)

SDIT

Integrated Islamic Elementary School (Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu)

SI

Islam Union (Sarekat Islam)

SMA

Senior High School (Sekolah Menengah Atas)

SMAN

State Senior High School (Sekolah Menengah Atas Negeri)

SMK

Vocational School (Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan)

SMKN

State Vocational School (Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan Negeri)

SMP

Middle High School (Sekolah Menengah Pertama)

SMPIT

Integrated Islamic Middle School (Sekolah Menengah Pertama Islam Terpadu)

SMU

Senior High School (Sekolah Menengah Umum)

SNK

Survey on National Values (Survei Nilai-Nilai Kebangsaan)

STAINU

Nadhlatul Ulama Islamic School (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Nahdlatul Ulama)

STIKES

Institute of Health Science (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kesehatan)

STIKES BTH

Institute of Health Sciences Bakti Tunas Harapan (*Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kesehatan Bakti Tunas Harapan*)

STKIP

Institute of Teacher Training and Science (*Sekolah Tinggi Keguruan dan Ilmu Kependidikan*)

TKIT

Integrated Islamic Kindergarten (*Taman Kanak-Kanak Islam Terpadu*)

TPA

Al-Qur'an Education School (*Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an*)

TPQ

Qur'an Education School (*Taman Pendidikan Qur'an*)

TNI

Indonesian national army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*)

UCL

University College London

UIN

Universitas Islam Negeri

UINSU

Universitas Islam Negeri Sumatra Utara

UIR

Universitas Islam Riau

UIN RIL

Universitas Islam Negeri Radin Intan Lampung

UKM

Student Activity Unit (*Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa*)

UKMI

Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa Islam

UMY

Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

UMS

Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta

UNISLA

Universitas Islam Lamongan

UNTAN

Universitas Tanjung Pura

UNS

Universitas Negeri Surakarta Sebelas Maret

USU

Universitas Sumatera Utara

UUD

Constitution (*Undang-Undang Dasar*)

YLSC

Youth Islamic Study Club

YLYPI

Yayasan Lembaga Pendidikan Islam

Table of Contents

Glossary_____	iii
Table of Contents_____	xv
Foreword _____	xix
Preface _____	xxiii

Chapter 1

Introduction

- A. Symptoms of Religion: Radicalism and A Conservative Turn _ 1
- B. Muslim Youth, Identity Search, and Symptoms of Radicalism _ 4
- C. Concepts and Definitions _____ 6
- D. Further Information on the Study _____ 9

Chapter 2

Social Media and The Decline of Religious Learning

- A. Increasing Roles of Social Media _____ 20
- B. Diminishing Roles of Family _____ 24
- C. Quo Vadis: Formal Religious Education _____ 27
- D. The Influence of Social Environment _____ 34
- E. *The Power of Literacy* _____ 43

Chapter 3

Muslim Youth and The Hybridisation of Identity

- A. The Meaning of Religious and Hybridisation of Identity ____ 47
- B. The Precautionary Attitude of Youth Cosmopolites _____ 57
- C. Millennials' Attitude Towards Digital Friendly Ustadz _____ 62
- D. Social Media, Exposure Radicalism, and Hijrah Lifestyle ____ 65

Chapter 4

Diversity and Tolerance

- A. Da'wah Activism, Structuralism, and Communal Tolerance __ 69
- B. Tolerance in Theological Restrictions _____ 71
- C. *Intolerance, Exclusivism, and Prejudices* _____ 87
- D. *Movement Activists, Civic Tolerance, and Pluralism* _____ 90
- E. *Nationalist Activists and Fear of Religious Issues* _____ 97

Chapter 5

Individual Freedom and Human Rights

- A. General Views _____ 99
- B. Individual Freedom and Human Rights _____ 101
- C. CSOs Act and HTI Dissolution _____ 108
- D. Gender Equality and Gender Justice _____ 109

Chapter 6

Pancasila as Ideology and Democracy

- A. Pancasila in Various Surveys _____ 115
- B. Pancasila as Inspiration of Unity and Diversity _____ 118
- C. Islamic arguments on Pancasila _____ 122
- D. Re-Islamisation of Pancasila _____ 125
- E. Muslim Youth and Democracy _____ 129

Chapter 7

Muslim Youth and the Challenge of Radicalism

- A. *The Factor of Youth Radicalism* _____ 134
- B. Islamic Movement and Activism _____ 138
- C. Responding to Hardline Islamic Activism _____ 144
- D. Radical Groups in Highlights _____ 154
- E. Moderating the Meaning of Jihad _____ 165

Chapter 8

Closure

A. Conclusions _____	171
B. Recommendations _____	173

Appendix

A. Table of Researcher Name, Researcher Assistant, Time and Location of the Research _____	175
B. Total of Respondents from intra-organisation school _____	176
C. Total of Respondents based on Extra-Organisation Campus or CSOs Islamic Modernist and Traditionalist Organisation _____	176
D. Total of Respondents based on Significant Others _____	177
References _____	179
About The Authors and Editors _____	183
About CSRC _____	187

Foreword

Today we are witnessing social and political phenomena that increasingly coincide and cross with religious-ethnic phenomena, a situation where public and academic circles wonder on what they are and how to explain them. The explosion of radicalism and extremism in the name of religion, the return of conservatism (or *conservative turn*, using the term from Martin van Bruinessen), to the rise of populism and identity politics, have coloured an increasingly globalised contemporary life. Massive interaction and digital communication between citizens has created an impression of dualism between the real world and the cyberspace, making it difficult to recognise well-defined boundaries between cyber discourses and social realities in the real world. This complex millennial-life phenomenon involves the most dominant social actors, namely the youth, who are not only technologically literate but also whose mind is hard to escape from the digital ontology and epistemology. Such are the popularly called “youth of today.”

The book in front of the reader is titled “Muslim Youth Millennials: Conservatism, Hybridisation of Identity, and the Challenge of Radicalism.” The title may illustrate symptoms that are not always steady and showcase the mood of today’s Muslim youth looking for their identity, who, on the other hand, also have to deal with bombardment of information competing to influence their mind and consciousness. As a result, they are faced with

dichotomous choices: between the values of citizenship and communal values, between purity of aqidah and social disclosure; between democratic rules and God's laws, and so on. The book argues that millennial Muslim youth experience a crossover of religious social identities, although their social bases still affect their religious attitudes and behaviour. The phenomenon mentioned herein as hybridisation of identity allows them to open to the various sources of information, but at the same time require them to find their ground so as not to lose directions. This inevitably makes them aware when responding to issues facing Islamic doctrines with social, political, and humanitarian values derived from traditions outside of Islam. The availability of information helps the process of religious moderatism among Indonesian Muslims youth, but the same matter can, on the other hand, place them in a vulnerable position to intolerance and even religious radicalism.

The explanation above epitomises the main findings of research that became the basis of the publication of this book. The book itself was taken from a national report of qualitative research results entitled "Muslim Youth: Their Attitudes and Behaviour towards Violence and Extremism." The research was conducted in 18 Indonesian cities/regencies and involved 935 Muslim youth respondents who are mostly students of high schools and universities ranging from 17 to 24 years old. They were deliberately chosen from organisational activists at schools (such as OSIS and Rohis) and universities (BEM and Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK)), as well as student, youth and Islamic organisations from different ideological spectrum. Starting from September 2017 to January 2018, the research was conducted in the following cities and regencies: Banda Aceh, Medan, Pekanbaru, Bandar Lampung, Jakarta, Bogor, Tasikmalaya, Bandung, Garut, Yogyakarta, Solo, Lamongan, Pontianak, Balikpapan, Makassar, Bulukumba, Manado, and Bima. Due to the wide scope, this qualitative study involved 14 researchers, 18 research assistants, and 2 consultants. The researchers whose names we cannot mention here individually have worked hard since the field data collection through in-depth interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), to report writing in each region. The drafting involved a thorough reading and analysis of data and reports per region. Six authors were involved in the

research to identify consistent patterns, or the lack thereof, in the available data related to the attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth in responding to various issues, especially related to disputes between Islamic religious doctrines vis-a-vis the social and political condition in Indonesia. The authors include Chaider S. Bamualim (research coordinator), Hilman Latief (Yogyakarta and Solo researchers), Wawan Setiawan (Bandung and Garut researchers), Rita Pranawati (Jakarta researcher), Mohamad Nabil (Bandar Lampung researcher), and Irfan Abubakar (research supervisor).

The national report writing process itself relatively took a short time, from January to mid-February 2018, but the authors had to work intensively due to the available time. Thanks to the ease from today's digital technology, discussions of each draft report could be done in the cyberspace without requiring frequent face-to-face meetings. The various types of input especially during the dissemination of research results in Yogyakarta (12 February 2018) and Medan (15 February 2018) have been most useful in the refining of the draft, although due to time constraints, not all could be accommodated into the draft of this book. Constructive feedback and criticisms presented by the discussants, participants from academics, researchers, observers of religious and socio-political issues of religion, have been invaluable for improving the content quality and strategy of this book.

Most research of great coverage is not possible without the involvement of many parties and institutions. In our research CSRC partnered with other institutions namely PPIM UIN Jakarta, CONVEY, and UNDP. Along with it, various other research programs were conducted in similar themes for similar targets--Muslim youth—albeit in different methods and focuses. These other studies were expected to complement each other in helping us develop good and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of Indonesia's Muslim youth today.

We would like to express our gratitude to our partners without whose cooperation and support this book would not have touched the reader's hands. Firstly, our utmost appreciation must go to the researchers and research assistants who worked hard in all the important stages of the research, since the process of finding sources according to the prescribed criteria, to that of data collecting, data reading, analysing, drafting, and

finalizing the research reports. Secondly, we would like to thank our research consultants, Muhammad Adlin Sila and Mohammad Hasan Ansori, who helped prepare the research design, and provided critical input to the draft research reports and national reports. Also, our deep gratitude goes to the research coordinator Chaider S. Bamualim, and Secretary of the Program Junaidi Simun, without whose patience in managing this research organisation, the whole research process and publication of this book would not have gone smoothly. We would also like to thank the research management team, Efrida Yasni, Haula Sofiana, M. Nurhidayat and Lia Herliawati, who tirelessly supported the administration and financial management of this research. Last but not least, we would like to extend our highest appreciation and thankfulness to the PPIM Team of UIN Jakarta: Jamhari Makruf, Fuad Jabali, Ismatu Ropi, Didin Syafruddin, Din Wahid, Saiful Umam, and Ali Munhanif, who have not only supported financially but also have provided constructive input from the planning, implementation, and reporting stage of this research. Our highest gratitude also goes to UNDP for their active involvement throughout the entire process. This research has been a hard work made possible thanks to the assistance from these reputable institutions.

This work of ours is humbly dedicated to all policy stakeholders: the government, civil society, education actors, academics and researchers, religious figures, and media actors. Hopefully the publication of this book can contribute to improving our understanding of the development of social-political and religious phenomena, especially those involving the youth, for a better future of Indonesia.

Happy reading!

Ciputat, 23 February 2018

Irfan Abubakar

CSRC Director

Preface

This book is a publication of a research report titled “Muslim Youth: Their Attitudes and Behaviour in Responding to Violence and Extremism.” Held in 18 cities/regions from September 2107 to January 2018, the research aims to deepen understanding of the attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth who are active in intra- and extra-school and university organisations, as well as in youth and religious-based organisations. The research presents interesting narratives on the Muslim youth’s position vis-a-vis issues of radicalism and extremism. Owing to the wide range of themes related to the issues, the discussions in this book, inevitably, are not limited to discourses of radicalism; rather, they also cover broader issues from diversity, tolerance, individual freedom, human rights, Pancasila ideology, to democracy. Therefore, this book deals with the patterns and directions of movement of Indonesian Muslim youth today.

To date there has been considerable writing and convincing research on the dangers and adverse effects of radicalism and religious extremism on the continuity of values of civilisation, democracy, and social harmony. An Indonesian expert from Australia, Greg Fealy, considers the rising radicalism in Indonesia over the past few decades has caused the decline of Indonesia’s image and credibility in the international world (Fealy, 2004). Indonesians being known for their politeness and friendliness, many of them suddenly

become overwhelmed by fanaticism and brutality in the public sphere. Moreover, the behaviour of pro-violence and intolerance involves the youth as the main actors, which has been pointed out in several studies and surveys.

The arduous process and execution of the research must have rendered its inevitable shortcomings as recorded in this book; nonetheless, the editors would still emphasise that the results of the study are worthy of publication for several reasons. Firstly, this research has focused on youth as its analytical unit. These young students-activists from intra- or extra-school/university organisations, as well as those from other such organisations outside schools/universities, were its direct informants. Therefore, this study directly claims explanations of what exactly are the meaning and roles of intra- and extra school/campus organisations in supporting or preventing the process of infiltration of radicalism and extremism in educational institutions.

This book hypothesises that the ideology of organisations to which the students are affiliated strongly shapes their attitudes and behaviour toward radicalism and violence. It means that student organisations, both intra and extra, can actually be functioned positively by school and government authorities to support inclusive educational programs and to act as implementers of the values of citizenship, democracy and human rights.

Secondly, the results of the research also contribute crucially in various themes. It discussed the themes surrounding the style of learning and religious education typical of the millennial youth, social environment, organisations, and, especially, the influence of digital and social media. In addition, the research also discussed views on actual issues facing Islam vis-à-vis the values and practices of democracy and citizenship in Indonesia. For example, it discussed how the young understood the concepts and values of diversity, tolerance, individual freedom, and human rights.

The study has in general clarified several issues related to Muslim youth, who show so strong a proclivity to defend their “dogmatic” attitude on a number of sensitive issues, particularly in relation to non-Muslims, that they become intolerant. Easily a case in point here is the attitude of some of them towards giving their Christian colleagues a Merry Christmas wish.

In recent years, there has been a strong tendency in Muslim youth circles

to not wish “Merry Christmas” to their friends and associates. Yet, this should be seen more as a reflection of their caution to what they consider dogmatic. Since such an act might disrupt “*aqidah*”, Muslim youth tend to adopt a more communal-cryptical tolerance model, in the sense that they would rather follow the religious teaching and at the same time obey social values so as to be safe and secure, than violate them, without sacrificing the substance of their friendship.

Borrowing in this context the conceptual framework from a “tolerance” expert Jeremy Menchik, such an act can be considered as the embodiment of what he termed “*communal tolerance*,” whose basic legitimacy stems from “social and state rules.” This framework certainly differs from the Locke-Rawls’ model of “secular-liberal” tolerance. The latter is conceptually rooted in individual rights, separation of religion from the state, and state neutrality towards religion (Menchik, 2016). Thus, the results of this research provide sufficient quality materials for debates, especially in order to re-discuss the conceptual framework of Menchik model of tolerance as used in this book, to allow for “new” interpretations of the material findings we have about diversity and tolerance. We believe that, in this perspective, the results of this study provide a theoretical conceptual contribution to enrich our understanding of the position of young Muslims against the issues of diversity and tolerance. They have been hot issues as of late.

Thirdly, one key finding of the research lies in its exposure of a new dynamic that might be claimed as the latest feature of the sociology-religion of educated Muslim youth, in which the “cross” of affiliation and religious orientation has a significant meaning. As emphasised in this book, affiliate “cross” is a product of the dynamic socio-political interaction that the youth experience in their social environment. The phenomenon of “identity hybridisation” is a process of forming a new formula for youth identity due to the mixing culture, traditions, values and set of principles held by the community. What is important for us to note is that “identity hybridisation” is a symptom that provides space for accommodation or an exchange of knowledge, deed, and experience, especially in respect to new values.

Theoretically it can be stated that the millennial is a hybrid generation with an inclusive attitude and that is easy to accept new values introduced

to them. This can be both positive and negative, depending on how several related factors influence the thinking, attitude and behaviour of Muslim youth, how responses or models are given to them, or who the authorities are within their circles, i.e. educational institutions, social environment, and families.

It seems that “hybridisation” is quite dominant in characterizing the attitude or behaviour of the young generation of Islam today *vis-a-vis* radicalism and violence. Overall, this study claims to categorize the general attitude and behaviour of Muslim youth in the country as moderate; it also argues at the same time that the trend of conservatism with scriptural and communal traits has coloured their tendency. Conservatism itself is not necessarily negative, but too much of it can render a negative impact on the embodiment of tolerant, open and inclusive social values. Also, excessive conservatism, communalism, and scripturalism allow for intolerant attitude and behaviour, and potentially invite infiltration of values or understanding of radicalism and extremism among Muslim youth.

As an Indonesian saying goes, there is no such thing as a perfect ivory. May the reader benefit from what this book has to offer whilst all the shortcomings therein remain our responsibility as its editors.

Chaider S. Bamualim,
Hilman Latief
Irfan Abubakar
(Editors)

Chapter I

Introduction

A. Symptoms of Religion: Radicalism and A Conservative Turn

The phenomenon of radicalism and extremism in the name of religion that has emerged in the last two decades, with its immeasurable impact, has caused trepidation to many parties. Not only due to its disruption to political stability and security, many are worried because of its expansive effect. The strengthening of radical and extreme religious attitudes to some extent can provoke horizontal conflicts. Moreover, it is not impossible for this political-religious phenomenon to detriment the values of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and the existence of Pancasila as the state ideology.

Some observers have noted two things as signs of escalating currents of radicalism and extremism. *First*, the continuous development of religious ideologies that pushes their agenda for changing the social-political system. *Second*, the dominance of pro-violence behaviour and attitudes in responding to political conflicts and disputes.¹ Accompanying the phenomenon of radicalism and extremism is what a Dutch anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen called the *conservative turn* of re-enforced religious

1 Donatella della Porta and Gary LaFree, editors for special edition of *The International Journal of Conflict and Violence* (2011), in their introduction titled "Process of Radicalism and De-Radicalisation." See Alex P. Schmid, *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*, International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), Research Paper, The Hague, March 2013.

conservatism among Muslims in Indonesia.²

Conservatism is a religious phenomenon that reflects obedience in diversity with the tendency to maintain the values of *aqidah* and *shari'a*. Conservative groups try to maintain religious institutions, traditions, and authorities. In Islamic societies, this trend holds broader and is not always synonymous with radicalism. Research by CSRC-PPIM UIN Jakarta held from September 2017 to January 2018, titled "Muslim Youth: Behaviour and Attitudes in Responding to Violence and Extremism," indicates the strengthening of the tendency of conservatism among Muslim youth today. Religious conservatism incarnates in two trends: communalism and scripturalism. In the sense that Muslim youth tend to become more religious, not only does it reflect in their perseverance in observing the pillars of Islam,³ but also in their effort to maintain the purity of *aqidah* and *shari'a* in social relations, primarily with non-Muslim communities. As will be explained in Chapter Four, communal attitudes are reflected in the way Muslim youth respond to the issues of tolerance that are heavily discussed. In addressing Christmas greetings, for example, most Muslim youth are beginning to show new and more conservative tendencies than in previous years. Today they choose to be more cautious and tend to avoid delivering Christmas greetings to their non-Muslim friends or acquaintances, to maintain *aqidah*.

It should be emphasised here that politicised conservatism can burst into a movement or insistence that demands for realisation of a social order based on social-communal norms according to the *Shari'a*. As we know, in the last 20 years, the jargon of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, has increasingly been heard. Radical Islamic figures and activists have demanded a formal application of *Shari'a* or at least for the social order to be strictly regulated using *Shari'a* norms. Since the beginning of reform, these aspirations have been shouted loudly, not infrequently using verbal or physical violence. A

2 Martin van Bruinessen (ed), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). Martin van Bruinessen's writing in the book was first published in RSIS Working Paper No. 222 entitled "What happened to the smiling face of Indonesian Islam? Muslim Intellectualism and the conservative turn in post-Suharto Indonesia," 6 January 2011.

3 Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, "The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalisation", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2012), p. 2.

main character is Habib Rizieq Shihab, who is known for his hard work in organising missions. This FPI leader is not reluctant to impose his will with violence and loud noise, which he has risked doing several times.

Of late, this controversial figure surprisingly has become a youth's idol as several surveys indicated. This phenomenon provokes the question of whether Muslim youth have sufficient knowledge about their idol figures. As a result, whatever the motive, it is intriguing to learn further how the perception of Muslim Youth upon such leaders and institutions as Rizieq and his FPI. Equally important is gain insights from young FPI activists themselves on several issues, including on issues of pluralism and tolerance, freedom of individuals, human rights, Pancasila, and democracy.

Another symptom marking the wave of radicalism is the insistence on realising the Khilafah Islamiyah as the state ideology and its social system. The supporters of this movement involve generally educated Muslim youth. They deem the democratic system as un-Islamic and, therefore, must be replaced by the Shari'a system, which they claim to be more Islamic. That this group does not use violent strategies in its political struggle is a fact, but its revolutionary and anti-system features have the potential to provoke horizontal and vertical conflicts. Furthermore, it is interesting to know the attitudes and views of youth activists who join organisations like HTI, Khilafatul Muslimin, to name just a few, on the issues raised above.

Some studies and surveys have shown us that a significant portion of the middle class as well as the educated Muslim youth is involved empathetically in radicalism movements.⁴ One study revealed the tendency of intolerance in some Muslim students. From this study of high school students and college students, for example, it was revealed that 9.5% of respondents tended to be intolerant of non-Muslim minorities. Sixty-five percent of them also expressed support for *sweeping* actions by radical Islamic organisations.⁵ Why they had such notion needs to be clearly explained. This book, based on that study, shows a map of the tendency of millennial Muslim youth to violence. The respondents' attitudes and ideas on violence will be presented

4 Survey of Balitbang Regional Office of Ministry of Religious Affairs of Central Java, February-March 2017.

5 General Director of Higher Education Ministry of National Education, 2007.

in Chapter 7. We do hope that the explanation therein can enrich our understanding of the trends of youth today against radicalism.

B. Muslim Youth, Identity Search, and Symptoms of Radicalism

Youth is a part of social groups which continue to process in the search for identity, and they are often caught in an identity crisis. In addition to psychological factors, identity crisis can also occur due to social change, modernisation, and globalisation, especially during the transition from childhood to adulthood (Hasan, 2016). Indeed, many youth enjoy the effects of modernisation and globalisation, such as the spread of flourishing computer technology, the internet, social media, modeling industry, music, cinema, and modern lifestyle. However, it does not always mean that the phenomenon makes them happy.

Youth are often faced with great challenges when they are in a circle of competition as well as in the current, accelerated networks of technology and knowledge intensive primarily to respond to the uncertain future (Hasan, 2013). Clearly, such challenges can impact negatively, especially when they are forced to meet their future and be more prosperous. This state becomes exacerbated by psychological shocks due to unequal ownership and distribution of material resources. In such contexts, their anxieties and tension potentially amplify. The unstable among the youth may be tempted by radicalism and extremism, which eloquently offer them some kind of formula in the pacifying name of religion (Hasan, 2016).

It should be noted, however, that the possibility of exposure of youth to the flow of radicalism is not solely due to psychological factors but also to socioeconomic factors. Those allured toward fashionable lifestyles yet unable to obtain it owing to their family's financial condition can succumb to depression and negative influences. Some young generation from the low-income families recognise that they are incapacitated by such material-structural barriers (Pam Nilan, Lynette Parker, Linda Bennett and Kathryn Robinson, 2011).

The combined psychological and economic factors that negatively affect youth could cause them to turn radicalism and extremism as an escape or as a focal point of hope. It can be emphasised here that in the membership

structure of hard-line Islamic organisations such as FPI, HTI, Laskar Jihad, and MMI, there is a large portion youth groups who are poor because of unemployment and various other reasons. Sociologically, a lot of poor youth are affiliated with these radical mass organisations. They may have been thrown out in the competitive and complex employment market. As a result, they have to partake in informal economies for mediocre and haphazard streams of income. In the states of being barely employed and feeling hopeless and alienated radical mass organisations make a perfect refuge in which some youths are ready to be employed as soldiers. With the new paramilitary status, their confidence gets boosted. This condition is important since it can overcome their social alienation and frustration (Bamualim et al, 2002).

In addition to religious factors as an effectual healer of their anxiety, a new phenomenon is also worth noticing that is relatively dominant in Muslim youth today. This important phenomenon, elaborated in Chapter 3, is the “crossword” affiliation process and religious orientation as a feature of life of today’s youth. The affiliated “crossword” is formed based on the socio-political-religious dynamics and interactions that youth experience in their social environment. This phenomenon, also called “identity hybridisation,” explains the existence of a new formula of youth identity due to the mixing of cultures, traditions, values and principles widely held by the people in the environment in which they operate. It emerges owing to the intensive interaction process between youth vis-à-vis the context and traditions around them. It should also be noted here that the process enables them to “accommodate” the new values with the ones they get from families, teachers, environment, educational institutions, organisations, and so on. This means that the colours and patterns of the social environment in which youth spend most of their time will most likely influence their views, attitudes, and behaviour.

The selection of universities and schools as the research focus was driven by the assumption that radicalism can arise anywhere, not only in the urban, poor, and marginalised environment. In the context of universities and schools, radicalisation usually begin with an exclusive identity-building effort. Most young people who move in from villages to cities do not wish

to be uprooted from their cultural roots and from the moral values of their religion (Hefner, 2001). Therefore, despite being active in colleges, they remain diligent in performing the pillars of Islam, especially in practicing the *fardhu* prayers wherever and whenever possible when mosques are not available. From here, dakwah activism typically emerges in schools and campuses.

At first, the mission of *dakwah* campus may aim to strengthen moral-cultural ties, but in its development it transforms into acts of preserving identity and of relying upon interpersonal and ideological group-based activism. In such contexts and loci, the idea of radicalism may germinate. Rohis or LDK activities that are not supervised and controlled by school and campus authorities, for example, may be used by radical activists to peddle their radical or extreme religious discourses.

Several studies, especially by Maarif Institute, have found that radicalism in schools and colleges usually enters through alumni. The latter study interviewed Rohis and OSIS officials and activists of BEM and LDK as some of intra and extra organisations. From these informants shared insights on the position of youth in school and college communities related to important issues related to diversity, tolerance, individual freedom, human rights, Pancasila, and democracy as well as radicalism and extremism.

C. Concepts and Definitions

Following the above explanation, it is important to clarify a number of concepts or terminology, which include: (1) Muslim youth; (2) Millennials; (3) Attitude and behaviour; (4) Radicalism (radicalism); (5) Extremism (extremism); and (6) Conservatism. In this study, Muslim youth are those people aged 15-24 years as defined by the UN.⁶ The *millennial*, or millennials, is intended as a generation of young people born between 1982 to 20 years later. In 2017 they are between 16 and 36 of age.⁷ According to The Big

6 The United Nations for Statistical purposes, defines 'youth', as those persons between the ages of 15-24 years, without prejudice to their definitions by Member States. Accessed from Unesco.org "What Do We Mean by "Youth"?" http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youthde_definition/ (Accessed on 30 November 2017).

7 Neil Howe and William Strauss, *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation*, New York: Vintage Books, 2000.

Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI), *attitude* means deed that is based on stance and belief.⁸ In other words, it means a way of feeling or thinking about someone or something, especially that which influences one's behaviour. As for *behaviour*, it means an individual's response or reaction to a stimulus or an environment.⁹ Behaviour is the way of behaving. While attitude is a more meaningful mental attitude and establishment, behaviour means the procedure, nature and character.

Radicalism in this study is defined as a socio-political religious phenomenon that has the following characteristics: (1) although not necessarily always breeding acts of violence, supporters of radicalism are potentially trapped in violent acts given the tendency in their movement, as Della Porta and LaFree stated;¹⁰ (2) insistence on a revolutionary political change and strongly opposed to a status quo. (3) resistance to a legitimate government because of felt alienation and discrimination, as stated from Bartlett and Miller (Schmid, 2013). (4) Radicalism is an independent spectrum/variant located just one level below extremism and terrorism (Schmid, 2013). It means that radicalism is a symptom of pre-extremism and terrorism.

In contrast to radicalism, the variant of extremism by Schmid is defined as religious religious thoughts and movements aimed at creating homogeneous societies based on rigid and dogmatic ideological doctrines. The extremists are aimed at realising a conformist society, oppressing opposition groups,

8 KBBI defines the following attitudes 1 a figure or body shape: 2. the way of standing (erect, orderly, or prepared for action): 3 Acts and so on based on conviction, life; behave v 1 stand tall (prepare): 2 take a stand: take a stand for attitude towards (Something).

9 Behaviour (*perilaku*) responsiveness or individual reaction to stimuli or the environment; - collective activities of people together in a certain way and follow certain patterns as well; - laws of conduct that result in lawsuits because is a will that violates (contrary to) the interests of others; behaviour; gestures: ki behaves in a made-up style (so that looks dashing and so on); - live view of life

10 Donnatella della Porta and Gary LaFree, guest editors for the special edition of The International Journal of Conflicts and Violence (2011), in the introduction entitled Processes of Radicalisation and De- radicalisation. From this point of view radicalisation necessitates a change in perception of the polarisation and absolute definitions of a situation, and the articulation of radical goals and targets. It may have evolved from hostility towards certain social groups, or institutions and social structures, as well as increased use of violent means. See, Alex P. Schmid, *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*, International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), Research Paper, The Hague, March 2013.

and usually underestimating minorities. They would prefer: (1) the use of force/violence rather than persuasion; (2) uniformity rather than diversity; (3) collective goals rather than individual freedom; and (4) giving orders rather than facilitating dialogues (Schmid, 2013). In terms of analysis, we use the following matrix to explain the tendency of attitudes and behaviour of young Muslims against violence within the framework of Islamism with the following scopes: (1) Hardliner; (2) Radicalism, and; (3) Extremism.

Table 1
Matrix

Variant	Literal	Intolerance	Revolution	Violence
Hardliner	Yes	Yes (Society)	Yes	Yes
Radicalism	Yes	Yes (State)	Yes	No
Extremism	Yes	Yes (Society and State)	Yes	Yes

The matrix aims to facilitate the analysis especially to discuss research findings in the final chapter of this book. It shows how the concepts used in this study will be useful in seeing the tendency of attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth according to the above spectrum of Islamism, which includes the three variants--“Hardliner,” “Radicalism” and “Extremism.” Note that the spectrum of Islamism can include wider variants than those above.

Aside from above concepts, some of important terms used in this study are *conservatism*, *communalism* and *scripturalism*. *Conservatism* is a part of the terminology political ideology that emerged in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century to show opposition to the spirit and principles of the French revolution of 1789. One of the conservatism’s agenda was to defend incumbent institutions, support tradition, and believe in human imperfection.¹¹ In this study *conservatism* is defined as an attempt to preserve old institutions, traditions, and authorities--especially those of religion. Included as a variant of conservatism is *communalism*, which is adherence to a social-political group’s value system based on ethnic and

11 Andrew Heywood, *Ideologi Politik* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2012), p. 111-112.

religious affiliations.¹² *Scripturalism* in this study means a concept that is believed to have its reference in in the Qur'an and Hadith as the utmost Islamic authorities.

D. Further Information on the Study

Research Objectives

Conducted during September 2017 to January 2108, the research for the study aimed to find out the basic structure of attitudes and behaviour of millennial Muslim youth (15-24 years) toward violent radicalism and extremism. For this purpose, in-depth interviews were held on Muslim youth with four ideological variations: Islamist, Moderate [Modernist-Traditionalist], Progressive-Liberal, and Nationalist.

To facilitate the reading of their attitudes and behaviour and measure aspects related to the “what” and “how” of their support to radicalism and extremism, the collected data were analysed by tracing the process, motives, and influences of various factors (micro, meso and macro). Another goal of the study was to explain the differences and similarities in responses of Muslim youth from various organisations and ideological variants to radicalism and extremism. The expected outcome of this study are best practices/models of student organisations or institutions, inclusive and tolerant student affairs, and youth organisations that actively promote democracy and peace according to their characters.

Research Questions

Departing from the above theoretical insights, the research sought to explore, analyse and explain the following 3 (three) main concerns: first, how are the attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth about radicalism and extremism? How do the process and context of religious, as well as formal and informal learning, affect the formation of their attitudes and behaviour? How do the youth's knowledge, understanding, and experience on religion make them sympathetic or even actively support radicalism and extremism, or vice versa? What are their sources of learning (books, lectures, halaqah-

¹² <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/communalism> (Accessed on February 10 2018).

halaqah, social media posts, or videos)? What are the typical profiles of teachers, writers, ustadz, or sheikhs that they idolise? These are the questions for analysing at *micro-individual level*.

Second, how are the aspects of diversity, the differences, or the style and role of social environment, shaping their attitudes and behaviour? How tolerant are they to diversity? What are their ideas on individual freedom and human rights? How do the organisations they work with as well as other social affiliations affect their ideological attitudes and behaviour? What needs to be underlined here the effects of identity hybridisation on their religious views and behaviour patterns, which is the focus of our analysis at *meso-community level*).

Third, how do they view the ideology of Pancasila and democracy? Do they believe in Pancasila? What is their motive in supporting or rejecting Pancasila? In relation to Islam, how do they understand the relationship between Pancasila, Islam, and Islamic Sharia? How strongly do religious doctrines shape their ideological attitudes? To examine ideological attitudes in a contrastive way, it is also necessary to express how much Muslim youth believe in other ideologies beside Pancasila, such as Khilafat, DI/TII, and others. The deepening of the issue aims to reveal precisely their attitudes and behaviour towards radicalism and extremism—which will be an analysis of *macro-political level*).

Methodology

The study uses qualitative applied research based on an Interpretive Phenomenology (IP) approach. As such the research aims to understand, analyse, and explore how and why Muslim youth accept or otherwise reject radical ideologies and violent extremism. Positive, negative, or both responses are understood in three contexts: *First*, the strengthening of radical and extremist ideological among Muslim youth, especially through digital media; *second*, their social interactions are also believed to have contributed to the response, of which the interactions include extensive relationships with family environments, friendships, educational institutions, and organisations inside and outside of school/campus with diverse religious and spectrum styles of their political ideologies; *third*,

socio-political developments are also not spared from their attention and attitude, especially those related to government policies for countering radicalism and terrorism.

One crucial thing about the research concerns how to get resource persons or respondents who fulfill the criteria so as to meet the objectives. These respondents are Muslim youth aged between 15-24 years old (according to the UN standards) who are actively involved in various organisations and institutions of schools, campuses and youth groups across a different religious and ideological spectrum. In addition, the selected candidates need to also illustrate the local context of each area of research.

To assure the quality of the plan, the first important step was to develop research designs and instruments to guide the research team, research assistants, and research management in carrying out the whole set of activities. In this regard 4 (four) main guidelines of the implementation of research had been prepared: Guidelines for Recruitment of Resource Persons, In-depth Interviews and In-depth Observation Guidelines, FGD Implementation Guidelines, and Guidelines on Data Analysis and Writing of Research Results.

The next step was to test the validity and practicality of these research instruments through a design and research-instrument workshop in which the draft research instruments were discussed critically and profoundly for refinement. After the research-instrument revision was made, the researchers attended a consolidation meeting where they received a full explanation of the design and research instruments.

Research Sources

With regards to research instruments, on 20 September 2017 the researchers started to visit 18 cities/districts in 14 provinces in Indonesia, namely: Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Solo, Yogyakarta, Lamongan, Balikpapan, Pontianak, Medan, Bandar Lampung, Pekanbaru, Manado, Bima, Makassar, Bulukumba, and Banda Aceh. Before going down to the field, the researchers and their assistants had started the recruitment process by applying an intentional purposive sampling selection technique. This technique aimed to select candidates who most reflected

the characteristics of the studied group, and to make it easy for the team to conduct a comparative analysis of the candidates' views, attitudes and behaviour toward the issue at hand.

As mentioned above, the sources were mostly Indonesian Muslims male and female youth aged between 15-24 years old. In addition, some speakers were also selected as *significant others*, i.e. those who as assessed the researchers had influenced their attitudes and behaviour. Among them were teachers/lecturers, family members, and local religious leaders. The Muslim youth represented themselves as organisers/activists of various student organisations, and youth organisations from a diverse spectrum of ideological backgrounds.

The total number of resource persons targeted for recruitment was 936, consisting of 360 FGD speakers and 576 respondents of In-Depth Interviews. The number of netted FGD speakers turned out to be 380, which was bigger than planned while that for In-Depth turned less than planned at only 555. Overall, the actual number of resource persons recruited successfully for the study, 935, was close to the target. From the perspective of gender balance, female resources were nearly 30%, exceeding the minimal proportion required in research design. The gender composition of research can be seen in the graph below.

Graph 1
Distribution of Resources in 18 Cities/Districts Based on Gender Balance




For in-depth interviews, researchers were required to recruit 32 persons comprising 24 main speakers and 8 *significant others* in each city/district. From the 24 main sources, it was expected that the composition would come from student organisations (OSIS and Rohis) of senior high school or Madrasah Aliyah; administrators/activists of student boards in university

such as BEM (Executive Board of Student) and LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus), et cetera. Besides these intra-school and campus organisations, other sources were also used, namely from youth activists” or Islamic organisations with various ideological spectrum (such as PII, IPPNU, HMI, PMII, IMM, Muhammadiyah Youth, JIL, Remaja Masjid, KAMMI, HTI, FPI, GARIS, Pemuda Kaaba, Jamaah Anshar Daulah, Halaqah-halaqah Alquran recital groups, and so on). The third category of informants included youth organisations with open or interfaith membership (such as KNPI, Pemuda Pancasila, Karang Taruna, left-leaning organisations, youth hobby-based communities, etc.).

The total number of respondents (for FGDs and in-depth interviews) designated from the intra-school and campus organisations is 396 people, consisting of OSIS activists (126 people); Rohis (72); BEM (90), and LDK/UKMI (108). In practice, however, the total number of respondents from intra-school and campus activists exceeded the planned number of 437. The respondent composition that represented intra-school and campus organisations had to adjust as it turned out to be more or fewer than planned before. For the record, the total respondents from BEM reached 134 people while that from LDK only reached 70, or about 65% of the planned. One reason was because almost all universities have BEM; besides, the respondents came from student activity boards of this category. On the other hand, not all universities selected in the research have their LDK or UKMI organisation. The chart below describes the composition of resource persons from inter-school and inter-campus organisations.

Graph 2


Distribution of respondents from inter-school and inter-campus organisations in 18 cities/districts



The total number of research respondents from off-campus organisations/institutions was 378 people. The planned composition is relatively balanced: from various moderate Islamic organisations is to amount to 72 people. They are to come from the modernist or traditionalist circles, such as HMI, IMM, PMII, or from the oriented *dakwahis* such as KAMMI, MUI, Wahdah Islamiyah, Jamaah Tabligh, and so on; 72 from progressive Islamic organisations or movements; 72 from hard-line Islamic organisations such as FPI, LMI, FUI, LUIS, and others; 72 from radical Islamic organisations such as HTI, Khilafatul Islam, and the likes of them; and 90 from open organisations and/or of nationalist ideology, such as Pramuka, GMNI, PP, KNPI, etc.; and 144 *significant others* including teachers, educators, academics, and others. Such composition have to be well considered and presented to the researchers in the research design process.

However, in reality, the above composition had to undergo modification according to the prevailing condition in the field. The reality had to consider not only the availability of respondents per each expected typology, but also the researchers' time allocation and their access to the expected respondents. The actual total number of respondents from off-campus and on-campus organisations amounted to 451 people; respondents from organisations belonging to the liberal-progressive, hard-line, and radical categories, were among the least covered in the research. Their number, respectively, was as follows: progressive-liberal Islam (36 people), hardliners (25), and radicals (24). Meanwhile, quite a few moderate Muslims were recruited, totalling 228 people. In this research report, the moderate categories are sub-divided into two categories: the traditionalist-modernist (140 people) and the *da'wahist* movement (88). The number of youth respondents from interfaith or nationalist organisations was quite large: 138. Lastly, the number of significant others who were successfully interviewed was only 48 people. Details of the numbers of resource persons from organisations outside the school and campus are available The Appendix. Their number composition according to the patterns and ideological lines is represented in the following diagram:

Graph 3
 Respondents in 18 cities/districts based on ideological diversity of Ioff-
 school and off-campus organisations/institutions



Data Collection and Analysis

After the respondents were successfully identified and recruited, data collecting was required using in-depth interview techniques. This technique aimed to dig deeply for crucial information until deemed sufficiently saturated, that is until no new or different information could be extracted from respondents. In addition, in-depth interviews also served to uncover biographical narratives of respondents and reveal sensitive information that had to be presented openly to others.

The FGD technique aims to confirm findings obtained from the in-depth interviews. The FGDs enabled the researchers to capture the group dynamics that influenced the attitudes and behaviour of the Muslim youth respondents towards issues of radicalism and extremism. This was done through open exchanges of opinions on radical and extreme issues as raised by researchers. Each FGD was held in two sessions of 90 minutes each, which involved the researcher as its moderator/facilitator guiding the discussion whereas a note taker was assigned to record the process.

Once the data were properly collected, recorded and transcribed, the researcher conducted a thematic data analysis aimed at looking at the overall data and identifying similar issues and ideas. Information from respondents was categorized with reference to the objectives, conceptual framework of research, and research questions as guidelines. The data analysis ultimately aimed to identify similar and different patterns and concepts that could

further explain the essence of attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth in responding to various issues posed. Due to the limited time, prior to going to the field, researchers had had to gather to discuss and ascertain the issues and themes that would be submitted for interviews and FGDs.

Once the data collection was complete, the researchers coded them according to their relevance. This method proved to help equate the methods of data collection and analysis, especially given the fact that the research took place in a relatively short time covered a large span of areas, and involved a large number of research teams (1 coordinator, 1 secretary, 14 researchers, and 18 research assistants).

The themes for referencing data collection and analysis were structured in such a way that helped the researchers during in-depth interviews and FGDs. Although the starting point of this research had departed from the phenomenon of violence and extremism, the themes it covered were broad, ranging from soft to hard themes. The soft themes ranged from educational experience, religious teaching experience, interaction and association with families or organisations, non-Muslim access to religious literacy, up to behavioural patterns of interaction in the digital world. Other heavy themes covered around the issues of diversity and tolerance were; freedom and human rights, state ideology, and democracy; meanwhile, with regards to “heavyweight” themes, the research limited itself to issues of violence, radicalism and extremism.

The National Report Writing

The report writing was conducted in two stages: *first*, the stage of writing a regional report draft by each researcher in each city/district; and, *second*, the stage of report-draft refinement. All the researchers drafted their regional report and held a report finalisation workshop to get input from consultants and other research teams for improvement and refinement. In the same workshop the researchers were involved to participate in discussions and provide feedback on the national research report framework. Not many changes were made in the national reporting framework as it had been able to illustrate the general findings of the research in key words that represent the behavioural style and general attitude of Muslim youth in responding to the issues described above.

Hybrid identity, conservative turn, moderatism, social-media-famous or digital-savvy *ustadz*, as well as communal tolerance were discussed and debated during the workshop. The discussion on the above key words mainly focused on conceptual clarification, interpretation of any emerging data-supporting claims, and theoretical information to help understand the concepts. All the authors were involved in the drafting of the national report discussion, followed up on initial findings, and discussed the research main findings.

Each author was then given the tasks of reading in-depth interview and FGD data from all regions prior to coding them based on pre-set themes. On that basis, data categorisation was made by way of referring them to the methods of analysis as discussed in the research-design stage. It was necessary to juxtapose the respondents' views, attitudes and responses vis-à-vis the research questions above, in a way that is in accordance with the types of organisations that the respondents associated themselves with, as well as with their social bases.

Chapter 2

Social Media and The Decline of Religious Learning

Religious education is one of the key ways in which Muslim youth build their religious knowledge. It influences the Muslim's outlooks, their religious practices, their relationships in social life, and their on views towards muslims in the life of a nation.

In the millennial era, families, educational institutions, friendship, environment, and organisations are not the only factors influential in Muslim youth's learning process. Social media also contributes to the process. Most respondents in this study are those millenials who are very much attached to the internet and social media. The presence of the Internet and social media affects not only the patterns of interaction between children and parents, or that of communication among individuals, but also the existence of various sources of religious learning media. It is not surprising that the religious complexity of Muslim youth is influenced by the presence of the Internet and social media technologies.

The experience that Muslim youth have in interacting with friends during religious learning in various places, as well as the acquired religious knowledge itself, will shape their religious identity. This is where the process of identity hybridisation will be part of the impact meetings and interactions with various sources of learning, groups and environment. The identity hybridisation will be explained in the next chapter. This chapter will

examine in depth the types of religious education and learning that affect the millennial Muslim youth.

A. Increasing Roles of Social Media

Social media in this era can be a friend and a haven for knowledge for Muslim youth in learning religion. Digital-friendly religious figures are easier to accept that otherwise because that means they can be accessed easily wherever and whenever the youth want. According to data from 18 cities/districts in this study the presence of social media has reduced the role of religious education in families, educational institutions, and educational organisations.

Social media in the era of globalisation are used massively by young people for various purposes including that for learning about religion. Therefore, it only seems natural that they reduce the role of schools and families in such activities as studying religion. The age of respondents of this study ranges from 17 to 24 years old, which suggests that they are already independent beings in terms of seeking information and using media—online or offline alike—as sources for information.

Some ustadz have been popular by the Indonesian public and youth, such as Yusuf Mansur, Habib Rizieq Shihab, (late) Jefry Al Bukhori, and Abdullah Gymnastiar. The social power of the media also has given rise to new, popular or “viral ustadz” figures, such as Hanan Attaki, Adi Hidayat, Abdul Somad (da’i of millions of viewers), Khalid Basalamah, and Felix Siaw. Other names are only known locally, such as Ustadz Evie Effendi and Jujun Junaidi in West Java, and Salim A. Fillah in Yogyakarta. The only ustadz or Islamic figure who is a foreigner is Zakir Naik. As for the ustadzah, although they may not be as well-known as the male counterparts in society, the most popular ones include Mama Dedeh, Okky Setiana Goddess, and Umi Pipik.

Of the many reasons why these ustadz became the option for respondents, one was popularity. The names mentioned above often appear on TV and are popular in the community, such as Aa Gym and Yusuf Mansur. In addition to TV, they also often appear on YouTube and become an inspiration for respondents. Other ustadz also appear on non-mainstream TVs and some others are only on YouTube but are also popular. Their popularity gets

boosted due to the themes and quality of their *dakwah*, which are just about right, not too heavy, and easy to understand. On top of that, some of them possess good public speaking skills, have a sense of humor, and are very contextual in the manner they motivate the youth. The burning question remains: is their popularity due to their digital friendliness and their being active on social media, or has there been any agency involved who plays a role supporting their presence on social media? It was in this context that the battle in the production and reproduction of discourses took place.

Muslim youth are very close to the internet and social media. The internet becomes a reason why they choose to seek religious information through in social media. One FGD participant, Deliana Safitri from LDK Mercuru Buana, Jakarta, stated that using social media was useful and convenient, very much suitable to her needs. Its easy access means it can be used by anyone and anytime. The themes can adjust according to expectation. Search engines will help quickly what they want. No longer having to attend religious meetings, people can listen even from a remote distance. Besides, they can always playback past *dakwah* videos from their favorite Ustadz.

Furthermore, the appearance of preachers on social media makes it all the more interesting than otherwise. Their contents are usually contemporary, clear, easy to understand, and suitable for the psychology of today's youth. The themes are typically about the youth, such as on how to relate with the opposite sex, how to achieve more, or how to "hijrah" to a better Islam. As revealed by Putra, Chairman of Rohis SMAN 9 Manado:

"Preachers on social media are interesting because their contents or themes fit with teenagers like us, such as those on joining organisations, relationship, motivation, early marriage, and *ukhuwah islamiyah*. Their arguments are usually clear, too; unequivocal and not complicated at all."

A similar opinion came from with Nursaid, a muslim member of Lamongan Community Designers and who has NU background. The figure he looked up to the most was Muhammad Abduh Tuasikal, who is from Ambon but is now living in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta. His *dakwah* is often aired on Yufid TV, but Nursaid commonly accessed it from *muslim.or.id*. Ustadz Abduh's *dakwah*, simple yet very touching to him, had become the foundation of his religious understanding that later brought him to *salafy*.

These millennial-generation ustadz offer Islamic concepts that can be appreciated by the youth. Their themes such as the rise of Islam, back to the Qur'an and Hadith, hijrah, early marriages, are made simple yet appealing to the heart and mind of the young. As stated by Fathur Hadyan from LDK Phosma, Universitas Syah Kuala, the concept was simple and easy to understand by youth.

Social media for Muslim youth is not only used to increase knowledge but also to change religious attitudes. To Shekila Zahra, a young woman who serves as an official admin of *Niqab Squad Jakarta*, social media influence her as much as her family and the environment she is in. The convenience of social media and their conception of Islam have become more significantly influential to her. Zahra has a unique religious learning process. His father was a convert, his mother who is now an active member of Muhammadiyah had once attended a pesantren affiliated to PERSIS when she was in an MTs (middle school). She continued her study at MAN (high school) and attended Islamic University of Jakarta. Although the formal religious education environment could have made brought her close to religion, it did not happen. Her situation, and her lack of interest in the science of religion, did not transform her to "hijrah." Said Zahra:

"I learned more from Instagram than from my environment. I'm not fond of reading. I prefer YouTube because the speaker talks directly to me, so I know the tone, the emphasis...."

Zahra found videos of Ustadz Khalid Basalamah's dakwah on *Instagram* and *YouTube* so touching that she followed what the ustadz had said about the profile of the female inhabitants of heaven. Later, she decided to "hijrah," or shifting by using a *niqab*. While still learning from Instagram, she also produced her own short videos to spread in her *WhatsApp* and *Instagram* groups under the name of *Niqab Squad Jakarta*.

Such changes in religious attitude after watching YouTube also happened to Candra, vice-chairman of Rohis SMAN 3 Manado, a Muslim living in non-Muslim majority areas. He looked at Zakir Naik's video on YouTube about delivering Christmas greetings. Before that, he used to attend Christmas celebrations but now he has changed after watching that

video of Zakir Naik. A similar thing happened to Ambia Samsuri, a board of BEM Syah Kuala University Banda Aceh, whose attitude toward tolerance was influenced by social media. He argued that the requirement of tolerance was not disruptive, quoting a casual translation of the Prophet's statement in a hadith. Nadirsyah Hosen criticised the translation as tendentious and semantically altered, and thereby, gave fallacious idea to many readers who rely on social media as a source of learning.

Such a situation was explained by Lim (2005) in Hosen (2008) that with the power of the Internet network, users can spread their understanding of global conspiracies and spread their trust and identity against other internet users.¹³ For online readership, the spread by such a group has stronger cyber power than does CNN or BBC. Similarly, the online fatwa has become a reference for youth, who, together with other online media users, determine the fate of the fatwa in cyberspace.¹⁴ The explanation above shows the trend of youth referring their religious understanding from the internet.

Not just passively, Muslim youth activists also encourage the reproduction of religious studies and learning through the Internet. Deliana and Taufiqul Aziz both from Ta'lim Alif Da'wah Organisation of Communication Faculty, University of Mercu Buana, stated that they were actively looking for famous *ustadz* in social media. Moreover, they also produced their own social media for religious learning. One of their videos, for example, an episode of Educative Comedy Alif Part 2, was viewed by more than 110,000 people.¹⁵ Meanwhile, LDK UIN Jakarta, according to Chandra and Musab Izzuddin, also broadcast live reviews through Instagram. Live studies through Facebook and Instagram were also done by Ahmad Goniawan and his friends at LDK Jakarta State University. To these LDK activists of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and the State University of Jakarta, live broadcast means documenting activities while helping their friends who cannot participate directly.

13 Nadirsyah Hosen, "Online Fatwa in Indonesia: From Fatwa Shopping to Googling a Kiai", in Greg Fealy, Sally White, *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008

14 Nadirsyah Hosen, *op cit*.

15 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcYDeXIWrew> (Accessed February 10, 2018).

Other social media platforms popular for religious learning in the Muslim youth environment include WhatsApp, Facebook, and other online sites. Rohis activists also have their national Rohis group network on Facebook. A few WhatsApp groups are considered useful to help them keep their faith. For example, Ahda chose to use the *niqab* after following a WhatsApp group by *Ukhti Syar'i Movement*, a Muslimah group in Line, and an account called *Youth Hijrah*. Rifki, an activist of OSIS Nusantara Forum from Bogor, joined a WhatsApp group called *Pesantren Hati*, from which he learned many things about religious issues although it was a one-way group and he had no idea who ran it. Shekila Zahra, Armar (Rohis SMAN in Jakarta), Musab Izzuddin (LDK, UIN Jakarta) and M. Basri Lampe (IMM Kota Makassar) joined a “Mutiaru Subuh” WhatsApp group for information and *dakwah*.

The above explanation goes to show how the lives of Muslim youth have been impacted by knowledge produced on the internet. In many other cities in which this study was conducted the phenomenon of viral hadiths, similar to the one cited above, was also found. This confirms the reduced role of formal education in imparting religious understanding to families.

B. Diminishing Roles of Family

Many believe that a child's family to be a dominant factor in his or her education, including religious education. The family forms a foundation of religious education. A child usually gets the first touch in the family. It is the family that becomes the starting bookmark of religious sources, for example when a child becomes a youth and gets formal education. Nevertheless, this study found that family influences gradually diminish in terms of youth's religiosity. Moreover, it was also found that social media and the Internet have transformed into “new teachers” for them.

A family is the foundation of religious education because it becomes the place for children to learn the first things in life. The influence of the family is very large in the early stages of a child's growth, especially the first 5 years. However, family influence on a child can gradually diminish so as to not become the only source of religious knowledge any more due to a plethora of external information surrounding the child. The influence from external information, through reading, Internet surfing, and social relationships, can

influence the child's religious pattern. The foundation of education is being tested in this situation by forces that grow more and more influential to the religious pattern of the young generation.

The same holds true for religious learning, where the more mature a child, the less the influence of his or her parents. Not that all religious teachings from parents will disappear, but the infiltration of religious knowledge that children get from the outside world begins to enter their religious practices. In the study, respondents who were student-activists of Rohis and OSIS still spent a considerable amount of time with parents. Although they were already entering a phase of independence in life, their thinking capacity still could not be considered as mature.

The condition is akin to a case associated with Erikson's developmental theory concerning teenagers, aged 12-18 years, who are not considered adults although physically they look like them. This is an age group searching for identities and with a thirst for outside activities. This is the time when the role of parents as a main source of protection and value reference begun to decrease. On the contrary, this is the time when the roles of groups of friends and the environment increase.¹⁶ Clearly our respondents-activists aged over 18 were entering their early phase of adulthood.¹⁷ In this phase, they were learning how to interact with others more deeply. They did so, among others, through gathering with groups of the same hobbies. Organisational engagement allowed them interaction in more depth. In such a phase, when the role of parents as shelter has started to diminish, the first phase of identity hybridisation process begins. It is known that parental guidance and instructions influence the development of a child's religious knowledge. This influence encompasses the fundamental aspects of religion, which are: *aqidah*, worship, and ethics (*akhlakul karimah*). To some children, parental assistance goes further so as to facilitate attainment of high-level religious knowledge. Children who come from religious families strictly practice religious disciplines even though they study in public schools.

16 Jahja, Jude. *Developmental psychology*. Jakarta: Kencana Media Group: 2011; Crain, William. *Theory of Progress, Concepts and Applications*. Jakarta: Student Library; 2007; L, Zulkifli. *Psikologi Perkembangan*. Bandung: CV. Remaja Karya, 2008. Byod, Denise. *Lifespan Development*. Berlin: Pearson Education, Inc:2006

17 Ibid

Most of the research respondents claimed to have received basic religious knowledge from their parents or family environment when they were young. Tri Fitriani, student of high school in Bima, grew up in the care of a devout family, most notably her mother. Since childhood, she had been introduced to Qur'an and daily religious practices such as praying and fasting, as well as social morals such as honesty, caring, sincerity, patience, and not speaking ill of other people. She also reflected on her siblings who grew up as a religious youth. Despite attending non-religious schools (elementary, middle and high school), her religious understanding and practice remained unaltered from growing in family oversight. After high school, she was active in Indonesian Islamic Students (PII), a choice based on religious background, also due to the influence of her siblings who was a PII activist. In the organisation, her religious interest got strengthened with the religious capital she brought from family. In fact, among fellow PII activists, she was more than just a religious source for her friends. This means she understood the religion first before becoming a religious organisation activist.

Family becomes a very basic source of religious understanding in children. Two respondents, Musab Izzuddin, Chairman of LDK UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, and Chairman of Rohis MAN 4 Jakarta, Nabila, stated that their mother and family were already active in tarbiyah, so that tarbiyah culture came from them. Both were educated to enrich the culture tarbiyah, an integrated Islamic school. Nabila for example invited her mother in a Palestinian demo with PKS during holidays. To this day, the tradition of tarbiyah knowledge and culture has become rooted in them.

Armar, a chairman of Rohis in Jakarta, said that he gained religious knowledge from his mother, who was also a teacher in the village where he lived. With NU culture, Armar gained religious knowledge from his mother, who was also a religious figure, and was equipped with his liveliness in Rohis. Armar watched the YouTube channel of Abu Takeru with a tagline "Naruto just ngathung." His opinion on democracy was influenced by Abu Takeru's attitude that rejected democracy because it was considered incompatible with Islam. He had a different opinion from that of the culture of NU as adopted by his mother: He was certainly still able to change in accordance with the most powerful influence around him in his process of identity search.

Most of the families of these activists inculcated religious values early on. What is experienced by respondents above was a form of family influences that are a provision for children in their understanding of religion. However, non-family factors, both formal education, campus activity, friendship in the extra organisation, also social media can also influence religious education. The influence of families in the religiousness of Muslim youth can reduce if there is no control and good communication with family members.

C. Quo Vadis: Formal Religious Education

The Declining Influence of Religious Education in Schools

Religious education in schools is one source of religious learning in the formal education system. The muslim youth who were respondents in the research underwent religious education in such schools, which seems to suggest that religious teaching in formal education has played an important role in their learning process and from which they were supposed to be able to benefit in the best way possible. Yet, such is not the case. We find that formal religious education in schools has been unable to address their need for religious education and prevent them from joining the flow of conservatism. As a result, they seeked for additional learning resources from outside school environment, including via social media, to fulfill their curiosity. They seem to have been unable to select and sort out the kinds of media would take them in the direction of moderate religious patterns.

Formal education has a unique nature; it has a curriculum and educators who serve as connectors in class for the achievement of the curriculum. In the context of religious education, there are two types of formal education: first, the general-based formal education such as high school and public universities; second, the religious-based formal education such as Madrasah Aliyah, religious-based universities, and boarding schools that are accompanied by formal education.

In formal education, portions of religious subjects are given only minimally relative to general lessons. The same holds true at higher education; in most universities only some 2-credit general basic courses are given. Academic targets often limit the interaction patterns of teachers

and learners--although progressive teachers may be able to overcome such limitation. Religious education in both high school and university levels tend to stress on cognitive aspects while religious teachings should not stop there but rather also address affective and psychomotoric aspects. Religious education should play an important role in character education. Although in terms of material content there may be little that muslim youth will obtain, still it can affect and colour their religious life.

Such limited religious education in formal education was admitted by Thalia, a board member of Rohis of SMA Negeri 15 Pajjaiang, Makassar. According to her, religious education in public schools was still limited to fulfilling the curriculum requirement rather than due to awareness of the students' need; moreover, it did not include character building for dignified muslim students. Ginan A Malik, an activist HMI Garut said, "As we know, this Muslim-majority country is often shaken by polemics regarding the attitude of the government that always subordinates religion to other subjects. A very short week is all that's allocated for religious subjects." Thalia added that the presence of Rohis and study groups of Islam through OSIS could increase the portion. As an example to this is a routine Saturday study, which provides wide views on Islamic teachings and Islamic histories. In contrast to classroom learning that is one way whereby teachers lecture, in school mosques the learning prioritises on dialogues and question-and-answer sessions.

Nevertheless, formal education still imparts religious influence on children education. Rifki Montazero knew an Islamist movement in Lampung, Jamaah Khilafatul Muslimin, for following up the information from his teacher at school about the split of groups. SMA Muhammadiyah is categorized as a public high school with additional religious lessons but does not teach religion as much as pesantren. Montazero was informed of the Islamic schism from school. Although he traces through internet about Islamic divisions, the trigger for further tracking begins in the school room. Montazero explains as follows:

"I joined Khilafatul Muslimin in 2007 when I was in Muhammadiyah high school in Probolinggo, East Lampung. I was quite close to Pak Syaiful, a teacher of *Kemuhammadiyah*. One day the class discussed about the Muslims splitting into 73 groups

out of which only one group would go to Heaven. I asked him which one. He told me to find the answer myself when I grew up. I stumbled on searching the Internet and eventually found out about this *Muslim Khilafatul* on a website. When I contacted again after a while in 2011 via Facebook Messenger in 2011, I asked him if that group was the one that he'd meant. "Yes," he replied.

Formal education through pesantren significantly increased the respondents' religious knowledge. Hanafi, for instance, who came from an ordinary family, and not an Islamic scholar, learned much about the religion when he went to Al-Kautsar Pesantren in Dompu, West Nusa Tenggara. After that he majored in social studies in Madrasah Aliyah. During his 6 years at the religious school he felt his religious knowledge increased rapidly and settled with him unchanged despite his college degree from a public university. Later, when he attended the Institute of Science and Education (STKIP) Bima, he held a strong vision of Islam, a sort of religious zeal that grew with the organisation of religious-based campus.

A similar thing happened to Riyan Hidayat, chairperson of DEMA UIN Jakarta. He expressed that his experience when studying in a pesantren in Lampung as very influential for the foundation of his religious education. To these respondents, the impact from living in a pesantren remained imprinted throughout their spiritual journey at a later stage.

Those who went to boarding schools or religious schools (MAN) were certainly fortunate in that they could access textbooks as sources of religious knowledge and enjoyed guidance from competent religious teachers, as well as strong religious atmosphere not available in public schools. Moreover, they also benefited with profound understanding the many aspects of the religion, such as *fiqh*, *muamalah*, *aqidah*, *akhlaq*, and esoteric knowledge about Al-Qur'an and Hadith.

Apart from that, it is worth noting that in Bima the tradition of religious study in religious schools is barely different from that in public schools. The difference is only at the level of density in their respective religious curriculum. This is so because they have been some "Islamisation" of public schools in Bima since the late 90's when the incumbent regent, H. Zainul

Arifin, started enforcing the use of veil to young girls.

However, selection of formal education belongs as a domain for parents, notably in the sending of their children to formal schools. Fadilah Nurhidayah, HTI activist in UIN North Sumatra, for instance, was influenced by her mother in the choosing her religion-based school.

“My mom attended MTS... and she taught me how to wear hijab when I was a third year student at a public elementary school. When I graduated, I wanted to continue to a public middle high school, but she did not think it a good idea, so I ended up in a religion-based school. Then I continued my study at MTS Bina. To me, my studying at a religious school or MTS was important.”

Sending children to religious education institutions is a new community trend, including in Banda Aceh. Back in 1980s and 1990s, most state schools there had no interest in using a teaching system that offered religious education. However, the late 1990s picked up the prominent trend of schools offering Islamic education; some of them even became favorite schools.¹⁸

Before the early 2000s many parents would send their children to a modern *dayah*, which—adopting a system from Pesantren Pesantren—offers religious education and also that of general education. After the tsunami tragedy, until now, parents have had the tendency to send their children to *dayah*-like institutions that offer integrated programs with more emphasis on the aspect of memorising al Qur’an. Kausar, a second child of four siblings born into a religious family condition, went to such a school. His father was a civil servant, his mother a housewife, both encouraged their children to go to a religious school and motivate them to become *hafiz*. Thus, Kausar became one, mastering eight *juz*; he finished his education at His sister went to a tahfidz school and his younger brother went to MIN.

From the explanation above we can see that religious education in formal institutions of non-religious schools is not considered adequate in fulfilling the need for youth religious education. Furthermore, formal education in public high schools and universities, at some point in time,

18 Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru*, Jakarta: Logos, 1999.

somehow triggered the emergence of certain religious styles among Muslim youth such as one that introduced Rifki Montazero, through his teacher, to *Khilafatul Muslimin* network. It is notable that young activists who are educated at boarding schools or Madrasah Aliyah have enjoyed better religious education and that in the selection of formal education, parents still play a dominant role as they wish to lay strong religious foundation in their children, including by following the trend of becoming *hafidz*.

Integrated Islamic Schools, Rohis and LDK: A New Model of Religious Education

SDIT being one of the most promising learning alternatives in urban areas, many parents follow the trend of sending children to learn there, ranging from kindergarten to integrated Islamic elementary schools. These schools offer longer education and more parental services than formal education does. In Aceh, the trend of sending children to SDIT is accompanied by proliferation of pesantrens offering *tahfidz* programs.

Some respondents went to integrated schools because of their parents. Musab Izzuddin of LDK-UIN Jakarta, who received education from TKIT to SMAIT, and Nabila (chairwoman of Rohis MAN 4 Jakarta) who received education from TKIT to SMPIT, serve as examples here. Both of them received integrated school education owing to their tarbiyah family culture. For urban communities, integrated Islamic schools give a new colour of formal schooling plus religious learning, which addresses the relatively unmet parental needs.

Fahmi Azhari, a high school student in Medan, who has experienced boarding-school education in Medan, exposed himself to tarbiyah-affiliated religious activities by joining *Mabit*. It offers one-day training on Islamic contents run in the afternoon at the beginning of each month by ustadz from SMIT Medan as well as from outside of the school. The training started after lunch covering diverse themes. According to Fahmi, "The themes vary: *ukhuwah*, *jalasi ruhiyah* (the purging of the spirit), *aqidah*, and all sorts of other materials."

Among LDK, there is also a process that reflects the intellectual history of its activists. They learn to understand religion by participating in LDDK

(Basic Training of Dakwah Campus) and LMD (Dakwah Management Exercise), *halaqah*, literature reviews, and mentoring. This LDK engagement enriches their knowledge on aspects of *aqidah*, *fiqh*, and *mu'amalah* of Islam.

Being embryos of LDK, most Rohis organisations prepare their cadres from middle-school students in which proses branding piety becomes a special attraction for Rohis. Three leaders of Rohis from SMAN 9, SMAN 3, SMKN 1 Manado acknowledged feeling highly motivated to be more pious and more social than their friends who were not part of the board. Putra, Chairman of Rohis SMAN 9 Manado revealed:

“I’m joining some courses on *halaqah* and *liqa*, which were held by the Tadzkir Board of University of Sam Ratulangi. I also go to *Rumah Tahfidz* learn to memorise 30 *juz* in a mosque in Manado city. My daily routines typically begin with school; after that I spend some time at the Board of Badan Tadzkir, then hang out with students. Sometimes I sleep there in our basecamp. I’m comfortable here, making good friends; I like the environment; it increases my religious awareness. I pray 5 times a day; I also do routine sunnah fasting. My parents aren’t worried even if I don’t go home, because they know I’m active in Rohis.”

Chairman of Rohis SMKN 1 Manado, Sulthon, said his activities in Rohis and lessons from teachers are colourful enough for his life. Randy, chairman of Rohis at SMAN 3, felt the same way. He was happy to coordinate Rohis activities and follow various religious studies. They knew each other well in *halaqah* or *liqa* forums such as SAINS (Monday-Thursday Fasting) and Friday Intensive Study (JUSTIS). As caretakers they directly served exemplary role models, a source of motivation to his friend--fellow Rohis members. In addition, on average most Rohis activists also performed well academically; many of them ranked among the top 10 in class.

Both Rohis and LDK are interlinked organisations bearing a similar vision. Zuhriah, Student of IAIN Pontianak, was quite active and highly motivated. He joined campus organisations, especially LDK, because since he was in middle school and high school he had always been active in Rohis; hence his preoccupation in campus organisations. According to him, *da'wah* is a duty for all humans.

LDK has the establishment of cadres with a solid recruitment system. Not

surprisingly, these cadres are militants. The standardized recruitment and regeneration patterns are decided at the national level, which makes the institution relatively impervious to non-moderate organisational influences. Even if there are any external organisations that want to exert some influence, their effort usually gets thwarted. Such is what happened to some members of GEMA Liberation at the University of Lampung. When they usurped into LDK and tried to incorporate their liberal ideas so as to change from within, they became somehow ostracised by the board members and had to leave.

Although the recruitment pattern and the cadre system have been standardised, the religious background of its members is relatively diverse. Not all of them are adherents of the *tarbiyah* movement that adopts *salafi-wahabi* teachings combined with *Ikhwanul Muslim* movement. This study found that only a few LDK activists and members are actually from NU, Muhammadiyah, or other organisations. With regard to its religious style, the way they dress is unique. Some activists wear *salafi-wahabi* clothing with hanging pants and *burqa/niqab*; some do not.

Hanafi, former activist of STKIP Mataram, had interest in LDK because their activists have unique characters not found in other organisations, especially in terms of daily religious behaviour. According to him, LDK activists look diligent, neat, and orderly. They set real examples. Hanafi found himself steadily following the various levels of cadre activities, studying religion, joining LDK activities, and finally occupying the position as LDK chairman in his campus. The influence of LDK is strong enough in its religiosity, as it provides a good environment for the development of religious instincts. Praying five times a day is no longer a problem; together with other LDK friends he became a source of motivation to other students in terms of worshipping commitment.

The internalisation of religion finds its physical expression in the style of dressing in a white hemp and thin beard-style of mosque activists among Indonesian university students. Living in the wing of the campus mosque, he and his fellow friends managed to maintain the religious image of the mosque institution. Given the rising trend of integrated schools existence, Rohis and LDK, it is obvious that the three institutions are the new religious social base. Not only as an alternative source of learning both formal and

informal education but has given different religious colours outside NU and Muhammadiyah. Although the integrated school, Rohis and LDK still belong to only a few people, but its presence has coloured the Muslim youth.

D. The Influence of Social Environment

The social environment has an important role for Muslim youth in shaping religious attitudes. It can be informal education, organisational affiliation, or social friendship. The study found that the presence of local ustadz maintains moderatism among the Muslim youth although at the same time the potential of contact with radicalism also remains open, i.e. when meeting with inappropriate characters. While informal education provides a foundation on their religiosity, friendship is so influential to the religious patterns of youth that it may determine whether they will go moderate or radical. In addition, affiliate organisations increasingly reinforce the youth's religious patterns. A religious process that is widely influenced by the environment, informal education, *kyai/ustadz*, and organisations renders itself as both experience and influence along the process of identity hybridisation.

The Role of Local Kyai/Ustadz (Scholars) in Maintaining Moderatism

Argarri Akbar, Rohis counselor at SMA 34 Jakarta and also chairman of Rohis in DKI Jakarta, and Andhika Rifqi Alfaris (Rohis, SMA 78 Jakarta) both received strong religious teachings from their ustadz in their neighborhood. Argarri studied *the yellow book* from his ustadz of Aswaja-affiliation outside the school and was also active in Rohis during high school. The provision from his ustadz made him never contradict his senior in the organisation about delivering Christmas greetings. He said delivering greetings on the Christmas day was okay as long as we had no intention to destroy *aqidah*. This opinion was strongly opposed by a senior at Rohis. Argarri also disagreed with an Islamic state. According to him:

“Instead of building an Islamic state, it is better to build existing ones with Islamic values. We have a more important and more urgent *maqashid of shari’ah* than formalisation. I know *maqashid shari’ah* from Asy-Syatibi.”

A similar case was experienced by Andhika, Rohis chairman at SMAN 78 in Jakarta, who diligently studied the book after magrib with ustadz in the mosque. He learned that social media could not be the dominant source of religious learning and information from there needed to be consulted with the ustadz. His opinion was also shared by Argarri. Both held local kyai as a venerated source of religious learning. These show how youth are spared from misappropriated information and still have a tolerant religious attitude that is able to stem radicalism in the onslaught of social media, which is not necessarily moderate.

Despite today's presence of digital friendly ustadz, some young activists still study with local ustadz. Faizal, head of OSIS SMKN 1 Lamongan, in addition to his parents' encouragement to learn about prayers and read al-Qur'an, studied in the mosque in the neighborhood. He idolised a local kyai KH. Anwar Zaid and made him as his reference. The East Java kyai was rather quirky in that he used light-weight language in his da'wah; according to Faizal, his teachings were easily digested.

Encounter in public spaces often brings informal meetings that make youth come to see their figures as a source of religious learning. It usually happens when there are teachers who play not only a formal role in class but also an informal one outside class. In MAN 1 Bima, the school was hiring new teachers to become student partners in the discussion of religious issues outside of school hours. H. Farid Hasan, one of the selected candidates, revealed that the task was additional to his responsibilities as deputy headmaster; he accepted the job as part of his way of being concerned. In his view, many students were willing to learn more about religion and felt that social media would not warrant intact understanding unless it is balanced with other authoritative sources--in this case, competent teachers.

Teachers who are active outside classroom do influence Muslim youth. A case in point was Ariani, secretary of BEM of Lamongan University, who admitted of being very much inspired by her high-school teacher of religious studies. Until now she has still communicated with her teacher, who is from Solokuro. Ariani admitted that in times of difficulty, she would consult him. Although her parents profess a different religious faith, the family did not see it as a problem.

Informal teachers can also influence youth's views on religion. Akhda, student at a private university in Jakarta, knew much about religion and decided to wear a *niqab* not long after she met some tutors who wore them. She said, "I liked it when a teacher told me that someone who took care of her *aurat* would look more beautiful when she got married." Without further clarification, Akhda trusted the teacher's words and followed her advice.

Andika, Argarri and Faizal are millennial generations who still consider the importance of *local ustadz* as the main source of religious learning. This includes the role of post-formal education teachers in classroom. Their existence reinforces religious understanding of Muslim youth while maintaining their inclusive-moderatism although, at the same time, the potential leading to conservatism is also open; for instance, if the source of learning is from those conservative teachers donned in peculiar apparels.

Informal Education

Informal education play a role that is not less important in youth religiosity. Due to the construction of society and the presence of digital media, informal education is somehow diminishing; not all activists have had the opportunity to get educated. However, good informal education can provide a moderate religious positive colour for moderate Muslim youth activists.

For many youths in Garut, informal education is undergone primarily up until they reach elementary-school age. Almost all of them experience similar childhood religious activities: they recite Qur'an twice a day at night between *Magrib* to *Isha* and in the morning by dawn time. They study in mosques or *langgar* and these activities are generally carried out on the order of parents, following the usual local culture. As children, our respondents would learn the *hijaiyah* (*Arabian Alphabet*) to read al-Qur'an readily, memorize prayers, know the ordinances of worship, and study *fiqh* as well as *aqidah-akhlak*.

Similarly, the introduction of religious education to respondents in Makassar started from early childhood through formal education (TPA) and "village studies." Assessment materials are usually adapted to the mission of the respective organisation. They usually test the knowledge of *fiqh*,

mannerism, and history. After elementary education, their religious learning resources shift to formal schools, formal organisations, or pesantren.

Tika Lia Rianti, a convert from Bali, while living in Jakarta joined YISC Al-Azhar for special lessons on religion. Rianti had a different urban style of seeking knowledge, that is by attending in-mosque teenager classes which offer well-structured curricula.

Informal on-campus education is also a source of religious learning. It is usually carried out through various regular activities, such as recitals or discussions. At Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU), Chairul Azhar Purba, took part as a member of the Islamic Students' Activity Unit (UKM). This organisation is a unit that aims to develop human resources in the perspective of Islam so as to address daily issues. Its program includes Arabic learning and routine recitation that examines the pillars of Faith and the pillars of Islam based on the Qur'an and Hadith.

Meanwhile, respondents in Solo also acknowledged campus dynamics as a platform for developing Islamic youth activists. Being activists of Islamic organisations, almost all the respondents admitted that they often joined Islamic studies both on- and off-campus. Some respondents were also active teaching TPQ in a few off-campus mosques.

Thus, informal education has a strong potential in maintaining moderatism. Direct encounters of students and teachers in a cultural atmosphere not only strengthen the bonds but also open up a wider, more flexible and relaxed space for dialogues. Socialisation with the nearest environment becomes a plus in the context of the digital world. Informal education in mosques, campuses and *majelis taklim* also contribute to youth's religious education despite interruption from the digital media.

Friendship as an Important Factor in Muslim Youth's Religiosity

Friendship also affects the learning process to the point that it may determine whether one's religiosity will turn to be moderate or otherwise. Andi Setiadi, who headed the Islamic Students in Lampung, admitted that his association in the exclusive propagatory organisation had made him "militant." The influence of exclusive studies also prepared all the information and reading materials for him. Andi's environment in this organisation has

resulted in his *anti-Shia* understanding. Meanwhile, M. Fikri from GEMA Liberation had different experience. He admitted joining HTI following his mother and was quite active in following its studies there. His mother was a member of HTI, active in *majlis taklim* around the neighbourhood. Because of the different circumstances and unique dressing (e.g. wearing *himar* or *niqab*) codes, the environment around their residence tended to shun them; even some neighbours once labelled them as a terrorist family. The incident led to disruption of good neighbourly relation. Fikri was also active in HTI, a place where he met others in the community of solidarity and felt part of them.

Nursaid, an activist of Muslim Designers Community Lamongan, also underwent a change from NU to the ideology of *salafy-dakwahis* from friend's invitation. With her NU family background, she was familiar with *salafi* while studying at a Technical High School in Malang. Although educated at a pesantren, Nursaid's invitation to a *salafi* study made active in taking care of a pesantren in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta.

Notes from a study in Lampung indicates that with regard to familial affiliation related to religiosity, parents are not always followed by their children. Some respondents whose family background is based on NU or Muhammadiyah, for instance, preferred to affiliate themselves with other *madzhab*s that are considered more "appropriate." Not rarely do those with background in Muhammadiyah, NU, or Jamaah Tabligh at the village convert either to HTI, *Salafi*, *Khilafatul Muslimin* or others, due to friendship.

One thing this study argues about this university phase is that parental influence seems very relative and, in many cases, even is not strongly influential. Many students of Muhammadiyah family background tend to *not* end up as activists in Muhammadiyah's autonomous organisations such as IPM and IMM. On the contrary, many activists brought up by parents of no specific or cultural affiliation in the Nahdiyyin tradition *do* tend to become very active in Muhammadiyah-affiliated organisations. Moreover, based on the respondent profiles, friendship as an environmental factor seems to impact more greatly than does family, especially in the university phase.

The environment in this respect includes internal campus dynamics, prevailing socio-political issues, and events related to Muslims or Islamic

issues in Indonesia. The process of seeking a religious understanding conducted by student activists at their age is still strongly reflected by the activities around them, in places relatively far from where their parents live. The joining of students from Muhammadiyah family into HTI or as troops in Surakarta is not without reason. UMS is an open place, where a few lecturers who are HTI sympathizers patronise students. Similarly, the students with a proclivity to follow Salafism have mentors from among the lecturers. The same can be obtained from that phenomenon occurring in public universities, such as UNS. This is what might be called as a religious “*hijrah*” phenomenon among Muslim youth campus activists.

Multi-Organisation Affiliates

Organisational affiliations have a distinctive influence on the process of youth’s religiosity. In general, Muslim activists undergo a significant phase of thinking development from within organisations. In addition to thinking, organizing also provides space for socializing, and for getting new sources of religious learning other than that from their. The existence of a religious organisation as an environment makes young Muslim activists dive in a different religious life outside his formal education. The process of meeting with many diverse groups and organisations is part of the process of identity hybridisation.

Several campuses or schools organisations are the place for youth in learning religion. Some examples are BEM and LDK in university level and Rohis and OSIS at high school level. Furthermore, extra-light activities are also not formally limited by the campus; among the examples here are Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM), the affiliated Muhammadiyah Youth to NU, HMI, GPII, and PII, which enter the ranks of moderate organisations.

Some extra generations off campus are Jamaat Tabligh, Wahdah Islamiyah, Gema Pembebasan, and FPI, which are categorised as conservative organisations of *dakwahis*. On-campus and non-campus local organisations also exist, such as *Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar*/GAMAN Movement (Lamongan), Khilafatul Muslimin in Lampung, IPRA (Ikatan Pemuda-Adaja Youth) in Manado, Tasikmalaya Assembly, Indonesian

Muslim League in Medan, the Tafseer of Qur'an (MTA), and Laskar Umat Islam Solo (LUIS, Surakarta). In any such organisation Muslim youth get religious environment that colours their diversity.

Intra-school organisations and universities are more environmentally constrained, but that does not mean there is no exchange of ideas and information. In Rohis for example, new religious knowledge can become interesting. Armar, Rohis chairman at SMA 29 Jakarta, stated that he joined the organisation because he had little knowledge about Islam. He felt that what he had learned at home and at school was not enough. The same with LDK; the desire to gain religious knowledge brought activists into religious organisations in informal education. More on Rohis and LDK will be discussed in another section of this book will discuss more on Rohis and LDK.

Organisations of non-formal education also provide media to discuss Islam. Bay Hikmah Saragih, a member of HMI USU, recounted that in the organisation, besides holding discussions of divine issues, they also held a recitation that usually took place in the secretariat. The recitation could be reading al-Qur'an and discussing its tafsir. The recitation of the holy verses of the Qur'an would be done with candidate cadres. This interpretation study is as a medium for dialogue and to train the critical reasoning potential of the cadre. The discussions with the candidate member would centre around why they chose HMI, or if they realised the importance of answering such questions as why join HMI or those on social issues. In an interview with Bay Hikmah Saragih, he said:

“We give the question to candidates or other members on how and why they want to join HMI. We encourage the students to think critically, not just accepting what is written on paper or what they can immediately absorb.”

Caderisation in HMI serves as proof of the learning process undergone by religious activists. Although the acceptance level and development vary, the regeneration process gives religious colour to young activists and maintains their moderatism.

Caderisation in organisations such as HMI is conducted in ranks to emphasise the member's respective understanding and interpretation of Islamic aspects, as well as their religious identity. In HMI this includes

Kader Training I, II, and III, with its foundational material focusing on NIK (Identity Value Cadre)--or formerly NDP (Basic Values of Struggle). NIK or NDP contains progressive religious understanding based on the principles of Islam and nationality as its platform based on the thoughts of the late Nurcholis Madjid (Cak Nur). Cak Nur seems to be the main source of understanding of Islam among HMI activists, who devour over--or at least are familiar with--his books. Thus, from this process, moderatism of religious thoughts in HMI activists is sourced. Meanwhile, among PMII, there is PKD (Pelatihan Kader Dasar/Basic Training) and PKL (Pelatihan Kader Lanjut/ Advanced Cadre Training) for Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah, a moderate religious ideology that has evolved around and characterized the Nahdliyin community. Among the IMM activists are known DA cadres (*Darul Arqam*) in three levels: basic, middle and plenary--all being the vehicles for internalisation of Muhammadiyahian doctrines based on modernist-reformist thinking.

This formal process not only concerns on internalised religious understanding but also national understanding. To build the maturity of the religious and national understanding, the process of awakening are embedded conducted through discussions and intellectual studies called *Up-Grading* or *Follow-Up* in order to help form a shared social vision of religion and nationality at a certain level. It should come as no surprise that organisations with affiliation to NU, Muhammadiyah, and HMI maintain their moderatism.

Non-campus religious groups can be as powerful. Wawan, activist of GEMA Pembebasan UIN Jakarta, acquainted himself with HTI when studying in Palembang. He saw a HTI booth on campus and felt that their ideology fitted him. In Jakarta, he actively joined GEMA Liberation. A different situation occurred in East Jakarta to GPII activist, M. Rizki, who joined GPII for about 2 years. GPII not his first organisation, he used to be active in *paskibraka*, *Remaja Masjid*, and go to *Majelis Rasullullah* under Habib Munzir. Although GPII values are not too binding, the frequent meetings with friends as well as the process of kaderisation do significantly intensify exposures to the organisation's ideology. Meanwhile,

Rif'an, an activist of LUIS Solo, shows that organisational experience in

civil society organisations is no instant process. In his case, the intensity of interaction with the environment, socio-economic needs, and religious tendencies had to end up at least temporarily since he became part of LUIS although he had previously been active in IMM and KAMMI.

As a mass organisation, LUIS has been quite active in responding to various social problems in Surakarta and its vicinities, and even to national issues related to Muslims. Its

public communication has been good with a few of its publications circulating in various online media. LUIS spokesman Endro Sudarsono criticized government policies on online media bans or on Islamic sites that they labelled as radical (via the MoCI and on the role of BNPT); in his view, LUIS considered it excessive [for anyone] to ban the “balancers” of government.¹⁹ LUIS actively defended and supported four Solo Anti-Alcohol activists who were tried in Surakarta court for allegedly taking unilateral action and disturbing the order.²⁰ Activists joined LUIS because they consider LUIS activities, ideology, and movement to be proper.

Meanwhile, The Wahdah Islamiyah organisation in Sulawesi is distinctive in their effort to develop activists with strong characters. Riska from SMAN 1 Bulukumba has father who works as a farmer, while her mother is a housewife mentioned that her parents are devout Muslims although without deep knowledge of Islam. After joining Wahdah, Riska at first felt compelled to teach her parents, but then she did not dare do that due to her fear of being ungodly. Although her parents were not proud of Riska going to Wahdah Islamiyah, they were happy because her daughter became a nicer daughter. As for the benefits from the organisation according to Riska, she felt at home at the nice environment; she could make many new friends there, “the righteous ones,” who helped one another other in close sisterhood.

Joining an organisation was also viewed positively by other fellow students as it allowed them to be more knowledgeable in religious matters and make friends with those who came to ask about religion.

19 <http://www.panjimas.com/news/2015/04/01/bredel-media-islam-yang-merupakanpenyeimbang-pemerintah-luis-bnpt-emosional>.

20 <http://www.panjimas.com/news/2015/04/05/luis-serukan-umat-islam-hadir-dalamsidang-praperadilan-aktivis-anti-miras-solo-tahap-ke-2>.

Another benefit of joining Wahdah Islamiyah according to Riska was that she felt she had someone to guide and advise her. She also admitted had never been as as she was joining

Interestingly, FGD participants from Wahdah Islamiyah did not want to mention any national Islamic figures, such as Gus Dur, Cak Nur, Syafii Marif, or Aa Gym as role models. The group seemed to only regard ustadz from among Wahdah Islamiyah as their role models.

It can be drawn from the above examples that the influence of intra and extra organisations is such that they can give colour to the religiosity of Muslim youth activists. Rigorous caderisation processes certainly influence their religious practices, while less intensive ones do not contribute as much difference. How muslim youth choose organisations is influenced by many factors such as their sense or perception of social needs, existence, piety, and comfort in interaction. Affiliation to organisations also influences youth tendency towards moderatism.

The influence of good friendship and conducive environment, which is usually gained through hanging out in informal education, recitation meeting with *ustadz/local kyai*, or other organisational activities, has contributed to the formation of religious patterns. The role of trusted people like teachers in adolescence has gives a strong colour to religious practices up to this day. Friendship also has an important role in bringing Muslim activists to learning resources that can lead to moderate-inclusivism and conservatism. It must be realised, however, that the dynamic is higher and more varied among Muslim youth who are studying at universities.

Group dynamic in university settings is far more intense than it is in Rohis and OSIS as there is no control from lecturers, colleges, and perhaps even families. As a result, environment during the college phase is influential as far as youth religiosity is concerned. In this study, the environment is assumed as one of the significant factors and thus is considered as an entry point of access to the respondents' religious position.

E. *The Power of Literacy*

Among most Muslim student activists who became respondents of this research, literature in the form of Islamic books has not seen a strong

influence. In other words, the tradition of Islamic intellectualism is not--or has not been--the interest of most activists. What is meant by the tradition of intellectualism here is the opportunity and ability to appreciate and reflect the intellectual works of Muslims, both in the national and international scope, to be contextualised in Indonesia. In giving an argument for an issue they have, the respondents rarely quoted quotes, named references, or mentioned book titles.

In this context, there is a problem in Islam literacy among youth at least when measured or seen from the perspective of availability of Islamic literature circulating today. Some respondents who access Islamic literature of their interest are HTI activists from HTI and from Dakwah Kampus.

LDK and HTI activists can refer to their sources of religious knowledge than can others. Andi Setiadi, for example, received regular study materials on *Shi'ah* apostasy every week from a *da'wah* organisation he followed, the literature under this topic being abundant in many books. Felix Siaw's books made one part of Andi's mini library, which he managed with his friends. Inevitably, discussions with his friends formed an exclusively anti-*Shi'ah* character.

Furthermore, philosophical books read by activists have much influence on their religious perspectives. Those who read philosophy books, although the number is miniscule, tend to be more moderate than those who do not. For example, Mustain Lamongan IMM activist does not endorse the way of violence; he does not argue on the importance of substituting democracy with an Islamic state although he is not satisfied with democratic practices today. Similarly, Emha Asror, HMI activist who is also active in Formaci, prefers reading books of philosophy and other textbooks directly compared to reading from social media; this affects his point of view. For example, he criticised the *hate speeches* occurring around the case of the former Governor of DKI Jakarta, Ahok. He did not subscribe to violence and intimidation, including also when applied in the context of Perppu on CSOs. He did not agree with HTI and nor with the State that ignored the legal process to dissolve the organisation.

Among the youth activists that are affiliated with modernist muslims gradation takes place in the process of deepening and renewal of the

intellectual work of modernist Muslim figures. In this context, it can be stated that there has been a shift in the characteristics and orientation of the tradition of religious studies among Muslim youth activists, who are no longer interested in breaking the establishment of Islamic thought. But many adopt common concepts circulating in public or information-based opinions gained from the lectures they get from *YouTube*.

However, the reading of modernist books will affect this perspective. Hasani, activist of PMII Pontianak, is very fond of books by Quraish Syihab. The moderate outlook of Quraish Syihab influenced Hasani's point of view, especially about peace and his writings always invites people to appreciate differences.

Literacy activities are still ongoing, but this activity is still limited as a regular effort to increase knowledge. The reading tradition grew especially when they entered college and became student activist organisations. Among LDK Bima, for example, a simple campus-based mosque library can deliver its activists to religious books, although it is still very limited. In addition to reading alone, another model is the extraction of readings from seniors who are transmitted back to the juniors through *halaqah* or follow-up activities, and later pervasive into religious knowledge.

The books are quite diverse, covering *fiqh*, scientific al qur'an and *hadith*, sufi, even Satan. Islamic magazines like *Ar Risalah*, *Hidayatullah* and *An-Nida* also colour religious insights among Muslim youth in Bima. Some books are classified as heavy reading materials, such as those from the likes of Cak Nur, Koentowijoyo, Ali Shariati, Ashgar Ali Engineer, Abid al-Jabiri and other Islamic thinkers, although very limited because of the problem of access to the literary sources. Other activities to access these books include the reading pattern "from boarding school to another boarding school", i.e. visiting seniors who have ample literature.

The digital world has played a significant role in influencing the youth activists. The outbreak of the Internet and the emergence of digital ustadz also affect their reading interest. The reading sources that spread through the internet and social media are favored by youth, but they are not free from hoaxes or hate speeches. A small number of activists still read philosophical textbooks and books by moderate figures and this has very much affected

their outlook towards moderatism. Meanwhile, to a number of activists, their religious references are limited to the literature that is shared and believed by the group, which affects their exclusive pattern of religious thoughts.

Chapter 3

Muslim Youth and The Hybridisation of Identity

A. The Meaning of Religious and Hybridisation of Identity

The ever-increasing flow of information in the digital technology era has impacted strongly on the millennial generation and those who use such information technology as computers, internet, tablets, smart phones, and other devices. Information, accessible through various characters and types, becomes closer and more adorable to youth. Therefore, the maturity of youth in cultivating their knowledge is determined on what and how they get the information, including that which concerns social, political, economic, cultural and religious issues. Specifically, their understanding and experience are determined by the model and the type of information they read every day as they are doing the searching process.

It can be seen from this research on the attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth in various cities in Indonesia that activists, particularly the Muslim students-activists, have diverse viewpoints in their understanding, perceiving, and assessing of religious, socio-political, economic and the cultural issues surrounding them. Their expressed religious views show their identity as a group of people who are in search of identity in social, economic, political and religious contexts that tend to be dichotomous. Youths are faced with situations where dualism or dichotomies can be seen

daily, such as: freedom and restraint, liberalism and conservatism, religion and secularism, altruism and crime, philanthropy and corruption, luxury and poverty, democracy and authoritarianism, traditionalists and modernists, rituals and social action, building new cultures that advance and nurture old traditions, etc. In a situation whereby they are still in the process of searching information, they are being “forced” to determine some sort of attitude that will in turn determine their insights, however limited they may be. In other words, youth, including university students and Muslim students, who are in the process of transition to maturity are being pressurised by those dichotomous extremities. Therefore, the religious position of the youth, Muslim students and activists, is such that they are always in a dilemma to respond to the problems and their complexities, such as with regard to social interpersonal relationship, human rights (HR), political leadership, democracy, employment and economic opportunities, and so on.

One thing to emphasise here is that most respondents are educated Muslim students and student activists with the following characteristics. *First*, educated people have a relatively broad insight into understanding and digesting the surrounding situation and being able to think systematically. Therefore, their opinions, views, and religious attitudes are at least relieving their knowledge. *Second*, educated people have more access to reading sources than other groups in their generation. In addition to experiencing a religious learning process in the classroom they can also access various reading sources from libraries and the internet. *Thirdly*, as Muslim activists, the intensity of religious learning they acquire can help them in understanding normative views or interpreting views when they are organizing activities. *Fourth*, as activists, Muslim students and university students interact with many parties in the networks they have, be it with parties that are their “ideological patrons” and with others with different or even opposite views.

The meaning of Religiosity

In general, religiosity in this study is religious attitudes or appreciation. In a more specific context, youth’s religiosity is the attitude, perception and appreciation of Muslim youth to the teachings of Islam they obtained,

both in terms of understanding and behaviour (rituals and religious socio-political attitudes). Furthermore, this study does not simply look at how Muslim youth hold a principle or religious view but also try to understand the culture background and religious education they have. Of course, it became interesting when this study was conducted in various areas, ranging from the very cosmopolitan cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Makassar; to the densely-populated areas with strong ethnic and cultural identities, such as Aceh, Manado, and Bima. There are many similarities and there are also differences or uniqueness of each region. Some of the similarities found include the following: 1) the diversity of educational backgrounds, religious affiliations, and organisation affiliations of most respondents is the result of the experience (social, religious and in certain political contexts) that are not linear; 2) most respondents maintain their norm or religious views or tendencies, and tend to be textual or literary, although they can still be open to accepting new things; 3) Respondents also dominantly state that their religious learning process is not only attained in college or school, but also from the internet and other online media, including social media currently being admired by youth.

In various interviews and FGDs, information provided by respondents about religiosity, specifically about the concept of religious obedience, was quite diverse. Most of them recognised that as Muslim youth activists, they undertook practical worshipping routines such as prayer and fasting, e.g. primary prayer 5 times a day. Some of them tended to undertake sunnah deeds such as sunnah rawatib prayers, as well as sunnah fasting on Mondays and Thursdays. There was also recognition among of them who said that their worship was still “not perfect” for either compulsory or sunnah activities. Generally, they acknowledged that they had not yet come to be called “a righteous person” the reason being that they realised that there were many things in Islam that they were still unable to fulfil. In the process of FGD, especially in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, they were also asked about wider righteous deeds. Many respondents said that being good and kind could be done through how we treat others, and that non-Muslim people can still be righteous based on their religion. In addition, being righteous was not merely “our own” (in the sense of an individual) but could also be

owned by others, fellow Muslims, although the expressions might vary.

Hybridisation of Identity

One of the key findings of this study is that Muslim youth activists today experience a phenomenon called the “hybridisation of identity.” It is the presence of religious identity because of the crossing of affiliation and religious orientation based on religious social-political dynamics that the respondents witness and their interaction with social environments. Theoretically, the phenomenon of hybridisation of identity is not a new concept.

A few socio-religious scholars and observers have used this term in their reading of Islamic phenomena, including that on Islam in Indonesia. One of them is Carool Kirsten, a Dutch lecturer at University College London (UCL)--also the author of *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Societies, Ideas and Values*. She uses the term “*cultural hybridity*” to read and understand the development of Islamic thought in Indonesia.²¹ One of her issues is the emergence of ‘Islamic reform’ in Indonesia with the presence of figures such as Nurcholish Madjid and the idea that he carried. In Kirsten’s view, Nurcholish Madjid is one of the figures called a “mixed cultural-religious background.” Nurcholis Madjid was born in a devout Muslim family; his father was an active member of Masyumi in a small mosque in a traditionalist environment, but spent his adolescent years in modern pesantren Gontor Ponorogo. After completing his studies at the Faculty of Adab IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, he continued his studies at the University of Chicago United States to deepen the history and Islamic thoughts. When he returned to Indonesia, Madjid did not dissolve in the two main flowing currents, which are Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), but offered an idea of an update called “*neo-modernism*.”²² Carool Kirsten also mentioned other names which she deemed to be similar, including some activists-figures in Muhammadiyah movement. According to her, Muhammadiyah is currently not separated from what the cultural hybridisation process as can be

21 Carool Kirsten, *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Societies, Ideas and Values*, Oxford University Press, USA: 2015, p. 47 and 49.

22 Carool Kirsten, *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Societies, Ideas and Values*, Oxford University Press, USA: 2015, p. 47.

seen from figures such as M. Dawam Rahardjo, Kuntowijoyo, and Muslim Abdurrahman. Kirsten also gave the same description when discussing the profile of Kyai Abdurrahmad Wahid (Gus Dur) and Kyai Mustafa Bisri (Gus Mus). When speaking of Islam, the above figures from both traditional or modern pesantren—or the traditionalists and modernists--alike can speak about Islam by using various approaches, social theories, and cultural strategies.

The concept of hybridisation of identity is also interpreted as a form of emergence of a new formula due to a mixture of community-held culture, tradition, values and principles in an intensive interaction process between individuals or a group of people with the contexts and traditions around them. One can be accommodative to the new values they get from family, teacher, environment, educational institution, organisation and others. Therefore, the identity of youth is unique since in the process of “searching for identity” they determine their views and adopt knowledge they acquire to be temporary in response to the actual situation. Therefore, it is important to note that the whole views of the youth reflected in this study must be understood as temporary views rather than of constant understanding. For instance, a student may develop an understanding (without any particular strong reference) that she or he cannot send greetings on a feast to other believers. In another instance, some Muslim youth based on their reading and information they heard learned that they should not send greetings to other believers while at the same time they know they have friends and relatives with different religion in the village or school. Muslim youth who have many friends and or who often interact with close friends of different religions at school or college will have different views and attitudes about holiday greetings compared to those with no such friends or relatives.

In another context, this hybridisation concept coincides with another concept-- cosmopolitanism, although there are a few exceptions. Muslim youth live in diverse environments and have a rich diversity of experience in religious education. Cultural plurality is a sight of their daily life. They are aware there are many Islamic groups or Islamic organisations outside where they live. They realise that each group or organisation has the ideal of their struggle, and from an active start they also understand that they are

competing on campus in certain matters, such as student politics. Activists can interact openly with each other--or to use a term that Khoriddun al-Junaed once called, they have “fluid interaction,” which can at least moderate their views.

The hybridisation of youth Islamic identity occurs due to the experience they gained from their childhood to adolescence and/or until the study period in colleges. The process of identity hybridisation is still ongoing along with Muslim youth meetings in various interactions with diverse groups and environments. As mentioned earlier, not many of the respondents have linear experience in a religious tradition, either at the family level or after they were separated from their families and joined Islamic student organisations. In this context, the identity hybridisation is seen in the following aspects.

Hybridisation of identity: Crosses Family, Institution Education, and Organisation

The previous chapter has discussed the influence of religious learning resources: what factors influence their attitudes and views, whether it is the family, the educational institution they are studying today, or the organisation they are active in. This question may not be answered in a clear-cut, sure, and rigid manner. Activists, of moderate-liberal and radical-conservative views alike, have been through a very dynamic experience. Many Muslim student-activists have a cultural proximity or even affiliation with one of those two organisations, both as activists and sympathizers. At the same time, the respondents are active in student organisations whose ideology and religious social-political orientation are not aligned with the goals, vision and mission of Muhammadiyah and NU.

Some respondents have a background profile of religious experience or, rather, affiliation and religious activities. One of them is a respondent from Yogyakarta who is also active in IPPNU and PMII. He feels comfortable with the two traditions--Muhammadiyah and NU. For him, “NU and Muhammadiyah are the same; only different in areas of motion.” He studied at Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY); it was his own choice due to its high accreditation. At UMY he often got courses of Al-Islam and

Muhammadiyah in a few several semesters, and learned many things about Muhammadiyah. While attending college, he stayed at the Pesantren Al-Munawwir Krapyak. According to him, besides being famous and well-environment, Krapyak is also not far from UMY campus. He made many friends and interacted with moderate Muslim figures. In his confession, he supported Habib Rizieq Shihab's mind and struggle, although he disagreed with his model of action. In addition to admiring Habib Rizieq, he also admired Aa Gym, Gus Dur, and Gus Mus.

Another respondent showed similar symptoms of hybridisation of identity that takes place among youth. An informant in Solo was born and raised in an NU family and trained in the NU tradition by parents and teachers. He also admitted that his grandfather was still '*abangan*' and rarely prayed. He then continued his undergraduate degree studies at the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta, and was then active in KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union). Although he was a KAMMI activist, he did not show a rigid attitude about political parties. To him only several parties attracted his attention, which included PAN, PKS and Gerindra, although his main tendency remained with the PKS.

Another case of respondent representing hybridisation of identity can be seen from the experience of an active student at Laskar Umat Islam Solo (LUIS)²³ who was also active as a volunteer from Daarut Tauhid Solo, an Islamic training and education institute founded by Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) in Bandung. Previously, while still active in the campus, he was once a part and active in KAMMI and IMM. If we examined his experience on several organisations, it can be said that the process of involvement in CSO such as LUIS is not an instant process. It means that the intensity of interaction with the environment and socio-economic needs and religious tendencies end up at least temporarily as part of LUIS. Although he had previously been active in IMM and KAMMI, he acknowledged that his

23 As CSO, LUIS is actively responding to various society problems in Surakarta and surrounding areas, and even national issues related to Muslim. Public communication from LUIS is also quite good and widely circulated in various online media. Spokesman of LUIS, Endro Sudarsono, criticised the policy of government, such as online media bans or Islamic sites that are considered radical by the government (via the MoCI and on the role of BNPT), which LUIS considers excessive for banning "balancers" of government.

parents were inactive and were not affiliated with certain CSOs and were likely to attend studies (*pengajian*) on television. Politically, he liked PKS, and in terms of religious studies he chose Ustadz Mu'inudinillah and Ustadz Tengku Azhar, both local ustadz Solo, as his favorites.

A respondent in Jakarta showed a phenomenon not much different. She is an active woman at IMM Ciputat. Her father had a unique religious journey. She did not know her father had been active before, but she got the information that her father had 'emigrated' to NII. Her mother, with a NU background, had joined NII following her husband. However, since the early 2000s her father came out of NII, which was followed by her mother. He began teaching at a Muhammadiyah madrasah, participated actively in this organisation, and later became Chairman of Muhammadiyah branch. This respondent said that in high school she had joined *liqa* (gathered for study with friends in the school mosque), but then felt less comfortable. According to her, "[They] feel themselves are the right one. Then, they like to offend Muhammadiyah, NU, and so on and from what I see they become exclusive." She joined *liqa* for two years before finally joining HDI (Muhammadiyah Student Association). Although she is no longer active in *liqa* now and is active in IMM, she is still feeling a spiritual '*drought*'. In the past "I used to feel comfortable at *liqa* as we had to recall several Surah in Qur'an. But in IMM we don't do that. That's why I feel *drought* at IMM." She still went to Aa Gym's recitation once a week to fill her spiritual needs. As with other activists, she accessed various information on the internet, including websites owned and managed by Muhammadiyah activists. She said that she disagreed with demonstrations in droves such as movements 212 and 299. She has criticism of the website of the Enlightenment (*Sang Pencerah*), an unofficial website run by Muhammadiyah youth activists. According to her, not all the contents published on the website she could agree with. "Sometimes there is news that is too cornering NU. The media should be neutral even though it belongs to Muhammadiyah," she said.

The profile of Chairman of LDK Salam Universitas Indonesia can also be illustrated to enrich the argument of hybridisation and how the identity of Islamic religious affiliations is quite flexible and is sometimes not diametrically compatible with religious views. He is a boarding alumnus

in Pesantren in Kebumen, which is thick with NU culture. He was active in LDK up to the faculty level before he finally got elected as chairman of LDK UI. His intention to join the LDK is to keep the association in Jakarta. He is into NU, a fundamentalist because of his pesantren-alumnus status. In fact, he calls himself a “straight line NU,” a term he uses himself. He also does not give any Christmas greeting, but about non-Muslim leaders he has to see the context first, which means that leadership by non-Muslims might be accepted. He admits of admiring many figures. Past figures he admired were Mohammad Natsir and Buya HAMKA, while the current figure is Yusril Ihza Mahendra. For Muhammadiyah, he admires Haedar Nasir (Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah) and Dahnil Anzar Simanjuntak (Chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth). “I admire Dahnil because of his more empirical way of delivering; his data are clear. And, (I like) Ustadz Adi Hidayat (alumnus of Pesantren Darul Arqam Muhammadiyah, Garut).”

In his view, the Action of 212 movement may well have been necessary to do but he noted that the movement “should have been proportionate.” He admits that many things are done in action 212, like making fun of others. He says, “Islam never teaches us to make fun of something or someone.” “I also sometimes growled at myself to see some postings (on social media) that seem to magnify Islam. But I’m not even happy with people who (seek) to glorify Islam in such a way by cornering other people such as Ahok and so forth,” he concluded.

From the above description, the dichotomies of modernist-traditionalist, moderate and conservative-radicals become more fluid, and cannot always be diametrically and rigidly confronted. Educational background and youth religious affiliation dynamically determine their points of view. A person born and raised in NU tradition can join KAMMI as an activist or PKS sympathizer; likewise those born in Muhammadiyah tradition. There is a process of rationalisation done by youth in their own way. Some people may look very literal-textual in understanding the teachings of Islam while at the same time show a more open social attitude.

Based on the search obtained from the field in Medan, it was found that every respondent had different views and attitudes related to radicalism and extremism. The difference was caused by several factors, including:

first, the pattern of world view or ideology that shape the cognitive and psychological aspects of Muslim youth. This can be expressed by comparing the attitudes and views of one respondents to those of others from different organisational backgrounds. The views and attitudes of respondent active in moderate organisations such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI) or nationalist like the Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI) on democracy will, for example, be different from those of radical organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) extremists like the Indonesian Muslim League (LMI).

Second, the social environment ranging from family, educational environment, friendship, including the cultural sphere that constructs the narrative of a group or communal identity was another cause. A person since childhood or adolescent educated or raised in an environment that teaches or practices inclusive and tolerant behaviour will grow and form as in their environmental or vice versa. Environment does not just mean a place to gather with others. It is also a space of interaction among people in which exchanges of values and knowledge occur. Usually, people will adapt to and will only feel comfortable with the environment that is seen fitting or in accordance with the values they followed. An example was found in a respondent named Fadilah Nurhidayah, HTI activist in UIN North Sumatra, who since adolescence followed recitation held by HTI in a mosque because of her neighbor's invitation. She then felt she fit with the reciting environment and tended to exclude herself from other social environments that were congruent with her style and values.

Third, social or political issues, local issues, national and global, were the other factor. Issues such as poverty, inequality, religious blasphemy, suppression of fellow Muslims in other countries, have drawn attention of Muslim youth. These issues and problems are often considered as a momentum for unifying forces to realise the agenda and ideals of their movements. What happened to KNPI activists in Medan, Akbar, while still sitting in high school was an apt example. He felt a passion for *jihad* to kill enemies after hearing the stories from his classmate and from the book he read about suffering Palestinians. Although this time he had abandoned his view after becoming an HMI cadre, the narratives on political issues that

concern Muslims did prompt him to behave radically and even extremely.

B. The Precautionary Attitude of Youth Cosmopolites

The mindset of Muslim youth activists in Indonesia demonstrates strengthening textual-literal views along with general trends occurring in Indonesia, which is more likely than not—to borrow the term from Martin van Bruinessen—to become more conservative.²⁴ This research was undertaken after a series of religious political events and incessant pros and cons on social media that become daily consumption of the millennial generation. In the observation by the research team, the dynamics of national politics and the incessant variety of issues on social media have given a lot of influence to youth in perceiving their Islamic values. In the initial discussions about piety conducted in the FGD forums and interviews, the respondents stated that piety and spirituality were a process that anyone could have. Even if those who followed FGDs or interviews are Muslim activists in their respective places, they realised that they were still far from the pious category. This kind of attitude becomes an important fact that, among youth, the concept of idealised spirituality in Islamic values is still far away for them to fulfill. This view is also followed by another view that every religion has its own concept of spirituality that cannot be imposed on to other believers, nor can the expression of piety differ from among Muslims themselves. For this reason, many respondents expressed the importance of respecting differences. In addition, there are other characteristics possessed by youth who become the subject of this research, which is the problem of inconsistencies between thoughts that tend to be very normative-literal and yet suggestive of moderate social actions.

In this context, it can be said that educated youth who have done the process of identity seeking have developed insights for caution. They prefer to refer to textual teachings as a grip rather than for reinterpretation and contextualisation purposes although, for that matter, they often exhibit an ambiguous attitude in the sense that they may sometimes look open yet at the same time also show strong literalism. In the context and environment

24 Martin Van Bruinessen, *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013.

of cosmopolitan (urban) society, Muslim activists in Indonesia are developing. They have opportunities to explore Islamic issues and at the same time interact in a multicultural society. In this situation, Muslim youth have more flexible and adaptive attitudes towards issues related to their environment. They can be more open, inclusive, and understanding of many differences, including on intra- and interreligious affairs. Their religious diversity is based on what has been learned so far through negotiating with a more dynamic and complex environment. Based on the results, as well as on the data obtained from the field through interviews and FGDs, there appears to be a symptom of “cross identity” of high caution, especially among Muslim youth, in determining their religious views and attitudes in the cosmopolitan society. Therefore, the research team argued that the phenomenon of Muslim youth in Indonesia, especially among Muslim students and activists, is often coloured with textual-literal attitudes *in their thinking* but can be moderate and *contextual in practices*.

The prudential attitude of Muslim youth can be seen from their conclusions on certain issues such as on pluralism and tolerance, which will be described in more details in the next chapter. Pluralism is one of the issues discussed in this study to see the responses of Muslim youth activists in Indonesia. They were asked to give their views on several cases, such as diversity, tolerance, and conflict resolution. Various questions to respondents were answered by taking different angles and emphases. In this context, moderatism can be seen whether it is part of their religious principles or otherwise. They very much connected their responses to the news circulating on the media and on social media.

With regard to tolerance, at least two issues emerge: namely Muslim and non-Muslim relation and peaceful conflict settlement. Muslim and non-Muslim relation is one of the most pertinent issues or questions to respondents. One of the questions was geared towards their views and attitudes about Christmas greetings. In Indonesia, as in Malaysia, but not so in many other Muslim countries, this is often a matter of controversy and annual discussion. Every December, there is a lot of debate in the media or on social media even among Muslims themselves, about the permissibility or prohibition of Christmas greetings.

Many campaigns on the prohibition of greeting Christmas to Christians and other religious holidays (to Buddhists or Hindus) are regarded as a matter of *aqidah* that concerns theological “justification” on the matter of believing their (Non-Muslim) teachings. Here it can be seen how texts or scripts begin to influence the attitude of Muslim youth to non-Muslim groups regarding their social relationships, thus forming a more scriptural pattern of action or tolerant relationship.

The findings so far indicate that, although exceptions apply in certain cases, most respondents said they did not extend greetings when it Christmas in December. The reason, they hear that it is circulated and not allowed. Not many respondents provide justification for the source of information influenced their attitude about the prohibition of Christmas. The assumption is not that youth are unable to seek or establish permissibility and the prohibition of the law to send greetings on others’ religious holiday, but, according to the research team, more due to the massive information they receive from various sources. Nor was there much respondents’ ability to explore information persuading their own opinion that in Islam there is a prohibition in greeting others on their religious festivities. Thus, as stated earlier, the reverberation of opinions about the ban will be easily found online by new religious personalities, not by great time-tested scholars. In this context, the effect of new information for young people is crucial to their religious views.

The above-mentioned attitude, the refusal to greet on other religion’s festivities, does not seem to be accompanied by an antipathy attitude toward non-Muslims or Christians. The explanation of the absence of antipathy can be seen from several views as follows. *First*, most respondents said that they could live in coexistence with non-Muslims. They also did not feel troubled by the presence of non-Muslim neighbours nor with the presence of non-Muslim places of worship in the neighborhood. One key term that often emerges from them is “as long as they (non-Muslims) do not disturb us.” This term seems to suggest many meanings. One of them is to mean “disturbing the order and tranquility of the Muslim community,” which may be related to the issue of missionarism or Christianisation. *Second*, they held the view that respecting the existence of other religious communities was

necessary. Differences in trust were indeed not central to their discussions. For most of them, it seemed that not greeting Christians on the Christmas day does not mean a disrespect, but just keeping themselves reminded of their own *aqidah*. When associated with *aqidah*, the words they often said are, “There’s no bargaining here--no tolerance in matters pertaining to *aqidah*.”

In addition, they tended to say that respecting other religions could be done by collaborating in social activities and not humiliating or deriding adherents of other religions. In this context, the question that arises is whether to not give any greetings in Christmas day is a form of radical attitudes or of literal-textual or cautious content. When looking at the mode, the researchers saw it as a precaution. Some respondents also said that they did not do it, but they did not forbid nor encourage their friends. This suggests that it is the matter of individual attitudes. The same holds true with leadership by non-Muslims. A majority of respondents said that that Muslims did not need to choose non-Muslim leaders, although a few others argued that non-Muslim leadership was something contextual that was related to political affairs or citizenship issues, competencies and public needs.

It should be noted that in regard to youth intellectuals as educated people, the experience in interacting and communicating with people outside their group is essential to determine their attitude towards non-Muslims. Precisely because they are formal campus activists who are visible in everyday life they tend to be more adaptive or understand the environment, i.e. campus. Their interaction with people of different faiths and organisations can make them behave more openly. Therefore, school and college environments still open the room or forum of communication for student-activists to interact with other activists, which may help moderate their religious views. Students with intensive interaction or who have non-Muslim close friends do have different perceptions compared to people who never interact directly in their student activities and learning activities. In the view of the research team, the tendency of their attitude and the development of their religious views will be largely determined by the environment in which they take part and surely also by the national political context, which currently

undergoes very strong Islamic polarisation. Another important thing to note is the attitude to show solidarity toward fellow Islamic movements.

Aside from the literal attitude tendency above, a common *ijtihadi* problem concerns with bank interest. Most respondents viewed that bank interest was forbidden, and this attitude was more of a caution than a strong rejection with as strong ideological basis. This view is strengthened along with the growth of sharia banking and the increasing acceptance of a version of understanding among Indonesian Muslims about bank interest. Nevertheless, they could not come up with further arguments, not especially with the fact that most of them or their parents had accounts in conventional banks. The exploration of whether bank interest could be equalised or whether it could be analysed further differently, was not revealed. The fact that they disagreed with bank interest was not followed by hostile attitudes toward conventional banking.

Almost all the groups or their representatives who were the subject of this study showed hesitancy or exercised caution in assessing issues related to violence and terrorism. These activist respondents, on average, did not like acts of violence and claimed terrorism in the name of religion as something beyond their comprehension. This view was consistent with the information and opinions they conveyed when addressing the specific cases studied in this study, such as social issues, inter-religious relations, individual freedom, human rights, Islamic political movements, and so forth.

Despite their respective “rationalised” opinion, the majority of respondents claimed they did not justify violent acts; instead, they encouraged the needs for order, respect toward other religions, and harmony with them, and defended the ideology of the state (Pancasila) as well as the NKRI. A precautionary attitude and taking a safe stance by referring to literal aspects of religion for students is only natural. Moreover, the list of questions indeed revealed many things related to issues of *ijtihadi* and even controversies in Indonesia, such as on Christmas greetings, bank interest, inter-religious marriages, leadership by non-Muslims, and inter-faith marriages.

The argument model presented by respondents in discussing the issues above was pretty diverse. Some activists were inclined to use religious

arguments in expressing their opinions, although without any further exploration. Those who were more open minded, however, built public arguments for non-Muslim leadership as well as women's leadership. Moreover, historical and political arguments were used quite dominantly used by the respondents in justifying their views on Islamic movements, state politics, international affairs, existence of Islamic mass organisations, and so on. In this context, the research team concluded that the youth's religious views were in such stages that they were mostly based on ongoing normative religious arguments; hence, naturally, the conservative tendency. Yet as the discussions were brought into public issues, much of their thinking was proven moderate.

C. Millennials' Attitude Towards Digital Friendly Ustadz

The dynamics of Muslim youth thinking illustrated in this study also indicate that the process of seeking identity among millennial generations is not final; it actually just entered an initial process. Theirs is a period of initial character formation based on early knowledge that has yet to deepen. Thus, the progressive religious view that is part of the interpretation of religious texts has not arisen because of the limited capacity of understanding and is still in the process of "fertilisation." But the next questions concern who gives more knowledge so that their understanding grows in the future; what kind of understanding models they will often get in daily life, and; what forums they will accustom themselves in during the process of learning to understand religion.

Certainly, when we enter their realm of thinking in schools and colleges, many phenomena can be explored particularly to address the very questions above. If we are allowed to divide the flows or patterns of Islamic thoughts into three main views—namely: progressive-liberal, moderate-compromise, and literal-conservative, then what can be observed is the extent to which religious figures are able to enter the life of the millennial generation, both in the *offline* and *online* world. For students, progressive and moderate ideas may still be difficult to obtain. Practically, religious studies in schools and campuses have not involved in their discourses many urban-based thinkers and intellectuals from large campuses. Students,

thus, need mentors or teachers as their sources for intensive questions and dialogues. In this stage of development, the offline world is the closer one to them as far as their religious studies are concerned. Those who become their mentors will usually introduce fundamental Islamic values that can strengthen the commitment of Islamic students and students. Therefore, it is not surprising that in addressing contemporary socio-political issues, including horizontal conflicts, interreligious social relations, vandalism, tolerance, violence, harmony, and so forth, theirs are generally normative views.

In addition, as a generation that is still in the early exploratory stages of knowing and formulating religious understanding, this millennial generation also has not been familiar with the patterns and streams in Islamic mass organisations. They only know some mainstream organisations, such as Muhammadiyah and NU (at least in terms of names, except activists who are associated with Muhammadiyah and NU), as well as a few Islamic organisations that often appear on TV or social media. One interesting topic and an important finding is the shift of authority—that is, the role of religious figures in the *offline* world being shifted by figures in the *online* world. The millennial generation that prefer digital technology has made social media and online information resources one of the learning media, including for studying Islam values. Scholars who read widely or who wrote their insights deeply and systematically on some issues used to be considered “authoritative” in that field; nowadays, such authorities, at least as perceived by them, can be found from digital sources such as blogs and YouTube. To these youth the personality of a religious person is currently determined by their popularity and the frequency of appearance on the mass media, especially on electronic mass media. TVs and the internet become a reference for many of them to get information on the figures they idolise. Apparently, neither any analysis of major figures and ideas is significant enough to be understood by them. This can be seen from the results of interviews or FGDs conducted during the study, where respondents know many popular figures. Several names of ustadz were especially popular and got frequently mentioned by our informants from various regions. Among the most popular ustadz who often appeared on the social media and the

internet were discussed in the previous chapter.

What is, then, the role of local *ustadz*? From observation and interviews the researchers found that not many of them become “idols” to the young Muslim students. Instead, the young are more familiar with those *ustadz* popular on social media. As admitted by many respondents, they knew these *ustadz* from YouTube, and most of them had never met these *ustadz* in live; nor they had ever read any books from their idols. Respondents in West Java and Yogya-Surakarta did mention a few names of local *ustadz*; however, in some other places local *ustadz* were not as identifiable as their idols. Uniquely, a few names of these “sosmed” *ustadz* as mentioned above, both of *salafi* and pop characters, did appear in many places, from Aceh to Pontianak. Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, which has a distinct Islamic character with its Islamic model of government, is no exception to the popular phenomenon. The study found that those *Ustadz* also went viral among the Acehnese youth. These youth hardly ever mentioned of knowing or idolising local religious figures.

In Manado, similar findings also coloured this research. The influence of religious understanding from social media to respondents is more visible than that otherwise. The few male preachers often mentioned by them, especially from viewing YouTube, included: Hanan Attaki, Khalid Basalamah, Adi Hidayat, Felix Siaw, Abdul Somad, Aid al Qorni, Zakir Naik, Arifin Ilham, Habib Rizieq, Muzammil, Jefri al Bukhari, and Aa Gym. The female counterparts were: Okky Setyana Dewi, Mamah Dedeh, and Umami Pipik Dian Irawati. Common reasons for their choice were: interesting delivery, easy-to-understand interpretation of *dalil*, clarity, simplicity, and entertaining quality. In addition, the topics most-accessed typically addressed youth concerns, such as: intercourse by the young people, relationship, motivation, young marriages, and *ukhuwah Islamiyah*. Some respondents said they knew or had seen FPI leader Habib Rizieq’s lectures, but they admitted being uninterested in his lectures because they were considered too harsh. One Rohis activist, however, considered Habib Rizieq, Aa Gym, and several other preachers as Islamic warriors. Only a few activists of the Tadzkir Agency have strong Nahdlatul Ulama or PMII background, or that of GP Anshor; they were Gusdurians who have interest

in figures and clerics such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Shafi'i Ma'arif, Wahid Hasjim, and Nurcholis Madjid (Cak Nur). Beyond that, mentors and teachers of Islamic subjects at school were among other important figures colouring the students' understanding about religion.

Regarding a preacher known as Felix Siaw, several respondents from Rohis said they were interested in his lectures on personal stories, reasons, motivation, and decision to be a convert. To them the case of Felix Siaw could inspire people so as to affirm their Islamic *aqeedah*, or that Islam is the right religion rather than others, especially Christianity. This assumption appears to have been related to the phenomenon of religious conversion that often occurs in people of Manado, whether from Christianity to Islam or vice versa. In fact, Rohis SMAN 09 Manado had planned to invite Felix Siaw to give a lecture and motivation in March 2018. "The plan has been confirmed by ustadz Felix Siaw after several unsuccessful attempts. For us, it is important to motivate on the student *aqidah*. A Chinese who becomes a convert must have had a strong belief in Islamic values; so as Muslims, why don't we?" The figure of Zakir Naik is also important in this context because he is considered one who can enlighten people on issues of theological Islam-Christian contestation.

Indications of popularity are proxied through respondents' perceptions and views on mainstream and moderate Islamic organisational figures in Indonesia, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persis, and other major Islamic organisations. Most young people are only familiar with very few living figures from these mass organisations--mainly from Muhammadiyah and NU, such as Haedar Nasir and Said Agil Siradj. A few respondents from NU mentioned the names of the late Gus Dur, and Gus Mus whose frequency of public appearance is but too little to be considered in the category of viral *ustadz*. Interestingly, a few respondents often touted incumbent MUI chairperson Kyai Ma'ruf Amin, who was quite instrumental in several religious socio-political issues in Indonesia.

D. Social Media, Exposure Radicalism, and Hijrah Lifestyle

Does social media encourage radicalism? It certainly does have influence towards its viewers, and youth groups are vulnerably exposed to radicalism

rampant on the internet. In fact, radicalism in this context is not about its literal-conservative sense, but one that can lead to real acts of violence and terrorism. However, the research restricts itself to only cover several views that may lead to violence and terrorism. As previously stated, most of the respondents were no fans of violence. As educated activists they, understandably, had moderate views on issues of violence and terrorism. Only a few assumed that acts of terrorism and violence were part of *jihad*. Some respondents tended not to give an assessment of terrorism, yet they were interested in why people committed violence or terrorism. Why, for example, do sweeping razias [by fellow citizens] occur? Another important phenomenon to reveal here is the emergence of new CSOs in the form of combatants. This phenomenon was seen in several cities. These combatants were not student organisations, but rather new entities formed specifically with an Islamic identity to respond to socio-religious issues in a respective region. In addition to the national armed forces, such as FPI and former Laskar Jihad, combatants also appeared regionally such as by LUIS in Surakarta, the Islamic Jihad Front in Yogyakarta, as well as by other organisations in Bandung, Garut, Lampung, and Tasikmalaya. However, the emergence of these combatants was directly proportional to the emergence of Islamic-based communities on interests or hobbies. The habits of young people who liked the association more freely and not too many binding rules, began to be transformed and given a religious life. In other words, there has been a strong '*hijrah*' movement in society. In West Java, for example, one can see the existence of Pemuda Move On, Tato Hijrah Removal, Pemuda Fight, Para Penolong Allah (God's Helpers), XTC Hijrah, Brigez Berzikir, and GBR fi Sabilillah to mention but a few examples. In this context, we can see what is called as the hybridisation of identity of Muslim youth in a broader context. In this context Islam is being drawn to colour youth lifestyles without subsequently uprooting previously-adopted lifestyles, which had been part of their identities such as those identities obtained from joining motorcycle clubs or youth clubs.

One striking phenomenon in various places today is the emergence of hijab and *niqab* movements for Muslim students. This was massively evident in many colleges in big cities, whereby many non-activist youth were

beginning to take interest in using *niqab*, whether as part of an ideology or a temporary lifestyle. In a discussion with a lecturer of an Islamic subject at a private Islamic university in Yogyakarta, it was revealed that more female students were using *niqab* now for ideological reasons. He gathered several of them and discussed about *niqab* and the reasons behind it. The main reference from these students was the classes they had followed, which then led them to the fatwa or the opinion of Shaykh Utsaimin in Makkah.

Nevertheless, according to the research finding in Banda Aceh social media as well as the role of a new model of a well-known figure wearing a *niqab* is quite influential. For example, at the wedding of Muzammil and Sonia on Friday July 7, 2017, the groom being a young preacher and the bride an ITB alumnus, at one of the mosques in Banda Aceh. The wedding schedule was done just after the *shubuh* prayer. At that time, the Muzammil's future wife was robbed in *niqab* while he himself wore a butterfly tie suit, witnessed by thousands of people. The phenomenon of Muzammil's wife wearing *niqab* stole everybody's attention. As for Muzammil himself, he did not appear as an ustadz. Netizens talked about Muzammil's clothes and his wife's *niqab*. During the FGD one participant speculated that the *niqab* trend in Banda Aceh had been inspired by weddings by public figures such as Muzammil's wife.

As the concept of "hijrah" is imprinted on religious consciousness, the phenomenon of wearing *niqab* by the youth generation in Banda Aceh is mostly consequential to the result of their learning through social media. However, while it is true that not every female student wears *niqab*, there is another phenomenon of them wearing masks. According to some respondents and female students, masks were part of a process to wear *niqab*, although initially they were used for health reason. A female student who joined the FGD said that she had her own view on *niqab*; according to her, it was the style of Islam. She learned that many female students who wore *niqab* liked to take selfies and showed their *eye liners* on social media. According to her, this behaviour was far from being Islamic. She concluded that there was no strong basis for justifying *niqab*-wearing behaviour as fashion.

Chapter 4

Diversity and Tolerance

A. Da'wah Activism, Structuralism, and Communal Tolerance

Post-*reformasi* Indonesia witnessed a rapid development of Islamic da'wah activities run by urban educated Muslim youth. The purpose of their mission was to bring Muslims through the social and political changes based on Islamic moral teachings and spirit as set forth in the Qur'an and Hadith. The Islamic da'wah agency is run by an organisation whose main purpose and activity is to invite Muslims to practice the moral principles of Islam as exemplified by the Prophet and his Companions in the early life history of Islam.

University-level organisations such as Campus Dakwah Forum (LDK) and high-school-level Rohani Islam (Rohis) represent the backbones of da'wah activism among Muslim youth in intra-school and college environments. The off-campus organisations are represented by Muslim youth activists who are engaged in Islamic religious organisations that highlight religious-socio-political actions in society, such as KAMMI, Wahdah Islamiyah, FUI, FPI, LUIS, and a few others. The development of Islamic da'wah through the internet and social media which has boomed since 2009 to some degree has participated in colouring, nurturing, and strengthening the youth's religious understanding. This religious feature has been shaped by an Islamic mentoring process that has been developed by *da'wah* activists since the

last few decades, mainly through *liqa* forums in schools and or universities.

The religious style of these young da'wahist activists is generally scripturalist in the sense of using the Qur'anic and Hadith arguments with literal understanding, without going through the processes of reasoning comparisons with the available commentary models. They also do not contextualise the meaning of scriptural texts according to the context of the decline of verses or the emergence of hadiths and take general principles to apply in the changing contexts. This religious scripturalism is influential in shaping the ethical understanding of social relations with the followers of different religions, including in understanding the conception of religious tolerance. Epistemologically, they define the concept of tolerance based on verses or hadiths that are believed to provide principles that provide restrictions on what should and should not be observed in practicing tolerance.

This tolerance paradigm serves as a theoretical framework for assessing the principles of democracy and human rights (the principle of citizenship), simultaneously becoming the point of reference for a democratic state of Indonesia in regulating social and religious life of its people, such as the principles of religious freedom, equality, non-discrimination, non-violence, et cetera. The result of the paradigmatic judgment raises the varying and multilevel configuration of attitudes and behaviour from a democratic perspective, from the furthest to the closest to a standard of civic tolerance. In short, the tolerance model formulated by da'wah activism among Muslim youth today is not far from what Jeremy Menchik did in his research on contemporary Islamic relations and democracy in Indonesia as communal tolerance, which is tolerance based on Islamic teachings with the characteristics of promoting the rights of Islam, collective rights to individual rights. Another logical consequence of this paradigm necessitates the accommodating of secular laws on boundaries that are not contrary to Islamic laws, and acceptance of the principle of a nation-state founded on *Godly nationalism*. Menchik even claimed this communal tolerance as a tolerant paradigm of Muslims in Indonesia.²⁵

Factors of scripturalist religious understanding are not alone in shaping

25 Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance Without Liberalism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

the configuration of attitudes and behaviour of young dakwahis activists. However, the level of literacy on civic values and the level of encounter in empirical experience with other different groups do contribute to the choice of attitudes, especially in responding to practical non-Muslim religious social issues, such as home construction of non-Muslim worship sites in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods, the election or reception of non-Muslim leaders, and the delivering of Christmas greetings.

This research reveals that those who hold this communal tolerance paradigm are easily led to intolerance and even discrimination in the absence of restoration of exclusive social attitudes and prejudices against different identity groups. On the other hand, Muslim youth who are deliberately joined in radical ideological movements understand tolerance not in a communal scheme, although departing from the same starting point, but within the Islamist framework. The Islamist paradigm defines tolerance within the framework of Islam that puts non-Muslims as citizens who are not equal to Muslims, but enjoy protection from Islamic rulers in terms of paying taxes (*jizya*). Although normative ideas of horisontal tolerance in social intercourse are highlighted, this conception, seen from the eyes of modern citizenship, clearly approves the application of intolerance by the state.

B. Tolerance in Theological Restrictions

Muslim youth activists who became the respondents of this research, especially those from LDK, Rohis and Islamic Organisation Dakwahis stressed the importance of making Islamic Scriptures as a reference in understanding and living tolerance. Qois Alfaqi, a young activist of Wahdah Islamiyah, Makassar, believed the concept of tolerance should be based on what Allah had determined in the Qur'an, Hadith, and the history of the Prophet. Alfaqi rejected the idea of common sense as the basis for tolerance because it is the same as logging religious affairs that can lead to uncertainty and conflict. The Qur'an is absolute; therefore, attitudes and behaviour based on it produce a more certain truth. Alfaqi also believed that the Qur'anic concept of tolerance had been practiced by Muslims during the time of Prophet. According to him, Muslim in those days were accustomed to cooperating with other people from different religions, especially Christians.

The existence of tolerance in the history of Islam is also agreed by Andika Permadi Putra, an HTI activist, Bandung. According to him, not only the Prophet but the rulers in the era of Daulah Islamiyah ran a tolerant behaviour in terms of neighboring Christians and Jews. Putra denied ISIS assault actions as part of the Islamic teachings. He even suspected ISIS as part of the conspiracy agenda of the enemies of Islam to destroy the tolerant image of Islam. Nadia Rizkia, Member of OSIM ACEH, had the same understanding as Putra did, that tolerance in Islam meant not doing violence against different people.

What is the definition and scope of tolerance in the Islamic perspective? The view from religious epistemology-scripturalists holds that the tolerance as taught by Islam is limited to *muamalah* or social interaction. Thus, they tend to show resistance to any discourse that identifies tolerance with the idea of pluralism, which places diversity as a principle for managing differences. Rhetorically they affirm the rejection of tolerance in belief or creed.

According to Safrik, the board of LDK STKIP in Bima, referring to the Qur'an (Surah al-Kafirun: 6), the difference of *aqidah* cannot be unified so that all can be done only to understand each other and to be tolerant. Tolerance in social interaction can be accepted if good and right, but if associated with *aqidah*, should be abandoned. Before explaining what the reason is for the rejection of this tolerance of faith, it is necessary to understand what is meant by tolerance in relation to beliefs.

Cohen in his book "*What Toleration Is*" believes that tolerating a different or even contradictory thought or belief does not necessarily approve or support it. In other words, relativism is not a manifestation of tolerance. A tolerant person does not mean letting go of his commitment and loyalty to what he believes to be the truth. Nevertheless, he can accept or allow these different thoughts and beliefs to exist.²⁶ Borrowing the concept by Bretherton, he said that tolerance is to be patient with differences even if the difference is something that is not favored.²⁷ In this conceptual framework,

26 Jason Cohen, "*What Toleration Is*", In *Ethics*, Vol. 115, No. 1 (October 2004), The University of Chicago Press, p. 75.

27 Luke Bretherton, "*Tolerance, Education and Hospitality: A Theological Proposal*", in *Studies in Christian Ethics*, Vol 17, 2004, pp. 80-103 cited by Raihani, "*Creating a Culture of Religious Tolerance in Indonesian School*" in *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 22. No 4 Special Issue: Education for A Tolerant and Multicultural Indonesia (December 2014), p. 543 (pp. 541-560).

it is understandable to those who say there is no tolerance in the realm of faith to affirm that tolerance does not include agreeing or supporting the beliefs or creeds of others who are tolerated. Zuhriah, board of LDK IAIN Pontianak, who was also an activist of KAMMI Pontianak affirmed the semantics of tolerance as intended:

“What to tolerate? If the issue concerns a religious law that has become a standard, we simply cannot tolerate it; if it’s only about an economic problem, or a scientific issue, about Bahasa Indonesia, or English, or something like that, we can tolerate, right? For example, on issues about aqidah, or Shari’a matters, we may not tolerate them since they have become a standard rule in our religion. On issues concerning Muslim or non-Muslim leadership, Islam commands us to choose an Islamic leader; so choose an Islamic leader. Choose a leader who is knowledgeable in aqidah.”

Tolerance in Islam is not the same as relativism reinforced by Ahmad Naufal, activist Jamaah Tabligh, Surakarta. Naufal argues that the attitude of tolerance as taught by the Prophet is part of the *da’wah* strategy to create a positive impression about Islamic teachings so that Islam can be proud. Ideally, an Islamic mission aims to invite non-Muslims to Islam, Naufal explained, but because there is no compulsion in religion, the rest must respect the beliefs of people. According to him, religious tolerance in Islam is highest when applied in the form of allowing other religious people to perform their religious rituals and ceremonies. You even need to take care of them when the non-Muslims worship. However, more than that is not tolerance anymore. Naufal rejects the manifestation of tolerance by supporting the teachings of other religions, such as in greeting on Christmas.

On the other hand, the expression of no tolerance in aqidah may indicate an avoidance of close intimacy with non-Muslims for fear of undermining loyalty to its own religious beliefs. Bayu Putra Martama, an activist of the Muhammadiyah Surakarta Student Association (IMAMTA), an activist of the Muhammadiyah University of Muhammadiyah (UMS), said he was trying to limit his association with non-Muslims so as not to make them closer to non-Muslims than to Muslims. Fear of the fading of faith due to over-tolerance was also felt by Andi Mardika, an activist of the Middle

East Alumni Association (IKAT), Aceh. Mardika assessed the behaviour of Muslims living on the borders of Aceh as an excessive tolerance, because they blend indefinitely with those of different religions, especially at joint meal parties, which sometimes lead to religious abuses, such as eating pork, and inter-faith marriages.

The same fear can lead to an attitude of prejudiced intolerance. This was shown by Umi Nur Khasanah, an activist of LDMPM (Community Service Propagation Institute), UMS Surakarta, who claimed to be neighbor with non-Muslims in the daily association of origin unrelated to religious matters. To her, being “related in religious affairs” includes living close to a non-Muslim worship site in her neighborhood. Khasanah admitted being displeased with the presence of a church in front of her house, and hoped there would be none. At the same time, she believed that Muslims were treated unfairly by non-Muslims and hoped to help uphold Islam by “reminding her friends that Islam is now in a critical situation as they want us to be eliminated.”

Religious Scripturalism, “Merry Christmas” Greetings, and Inter-faith Marriages

At a practical level the concept of tolerance as described above manifests itself in the rejection of Christmas greetings to Christians celebrating Christmas. Quite a lot of students or activists of youth organisations judge it forbidden to give greetings on Christmas even to their own friends. Daffa Minabari, a member of Rohis SMA 9 Manado, who confessed to listening to lectures by Felix Siauw and Khalid Basalamah, did not greet his Christian friends in Manado. The reason was because such utterances were believed to negatively affect the purity of *tawheed*. The same thing was also acknowledged by Syifa, chairperson of OSIS SMA 49 Jakarta, who admitted sharing the same view as Daffa’s on Christmas greetings, the reason being that she thought doing otherwise would be wrong. Interestingly, Syifa admitted not knowing much about the law on greeting people of other religions on their religious festivities; and only recently did she get information about the debate surrounding this issue. To play safe, she chose not to say it. Sucia Ramadhani, a young writer, student of University of Indonesia, was informed about the prohibition on this matter when she

went to college. Despite having many Christian friends, she also chose not to deliver Christmas greetings to them.

As suggested above, it is forbidden to deliver Christmas greetings because of the pretext that it could mean condoning a wrong doctrine. How do young Muslim activists explain their argument about the case? Is there any proposition we can refer to from the al-Qur'an or al-Hadith, and, if so, how do they interpret the text to substantiate the argument? Supriadi Nasir, a dakwah activist who was active in the Regional Leadership Council of Wahdah Islamiyah, Bulukumba, and at Lingkar Dakwah Mahasiswa Indonesia (LDMI), thought that delivering Christmas greeting would mean showing approval that Christianity was the true religion, while Islamic beliefs taught that the theology of the Trinity in Christianity was vanity. Nasir quoted a verse in the Qur'an, Surah Maryam, "to the point that the sky collapses almost when one says that Jesus the son of Mary is the son of God." Allah's addition clearly says "Lakum punwa wa li yadien" (for you is your religion, for me is my religion). According to Nasir this concept of tolerance is right and good. Islam does not forbid you to tolerate Christians, do good, buy and sell and so on. That's all the law is *mubah*, it is okay. But when touching the domain of *aqidah*, the issue becomes different, "For you is your religion and for me is mine." Andika Permadi Putra, HTI activist, Bandung, even questioned what Christmas was? As far as he was concerned, Christmas was the birthday of the pagan gods that was then forced to be considered the birthday of Jesus Christ for in that context the pastors of that time wanted to disperse the pagans and invite him to Christianity. The birthday of Jesus Christ is still much debated. In other words, Andika said, when Muslims greet, "Merry Christmas" on December 25, it might well mean we congratulate them on the birth of the Sun God.

Another reason for the ban on Christmas greetings, according to its supporters, is because the utterance may influence the *aqidah* of whoever utters them. Asdar, a young da'wah activist, Bulukumba, referred to the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad as narrated by Abu Daud, who asserted that he who resembled a group of people, belonged to it. According to Asdar, concrete forms of the resemblance here included giving Christmas greeting to Christians. Nursaid, Muslim Designer Community activist from Lamongan,

even considered there was no difference in delivering Christmas greetings with reciting the *shahada*, which is also a greeting. Strictly speaking, if by reciting the creed a Christian is said to have changed beliefs, then vice versa the same also applies for a Muslim. Furthermore, M. Arfan, an activist at LDK Hasanuddin University, Makassar, believed that speech has a great influence in human beliefs and actions. He exemplified a marital vow, a condition that validates a marriage just by consentiously saying the vow. When a bridegroom pronounces the consent in front of her parents or guardian in the presence of witnesses, then the marriage contract is legally enforced. Just by saying the vow, something forbidden immediately becomes halal. This is analogous to saying “Merry Christmas;” pronouncing it means confessing of Jesus being the son of God, as in Christian theology. Thus, this, in Islam, contains some element of *shirk*. In his view, the forms of tolerance is not by injuring aqidah, but by respecting other believers, helping them, interacting naturally with them, and not attacking or destroying their places of worship.

Not every respondent who rejected Christmas greetings explained their argument; some of them accepted took it as a given religious doctrine. Adnan Zaid Tirmizi, Head of Religious Affairs at SME BEM STKIP PGRI Lamongan, who was also a cadre of HMI and NU, did not discuss the reason for banning Christmas remarks but sought another way to express tolerance without breaking religious requirements. According to him, unlawful Christmas greetings in Islam should not prevent Muslims from expressing their respect to the freedom of Christians to celebrate Christmas. In exchange for Christmas greetings, Tirmizi chose to send flowers on the occasion:

“No, but we still can spread a knowledge about diversity. Which means as follows: for example on a Christmas day we do not say a merry Christmas, because it is not allowed in our faith. But we can socialize to the community for example by giving them flowers. This means that we convey to the public that religious tolerance is very important. So, if we should also respect all of our non-Muslim friends. It’s about their belief ... In Islam delivering Christmas greetings should not be done because according to the source that I read when we do that, we are included in it. The argument goes that if you imitate a people, you are already part of the people. “

Muslim youth activists who refused to deliver Christmas greetings using the arguments discussed above tend to accept Islamic legal opinions that underlie the forbidence to delivering it without trying to analyse the argument critically. Prudence in religion seems to be one consideration to accept the argument without reserve. There is no use of comparative reasoning with other interpretations or testing the above argument with empirical facts, such as looking at motivation and the context of communication when a Muslim congratulates Christmas. Do those who congratulate Christmas or commit a speech act do so because they want to support aqidah or because they believe in the truth of Christianity? Conversely, is it in the context of communication that a Christian colleague receiving a Christmas greeting card from a Muslim colleague believes or at least suspects that his companion is sympathetic to Christianity or has doubts about his Islamic aqeedah?

Nevertheless, in the perspective of tolerance developed in the European liberal tradition, such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, or Jurgen Habermas, what is practiced by the da'wahist activists above does not violate the basic meaning of the term tolerance, provided that they allow others (including Muslims) to deliver Christmas greetings. What is shown by Tirmizi above clearly proves a unique tolerance. On the one hand, he does not congratulate Christmas for believing in religious prohibitions, but at the same time he tries to demonstrate the value of civic tolerance by showing respect for differences. It is interesting to quote Jurgen Habermas, who explains the meaning of religious tolerance in the perspective of citizenship:

“Religious tolerance presupposes an element of rejection of something based on religious beliefs. Such rejection is a requirement for all types of tolerant behaviour. We can behave tolerantly to the beliefs of others if we reject the beliefs for good reasons. According to Jurgen Habermas, “[W]e need not be tolerant if we do not care about the opinions or attitudes of others or even simply because they respect the value of” otherness. “In this case tolerance can work if there is justification for the rejection of conflicting claims of truth the.”²⁸

28 Jurgen Habermas, “*Religious Tolerance: The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights*,” in *Philosophy*, Vol 39, No 307, (January 2004), Cambridge University Press, p. 5-18.

Tolerance in a liberal and democratic perspective indeed requires a situation where one disagrees with different beliefs, views, and interests and even contradicts their own beliefs. Giving tolerance means allowing or permitting the embodiment or expression of beliefs or rejected interests in social reality. In other words, tolerance necessitates restraint from the desire to strictly prohibit unauthorized activists. At this level, the supporters of communal tolerance generally accept the conceptual scheme above. Nevertheless, tolerance in the perspective of liberalism further demands that an attitude of refrain from aggressive emotions over things that are not favored must remain based on “good reasons.” It is not just apathy or merely relativism that has no claims of truth.²⁹ In the context of delivering a Christmas greeting, for example, one has exercised tolerance for good reason when he allows others to do the act of speech, even if he disagrees or even dislikes, merely because he realises that tolerance reflects respect for the right of others, or for the reason of applying the teaching of patience and restraint, not because of ignorance or fear. Except the normative statement expressed that tolerance is part of Islamic teachings, in this research has not been revealed any explicit statement of sources that show understanding or understanding of Islamic morality behind the command of tolerance.

The scripturalist or literalistic tendency to legal opinion on the prohibition of Christmas greeting on a certain level has changed the behaviour of some Muslim youth in their interactions with their Christian friends. Some cases show how initially they did not question the Christmas greeting by being accustomed to doing so, but after obtaining religious information about the prohibition, then they stopped doing so, but not breaking the social interaction between them. Rosyid Zaelani, activist of KAMMI, Surakarta, recalled during public school in Wonogiri he had many Christian friends. He claimed to be invited to the home of Christian families when they celebrated Christmas. He fulfilled the invitation, joined the meal, and mingled with the family members there. However, he refused to congratulate Christmas for believing it violated the Islamic creed.

29 Jurgen Habermas, “*Religious Tolerance: The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights*,” in *Philosophy*, Vol 39, No 307, (January 2004), Cambridge University Press, p. 5-18.

Tika Liarianti, a member of YISCAI-Alzhar, Jakarta, admitted that since she knew that it was forbidden to say Christmas greeting, she has taken a careful stance. When she did not know of such prohibition, she usually greeted her Hindu friends on Galungan. She even used to decorate the Christmas tree together with her grandparents. Another story came from Argarri Akbar, chairperson of the Alumni of Rohis Association in Jakarta, who claimed to have argued with his senior in Rohis about Christmas greetings because he thought it was okay. According to him, recounting his childhood experience, “[F]or six years in elementary school, I was a Muslim minority. I used to hold the bible. For me, greetings, if we do not intend the harm the aqidah, are just normal. It’s their holiday. I was strongly opposed by my senior but then I accepted their argument. I already understood why they thought baseball was okay.” Candra, vice-chairperson of Rohis SMAN 3 Manado, living in a Christian-majority neighborhood, admitted that he mingled well with non-Muslims both in school and his neighborhood. He often attended Christmas celebrations, but he refused to say the Christmas greeting. Candra claimed to understand this doctrine after hearing Zakir Naik’s lecture on YouTube. After listening to it, Candra claimed to have more understanding on the differences between Islam and Christianity.

In the above examples, the speakers with religious reasons behind the Christmas greetings prohibition generally quoted verses from the Qur’an or hadith of the Prophet, which were interpreted by way of analogizing the texts with other prohibition cases that are considered to belong to the same or similar category. With regard to inter-faith marriages, those who refuse and know the legal basis of rejection in general refer to verses from the Qur’an, which they believe would regulate the affair. Asdar, a young da’i from Bulukumba, said he refused to marry a non-Muslim based on the Qur’an Surah al-Baqarah verse 221: “And do not marry polytheistic men [to your women] until they believe. And a believing slave is better than a polytheist, even though he might please you.” Ahmad Fauzan, a member of OSIS MAN Darul Istiqamah, Bulukumba, believed that when an inter-faith couple fell in love, their marriage was legitimate if their non-Muslim counterpart converted into Islam. Indeed, some respondents allowed inter-faith marriages provided that the men were Muslim and the women might

be otherwise as long as they were considered as Ahlu Kitab. Beyond the Ahlu Kitab, inter-faith marriages are not to be allowed.

Only few respondents viewed inter-faith marriages as a problem; most of them even accepted non-religious justification solely based on empirical facts. Among them was Tri Raharti, GMNI activist, Lamongan, who based on her personal experience of having a non-Muslim grandfather, viewed that it did not affect her family to follow his grandfather's religion. Freedom was a value that was upheld highly in her family so that all her grandfather's children remain Moslems.

Non-Muslim Leadership Issues: Contestation and Negotiation of Islamic Reason and Civic Reason

The perception of tolerance does not merely apply in cases of religious celebrations but also enter the political realm, especially in the election or acceptance of non-Muslim leaders. Responding to this issue, viewed from a democratic perspective, Muslim youth activists who adhere to the principle of communal tolerance show a stratified strategy of stature, ranging from winning religious arguments, being ambivalent, to negotiating religious arguments and civic arguments. Those who fall into the *first* and second categories judge political choices not only as muamalah affairs, but also involve the consequences of faith. But the first and second categories differ in terms of acceptance of the democratic argument; the first group tends to be blatantly negative, while the *second* still shows acceptance of the principle of equality of citizens although in the end religious arguments are more dominant in influencing their attitude when determining which muamalah and faith territory. Furthermore, social exclusivism and prejudices that accompany religious scripturalism serve to narrow the limits of tolerance, if not to lead them to intolerant and even discriminatory behaviour. Those in the *third* category, meanwhile, position religious doctrines at the cognitive level but choose a pragmatic attitude when confronted with the consequences of state rules.

The attitude of absolutising religious arguments on non-Muslim leadership issues can be seen from the response of M. Arfan, LDK activist of Hasanuddin University, Makassar, when asked for his response to the

question, “[I]s it better to choose a fair non-Muslim leader than a despotic Muslim leader?” Arfan held that such a proposition was logically flawed, equivalent to comparing two things that were not equivalent or equal. For example, which one is better an apple or a banana? The correct logic would be to compare a Washington apple to a Greenish. According to him, such logic could further lead the common people to building association that all Muslims are bad and otherwise all non-Muslims are good. Therefore, Arfan suggested that it is not a bad thing to choose a worst Muslim leader; or, otherwise, it is not good to choose even a best non-Muslim leader. When asked about democracy and human rights, Arfan held that human rights values conflict with Islam because human rights glorify individual freedoms and rights, while in Islam, although freedom is respected, freedom must be limited by the provisions of al- Qur’an and al-Sunnah.

Attitudes that promote religious arguments along with prejudices appear in the response of Nadia Rizkia, a student and a member of OSIM at a senior high school in Aceh. Despite believing that Islam teaches tolerance, Rizkia strongly rejected non-Muslim leadership. “Alhamdulillah Ahok did not win, because Jakarta, the center of Indonesia, (if he wins) automatically oppresses the natives and he is almost like a Dutch. A Muslim who leads Muslims will defend Muslims; non-Muslim leaders will rule out Muslims.” Arif Marifudin, a member of the Campus Dakwah Forum (LDK), IAIN La Rayba, Bogor, shared Rizkia’s argument and racial sentiment. He strongly rejected non-Muslim leadership in Muslim-majority areas because it could result in marginalisation and discrimination against Muslims. He thought Singapore was a real example. Its history was once part of Johor in the process its Islamisation, but now almost all the citizens are Chinese. Religious prejudice can also arise from the results of personal experience in interacting with non-Muslims, as retold Muhammad Sahrin, activist LDK Aljani, UNIAM, Makassar. Sahrin rejected non-Muslim leadership because of his bitter experience related to his relationship with non-Muslims during the communal conflict in Ambon in the early 2000s. According to him, “non-Muslims (Christians) are very dangerous if given the opportunity to lead in Indonesia.”

The ambivalence between religious argument and human equality in the issue of election of non-Muslim leaders appeared in a response by Tika

Liarianti, a member of YISC Al-Alzhar, Jakarta. According to Liarianti, “[F]rom a religious side, non-Muslim leaders are clearly not allowed. From the human side, if he is competent, why not, as long as he keeps the principles of Islam. I’ve seen Zakir Naik’s video on YouTube. He said if anyone should nominate Muslims even though the more competent ones are non-Muslims.” As can be seen here, although initially ambivalent, Liarianti’s conclusion was determined more by a religious argument than by a civic argument. The same ambivalence was also shown by Eni Marfuati, activist of LDMPM (Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Pengabdian Masyarakat) UMS, Surakarta. Although she agreed with equality of rights and duties between Muslims and non-Muslims, Marfuati simply could not accept non-Muslim leaders. When asked what if it turned out that non-Muslim leaders got elected in Muslim-majority areas, she said she would know what to say. Thus, at this point Marfuati’s ambivalent attitude was not resolved.

The third strategy, on negotiating the diversity of reason and citizenship, appeared for instance in a response by Fina, Secretary General of BEM of University of Indonesia, who claimed that as much as possible he would opt for Muslim leadership. He would not choose non-Muslims, but if ultimately non-Muslims got elected, he would inevitably follow the prevailing rule in the country. In line with Fina, Bayu Putra Martama, IMAMTA activist of UMS, Surakarta, initially claimed to be unable to accept non-Muslim leaders. However, due to the demands of political reality, Surakarta elected a non-Muslim leader and he had no alternative but to accept it on the condition that his work program “should not deviate from Islamic values.” Although slightly differently, the same strategy was adopted by Alif Mili Utama, activist of LDK Aljani, UNIAM, Makassar. According to him, Prophet Muhammad ordered his followers to choose Muslim leaders based on their religiosity and leadership qualities.”

However, continued Utama, if it proved difficult to get qualified Muslims, then it should not matter to have non-Muslim leaders. “For example, Ahok (Basuki Purnama) is former Governor of DKI, and is about to be running again. Ahok, who is a Christian, is basically sympathetic to other religions, including Islam. Because Ahok has good intentions to advance the nation and improve the welfare of society, and he is fair to every adherent of religion, we can just choose him to be a leader,” explained Utama strengthening his argument.

Ambiguity and Paradox of Tolerance in “As long as it does not get intrusive”

In addition to limiting the scope of tolerance with theological barriers, some Muslim youth dakwah activists are providing a so-called “non-intrusive others” requirement, a condition closely related to the psychological situation in mutual relationships with the social environment conditions in which individuals interact. This expression in the context of understanding the nature of tolerance is very relevant to the basic meaning of the word tolerance itself. The word “tolerance”, in English “toleration” or “tolerance”, comes from the Latin word *tolerare* and *tolerantia* meaning “to hold or bear (pain, burden, or something that makes uncomfortable).”

From the basic meaning of the word we can get the understanding that tolerance is related to the virtue or mental attitude of a person who can hold or bear something that is not approved or liked.³⁰ When analysed more carefully, the phrase “non-intrusive others” implies an ambiguity in understanding the concept of tolerance, in which the phrase itself denotes a logical contradiction within itself (*contradictio interminis*). In other words, it is the same as saying something that sounds strange, “[Being] able to withstand and bear something that disturbs as long as it does not interfere.” On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the concept of tolerance contains a paradox not easily resolved, which, if unrestricted, may lead to the loss of tolerance itself.

How to respond to extremist actions or activities that cause harm, danger, and death for others, when the act reflects the attitude of intolerance? Liberal-tolerant thinkers in Europe have offered a solution to this paradox by making universal constraints of individual autonomy or basic human rights. In this perspective, the limits of tolerance are if they do not undermine the autonomy or basic rights of others. In other words, there is no tolerance for intolerance.³¹

The phrase “non-intrusive others” is delivered by some of the Muslim youth activists above as communal responses to the paradox of tolerance.

30 See the meaning of the “Toleration” concept in the “Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy” in <http://www.iep.utm.edu/tolerati/>, (Accessed 5 February 2018).

31 See the meaning of the “Toleration” concept in the “Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy” in <http://www.iep.utm.edu/tolerati/>, (Accessed 5 February 2018).

The question then is how the epistemological framework defines that phrase, since in the pragmatic context the meaning of the words can be very broadly implicated. At a glance this phrase may reflect the psycho-social experience of interacting with non-Muslims, which is often characterized by conflict and tension, but this research shows this expression has theological justification. It's just that the perception of the respondents on Muslim-non-Muslim (especially Christian) relation in social-empirical reality influences the way they interpret the scriptural texts they refer to. In other words, it seems that the scriptures are understood according to their cognition of the socio-religious situation taking place today.

This religious phenomenon can be observed in the view of Ambia Samsuri, a student of Political Science, the board of BEM Universitas Syiah Kuala (Unsyiah), Aceh. Samsuri quoted a free translation of a hadith on the Prophet: "Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him) is never angry when harassed but will act decisively when Muslims are disturbed." Samsuri by quoting as such implied that in social relations with non-Muslims may occur things that interfere with relationships, such as mutual mockery, condescension, and others. But it will be left if it does not touch the case of religion and Muslims. If it touches, then there is no tolerance.

The word "disturb" in Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI) refers to some adjacent meanings: 1) disturbing, seductive; 2) touching; offensive; 3) criticize, mock; 4) interfere (affairs of others). By accepting all the meaning of the word "disturbing" it, we can imagine the broad practical implications of the limits of tolerance according to Samsuri earlier. It can be interpreted that any non-Muslim actions that are believed to offend, criticize, interfere in Islamic affairs and interests of Muslims will not be allowed or otherwise will be addressed firmly. It is not clear whether the word "assertive" refers to an action that is on the legal path or vice versa. Indubitably, assertiveness is a consequence of the principle of no tolerance in belief. Samsuri acknowledged that with this principle of tolerance, "Muslims are more tolerant in their lives; the proof of non-Muslims in a Muslim region is preserved peace, whereas the proof of Muslims in non-Muslim areas are in the danger of being religious."

Further exploration to the origin of the statement conveyed by Samsuri

above found that the quotation circulated widely on social media with the complete sound of hadith in Arabic and its translation in Indonesian, which is quite accurate in the general meaning. The sentence was quoted from Sayyid at-Thanthawi, former Grand Sheikh al-Azhar and Mufti of Egypt, extracted from the hadeeth of the Prophet as narrated by Hindun bin Abi Halah issued by Imam at-Thabarani and Imam at-Tirmidhi. In the expression of the hadith and its translation there is only the expression “if the religion of Allah is insulted (His teachings are violated),” and thus there is no such words that state “if Muslims are insulted.” In his commentary Nadirsyah Hosen, professor of Islamic law at Monash University Australia, criticised the translation of the viral hadith on social media as over-stretching the line, if not a twist, of the meaning of the hadith.

The sentence that says, *شيء لغضبه يقيم لم الله حرمت انتهكت فإذا* is more correctly translated “but if his teachings are violated, nothing can be upright in his anger.” While the translation “if Allah’s religion is insulted” is considered by Hosen as stretching the meaning tendentiously. In addition, according to Hosen, the hadith is presented in several different narrations not in the context of law but rather in the context of attitudes and behaviour of the Prophet. In short, the spirit of the hadith, according to Hosen, rests on the Prophet’s firmness in ensuring the establishment of the teachings of Allah by the Muslims, and not the Prophet’s outrage in responding to non-Muslims’ insulting Islam or fellow Muslims.³²

Issues for Building Non-Muslim Worship Houses and IMB Rhetoric

The “undisturbed” psychological boundaries in its practical application are mostly related to majority-minority relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims and their relationship to the establishment of non-Muslim worship houses in Muslim dominant environments. Indeed, there are some sources who associate it with negative-valued communication behaviour such as mocking or reviling. But the issue of building houses of worship in the context of majority-minority relations needs to be discussed here

32 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Is it true that the Prophet is angry when Allah’s religion is insulted?”, Published in <http://nadirhosen.net/tsaqofah/syariah/benarkah-nabi-marah-kalau-agama-allahdihina> (Accessed January 27, 2018).

considering its consequences with state law enforcement. It should be underlined that the liberal paradigm differs from the communal paradigm in answering and defining tolerance limits or in the context of “non-intrusive others.” In liberal terms, the limits before something or someone is disturbing are generally such insofar as they do not violate human rights or individual autonomy, but in a communal framework, they refer more to the collective accepting of the Muslim society. In the case of establishment of the church, for example, in the majority Muslim community its presence may be considered disturbing, although not necessarily so in the eyes of individuals.

Some cases demonstrate protests over church building that often lead to destruction and persecution. Seen from a communal perspective, these protests and destructions are rooted in Muslims’ collective dislike of the existence of the church. To overcome this communal conflict, the government on the recommendation of interfaith leaders made the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs Number 8 and 9 of 2006, which regulates the conditions for establishing houses of worship of minorities in the majority environment. Ironically, relying on this rule, some groups in Islam often complain about the presence or establishment of churches in Muslim circles, even after the churches have obtained construction permits.

Conflicts surrounding the establishment of a church in a Muslim-majority neighborhood today have developed in the discourse level, not as an issue of religious dominant dislike toward the presence of other religious houses of worship in an environment but rather as a matter of lawlessness. This course seems to have influenced the way some Muslim activists interviewed in this research looked at the issue of building houses of worship as a matter of the legitimacy of government permits. Sucia Ramadhani, of Young Writer UI, Jakarta, believed, “On the establishment of other religious houses of worship, if the procedure is correct, why should it be disputed? We also must respect other religions, and vice versa. The church cannot be established because its permission is problematic.” It is interesting to quote Adnan Zaid Tirmizi, Head of Religious SME BEM STKIP PGRI Lamongan, who defined tolerance in a communal perspective as a respect for collective rights rather than autonomy or individual freedom. According to him, not

only must the majority respect the minority, but the minority must also respect the majority. Therefore, the establishment of a place of worship in this view should consider the majority-minority aspect. According to him, the construction of a place of minority worship will damage the existing community order. The minority should not impose the will of the group, and if that happens it is tantamount to being intolerant towards the majority and the values and the order that have long been there. However, if the church had already existed, Tirmizi would have preferred to let it be. At this point, Tirmizi did show an attitude of tolerance. But unfortunately, we could not identify the paradigmatic reason, other than because the house of worship already pocketed a permit.

Beyond cases related to the construction of worship houses characterised by some communal conflict, those who have factually experienced coexistence with Christians and who have also long had church buildings there, show the attitude that accepts the church's presence without questioning its permission. Yet they continue to show hope that Muslim-non-Muslim relations are coloured by a harmonious relationship that is proven by not interfering each other. Yayuk, LDF FKMI Nurudin, Untan, Pontianak, claimed to be friends with non-Muslims; she said in their village there is a place of worship and it feels peaceful.

C. Intolerance, Exclusivism, and Prejudices

The paradigm of communal tolerance cannot always be consistent in maintaining tolerant attitudes and behaviour in its generic sense of refrain from being harsh and negating something that is not approved or favored. Empirical experience in interaction with non-Muslim coloured contestation, exclusivism, and communal prejudice can easily encourage and justify intolerant attitudes and behaviour. Such an attitude can be read from the comment of Riv'an Widiyanto, Laskar Umat Islam (LUIS) activist, Surakarta, when his response was asked about the construction of other religious houses in his environment.³³ Widiyanto admitted there was no problem if

33 LUIS an Islamic organisation that often appears in the media because its activities are considered to involve violence and vigilante, such as sweeping place of entertainment, read <https://news.detik.com/berita/3375724/terkait-aksi-sweeping-5-figure-laskar-solo-captured-police>, (Retrieved 5 February 2018).

they did not disturb the activities of Muslims. “But if it is disturbing, then it is obligatory for Muslims to fight against violence against them.”

A lack of experience with different religious groups often reinforces the exclusiveness of Muslim youth, especially that attitude is coloured by the development of religious prejudices. In turn this attitude justifies the rejection of the activities of other religious groups in the neighborhood, which is often followed by acts of violence. On the other hand, religious doctrines are shown to tend to legitimize and sanctify that attitude. It is interesting to note the narrative told by Arif Marifudin, a member of the LDK IAIN La Rayba, Bogor, who claimed to have rejected the church or other houses of worship (other than the mosque) around or close to his home in Gunung Salak Subdistrict, Bogor. Marifudin considered his own attitude to be based on a doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence that reads: “*Al-'adah muhakkamah*”, which means customs can be made a source of law. According to him, the Muslim community in his village considers the presence of other places of worship as violation to the prevailing customs in the area, which from generation to generation has never known other places of worship except the mosque. However, since 2000 the tradition was judged to have been disturbed by the presence of church building activities. Marifudin said that while he was still in junior high school class VII, in Mount Salak, a church was built called the Church of the Cave of Mary, but its presence was rejected by some local Muslims who protested the construction of the church. Including those who participated in the action was his own teacher who he thought knew a close figure of FPI and a TNI soldier. According to him, the church was successfully destroyed by the local people and the construction was successfully thwarted by involving the help of community leaders. In his way of telling stories there was no remorse in Marifudin's tone.

One of the reasons for the apparent denial of church building is that some respondents think of it as part of Christianisation. Andika Raybafi, Chairman of the Student Representative Council (DPM) Faculty of Law, University of Djuanda, Bogor, claimed he could not accept the presence of the church if used as for Christianisation. The same thing was conveyed by Rosyid Zaelani, KAMMI, Surakarta, who disagreed with other houses of worship in his village, for assuming that the presence of the church would

bring with it the mission of converting the Muslim villagers. According to him, “The people of the village, their Islam is still not strong enough, and so if there is a church there, automatically they will spread the religion as well. Obviously, the classical problem is economic. They can be persuaded with work and other amenities, and finally they should convert. That’s why I disagree with the idea of building a church there.”

A story similar to the one above from Marifudin (Bogor) was also resonant in Syamsul, a member of the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI), Medan, who claimed of being actively involved in advocating for the eviction of churches in Binjai. The most common disputes stem from land issues and building permits. According to him, FUI would act on the action after listening to complaints. The complaints would be studied until they were believed that the case was problematic and worthy of “advocacy” action taken against it. Yuda Tri Arifa, an LDK activist, UINSU Medan, used the same excuse to tolerate the church’s dissolution action as what FUI did in Binjai. “The dissolution of the church is normal there. To know why CSOs were disbanded there, we should know the causes of the disputes, for instance whether land grabbing has occurred, et cetera,” said Arifa. Rahmat Gustin, an activist of the Indonesian Muslim League (LMI), Medan City, claimed to be actively conducting surveillance on the construction of non-Muslim worship sites after experiencing a ‘bitter history’ related to the eviction of a mosque building in Medan for the benefit of some investors. According to him the eviction in addition to violating the rules of wakaf in Islam, also tarnished the face of Muslims.

Attitudes and behaviour of intolerance as indicated above do generally involve young Muslim actors engaged in Islamic organisations that are self-proclaimed as combatants, fronts, guards, protecting the interests of Islam and Muslims. Nevertheless, their displayed intolerance is still within the framework of horizontal relationship with non-Muslim communities, for at some level they still accept the nation-state system and its constitution. As for those who are engaged in organisations built based on some Islamist ideology, the intolerance captured from the narrative is not practiced by society members against others horizontally but is reflected in the conception of citizenship in the *daulah Islamiyah* system that places other faiths as a second-class community protected by the Islamic rulers.

According to the acknowledgment of informants from radical Islamist organisations, Christians and followers of the books (*ahlul kitab*) have been and will enjoy a good position in the daulah system of Islam; their freedom of religion is guaranteed as long as they follow the Muslim ruling and fulfill the obligation to pay tax (*jizyah*). The position is different from that of Islamist groups such as Ahmadis and *Shiah*; they will be severely punished to death. The reason is because they do *talbis*, mixing the right and vanity, an attitude they think is more dangerous than non-Muslim *kufir* because those who are *talbis* can be called enemies of Muslims.

D. Movement Activists, Civic Tolerance, and Pluralism

Since the days of the independence movement through the Old Order, the New Order, and up to the present day, Muslim youth in Indonesia have engaged and continue to engage with various forms of social, political and religious organisations. Through all that they have developed their leadership talents and national insights--social, political and religious alike. Some of them chose to work in nationalist organisations such as GMNI or KNPI, which overshadowed various OKPs in Indonesia. Others entered organisations of Islamic-based student movement, such as HMI, PMII and IMM. Organisations such as the Islamic Student Association (HMI) were born shortly after Indonesia's Independence Day, on August 17, 1945. Afterwards, a series of student-based and youth-based movement organisations from the wives of large Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah also existed. HMI, PMII, IMM, and Islamic based movement organisations were born and developed along the journey of the nation.

The main reason for their existence was closely related to efforts to defend the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and participate in the nation's independence through development programs in all areas. In other words, from the beginning of their existence there has had no fundamental contradiction between the principles of nationalism and the organisation's ideal purpose. Even in the process of the nation's journey to the maturity of its constitutional system, the young cadres of these Islamic organisations, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Syafii Maarif, to mention but some, have succeeded through their works in donating what is called a

conceptual framework for understanding integrative relations between the national values based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with Islamic values and universal human values.

In contrast to Muslim youth activists engaged in dakwahist organisations, activists of student-movement organisations, such as HMI, PMII and IMM, to some extent, demonstrate an understanding of tolerance based on civic perspectives, albeit still based on Islamic arguments. Or in other words, they generally do not experience the psychology of obstinacy or ambivalence in integrating Islamic communal rights and individual rights because they accept the concept of individual freedom based on democracy and human rights as an integral part of Islamic teachings. The concept of tolerance in their view is based on the conceptuality of citizenship values constructed from the convergence of universal human values and Islamic values interpreted by a contextual, not a scripturalist, approach.

Furthermore, some respondents have even stepped through the *maqam* (stage) of tolerance toward the *maqam* pluralism, which makes diversity a principle of managing differences. In this case, they are different from the da'wahist activists who tend to firmly reject the principle of such pluralism. Pluralism is synonymous with relativism that sacrifices loyalty and commitment to the exclusive truth of Islam. However, for the activists of this progressive Islamist movement, pluralism is precisely one of the more legitimate and more solid forms of Islamic manifestation in managing the diversity that became Indonesia's destiny.

On the other hand, HMI, PMII, IMM or other similar activists have nationalist players who are the same as nationalist activist organisations such as GMNI or Pemuda Pancasila. They all accept without hesitation the Pancasila system, the Constitution, and the civic values embodied in it. However, unlike the activists of this moderate Islamist movement, Muslim activists working in GMNI, for example, show a reluctance to enter the conversation on religious issues because they consider them sensitive issues. Consequently, when faced with cases of religious intolerance, they tend to avoid approaching religious issues and prefer to emphasise conversations about issues of unity or justice. Their attitudes are inclusive at a practical level but not at the level of discourse.

Islamic Arguments on Civic Tolerance and Pluralism

Civic tolerance departs from the values of equality between citizens, and respect for the fundamental freedom of every citizen guaranteed by the state. As stated before tolerance essentially presupposes an initial condition in which some citizens disagree with the thoughts and activities of other citizens, but they choose to endure their dislike and allow others to do so.

Civic tolerance is reflected by the attitude of the person who is tolerant because it respects the rights and freedoms of others, regardless of whether the individual rights are appropriate or contrary to the values and communal interests of his own religious group. This perspective is shown by some activists HMI, PMII, Gusdurians, IMM, and UIN alumni, who became respondents of this research. M. Bambang Pontas Rambe, Chairperson of HMI Branch Bandung, an HMI activist of Untan Pontianak, and Akbar who is administrator of KNPI Medan, generally show a clear attitude that religious tolerance is a consequence of respect for the rights and freedom of religion that is protected in the country. Therefore, violence in the name of religion, including attacks on places of worship, reflects violations of the principle of freedom. Building on the Islamic arguments on the principle of citizenship, Muhammad Hasani Mubarok, activist of PMII, Pontianak, argues that al-Qur'an has determined that in interacting with one with a different religion, the moral attitude that ought to be demonstrated is to respect the person's right to exercise his or her faith. According to him the cause of conflicts among religious people is owing to neglect of the principle of mutual respect for religious freedom. In non-Muslim leadership issues, Mubarok views that non-Muslims are not allowed to become political leaders, but it should not be used as a guide in determining salvation in the world and in the hereafter; as the task of leaders is not to provide salvation but to run the wheel of development and system of government. In the past, it was possible for some leaders to be in charge of leading the world, but now, according to Mubarok, leadership has grown with time to follow the development of the state system. For Mubarok, the right to become a political leader should be guaranteed by the state to every citizen without discrimination.

In line with Mubarok, Bambang Herianto, the board of BEM Dakwah UIN Medan, showed the importance of respecting the principle of freedom of

religion by telling about the harmony among the Muslims and Christians in Medan. Herianto witnessed how in the Muslim-majority area mosques and churches stand close together, each community being encouraged to support and help for the smoothness of other people's worship. Such harmonious relations are only made possible through respect for the freedom of religion in minority citizens. According to Herianto once that respect is denied, great conflicts are likely to arise. A similar view came from Shinta Anggraeni, graduate of State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung, who believes the key of tolerance is to respect differences of belief and even when they are contrary to our own. Anggraini admits that the awareness of tolerance is growing due to the habit of getting along with non-Muslims from an early age.

The activists of this movement put forward further the idea of the importance of managing diversity that became the destiny of Indonesia by continuing to care for and guard it. What is the function of religion in the effort of caring for this diversity? To them, religion must be able to function to support the continuity of diversity values and respectful relationships that have become the native character of Indonesian ethnic groups. Bambang, HMI Bandung, rejects the Islamist view that carries the agenda of uniformity of national life based on Islamic identity. According to him, "religion in Indonesia should not be nationalised because we have an idea that Europeans do not have, which is the idea of diversity. These nations should put it forward while we are religious. Not that we are religiously encouraged by nationality and ethnicity, but religion makes the religious culture that turns to encourage or colour the national situation existing in Indonesia. "More than just a discourse, some youth activists from this movement organisations have been actively involved in caring business and promote the values of pluralism with various activities of interfaith encounter and dialogue. Several activists of PMII and Gusdurians interviewed claimed to take the path of civic activism like this. One of them was a woman activist from PMII, Manado, by the name of Indah. This 24-year-old girl along with her Gusdurian network made a counter discourse in public spaces, engaging in interfaith dialogues with UKIT (Christian University), and with the media/journalists, as well as advocating some cases of bullying on LGBT followers,

and many others. Indah admitted that the experience of encounter with this different group had helped her overcome misunderstanding of other religious beliefs.

Arsyad, also a Gusdurian activist, Makassar, claimed to be actively involved in discussions and activities of the South Sulawesi Intercultural Network. He had been accustomed to attending other religious observatory open houses, even performing his prayers at church. In contrast to some dakwahis activists who refused to be too close to non-Muslims for fear of purity of *aqidah*, Arsyad felt the opposite, by associating closely with followers of other religion; he became “increasingly feeling secured with the Islam values.” Such a religious perspective was recognized by Arsyad because he used the Islamic learning methodology in a way he called the *istiqrai* method of conducting research—a sort of comparative study of religious and other texts. According to him, in addition to the *istiqrai* approach, there was another Islamic learning approach, namely *istidlal*, usually taken by plucking verses of the Qur’an and making it a proposition. The second way, according to Arsyad, was very weak to use to catch more essential meanings of Islam.

Such inclusivism in the social level was recognized by Emha S. Asror, activist of the Ciputat Student Forum (Formaci), Jakarta, significantly in shaping the character of a tolerant and pro-peace citizen. According to him, the conflict among religious followers occurs when people gather with their group exclusively. Religious conflicts are rare at the individual level, “but when it comes to the community, the individual gets labeled, legitimized, and then constructed, that identity eventually arises.” Asror claimed to have an inclusive experience not only with corresponding thinking but also with discourses people perceived as contrary to their original rationale. For example, he read the book of radical thoughts by Sayyid Qutub in which he found a humanist side that was not yet known by many people; this character was more relevant to study nowadays, especially in Indonesia than Qutub’s ideological works. This inclusive religious experience according to Aldinah, IMM activist of Ciputat, Jakarta, had helped him improve mutual understanding and mutual respect among believers. Similarly, Aldinah’s story went as follows:

“When I was in high school, I had some non-Muslim friends and had no problems. Some were Hindus, some Christians, and they kept reminding us of the times of prayer. On Eid Fitr, they sent me greetings. But on Christmas, I never did such a thing, because at the time I still believed in the plea to not deliver Christmas greetings. Now I do think it is okay to just deliver the greetings. I do not dare to judge that the *Shia* are wrong, misguided, or anything, simply because I have not been in the *Shia* yet. I have siblings who are *Shia* followers and I often compared *Shia* and *Suni* in terms of their jurisprudences. Sometimes I felt it affected me, for example, during fasting. They only stop fasting when it’s dark. With regard to charity, there is a term called *khumus*, such as *zakat*, that part of property that must be paid for every year. They explained some theories on it, which sometimes I felt it rational and sensible. To fill in that particular religious aspect, I participated in such studies in Daarut Tauhid Jakarta in Kebayoran Baru. I feel comfortable here, more peaceful. It’s not like in IMM. I see Daarut Tauhid is neutral. They do not feature Muhammadiyah or NU. They do not classify themselves.”

Citizenship Tolerance and Its Applications in Issues on Worship Houses and Christmas Greetings

The paradigm of tolerance of citizenship and pluralism when embodied in practical issues such as the construction of houses of worship and the delivering of Christmas greetings does not create a sense of greed; rather, it produces a more assertive attitude of unconditional tolerance. In the case of Christmas pronunciation, they do not try to understand the scriptural text literally and are, therefore, more loose and rational in formulating theological boundaries by considering the empirical motivation and context of communication.

As shown by Maulana Yusuf, Secretary General of the Siliwangi Youth Student Association (IMA), Tasikmalaya, who did not question if there were churches or other worship houses in the vicinity of his home. He even advised Muslims to tolerate them because they lived in Indonesia, a country full of diversity. Interestingly, Yusuf with this view of citizenship tolerance claimed to follow the Star Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), an Islamic political party. The same thing was shared by Bambang Herianto, board of

BEM Dakwah UINSU Medan, and also by Akbar of HMI and KNPI Medan; the latter even believed that worship houses were a need of citizens. “Churches are founded because there are congregations nearby, probably similar to schools in remote villages need to be there so the people do not have to go to town for education.” Rambe, HMI of Bandung Regency, criticised some Muslims who were intolerant to the existence of non-Muslim houses of worship around their residence solely for reason of majority right. According to him the majority cannot be used as a pretext to act arbitrarily. It is precisely due to the existence of the majority of Indonesian Muslims that there “should be a passion that can trigger the acceptability of the world community, which can indicate Muslims in Indonesia are open minded, unlike other Muslim communities in certain countries, e.g. Saudi Arabia.”

Responding to the issue of delivering Christmas greetings, Bambang Sudarmono, HMI, Pontianak, considered it no problem since it should not be interpreted with God’s sigh. He thought it was to be based on self-belief so if we did not believe it, it should not matter. Bambang gave an example it would be funny to call a president or lecturer an infidel for delivering a Christmas greeting. In this context, not all activists of dakwahis in LDK and Rohis forbade Christmas greetings. One activist allowed them. Rahman, activist at LDK Muslim University of Indonesia, Makassar, had a contextual view of delivering Christmas greetings. He viewed it from humanity side that should be okay for us to show tolerance by delivering the greetings, as long as we had no intention to follow their beliefs.

Dwiki Ardiansyah Husain, chairperson of the Tadzkir/LDK Politeknik Negeri and board of PMII Rayon Poltek Manado, interpreted surah al-Kafirun verse 6, “For you is your religion, and for me is my religion” to show that Muslims in Indonesia should allow followers of other religions to worship peacefully. He disagreed with the interpretation that a Christmas greeting means recognition of a Christian faith. According to him, a Muslim who is delivering a Christmas greeting to Christians is not doing it as a form of recognition of Jesus as the child of God but rather as a form of respecting fellow citizens. The chairperson of Rohis Syaichona Cholil High School Balikpapan, a school owned by NU Balikpapan, allowed the greetings, viewing them neither as justification nor part of their religious ritual.

Issue of Non-Muslim Leadership and Political Identity

As with the two-religious issue above, Muslim youth activists who carry the value of citizenship do not view the election/acceptance of non-Muslim leaders as a matter of *aqidah*. But they view it as a political matter only. Yogi Purnama, activist of IT Study Forum at Pesantren Nurul Islam, Garut, thought it was okay if Indonesia was led by non-Muslims, “as long as he is able to lead properly. Otherwise, no matter what his religion, I will oppose him.” In line with Purnama, Nur Ani, the board of BEM Language and Literature Unhas, Makassar, argued that although the population majority profess Islam, Indonesia is not an Islamic country. Therefore, the leader does not have to be a Muslim. Precisely what this nation needs is a fair leader willing to work to build a nation or region, a leader who can bring good and prosperity to the society. Shinta Anggraeni, graduate of the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung, firmly criticised the group which according to her run identity politics by mobilizing religious sentiments for political purposes. Anggraeni assessed Ahok’s case, former Governor of Jakarta, as an abuse of the name of religion for political interests.

Despite believing the Qur’an verse that forbids non-Muslim leadership, Rahman, LDK of the Muslim University of Indonesia, Makassar, still believed that the view could be applied in a system in Indonesia, which is not an Islamic state. He asserted Indonesia is a country consisting of various ethnic and religious, but not an Islamic country. If the rules of Islam were applied, it would threaten the nation’s unity. In line with Rahman, Sari Maryati Napitupulu, Garut, said, “If there is a good leader of other religion who can make real changes, based on tolerance I do not think there will be a problem if this leader is a moslem or otherwise. Moreover, Indonesia is a country with a diverse population of tribes, nations, and religions. Its motto being ‘Unity in Diversity’, Indonesia must adhere to the principles of harmonisation, kinship, and tolerance.”

E. Nationalist Activists and Fear of Religious Issues

Muslim activists who are active at GMNI, Pemuda Pancasila, or KNPI, have no qualms about being tolerant of different religions. Similarly, progressive Islamist movement activists are fully committed to the values of Pancasila, nationality and citizenship embodied in the 1945 Constitution of

the Republic of Indonesia. However, they generally do not show interest in discussing religious issues because they perceive them as sensitive matters. They choose to stay away from it. Consequently, these nationalist activists appear not maximal in contributing to various issues of intolerance and violence that involve religious issues. Their involvement cannot go beyond nationalist rhetoric, such as maintaining *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, or national unity. This was recognized by Rahmanitasari, chairperson of GMNI of UIN RIL Commissariat, who stated that issues concerning religions were not considered seriously. Instead, interfaith activists prefer to discuss issues of nationalism, thus avoiding talks about religious issues. The organisation once attempted to bring forth religious issues to be discussed, but the discussion did not run productively--hence their avoidance.

A similar story came from Aditya Murdani, Secretary General of Pemuda Pancasila (Youth Pancasila), who was also active in KNPI Lampung Province. He admitted that in Lampung they rarely discussed issues on Shi'a and Ahmadiyah. According to him this was because the youth activists tended to turn passive out of ignorance about the problems. Much of the progress made in the world of youthful Islamic activism escaped their observation and attention. Askar, Chairman of GMNI Branch of South Jakarta, was of the same opinion on their ignorance of religious issues. Indeed, there were initiatives within the organisation to encourage each other to maintain their own faith. Ahok's case, which involved massive Muslim demonstrations in 2016, which then led to Ahok imprisonment by a judge who broke his case at the North Jakarta District Court in 2017, at least influenced nationalist activists to be increasingly cautious in dealing with religious matters. This impression can be captured from Askar's narration below:

Judging from the religious sentiments by many moslems, they were angry at the former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Yet, from field observationwe could analyse the presence of political interest in igniting the mass. Ahok was accused of defamation, having entered an area he was not familiar with. As a child, he was not educated about Islam. He could have been more careful in using words or in discussing issues related to the religion. He should have been able to practice self-control because, after all, this religion is very sensitive.

Chapter 5

Individual Freedom and Human Rights

A. General Views

Before we elaborate on the research findings, it helps to allude to a few writings on the subject of Islamic views on human rights. Greg Fealy's writing, "Indonesian Islamist Perspectives on Human Rights", published in the book of *Islam and Human Rights in Practice: Perspectives Across the Ummah* edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Benjamin Mac Queen (2008), helps us to pay attention to general trends in view of Muslims in Indonesia on human rights. According to Fealy, although Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, it is not so much involved in the debates on international relations about Islam with human rights. It should be understandable then, as Fealy observes, that the general view of Muslims in Indonesia on human rights tends to be parochial. He argues that this has been caused by three factors. *First*, there is a general feeling that Muslims in Indonesia are frequently tyrannised. *Second*, there is widespread suspicion that the Western agenda in the field of human rights is contrary to the teachings of Islam. *Third*, there is the view that The West itself is not consistent in the realisation of the principles of human rights.

Some issues worth paying attention to are on the attitudes and views of Indonesian Muslim youth about individual freedom and human rights.

First, related to freedom of religion, this issue is visible among others from the general suspicion over the threat of “Christianisation.” As previously discussed, the construction of non-Muslim community houses of worship is a connected issue. There is also a collective memory of the forms of events understood as “tyrannies” towards Muslims. *Second*, on the problem of boundaries of relation between Muslims and Christians, cross-talks often arise about the delivering of Christmas greetings by Muslims to the Christian community. Also, not rarely did disputes arise over whether interfaith marriages should be allowed.

Third, on gender issues and sexuality, particular issues on the roles and positions of women in the public sphere are still in material debates and are growingly important. In addition, the existence of LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual) is no less important as one of the seeds of controversy. *Four*, related to the power of identity politics, the issue of “blasphemy” which was later released by Islamists, especially from the hardliners, also triggered controversial differences in attitudes and actions among Muslims themselves. Thereby, the ensuing legislation helped regulate the existence of community organisations and the controversies and differences in collective attitudes and actions. Issues such as these have enabled some Muslims to express their religious identity.

What are the influencing factors to the differences in attitudes, views, and actions of Muslim youth in connection with the above issues? At least three factors can be underlined here, namely: sociological factors, intellectual literary factors, and historical factors. It should be stated here that organisational affiliation and social settings of Muslim youth do play an important role. Youth participation in various religious organisations, both inside and outside school or college, influenced their perspectives. Therefore, the social-environment underlying their existence is no less important in the process of formation of their views and attitudes. Some of the youth were moderate or tend to be liberal; some looked moderate but inclined to extremism. Another factor was literacy in the digital world. Primary sources of knowledge and understanding about Islam and its relationship with a variety of collective problems, to Muslim youth today, seem to be available online in the various channels of online da’wah, such as through Twitter, Line, Facebook, WhatsApp, and the likes.

Several names of the popular da'i who often appeared in the channel were: Hanan Attaki, Aa Gym, Rizieq Shihab, Evie Effendi, Adi Hidayat, Zakir Naik, Felix Siau, and a few others. The last factor, which can be argued here, is related to the collective memories of Muslim youth over events in the past that gave rise to a traumatic experience. External events that are commonplace with respect to the life of religious people in the past, therefore, also do affect their attitudes and views. The riots in Tasikmalaya in 1996, for example, were among today's public issues that were repeatedly discussed by a number of speakers.

As for the expressions of attitudes and views on such issues as collective expressions of political views, not a few young Muslims joined the waves of demonstration on religious issues in recent years, both at regional and national levels. The collective religious movements, such as Subuh Prayer, which has launched in several cities, also offer their own expression channels. In addition, there are cultural and collective cultural expressions as reflected in some efforts to colour the life style of Muslim youth, ranging from hijab designs to organising Islamic festivals at school for a Valentine's Day. The effort of "hijrah" is no less important, which juxtaposes some Islamic labelling vis-a-vis common youth lifestyles. Lastly, there is also a form of symbolic religious expressions with political nuances through various choices of expressions, one example of which being the raising of *tawheed* flags on some mountains by a few Bandung activists.

B. Individual Freedom and Human Rights

The attitudes and behaviour of Indonesian Muslim youth towards issues of individual freedom and human rights are strongly influenced by their ways of thinking, visions and missions of the organisations and families to which they belong to. On the other hand, their views remain varied, not monotonous; many of them are somewhat ambiguous. In other words, although organisational affiliations and social environment backgrounds influence their attitudes and views, to some extent basically they develop their own attitudes and perceptions.

Generally speaking, only very few Indonesian Muslims youth expressly reject individual freedom and human rights. Those who rejected those values were activists from the Islamic Youth and Salafi Islamic Youth

Forum in Bulukumba; from HTI activists in Bandung Raya; from IMAMTA, and; from LDMPM UMS, Surakarta. These groups also accused individual freedom and human rights as part of a Western ideology that aims to destroy Islam in Indonesia. There were also a small number of other Muslim youth groups sharing the view; but most of them accepted individual freedom and human rights on the basis of religious values, not on cultural values. They also provided critical notes that individual and human rights were often used as excuses to suit certain purposes, such as for making abusive or defamatory acts, and for spreading hate speeches to harm other people or groups. Therefore, suspicion that individual freedom and human rights are part of Western ideologies intended to destroy Islam in Indonesia does exist. The second type consisted of Muslim youth who joined *da'wahist* groups such as Rohis, LDK, KAMMI and PUJ. Quite a lot of them did not oppose the freedom of individuals and human rights. This group included moderates such as activists from Fatayat NU, PMII, HMI, PUDAM, Lajna Ima'illah-Ahmadiyah, LIDMI, KNPI, and AGRA. Although not all of them were void of suspicion about individual freedom and human rights being part of Western ideologies to destroy Indonesian Muslims. Their opinions and arguments can be classified into three categories as below.

The *first* category is on the view that fully supports individual freedom and human rights. This view is generally shared by moderate and nationalist organisations and by moderate and nationalist student movements. Some of the activists are active in intra-school organisations such as OSIS and BEM. Examples here are PMII activists Eidat Ahmad Firdausa and Khadijah. Firdausa was active in PMII Commissariat of Islamic High School Nahdlatul Ulama (STAINU) Tasikmalaya, while Khadijah was board of Bulukumba PMII. Firdausa viewed that individual freedom and human rights were familiar things in Indonesia. As proofs to this are facts that each person is free to choose any educational institution, free to live anywhere, and free to speak. In Firdausa's view it was individual freedom rather than Western ideology that was often used to attack Indonesian Muslims, because, according to her, individual freedom and human rights were needed by humans. Khadijah affirmed that individual freedom and human rights are in accordance with the teachings of Islam and with Pancasila, and that both have been regulated

by the state. Similar views were also shared by PMII activists from Bima, Makassar, Bulukumba, Medan, Bandar Lampung, Surakarta, and other regions. LDK activists, which have NU background, also showed support to human rights. As Akbar said, "God entrusts the sustenance and prosperity to the system of the state. When the state is absent on the people's issues, it is our duty to voice and remind the ignorant parties."

HMI activists generally express support for individual freedom and human rights. It was interesting to see Bambang (22), chairperson of Bandung Regency HMI, who responded to the case of rejection by some Islamic groups to the Christmas celebration in Sabuga at the end of 2016. Bambang could not accept the reason when some Muslims said that the square was still in Great Mosque area of Bandung. In his view, the square was still part of the public space, like Sabuga. Bambang had a principle that religion was an individual right; the state was obliged to protect citizen rights. Thus, religion being an individual right, it would be unnecessary for one group to attempt to dissolve religious activities of other groups, irrespective of the cliché reason such as "Because the activities are illegal." Interestingly, the same thing was expressed Wawan Maulana, activist KAMMI Bandung, in whose view: "As Muslim, we should not be overrated. Being muslim means being fair. As it turned out, later on, there was a congregation when Muslims held a mass dawn prayer in Bandung. They didn't even bother of obtaining any permission for that."

In addition to having a religion, according to Bambang, having an ideology was an individual right, and both rights had to be protected by the state. The notion of *khilafah* and communism, however, was understood as a living ideology. Especially on campus, all were worth talking about and evaluated intellectually, and scientifically. Letting an idea die only because of a historical factor within a nation's politics would not be education; it would be deception.

Orientation toward communism must be rejected; the effort must come from within the society through its intelligent, reasonable and knowledgable thinkers. For example, in 1965 HMI was involved in the dissolution of PKI. HMI did not attempt to dissolve its ideology, Marxism, but the PKI, which at that time aspired to dissolve HMI.

Muslim youth who are classified as nationalists do not consider individual freedom and human rights as part of a Western ideology but rather as part of human nature since birth. KNPI Surakarta activists, however, see individual freedom and human rights as something opposing Islamic values. What's contrary to Islam is when some groups—self-claiming as being closest to rulers or being the most-Pancasila--use individual freedom and human rights as a pretext to tyrannise other groups.

Still, with regard to these rights, some agree while so do not. Rahmanitasari, GMNI activist who was also administrator of Ma'had Al-Jami'ah UIN Raden Intan Lampung, put forward a quite progressive view. According to her, in the context of leadership in Indonesia with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, everyone has the same right to vote and to be elected. The Qur'an does require the choice of Muslim leaders, but if there is a more competent, responsible and competent non-Muslim leader rather than a less competent and even corrupt, then why not choose a non-Muslim leader. What should be seen is not his or her religious background, but the person's performance and integrity.

At the student level, some OSIS officials showed agreement with the idea of individual freedom and human rights. Chairperson of OSIS SMAN 1 Surakarta believed that individual freedom and human rights were introduced from the West, but not against Islam, let alone as an instrument to attack Muslims. Agung, chairman of OSIS MAN 1 Bandar Lampung, argued that every individual had the right protected by law as a citizen. He said giving forth opinions, associating, and selecting were examples of individual rights that should be rewarded without harming others. Agung (OSIS MAN 1), Numayeni (OSIS SMAN 5), and Tiara (OSIS SMA Gajah Mada), spoke of whether an area with a Muslim majority population could be governed by a non-Muslim governor, regent, or. In their view, a figure that is honest, credible, who has integrity and is capable of prospering the people is better than he or she who is just good looking but has no concrete plans.

Despite their support to individual freedom and human rights, Muslim youth activists remained critical to them as shown in field-observation records. Aditia Murdani, PP activist, Riki and Pupung, PMII activist in Lampung, said that the implementation of human rights was still hampered

by social, economic and cultural issues such as high rates of poverty and unemployment, and economic disparities. They considered various issues of socio-economic disparity to be a factor in a crime reported by the national media long time ago. According to them, Lampung farmers might be the most deprived class in terms of individual rights. They had no freedom to determine prices; instead, they tended to be invariably harmed by the fluctuating prices of agricultural produce such as cassava, rubber, and palm oil that, oddly enough, declined nearing harvest time. On this phenomenon, Saiful Huda, President of BEM UIN Raden Intan Lampung, demanded that the government pay attention to their welfare, as farmers are the grassroots of the country's prosperity; indeed, the majority of population in Indonesia are composed of farmers.

Second, some youth hold a view that accepts individual freedom but imposes limitations to it, namely as long as it does not conflict with religious, cultural and legal values of the state. Encep Somantri (21), chairperson of LDK STIKES BTH Tasikmalaya City, argued that individual freedom and human rights cover all aspects of life so long as they do not conflict with religions and state rules. Muslim youth activists in Bima, especially from da'wah organisations, such as LDK, put Islam as a benchmark and a foothold in interpreting individual freedoms and human rights.

Syafrik, LDK activist, illustrated how individual freedom and human rights were to be bound by a sort of norm, "Because of fear of injury to ourselves and others, vehicles must obey traffic lights." They should also recognise that in a religious community, every citizen has the right to choose religion freely and is taught mutual respect by Islam. However, in settling sensitive issues such as the construction of non-Muslim worship houses in areas of Muslim majority, they choose to have the government to intervene to regulate it. Some even argued that it would be more exalting if a group of people of other faith do not impose their will to establish a place of worship in a Muslim community. Wahdah Islamiyah, activist in Bima, concluded that discourses on human rights tended to be misunderstood as unlimited freedom, thus forgetting politeness to teachers and parents. Under the pretext of human rights, people abused one another with words, slandered others, and spread hatred through hate speech.

One of the issues of individual freedom and human rights in their spotlight was the LGBT phenomenon, that is judged to be contrary to Islamic values. In Bogor, almost all Muslim youth who opposed Islamist individual freedom and human rights also opposed LGBT legalisation. Interestingly, as far as LGBT is concerned, most of them seemed to deny LGBT as part of individual freedom. According to Alma Fidya (21), board of the Student Activity Unit STHG Tasikmalaya, LGBT may be regarded as expression of personal freedom, but there exist norms. The views of Muslim youth of da'wahists on LGBT were derived from the responses by their senior activists. One of them was Acep Guntur Alam (35), lecturer (over 6 years' experience) at Institute of Technology Foundation (Islam) Bojong International Tasikmalaya, who was also a post-graduate student of Program of Education of Al-Qur'an University (PTIQ) Jakarta, and served as chairperson of PUI Youth and Secretary of the Sharia Council of Kodrat Manusia. To Alam, human beings are homo sapiens or intelligent and wise persons; if they deviate, it means they were unhealthy. LGBT itself, according to Alam, was a psychiatric illness that had to be cured. Furthermore, Alam believed that many women wore miniskirts freely in public, and this habit was even demanded in certain jobs everywhere. In the context of Tasikmalaya, the phenomenon is considered to have shifted the primordial customs of the Sundanese tribe. To him, individual freedom ought to be first and foremost interpreted as liberation from sin or from the torment of hell. To give a context, Alam cited Surah al-Tahrim (6), "*Take care of yourself and your family from the fires of hell.*"

The views of Muslim youth activists of Manado need to be highlighted here. The reason is that some of them showed a skeptical attitude towards individual freedom and human rights. This was evidenced by the suspicion that individual freedom and human rights carried with them a Western interest to undermine the behaviour of Indonesian Muslims. Apparently, such negative attitudes were likely to be caused by their empirical experience religious life as a minority in the middle of Manado, which is predominantly Christian inhabited. Some of them claimed to have been treated with intolerant acts. For example, Yusran, an activist of Youth Islamic Association (IPRA) Manado, informed that when some Muslims in Manado wanted to hold an open event in the public sphere, they often got inhibited;

permits were hard and complicated to obtain. IPRA also often received reports of limited or restricted activities of Rohis, such as lack of support facilities, and Islamic studies were organized by combining students from several classes only, so not maximally. On the contrary, when Christians were to hold events, permissions could be obtained easily. There were cases when Muslim groups wanted to voice their rights and freedom, they would often be labelled radicals, such as when they voiced anti-Ahok campaigns. In addition, groups of close Christian organisations such as the Manguni Brigade, which sometimes resembled FPI in their actions, were not categorised as radical groups.

Belonging to the *third* category is the view that rejects individual freedom and human rights as they are believed to be sourced from the West as part of their conspiracy to destroy Islam in Indonesia. Such a view was reflected in the opinion of Intan Andriani, IMM activist of Bulukumba. Alfian, activist of Islamic Youth Da'wah Forum and Andi Irwan a young Salafi activist, both from Bulukumba, felt the same way. They both expressed strong rejection of individual freedom and human rights. For them, these two things were not of God's laws, and those who believed otherwise would belong as non-believers. However, both Alfian and Irwan rejected violence through raids. Their attitude was shared by activists from IMAMTA and LDMPM of UMS Surakarta, who showed disagreement with the concept of human rights. To the IMAMTA activist, human rights discourse was a mere political game since, in practice, there were issues of injustice that often cornered Muslims. Meanwhile, the UMS LDMPM activist showed caution as she highlighted the phenomenon of violent attacks by Islamic groups against other groups. To this female activist, such acts needed to be reviewed first; they could not be directly assessed as violation of human rights owing to the complexities of social issues.

Andika Permadi Putra, HTI Bandung activist, viewed human rights as a derivative of the ideology of capitalism. He said Islam did not recognise the term "human rights" as it only recognised the concept of "rights" only. Andika saw two values in human rights: pluralism and liberalism. These values underpinned the facts he often witnessed whereby people who insulted the Prophet went by unsentenced, whereas in Islam such an insult was deemed worthy of death. Beyond that, the Indonesian elite also often

exhibited uncivilised behaviour, such as in throwing a chair or hitting the table in the middle of a trial. Indonesia, moreover, did not limit the domain of freedom of ownership. A filthy rich person could own an island while many people still lived in abject poverty.

The above phenomenon was contrary to Islam, which divides ownership rights into three parts: individual ownership, state ownership, and common ownership. Ownership of natural resources should not be left to individuals because they were the properties of the community whose management was entrusted to the state whose proceeds ought to be fully returned to the community. Individuals could only own what was attached to them, such as clothing, vehicles, houses, and land. Moreover, Andika said Islam did not encourage its adherents to live in poverty; many of the prophet's friends were wealthy people.

C. CSOs Act and HTI Dissolution

To date, only one organisation, HTI, has been disbanded as a result of Perppu No. 2 of 2017, which has been ratified into Law Number 16 Year 2017 on Community Organisations (CSOs) by DPR RI. The mass media have played their part in national polemics over the pros and cons of HTI dissolution almost throughout the year 2017. They invited many experts to comment on the issue on-screen according to their respective discipline. The pros and cons of HTI dissolution itself also occurred among young Indonesian Muslims.

Chairperson of Rohis SMAN 1, chairperson of KNPI, and activists of KAMMI Surakarta opposed the CSOs Act. Chairperson of Rohis SMAN 1 Surakarta assessed that the government had acted wrongfully against Muslims while the chairperson of KNPI Surakarta called the CSOs Act as a tool to dwarf and attack Muslims. In fact, KAMMI activists Surakarta strongly accused the government of being arrogant because it had tried to oppress Muslims by issuing the Ordinance Act. In Tasikmalaya, an activist of the Vice Branch Council (DPK) of Vina Bina Lestari of Islamic Unity (PUI) argued that the constitution of CSOs was only a tool for the government to dwarf the Muslims; the chairperson of KNPI Surakarta shared the same view. This activist from Tasikmalaya even equated the HTI dissolution with

the government's allegiance to communism, which he described as anti-religious.

Most responses towards the CSOs constitution by Muslim youth in Yogyakarta were also negative. IMM activists said of it as a tool to curtail freedom of association; HTI activists viewed the CSOs law a government attempt to dwarf Muslims because they considered Indonesia to be in a precarious position, which was not the case. Ikhwanul Muslimin activists also agreed with the statement that the law of CSOs was such a tool against Muslims; the Persis activist felt it was inadequate for Muslims, because it actually divided and weakened Muslims, who were distinct despite professing a same belief.

Some youth took a pro position on the CSOs Act. In Surakarta and Yogyakarta, Muslim youth with NU background, who were active in IPPNU and PMII, agreed that the dissolution of HTI was reasonable. To PMII Surakarta activists, HTI deserved to be disbanded because of frequent violations, such as provocations that might even cause horizontal conflicts. Meanwhile, according to activists of PMII Yogyakarta, the law was the bastion of Indonesia so as not to collapse, so that the existing organisations would not conflict with the principles of the unity of NKRI. In Tasikmalaya an activist with the Minister of Arts and Culture of Islamic High School Nahdlatul Ulama (STAINU) did not see the Ordinance Act as a government tool to attack or dwarf Muslims in Indonesia. In other words, young Muslims who are under the auspices of NU stay under the same rhythm: they agree with the publication of the CSOs Act.

In Bulukumba, HMI activists positioned themselves in the middle of the road between the pros and cons. They suspected, however, on what was behind the publication of CSOs Law: if it was used as a tool by the government to intervene Islamic groups, it might invite new problems.

D. Gender Equality and Gender Justice

Historically, people often regard women as second class under men in the social structure. Some remarks say that in the Arabic age of ignorance, female babies born were considered a disgrace, its presence undesirable so that their lives were quickly deprived. To a certain extent, the patrimonial

system still preserves the construction such a logic: to regard women as a second class under men in the social structure. As a result, the roles of women in the public sphere are relatively quiet and limited.

Feminist figures have since the 1960s voiced the injustices affecting women, at least in the academic studies of academics. One of them who recently attracted attention was a priest and preacher Amina Wadud, who sparked controversies on her Friday sermon in New York back in 2005.

In the context of post-*reformasi* Indonesia, the roles of women have been relatively more visible than before. Not only have they been given the right to speak; they have also occupied strategic governmental positions. Megawati Soekarnoputri became the first woman to hold the highest authority of this republic, as president. However, as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world that was ever chaired by a female president, Indonesia has not necessarily erased the notion that women are second class under men. As proof, this research reveals that gender equality is still understood in several different points of view: pro, cons, and middle of the road.

Indonesian Muslim youth activists belonging to the Islamist circles still view that women are not entitled to lead. They rely on the Qur'an, at least Surah Al-Māidah (34): males as female leaders. In general, this group agrees that female leadership violates nature. In Lampung, this view was expressed by HTI, KM and KAMMI activists. In Surakarta, FPI activists who attended to Salafi presented various sources from the Qur'an and Hadith in straightforward and zealous ways to show that women were unfit and should not be leaders. Interestingly, many Surakarta high school students, both men and women, also objected to the leadership of women, arguing that female leaders were fond of selling state assets to foreigners. They referred to a traumatic impression from the period of female leadership in the country.

Indonesian Muslim youth from nationalist and moderate Islamic organisations such as GMNI, PP, PMII, and HMI have argued that feminism should be campaigned as a form of equal rights and social justice. A female respondent from Lampung who tended to be nationalist even expected gender-equality goals that women could play an active role in the public

sphere, have equal opportunities with men, and that their social-justice subordination to men must be reduced so that the emancipation that was being fought could yield good results.

The possibility of women being able to participate in the public sphere was also conveyed by a student of Madrasah Aliyah Negeri Surakarta. While he did not dispute Surat al-Maidah 34 (“Men as female leaders”) in his understanding, men as leaders for women apply only in the domestic and not public sphere. “Leadership is not about gender but about trust and the capability to protect the people.”

A more compromising attitude was voiced by OSIS activists in Lampung although their view still suggested some anxiety that a gender equality campaign could lead to liberalism (free sex, alcohol, and drug abuse). On the other hand, they said that in certain situations there was no problem with female leadership. “Ideally, the leader should be a man because this has been ordained in the Qur’an, but in certain cases, for instance when female candidates are much superior than male candidates, it should make more sense to chose the women,” he said.

The views from Bima were no less interesting. Although in general the Muslim youth’s views on gender issues there were similar to those in Lampung and Surakarta, there were more pros and cons in the former than the latter region. However, overall, the Muslim youth in Bima shared common views on the normative level, such as that women had high values and dignity in Islam; Islamic teachings on the position of women became distinct from the ignorance prior to the arrival of Islam there. Islam advocates women to close their *aurah*, such as by wearing a headscarf, and this is not interpreted as an attempt to curb women, but rather as a way to show that women are judged to have dignity in public. Mufida, a veiled student, revealed the worldview of the community regarding the veil and the value of women. She witnessed the difference in the society’s treatment of her grandmother: when the grandmother wore a long headscarf people reacted more respectfully and politely to her.

The Muslim youth in Bima also agreed that violence and harassment against women will contradicted any religious teachings and principles. The Islamists thus tended to see that the women themselves as the source

of cases of violence and abuse against women; thus, they had to protect themselves. As for moderate nationalists and Islamists, they did not blame women, because that would mean blaming the victim. To the nationalists, what had be done was, indeed, a long struggle: change the patriarchal culture that had penetrated the social system.

Chapter 6

Pancasila as Ideology and Democracy

The strengthening of conservatism in the form of communalism and scripturalism in the view and experience of pluralism, tolerance, and human rights among Muslim youth, as discussed above, seems to apply generally in their attitude to Pancasila and democracy. Essentially, there is an equal understanding of Muslim youth in understanding and addressing the whole theme. This means that the support of most of them against Pancasila and democracy is also sustained by the belief that among Pancasila, democracy and Islam there is conformity and compatibility without any significant contradiction. The majority of Muslim youth hold that Pancasila conforms to Islamic values; they even claim it Islamic. But beyond that view, there are still quite a number of young Muslims who have more autonomous notions such as that Pancasila being the only ideology and foundation of the state to be sustained by all citizens; some also have a more 'nationalistic' argument that Pancasila can unite the whole citizens of this nation as well as be the source of inspiration for unity and diversity. Without needing to dichotomize the two models of 'Islamic' and 'civic' arguments above, the study concludes that the two models of the argument provide a solid basis for the adherence and loyalty of Muslim youth toward Pancasila. Politically and philosophically, such attitudes are as sturdy as they are crucial means to support the creation of national and state life that is more solid and

authoritative, to actualise the plural and unite society.

In the context of the explosive phenomenon of radicalism and extremism in the public sphere, the findings of this study signify that the ideology of violence is ignored by the millennial Muslim youth. There may be a handful of young people, exposed to radicalism and extremism, tempted to follow the heresy, but the findings of this study provide a solid basis for believing that the future young Indonesian Muslim generation is a Pancasila and moderate young generation, even if they have been exposed to radicalism and extremism, which will always be there. As explained at the beginning of this essay, radicalism and extremism are explosive in the public sphere and, therefore, have the potential to undermines any group that has no ideological integrity.

In particular, youth with a high level of liability are often faced with dilemmas and identity-seeking problems; in such psychological situations they have a high degree of vulnerability to the possibility of being infiltrated with new ideologies opposed to Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state. Radical activists are accustomed to using religion as a political resource,³⁴ and making claims on those resources, in addition to claims on behalf of representation. They demand recognition and restructuring public life according to religious principles.³⁵ Youth who like new and revolutionary things tend to be interested in radical group bid agendas, which usually challenge their guts. But it should be noted that radicalism and extremism may only develop when Pancasila as the ideology of the state is declining. The decline of Pancasila's role and function can lead to a decrease of citizens' trust in the state. In addition, the decline of Pancasila can also reduce the loyalty of citizens to the state. Meanwhile, as a citizen, obedience and loyalty to the philosophy and the basis of the state is a common practice, not least among the educated Muslim youth activists. As young millennial generation, they can serve as locomotives and inspire the strengthening of nationality and Indonesian values.

34 Rhys H. William, "Religion as Political Resource: Ideology or Culture?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (2003-08), President of the Association for the Sociology of Religion (2009-10) and President of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (2011-12). His academic interest includes sociological and religious studies

35 Rogers Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches", <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x/abstract>, p. 6.

The results of this research report aim to provide a description and explanation of the attitude and behaviour of ideological behaviour of Muslim youth, including how the variety of typology of support. This explanation is the result of a series of in-depth interviews on several youth activists with backgrounds of intra and extra-school/campus organisations, as well as on respondent affiliated with socio-religious organisations outside the school/campus. Their views are important because of the reflection of the attitude and behaviour of the educated young elite, the hope of the people. To them, questions are asked to test their ideological behaviour, so that their allegiance to Pancasila can be known.

What needs to be considered here is how religion in this pervasive Islam has a stake in shaping the vision of them about Pancasila and nationalism. How do we see it? For example, if there is a claim that Pancasila conforms to Islamic fundamental values even with monotheism, as its most important principle, how to explain it? As most of them affirm the absence of conflict between the values of Pancasila and Islam, they feel confident about Pancasila and conclude there is no need to apply the Islamic law as a formal law, let alone the *Khilafah Islamiyah*.

A. Pancasila in Various Surveys

Before continuing to see the full portrait of the attitude of Muslim youth against Pancasila, it is necessary to first present the results of our various-stakeholder surveys on Pancasila. In summary, they provide an overview of the public perception of Pancasila, which is optimistic and pessimistic. Among these surveys were the Wahid Foundation survey conducted in October 2017. From the study, it was found that more than 80% of Indonesian citizens supported the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The support is inferred from respondent's comment on the statement: "Pancasila and the Constitution now is the best for our lives as Indonesians."³⁶ Against such questions, the respondents expressed their approval and or support.

Another survey was from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which also found similar results. That the majority (90.5%)

36 Wahid Foundation, "Religious Social Tolerance Trend among Indonesian Muslim Women", Wahid Foundation Research Report, Jakarta: 2017.

of respondents supported the philosophy and the foundation of the Pancasila state, and firmly rejects the replacement of the state base with other ideologies (CSIS, 2017).³⁷

Slightly looking back in 2010, Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta conducted a survey on Pancasila on *takmir* mosque in DKI Jakarta with the aim to see the ideology-political attitude of the mosque board in the capital. The result showed that 89% of *takmir* mosques did not feel problematic with Pancasila. Even most respondents acknowledged that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the best model (Al-Makassary, 2010). Most of respondents (78%) also believed in democracy and believed it to be the best system of governance today (Al-Makassary, 2010).

In the midst of optimism over the ideological attitudes of citizens in general, the following survey results on the contrary gave a somewhat negative picture of citizens' attitudes towards Pancasila. The National Values Survey (SNK) revealed that 24% of Indonesian people did not know the precepts of Pancasila. Some 18% of them did not know the title of Indonesia Raya anthem, while 53% did not know the lyrics of the national song. Furthermore, 55% of Indonesians rarely even ever joined devotion,³⁸ and 42% of them were accustomed to using pirated goods.

The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) Survey also decomposed the sign of weakening Pancasila resilience as a political ideology for the last seven years (2010-2016). From the research, it was found that the National Resilience Index, which included tolerance variables, legal equality, civil rights equality, and national unity tended to experience a constant deterioration, from 2.31 (2010) to 2.06 (2016).

The decreasing number of influence Pancasila in a nation, state, and society has the potential to undermine the ability of the state to control the socio-political life of its citizens.³⁹ "This is stated by many political

37 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "What's with the Milenial? Social, Economic, and Political Orientation: Press Release and Press Conference of NISCFI Survey, Jakarta 2 November 2017.

38 Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), Survey of National Values (SNK), Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2015.

39 Andrew Heywood, *Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 40.

philosophers such as Karl Popper, J.L Talmon and Hannah Arendt, who argue that political ideology serves as a means of controlling human actions. Ideology also serves as a means of social control to ensure citizen loyalty. Other experts, such as J. M. Keynes (1883-1946) British economist, believes similarly. According to him, the world is governed by the power of the mind. To him, economic theorists and political philosophers have a powerful influence in controlling human behaviour. This means human actions are sourced from or inspired by beliefs.⁴⁰ “So, if the ideological system of a country does not function optimally as a controlling social life in a country, it could have a negative impact on its political life, because various possibilities can occur. Among these are citizens who may act beyond the boundaries of law and social norms without basic guidance of philosophy and the state. This condition can be worse if the actions and minds of citizens are more influenced by a political ideology other than the official state ideology.

On the basis of such thinking, this study attempts to analyse the attitudes and ideological behaviour of Muslim millennial youth, to gauge how central Pancasila influences their political minds as citizens. Is there a basic dogma or religious norm in shaping their ideological attitude? To what extent does dogma influence their attitudes? What about the influence of religious-political ideologies such as Islamism on Muslim youth and what impact does it have on them?

It should be highlighted here that the themes of Pancasila, Islam and Democracy are part of a major theme of Muslim Attitudes toward Violence and Extremism. Although limited, the collected data on this theme are sufficient to construct a narrative of Muslim youth about Pancasila. Interviews and FGDs were conducted for over two weeks. Coming from different socio-religious backgrounds and ideological-political orientations, their view certainly provides a different picture. That is, the portrait of recognition and support of these educated Muslim youth towards Pancasila is also diverse and interesting to observe. In short, the support of Muslim youth activists towards Pancasila has some trends, and can be illustrated in several major typologies as described in the following explanation.

40 Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideology* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2016), p. 3.

B. Pancasila as Inspiration of Unity and Diversity

The first typology is that Muslim youth acknowledge and accept Pancasila unanimously as a symbol of the glue of a plural nation. There are two arguments used to support their position. The first is that Pancasila is a symbol of unifier for the nation and state. The second is that Pancasila provides a solid foundation for the growth of diversity and nationality. To several Muslim youth active in civic organisations, the emerging idea was Pancasila being the only unitary and symbol for a multi-cultural social life. As for the function, Pancasila maintained, cared for and integrated Indonesia as a political and cultural entity. Their support seemed unpretentiously genuine in the sense that the support of millennial Muslim youth against Pancasila was sincere, solely owing to the imagined function and role in unifying the nation. To them, Pancasila was the pillar of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, the faces and icons that united Indonesians. Although they did not dismiss that in the basis and philosophy of this country there was the essence of Islamic values, educated Muslim youth who entered this typology accepted and supported Pancasila unanimously, unconditionally. In the circle of those who belonged to this group, the idea of the application of Islamic law as a formal law did not receive a warm welcome. Similarly, the idea of making the Khilafah a system of government had no place at all.

The youth who supported this view mostly came from organisations with a strong nationalist base, such as GMNI, KNPI, Pemuda Pancasila, PMII, some HMI and IMM, and limited in LDK and Rohis circles, and some students and students who were free from the influence of, or were inactive in, radical Islamic organisations. Sekar Andini, student from SMAN 2 Manado, argued that “Pancasila is the ideology of all the Indonesian people and democracy is very appropriately applied in Indonesia.” “I do not agree with the Islamic state because it does not fit the Indonesian context,” she stressed.

What is interesting in this connection, as seen above, is that the nationalist argument used as a basis for support for Pancasila was not merely monopolised by Muslim youth on the social basis of nationalist organisations. There were quite a number of young Islamic activists, coming from a more moderate or even conservative social milieu, who also used the national/diversity argument to support Pancasila. Rifa’i Samu, Chairman

of IPNU Bitung, said that it was not easy to try to replace the ideology of Pancasila with the Khilafah system, since Indonesians come from various socio-political and cultural backgrounds. He had the view that when it was imposed, the implementation of the Khilafah and Islamic Shari'a could cause chaos.

In line with Samu, Muhammad Syahrullah, activist of Rohis SMAN 1 Tasikmalaya, argued that Pancasila was the result of *ijtihad* from the ulama for the benefit of the whole Indonesian nation, and not to benefit certain parties. Pancasila was an ideology for all Indonesian people without exception, with democracy as the right state system. In Syafrullah's thinking, the Islamic state was an ideological notion inconsistent with the Indonesian context.

Still in the same tone, Rafli Tjolleng, vice chairperson of Rohis SMAN 4 Manado, also used the diversity argument to deny the application or application of Shari'a and the enforcement of the Khilafah. According to him, "Pancasila is the ideology of all Indonesian people and democracy is very appropriately applied in Indonesia." To him, Pancasila was final. The Khilafah was not necessary because it did not fit the historical, cultural and political context of Indonesia. As a Rohis activist, Tjolleng rejected the Khilafah as it was deemed irrelevant. In line with Tjolleng, Asep Lutphi, head of BEM of Institute of Islamic Tasikmalaya, also strongly disagreed with the idea of making the Shari'a an official state law. According to him, such an idea was not necessary because the state had sufficiently facilitated the application of the essence of Shari'a values in the life of the nation and the state.

Doubts or rejection of the application of Islamic Shari'a as the official law of the state were also shown by LDK activists from Majalengka, West Java, Encep Somantri. Somantri used the reasons of nationality and diversity to underlie his rejection. According to him, this country championed together by all the children of the nation, so that the formulation of Pancasila together had provided the basis for us to keep Pancasila as a unifying nation together.

Faizi also had the same concern with above respondents. In his view as activist PMII from Yogyakarta, holding on to the principles of diversity and inclusiveness was a necessity in the state. According to him, the rights and interests of religions without exception should be protected in accordance

with the essence of Pancasila, which oversaw equal protection to all citizens without discrimination: “We cannot be separated from the rights and interests of other religions, because Pancasila has functioned as the pillar.” In the same tone with Faizi was Juliana Rahmawati who was also from Yogyakarta; she believed that the precepts in Pancasila contained Islamic values. She also said that, “Pancasila made activists and leaders Muhammadiyah, NU, and other religious groups, so it is not possible for the principles and content to only benefit one party only.” Meanwhile, Hasby Amin Rofiq from Komunitas Benahi Tasikmalaya had a consistent view with several respondents mentioned above: Pancasila was an ideology or nationalism that should not be changed and replaced with any ideology. This further clarifies the attitude that Pancasila is the solution to preserve diversity, as strongly based on the precepts of the “Supreme Godhead.” Thus, from several respondents’ views above, it is clear how young Muslims had a strong awareness that Pancasila was an important instrument that provides a strong base for growth and development of national and diversity values.

The diversity argument was used not only to support Pancasila but also to reject the penetration of other ideologies. Alwi Tuuk, Vice Chairman of Rohis SMAN 1 Manado, rejected any other ideology than Pancasila, again for reasons of diversity. Tuuk stated that, “Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world could be an Islamic state, but seen from our constitution (Pancasila and UUD), it is more appropriate in the present condition because our society is also made of many cultures and religions.” Tjolleng, as mentioned above, used the diversity argument to support Pancasila and reject the adoption of other ideologies and legal systems such as the Shari’a and the Khilafah. According to him, Pancasila was an ideology for all the people of Indonesia and for democracy it had been very appropriately applied in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, Muslim youth activists from Manado who were active in IMM, HMI, KAMMI, SI, IPPNU, and PMII, also agreed not to contrast Pancasila with Islam. Similarly, young activists who were affiliated with nationalist organisations such as KNPI, GMNI, and OSIS, they had a strong view that Indonesia was quite a Pancasila state, but it was not a problem if Islamic values were still used as a basis or guidance for practicing every precept of

Pancasila. Another resource, Ambia, stated the following:

“Indonesia has a pluralistic social system, in which all religions are acknowledged to exist, and their rights are maintained by the state. Therefore, if you want to make Islam the official law of the country, there will be new hatred, because in the struggle for Indonesian independence, non-Muslims also fought for the independence.”

Thus the knowledge that Indonesia is plural has enabled Muslim youth to understand that the consequence, ideology, and state system had to be created and managed. Presumably this is strongly imprinted in the thinking and consciousness of young Muslim activists. It is undeniable that this is an asset to build a solid foundation for the sowing of human rights values, especially to promote the establishment of more pluralistic civil society and respect pluralism.

In addition to their pure support for Pancasila, Muslim youth activists were also critical of the widely circulated cynical contention or discourse in the circles of many Islamic organisations on Pancasila. For example, there was a presumption that Pancasila only benefited non-Muslims. Such prejudices were not very well informed in the circle of respondents. Muhammad Hafidz, head of OSIS in a senior high school Tasikmalaya, denounced such prejudices. A similar attitude was shown by Muhammad Syahrullah, chairperson of Rohis SMAN 1 Tasikmalaya city. A wider view was not infrequently owned by them, among others by Asep Padli, LDK activist at a private university in Tasik. According to him, despite the important role of Islamic figures in the history of the formulation of Pancasila, they did not hesitate to consider the interests of non-Muslims: “Although the people who formulated and designed Pancasila as the state ideology were Indonesian Islamic scholars, its content was strongly considered so as to be fair to followers of other religions.” So, it is also beneficial to non-Muslims. Encep Somantri, a LDK activist from Majalengka Private Higher School, expressed an inclusive view. According to him, the principle of the Supreme Godhead could not be interpreted exclusively as Islamic as it had a universal meaning for non-Muslims as well.

C. Islamic arguments on Pancasila

The second typology from the perspective of attitude and behaviour of Muslim youth against Pancasila is the use of Islamic arguments to support Pancasila. They acknowledge Pancasila as the philosophy and foundation of the state because it regards Pancasila as having strong relevance to Islamic values. From the majority of respondents, there was no negative information about Pancasila. None of them felt any problems with Pancasila, ideologically or politically. It means that the whole essence was not at issue, not only as a legitimate philosophy or legal basis, but also a view of life. Some informants emphasised that their support for Pancasila was final and could not be tampered with. The main reason behind the support and acknowledgment of them towards Pancasila was that because the overall content and essence of Pancasila was Islamic, compatible with the principles of Islamic teachings. They were convinced that between Pancasila and Islam, there was no opposition to one another. Pancasila was believed to be part of the essence of Islam, both as doctrine and identity.

In Pekanbaru, activist of Riau Islamic University (UIR), Andi Sapusa, attributed the first precept, "Belief in the One Supreme," with the concept of *Tawheed* (Make God be the only one) according to the Islamic doctrine; that God is One and only One. Even many of them were convinced that the first precept as a translation of the doctrine of *Tawheed*; therefore, they felt there was no problem with Pancasila. Moreover, in their eyes, the values of Pancasila were representation of Islamic values. The Pancasila affinity factor with Islam excluded various doubts from this group to support Pancasila unanimously as the philosophy and the basis of the state.

In addition to the arguments for the conformity of Pancasila and Islam, another thing which is the basis of support is a historical factor. Many young Muslim activists have a good history of knowledge, and understand the role of Islamic figures, such as; KH. Wahid Hasyim (NU), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and KH. Abdoel Kahar Muzakir (Muhammadiyah), Haji Agus Salim, Raden Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso contribute in formulating the basis and philosophy of the country. They together with other national figures were involved in thinking, discussing and debating Pancasila in BPUPKI sessions ahead of independence. With Soekarno they were approached and trusted

as members of the Pancasila drafting team together with other nationalist figures.⁴¹ In addition to conformity factor content and essence of Pancasila with Islam as the basis of his argument, young Islamic activists also have good knowledge about the history of the formulation of Pancasila, the important role of Islamic figures in the process. On that basis, they claimed Pancasila as an important part of donations and thought of Islamic figures for the state of Indonesia. When we tried to ask whether without the “Belief in the One and Only” Pancasila would still be acceptable, the response varied, ranging from silence, confusion, and unwillingness to answer.

Meanwhile, in Tasikmalaya, the argument about the compatibility of Pancasila and Islam also aroused. It was found that none of the young Muslim activists thought that Pancasila was against Islam. Ahmad Sujaya, General Chairman of Majelis Pimpinan Cabang Pemuda Pancasila, Tasikmalaya argued that the first principle of Pancasila matched with Surah al-Ikhlas. This means that there was a strong foothold of Islamic theology in Pancasila that could be a solid foundation for the loyalty and love of Muslim youth to Pancasila. The question of the removal of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter from the first principle of Pancasila was judged as a proof of tolerance and sacrifice of the Islamic leaders for the nation and state, admitted Agus Misbahuddin, Daily Board of the Madani Tasikmalaya (GMT).

The same pattern was also found in Yogyakarta. Many Muslim youth under the pillar of PMII, Persis, and IPM found a match between Pancasila and Islam. Even young Muslim activists who were affiliated with hardliner Islamic groups and Ikhwan, such as Laskar Jihad and Muslim Brotherhood, did not contradict Pancasila and Islam, either. Therefore, the values contained Pancasila, according to them, were able to accommodate the values and aspirations of religions adopted by the people of Indonesia in general. Once again, the first precept is always a reference to the relevance of Pancasila and Islam. The first precept of Pancasila is judged according to Islam and made by Muslim clerics. The logic is that given the fact that Pancasila was created by national figures whose majority were Muslim, it would be unlikely for them to produce Pancasila principles or policies that would harm Muslims.

41 Yudi Latif, *State of Plenary: Historically, Rationality and Actuality* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2011).

Meanwhile in Aceh where Islamic Shari'a has long been enforced as a positive law of the Aceh Provincial Government, Muslim youth activists recognise Pancasila as the state ideology although they maintain a critical attitude to the socio-political, economic and governance situation that is not working as it should. Many of them are concerned about various complicated issues that affect Indonesia today. Most of them criticize corrupt criminal acts, certain group economic hegemonies, issues of communism, and the controversies over the Substitute Rules of Law (Perppu) on Social Organisations. Related to the relationship between the Islamic Shari'a and Pancasila, it can be stated here that basically the young generation of Acehnese Muslims do not contradict the Islamic shari'a that they have obeyed as a regional regulation with Pancasila as state philosophy in the broader sense. They recognise and believe it as the ideology and foundation of the state, and even pair it with Islam.

In summary, the views of Acehnese youth activists can be divided into two groups, as follows. *Firstly*, Indonesia with its Pancasila, especially the first principle of the One Supreme Godhead, has no contradiction with the teachings of Islam. This means that the ideology of Pancasila reflects the aspirations of Muslims and includes the interests of Muslims and Islamic values in them. *Secondly*, the Islamic Law does not have to be the official law of the state, because Indonesia is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and there is an ideology of Pancasila that represents the essence and application of the Islamic law. *Thirdly*, the ideology of Pancasila has been designed by scholars in such a way as to fit the socio-cultural diversity of the Indonesian nation. Therefore, if anyone wants to make the state of Indonesia as an Islamic state that applies Islamic law in full, it will be difficult due to Indonesia's diversity. *Fourthly*, Pancasila has been designed to fit a diverse country, thus enforcing Islam as the basis of the country will be extremely difficult. Furthermore, Islam must adapt to the environment and not necessarily impose a khilafah so that people outside of Islam are interested in Muslims.

The above four views show the relatively strong nationalism of young Acehnese as well as a reflection of their love for Indonesia through its determination to make Pancasila the basis of the state. In addition, as emphasised above, Pancasila is considered in accordance with Islamic values,

such as the Supreme Godhead which contains the values of *Ketauhidan*, a just and civilised humanity that includes values of ethics, justice for all Indonesian people and so on. Thus, for them, among the precepts in Pancasila contains the universal values of Islam, namely: Selfhood, Justice, Humanity, and others. This is in line with the opinion of the head of the HMI cadre of Banda Aceh, Zulfata, that:

Pancasila is something big that needs to be developed and applied for the people of Indonesia. It is an interpretation of universal Islamic law without contradicting any theological question or any religion. Only those people who do not understand Pancasila think that it takes side with non-Muslims. It is difficult to distinguish the fundamental meaning of Pancasila and the meaning of its supernatural powers. The failure to distinguish them is what makes people suspicious of Pancasila.

One important point to note here is that despite discovering the compatibility of Pancasila with Islam, most young activists tend to *not* think about the need for the application of Islamic Shari'a as the social system of Muslims. Young Muslims of Manado, especially those active in IMM, HMI, KAMMI, Sarekat Islam, IPPNU, and PMII, firmly do not contradict Pancasila with Islam, as well as activists KNPI, GMNI, and OSIS. To them, behind the five principles of Pancasila there lies a foundation of Islamic values. Thus, for them there should be no formal institutionalisation such as the enforcement of the *Khilafah* or Islamic Shari'a.⁴²

D. Re-Islamisation of Pancasila

The third typology of attitude and behaviour of educated Muslim youth toward Pancasila is the ambiguous recognition and acceptance of Pancasila. In this typology, there are two groups. First is the group that recognizes Pancasila as the philosophy and ideology of the state, but has its own ideological agenda in the form of "re-Islamisation of Pancasila" by seeking to restore Pancasila to the spirit of the Jakarta Charter. Young

42 KAMMI Surakarta 100% agree with democracy; BEM, HMI, and IMM Makassar support the dissolution of HTI. HMI, PMII, IPPNU, and Sarekat Islam Garut reject the *khilafah*; LDK Syiddah and Young Muslimin Indonesia Tasikmalaya recognise Pancasila and UUD 45 but also make the Qur'an and Sunnah as its foundation.

Islamic activists who are affiliated with FPI belong to this group. Second: the group that recognizes Pancasila as the philosophy and the basic state but has a dual agenda at the same time, namely the application of shari'a and khilafah. Typical in this category are HTI activists. Therefore, recognition of HTI activists that they acknowledge and support Pancasila as a philosophy and the basis of the state must be viewed critically as a political statement.

An FPI activist in Pekanbaru, Khalid Tobing, asserted that FPI never feels any problem with Pancasila or with NKRI. FPI is also aware that the first principle of Pancasila is a contribution as well as a form of concern for Muslim in Indonesia, as a sign of distinguishing between Indonesia with communist and atheist countries. FPI wants to emphasise the importance of Indonesia based on religion and belief in God Almighty. Since its establishment in 1998, FPI has expressed their desire and motive to restore Pancasila to its original spirit and spirit, the Jakarta Charter. For them, the removal of seven words from the first precept of Pancasila "with the obligation to observe the Islamic Shari'a for its adherents," is a historical accident. Therefore, it needs to be straightened out by fighting for the return of the Shari'a on the first principle of Pancasila as a form of Muslim concern. Nevertheless, most young FPI activists have no agenda of replacing the ideology of Pancasila with other ideologies, but it is true that they want to give him a thicker Islamic weight.

Included in this category are several activists of the Islamic movement organisation in Bogor. They support and acknowledge Pancasila as the philosophy and foundation of the state, and do not want the khilafah, but they hope that the Sharia of Islam is upheld in everyday life. In Bogor; several organisations fall into this category. Firstly, it is the group of Islamic movements Tarbiyah allegedly affiliated with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The figure is Abdul Rasyid, Chairman of IMM Branch Bogor. Secondly, it is the Islamic movement Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar that win ahl al-sunnah wal-jama'ah (Sunni Islam), but not Muhammadiyah or NU. Most of its characters are alumni of higher education in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Included in this group are activists from Yayasan Masjid al-Hisbah Wahabi-Salafi in Tamansari, among whom is Rendra Sukma Wirawan. Thirdly it is the Islamic movement alumni of action 212 with the main agenda of the development of da'wah and the strengthening of Islamic economics.

Unlike the above movement, most of the young HTI activists are the most consistently 'against' Pancasila. Despite claiming to be Pancasila-ist, the main goal of HTI activists is the establishment of Islamic caliphate and shari'a. This is clearly contradictory! But their motive of offering the khilafah is as a solution to the decline of socio-political and economic conditions of the Ummah, exactly what happens in most Muslim countries. According to young HTI activists, the decline of the ummah occurred mainly due to the absence of Islamic law. For HTI activists who reject allegations of anti-Pancasila, the khilafah is not actually the culmination of their ideals. Their main dream is the establishment of God's law on earth, through the strategy of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. And for them, this dream may be realised at the governmental structure level down to social and individual life, from the centre of government to the grassroots.

In addition to HTI activists, in Bima there are also LDK activists who claim to accept Pancasila but at the same time dream up the establishment of Islamic khilafah and shari'a, albeit with somewhat different thinking from HTI activists in general. The form of khilafah that they hopes for is a form of Islamic political leadership with a clear command structure to strengthen the ummah so as not to be easily torn apart. This is not a khilafah version of HTI, nor any other version of the caliphate that uses violence, either verbally-psychologically (disbelief or physical-psychological terrorism as an instrument of struggle).

In Garut, an activist of Muhammadiyah Student Association (IPM) confessed that his level of trust to Pancasila was lower (40%) than his expectation for the enforcement of the caliphate (60%). A relatively similar establishment was found in Tasikmalaya. An activist of Creative Youth Society (PPK) expressed his organisation's support for Pancasila and believed that Pancasila was compatible with Islamic values and nationality. In addition, he argued that the government's social-political policy was also viewed as not all harmful to Muslims. However, for him the Shari'a of Islam was better and the most appropriate to the instincts of Muslims.

From Makassar, it was found an ambivalent view that the enforcement of Islamic Sharia (khilafah) is not contradictory to Pancasila, but a government based on Khilafah is difficult to implement in a plural society. There was

a young activist who argued that the demand of khilafah was justified in the domain of organisational leadership, but should not undermine the state ideology, because as a state ideology, Pancasila was final. How can the enforcement of Islamic Sharia in the framework of Khilafah Islamiyah not contradict the Pancasila that adopted the principle of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Unity in Diversity? How is it possible that the justification of khilafah in the realm of organisational leadership does not interfere with the ideology of the State? This ambivalence is thought to be due to their lack of knowledge and understanding of Pancasila, as well as the low insight of their nationality as Indonesian citizens. Those who are included in this typology are those who refuse to unanimously recognise Pancasila as the state ideology. Rejection of Pancasila was found in Bulukumba, Lamongan, Tasikmalaya, Lampung, Bogor, and elsewhere. Bulukumba itself provides a rich reference for Pancasila lessons, including in pesantren. But, despite the announcement of the Muslim youth of Bulukumba, who supported Pancasila and understood it as a middle ground, there were activists of FPMI (Forum Pemuda Dakwah Islam) who rejected all human laws except God's law, including Pancasila. Nevertheless, this activist rejected the violence commonly caused by raids.

In Lamongan, which often holds sectarian conflicts, young people of Pondok Pesantren Al-Islam in Tenggulun refused to recognise Pancasila as the basis and purpose of life of nation and state. Usman Raya, Santri PP Al-Islam Tenggulun Lamongan stated that Pancasila was nothing more than human-made. In Pacitan were also born a group of Muslim youth who tended to seek and follow groups that showcased and exhibited the enforcement of religious teachings in the public sphere.

They engaged in religious acts that followed radical or extremist groups in the name of jihad fi sabilillah. In Bandar Lampung, several young activists craved for the Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) led by a khalifah named Abdul Qodir Hasan Baraja. KM implements a strict and disciplined recruitment system. Acceptance of each new member shall be made with allegiance to the Caliph at the lowest level or *kemas'ulan*. By way of meditating, they are obliged to follow the rules that apply in KM and deny the laws of *toghut* products. In Bogor, there was a young generation with a pattern of

thought and Islam that wanted an Islamic state (daulah Islamiyah) based on syariat Islam in all aspects of life. This utopian (extremist/radical) style was embraced by the youth of Islam who were once HTI activists and still loyal to HTI thinking, among whom was Waddah Arrahmani from FKIM (Forum for Student Islamic Studies).

In the view of GMNI Surakarta activists, Pancasila is now under threat, along with the emergence of many groups of people who try to undermine society by offering an ideology other than Pancasila. The ideological offer, which according to some groups is an alternative, by GMNI activists was regarded as a rupture against the state. To GMNI activists, the Islamic Shari'a campaign was a destructive action against Pancasila as a final and open teaching for anyone who wanted to fill the values of Pancasila in a state. Pancasila was not contrary to Islam for the process of formulating Pancasila itself involved many Islamic activists.

From the above explanation, young educated Muslim activists are split into four groups or typologies, especially in terms of how they deal with Pancasila as the philosophy and foundation of the state. Despite the split as described above, in general it can be concluded that their belief in Pancasila, as the philosophy and the basic state, is quite solid.

E. Muslim Youth and Democracy

The attitude of Muslim youth activists to democracy is arguably proportional to their response to democracy. Even in hardliners, for instance in Lamongan, the voice of support for democracy seems clearer and stronger than the one who rejects it, although it is considered a Western product. Included in this sequence are rational young activists who think that everything that is suitable for national interests may be recognized and applied in Indonesia.

However, some exceptions are found. Among the majority of pro-Pancasila activists, some reject democracy as a state system. In Lamongan, for example, some activists claim that Islam does not teach the process of direct leader elections, arguing that the weight of each popular vote is not the same because their qualities are different. Given the quality difference, the knowledge and understanding of socio-political and state issues are not

the same. Because knowledge and level of understanding are not the same, then their voice should also be rated differently; it cannot be generalised. This is certainly different from the principle of democracy, which gives the same political rights to every person based on the principle of human rights.

An HTI activist from Bandung, Nursaid, questioned and criticised the meaning of democracy which was narrowed down to the meaning of 'deliberation'. According to her, the concept of deliberation was clearly derived from the Quran, but it was wrong if democracy was said not to contradict the teachings of Islam because the core of democracy was how to make laws based on human thinking, which in the context of Indonesia means being made by the House. In fact, in Islam the law or legislation was the right or authority of Allah SWT alone. In addition, *musyawarah* in Islam was not the same as that in a democracy. In Islam, when problems were related to the sharia law, there would be no deliberation there, such as the dawn prayers had to be two rak'ahs; in a democracy, even a law on adultery could not be discussed.

Meanwhile a HMI activist in Bandung criticized the mass organisations used by the Government to dissolve HTI. In this case, he said, the government itself was inconsistent in safeguarding democracy, because it made policies only based on the alleged potential of radicalism. To him, a democratic country should be open to all other philosophies and ideologies in the community. Any idea or an ideology had to be let alive, not killed, even if an ideology happened to be chaotic as the state had a law to crack it down.

An interesting view of democracy emerged from Surakarta Muslim activists. A GMNI activist, while assessing that democracy was in accordance with Islamic values, the concept of Indonesian democracy according to him was not in accordance with the primordial socio-culture of Indonesians who put forward deliberation. Indonesian democracy was now trapped in transactional practices. In contrast, KAMMI and KNPI activists support 100% democracy and reject the notion as if democracy is made to destroy Islam, to them, adopting a system of ideology from outside should not matter if it has harmony with the Indonesian context. The democratic system is suitable for archipelagic Indonesia because the Indonesian society is plural-religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and geographically.

The support of Muslim youth activists to democracy has not been without records. Not all civil and political rights of citizens have well received, especially regarding non-Muslim leadership. While santri an-Nahdliyah from NU base in Makassar are willing to accept limited non-Muslim leadership, there are also those who only accept limited non-seasonal leadership as leadership in the regional level, such as to fill the mayor's, bupati's, or vice-president's position. There are also young Muslims who totally refuse non-Muslim leaders. A high school student in Bulukumba, Riska, was "more willing to accept a dishonest Muslim leader than an honest, non-Muslim leader," a typical slogan commonly used by Islamists.

Certain demographic and socio-political contexts usually affect the democratic attitude of young Islamic activists. In Manado, which is predominantly Christian, non-Muslim leadership is acceptable. But there is hope for Muslim leaders to exist, so that Muslims are free from the threat of discrimination, as stated by an IPPNU activist of Bitung City. According to him, "if told to choose a dishonest Muslim leader with an honest non-Muslim, I would choose a dishonest Muslim because he would be more concerned with the people."

With regard to female leaders, there is limited rejection. This refusal came mostly from activists of LDK, KAMMI, and HTI. To them, there are always more qualified male leaders than female leaders; therefore men should take precedence. This view is in line with the view of Ansor board in Garut. Meanwhile, among the nationalists in Lampung, there is a view that fully supports the democratic system but at the same time critically argues that the current implementation of democracy is not always satisfactory. The issuance of the Permas Ormas was an example of how democracy was applied insufficiently. To them, the Perppu showed the government's arbitrary attitude in curbing the freedom of association, which is actually guaranteed by the Constitution. Democratic practices have marked a negative note by some young Muslim activists.

From the description above, it can be concluded that support for Pancasila and democracy is quite strong, as reflected in the obedience and submission of educated young Muslim activists to the nation and state. What stands out from the findings is the strong influence of religion and

belief in shaping ideological insights and attitudes. Most young Muslims accept Pancasila because it corresponds to Islamic values as emphasised above. Even groups of young people who reject Pancasila and democracy are also heavily influenced by religious motives. There is a very close link and connection between personal affairs with political-ideological matters.

This phenomenon reflects an “imbricative” relationship--to borrowing the term from Brubaker, between nationalism and religion. To Brubaker, the concept does seem to contradict secularly-biased nationalist studies. To him, these studies obscured the interesting affinity and connectivity between religion and nationalism. Whereas as a distinctive political form, nationalism demands a harmony between ‘the nation’ and the state, in the sense that the nation or the people should be fully protected by the state; religion should be seen “not as something outside of nationalism, which helps explain it, but is connected deeply, as an integral part of it, not as an explanation of it.”

Thus, this phenomenon can also be a reflection of religious nationalism on the basis of communal and social norms, which is certainly different from the more secular-liberal nationalism of citizenship. Therefore, these findings are not surprising, and this only reflects the “imbricative” relationship between religion and state. In the context of Indonesia, the perception of ideology and nationalism, in which doctrines appear to play an important role in determining the perception and support of young people, is reasonable given the central role of religion in politics in Indonesia.

Adopting or supporting a nationalist ideology with such a religious argument is by no means independent of the issue. In the third typology, where support for Pancasila is given with the motive and agenda to engage in Pancasila in a more *kaffah* manner, it has potential for conflict and intolerance. Similarly, the action of rejection of Pancasila should also be explored the root causes and how to overcome them. Perhaps, through the seeding of Pancasila values with a more persuasive approach to the problems, the anti-Pancasila attitude of the millennially Islamic youth can be overcome.

Chapter 7

Muslim Youth and the Challenge of Radicalism

The explanation in the previous section illustrates to us that the identity of Muslim youth in Indonesia, at least as the subject of this study, undergoes a hybrid of identity in which one's self-identity is still in the process of becoming and unfinished. Therefore, the process of searching for self-identity is always in the tension among "consistency," "immanence," and "permanence." The hybridisation of identity as described in the previous section is found in at least a family religious background that is generally not inherited linearly by Muslim youth. Thereby, with educational institutions, the organisations involved and religious understanding both obtained in formal institutions, the internet and social media, do show cross cultural, social, and political-economic identity values that affect each other.

The "urban" character of most of Muslim youth interviewed and engaged in the FGDs of this study makes another significant contribution to the possibility of their hybridisation identity. Their migration from rural to urban areas (provincial and district capitals), both for education and work, enables them to encounter more colourful identities and values than when they were in the village, more specifically so to those who want to go to higher education. Moving places at once, from village to town, makes them feel want to know strongly about new things that have not been obtained either when in the village or when in school. This connection and

encounter with wider and more complex world leads them to experience a hybridisation of identity that is currently in the process. These patterns are commonly found in almost all areas of the study with their own uniqueness.

Hence, hybridisation of identity in many ways poses a positive tendency in the sense of openness of thought to accept new values without abandoning the old social-religious. Thus, this pattern has a moderate and tolerant tendency in attitudes and behaviour at once, especially in terms of religiosity as described in the previous section. Such findings are still very dominant in almost all places where moderates among Muslim youth are still mainstream. On the other hand, identity hybridisation has its own flaws, especially inherent defects, which are “vulnerable” to the temptations of radicalism and extremism because they have unique characteristics: “unsteadiness” or, in a more popular language use now often called as “confusion.”

The confusion often stimulates Muslim youth to seek religious footsteps that are considered more solid. This more robust pattern usually makes a small portion of Muslim youth undergo a complex hybridisation of identity in another form, namely the process of “radicalisation” by linking themselves in cultural and religious relations with each other cohesively, even if they are not from a background of a strong Islam. It is precisely in such links that they find the “meaning” of their identity as “true Muslims.”

A. *The Factor of Youth Radicalism*

At least a small part of the field data of this study showing the complex hybridisation of identity pattern as mentioned above seems to agree with Quintan Wiktorowicz’s findings when observing radical groups in the West. According to him, activist or Muslim youth can experience a cognitive opening because of anxiety about their crisis identity. This cognitive opening is a critical moment experienced by them to accept a religious understanding that is considered steadier than the previous understanding. In general, these cognitive openings are initiated by the confusion so that they seem to experience uncertainty about their identity and, therefore, they are relatively easy to accept new ideas and understandings⁴³ that are

43 Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*, (Toronto and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005), p.85

perceived as clearer, surer, and have a stronger foothold. But it should be underlined that cognitive opening is not always linear with the radicalisation process, as it happens on the contrary, experiencing a “moderating process”, depending on the context that accompanies it. Findings in the Bulukumba region and other place, for example, exhibit such strong symptoms as will be seen later in this sub section.

Therefore, in some places of this research area, although not always and all, young Muslims whose religious family backgrounds are not very strong, at some point are dynamic, open with new religious views and understanding, but then leave their old views and understanding. This cognitive opening process seems never complete as it often shifts from one religious or organisation to another. One of the Muslim youth in Bandar Lampung, for instance, admitted that his family came from less Islamic background and was not religious in either traditionalist or modernist sense. When entering high school, especially during adolescence, he encountered the religious style introduced by *Jamaah Tabligh*. Joining *Jamaah Tabligh* made himself excited to fulfil the rituals commanded by the religion.

But then the understanding of *salafi* put him in a confusion. Dissatisfied with these two understandings, he went through the process of further searching, and when in high school, he was in touch with the religious ideas promoted by HTI. From this experience of encountering various groups and religious teachings, he indirectly made comparison and then felt himself more compatible with HTI. In addition to their firm teachings, with less preoccupation with personal obedience, it also offers a clear social-political of Islam as a political community (*ummah*) that upholds Islamic leadership under the pillar of the Caliphate. Such radicalisation process is relatively dominant found in Lampung with its own peculiarities.

Another given example of this complex radicalisation process is also found elsewhere such as in Solo, Central Java. If it is already described in the previous section, the reiteratation in this section only aims to strengthen it. A Muslim youth who become respondent claimed about the vague contribution from his family because he received more religious studies from television. While studying on campus, he was active in KAMMI and IMM. In the next career, he did not choose Muhammadiyah, which was

mostly followed by many students of IMM cadres, but preferred to be actively involved in a pillar organisation in Surakarta, namely LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Solo/Surakarta). Politically, the respondent quite liked PKS but was not actively involved in it. Ustadz Mu'inudinillah and Ustadz Tengku Azhar were among the figures he admired and he also volunteered at Darut Tauhid Pesantren belonging to Aa Gym (Abdullah Gymnastiar) in Bandung.

In Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, a relatively large number of Muslim youth interviewed and involved in FGDs experienced cognitive opening. One of the reasons was driven by intellectual or scientific curiosity that is strong and wide. Therefore, their journey and identity search process experienced a dynamic movement in which the sources of knowledge were not only excavated and obtained from where they engaged in an organisation or educational institution, but at the same time, also from seeking a variety of sources of knowledge from other places. As already noted in the previous section, this constantly moving hybridisation of identity is not only moderate and tolerant, but at the same time contains ambiguity and inconsistency, and is vulnerable to cognitive opening of the elements radicalism and extremism, such as the one exemplified in Bima.

Another interesting point to note is that the cognitive opening of Muslim youth is not necessarily a complex process of radicalisation. In certain contexts, the opposite is true, where in the beginning Muslim youth who have an understanding and links to a radical group are experiencing a moderating process. The field data from Bulukumba provided a fitting example within the context of these findings. A Muslim activist who was involved in the struggle of KPPSI, *Laskar Jundullah*, and PPSI (Islamic Youth Enforcement Youth) to enforce Islamic law in South Sulawesi became out of context after the candidates of Governor and Regent who brought the jargon fell. As candidates for Islamic sharia leaders lost, the jargon did not get adequate response from the community and other local leaders. Therefore, inevitably, activists who had been so active in KPPSI, *Laskar Jundullah* and in PPSI, many actively participated in movements no longer had affiliation with certain religious ideologies or aspirations. They then preferred to move on to the field of community empowerment that was not in direct contact with religious issues, such as AGRA (Alliance of Agrarian

Reform Movement), and so forth.

The example shown above shows that the hybridisation of identity in other forms, for instance, the complex radicalisation process experienced by Muslim youth is more influenced by micro-individual factors. But neither does this mean that the micro factors (social and friendship) are more conventional nor the macro factors have no effect. The case in Bulukumba as mentioned also shows a very dominant micro-social factor. In some other areas, this factor is also relatively dominant where the involvement of a Muslim youth in Islamic movements and activism has been inherited since within their family, social environment such as friendships, communities, and local contexts--starting from Aceh, Medan, Pekanbaru, Lampung, in Sumatra as the most western region of this research area, up to Bulukumba and Bima, in the eastern part also confirm these findings. For example, why a Muslim youth gets involved in an Islamic movement and activism, e.g. FPI or HTI, may not necessarily be due to personal cognitive openness as it may be inherited from family, friendship and the social environment more broadly. In fact, many of them, from the very beginning, formed a sort of enclave, a relatively closed community, to preserve and nurture the network of their families and communities so as not to break out of the Islamic movements and activism they have been involved.⁴⁴

Most elusive from our 18-region field surveys has been in the influence of macro-international factors that induce Muslim youth to engage in radical or extreme tendencies and Islamic movements and activism. From the field data, this pattern was found in two places: Medan and Lamongan. What happened to a Muslim youth in Medan was one example. Akbar was teemed with a burning urge for jihad to kill the Jewish people after hearing and reading stories on the sufferings of the Palestinian from his class, siblings, and the books. Although now he abandoned this view after being a cadre of HMI and KNPI, it illustrates how the macro-political issues affecting Muslims in other parts of the world make a distinctive contribution that shapes the attitudes and behaviour of a small minority of Muslim youth in Indonesia

44 The Khilafatul Muslimin, based in Lampung, has practiced Islamic life under the auspices of a Caliph tight enough in controlling its members to remain consistent in life based on Islamic Shari'a.

over violence and extremism.

Lamongan District, East Java, provides an entirely different example from other places in this research. Several Muslim youth in Lamongan demonstrated a complete example in which micro-individual, micro-social, and macro-international factors contributed to a small percentage of youth engaged in violence and extremism. Some examples that can be mentioned here was the death of a Lamongan youth in Iraq, named Wildan Mukhallad, when joining ISIS. Wildan came from a family background that had hybridisation of identity. He studied at Pondok Al-Islam in Tenggulun, run by the family of Amrozi, who was convicted in the 2002 Bali bombing. In his young age, he chose to end his life in a land full of conflicts on the border of Iraq and Syria. Surely Wildan was not the only young man to commit suicide bombings, as according to the research team that jumped into Lamongan, many Muslim youth of Lamongan had left for Iraq or Afghanistan. In addition, on April 7, 2017, Police of Densus 88 in Lamongan District arrested two youth who were suspected of being terrorists. Against this phenomenon, many surrounding communities did not question it as a behaviour and radical behaviour and extreme. Therefore, the joining and departure of Lamongan youth to jihadis to various places above and their involvement in cases of terrorism, was not only influenced by micro-individual factors but also by micro-social and macro-international factors that complemented each other.

Based on the above explanation regarding the field findings from 18 regions, it can be stated that the three factors (micro-individual, meso-social, and macro-international) contributed respectively in the process of linking Muslim youth with Islamic movements and activism certain. Although relatively minimal macro factors were found in the field of all the areas studied, as it was only found in Medan and Lamongan, it cannot be ignored at all. As long as the micro and meso factors meet, then the macro factor is just waiting for the right moment to come.

B. Islamic Movement and Activism

In addition to Muslim youth having hybridisation of identity that in some cases led them to complex processes of radicalisation, at the same time new Islamic movements and activism emerged whose names are not yet quite

popular among Indonesian Muslims as compared to the movements that have long existed and gained popularity in various parts of the country, such as FPI, FUI or HTI, MMI, et cetera. Beyond these names, many new almost-identical groups have emerged both in local and national scales.

Approximately 8 places in the 18 districts/cities in this study area have seen relatively new Islamic movements and activism. If some of these Islamic movements and activism have been relatively long standing, their names are not so widely known in the local context and their movements are neither vibrant nor massive at the national level. In Sumatra, for example in Aceh, there is ASWAJA Movement that is against the Wahabi, *Shiah* and communism ideology; in Medan: a so-called Indonesian Muslim League (LMI), which is almost like FPI; in Bandar Lampung: Khilafatul Muslimin, Jamaah Muslimin (Hizbullah), Hizbullah Student Communication Forum (FKMH) who aspire for a completely different Islamic Caliphate, different from HTI. Meanwhile on Java Island, in Bandung: Defenders of Ahlus Sunnah (PAS), Alliance of Islamic Movement (API), Anti-Shia National Alliance (ANNAS); in Tasikmalaya: Community Alliance and Tasikmalaya Muslim Activist (ALMUMTAS); in Yogyakarta: Islamic Jihad Forum (FJI); in Lamongan: Movement of Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar (GAMAN). Then in South Sulawesi, specifically in Makassar: Laskar Pembatas Alatas Sesat (LPAS). The presence of relatively new Islamic movements and activism adds to the vibrant and festive movements of the old existing players like FPI, HTI, MMI, GARIS, Thaliban, Hizbullah Brigade, LUIS, FPIS, Wahdah Islamiyah, JAT, and so on.

In addition to the relatively new movements and activism of Islam mentioned above, there are also new Islamic boarding schools and autonomous foundations in many places that have a more recent "Salafi-style", salafi-jihadis⁴⁵ or others. In the region of Sumatra for example,

45 The fundamental difference in Salafism, between salafi jihadi and salafi, departs from their way of understanding reality. The first one, salafi jihadi, emphasises on the analysis of political reality and wants to change it by planning strategies and how to apply the strategy so that *aqidah* is transformed into an offensive jihad. The second one rests on the basic principle of Wahhabism *aqidah* by using the method of avoiding reality and separating it between the dirty reality and the clean reality and away from politics. See Meijer, Roel Meijer, "Introduction," in Roel Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), p 24, Oliver Roy calls this second group "neo fundamentalism." According to him, by the late 1980s, the failure of modern Islamic political ideas to establish an 'Islamic' regime in a country had implications for

Pekanbaru, shows the emergence of foundations and salafi-based school. In general, their institutions are initiated by Middle East alumni, especially Saudi Arabia. To name a few, Pesantren Alfurqan and Pesantren Umar bin Khattab represent proliferation of institutions and salafi pesantren in Pekanbaru.

Shifting to Java island, in Bogor there was Ibn Mas'ud Boarding School focusing on *tahfidz* al-Qur'an program. This school was proxied by the local community and was dissolved by the government for sending many of its employees to join ISIS. Still in the same city, there are also al-Hisbah Foundation and Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal Mosque that characterise *salafi-*iwahabi** patterns. Both received direct assistance from Saudi Arabia in running their organisations. They occasionally bid for other Muslim groups and comment on the "212" movement as a zoo entourage.

In Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, in addition to organisations such as FPI and HTI, there are also relatively new not-mainstream boarding schools. Umar Bin Khattab's board of affiliates close to Al-Mukmin Ngruki, Surakarta, likened them to salafi schools and some similar schools also operate nearby. In addition to the above three places, for example, almost similar foundations and pesantren grow simultaneously and massively in other places--on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, even to Papua.⁴⁶

From the various symptoms described above, among experts and researchers there is no clear and conclusive agreement to provide a conceptual definition of the phenomenon of Islamic movements and activism that increasingly vibrant lately. Relatively many books, research findings, and other references to conceptually describe the phenomenon of "political Islam" or "Islamism" that makes Islam a religion, not only takes care of personal and social issues but also takes care of the matter of state administration. Hence this passage does not want to go deeper into the often-complicated conceptual debate, but to facilitate the reading of

a revolutionary, politically and revolutionary Third World type of Islamist shift toward neo-pure fundamentalism-a movement that calls for a return to pure Islam by means of da'wah, populist, conservative emphasizing individual piety rather than political activities. See Oliver Roy, p. 29-31.

46 Islamic activism in Papua, especially in Jayapura and surrounding areas, is currently dominated by Jamaah Tabligh. While the salafi group is partly personal and there is no official institution while NU and Muhammadiyah have existed long enough there.

fieldwork data; it simply divides it into three categories according to their own characteristics: 1) hardliner), 2) radicalism, and 3) extremism. The divisions into the above three categories are relatively sufficient to see a general portrait both in terms of views, attitudes, and behaviour of young Muslims about violence and extremism.

Certainly, the three categories cannot describe in detail and overall data; still, they relatively represent the various Islamic movements and activism that emerged in all research areas, ranging from Banda Aceh in the westernmost part, to Bima in the easternmost. It should be emphasised that the three categories are not fixed; as the items are highly dynamic and the process of grouping may have been “biased” since oftentimes groups simply cannot really be fully incorporated into one category. Given the dynamics, a group at a certain historical point may fall into the hardliner category, but at other points can metamorphose into radical and even extremist categories, depending on the context that accompanies it. There are even movements and groups that in a historical point become radical, but at other points become “moderate” because the context that accompanies it to be radical is constantly unfavorable. The field data from Bulukumba as described above confirm this latest finding.

Now, let’s start with the first category, the hardliner. This category has the dominant character of being an intolerant, revolutionary, conducting raid/sweeping with violence against all sins and public sickness, but not anti-system/state, and anti to terrorism. The characteristic of this movement or group is to change the social order of the immoral society into a “cleaner” order. But it must be emphasised that this movement has no aspiration to change the state order into an Islamic state or a Caliphate. The most distant aspiration of this group is to return the Jakarta Charter or better known as the Unity the Republic of Indonesia. FPI, just to name just one example, became the most fitting prototype in this category. From 18 regencies/cities that are the loci of this study, almost every place has a movement or group which has this first category with different degrees, except in Manado, North Sulawesi. Islamic movement and activism in Manado is much less deserted than in other areas in this lively study.

The second category is radicalism. The inherent characteristic of this second group is the strong ideal that wants to change the social order

through political control by changing state ideology (secular) into an Islamic state or a Caliphate. But their struggle does not use sweeping, unlike the group in the first category. The group also strongly rejects violent means such as terrorism. HTI becomes the exact copy that represents this category. Just like the first category, almost everywhere in the research sites, the second category exists and spreads their views and ideologies with varying intensities. Even in Manado region, whereby the first category is not obtained, groups in the second category seem to have operated albeit with limited resonance.

The third category is the farthest range from the first and second. This category, i.e. extremism, is understood as a movement or group that has dominant traits as intolerant, revolutionary, championing ideological ideals with sanity, and is certainly against the system or state. This category is not widely encountered in all areas of the study, but only a few. From 18 cities/districts about 7 to 8 areas are detected to have this group. The Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), which supported ISIS or in the days of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), merely mentioned as examples, which often spread terror in several places, seem to fit into this third category. From field data, this third category operates with very limited resonance from public reach in Medan on the island of Sumatra, in almost all areas of research in Java, Makassar (South Sulawesi), and Bima (NTB).

All the three categories are simply represented in the table below.

Table 1
Matrix of Islamic Movement and Activism

Category ➡	intolerant	Revolusioner	Violence	Anti-State	Terroism
⤴					
Harliner	v	v	v		
Radicaism	v	v		v	
Extremish	v	v	v	v	v

Area Mapping: 18 Cities/Districts

The mapping of this region does not reflect the attitude and behaviour of Muslim youth against above three conceptual categories, but rather wants to see the general portrait of the whole region from the vibrant and lively

side of various Islamic movements or activism with a very wide variant: ranging from the softest, moderate-conservative, hard-liner, radical, to the extremist. As described in the introduction, this study was conducted in 18 cities/districts throughout Indonesia. Based on field data, a simple research area can be divided into three categories: 1) the further areas from Islamic movements or activism, 2) the relatively lively and lively territory of Islamic movements and activism, 3) the most vibrant and lively territory of Islamic movements or activism.

Region 1 is occupied by Manado, Pontianak, and Balikpapan. In these three areas, the existence of Islamic movements and activism is relatively quiet. Pontianak and Balikpapan, for example, organisations such as FPI that sometimes conducts sweeping against places of immorality do not get an enthusiastic response from the community, especially from the youth. Therefore, the existence of Islamic movements or activism in these two places is not decisive at all. Manado is the most deserted place of Islamic movements and activism, because the existence of FPI, for example, is rejected by the local community. Yet at the same time, the largely Christian refusal of Islamic movements and activism such as FPI invites “radicals” from the Christian community itself.

While region 2 is the following places: Banda Aceh, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Bulukumba. In these places, Islamic movements and activism are far more vibrant than the first region. Starting from the largest religious organisations in Indonesia such as NU and Muhammadiyah, along with the extra-school youth organisations and campuses such as PII, HMI, IMM, KAMMI, PMII, were actively involved in enlivening the Islamic movement and activism there. Not to be missed, hardliners like FPI and radicalism such as HTI and MMI also spread their ideology and teachings. Not only that, Islamic boarding schools of salafi, especially in Pekanbaru and Yogyakarta also appear in these two places. Likewise, with institutions that work in the field of da’wah such as Wahdah Islamiyah, Lingkar Dakwah Mahasiswa Indonesia, Islamic Youth Dakwah Forum, and others contribute in enlivening Islamic movements and activism in these places.

Region 3 is the most vibrant of Islamic movements and activism. The regions are Medan, Lampung, Bogor, Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Garut,

Surakarta, Lamongan, Makassar, Bima. These places are said to be the most vibrant because Islamic movements and activism are the most complete-compared to other places in the 18 cities/districts of the research area-starting from the tarekat movement to extremist movements such as Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) supporters of ISIS. Therefore, on some occasions, the territories, if not the targets of terror themselves, sometimes became the sources of terror perpetrators. Yet there are other areas not included in this area of research that contributed to the perpetrators involved in extremist movements.

Therefore, the rest of this passage wants to see the response of Muslim youth, mainly their attitudes and behaviour to the three categories of radical and extreme Islamic movements and activism.

How are their views, attitudes and behaviour towards hardliner Islamic movements and activism? How are their view, attitudes and behaviour towards radical Islamic movements and activism? And how are their views, attitudes and behaviour towards extremist Islamic movements and activism? The remainder of this section is to capture the views, attitudes, and behaviour of Muslim youth from various religious, socio-political and economic backgrounds against variants of Islamic movements and activism as have been described and categorized into three above.

C. Responding to Hardline Islamic Activism

In general, the major findings of this study show that moderatism is still mainstream among Indonesian Muslim youth. The findings are linearly and coherently still consistent from the beginning as described in the previous sections, at least to the end of this section.

Besides influenced by identity hybridisation factor as already noted, moderatism is also seen when Indonesian Muslim youth respond to the various themes and issues raised by this research. From themes such as diversity and tolerance, individual freedom and human rights, nationalism and internationalism, to the violence and extremism to be studied in this section, their attitudes and behaviour still exhibit relatively similar general symptoms: moderate.

Thereby, in response to Islamic movements and activism that tend to use violence in problem resolution, in general it is also relatively moderate. Even

activist organisations such as HTI, Liberation GEMA, Khilafatul Muslimin, Jamaah Muslimin (Hizbullah) even those who have the ideals to establish an Islamic leadership as well as Caliphate, almost most disagree with the ways of violence such as raid/sweeping against the place - a place of sinners that appears in society. Even if they have ideals to realise the leadership of Islam or Caliphate, they still believe that da'wah in a peaceful way is the main way to achieve these goals, at least for the context of Indonesia.

Anti-Violence as the Call of Religion and State

Indonesian Muslim Youth at least those involved in this research either through in-depth interviews or FGDs, mainly from Rohis activists, LDKs, Islamic mass organisations focusing on da'wah, and a small portion of the OSIS, do emphasise that anti-immoral behaviour is a normative call of religion. Even if in general they disagree with the use of violence in eradicating disobedience or community disease (prostitution, gambling, liquor/alcoholic, food stalls open during Ramadan, etc.), they assume normatively it is forbidden by Islam. The Islamic Shariah clearly states or instructs its people to prevent all the evils that occur in society with various efforts that can be done even though it is very minimal. Akmal Syah, chairperson of KKD MAN 2 Medan, quoted a “popular” hadith narrated by Abu Sa’id Sa’ad bin Malik Bin Sinan Alkhudry on the command of Islam in preventing munkar: “If you see someone do sin, then stop with your hands; if not able, then prevail with speaking the truth; and if not able then prevent with the heart.” So, we must pray that the sinner will receive guidance, and the latter is the weakest of faiths.”⁴⁷ He continued, according to Islam itself, to prevent that sinner is a necessity. Therefore, when there is disobedience, for example there are people who drink liquor, who like to cause unrest in a village or area, it is fitting to be prevented because Rasulullah SAW so ordered it.

Anti-immoral attitude as a normative call of religion is also strong enough voiced by Muslim youth activists in Lamongan. From the activists of OSIS, Rohis, LDK, LDII, and Muslim Designer Community in Lamongan,

47 This hadith is narrated by Abu Sa’id Sa’ad bin Malik ibn Sinan Al-Khudry. The complete meaning of this hadith is: “Whoever of you sees someone do sin, then he should change it with his hands; if he cannot be able to do so do it with his tongue; if he cannot bear it with his heart and that is the weakest of faith.” (HR Muslim).

they argued that the behaviour and places of sin were regulated in Islam. They affirmed that such behaviour and places are prohibited by the Islamic Shari'a and, therefore, were obviously prohibited. Not stopping there, some of them also expressed his view that immorality was not only prohibited by religion, but also could cause unrest among the surrounding community. Hence every variety of disobedience that appears in society should not be ignored and indeed deserve to be evicted and raided. According to Muhammad Faizal, activist of OSIS SMKN I, Lamongan, and Erina, one of the women student in one of Islamic Boarding School in Lamongan, the attitude toward various disobedience that appeared in the society had to be firm because the shari'a of religion had clearly prohibited. But according to them the assertive attitude should not be arbitrary with vigilante, but ought to be coordinated with the authorities who had the responsibility to discipline it. Such opinion was also stated by Adnan, chairperson of BEM STKIP PGRI, Lamongan: "If it is not in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law and Islamic law does not allow it, then such acts are worth raided but not by means of violence accompanied by destructions."⁴⁸

In South Sulawesi, particularly in Makassar and Bulukumba, most Muslim youth activists interviewed as well as FGD participants, both from student activists and youth activists, almost all have the view that any immoral behaviour is not permitted by the Shari'a. Desy Octaviani, an activist for LDK STIK Panrita Husada, Bulukumba, emphasised the importance of keeping an act that was prohibited by religion. Moreover, she argued, the association of Muslim youth had gone beyond limits, trapped in an individual free association away from the normative values of religion. Among the students, especially the activists of OSIS and Rohis, both in Makassar and Bulukumba, admitted that they found a social reality in their daily lives that contradicted their religious understanding. In their findings, the current symptoms of disobedience were so prevalent in society, whether in the form of prostitution, gambling, drinking liquor, and so forth.

Anti-immorality, in addition to being a normative call of religion, according to some Muslim activists in Indonesia, is also a normative call of the state. As

48 Muslim youth in Lamongan, mainly from students, have almost similar views on this issue.

one activist of OSIS in one of the schools in Bogor; Syarifah Yasmin Alhasyim pointed out, that all disobedience that aroused in society was not only against the principles of Islam but also clearly against the state. According to her, the state also prohibits various acts that gave rise to immorality such as prostitution, alcohol, gambling, and so forth. "Alcohol, gambling, and all other immorality are not only against Islam but also against the state," she asserted in an interview in Bogor. The opinion that anti-immoral attitude is not only a religious call but also a country, is massively seen in Tasikmalaya. In this santri city, the movement is not only concentrated into organisations like FPI, but there are also other similar organisations like the Thaliban, and other organisations under the umbrella of ALMUMTAS. In fact, they regularly conduct a *suhbah* against all the evil that appears in the community to maintain religious values, but also at the same time maintain the values of the region, namely the values of Tasikmalaya city, which is identical as santri city.⁴⁹

Sweeping with and Without Violence: State and Civil Authority

If the anti-immoral attitude is a normative call of religion and state as well as described above, the question is then: is it permissible to prevent such immoral acts with the way of raid/sweeping containing elements of violence in it? It is interesting to explore the response of Muslim youth in Indonesia to this question. Even if most of them did not give their consent to the raid/sweeping with violence, those who agreed not only came from among the activists of FPI and similar organisations. OSIS, Rohis, LDK, BEM, even nationalist OKP such as KNPI and Panca Marga agreed with raids/sweeping against various immoral acts that occurred in society with limited vibration.

In general, there are three trends in responding and behaving towards disobedience or evil that appears in the community. The *first* trend refuses all raids and sweeping. This is most dominant among Muslim youth in Indonesia in almost all places and organisations. *Secondly*, they agree with nonviolent raid/sweeping and destruction. This second response is dominant among OSIS, Rohis, LDK, BEM, and also from moderates and nationalists, some of whom can be incorporated into this category despite a small fraction. *Third*,

49 Islamic movements and activism in Tasikmalaya under the auspices of ALMUMTAS moves in three areas: da'wah, hisbah and jihad.

they fully agree with the raid/sweeping. This third tendency is more visible than Muslim youth activists who are mostly involved in organisations that often perform their sages as seen in the descriptions below.

Very few Muslim youth in Aceh from various organisational and religious backgrounds agree with raids/sweeps against the various evils that appear in society. A persuasive and dialogical approach is their preferred approach rather than violent ones. These attitudes and behaviour are in addition influenced by the situation of Aceh itself in which the Islamic qanun is enforced, also because these activists are the millennial generation born in the era of the 90s. Those who were born in the 1990s have absolutely no common enemies as experienced by the previous generation that was hostile to the central government in Jakarta, especially those involved in GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). Thus, almost all young Muslim activists in Aceh who were interviewed or involved in the FGDs had the character of experience that did not face violence as happened in Aceh in the past. However, some of these activists had a very high level of sensitivity to social issues in Aceh. Rahmadsyah, a young Muslim activist in Banda Aceh, argued that Islam did not recognise the violence of church burning, sweeping, etc. as far as Muslims themselves were not fought or expelled from their own country. According to him:

“Islam is not familiar with violence as it exists in cases that are occurring now such as burning down churches, sweeping, demonstration and other forms. [But it’s] another matter if Muslims get cornered due to their religion or religious interests; in this case Muslims can resist or do self-defense.”

The same support for neither raid nor sweeping has come from most Muslim youth in Indonesia who are active in moderate organisations such as HMI, IMM, PMII and KAMMI. A young activist HMI in Bandung named M. Bambang, a young activist IMM in South Tangerang named Aldina, and a PMII activist in Surakarta, have almost similar opinions. Bambang highlighted the subject of the action that he considered as not reflecting the intelligence of a nation.

According to them, if we were as smart a nation as we self-confessed to be, then we would choose other ways to adapt appropriately, especially

because all of us are fellow brothers and sisters from the same religion, one country, and one state. If the settlement could be achieved in a civilised manner through deliberation, discussion, or meeting, then why act and hit your own brothers/sisters? Aldina thought such an action would be less productive; it would only disrupt stability, economy, security, and so forth. She suggests that Muslims should act in other, more productive forms. Another perspective was given by activist of PMII Surakarta. According to him, the government should be involved in solving such problems because partly it is their duty to maintain peace through the police or security forces. Personally, he acknowledged that when viewed from the aspect of Islam with the mission of *amar ma'ruf and nahi munkar*, the sweeping could be justified, but because it involved public issues and it was part of the task of government apparatus, it should be their responsibility. The community did not need to do the sweeping action, especially without any governmental permission.

Activists of PMII Surakarta highlighted such an action as obligation of the government, particularly the respective local government. However, local governments are often absent in times of communal unrest, regardless whether the upheaval was accidental or intentional, perhaps also because of a shortage of officers on duty or limited access to certain areas. Against such absence a small part of Indonesian Muslim youth decided on civilian raids/sweeps against whatever they consider as immoral acts. Yoga Saputra, student of Ulul Albab Islamic Boarding School, Bandar Lampung, and Andi Setiadi, head of Islamic Student (MPI), Lampung Province, expressed their approval for such action in consideration of the government's absence.

According to Saputra, sweeping is needed to localise disobedience that is increasingly widespread today. He thought the government was ignorant in protecting their people from the trap of immoral acts that spread throughout the country both in urban and in the township. In fact, if traced from the root of the problem, according to Andi Setiadi, sweeping done by FPI was good and could be categorized as jihad *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* between government negligence in eradicating disobedience. Because it should be the obligation of government in overcoming such immorality, gambling, prostitution, and nightspots. In a morning interview in Bandar Lampung, Andi Setiadi said:

“From our point of view, what FPI does is good. It’s good they do it. It should be the government’s duty in the first place, but the government is not seriously there. Indeed, if we assess if this is necessary, I’d say, yes, as long as it is reasonable and not excessive. Because if there is no FPI, it seems that we allowed them to happen. At least once we raid on one or two places, it would be a deterrence to those who want to commit the same activities. So, what FPI has been done is good, but we should make sure the government plays its key role on this.”

Opinion regarding the government’s absence was also expressed by Akbar, a KNPI activist in Medan, North Sumatra. Substantially, he disagreed with sweeping acts especially those using violence, but acknowledged that such actions would be welcome only if done by mass organisations such as FPI and only happened when Ramadhan was coming. The rule of law does not allow sinful activities in those places. Akbar further assessed that the sweeping as FPI was done because law enforcement had not worked. As a result, the role that law enforcers should have played was taken over by Islamic organisations.

Nevertheless, Akbar highlighted that the actions would be wrong if done without first reporting to the authorities and without sending warning letters to the intended party. Especially if the action was done with violence, then obviously this way should be rejected. Akbar saw a more fundamental issue of FPI sweeping, that there is no law enforcement by the authorities. In addition to KNPI activists, young activists LDK UINSU also highlighted the same thing. In fact, he often discussed with FPI friends, and from the results of the discussion, the FPI had reported to the authorities but sometimes did not get a response so that inevitably ended up in raids. He said:

“According to the reports I have found, the result of discussions with FPI friends, they have sent letters and also informed the authorities, but got no responses. That’s where they started moving and going down. ... if in my opinion, the presence of FPI as a movement is because of the loss of the role of law enforcement so that FPI took it over.”

If most Muslim youth reject sweeping, and some agree that the authorities are negligent, full agreement on the action comes from those

who are active in the group. The activists who joined in this group, ranging from Pekanbaru, Riau, in the West to Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, in the eastern part of this research area said that what they do is a good action. Yet there are one or two outside those who also fully agree with the action, even saying that mass organisations such as FPI should be supported with financial support. LDMPM activists in Surakarta, for example, consider that what FPI does in dissolving places that are against the Islamic Shariah is a step that it deems good, as a form of Islamic struggle, and is a jihad activity. Thus, what FPI needs to get support or even assisted and financed.

The heroic side of the FPI exponent in running *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* in full is seen in Pekanbaru, Riau. Even FPI in Pekanbaru has a special strategy in its various actions in order not to get news coverage from the media when carrying out the action. According to Khalid Tobing Barus, Secretary of DPW FPI Riau, one of the main strategies of FPI Pekanbaru is to embrace other mass organisations in mobilizing the demonstration and the time of hisbah so that the media spotlight that is feared could damage the image of FPI if there is a possibility of clashing, can be overcome well. Khalid acknowledged that, because of his reputation in FPI in fighting for *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, he made himself appointed as Chairman of FP-BUMI-LK (Front for the Barisan Islam-Lancang Kuning Front), a new organisation that brought together several Islamic and youth organisations underneath, to mobilise (hisbah) to address some of the national issues that are considered contrary to the Indonesian Muslims. According to Khalid, this institution is "Think Thank" of Islamic organisations in Pekanbaru. In fact, some prominent street/juvenile community in Pekanbaru such as "ASKARTEKING, KURFANOT, and EKSTESI" are called Khalid as "sympathizers" FPI Pekanbaru incorporated in FP-BUMI-LK.

Another heroic side based on religious principles, slightly different from the FPI exponents in Pekanbaru, was found in a young FPI activist in Makassar, South Sulawesi. According to Hanif, what he did with FPI in *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, such as raids and sweeping of immoral places is a method of hisbah that cannot be categorized into jihad. Because according to him, the struggle in Islam that there are three: 1) da'wah, 2) hisbah, and 3) jihad. And what he does with FPI, belonging to the second category, has

passed the first category, calling on goodness or preaching, and not yet in the third category, fighting in the way of Allah. Therefore, he added, the struggle cannot be categorized as jihad, but it can be categorized as a struggle in the way of Allah with a strong intention. According to him:

We on the field are judged jihad may not have reached it yet. There are three methods of Islamic struggle, namely Da'wah with tenderness; Hisbah with firmness; the third with *Jihad*, it must be hard. There are two *jihad*, the life of a noble or a martyr. There is no doctrine to back down, must stay ahead. There is one Muslim hadith narration that "whosoever has no intention in religion means to fight in the way of Allah, his death is death of ignorance, that is my standard."

Joh Hasan, FPI chairperson in Bima, East Nusa Tenggara, said that sweeping action was not just seen from the heroic side, based on reputation and religious principles. According to him, what was done by FPI in Bima, was more motivated by the damage of society which was very bad, especially at local level. The damage was already intolerable because of its high severity: it was totally destroyed by the condition of Bima society today. Therefore, according to him, the action of hisbah in the form of raids and sweeping was still in a very reasonable stage, even including mild when compared with the application of Islamic sharia in Bima in the days of the sultanate of the past. Joh Hasan reminisced the glory of the Islamic sultanate of the past in which the application of the Shari'a was applied so that various disobedience in society could be anticipated. According to Joh Hasan in an interview in Bima:

"Islam and society in Bima is already bad; it has been destroyed. So, we try to dakwah in that way (sweeping). It is still better, [just result in mutual] reminder of *amar makruf nahi munkar*. At the time of Sultan, they had all been hit by the sharia law."

Which is Manado's peculiarity, Christian hardliners are very interesting to observe and their movement is more closely related to these hard-line movements and activisms that are the case of Manado. This region provides another perspective on a hard-line activism that not only comes from some Muslim communities but also comes from the Christian community. As

explained in the previous section, the rejection of Islamic militant movements and activism in Manado is very strong, especially coming from the Christian community. However, according to some young Muslim activists in Manado, there is currently a bias that has emerged among Indonesians, especially in Manado, where the mainstream of the campaign of tolerance, anti-radicalism, and the fight against intolerance has been suggested only for a certain religious group, particularly Islam. According to them, in Manado, the Muslim minority is often the target of intolerance from the Christian majority. This assumption was brought up by many young Muslim activists in Manado during the FGD. According to one FGD participant, in Manado it was the Muslim who often got discriminatory treatment at various levels. According to him, "Here, the intolerant actors, and the radical movement are the majority or Christians; we Muslims are often victimized. For Islamic religious activities, it is very difficult to get permissions from them. The radicals are Christians, and they are backed up by rulers, municipalities and officials, for example when Fahri Hamzah wanted to visit Manado, they did not allow it to happen."

The assumption may have aroused from some cases considered as forms of intolerance against Muslims as a minority group. These cases show similar symptoms among Christian communities, namely the emergence of violent Christian movements and activism that openly appear and carry on their activities, and seem to be protected. On the other hand, anti-movement campaigns or hard-line by Islamic groups are voiced in such a way as to target Islamic mass organisations like the Islamic Defenders Front and the like. The Christian hardliners in question are the Manguni Indonesia Brigades, Laskar Manguni Indonesia, the Warany militia, and several other groups. These violent Christian movements and activism germinate in Manado; they are actively in action when problems arise with issues of Christian-Muslim relations.

However, one of BMI's chairman, William Sigar Paniki, explained that BMI is a public organisation based on Minahasa culture not a political party or religious militia. He argues, community organisations are more eager to maintain and choose local wisdom in which the local indigenous people should be respected by the people migrants from outside Manado. According to him:

“BMI with other organisations such as Laskar Manguni, Warriors Warany and others want to reaffirm the identity of Minahasa tribal customs as residents original Manado-Minahasa. The Minahasa tribe is the host and landlord on Minahasa island while the other tribes are outsiders and guests. We Minahasans are open hosts, accepting whoever comes to visit. Visitors or guests are welcome but must take care of the attitude, courtesy and obey the rules and rules that exist in the house “

Other tribes outside Minahasa refer to foreigners or migrants from outside the archipelago as well as from the islands in the archipelago. However, then the term migrants are pursued on other tribes that come from areas that are traditionally associated with Islam. The configuration of the migrant tribes existing in Manado, in line with the image of Muslim youth who are the subject of this research, among others: Gorontalo, Bugis-Makassarese, Javanese, Ternate-Tidore, Bolaangmongondow, Kotamobagu, and others. While Minahasa is synonymous with Christianity, the relation built up from this narrative is that the host embraces Christian while immigrant groups embrace Islam. The building of this relation is illustrated in two cases that most of the young Muslim activists of Manado called the intolerant act against Muslims, namely the case of the “Texas” Mosque (Al-Khairiyah) in Manado and the Syuhada Mosque in Bitung City, about 60 km from Manado.

D. Radical Groups in Highlights

The attitudes and behaviour of a small part of Muslim youth to hard-line Islamic activism split into three firm opinions: disagreeing, agreeing on terms, and fully agreeing. From Muslim youth who were the subject of this study, namely among the students active at OSIS and Rohis, BEM and LDK, as well as moderate Islamic OKPs such as HMI, IMM, PMII and KAMMI, including even the nationalist OKP, this behaviour toward hard-line Islamic activism falls within the “disagreeing” and “agreeing on terms” range, while those who fully agree on sweeping and raiding actions are mostly those who are active in the groups of *hisbah*. When the next themes are put forward, especially about radical Islamic activism that has the ideals of replacing the Indonesian state plus its Pancasila

with world Islamic leadership or Islamic caliphate, generally the attitude and behaviour of young Muslims in almost all places and organisations, shows a similar response: rejection. Students active at OSIS and Rohis, in LDK and BEM, OKP activists such as HMI, PMII, IMM, KAMMI, KNPI and others, stated such rejection. This excluded Muslim activists interviewed and involved in the FGD, who were members of hisbah groups.

In this research finding, there are at least three organisations with the ideal of upholding the world's khilafah or Islamic leadership. The most popular one is HTI. Its followers, who continued to grow from various professions, at least since publicly announced since 1999/2000s, made the government to dissolve the organisation. In addition to HTI, one of the interesting findings of this research is that there are other earlier pre-Islamic Caliphs that have similar ideal to uphold either the Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) or Jamaah Muslimin (Hizbullah).

However, the last two names did not just preach on the importance of Islamic Caliphate or leadership, but have also practiced Islamic Caliphate since its inception. Khilafatul Muslimin is based in Bandar Lampung while Jamaah Muslimin is based in Bogor. These two Caliphs are not as famous as the HTI because the da'wah field and their struggle are moving on the periphery and have no as strong international network as that of HTI. Yet despite the differences in their basic principles, these three communities have the same ideals: to uphold the world's Islamic leadership or Islamic caliphate.

Khilafatul Muslimin: Komando Jihad

Different from HTI, Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) has had a *khalifah* named Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja. The Caliphate, based in Teluk Betung, Bandar Lampung City, has applied Islamic law to its members. KM was established in 1997 when the Caliph received the teaching from two people in prison to become Caliph. This milestone continues today and is instituted under the name Khilafatul Muslimin. In its development, KM experienced a relatively good improvement; it now has many representatives throughout Indonesia, and even some regions abroad. According to the exponents, their congregation is now reaching tens of thousands and the most membership in Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara.

Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja himself was a former long-time movement in Lampung, the former Komando Jihad. He was one of the few people who revived DI/TII in Lampung together with Pak Ujeng, and several other friends. It is said that in 1977 Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja led a Komando Jihad operation in Palembang to obtain weapons for DI/TII forces by attacking the Police Station. He brought a troop of no fewer than ten men. Although eventually arrested, tried, and imprisoned in Lampung, some time later Hasan Baraja led a rebellion that caused almost all the prisoners to escape. Most of the escaped prisoners could be recaptured but the heroic action was able to raise the reputation of the DI/TII KW 8.2 group.⁵⁰ Sometimes after that, he was arrested and detained for 13 years, allegedly involved in bombing cases in East Java and Borobudur in beginning of 1985. Another important background noted here is Abdul Qodir Hasan Baraja, a close friend of Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir at Pondok Pesantren Modern, Gontor. He is also one of the founders of Pesantren Al Mukmin, Ngruki. In 2000, Abdul Qadir Hasan Baraja also took part in the founding of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) although not active in its membership.⁵¹

The institutional structure of the *Khilafatul Muslimin* that he leads has a standard handle. Under the Caliphate there are several leaders who have duties in accordance with their respective territories. The first is the *Daulah* (the state level) led by an *Amir Daulah*. The selection of Amir Daulah by the Khalifah was done in the second week of Muharram month in the span of three years. The second is the territory (the level of governor) is headed by an Amir territory. The selection of amir territory begins on the 10th of the month of Shawwal in a period of two years. The three *Ummul Qura* (city level) headed by Amir Ummul Qurra are chosen every year once in the first week of Ramadan. Last is *Kemas'ulan* headed by Mas'ul Ummah elected once a year in the second and third weeks of Ramadan. Not only that, according to the fatwa Khalifah, KM also held syatur syim syyilafahan and syyar Islamic world four years once in the second week of Rabiul Awal.

50 International Crisis Group, "Recycling of Indonesian Militants: Daarul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bomb", Asia Report No. 92, 22 February 2015, Singapore/Brussels: International Crisis Group, p. 8-9.

51 Al Chaidar, "Biography Ust. Abdul Qodir Hasan Baraja." *Khilafatul Muslimin* online portal: www.khilafatulMuslimin.com, (Retrieved on 20 November 2017).

According to several KM activists, this standard pattern is the result of Caliph's *ijtihad* while referring to authoritative sources within Islam. KM membership system is also relatively tight where if new members are required to be taught at the Caliph at the level of *kemas'ulan*. After that, they have an obligation to follow the laws applicable in KM, including also denying the laws of the products of the *taghut*, such as Pancasila and the like. Their da'wah promotes non-violent persuasive ways and invites the *ummah* to the right path in a good way and gives exemplary. The membership recruitment system is not much different from other *harakah*, where almost all the containers are used: recitation, friendship, da'wah through social media, publishing magazines, and so on.⁵²

Jamaah Muslimin (Hizbullah): World's Islamic Leadership Progenitor

Jamaah Muslimin claims to be the first Muslim community to have assumed the leadership or Islamic Caliphate following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Jamaah Muslimin was initiated by a Muslim activist in the era of independence: Wali Alfatah (1908-1976). According to some literature, Wali Alfatah was one of Bung Karno's former close friends. Prior to his conversion as Caliph, he also served as Masyumi party secretary. In the view of Wali Alfatah, Imam or leader for Muslims is obligatory. Denying the duty of congregation led by an Imam or Caliph is a great sin. In addition, the existence of an Imam for Muslims will make them as *ummah*, not just a bunch of people who claim to be Muslims but have no leader.

Based on his views, Wali Alfatah invited the clerics and Islamic leaders to unite under one leader who taught as an Imam/Khalifah. Given the importance of leadership, on August 20, 1953 to coincide with 10 Dhu al-Hijjah 1372 Hijriyah in Jakarta, Wali Alfatah was willing to bear the burden of being banned into the Imamul Muslimin (Muslim leader) all over the world. Prior to the settlement, the Muslim Jama'ah travelled the world first to Muslim lands to ascertain whether any Imam or Khalifa had preached before. Since they found that not a single person had been denied, then according to them, the inauguration of Wali Alfatah as the Imam or Caliph of the Muslim world was lawful according to the syariat.¹¹ For the same

52 "Fatwa Khalifah" in *Islam Alkhalifah Magazine*, 49th Edition, Sya'ban 1436 Hijriyah, pp. 4-5.

reason, this made the Jamaah Muslimin refuse to acknowledge Abdul Qadir Hasan Albaraja as Khilafatul Muslimin or the Caliphate, because he was only teaching after Wali Alfatah.

Jamaah Muslimin does not justify fighting for Islamic leadership or caliphate in political ways that Islam is not allowed to. For example, demonstrating, coupling a government, joining a democratic system, or participating in elections, are not justified because they do not come from Islamic teachings. In addition, the Caliphate of the Messenger of Allah according to them is not a political-state leadership like a king or president, but rather a prophethood. According to him, "Islam is not a state but a leadership. Islam came through the Prophet not in his capacity as a king. Islam in Medina was not a state; to the whole Muslim community after the conquest of Mecca the Messenger of Allah did not declare himself as king, for Islam is a prophethood, not a kingdom. Medina was not a state, it was a Muslim society whose community was led by the Prophet himself. This must be distinguished; we must know the vision of Islam; or how and the state system should be in case the country is more about politics." Fighting Islam beyond the path permitted by the teachings of Islam, according to activists Jamaah Muslimin, will contaminate Islamic teachings, so it is certainly not allowed.

According to the congregation, currently Jamaah Muslimin already has representatives in several places in the country, among others in Greater Jakarta, Lampung, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and even some overseas. It is not clear how many worshippers there are today, but they already have embraced students—such as HTI takes shape in the Movement Student (GEMA) of Liberation, called the Hezbollah Student Communication Forum (FKMH).

In addition, a number of boarding schools, especially Alfatah boarding schools in some areas in the country, have become part of the congregation of Jamaah Muslimin. Their teaching is not a mandatory requirement for those wishing to join there; it is voluntary and they have also applied the Shari'a law to all its congregation as Khilafatul Muslimin. Currently, the Imam or Caliph of the Jamaah Muslimin is Drs. Yakshallah Mansyur, MA (as per December 2014), who replaced the late H. Muhyidin Hamidy & Wali Alfatah, their first and second Imam.⁵³

53 Jamaah Muslimin (Hizbullah), *Ikhtisar: The obligation of praying together*, h. 39.

Mixing the Haq with the Bathil (Talbis)

HTI, Khilafatul Muslimin, and Jamaah Muslimin share the same ideals of upholding the Islamic Caliphate or leadership but do have different ways of making it happen. Preceding HTI, Khilafatul Muslimin and Jamaah Muslimin already have a Khalifah/Imam teaching and at the same time practicing an “Islamic” way of life based on Islamic Shari’a for all its congregation. Meanwhile, HTI until now has only preached to people around the world that the right political system according to Islam is the Khilafah of Islam, not democracy, nor Pancasila, nor the like of it. HTI has not had a Khalifah and at the same time has not been practicing Islamic Shari’a to its members as Khilafatul Muslimin and Jamaah Muslimin.

Despite the same ideal in upholding the leadership or Islamic caliphate, the fundamental difference in principles among them is rather obvious. According to a Jamaah Muslimin activist, the ways that are practiced by HTI violate the Islamic principles as they are fighting for Islamic ideals not through the way of Islam. Dakwah with strong political nuances, demonstrations, registering their organisations to state authorities, according to the activist, are unjustified ways in Islam. He added that the introduction of Islam by the Prophet was not through a stately leadership but rather through the leadership of prophethood whereas HTI wants to establish the world’s khilafah political empire in such a different and “un-Islamic” way that, according to a Khilafatul Muslimin activist Tomy Sugiharto, is a talbis way, namely mixing the *haqq* (Islam) with the false (democracy, Pancasila, etc.). Referring to several verses in the Qur’an, he said that those ways were clearly forbidden by Islam. Tomy added that currently HTI status was not clear. They asked for help to the leader of *thagut*, but then instead got dissolved by that same *thagut* government. “That’s why their status is not clear.”⁵³ Further, according to him:

“The concept of power by the Khilafatul Muslimin is different from that by HTI. To legalise the power of the caliph, the Khilafatul Muslimin, is simply by way of private teaching. For HTI, this hadith is just a theory that is vague and can never be put into practice. That’s why they opt for *talbis* (mixed ways). They turned to local governments to ask for help. Whereas the Prophet used to turn to his friends for help as soon as he was

accepted in Madinah, HTI here asked for help from the *thagut*, the anti-Islam government under the leadership of a female leader, Megawati. We call their stance: talbis. HTI proclaimed they wanted the khilafah but the very leader, or the Khalifah, did not exist. Next, they became an opposition, but then they turned to them for help. They got neglected and, finally, dissolved. Now HTI existence is unclear.”

However, HTI activists also have their own defense or postulate related to the da’wah they have been doing. In their view, the first thing to note is that Muslims should be able to distinguish the Islamic teachings of branches and principles, the belief, and the non-Muslims. The registration of HTI organisations to the government authorities, for example, is merely an ordinary instrument that is not a principle in Islam. It’s just a matter of branches, still allowed. But the subject related to secular systems such as democracy and Pancasila cannot be bargained because it has entered the territory of belief. Sovereignty in HTI is God’s sovereignty with its laws; while the sovereignty of democracy and Pancasila is the sovereignty of the people. Moreover, according to an HTI activist, Khilafatul Muslimin and Jamaah Muslimin activists fail to understand Islam in the context of the distinction between the *ushul* (base) and the *furu* (branch). He then gave an assessment of the Khilafatul Muslimin, and indirectly to the Jamaah Muslimin as well, which he considered as a system that distinguishes religious activities (worship) and daily activities. They still separate religion from life.

Furthermore, according to him, the Khilafatul Muslimin is no more than an organisational leadership, not the leadership for all Muslims. The leadership justified in Islam is leadership for all people. So, what the Prophet did, according to him, could not be separated from *aktirohani* in the sense of man’s relation to God nor from that of human activities in the community. If we see the Khilafatul Muslimin, they on the one hand realise the hadith that there is no teaching like *jahiliyyah*. Then, on the other hand, they hasten to appoint a caliph, except that the incongruity is that the existing leadership is not to all Muslims but to the people in their scope alone; that’s why it is similar to organisational leadership. Their teachings cannot justify a state within a state. In contrast, there is only to be one caliph in the middle of

Muslims. More than one caliph cannot be justified. The number of current leadership is not justified for the state. An HTI activist remarked:

“Our differences with them lie in scopes: they believe religion should only regulate worshipping rituals, not other activities such as economic or military issues. Their view of islamisation is as was incepted in Medina. We, on the other hand, like in the Ottoman empire, believe Islam regulate all things, not just ritual issues.”

Muslim Youth's Response

In spite of the different principles and intense dynamics, the three communities share the same ideals: upholding the Islamic Caliphate and leadership. In this context, HTI has the fullest power in realising this Islamic leadership or caliphate compared to the *Khilafatul Muslimin* and *Jamaah Muslimin*. All three have networks in almost all levels of society, including among students, but the movement of HTI has by far the strongest foothold. Supported by a strong international networks centering in London, England, and other Muslim countries, the support to their da'wahs has been massive. Inevitably, this study also found HTI constituents in almost all walks of young Muslims, students and students, including OKP; HTI is very penetrative. Even among the students, they have a wing organisation called GEMA Pembebasan, which is claimed to be followed by sixty thousand students from various levels, at least according to the GEMA Liberation Center Chairman in 2017.

Inevitably, this study found that HTI ideas have been penetrative beyond merely that among highschool students. Chairperson of OSIS SMA LYPI Pekanbaru, a school built on campus of Islamic University of Riau, was an HTI activist. In an interview, he recounted the history of the organisation and claimed to be its cadre. He had often attended HTI studies since junior high school as his parents were organizers of this organisation. In his confession, the OSIS chairperson had been given five years of coaching from HTI in several places in Pekanbaru. Paradoxically, the counseling teacher who guided the students at the LYPI School did not know if any of her students were cadres and sympathizers of HTI organisations. As widely known, HTI itself is a mass organisation that has just been officially dissolved by the state.

Concerning HTI dissolution, he and colleagues in this organisation only responded coldly. To them, HTI is not dissolved, but is only being “rested.”

Although the penetrative HTI ideas among different types of students, in general, Indonesian Muslim youth who were the subject of research were not much interested in supporting HTI ideas, except those who were members of HTI, *Khilafatul Muslimin* and *Jamaah Muslimin*. That is, the resonance of HTI ideas and thoughts is also only limited. Even though some do agree with the idea of the Caliphate, they do not agree with HTI because, according to some young Muslims in this study, the Caliphate would be upright in due time, regardless of whether HTI and other such organisations do something about it. Meanwhile, in general, almost all Muslim youth in Indonesia, both in the OSIS, Rohis, LDK, BEM, and moderate OIC, let alone the nationalist ones, are not at all confident in the thought of establishing the Islamic caliphate or leadership. The young people who fall under this latter category are convinced that it is very difficult to replace Indonesia’s ideology of Pancasila into a khilafah state with Islamic shari’a.

To HTI activists or sympathizers, Pancasila is not as something against the Caliphate. If the Caliphate is upright, in their view, then all the ideals contained in Pancasila will be fulfilled. An activist of HTI in Medan, Fadilah Nurhidayah, said that the khilafah system was not something that could not be enforced. According to her, the system of khilafah - which by many circles was considered difficult to apply in Indonesia - was considered possible to be applied in the country. If Indonesia’s diverse society was the issue, due to existence of not just the Muslim societies but also non-Muslim minorities, then it was not really a problem. She cited on the Medina state. According to her, therein was applied the system of Islamic government when the community consisted of Jews, Majusis and Christians. So, it was no reason enough that the Caliphate could not be put upright. Islam, according to her, was a blessing also for non-Muslims. HTI did not threaten Pancasila. Therefore, with the khilafah Pancasila would be fulfilled and realised. In her assessment, da’wah movement carried out HTI brought goodness to the community.

Besides thinking of changing the system of government with the Khilafah, Fadilah also criticised the prevailing democracy in Indonesia. According to her, democracy was born by capitalism and was a *kufir* or haram system.

It was *kufir* because democracy did not follow the rules of Islam. This very reason made her a non-voter during Pilkada. She confessed, she “chose not to vote” because her choice would be accounted for in the afterlife. Instead, she believed the Khilafah system could save Indonesia. The system was considered the answer to all problems that existed. She was so convinced the khilafah system could save Indonesia because this system came from the sky, not human-made let alone humans who did not believe. According to her:

“Everything is arranged. Allah created the Qur’an complete with its contents on *qisas* prior to the system of sanctions as the proof. Allah ordained us to embrace Islam perfectly. We cannot [in Indonesia] embrace it perfectly because we were not set Islamically.”

The pattern of Islamic placement as a complete system, which not only regulates religious rituals, but also the political system of state, military and all aspects of life, is found in all views of HTI activists everywhere. From Aceh and Medan in the West, to Bulukumba and Bima in the east, the pattern is the same: placing Islam as a perfect state system that is considered capable of overcoming other systems. “Islam as religion covers all aspects of life. It is not a religion as understood by secularists. When talking about Islam, people must speak in a *kafah* or comprehensive way, not partially. We can’t advocate praying and committing usury at the same time. We can’t be pious and corrupted,” according to Andika, HTI activist Bandung.

Outside HTI activists and sympathizers, there is also a small portion of young Muslims who believe that the Caliphate will be established in time under any circumstances. Fought or not, according to the adherents of this thinking, the Caliphate will remain upright, because it is God’s promise, according to them. Zainuri, BEM activist at the University of Lampung, believed in the fatalism that the Caliphate will be upright whether or not it is accepted by Muslims. This kind of thinking was also found in Medan. Rahmat, an activist of the Muslim League of Indonesia, was optimistic that one day (if not today) the Khilafah system would come true. This belief comes from the holy book of the Qur’an, which states that the Khilafah system has been promised by God. Rahmat quoted a verse of the Qur’an which reads, “*Tsumma takuunu khilaaqah ‘alaa minhajin-nubuwwah.*” It means as

follows: as a promise, the system will be realised, with or without the efforts of Muslims to make it happen; but as a manifestation of the realisation of worship, man must still seek to materialise. In addition, there is a reward for those who do and seek to accomplish what is promised by God.

Nevertheless, Rahmat had a very different standpoint from that of HTI activists and sympathizers who regarded democracy as haram. He disagreed if the Muslim completely abandoned and felt hostile to democracy. He alluded to the action of Defense Islam that took place in Jakarta. According to him, such acts had opened minds and given a new paradigm to groups who wanted to fight for Islam. The action made him realise that Islamic groups should not remain silent when it came to existing democratic processes. Thus, despite his disagreement with democracy, Rahmat believed that the democratic system could be used to voice or advocate the defense of Islam. In this consideration, if the Islamic groups were apathetic to democracy by constantly labeling it as a pagan product without any other approach to contest it, then the Islamic group will only lose out. Therefore, he argued, groups of Islamic khilafah defenders should not be too allergic to take advantage of democracy as part of the effort to fight for the system of khilafah in Indonesia. In his view, although many things could not trespass democracy, some could as there were always things to improve. "We believe that 212 Movement has opened our eyes wide open. If we were silent and apathetic those in power would only have the last laugh."

The strongest opinion shared by Indonesian Muslim youth is that they are not convinced by the Caliphate as they consider the Indonesian system of governance with Pancasila as the best among systems. Some young Muslims who adhere to this thinking even consider that HTI deserves to be dissolved since its ideology does threaten Pancasila. Fadli, activist of OSIS MAN 2 Bulukumba, South Sulawesi, believed that HTI clearly and openly defied the Indonesian state and its Pancasila ideology. Disbandment to HTI's dissent against a legitimate government was only reasonable. Fadli was not alone; almost all activists of OSIS and Rohis in Bulukumba, both from high school and MAN, were not uninterested in HTI's aspiration to replace Pancasila with the Islamic caliphate. KNPI activists in Surakarta were much more critical in assessing HTI and other similar dissents. According to one

of the activists, HTI and similar groups that have the ideal to uphold the Islamic caliphate in the middle of the current world situation is a utopian Islamic movement that wants to retreat backwards. Meanwhile, the current world situation continues to move forward with various technological developments.

E. Moderating the Meaning of Jihad

Fighting religious ideals with terror, bomb, suicide bombings and the like is the most dominant feature of this third category, that of extremism. As outlined in the previous section, this third category is the furthest from the first and the second (Islamic hard-line activism and radicalism). This category is understood as an Islamic movement or activism that has dominant features as intolerant, revolutionary, struggling ideological ideals with sanity, and is certainly anti against the system or state. Support for this category is not common in all areas of the study area, but only very minimally with low degrees and in specific contexts. But interestingly, for certain contexts and territories, as we will see later in this sub-section, support for extremism comes from active young Muslims in nationalist youth organisations.

As has been pointed out, when radicalism as one of the categories and indicators of Islamic movements and activism that spans one level under extremism does not get full approval from young Indonesian Muslims categorically, the worst point, that is extremism, is certainly not getting adequate support. The entire Muslim youth of different categories, OSIS, Rohis, LDK, BEM, OKP from the various areas of the study area argued that terrorism was a common enemy. Fakhruddin Alwi, an LDK activist at the University of Indonesia, believed that an act of terrorism was not dakwah, and it was not jihad, either. It was not the real jihad, because the jihad that he really thought was looking for knowledge that was also earnest. "I do not agree with the Bali bombing terrorists. That's not da'wah. I mean that jihad is serious in every way. No need to fight. Learning is jihad. If he has not been serious in his studies, he has not been a jihad," he said in an interview in Jakarta.

Terrorism in its various forms is totally out of place among Muslim youth everywhere. According to them, the terrorist's biggest mistake is claiming their actions as jihad. Jihad is a noble word that must be well understood

and true. Precisely because of the glory of jihad, Muslims should not be arbitrary in acting in the name of jihad. According to them, while people often misunderstand jihad, so their actions that are contrary to Islamic principles such as violence and terrorism, are claimed as jihad. The meaning of jihad itself is so vast, not merely spilling blood on the battlefield, but also, we can do with our daily charity: seeking knowledge, earning a living for the family, not doing corruption, being a leader of trust, and doing good things more seriously. It is also part of jihad. Therefore, the most important thing for Muslims is to study the jihad in the true sense as described in the Qur'an and As-Sunnah and after that we must spread it to the people.

Moreover, jihad in the sense of war is the ultimate meaning of other meanings. However; that does not mean we should be careless in the war on the stage of jihad. According to some of the Muslim youth, jihad on this battlefield must meet several conditions. First, Muslims are in a position of being attacked; or they are unbelievers who are bound by some covenants with Muslims, breaking covenants, then they attack. In such situations, Muslims are permitted-even obligated--to jihad *fi bilillah* (in the way of Allah), provided that the order or approval of the leader or government. This permission or approval from the leader/government becomes a key word, because according to them, friends in the past did not have to do jihad independently. They are always waiting for command, either from the Messenger of Allah as their leader or from other friends who are their leaders.

This permission or approval from the leader/government becomes a key word, because according to them, friends in the past did not have to do jihad independently. They are always waiting for command, both from the Messenger of Allah their leaders as well as from their other friends who are leading them.

In Garut, West Java, almost all young Muslim activists understand jihad in a broader sense. Of all the Muslim youth interviewed and involved in the FGD, whether those who approved sweeping or raiding and boycotting products from non-Muslims, none of them perceive such acts as jihad. All young Muslims, whether pro-sweeping or counter-believing, interpret jihad more broadly than just bombing. Seriously in the endeavor; for example, they also regard it as a form of jihad. There is also a meaning of jihad as a sacrifice,

but also in the context of a wider than just sacrificing lives. They agree that jihad defends religion by taking up arms only in a warring country. Indonesia they regard as a safe country; the act of defense on the pretext of religion to sacrifice lives is no jihad unless Muslims are really attacked and their lives are threatened, which is unlike the struggles of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and other Middle Eastern countries. In these areas, according to a Muslim youth in Garut, the struggle of Muslims was jihad, and it had to be by religious orders. Even according to him, jihad in the context of warfare had to be handed over to those with expertise in that, which is the army, whereas civil society should work as a backup only if the armed forces were overwhelmed. According to Yulpan Paisal, a young Muslim activist in Garut, in an interview:

“In the middle of conditions that all make it difficult for Muslims, to fight against non-Muslims is a must. But we must look at which unbelievers to fight against. There are two types of infidels: the *kafir dzimmi* and *kafir harbi*. The *harbi* infidels are evil. Muslims must not keep quiet. At least, Muslims should be able to survive and defend themselves. But *kafir dzimmi* like those in Indonesia should not get fought against with violence. The truth of Islam must be upheld, but not necessarily with bloodshed. Jihad also does not have to sacrifice lives. Muslims themselves can share roles. Jihad via arms must just be handed over to the armed forces, because it is indeed their duty. Unless civilian labor is needed, yes, it must be ready. Jihad is also not true if based on feelings of resentment. It’s better to forgive even though it hurts.”

Even if there are young Muslims in the study who said that jihad is fighting or killing, its resonance is only limited. Those who think as such in general are activists in Islamic organisations that have a hard and radical tendency. Rahmat, an activist of LMI in Medan, said firmly that jihad was a war (*qital*). The wider understanding of jihad-which can also be found in hadiths-which include, such as study, work, etc. According to him jihad for grace has been exaggerated while at the same time reduced of its real meaning. It was deliberately done groups that were unhappy with Islam by making people allergic to the real meaning. According to Rahmat in an interview in Medan:

In my opinion, jihad is *qital* (war). As for the term jihad being the last method as conveyed in a hadith, I think it is exaggerated to reduce the true meaning of jihad being a qital. Studying is also part of jihad; working is also part of jihad. That's the real definition.

According to Rahmat, when a person feels “allergic” to the term jihad, it is only a natural thing. People who hate Islam deliberately poison Muslims with the thoughts that make them allergic and that are far from jihad's true meaning. He noted that there was some terms in Islam of which Muslims themselves feel allergic to hear, namely: jihad, khilafah, imamah, and daulah. The fourth is always associated and identified with groups that are considered radical and extreme.

The jihad terminology put forward by Rahmat clearly leads to the use of violence. Such Jihad for the grace is important to maintain even in the context of a peaceful Indonesia. He believed only in that way can Muslim be respected by non-Muslims. There is a strong impulse in him to acknowledge violent jihad and pride in putting his pride as a Muslim above other believers. He said the turbulence between Muslims and non-Muslims was something that might happen. There was a strong prejudice in him that the nature of the unbelievers was to continue to persecute the Muslims. He pointed out to cases in Tolikara, in Papua, and elsewhere in the country.

Related to this topic, Lamongan region is an exception compared to other research areas. Some young Muslims in Lamongan supported what had been done by Amrozi et al, perpetrators of the Bali Bombing. M. Taufir Imron, chairperson of OSIS Madrasah Aliyah Lamongan Development, who also agreed the ways of FPI-style raids and even disobedience would not be cured if not in such ways, agreed with Amrozi's Bali bombing. In his view, what Amrozi did was right because Bali had been a sinister place so he dared to say that Amrozi was not a terrorist. The impact, based on his experience touring with his Vespa community in Bali, the Muslims in Bali were now more “respected” than ever before. When pursued further, on the meaning of the term “respected”, Taufiq seemed confused to distinguish between being “respected” or “feared.”

Lamongan did give a complete sample related to this subject. It is

considered complete since not only youth from OSIS but also from the nationalist youth organisations agreed that Amrozi's Bali bombing action was appropriate. Tri Raharti, chairperson of Lamongan GMNI, also believed that Amrozi was not a terrorist. Her view was influenced by the surrounding environment where she lived, which in fact quite admired Amrozi. According to some information, Bali was bombed because most of the land had been owned by outsiders and so that Bali was seen as "colonized." It was as if she wanted to say that Amrozi was only trying to liberate Bali from oppression.

This view was also expressed by one of Pancamarga Youth activists. According to him, many people in Lamongan did not consider Amrozi as a terrorist. Even he himself did not want to go too far to declare Amrozi a terrorist. He had a dilemma between the way and the purpose. He did not agree with his way to sacrifice an innocent person while he agreed with Amrozi's goal. In fact, according to him, the Balinese themselves declared they did not like the places bombed by Amrozi because they were laden with immorality.

The ambivalence of the Lamongan youth view was also reflected in Ariani Widoretno, secretary of BEM UNISLA, who had a double standard in identifying Amrozi as a terrorist. She saw it from 2 (two) points of view: the state's point of view and the viewpoint of Islam. From the state's point of view, she agreed that Amrozi could be called a temporary terrorist; from an Islamic point of view she agreed with what Amrozi had done. The argument, again, was because the places bombed by Amrozi were sites of immorality deserving to be annihilated even though she claimed herself as someone who dislike violent means.

Chapter 8

Closure

A. CONCLUSIONS

In general, this study shows that the attitudes and behaviour of Muslim youth against radicalism do not show a steady tendency. It can be claimed, however, that an educated youth generation tends to adopt conservative religious attitudes and behaviour, with its communal, scriptural, and puritan patterns. Nevertheless, the basic attitude of millennial generation is open to moderate religious values and principles, with considerable respect for individual freedom and human rights, albeit limited by religious and cultural norms. That attitude is also reflected on how they tell their social relationships with different social groups.

Such religious patterns and identities may reflect the learning process, understanding and religious experience influenced by religious, cultural, and socio-political contexts. Hybridisation of identities, as described above, seems to have a strong influence on the forming process of these views, attitudes and behaviour. The span and complexity of the various problems faced by the millennial Muslim youth make them have a conservative tendency in religion, especially for those who are still in primary school and college. The limited reach of their knowledge, as well as the ongoing searching process, makes it easy for them to follow normative views when presented with sensitive issues such as diversity and tolerance, individual

freedom and human rights, national insight as well as the description of radicalism and extremism.

It should be pointed out here that the differences in religious background and organisational affiliation of these youth, with varied ideological variants ranging from Islamists to nationalists, yield mixed results and explanations. ROHIS and LDK are student organisations whose general religious views are relatively moderate but have a tendency towards conservatism, turning to religious doctrines as a way of maintaining normative purity, and at the same time, exhibiting that their distinctive identity is different from other identities. OSIS and BEM are intra-student organisations and students whose views are relatively constant: moderate. Specifically with regards to BEM, their attitudes and views are largely influenced by the affiliations of extra campus organisations, because of the consequences of their activism in HMI, PMII, IMM, and KAMMI. Yet, in general, the student organisation is still categorized the same: HMI and PMII are moderate and in some degree, both tend to be liberal, while moderate IMM and KAMMI in certain degree tend to be conservative, communal, and scriptural.

The tendency that is relatively hard-to-read is that of Muslim youth who are mostly active in nationalist organisations such as GMNI, Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Pancamarga, and, in some degree, KNPI. The difficulty is because of its argument base; in responding they tend to avoid religious arguments. In general, their argumentation base refers to the state ideologies, such as democracy, Pancasila, and constitutionality. That is, with a foothold on these principles, it shows that their principles remain constant as 'nationalists' without being able to see the tendency whilst Islamist movements and activism also have a constant tendency. In general, it can be categorized as conservative, but it also has a tendency towards hardliners, radicals, and extremists, depending on the context that accompanies it—both at the micro and macro levels.

However, the conclusions above should not necessarily be understood as linear and constant. This is so because all the ideological spectrum of Muslim youth in this study also shows small fractures where a tendency towards conservatism and then radicalism also emerges. Starting from ROHIS, OSIS, BEM, LDK, HMI, IMM, PMII, KAMMI, and even nationalist organisations such

as GMNI, PP, Pemuda Pancasila, up to KNPI, the fractures do show. This study finds that their supports to religious doctrines in assessing religion and tolerance, individual freedom and human rights, support for Pancasila and democracy, and support for radicalism and extremism are relatively consistent. Such is all because of their failure to interpret and actualise Islam as practiced by moderate and progressive groups.

B. Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations are in order, which need to be considered by all stakeholders, from central or local government, universities, religious-based organisations, civil society organisations, youth organisations and wider community.

1. It is important to multiply and expand encounters among Muslim youth with diverse backgrounds--especially diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds, for example in inter-ethnic and interfaith camps. Such encounters will allow them to learn about others in respectful and open ways.
2. It is important to limit the influence of conservative and radical Islamic movements and activism in formal educational institutions without being trapped in counterproductive policies, such as banning, freezing, and the like.
3. It is paramount to introduce discourses on citizenship values for conservative groups like ROHIS and LDK through formal curriculum in schools and universities.
4. Schools or universities should not neglect ROHIS and LDK programs, such as *liqa*, to manage by themselves without intervention from school and college authorities with discourses on civic values.
5. It is important to expose and introduce through popular methods the diversity of interpretations within Islam towards conservative groups.
6. It is also important to encourage moderate groups to be involved actively in larger areas of dakwah such as ROHIS and LDK, and not just fighting in the BEM alone.

Appendix

A. Table of Researcher Name, Researcher Assistant, Time and Location of the Research

No	Location	Researcher	Assistant	Time in the Field
1	Banda Aceh	Dr. Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad	Muslima	20 September - 29 October 2017
2	Medan	Idris Hemay, M. Si	Nurman Achmad M. Si	9 - 23 October 2017
3	Pekanbaru	Muhajir Al Fairusy, M. Si	Derichad, M. Si	2 October - 21 November 2017
4	Bandar Lampung	Moh. Nabil, M. Phil	Miftahur Rohman, M. Pd	7 - 18 October
5	Jakarta	Rita Pranawati, MA	Fahmi Syahirul Alim	30 September - 24 October 2017
6	Bogor	Dr. Usep Abdul Matin	Lia Herliawati	21 October - 10 November 2017
7	Tasikmalaya	Dr. Usep Abdul Matin	Cecep Miftah Zainudin, S. Hi	20 September - 20 October 2017
8	Bandung	Dr. H. Wawan Setiawan	Anne Rufaidah, S. Sos	20 September - 30 November 2017
9	Garut	Dr. H. Wawan Setiawan	Amien Rais Iskandar	1 October - 8 November 2017
10	Yogyakarta	Dr. Hilman Latief	Muhammad Ridwan	23 September - 30 November 2017
11	Solo	Dr. Hilman Latief	Azaki Khoirudin	29 September - 1 November 2017
12	Lamongan	Muchtadirin, MA	A. Khoirul Mustamir, S.Pd.I	2-29 October 2017
13	Pontianak	Dr. Syarifah Ema Rahmaniah	Lulu Musyarofah, S. Ip	18 September - 5 October 2017
14	Balikpapan	Prof. Dr. Mujiburrahman	Kusnan, M.Pd. I	3 - 30 October 2017
15	Makassar	Dr. Andi. M. Akhmar	M. Nawir	25 September - 2 November 2017
16	Bulukumba	Dr. Andi. M. Akhmar	Abd. Khaliq Syukur, M. Hum	22 September - 30 October 2017
17	Manado	Ubed Abdillah Syarif, MA	M. Rahman Mantu, M. Hum	6 - 13 October 2017
18	Bima	Dr. Abdul Wahid	M. Agil Safero, S. Kom	29 September - 16 October 2017

B. Total of Respondents from intra-organisation school

No	Organisation	Total
1	OSIS	134
2	BEM	134
3	LDK/UKMI	70
4	Rohis	99
Total		437

C. Total of Respondents based on Extra-Organisation Campus or CSOs Islamic Modernist and Traditionalist Organisation

No	Organisation	Total
1	HMI, PII	49
2	PMII	31
3	IMM	30
4	IPPNU and others	30
Total		140

Dakwah Organisations

No	Organisation	Total
1	KAMMI	17
2	Remaja Mesjid	16
3	Dakwah Activist	9
4	Wahdah Islamiyah	6
5	Youth Muslim Organisation	19
6	PUI, LDII and others	21
Total		88

Hardliners Organisations

No	Organisation	Total
1	FPI	16
2	FUI	6
3	LMI, LUIS	3
Total		25

Radical Organisations

No	Organisation	Total
1	HTI	16
2	Khilafatul Muslimin	7
3	NII	1
Total		24

Open and Nationalist Organisations

No	Organisation	Total
1	Community and NGO	45
2	GMNI	17
3	KNPI	12
4	Youth Organisation/Youth Actor	34
5	Pemuda Pancasila	34
6	Pramuka (Scout)	5
7	others	14
Total		161

Progressive Organisations

No	Organisation	Total
1	Forum Study of University Student	31
2	Gusdurian	5
Total		36

D. Total of Respondents based on Significant Others

No	Organisation	Total
1	Teacher and Parents	29
2	Academics	5
3	others	14
Total		48

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About The Authors and Editors

Chaider S. Bamualim was born in Kupang on May 24, 1966, a graduate of Indonesia Islamic University (UII) Yogyakarta as bachelor (1990-1995). In 1997, he was a nominated scholar by the Dutch government through Indonesia Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) Program, to study Master in Leiden University of Netherlands. Upon his return to Indonesia, he was recruited as lecturer in UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, teaching Islamic reform courses at Faculty of Ushuluddin and Philosophy, and is now tasked at teaching politics of identity and ideology politics at the Faculty of Social and Political Science (FISIP) UIN Jakarta. In 2008-2011 the National University of Singapore (NUS) c/q Ministry of Education (MoE) Singapore granted him as Research Fellow at Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS). At NUS, he studied under Professor M.C. Ricklefs, a leading Australian historian, and A/P Michael Feener, a renowned Acehese expert, who currently serves as Sultan of Oman Fellow, Oxford Center for Islamic studies, England.

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Hilman Latief obtained his master’s programs in 2002 from Gajah Mada University and Western Michigan University (WMU), USA (2005). His thesis in WMU “Comparative Religion in Medieval Muslim Literature: Abu Rayhan al-Biruni and Abd al-Karim al-Sharastani on Religions of the Hind” was selected for publication by the Directorate General of Higher Education of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2012. In October 2014, he received the alumni achievement award from the College of Arts Sciences from WMU, and and best lecturer awards of Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY).

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After joining CSRC in 2003, Irfan went to study conflict resolution at AMAN's School of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Bangkok, Thailand (2005). His interest in the conflict issues led him to follow the Advance Course in Security Studies field at APCSS, Honolulu, Hawaii (2015). As a graduate of Gontor Pesantren, Irfan has written and edited many books and training modules with diverse themes ranging from Islamic Philanthropy, Islam and Peace, Conflict Resolution, Islam and Human Rights, to Islam and Democracy. He also examined and wrote several articles in the media around the hate-speech issue. Owing to his work in 2011 Irfan was selected by *Majalah Kampus Indonesia* (August, Vol.5) as one of the top 20 Indonesian academics (for humanities) under the age of 45. As a hate-speech expert, Irfan Abubakar has been regularly asked to speak at various seminars and trainings participated by POLRI officers.

Mohamad Nabil, completed elementary and middle schools in Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah, Guluk-Guluk, Sumenep, and continued for Bachelor degree in Islamic Politics at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He pursued his graduate studies at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy Postgraduate Program (STF) Driyarkara, Jakarta by writing a thesis against capitalism: *Egalitarianism's Criticism of G. A. Cohen on Libertarian Justice Theory* Robert Nozick.

Rita Pranawati, born in Kebumen, April 6, 1977, completed her master at Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies (IIS), Post Graduate School, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (2006). Her second master in Sociology was obtained from Monash University Australia under the Australian Leadership Award (ALA) and Allison Sudrajat Award. She has dealt with issues of democracy, human rights, Islamism, peace and development, women and children since joining CSRC Jakarta in 2006. Rita has been actively involved in the training on Religious and Human Rights, and in the preparation of various modules, ranging from the beginner level up to special modules for Muslim youth pesantren leaders from 22 cities in Indonesia (2009-2013). As an Australian

Alumni Moslem Exchange Program (MEP), she was actively involved in facilitating the Pesantren for Peace (PFP) program for Java-based pesantren from 2014-2016. She was also a trainer for the Military Police Unit (Satpol PP) for human rights and gender issues. Rita explored the issues of children and families when she joined the Nasyiatul Headquarters' Aisyiyah and joined Muhamadiyah Children Center in Aceh. She was commissioned by the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) since 2014-2017 and was re-elected commissioner for the 2017-2022 period. She is currently a family and alternative parenting commissioner, serving as KPAI Vice Chairperson. She was involved in the writings of marriage counseling books and joined the Ministry of Religious Affairs's Facilitator Guidance Team. Currently Rita is also Deputy Chairperson of the Central Executive Social Services Council Muhammadiyah and Coordinator of the Legalisation and Legal Affairs Division of the Aisyiyah Central Committee. She also lectures at Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Prof. Dr. Hamka (UHAMKA). Rita Pranawati can be reached via email at pranawati_rita@yahoo.com.

H. Wawan Setiawan, also known as **Hawe Setiawan**, was born in Subang, Java West, November 21, 1968. His last education was in the Postgraduate program of Fine Arts and Design at ITB. His daily routine consists in teaching at the Faculty of Arts and Literature, Pasundan University, Bandung. Wawan writes columns for newspapers *Pikiran Rakyat* and other media, apart from his editing and translating engagement. One of his books is "Tanah dan Air Sunda" (2017), a synopsis of which is excerpted in the book edited by Julian Millie titled "Hasan Mustapa: Ethnicity and Islam in Indonesia" (2017). []

About CSRC

Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) is a research institute in the field of religion and socio-culture, which was founded under the Rector's Decree of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta on April 28, 2006. CSRC engages in the development of culture in the Center for Language and Culture (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1999- 2006), given the increasing demand for developing religious studies (especially Islam) in socio-cultural and political relations. One of its main objectives is to understand the important roles that religion can contribute to the creation of a just and prosperous, strong, democratic, and peaceful society.

The importance of this development can be seen from the increasing role and influence of religion in the public space. Every day, religion is not only discussed in various levels of society, both nationally and internationally; its influence is further strengthened in the public space amidst the processes of modernisation and secularisation.

One evidence of the strengthening roles of religion in the public space is the rise of religious identities, symbols, and social institutions. A case in point here concerns Islamic expressions that gain a strong hold in the public space in Indonesia—this happens despite the fact that Islam is not the only entity in the space. Other entities exist that share the public space. As a teaching, ethical, and inspiratory source for the formation of social institutions, Islam

often appears in diverse expressions, as it is practiced based on its multi-interpretation by Muslim communities of different backgrounds. As a result of the diverse sources and backgrounds, many interpretations of Islam are inevitable, leading to religious teachings and values that often get practiced in distinctive colours and nuances. Islam occasionally appears in various portraits of exclusivity, but only rarely is it present as a source of social ethics, inspiration for the development of science and technology, mediator for social integration, and motivator for socio-economic empowerment of civil society. Islam has also influenced the formation of but a few socio-political, economic, and educational institutions that have a positive share in the national development. In this context, the presence of Islam in the public space does not need to be confused. On the contrary, such ethical and religious ethos need to be appreciated by the community and the support of all parties, especially the government.

The presence of CSRC aims to revitalise religious roles in such contexts. Religion must be practiced in the form of ethics and ethos at once, to colour the creation of a good and accountable system. Going forward, careful religious transformation needs to be done to answer the challenges faced by society, which are increasingly complex from day to day during social change and globalisation. Given that the flow of change goes faster than the ability of people to upgrade their capacity, it is necessary to have the right strategy to deal with it.

In line with its duties and roles, CSRC tries to contribute in the research, information and training sectors, and to facilitate various initiatives that can encourage the strengthening of civil society through policy development in the field of religious and cultural societies. We hope, in the future, Islamic institutional institutions develop into a productivity center for the people (production center), and not necessarily a social burden (social liability). Therefore, Muslims can enhance their role in socio-cultural and economic life in a positive and constructive manner.

The massive interaction and digital communication in society has created a dualism impression between the real world and the digital world, making it difficult to properly recognise the boundaries between the virtual world and social reality in the real world. This complex millennial life phenomenon

involves the most dominant social actors, which are youth that are not just experts in using technology but whose natural way of thinking is hard to separate from ontology and digital epistemology. They are popularly called the youth of today.

The symptom called in this book as hybridisation of identity allows them to open a variety of available sources of information, but at the same time they are required to find a way of life in order not to lose direction. The openness to the variety of information helps the religious moderation process among Indonesian Muslim youth, but on the other hand it can put them in a position that is vulnerable to intolerance and even religious radicalism.

