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A FIRE IN THE HUSK:

RELIGIOSITY OF GENERATION Z

**A National Survey on:
Attitudes and Behaviours at Schools and Universities Towards Religiosity**

PPIM UIN Jakarta – UNDP Indonesia

A FIRE IN
THE HUSK:
RELIGIOSITY OF GENERATION Z

CONVEY REPORT

A Fire in the Husk: Religiosity of Generation Z
Vol. 1 | No. 1 | Year 2018

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PREFACE

This CONVEY REPORT has been prepared to provide the general public with a short description on the findings of PPIM UIN Jakarta research called "A National Survey: Attitudes and Behaviours at Schools and Universities Towards Religiosity." The survey conducted an in-depth and comprehensive study on diverse current attitudes and behaviours of teachers and lecturers. This is important because at the same time, intolerance and radicalism are getting stronger among the people in Indonesia, including at schools and universities.

The study was part of the CONVEY Indonesia programme initiated by PPIM UIN Jakarta in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Indonesia. On behalf of the survey researchers, I would like to extend my gratitude to PPIM UIN Jakarta team and UNDP Indonesia, who have facilitated and supported the implementation of this survey.

More specifically, my gratitude goes to senior researchers at PPIM, Professor Jamhari Makruf, Messrs. Saiful Umam, Fuad Jabali, Ismatu Ropi, Jajang Jahroni, Ali Munhanif, and Dadi Darmadi, who have assisted in this study right from designing the survey instruments, up to data collection, reporting, and dissemination of the findings. I would also like to thank Messrs. Didin Syafruddin, Din Wahid, and Ms. Yunita Faela Nisa, who have critically read and provided input to the draft of this CONVEY REPORT.

Finally, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the researchers who have worked hard by giving their time, energy, and thoughts throughout the six months of the research. By all means this also includes our local researchers who have strived especially during the data collection. It must have been quite an ordeal just to reach the respondents in the remote areas in archipelago state like Indonesia. In fact, some of our researchers had to cross alligator-infested rivers in inland Kalimantan. Without their heroic work this CONVEY REPORT would not be possible.

Yogyakarta, 23 March 2018
Rangga Eka Saputra

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Post the reformation era that was marked with the openness of political opportunity structure, rapid development of radicalism and extremism movements in Indonesia has, among other things, infiltrated educational institutions. Some studies have confirmed this development. Radicalism and intolerance have usurped into educational institutions through various methods, among others through religious extracurricular activities by Rohis (Islamic Spirituality) (Maarif Institute, 2017; Wahid Foundation, 2016; Salim HS, et al., 2011); through alumni who are affiliated to radical movements (Masooda, et al. 2016); and through Islamic Religious Education (IRE) textbooks that contain radical and exclusive contents (PPIM, 2016).

As a response to this condition, this survey investigates the religious attitudes and behaviours of students and college students as well as the factors affecting them. This study aims to see the current levels of Muslim students' and college students' radicalism and intolerance in an in-depth and comprehensive manner. Some themes that become the variables affecting the radicalism and intolerance levels are classified into two. *First*, the personal level such as demography, conception on the meaning of life, and religiosity. *Second*, the environmental level such as closeness with mass organisations, family, internet/social media, Islamism, and government performance. The data collection was conducted from 1 September through 7 October 2017.

The main findings of this research show that on the attitude/opinion level, the students and college students tend to have radical (58.5%) and intolerant (51.1% internal intolerance and 34.3% external intolerance) religious perspectives. Meanwhile, on the behaviour/action level, most of them are moderate (74.2%). However, there is a significant difference in terms of tolerant behaviour: they tend to be more tolerant externally (62.9%) than internally (33.2%). This means that the students and college students are more tolerant toward followers of other religions than toward fellow-Muslims of different leanings inside the Muslim community itself, especially toward groups, sects, or ideologies considered to be deviant. A factor that especially affects intolerant attitude towards the internal differences is an association with the Ahmadiyya and Shia.

Three main factors drive their radicalism and intolerance. *First*, the Islamic Religious Education (IRE) learning model itself; as these

students and college students admitted, IRE has a big influence on them so as not to socialise with other religions' followers (48.9%). They also disagree if the purpose of IRE is to be tolerant and do good to Ahmadiyya (13.18%) and Shia followers (14.47%). Most of the students also stated that the IRE materials that they receive mostly put emphases on faith, taqwa (fear of God) and worship aspects (63.47%) whereas the materials containing lessons on tolerance and diversity only get a small portion.

Secondly, this national survey finds that internet access is a contributing factor of radicalism and intolerance. Currently, the internet is the main religious knowledge source for students and college students (50.89%). The students and college students who access it for religious knowledge tend to be intolerant and radical since most of the websites they visit (59.5%) as an alternative source of religious knowledge are hosting, or are run by, ustads who are in the radical category. The *third* contributing factor of radicalism and intolerance is the perception on Islamism and governmental performance. Even though their assessment toward the government performance in economic and legal enforcement aspects tend to be negative, their trust and loyalty toward Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, NKRI (the concept of a Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), and democracy remain high. More than 80% of them reject the stipulation that the Indonesian government, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, is a *thaghut* or an infidel institution. The strange thing is that their aspiration toward the implementation of Islamic law and the caliphate as a government system is also quite high (91.23%).

This study also finds that there exist opportunities and potentials in the efforts to counter radicalism and intolerance through IRE. The majority of students and college students agree if IRE contains: discussions concerning collective problems from the perspective of other religions (70.75%); interfaith dialogues on religious experience (79.12%); discussions concerning differences in order to reduce negative interfaith prejudice (89.24%), and; respect for local cultures (67.56%). Therefore, essentially there lies an opportunity for teachers to teach diversity, cooperation among different groups, as well as reduction of negative prejudice against other religious groups in class. In addition, IRE curricula that emphasise on tolerance and moderate Islamic thoughts are highly needed in countering radicalism and intolerance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Introduction of religious and belief studies needs to be integrated into Islamic Religious Education (IRE) curricula.
 - Concerning the material: In IRE teaching, religious literacy and interfaith education need to be developed.
 - It is necessary to give opportunities for diversity-experience and problem-solving experiences with interfaith students, and for sharing stories about religious values that uphold humanities.
 - Various educational methods that are more interactive and suitable with the characteristic of Millennial students--such as audio visual, infographics and social media—need to be introduced.
 - Recruitment, reformation, education, and training for IRE should be conducted.
2. The government is obligated to develop an open, tolerant and inclusive religious education. Actions that can be taken include reaffirming and deepening learning materials on tolerance in IRE through textbooks that become the guidebooks for teachers and lecturers. In addition, in order to ensure that IRE textbooks are not infiltrated by the ideologies of radicalism and intolerance, *Lajnah Pentashih* of IRE textbooks is required. This institution has the authority to oversee the creation and publishing process of IRE textbooks. The purpose is to ensure that IRE textbooks are free from radical and intolerant contents, as well as to guarantee that they are in line with the civic and national values.
3. The government needs to provide bigger opportunities for teachers to participate in training on archipelagic outlook, Islamic and Indonesian insights in a systematic programme. The training is aimed to build the capacity of teachers and lecturers in conveying the materials on tolerance and diversity. It is also expected to develop the teachers' awareness that IRE purpose is not only to educate students to be devout students, but also to prepare them to become good citizens who understand and practice civil values (tolerance, diversity, and freedom) and nationalist values (NKRI, Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and democracy).
4. The government needs to conduct media-literacy education, especially social media at the school and university level, including: learning to cross-check on hoax news, spreading positive contents on social media, and emphasising critical attitude in filtering and producing contents. Alternative narratives that are suitable with

Millennials characteristics need to be increased, for instance by producing and campaigning the contents that encourage the values of tolerance, diversity and peace at schools and universities.

5. Mainstream Islamic mass organisations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah need to be more active in producing and campaigning Islamic contents that contain message of peace and tolerance values with a more popular presentation.

I. BACKGROUND

In Indonesia, Islam and education are inseparable. Separating them, at least for now, is impossible to do. This is because Islamic education has a long history that has been attached to Indonesia.¹ Pancasila, as the state fundamental, has accommodated a space for religion to enter and become an important part of civic life, as written in the first principle "Belief in the One and Only God". This has become a national consensus of Indonesia that Jeremy Menchik (2017) calls as "godly nationalism." Religion, in certain boundaries, has become an inseparable part of national life.²

That type of national consensus is also reflected in Islamic education implementation that has been institutionalised since the early independence period. In 1946, Indonesia's Central National Committee Workers Agency (BPKNIP) required religious education to be a part of national education system and be included in the national curriculum.³ The state involvement in Islamic education was also seen from the authority of the Religious Affairs Ministry to conduct religious education bureaucratisation through the Education Act Number 4 of 1950.⁴

As a country with the highest number of Muslim population in the world, studies on Islamic education in Indonesia have drawn interest of many scholars. In the beginning, such studies revolved around traditional models of Islamic education, especially pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and madrasa.⁵ Recently quite comprehensive studies

1 Elihami (2016). "The Challenge of Religious Education in Indonesia Multiculturalism." *Journal of Education and Human Development* Vol. 5, No.4, pp.211-221.

2 For further information on Godly Nationalism concept, see chapter 4 in Jeremy Menchik (2017). "Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism." New York: Cambridge University Press.

3 Ibid. Elihami.

4 See Ismatu Ropi (2017). "Religion and Regulation in Indonesia." Singapore: Springer.

5 Some studies on pesantren and madrasah models of Islamic education in Indonesia, see Bianca J. Smith and Mark Woodward (edt.) (2014). "Gender and Power in Indonesian Islam: Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and Pesantren Selves." New York: Routledge; Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty, dan Robert W. Hefner (2010). "Pesantren

concerning Islamic Higher Education (Islamic Religious University, PTKI) have emerged.⁶ This model of educational institutions is considered to represent the fact of Islamic-education roots within the Indonesian Muslim society.

That fact is also proven by the high number of Islamic organisations in Indonesia that own educational institutions, at least as a medium for their members. Islamic educational institutions are not only owned by the biggest mainstream Islamic organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and are not only located on Java Island. Other Islamic organisations outside Java Island such as Nahdlatul Wathan (WT) in West Nusa Tenggara, Al-Khairaat in Central Sulawesi, and Jamiyatul Washliyah in North Sumatera, also have Islamic educational institutions that have rooted.

In its development, Islamic religious education in Indonesia is not only taught in pesantren, madrasa, and Islamic universities, but also in public schools and universities as a compulsory subject through Islamic Religious Education (IRE). The latest regulation on IRE in public schools and universities includes Act Number 20 of 2003 and Government Regulation Number 55 of 2007.

As a compulsory subject, the purpose of IRE learning must be aligned with the state purpose, that is in addition to shaping individual students who understand and are devoted to the religion, IRE also aims to shape them into good citizens. Religious education must be able to strengthen civic values such as: tolerance, freedom, justice, and equality.⁷ As affirmed by Ir. Soekarno in a meeting at the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) on 1 June 1945 “[T]he belief in God that grows in Indonesia must be a belief in God in a cultural sense, one without religious selfishness,

and Madrasa: Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia” in Robert W. Hefner & Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds.) “Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education”. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Dindin Solahudin (2008). “The Workshop for Morality: The Islamic Creativity of Pesantren Daarut Tauhid in Bandung, Java.” Canberra: ANU E Press; Martin van Bruinessen (2008). “Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia” in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand & Martin van Bruinessen “The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages.” Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; Noorhaidi Hasan (2008). “The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia” in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand & Martin van Bruinessen “The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages.” Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

6 See Ronald A. Lukens-Bull (2013). “Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia: Continuity and Conflict.” New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

7 The purpose of Islamic Religious Education is written in Government Regulation Number 55 of 2007 concerning Religion Education and Religious Education, Chapter III Article 2 (point 1) and Article 5 (point 4).

civilised, respectful toward one another, and virtuous.”⁸ That purpose is important because Indonesia, sociologically, is a plural country.

However, the escalating radicalism ideology at schools and universities has currently become a serious threat. The current radicalism in educational institution in Indonesia is very concerning. Some studies have confirmed that radicalism and intolerance ideologies have massively infiltrated schools and universities in a structured way. The infiltration especially happens through religious extracurricular activities, alumni who are affiliated to radical movement, students’ direct involvement with radical movement outside of school, IRE teachers who have radical perspectives, up to the IRE textbooks that contain radicalism. The apprehensive thing is that Islamic religious teachers themselves have religious perspectives that tend to be radical and exclusive. They are the main actors in shaping the religious attitudes and behaviours of students at schools.⁹

The strengthening radicalism at schools and universities are essentially inseparable from the tendency of increasing religious conservatism, radical transnational movement, and terrorism that is growing nowadays.¹⁰ In addition, rapid development of technology enables students to access religious materials on the internet easily. There are inclusive religious materials on the internet, but there are

8 Herbert Feith & Lance Castles (1988). “Pemikiran Politik Indonesia 1945-1965.” [1945-1965 Indonesian Political Thoughts] Jakarta: LP3ES. h.24

9 Some recent studies on radicalism roots in public schools among others are through: 1] Rohis extracurricular activity, see Wahid Foundation (2016). “Riset Potensi Radikalisme di Kalangan Aktivistis Rohani Islam Sekolah-Sekolah Negeri.” [Research on Radicalism Potential among Islamic Spirituality Activists of State Schools] and Salim HS, Hairus, Najib Kailani, and Nikmal Azekiyah (2011). “Politik Ruang Publik Sekolah: Negosiasi dan Resistensi di SMUN di Yogyakarta.” [Politics of School Public Space: Negotiation and Resistance in State High Schools in Yogyakarta] Yogyakarta: Centre for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS) UGM; 2] IRE textbooks, see PPIM UIN Jakarta (2016) “Diseminasi Paham Eksklusif dalam Pendidikan Islam: Bahan Ajar Pendidikan Agama Islam Untuk Sekolah.” [Dissemination of Exclusive Ideology in Islamic Education: Islamic Religious Education Textbooks for Schools].; 3] IRE teachers who have radical and exclusive religious perspectives, see PIM UIN Jakarta (2016). “Guru Agama, Toleransi, dan Isu-Isu Kehidupan Keagamaan Kontemporer di Indonesia.” [Religious Teachers, Tolerance, and the Issues of Contemporary Religious Life in Indonesia]. 4] Alumni and students who are directly affiliated with radical groups outside of school, see IBano Masooda, Didin Syafruddin, Azyumardi Azra, Abuddin Nata, Rusydy Zakaria, and Suparto Sunoko (2016). “Study on Islamic Religious Education in Secondary Schools in Indonesia.” Jakarta: Directorate of Islamic Education Ministry of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (Kemenag RI). Meanwhile a study on radicalism in campus, see M. Zaki Mubarak (2013). “Dari Semangat Islam Menuju Sikap Radikal: Pemikiran dan Perilaku Keagamaan Mahasiswa UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta.” [From the Spirit of Islam to Radical Attitude: Religious Thoughts and Behaviours of the Students of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta] Ma’arif Vol.8, No. 1-July 2013.

10 See Jamhari Makruf (2014). “Incubator for Extremism? Radicalism and Moderation in Indonesia’s Islamic Education System.” Policy Paper: Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society (CILIS); Karen Bryner (2013). “Piety Projects: Islamic Schools for Indonesia’s Urban Middle Class”. Dissertation: Columbia University; and Tan, Charlene (2011). “Islamic Education and Indoctrination: The Case in Indonesia.” New York: Routledge.

also a lot of radical and intolerant contents.

Based on the description above, this study investigates students' religious perspectives and behaviours. It comprehensively investigates the dominant factors which affect students' religiosity perspectives on a national scale. The research departs from the awareness that the emergence and influence of radicalism cannot be explained using only a single factor. Rather, it must be seen as a complex phenomenon that requires a multidimensional approach and involves various key themes such as: demography, conception on the meaning of life, religiosity, feeling of insecurity, closeness with religious mass organisations, family, social media, Islamism, as well as perception on government performance.

This research is important because in 2020-2030, Indonesia is projected to experience a demographic surplus when there is a significant increase in its working-age population.¹¹ This means that students who currently receive education will later fill that demographic surplus. What will happen to the future of Indonesia if they have radical and intolerant perspectives?

This study also contributes in filling the gap of previous studies concerning radicalism and intolerance in educational institutions in Indonesia. Amid the current increasing religious conservatism, transnational ideology flow, and extremism movement, this study becomes crucial in order to map and understand radicalism and intolerance among students and college students. In addition, this study is also useful in providing recommendations for governmental policy making, especially in the sector of Islamic Religious Education. This is because education is a pillar of national life that must be managed well, and a good policy must be supported by accurate and comprehensive research findings.

II. FOCUS OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

This study used a survey method conducted nationally in 34 provinces in Indonesia. From each province one regency and one city were taken as samples. Data collection was conducted from 1 September through 7 October 2017 simultaneously in all study regions.

Samples were taken from the population of Muslim students in public schools under the Ministry of Education and Culture and college students under the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher

¹¹ According to the National Population and Family Planning Board (BKKBN) of the Republic of Indonesia, in 2020-2030 the projected productive age population, between 15 to 64 years old, will reach 70% of the total Indonesian citizens. See www.bkkbn.go.id/detailpost/negara-harus-siap-bonus-demografi, 22 August 2016.

Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs. On student level, the unit of observation were Muslim students in Senior High School and Vocational School Grade XI. Meanwhile, the observation unit on university student level were Muslim college students on their third semester.

Samples that were used were 1,859 – 1,522 students and 337 college students – from the total population of 11,917,538¹², with a margin of error (MoE) of $\pm 2.3\%$. The sampling method was a Three Stage Stratified Sampling with regency and city strata. In ensuring the quality of data, this research performed spot check mechanism to 5% of the samples. The technical mechanism was such that if the samples in a regency/city were 1-4 schools, then a spot check was to be performed by inspecting the survey implementation in one school that was included in the samples. If the school samples were 5-10, then a spot check was to be performed in 2 school samples. In the end if the samples in one regency/more than 10 cities, then a spot check was to be performed in 3 school samples.

Two variables employed to measure the level of religiosity were radicalism and tolerance. Those two variables were subdivided into two levels: attitude/opinion and behaviour/action. Next, specifically for intolerance variable it was further divided into external and internal intolerance.¹³ From that classification, six independent variables were obtained: opinion radicalism (RADOP), action radicalism (RADAC), opinion external tolerance (TEOP), action external tolerance (TEAC), opinion internal tolerance (TIOP), and action internal tolerance (TIAC). Intolerance score was to be measured based on these categories: very intolerant, intolerant, neutral, tolerant, and very tolerant. Meanwhile radicalism was to be measured under these categories: very radical, radical, neutral, moderate, very moderate.

III. INTOLERANCE AND RADICALISM LEVEL OF STUDENTS AND COLLEGE STUDENTS


This study confirms that there is a strengthening radicalism and intolerance ideologies among the students and college students. The research results show that most of them have attitudes/opinion that are included in intolerant/very intolerant and radical/very radical

12 Population proportion from Ministry of Education and Culture/Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education were 10,128,991, while from Ministry of Religious Affairs were 1,788,547.

13 External tolerance is the tolerant attitude and behaviour toward other religions' followers. Meanwhile, internal tolerance is the tolerant attitude and behaviour toward different groups, ideologies, or sects within the Muslim community.

category. However, from action/behaviour perspective, most of them have tolerant and moderate tendencies (Picture 1). Even though they tend to be moderate and tolerant in behaviour, their attitudes, which mostly tend to be radical and intolerant, are worrying, because those kind of attitudes can potentially translate into radical actions.

Picture 1. Proportion of Students/College Students by Opinion and Internal Intolerance Action, External Intolerance, and Radicalism Category



From the behavioural perspective, the students and college students have perspectives that tend to be radical. If combined, those who have radical and very radical attitudes are more than half of the total respondents, which is 58.5%. Meanwhile those who have moderate attitudes merely amount to 20.1%.

Data on intolerant attitudes also show the same tendency. There is a difference between internal intolerance attitude and external intolerance attitude. The students and college students tend to be more internally intolerant/very intolerant (51.1%) than externally (34.3%). The same thing happens with the tolerance level; they tend to be externally tolerant (51.9%) than internally (31.1%).

The data above show that the students and college students tend to be intolerant toward different ideologies or groups within Muslim internal community than toward other religions' followers. Their internal intolerance attitudes are caused by their dislike toward the Ahmadiyya and Shia. As many as 86.55% of them agree if the government bans the existence of minority groups that are considered to be deviant from Islamic teachings. In addition, 49% stated that they disagree if the government must protect Shia and Ahmadiyya followers.

External radical attitudes and external intolerance are caused by hatred toward the Jews. Among these students and college students, 53.74% agree that the Jews are enemies of Muslims, and 52.99% of them agree that the Jews hate Islam. One of the triggers of intolerant attitudes toward the Jews can be traced to IRE textbooks that often describe the Jews as a cunning people.¹⁴ The conflict between Palestine and Israel also contributes to their intolerant perception toward the Jews, who they believe are persecuting Muslims (55.08%).

Picture 2. Attitudes against Shia, Ahmadiyya, Jews, and Christians



However, that kind of hatred does not really apply toward Christians. The students and college students tend to be tolerant toward them. As many as 76.22% of them think that Christians do not hate Muslims, and they also do not mind if other religions' followers give assistance to Islamic institutions (70.36%). These data confirm that the Muslims' tolerance toward other


14 For further information on Jews' description as cunning people and the enemy of Islam, included in IRE textbooks for Middle School Grade 7 page 197 and Middle School Grade 8 page 8-9. For further explanation see PPIM UIN Jakarta research report "Diseminasi Paham Eksklusif dalam Pendidikan Islam: Telaah Kebijakan dan Politik Produksi Bahan Ajar PAI" [Dissemination of Exclusive Ideology in Islamic Education: Islamic Religious Education Textbooks for Schools] (2016).

religions is only limited to official religions that are acknowledged by the state, with Christianity being one of them, but not toward other religions (including the Jews) that not acknowledged by the state.

DRIVERS OF RADICALISM AND INTOLERANCE

In addition to the Jews, Ahmadiyya, and Shia factors that drive intolerance and radicalism level, there are three other dominant factors: 1) IRE teachers and learning model; 2) internet access as a source for religious knowledge, and; 3) perception on government performance.

Picture 3. IRE material portion and influence to not socialise with followers of other religions



IRE teachers and learning model. Of all the students and college students, 48.95% feel that religious education has a big portion in influencing them to *not* socialise with followers of other faiths. Meanwhile, the ones who do not feel so amount to only 23.08%. This condition is quite apprehensive because religious education does not nurture students' tolerant attitudes toward followers of other religions whereas tolerant attitude is highly needed in a plural society like Indonesia.

Such attitudes may well result from the proportion of religious education that hardly ever emphasises on the strengthening of such values as tolerance and diversity to the students. This is seen from the fact that most of them feel that the religious education material they receive is mostly related to: 1) faith, *taqwa* and worship (63.47%); 2) noble characters and moral values (31.36%); 3) *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (3.82%), and; 4) Islamic glory (1.34%). Only 12.96% of noble characters and moral values material is allocated on respecting people of different faiths.

This result aligns with the basic competency that is desired in Islamic Religious Education curriculum. A big emphasis on faith, *taqwa* and worship material limits the teachers' time to include diversity and tolerance material. This is confirmed by the teachers' perception (91.20%) stating that the students and college students do feel that their faith and *taqwa* increase after receiving IRE subject. It is true that IRE material contains a chapter on *tasamuh* (tolerance).¹⁵ However, the portion is much smaller compared to that on faith, *taqwa* and worship.

The Internet as a source of religious knowledge. As evidenced by the research findings, the internet has a big influence in the increase of radicalism of intolerance. The students and college students without access to the internet tend to have more moderate attitudes than those who have it. A majority of them do have internet access (84.94%); only 15.06% of them do not.

The types of websites and *ustad/ustazah* that the students and college students go to as reference highly influence their level of radicalism and intolerance. According to them the most accessed website to obtain religious knowledge is nuonline.com, which represents

¹⁵ See Bano Masooda, Didin Syafruddin, Azyumardi Azra, Abuddin Nata, Rusydy Zakaria, and Suparto Sunoko (2016). "Study on Islamic Religious Education in Secondary Schools in Indonesia." Jakarta: Directorate of Islamic Education Ministry of Religious Affair, Republic of Indonesia (Kemenag RI).

moderate Islam; yet, they also often access websites that classify in the radical category, such as eramuslim.com, hidayatullah.com, voa-islam.com, and arrahmah.com. These websites often contain radical contents.

Meanwhile, their most popular ustad/ustazah in ascending order are: Mamah Dedeh, Yusuf Mansur, and Abdullah Gymnastiar. Below them, other popular ustad on the internet include Zakir Naik, Hanan Attaki, Arifin Ilham and Khalid Basalamah. The popularity of Zakir Naik and Khalid Basalamah becomes an important concern as they can be classified as ustad who frequently preach radical sermons. However, more unfortunate is the fact that some ustad who are affiliated to moderate mainstream Islamic mass organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, do not belong as popular ustad among the students and college students. Names of moderate ulemas such as Quraish Shihab, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Mustafa Bisri, Haedar Nasir and Nazaruddin Umar, are not included in the radar of popular ustad among these students and college students.

Perception on Democracy, NKRI, and government performance. Even though the students and college students are not satisfied with the government performance, their acceptance toward the state's fundamental principles--Pancasila, NKRI, and democracy--remains high. More than 50% of them state that the current economic condition is bad and really bad, particularly in terms of economic inequality. Also, 43.46% of them state that the economic condition is quite bad. From the law enforcement aspect, 69.80% of them state that law enforcement ranges from less fair to very unfair.


Negative evaluation toward government performance is not directly proportional to their acceptance toward NKRI and democracy. In general, they still believe that NKRI state and democracy political system are the best for Indonesia. About 90% of them agree that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution implementation align with Islamic values. As many as 85% agree that democracy is the best government system; 80.47% of them disagree with the statement that the Indonesian government, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, is an infidel and *thaghut*.

Those data show the students' and college students' indisputable loyalty toward NKRI. This condition creates an optimism that the future of NKRI and democracy stability will still be strong, despite the disappointment with government performance in economic and

law enforcement sectors. Therefore, economic improvement and law enforcement must still be the government's concern. This structural issue should not be allowed to trigger the generation to be radical, such as the experience of some failed countries in the Middle East.

The optimism above is not without problem. Despite their very high acceptance toward NKRI, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and democracy, their aspiration toward the implementation of Islamic law is quite high. As many as 91.23% of them agree that Islamic law needs to be implemented in civic life, and 61.92% of them perceive caliphate as the form of government acknowledged by Islamic teachings.

Picture 4. Assessment on government performance and acceptance toward NKRI and democracy



IV THE ROLE OF PERSONAL FACTORS

Demographic background

Gender. From a demographic perspective based on gender, the students and college students, both female and male, have religious attitudes/opinions that are mostly radical--for female 60.4% and for male 56.2%. Meanwhile, those who have moderate attitudes only account for 18.2% for female and 22.4% for male.

Even though their religiosity attitudes tend to be radical, from the behaviour/action aspect they tend to be very moderate. Of all the female students and college students, 75.6% have moderate religiosity behaviours; for male it is 49.5%. Those who have radical religious behaviours are only 6.1% for female and 8% for male.

Table 1. RADOP, RADAC, TEOP AND TIOP
by gender-based demography

		Intolerant (%)	Neutral (%)	Tolerant (%)
<i>TEOP</i>				
Students / College Students <i>p=0,017</i>	Female	32.4	14.2	53.4
	Male	36.5	13.2	22.4
<i>TIOP</i>				
Students / College Students <i>p=0,1.86</i>	Female	48.9	18.9	32.2
	Male	53.7	16.7	29.6
GENDER				
		Radical (%)	Neutral (%)	Moderate (%)
<i>RADOP</i>				
Students / College Students <i>p=0,043</i>	Female	60.4	21.4	18.2
	Male	56.2	21.3	22.4
<i>RADAC</i>				
Students / College Students <i>p=0,045</i>	Female	6.1	18.3	75.6
	Male	8	23.2	49.50

With regards to their intolerance level, the majority of female students and college students are tolerant toward followers of other religions. As many as 53.4% of them have tolerant attitudes; meanwhile for male it only accounts for 22.4%. From the intolerance percentage, quite a few respondents are intolerant in both gender categories: 36.5% for male and 32.4% for female. In addition, they tend to be intolerant toward the sects or groups in the internal Muslim community. The data show that males are more intolerant (53.7%) than females (48.9%).

Socioeconomic Status. The data show that no significant correlation prevails between economic status and radical attitude. That means the students with low-income parents do not automatically become more radical compared to the students whose parents have higher income, and vice versa. Radical attitudes are found among the students whose parents' income ranges under Rp 1 million (59.1%); from Rp 1 to 2.5 million (63.2%), and; from Rp 5 to 7.5 million (63.4%).

However, on the behavioural level, there is a significant correlation between socioeconomic status and radicalism action. The students whose parents have low income tend to be more radical compared to the students whose parents have higher income. In descending order, radical behaviours are mostly found among the students whose parents' income is less than Rp 1 million (10.3%); between Rp 1 to 2.5 million (6.3%); between Rp 2.5 to 5 million (6.2%); and between Rp 5 to 7.5 million (8%); and, the lowest, over Rp 7.5 million (4%).

Next, on the external intolerance attitude level, the lower the students' socioeconomic status, the more tolerant they are. Those whose parents have income under Rp 1 million (50%) and between Rp 1 to 2.5 million (53.2%) are more tolerant than the ones whose parents have income of Rp 2.5 million to 5 million (48.9%) and above Rp 7.5 million (44%). The data are consistent with their intolerance level, whereby students whose parents have an income more than Rp 7.5 million are classified as the most intolerant (52%); meanwhile, for the others, the respective percentage accounts for 31.8% to 37.1%.

From external tolerance behavior aspect, the distribution is equal between income groups. They have tolerant behaviours toward other religions' followers (more than 50% in average). As many as 63.1% of them whose parents' income is less than Rp 1 million have tolerant external behaviours--quite similar to the 69.4% of students whose parents' income is above Rp 1 to 7.5 million.

Table 2 RADOP, RADAC, TEOP and TEAC by socioeconomic-status demography

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS									
<i>RADOP</i>			Radical (%)		Neutral (%)		Moderate (%)		
Students / College Students <i>p=0,047</i>	<1 million	59.1	23.4	17.4					
	1 - 2.5 million	63.2	20	16.8					
	2.5 - 5 million	54.7	20.3	24.9					
	5 - 7.5 million	63.4	20.6	15.8					
	>7.5 million	52	24	24					
<i>RADAC</i>									
Student / College Students <i>p=0,182</i>	<1 million	10.3	18.3	71.4					
	1 - 2.5 million	6.3	20.9	72.8					
	2.5 - 5 million	6.2	19.7	74.1					
	5 - 7.5 million	8	19	75					
	>7.5 million	4	16	77.5					
		Intol erant	Neutral	Tolerant	<i>p- value</i>	Intol erant	Neutral	Tolerant	<i>p- value</i>
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS		TEOP (%)				TEAC (%)			
Students / College Students	<1 million	34.3	15.7	50	0.709	16.1	20.7	63.1	0.000
	1 - 2.5 million	35.6	11.5	53.2		20.8	19.4	59.9	
	2.5 - 5 million	37.1	14.10	48.9		18.7	20.3	60.9	
	5 - 7.5 million	31.8	14	54		23.8	20.6	55.5	
	>7.5 million	52	4	44		52	19.1	69.4	

This study does not show that poverty or socioeconomic factor has a strong correlation with radicalism attitude. Meanwhile, on radicalism behaviour as well as intolerance behaviour and attitude, poverty factor does not have a strong correlation with radicalism and intolerance level. The ones who have higher socioeconomic status have higher intolerance level. Meanwhile, those with the lowest socioeconomic status (income below Rp 1 million) tend to be more tolerant. Therefore, the factor that causes someone to become intolerant and radical is a complex one. Socioeconomic factor is not the main factor causing one to become radical. One of the main explanations here is the factor of societal plurality. For a plural society that is marked by many social cleavages, one of its bad consequences is the strong potential of ethnical conflict and political competition.¹⁶ Therefore, plural social cleavages in Indonesia in this context can be seen as one of the triggers for the increase of radicalism and intolerance.

Indeed, there are many studies that consider that poverty factor is the main trigger of radicalism attitude. Radicalism and conflicts

16 See the study of James A. Piazza (2006) "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18:1, 159-177; James Anderson and Ian Shuttleworth (1998). "Sectarian Demography, Territoriality and Political Development in Northern Ireland." *Political Geography*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 187-208, 1998.

emerge from a weak economic development.¹⁷ There is also a strong interconnection between socioeconomic condition, the growth of young population, and youth's radical behaviour. The Arab Spring phenomenon can be read in that context.

Worsening socioeconomic condition in some countries in the Middle East have pushed the young generation to find a solution by overthrowing the regimes that they considered a failure. The bad condition caused them to lose hope for the future. This in turn led them to radical attitudes and behaviours, and the form of radicalism that is closest to youth is religious radicalism.¹⁸ Nonetheless, such structural factors do not seem to happen in Indonesia.

Pesantren Background. The students with pesantren background tend to be more radical, both in attitudes and behaviours. On the attitude level, 66.6% who have pesantren background have radical religious understanding. Meanwhile, those who do not have pesantren background, are lower by around ten percent, 56.4%. On the behaviour level, 10.5% of those who have pesantren background tend to behave radically, compared to those who do not have pesantren background (6.1%).

The data are consistent considering their moderate attitudes and behaviours level. On the religiosity-attitude level, students that do not have pesantren background tend to be more moderate (21.2%) compared to those who received education in pesantren (15.9%). Likewise, on the behaviour level, 75.6% of students with no pesantren background behave moderately, higher than those who have studied in pesantren (68.9%). Therefore, it can be concluded that those who studied in pesantren tend to be more radical in both attitude and behaviour aspects.

This finding clarifies the misperception that people who receive in-depth religious education will tend to be more moderate. Pesantren as an established religious education institution in Indonesia plays a

17 Paul Stevenson (1977). "Frustration, Structural Blame, and Leftwing Radicalism." *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, Vol.2, No.4 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 355-372; George A. Lundberg (1927). "The Demographic and Economic Basis of Political Radicalism and Conservatism." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 32, No.5 (Mar., 1927), pp. 719- 732; Helen Ware (2005). "Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No.4, Special Issue on the Demography of Conflict and Violence (Jul., 2005), pp. 435-454.

18 Graham E. Fuller (2004) "The Youth Crisis in Middle Eastern Society", Michigan: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. h. 9-11

crucial role in shaping moderate Islamic understanding. However, with the strong wave of transnational ideologies that carry radical ideologies, essentially the type of pesantren followed by students and college students needs to be investigated further. For example: pesantren that belongs to Jamaah Islamiyah group and salafi group currently grow rapidly in some regions in Indonesia. Even though there are only a few of them, extremist and radical figures are born in this kind of pesantren. Therefore, it can be said that, in addition to having the potential to shape someone to become a moderate Muslim, pesantren can also shape a radical Muslim; it all depends on the type of pesantren.¹⁹

Table 3. RADOP, RADAC, TEOP and TEAC by pesantren-background demography

Pesantren Educational Background				
		Radical (%)	Neutral (%)	Moderate (%)
RADOP				
Siswa/Mahasiswa <i>p=0,000</i>	Pesantren	66.6	17.4	15.9
	Non-Pesantren	56.4	22.4	21.2
RADAC				
Siswa/Mahasiswa <i>p=0,015</i>	Pesantren	10.5	20.5	68.9
	Non-Pesantren	6.1	18.3	75.6

		Intolerant	Neutral	Tolerant	<i>p-value</i>	Intolerant	Neutral	Tolerant	<i>p-value</i>
LATAR PENDIDIKAN PESANTREN		TEOP (%)				TEAC (%)			
Students/ College Students	Pesantren	22.8	12.8	64.4	0.000	11.3	19	69.7	0.004
	Non-Pesantren	37.3	14	48.7		18.9	20	61.1	
		TIOP (%)				TIAC (%)			
Students/ College Students	Pesantren	48.4	18.2	57.4	0.351	38.2	29.2	32.5	0.333
	Non-Pesantren	51.8	17.8	30.3		33.1	33.6	33.4	

Different from the radicalism level, in regard to the intolerance aspect, the students and college students who have received education in pesantren are more tolerant. On the external tolerance attitude,

¹⁹ Some studies that examined this issue include: Ali Maksum (2015). "Model Pendidikan Toleransi di Pesantren Modern dan Salaf" [Tolerance Education Model in Modern and Salaf Pesantren], *Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam [Islamic Religious Education Journal]*, Volume 03, Number 1, May 2015, Page 82-108; Thohir Yuli Kusmanto, Moh. Fauzi and M. Mukhsin Jamil (2015). "Dialektika Radikalisme dan Anti Radikalisme di Pesantren." [Radicalism and Anti Radicalism Dialectics in Pesantren] *Walisongo*, Volume 23, Number 1, May 2015; Ayub Mursalim and Ibnu Katsir (2010). "Pola Pendidikan Keagamaan Pesantren dan Radikalisme: Studi Kasus Pesantren-Pesantren di Provinsi Jambi" [Pesantren Religious Education Pattern and Radicalism: A Case Study on Pesantren in Jambi Province], *Kontekstualika*, Vol. 25, No.2, 2010.

64.4% of the students with pesantren background have tolerant attitudes, whereas those who do not account for 48.8%. Similarly, from the intolerance level, 37.3% who have never been educated in pesantren are more intolerant than those with pesantren background (22.8%).

On the external tolerance behaviour, the students and college students irrespective of their pesantren background or otherwise have behaviours that tend to be very tolerant (above 60%). However, in regard to the internal tolerance behavior aspect, they tend to be intolerant. The students and college students with pesantren education are more intolerant (38.2%) than the ones without (33.1%)

Relevant Ministries. The other demographic aspect could be analyzed in the relevant ministries which manage the student and university students such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Culture, and/or the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education. By this demographic category, those under the Ministry of Religious Affairs have more radical religious attitudes, at 65.6%, than their counterparts under other ministries (56%). However, on the behaviour level, the students under the three ministries have moderate behaviours, which accounts for 74%.

The intolerance attitude level shows a pattern different from the radicalism pattern. The students and college students under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (kemenag) have higher external tolerance attitudes (70.5%) than those under the Ministry of Education and Culture (Kemendikbud)/Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (45.4%). The internal tolerance attitude shows the same pattern as the external tolerance attitude. The students and college students under the Ministry of Education and Culture/Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education are more intolerant (54.3%) than those under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (42.3%).

Table 4. RADOP, RADAC, TEOP, TEAC, TIOP AND TIAC by relevant-ministry demographic category

RELEVANT-MINISTRY		Radical (%)	Neutral (%)	Moderate (%)					
<i>Students/College Students</i> <i>p=0,000</i>	Kemenag	65.6	17.7	16.7					
	Kemendikbud	26	22.7	21.3					
RADAC									
<i>Students/College Students</i> <i>p=0,951</i>	Kemenag	6.9	18.3	74.8					
	Kemendikbud	7	18.9	74					
		Intolerant	Neutral	Tolerant	<i>p-value</i>	Intolerant	Neutral	Tolerant	<i>p-value</i>
RELEVANT-MINISTRY		TEOP (%)				TEAC (%)			
<i>Students/College Students</i>	Kemenag	16.7	12.8	70.5	<i>0.000</i>	10.8	15.9	73.3	<i>0.000</i>
	Kemendikbud	40.6	14.1	45.4		19.7	21.2	59.1	
		TIOP (%)				TIAC (%)			
<i>Students/College Students</i>	Kemenag	42.3	16.9	40.8	<i>0.000</i>	35.6	27.1	37.2	<i>0.019</i>
	Kemendikbud	54.3	18.3	27.5		33.5	34.6	31.8	

As for the external tolerance behaviour level, it can be seen that the students and college students under the three relevant ministries tend to have tolerant behaviours, and those under the Ministry of Religious Affairs tend to be more tolerant. As many as 73.3% of those with tolerant behaviours toward followers of other religions are under the Ministry of Religious Affairs whereas those under Ministry of Education and Culture/Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education account for 59.1%.

On the internal tolerance behaviour level, 33.5% of the students and college students under the Ministry of Education and Culture/Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education have intolerant behaviours; 35.6% of those under other ministries have intolerant behaviours toward groups considered to be deviant in the internal Muslim community.

Meaning of Life, Religiosity, and Insecurity

Some literatures state that there is a similarity between the condition of terrorists and members of a radical community. They are people who experience social isolation and alienation; they do not believe the ruling government and disagree with the government's foreign policies.²⁰ These conditions may lead to individual grief. In this context of 'grief' can be associated a process of radicalism on

²⁰ Study that has discussed this topic such as Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, & Michael King (2010). "The Edge of Violence: a Radical Approach to Extremism." London: Demos.

a personal level. Meanwhile, the variable that is used to measure a person's grief level is by seeing the perception on the meaning of life²¹

This study investigates whether the meaning of life, religiosity, and insecurity (threatened-feeling) variables are connected to the four dependent variables of this research, which are internal and external tolerance attitude and behaviour, as well as radicalism attitude and behaviour. Concerning the meaning of life and religiosity perception variables, these lead-questions are to be asked consecutively: "All this time, do you think that your life is meaningful?" "Do you feel happy lately?" and "How religious do you think you are?"

Meanwhile, the perception of Islam as a victim is phrased into 2 items that are actually statements to which respondents are requested to answer whether or not they agree. The statements are: "There is this opinion that Muslims are currently being persecuted," and "Economically, non-Muslim are at an advantage compared to Muslims." On this phase the analysis and interpretation are to be conducted for each item rather than being combined into one total score, in consideration of the dichotomic nature of the items.

Meaning of Life. The underlying assumption is that the more someone feels their lives are meaningful and happy, the less likely for that individual to be involved in radical attitudes and behaviours. In the case of a lone-wolf terrorist, psychological disorders such as depression, loneliness, and other emotional disorders are often found.²²

This survey finds that on radicalism attitude level, those who feel that their lives are meaningful tend to have radical attitudes (58.6%). This means that the more radical the attitudes of students/college students are, they are more likely to perceive their lives as meaningful. This finding indicates that it is possible that the radicalisation process on attitude requires appreciation of the meaning of life before having a radical attitude. Meanwhile, by the external tolerance attitude category, those who perceive themselves as meaningful tend to be on tolerant or very tolerant level (51.9%).

21 On the individual level, grief factor is one of the personal factors that is strongly associated with radicalism. The loss of life meaning and alienation from the society often happen when we lose the people closest to us, and the condition is found in many terrorism cases. Because it is not easy to measure a person's grief level, then perception on the meaning of life is made as a proxy to get the idea of someone's grief level. See Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt (2007). "Radicalization in the West: The Homeland Threat," in McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2017). "Understanding political radicalization: The two-pyramids model." *American Psychologist*, 72(3), 205.

22 Ibid. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017.

Table 5. Perception on the Meaning of Life by RADOP-TEOP category

All this time, do you think that your life is meaningful? Yes

	Radical/intolerant (%)	Neutral (%)	Moderate/tolerant (%)	X̄
RADOP p=0.029	58.6	21.4	20.1	28.334
TEOP p=0.031	34.3	13.8	51.9	28.045

Perception on Religiosity. Religiosity level is often perceived as a contributing factor in intolerant and radical behaviours. However, the existing literatures have not confirmed the linearity between religiosity and individual’s intolerant and radical behaviours. This means that the more religious an individual is, it does not necessarily mean that their behaviours will be more intolerant and radical. Therefore, it is important to check the religiosity dimension from attitude as well as behaviour aspects. Theoretically, the type of religiosity that is a quest (search of spirituality) in nature tends to be more tolerant than the religiosity in a worship ritual context. On the religiosity variable, this survey finds that the higher the religiosity perception on radical behaviour level, the students and college students who declare themselves as religious tend to be moderate (74.3%)

Table 7. Religiosity perception by RADAC category

How religious do you think you are? Religious/very religious

	Radical (%)	Neutral (%)	Moderate (%)	X̄
RADAC p=0.007	7	18.8	74.3	32.993

Insecurity. Another personal factor that has been found to contribute in radicalism attitudes and behaviours is the perception of insecurity that Islam is a victim or is being persecuted. Even though it is not a single cause, the perception of Islam being so is discovered to have a quite significant contribution in some radicalism cases. Some studies conclude that the economic aspect is more influential than the religiosity aspect in affecting radicalism behaviour.²³

23 For example see J. Esteban & Ray, D. (2011). "A model of ethnic conflict." Journal

This variable tries to see the respondents' opinion toward the statement that Islam is currently a victim in order to predict radicalism and intolerance attitude and behaviour. Various theories state that the weight of identity in victim framing is very effective in nurturing radicalism and intolerance.

As for the radical attitude category, the majority of respondents who answered this question have radical or very radical scores. The percentage of who agree with the statement that Islam is currently being persecuted tends to have bigger radical religious perspectives (64.3%) than the respondents who have moderate or very moderate attitudes (16.5%).

However, related to the external tolerance attitude, most of the students and college students who view that Islami is being persecuted tend to be in the tolerant category (56.4%). There are not many respondents who agree that Islam is currently being persecuted who are classified as intolerant, and the difference is statistically significant.

Table 8. Threatened feeling by RADOP and TEOP category

	Radical/ intolerant (%)	Neutral (%)	Moderate/tolerant X (%)	
<i>RADOP</i> p=0.000	64,3	19.1	16.5	6.535
<i>TEOP</i> p=0.001	31,2	12.4	56.4	9.411

V THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR

Closeness to religious mass organisations

Survey findings show that the students and college students feel close to mainstream mass organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. They feel that they are not close to radical Islamic mass organisations, such as Islamic Defender Fronts (FPU) and Al-Qur'an Interpretation Assembly (MTA), which become samples of this research. Only 9.3% of them state that FPI is the closest religious organisation to students/college students, whereas 90.7% say that they are not close to FPI. Those who feel close to FPI are most


of the European Economic Association, 9(3), 496-521; A. Richards (2003). "Socio-Economic roots of Radicalism? Towards explaining the appeal of Islamic Radicals." DIANE Publishing.

distributed in six provinces, namely West Kalimantan (29.2%); East Java (19.2%); DKI Jakarta (19.1%); North Sumatera (17.8%); Jambi (14.1%), and; Banten (13.4%).


This is good news since NU and Muhammadiyah, which represent a moderate Islamic community, are apparently perceived to be close to the students and college students. In addition to supporting HTI, mass organisations that are known to propagandise substitution of caliphate for the national state and democracy, apparently receive relatively small support. These data align with one of the main findings of this research, namely that the loyalty toward NKRI and democracy are very high.

Five Islamic mass organisations to which the students state that they are closest are NU (40.08%); Muhammadiyah (22.92%); Islamic Defender Fronts or FPI (9.31%); Al-Qur'an Interpretation Assembly or MTA (6.62%), and; Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Institution or LDII (6.19%). Meanwhile, the most disliked Islamic groups are the Shia (30.99%) and Ahmadiyya (19.72%). These data go along with the research finding that states that radicalism and intolerance attitudes of the students are affected by their negative perception toward the Shia and Ahmadiyya. Both groups are considered to be deviant and misguided from Islamic teachings.

Picture 5. Top five mass organisations chosen by students



Picture 6. Most disliked groups, ideologies, or Islamic mass organisations



Shia, Ahmadiyya, HTI, FPI, JIL (Liberal Islam Network), and Salafi


Furthermore, the students and college students who are affiliated with religious mass organisations tend to have radical religious attitudes, whereas on the action level they tend to be moderate. If observed further, those who feel close to FPI have the most radical attitude (67.6%) and high level of radical action (9.2%); this is still below the level of radicalism of those close to MTA (10.6%) (see Table 10). Nevertheless, even though in terms of attitude they tend to be radical (in average by more than 50%), those who feel close to mainstream mass organisations--NU (53.8%) and Muhammadiyah (56.1%)--tend to be more moderate than those who feel close to pro-Caliphate mass organisations such as FPI and MTA. In addition, those who feel close to NU and Muhammadiyah are also the most moderate group of students and college students compared to those who feel close to FPI, MTA, and LDII.

Table 10. Closeness to mass organisations by radicalism and intolerance level

Closest Organisations	RADOP (%)				RADAC (%)				
	Radical	Neutral	Moderate	<i>P-Value</i>	Radical	Neutral	Moderate	<i>P-Value</i>	
Students/ College Students	NU	53.8	20.9	25.2	0.00	4.8	16.9	78.3	0.00
	Muhammadiyah	56.1	21.8	22.1	5.52	7.3	19	73.3	1.47
	FPI	67.6	18.5	13.9	0.46	9.2	21.4	69.4	0.98
	MTA	60.2	26	13.8	1.85	10.6	23.6	65.9	0.02
	LDII	62.6	21.7	15.7	5.27	7.8	24.3	67.8	3.86

Support toward HTI Disbandment. Of all the students and college students 25.93% state that they agree if HTI is disbanded and 22.05% disagree. However, the majority (52.02%) state that they do not know about the issue. Those who agree with HTI disbandment reason that it is because HTI wants to replace NKRI with Caliphate (51.66%); HTI disturbs public order (26.35%); and HTI rejects democracy (18.46%).

Picture 7. Support and reason for HTI disbandment



If the influence of HTI disbandment is linked to radicalism level, according to the data below those who disagree with HTI disbandment have religious perspectives that tend to be more radical (65.6%). However on the behavioural level, whether they agree or not, they all have religious behaviours that tend to be moderate (68.5%).

Table 11. Attitudes on HTI disbandment by radicalism and intolerance level

Attitude on HTI Disbandment	RADOP (%)				RADAC (%)			
	Radical	Neutral	Moderate	P-Value	Radical	Neutral	Moderate	P-Value
Agree	53.7	20.7	25.5	0.00	10.6	21	68.5	0.00
Disagree	65.6	20.5	25.5	0.00	9.8	22	68.3	0.00
Do Not Know	57.9	22	25.5	0.00	40	16.3	79.6	0.00


The Internet and Social Media

As the findings of this survey show, the students and college students mostly access the internet, especially social media, as the main source of religious knowledge source (50.89%). Other sources that become references are books or the holy book itself (48.57%), and television (33.73%). It can be seen that attending a recitation is not their first choice in obtaining religious knowledge. Only 17.11% of them make recitation as a reference source and the the lowest proportion is *liqa* at 2.69%.

#Efficiency is the main consideration why the internet and social media become the main reference source for the students and college students. They can use their mobile device wherever and whenever in a flexible way to search for information related to religious issues. Easy access of technology and their position as digital natives (a generation

that was born starting from 1990) has made them inseparable from internet connection in their daily activities, including that for obtaining religious knowledge. Data from this survey confirm that 84.94% of students and college students have internet connection. Of that percentage, the ones who have internet access on their mobile phones account for 96.20%. This is the reason why internet-based sources of religious knowledge, largely through online-ustad and websites, are shifting the traditional authority of ulemas who still use conventional methods, such as through *talim* assemblies.


Picture 8. Main sources for searching religious knowledge



Unfortunately, popular websites that are often accessed by the students and college students can be categorised as radical. Even though nu.online, as a representation of mainstream and moderate Islamic organisations, is accessed the most (25.51%), some websites that often contain radical contents are also as popular among

them. Some of them are eramuslim.com (18.88%), hidayatullah.com (17.28%), voa-islam.com (12.24%), arrahmah.com (9.57%), salafy.or.id (3.70%), nahimunkar.com (2.23%), and panjimas.com (0.64). The popularity of suaramuhammadiyah.com is even lower than eramuslim.com, hidayatullah.com, and voa-islam.com, which is only 10.71%

Picture 9. Most accessed websites as sources of religious knowledge



The issue of blocked websites by the government through the Ministry of Communication and Informatics has become a subject of debate. Those who support it state that those websites have disseminated negative contents on online media which lead to invitations to terror actions. Meanwhile, those who are against it use the basis of freedom of speech that is protected by the constitution. Up until now debates on this blocking issue have been ongoing among academics, practitioners, activists, and the government.

This study also observes the tendency of the students and college students in viewing religious preaches on the internet. The most viewed preachers in descending order are: Mamah Dedeh (43.49%), Yusuf Mansur (28.06%), Zakir Naik (20.22%), Abdullah Gymnastiar (14.92%), and Habib Rizieq Shihab (10.08%). It is quite unfortunate

that ustad who are reknown for being moderate and for teaching diversity, such as Quraish Syihab, Mustafa Bisri and Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif, are not included in the radar of students and college students who access the internet. On the contrary, ustad who often convey hatred and prejudice against non-Muslims are quite popular, such as Zakir Naik and Habib Rizieq Shihab.

Picture 10. Religious preachers who become references on the internet and social media



Finally, there is a significant relationship between internet access and radical attitude. As many as 59.5% of students and college students who have internet access have radical and very radical attitudes toward diversity. However, on the action level, those who have internet access tend to be moderate; only 7.3% of them show radical behaviours. This fact proves that the internet is influential in the shaping of students' and college students' religious understanding. It is unfortunate, however, that a large portion of the digital space has


been taken over by radical communities. Meanwhile, moderate and mainstream Islamic mass organisations and Islamic figures have yet to fully utilise the internet for spreading peaceful, tolerant, and diverse Islamic values.

Perception on Government Performance and Democracy

Government Performance. An individual's involvement in radical actions and their decision to join extremist groups are influenced by some structural conditions. People can feel that they suffer injustice due to the socioeconomic condition surrounding them. This condition is commonly referred to as "relative deprivation," or the feeling as a victim of certain socioeconomic condition. Weak government performance (ungoverned governance) and weak law enforcement in managing public matters also lead someone to have radical attitude and behaviour. In countries with such structural conditions, especially in MENA (*the Middle East and North Africa*) countries, acts of violence, terror and radicalism grow rampant. In addition, in those countries, violent extremism is growing, including religious-based terror movements.

With Indonesia hosting the highest number of Muslim citizens in the world, its Muslims' perception on the government performance affects the religion-state relationship. Furthermore, it will also affect domestic sociopolitical conditions. Therefore, the feeling of being represented in every government policy becomes an important issue in this context. How students and college students perceive the government performance in economic and legal sectors and how it correlates to their radicalism level become crucial to be investigated.

Picture 11. Perception on government policies related to Muslims' interests



Survey findings show that the majority of students and college students rate the government policies concerning Muslims' interests positively. Only less than 10% of them feel that the policies concerning Muslims are bad. This condition will prevent them from feeling alienated that can otherwise lead them to relative deprivation feeling as well as radical attitudes and behaviours. Perception of being represented by the government policies essentially can strengthen the civic culture and democracy, because they believe in the current government and the state system.²⁴

Even though in general the government performance toward Muslims is considered to be good, law enforcement and economic aspects tend to be seen negatively. As many as 69.79% state that laws in Indonesia are still being enforced unfairly. Therefore, improvement in the legal sector must be the main focus of the government. If the young generation does not believe in law enforcement, it is feared that they will search for an alternative law they can trust better. The tendency is that they will put more trust in a religious law—Islamic law—as the source of law to be implemented.

Thus is their evaluation toward the economic condition. Most of them state that the current economic condition is not ideal. As many as 76.60% of them state that the current economic condition is not good, even very bad. The same perception is also found concerning economic inequality. As many as 52.28% of them state that the economic inequality between the rich and the poor is very bad. The survey finding confirms the significant relationship between economic dissatisfaction with the external- and internal-tolerance attitude level.

That the government performance in law enforcement and economic sectors is perceived by the students and college students as sub-optimum, it can be seen as a warning to improve these two sectors. A study has shown the connection between economic injustice perception with radicalism and terrorism potentials.²⁵ Likewise, poor governance in the political and law enforcement aspects also contribute to the emergence of violence and terrorism.²⁶ If the perception on economic and legal injustice meets a radical ideology – such as *jihad*, *thaghut*, caliphate and shahid, an individual will be susceptible to the radical ideology and movement.

24 See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). "The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations." Princeton: Princeton University Press.


25 See Ted Robert Gurr. "Economic Factors" in, Louis Richardson (2006). "The Roots of Terrorism." London and New York: Routledge.

26 See Alan B. Krueger (2007) "What Makes a Terrorist: Economic and the Roots of Terrorism." Princeton: Princeton University Press.


Support and satisfaction toward democracy. Democracy is given very high rating by the students and college students. As many as 85.10% of these students state that democracy is the best political system. Only 8.18% consider it as a bad system. These data reveal optimism that the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia will continue and consolidate. According to a theory of democracy, if support for democracy exceeds 70%, it is a stable democracy.

However, there is a decline in the percentage of satisfaction toward democracy compared to the support toward the political system. Still, most of them remain satisfied with democracy implementation (64.02%). Dissatisfaction toward democracy reaches 35.98% due to sub-optimum performances of political actors and institutions, i.e. political parties, politicians, and the House of Representatives (DPR). Some survey institutions have confirmed that the level of public trust toward political parties and DPR is very low. Corruption cases become one of the dominant factors that trigger public disappointment toward them.

Picture 12. Support toward democracy



Picture 13. Satisfaction toward democracy implementation



Islamism

This finding also describes that there is an ambiguity in the religious attitudes of students and college students when concerning some themes in Islamism. Despite their strong loyalty toward Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, NKRI and democracy, their aspiration on Islamic law implementation is also high.


Islamic Law Implementation by the Government. The students and college students support the government to implement Islamic law. The majority of them (91.23%) state that they agree with Islamic law implementation. This finding is important because at the same time their loyalty toward NKRI, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and democracy is also very strong. It is important to explain this anomaly. Their interpretation on Islamic law also needs

to be deepened. This includes the extent to which Islamic law can be implemented in civic life. In this regard, we can put issues pertaining to the implementation of Islamic law *not* on the constitutional level, but rather the legal level, i.e. under the criminal law, civil law, and regulation with religious undertones that are often developed in a local government level.


Their aspiration toward Islamic law implementation is mainly influenced by the strengthening Islamism movement in Indonesia after the reformation in 1998. Given the structure of political opportunities that democracy provides, this movement has unceasingly urged for the implementation of Islamic law, They unceasingly making Islamic law implementation it as a public issue. The public space that they utilise is along with the corridor of desentralisation and local autonomy.

This survey finding confirms that Islamism movements are popular among the students and college students; some examples are FPI and MTA. In addition, the Islamism movement also develop in some regions in the form of hard-line Islamic organisations, such as Reformist Islamic Movement (Garis) in Cianjur, Islamic Youth Front (FPI) in Solo, Tholiban Brigade Tasikmalaya, Jundullah Troop in Makassar, Anti Shia National Alliance (ANAS), and some other radical organisations.

Picture 14. Support toward Islamic law implementation



Picture 15. Islamic law for adulterers is caning



Strong support can also be seen specifically through Islamic law implementation themes. For example, when asked about their perspective on caning punishment, as many as 62.56% of the students and college students state that they agree that the Islamic legal sanction for adultery is caning. The implementation of Islamic law in Aceh may have become one of their references even though they might not fully comprehend its implementation.²⁷

²⁷ During early years of reformation, the government had accommodated the aspiration for the implementation of special regulation for Aceh Province through the legalisation of Act Number 18 of 2001 which gives Aceh an authority to implement Islamic law. Despite receiving many criticism because it has an impact on human rights violation, but up until now it still prevails. One of the most controversial issue

Therefore, it is important for religious education to provide flexible and contextual interpretation between Islamic law, national law, and social plurality condition. It is also important for moderate Islamic mass organisations to strengthen their *khiftah*, that is managing the education of its followers that is appropriate for the Indonesian context.

Caliphate. As previously explained, democracy enables identity strengthening of certain groups. In Indonesia, a country with the highest number of Muslim citizens in the world, some radical Islamic groups also try to influence the public with Islamic ideas such as caliphate, Islamic law and jihad. They even propagandise the ideas as an alternative to replace the fundamental concepts of Indonesia.

One of the most unceasing Islamic movements promoting caliphate and Islamic law was HTI. They targetted their propaganda at the young, especially those at schools and campuses. Therefore, it was no surprise that HTI movement was getting stronger and stronger in some schools and campuses. To respond to this concern, the government issued Act Number 16 of 2017 as the basis of HTI disbandment.²⁸

This survey finding provides a description that caliphate is perceived as an Islamic government system. It is important to note whether the caliphate system meant by the students and college students is the model that HTI aspires to achieve or whether it is just normative and general. Based on the previous finding, there is a tendency for them to dislike HTI (25.93%) because it is perceived to want to replace NKRI and oppose democracy. From here we can conclude that the acceptance toward a caliphate system is more because it is considered as a part of Islamic teaching rather than as the system aspired by HTI.


As many as 61.92% consider that caliphate is an Islamic government system. The rest, 38.08%, disagree of it being so. Of course, their agreement toward the caliphate concept can be a bad potential if it meets with the ideas desired by HTI. Therefore, Islamic religious education must be a fortress in giving the right understanding on caliphate in the national context. In addition, the strengthening of archipelagic outlook, tolerance, and diversity also becomes important

is qanun jinayat. Until 2016, Aceh Sharia Court has caned 180 people who have been convicted for violating this qanun jinayat.

28 In nomenclature that Act is concerning the Establishment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2017 on the Amendment on Act Number 17 of 2013 on Mass Organisations Becoming an Act. That Act has been legalised by House of Representatives (DPR) of the Republic of Indonesia on Tuesday, 23 October 2017


to nurture not only to students and college students but also to their teachers, lecturers, as well as school and campus administrators.

Picture 16. Caliphate system being understood as an Islamic government system




Jihad. Based on their responses on jihad, there is a tendency among the students and college students to refuse jihad if it associates with violence. For example, 62.29% of them disagree with the statement that jihad is a fight against non-Muslims, and 76.65% of them disagree that suicide is a part of Islamic jihad. From here we can see that there is a negative pattern on jihad concept using violence. However, the data still leave some concern because of those who agree with jihad as a fight against non-Muslims and that suicide being part of Islamic jihad on average exceeds 20%.

Picture 17. Jihad is a fight against non-Muslims



Picture 18. Suicide is part of Islamic jihad



Thaghut and infidel. The majority who disagree with the statement that considers the government as *thaghut* and an infidel reach 80.74%; only 19.24% of them agree with that statement. The statement that government is a *thaghut* is characteristic of the Jihadist

community. The main reason is because the Indonesian government does not implement a comprehensive Islamic law system as reflected in the caliphate concept. For example, criminal law that is used is an inherited colonial law made by humans, not from God. Likewise, democracy, which states that sovereignty lies in the hands of people, is considered to contradict Islamic law. They believe that sovereignty only belongs to God (theocracy), not in humans.

Actually the number of 19.24% who agree is a warning because it shows how strong this kind of ideology is. Someone who has this kind of ideology can be confirmed to have literal and radical religious perspectives. They see in black and white: one is Islam and the other is anti-Islam. Therefore, there is a strong tendency for them to be part or sympathisers of extremist groups.

Picture 19. Indonesian government being seen as *thaghut* and infidel




VI EDUCATION MODEL THAT COUNTERS INTOLERANCE AND RADICALISM

The description of radicalism and intolerance among students and university students has been explained above. There is a tendency that they have radical and intolerant religious perspectives – except for certain themes. Islamic religious education also contributes in shaping that kind of religious perspective. This, for example, happens through learning material that puts more emphasis on faith and worship instead of tolerance and diversity, to the teachers who tend to have intolerant and radical perspectives.

Even so, the findings of this survey give some opportunities for developing IRE learning models that can nurture tolerance and counter radicalism and intolerance. The majority of students and college students agree if Islamic religious learning contains discussion about other religions and respect for local culture. As many as 67.56% agree

if IRE contains material that appreciates local culture; 70.75% agree if IRE discusses collective problems from the perspective of followers of other religions; 79.12% agree if IRE gives them an opportunity to exchange ideas about their respective religious experience; and 89.24% agree if IRE contains discussion concerning debates to reduce negative prejudice between groups.

Picture 20. Support toward IRE purpose on tolerance



Some themes that emphasise inclusiveness are also accepted by the students and college students. The majority of them agree if the purpose of IRE is to push for gender equality, appreciate fellow Muslims who have different ideologies/sects, and do good toward other religions' followers. If the percentage between the ones who agree and the ones who strongly agree are combined, then almost 100% students and college students agree if the purpose of IRE is to appreciate and do good toward fellow Muslims who have different sects/ideologies.

On average 81.95% agree that IIRE can develop an understanding on gender equality. In addition, they agree that the purpose of IRE is to teach them to do good toward other religions' followers.

This data shows that IRE materials and learning model that emphasise on the strengthening of tolerance and diversity values are desired by the students and college students. Therefore, the data can be a material for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education and Culture, and Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education

to develop IRE materials and models that accommodate those values. In addition, no less important is the conveyance of IRE materials and learning so as to be oriented toward cultivating tolerance and diversity values in an interesting and compelling manner.

VI CONCLUSIONS

The results of this survey show that radicalism and intolerance are threatening Indonesian young generation. Even though their behaviours tend to be moderate, from the attitude aspect most of them are radical. In addition, on the internal tolerance aspect, they tend to have intolerant religious perspectives. This condition is extremely dangerous because radical and intolerant attitudes can lead to the emergence of radical and intolerant behaviours. The hatred of most students and college students toward religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyya and Shia becomes evidence that radicalism and intolerance have been sowed in our formal educational institutions.

Some important variables have been confirmed to have influenced radicalism and intolerance of the students and college students are the internet and social media. As a generation born in a digital era, almost all of them have internet access, and that technology is dominantly used to search for religious sources outside the classroom. Unfortunately, websites that are popular among them are managed by radical communities. Likewise, with regard to the ustad that they see on the internet or social media, some of them often spread hate speeches and radical ideologies and yet they tend to be popular among the students and college students.

All parties – the state, mainstream Islamic organisations, research institutions – must handle this problem seriously. Mainstream Islamic mass organisations can be more active in disseminating messages of tolerance and peace through media that are acceptable by millennials. It is a reality that some aspects of the digital space are controlled by radical communities. In addition, the state in this case Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education and Culture, and Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, are expected to reform IRE learning, starting from the teacher recruitment, increasing the portion of tolerance in IRE material and learning, as well as performing penetration in supervising religious extracurricular activities that are considered as entry points to radicalism at schools.

AUTHOR PROFILE

Rangga Eka Saputra is a young researcher at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He graduated in 2014 from Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, majoring in Political Science. Before joining PPIM UIN Jakarta, Rangga had become a participant of the internship programme at the Centre for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD) Paramadina. In 2017 he was selected to participate in the Certified Training Programme of “Religion and the Rule of Law in Indonesia and Southeast Asia” conducted collaboratively by Leimena Institute, International Global Engagement (IGE), and Brigham Young University. At PPIM, Rangga has been involved in some research activities related to religious education, such as in *Dissemination of Exclusive Ideology in Islamic Education: A Study on Policy and Production Politic of IRE Textbooks* (2016) and *Religious Teachers, Tolerance, and the Issues of Contemporary Religious Life in Indonesia* (2016).

INSTITUTION PROFILE

The Centre for Studies of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta is an autonomous research institution under Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta. PPIM UIN Jakarta was established in 1994 and has been continuously conducting research, advocacy, and publication on issues of religious life and education in Indonesia. In collaboration with UNDP Indonesia, PPIM UIN Jakarta has since 2017 conducted Countering Violent Extremism for Youth (CONVEY) Indonesia, a programme which aims to build peace in Indonesia based on the religious education potential by addressing tolerance, diversity, and violence issues among youth. In addition, since its establishment PPIM UIN Jakarta has also published the internationally acclaimed ***Studia Islamika*** journal, which focuses on Islamic studies in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

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**Enhancing the Role of Religious Education in
Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia**

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